Iran
The implication is that Israel chose not to escalate the risk of direct war with Iran. Hence we remain in our base-case “Minor War, Minor Oil Shock” scenario.
Our quant models suggest Democrats are still slightly favored for the White House. Our Senate model favors Republican control, though Montana and Ohio are the weak links that could deliver Democrats a de facto Senate majority in the event they keep the White House. But there are still six months before the vote. An oil shock from the Middle East or other negative economic news would force a major change to these models.
In the near term, favor oil and oil producers outside the Gulf Arab states. Over a 12-month horizon, favor US and North American equities, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and safe-assets. Within cyclicals, stick to energy and defense.
Stay overweight US equities versus world, long US energy sector versus Middle East stocks, and long Canada and Mexico versus global-ex-US stocks.
Investors around Europe and North America are concerned that the stock market is increasingly overbought and vulnerable to exogenous risks. We agree and have good reasons to fear that festering geopolitical risks and the US election season will deal negative surprises.
While 2024 will see various election risks, global geopolitical uncertainty is driven by the US election and its struggle with Russia, China, and Iran. The stock market can manage local domestic political risk. But it will correct upon a major outbreak of geopolitical uncertainty.
Middle East conflict, extreme US policy uncertainty, Chinese economic slowdown, US-Russian proxy war, and Asian military conflicts do not create a stable investment backdrop for 2024. Our top five “black swan” risks may be highly improbable, but they stem from these underlying trends.
In this brief Insight we examine the expanding Middle East conflict and update the situation in the Taiwan Strait on the eve of elections. The Houthis are a distraction and China is not likely to invade Taiwan in the near term, but both situations support our overweight of US equities relative to global. Global growth is likely to slow while commodities are likely to see at least minor supply shocks.
The attacks on Red Sea commercial tankers by Iran’s Yemeni proxies, the Houthi movement, are an inflation risk inasmuch as they lengthen voyage times for any shipping forced to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The risk of an expansion of these attacks is, in our view, limited, given Iran’s inability to project naval power in the region.
Oil prices will rise tactically due to supply risks. Recent developments indicate escalation of the conflict with Iran in the Middle East and confirm our expectation of energy supply disruptions and oil price spikes in the short run.