China Stimulus

Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (…

Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a…

The aim of this Special Report is to elaborate on and explain the different views on China that have coexisted at BCA in recent years. Although BCA strives to achieve consensus among its strategists, this is not always possible, as has been the case with…

Highlights In any country, excess national savings, i.e., current account surpluses, lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but have no implications on domestic loan creation. Savings are not necessary for the banking system to originate loans.…

Highlights A central bank cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth toward targeting interest rates. As such, the reserve…

Highlights China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks - and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit, and they do not need…

In China and the majority EMs, credit impulses will be negative over the next 12 months as and if their credit growth converges towards their current nominal GDP growth. These negative credit impulses will dampen EM/China growth and their corporate profits. In the next 12 months, the credit cycle is most vulnerable in China, Brazil, Turkey, and Malaysia and least vulnerable in central Europe, the Philippines, and Mexico.

If China's credit growth decelerates below 9.4% by the end of 2016 from the current rate of 11.7%, the negative credit impulse will overwhelm any plausible fiscal spending impulse. This is quite a plausible scenario given the lingering credit excesses in China. This warrants a caution on China-related plays in financial markets.