Policy

Highlights Finally, an upside surprise on inflation. Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. Investors should consider the Monthly Report on personal income and spending, and not the quarterly GDP data, to gauge hurricanes' impact on economy. While the Fed will consider impact of Harvey and Irma, policy will ultimately be made on health of underlying economy. Feature Chart 1Rally For Risk Assets##BR##A Week Before The FOMC Rally For Risk Assets A Week Before The FOMC Rally For Risk Assets A Week Before The FOMC Risk assets and oil prices rose last week along with Treasury yields ahead of this week's FOMC meeting. Both the S&P 500 and the Dow hit new highs last week as the dollar moved lower. The stock-to-bond ratio also climbed, approaching the highs it reached earlier this year (Chart 1). All of this occurred amid an absence of any meaningful news on corporate earnings, aside from Apple's launch of the latest iPhone. Q3 earnings season is still a month away. Our base case projects stocks outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months, but in early September we recommended that clients be prudent, pare back any overweight positions and hold some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. The most significant movement in assets prices last week came in the U.S. Treasury market. Aided by hints of some progress on tax cuts in Washington less damage than initially feared from Hurricane Irma's impact on Florida, and despite another rocket launch by North Korea, the 10-year Treasury yield moved from near 2.0% in the first week of September to 2.20% on September 15. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service notes1 that bond markets are priced as though the link between growth and inflation is broken. We expect they will be proven wrong as inflation regains its uptrend during the next few months. Finally A Surprise On Inflation Chart 2Does One Month Make A Trend? Does One Month Make A Trend? Does One Month Make A Trend? After five months of downside surprises, U.S. core CPI met expectations in August. It is still too soon say that this is enough for the Fed to raise rates again this year. To get a better sense of the underlying trends, we like to break core CPI into three sub-groups: shelter, core goods and core services ex-shelter and medical care. Shelter, which accounts for over 40% of core CPI, rose 0.4% m/m in August. This was the biggest contributor to core CPI during the month. Our shelter model suggests that this strength is unlikely to persist. On the flip-side, core goods prices (25% of core CPI) fell 0.1% m/m. Given the weakness in the dollar, core goods prices should soon begin to rise. To some degree, a slowdown in shelter and a pick-up in core goods could offset each other over the coming months (Chart 2). Therefore, a sustained pick-up in overall core inflation requires an upturn in core services ex-shelter and medical. This sub-component of core CPI is the most tightly correlated with wage inflation. There was a slight tick higher in annual core services ex-shelter and medical inflation in August. However, it is still near a 25-year low of just 1.1%. Bottom Line: Following five months of persistent downside surprises, the 0.2% m/m increase in core CPI during August was a welcomed change for the Fed. However, one month does not make a trend and Fed will need to see more evidence of inflation turning the corner before raising interest rates again. Any rise in oil prices would also give inflation a lift, although it would affect the headline more than the core inflation rate. Bullish Oil Supply And Demand Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. The International Energy Agency (IEA) revised its forecasts for global oil demand. Oil consumption will be 100,000 bpd higher this year than the IEA's previous projection. Furthermore, renewed turmoil in Libya curbed production by 300,000 bpd from a 4-year high of more than 1 million bpd. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service states that while predicting OPEC compliance is tricky, little to no cheating will occur. At worst, Saudi Arabia will step in and curtail production if Libya and/or Iraq begins to pump oil above quota. Finally, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the U.S. lowered its estimated shale oil output by 200,000 bpd for this year's third quarter. The decreased estimation confirms BCA's assertion that the EIA has overestimated the pace of the shale production response during 2017. Chart 3Drawdown In Global Oil##BR##Inventories Is Underway Drawdown In Global Oil Inventories Is Underway Drawdown In Global Oil Inventories Is Underway Taken together, these factors will help to improve the global net demand/supply balance by 600,000 bpd, if the current situation remains unchanged. As a result, global oil inventories will continue to be drawn down (Chart 3). Severe weather in the U.S. has temporarily distorted the energy markets. Crack spreads have widened in the U.S. as product inventories have declined along with Brent - WTI spreads. Nonetheless, BCA's commodity strategists remain bullish on crude oil, forecasting a rise in WTI to over $55/bbl and Brent to $60/bbl by year-end. Looking to next year, crude prices could go higher with an extension of the OPEC/Russian production cuts beyond March 2018 and continued strong growth in global oil demand. A sudden jump in the U.S. dollar could risk BCA's bullish view. Bottom Line: There is a disagreement between the market's view of the fundamentals of the global oil balance, which is guided by the EIA data, and BCA's view that is driven by the