China

The Hormuz crisis has exposed a structural vulnerability in China's petrochemical value chain. Going forward, Beijing will look to build greater supply security by scaling up coal-to-olefins capacity — a shift that creates a structural tailwind for coal prices and a structural headwind for oil.

Outside semiconductor stocks, EM/China profitability has been well below both their US peers and the levels that prevailed during the EM structural bull market in the 2000s. Over a 3- to 5-year horizon, EM/China relative equity performance versus global will be range-bound.

China does not produce too much. It spends too little. The only viable way for China to reduce investment without raising unemployment is by lowering national savings. Doing so is likely to be politically challenging, however. This suggests that China will suffer from subpar growth and deflationary pressures for the foreseeable future.

Taiwan will not be invaded soon but focus on external constraints, not internal. Strongmen or “visionary” leaders can override geopolitical constraints at critical junctures, at least initially. 

As long as the AI boom keeps booming, all other investment considerations will remain on the back burner. However, if the AI trade fizzles, this would expose deep-seated problems within the global economy, which could very well lead to an economic downturn as early as next year.