OPEC 2.0 framework.2 Oil prices could spike higher if the market adheres to the OPEC framework. BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service recommends an overweight to the S&P 500 Energy Sector and initiated an overweight in the Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing sub-group on September 11, 2017.3 Hurricane Redux Turning to the U.S. hurricane destruction, history shows that natural disasters have only a passing effect on the U.S. economy, the financial markets and the Fed.4 Ultimately, the macro environment in place before the storm will reassert itself. Nonetheless, it may be a few months before investors determine the long-term impact of the storms on Houston, Florida and nearby southern states. The U.S. data gathering agencies (BEA, BLS and Census) have processes to ensure that the storm's sway is reflected in the economic data. In the past, all three have produced post-disaster evaluations and will likely release the same type of information in the months ahead. Most of the storms' effects will be felt in the September data, but have already affected the initial claims data for the last week in August and the first week of September. The storms will also buffet the Q3 GDP (due out in late October). However, GDP data may not provide a comprehensive picture; GDP is not directly affected by natural disaster losses involving property, plants, equipment and structures. However, GDP can take a direct hit from the loss of productive capacity linked to a storm. The BEA notes that "while GDP may be affected by the actions that consumers, businesses, and governments take in response to a disaster, these responses are generally not separately identifiable, and they may be spread out over a long period of time." Investors should consider the monthly report on personal income and spending, and even more, the regional accounts by state, and not the quarterly GDP data, for details on the storms' economic fallout. Only hurricanes Katrina and Rita warranted a mention in the Q3 2005 GDP release, and none of the other major storms since that time have been noted by the agency. On the other hand, the personal income and spending reports released after all the major hurricanes since 2005 have provided key specifics on incomes. For example, the BEA stated that "work interruptions" linked to Hurricane Sandy reduced wages by $18 billion in October 2012 when the storm hit the northeastern U.S. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also tends to note a storm's influence on other primary income categories including personal rental incomes, proprietors' incomes, and other current transfer receipts (i.e. insurance payments received). Table 1Total Federal Spending And Total Economic Damage For Selected Hurricanes, 2000 To 2015 Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week A 2016 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report found that federal spending after major hurricanes can add as much as 0.6% to GDP growth (Table 1). CBO notes that most of the economic impact is in the first year after a storm, with most of those expenditures helping victims to obtain food and shelter, fund search and rescue operations, and protect critical infrastructure. Federal outlays for public infrastructure occur after the first year and provide a much smaller lift to GDP (Chart 4). Chart 4Federal Government Outlays For Hurricane Relief Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week The severe weather in the U.S. has raised the odds that the Trump administration and Congress will make progress on fiscal policy this fall. We think that the outlines of a tax bill will emerge in the next month or so, and while the probability of passing legislation this year is still low, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects the market to react when it sees the bill. The implication for investors is that the President Trump trades (Chart 5) that have unwound since the start of the year may soon become profitable again. The recent agreement between Trump and the Democrats to extend the debt ceiling and avoid a government shutdown support our stance. Chart 5Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Bottom Line: The hurricanes may have a bearing on the economic data for the next few months. Investors should closely monitor the input data to GDP, but not GDP itself. However, we do not anticipate that any economic disruptions from the storms will have a meaningful influence on near-term Fed monetary policy. Disasters And The Fed The hurricanes will probably play a supporting role in the Fed's outlook on the economy, inflation and labor market at this week's meeting. The FOMC statement will mention the storms and Fed Chair Yellen may include them in her opening remarks. Moreover, the news conference will provide another opportunity to discuss the issue. For example, the FOMC statement released in mid-December 2012, six weeks after Sandy, stated that "economic activity and employment have continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months, apart from weather-related disruptions". Fed staff noted that manufacturing production was held down by Sandy and that household spending, notably vehicle sales, declined in October due to the storm (Table 2). Similarly, the wrath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was noted in FOMC statements and minutes in the fall and early winter of 2005. For example, in the statement released at the meeting after Katrina hit in August 2005, the FOMC observed: "The widespread devastation in the Gulf region, the associated dislocation of economic activity, and the boost to energy prices imply that spending, production, and employment will be set back in the near term." Fed policymakers made similar observations in the aftermath of other natural and man-made disasters in the past 25 years (Table 2). Table 2FOMC Reaction To Disasters, Natural And Man Made Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Bottom Line: Fed officials will consider the disruptions to the economy and economic data caused by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, but ultimately make policy decisions based on the underlying strength of the economy, labor market and inflation. FOMC Preview The FOMC will initiate shrinking its balance sheet at this week's meeting, but neither BCA nor the market anticipate that the Fed will bump up rates. Moreover, the Fed will need more evidence that inflation, inflation expectations and/or inflation surprise has turned higher before resuming its rate hike regime. Furthermore, there is still a significant disconnect between the market and the Fed concerning rates for the next 12 months, and how that gap closes could be crucial for the financial markets, especially the bond market. At 43 basis points, the gap between the June dot plots and the market on the Fed funds rate in the next 12 months remains near its widest level of the year. The market is currently predicting only 30 bps in increases in the next 12 months. However, an uptick in inflation could quickly change that view (Chart 6). Despite the disagreement on rates, the Fed and the market are mostly aligned on the economy, the labor market and inflation, at least in 2017. For the first time, the FOMC will provide projections for 2020 at this week's meeting. At 4.4% in August, the unemployment rate is a mere tenth above the Fed's end-2017 forecast, but it is 0.2% below the central bank's latest estimate of full employment (4.6%). The Fed's measure of full employment has declined in recent years and we would not be shocked to see a drop again this week. The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate matches the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Chart 6Big Disagreement Between The Fed ##br##And The Market On Rates Big Disagreement Between The Fed And The Market On Rates Big Disagreement Between The Fed And The Market On Rates Chart 7The Fed Vs. The Market The Fed Vs. The Market The Fed Vs. The Market Chart 8The FOMC's "Long Run"##BR##Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The economy is on pace this year to grow at the Fed's 2.2% projection but is running above the FOMCs long-run calculation of 1.8%, which is the low point since the Fed started publishing these long-run projections in 2009. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is slightly above the upper end of the Fed's range set in June (Chart 7 and Chart 8). The Fed and the market are relatively close on inflation this year, but there is still a wide gap in 2018 and beyond. In June, the Fed lowered its inflation forecast for 2017 to 1.6% from 1.9% in March. PCE inflation is at only 1.4% (year-to-date in 2017), so there is not much disagreement in this regard. The market does not agree with the Fed's view that inflation will return to 2.0%, and this is a key reason why the 10-year Treasury yield recently touched a new post-election low at 2.0%, although geopolitical tensions also played a role. The central bank's view of inflation in the long run has not deviated from 2.0% since 2012. Bloomberg consensus estimates for core inflation for this year and next are below the low end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Market participants and some Fed officials are still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with an unemployment rate that is below the Fed's estimate of full employment. (Please see a BCA Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?").5 Who Will Be The Next Fed Chair? As some investors consider the Fed's next policy move, others are taking a longer view and thinking about Fed Chair Yellen's replacement. Yellen's term as Chair will end in February 2018, and the markets have not yet shown any concerns about her potential replacement. Until last month, the frontrunner to replace Yellen was Gary Cohn, the Chairman of President Trump's National Economic Committee; his appointment would conform to some historical precedents but violate others.6 Several new names have emerged as possible Fed nominees as Cohn fell out of favor in the White House in early September. Kevin Warsh, Glen Hubbard and John Taylor, are all high-profile economists with links to the GOP, but Warsh stands out because he served on Trump's Strategic and Policy forum before it disbanded in August, and was a Fed Governor in the early 2000s (Table 3). Hubbard, who is currently an academic, was President George W. Bush's chief economist. However, he has not worked with Trump and has no Fed experience. John Taylor is well known in monetary policy circles, but has no Fed or government background, nor has he served with Trump. Taylor advocates for rules-based monetary policy.7 Another possible name, Larry Lindsey, an advisor to George W. Bush's campaign in 2000, a Fed Governor in the 1990s, and worked in the Reagan White House but he has no connection to Trump. He has recently spoken in favor of the House tax plan. Table 3Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week The other two names under consideration - Richard Davis and John Allison - may have difficulty winning confirmations by the Senate. Both men were CEOs at major banks although neither have directly served Trump, nor been at the Fed or in government. Allison, a former president of the Libertarian Cato Institute, has argued that the Fed should be abolished and blamed the Fed for the financial crisis. The timing of Trump's announcement on Yellen's replacement may be critical. As a reminder, names floated by the Obama White House in the summer of 2013 were mainly rejected by the markets. Yellen's official announcement came in early October 2013. In August 2009, President Obama reappointed Bernanke for a second four-year term. Bernanke was initially nominated to be Fed Chair by George W. Bush in October 2005. If the appointment comes in October and the nominee is perceived to be hawkish, the risk is that markets may begin to price in the regime change sometime in the next few months. As we noted in the sections above, there is already a wide discrepancy between the Fed and the market over the pace and timing of rate hikes in the coming year. BCA's fair value model for the 10-year Treasury yield (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value at 2.67%.8 Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68%. Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Bottom Line: Markets will be increasingly concerned in the next six weeks about the next Fed Chair and his or her policies. While the reappointment of Fed Chair Yellen for another term would please the markets, several other possible successors would not. We anticipate that the President will make a choice within the next month. Taking a longer view, the next Fed chair will oversee the policy response to the next recession and its aftermath. Investors should understand how the next Chair views the Fed's role in the business cycle. Economy Focus: Some Good News From The Quarterly Services Survey Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector's contribution to the economy (~69% of GDP), most of the high-frequency data are related to the manufacturing sector (~12% of GDP) (Chart 9, top panel). However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS), initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the services sector of the economy, including companies of all sizes (small- and medium-sized). It produces the most timely revenue data, on a quarterly basis, within the flourishing service sector. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to estimate a more accurate picture of the national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers as it is very useful to track current economic performance. Even more, during the financial crisis, the BEA "aggressively responded to policymakers' needs for data on financial services". The QSS is a significant source of revisions to real GDP, as about 42% of the quarterly estimates of PCE for services is now based on QSS data. The "key services statistics" include information services; health care services; professional, scientific, and technical services; administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (Chart 9). For the first half of 2017, upward revisions to second and third estimates to real GDP stemmed from revisions to PCE services and nonresidential fixed investment, namely: health care services, financial & insurance services and intellectual property products (specifically software) and other services accounted for by cellular telephone services. The most recent QSS for 2017Q2 showed U.S. selected services total revenue rising by 3.2% over the last quarter and 6.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and non-seasonally adjusted data only available). The strongest growth came from revenues of Other Services (9.4% QoQ% and 18.4% YoY) followed by Arts, Entertainment & Recreation and Administration, Support & Waste Management. Sales in Finance & Insurance and Health Care & Social Assistance, which make up about 50% of total service revenues, are advancing at a sturdy pace, as is revenue in Information services (Chart 9). Chart 9Growth For Service Sector##BR##Industries Is Broad-Based Growth For Service Sector Industries Is Broad-Based Growth For Service Sector Industries Is Broad-Based Chart 10QSS Survey Heralds Some##BR##Upward Revision To Real GDP QSS Survey Heralds Some Upward Revision To Real GDP QSS Survey Heralds Some Upward Revision To Real GDP Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see some upward revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of real GDP next week (Chart 10). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2017. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Open Mouth Operations", published September 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance", published September 14, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Still Goldilocks", published September 11, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Shelter From The Storm", published September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?", published August 31, 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration", published July 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Trump And The Fed", published March 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On", published September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, We are sending you a Special Report prepared by my colleague Matt Gertken, associate vice president of our Geopolitical Strategy team. This report focuses on the upcoming 19th Party congress and discusses its implications on China’s economic and political outlook, as well as its impact on financial markets. I trust you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses Chinese Stocks Sold Off After Past Midterm Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis ...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Our Calls Have Been Correct Our Calls Have Been Correct Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Feature The Brazilian economy is finally improving following a devastating depression of about 3 years, where real GDP dropped by a whopping 7.4%. Does the current economic revival warrant a bullish stance on its financial markets? If the global risk-on trade persists among EM risk assets and commodities and there are no domestic political blunders in Brazil, the country's financial markets will continue to rally as economic growth improves. If the EM and commodities rallies wane and an EM risk-off cycle develops, Brazilian risk assets will sell off, regardless of domestic economic recovery. Provided economies around the world have become interconnected, it is often difficult to separate global economic and financial market impact from domestic economic dynamics. Yet, it is possible to do so in Brazil in the latest cycle. Chart I-1 demonstrates that the Brazilian real bottomed with iron ore prices on December 21, 2015 - not with the bottom in the Brazilian economy in early Q1 2017 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). In turn, the currency's rally amid the collapse in domestic demand has led to a material drop in inflation and allowed the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. The exchange rate is the main variable driving financial markets in many developing countries, including Brazil. In these countries, it is the exchange rate that causes swings in interest rate expectations, not the other way around. Furthermore, other important variables that led to the bottom in iron ore prices and the BRL were the Chinese manufacturing PMI and money growth, both of which bottomed in the second half of 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart 1BRL Correlates With Commodities ##br##Not Domestic Demand BRL Correlates With Commodities Not Domestic Demand BRL Correlates With Commodities Not Domestic Demand Chart 2Chinese Data Led##br## The Bottom In BRL Chinese Data Led The Bottom In BRL Chinese Data Led The Bottom In BRL In short, economic recovery arrived much later in Brazil, and so far it has been exceptionally tame and tentative (Chart I-3). Brazil's domestic demand performance has in no way justified the rally in its financial markets since January 2016. If anything, it is the opposite: the domestic economic recovery emerged too late, and has been extremely subdued compared with the sizable gains in share prices. For example, banks' EPS bottomed only in May 2017, while their share prices troughed in January 2016 (Chart I-4). Similarly, Brazil's fiscal outlook and debt profile has continued to deteriorate, even though the country's sovereign spreads have tightened substantially (Chart I-5). Chart 3Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Chart 4Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Chart 5Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Hence, one can safely argue that economic growth and domestic fundamentals were not the basis behind why Brazilian financial markets found a bottom and rallied starting January 2016. Rather, the critical driving force has been commodities prices, China, the U.S. dollar and global risk appetite. This is consistent with the defining features of bull and bear markets: In a bull market, liquidity lifts all boats, and all flaws are overlooked or discharged while minor positives are magnified by the market. In a bear market, even marginal negatives are overblown, and the market punishes severely for minor missteps. In short, global risk assets have been in a genuine bull market since early 2016, and that has overridden Brazil's poor domestic fundamentals. Going forward, we recommend avoiding Brazilian risk assets - not because we do not expect an economic recovery in Brazil to progress, but because our view on China's impact on commodities and the potential U.S. dollar rebound will curb overall risk appetite toward EM. We discussed this EM/China/commodities outlook at length in last week's report.1 Timing a shift in financial market regimes is always a difficult task, but our sense is that a top in EM risk assets will likely occur between now and the end of October, as China's Communist party Congress reiterates its focus on containing financial risk and leverage, as well as the authorities' marginal tolerance for slightly slower growth. Furthermore, our broad money (M3) impulse for China suggests an imminent relapse in Goldman Sach's current economic activity indicator for the mainland economy (Chart I-6). Our assumption is that commodities prices will drop due to potential weakness in China, and that the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields are oversold and will recover, respectively. Altogether, these views warrant a cautious stance on EM currencies. The real has historically been correlated with commodities prices, and this positive correlation will likely continue. As and when the Brazilian currency resumes its depreciation, the risk-on trade in Brazilian equities and credit markets will end. As for Brazilian financial markets, a few relationships are worth highlighting: Since early this year, iron ore prices have been inversely correlated with Chinese money market rates (Chart I-7). A possible explanation is that iron ore and other commodities prices trading on Chinese exchanges have been driven by meaningful speculative buying that negatively correlates with borrowing costs on the mainland. Chart 6China's Growth Is Set To Slow bca.ems_wr_2017_09_13_s1_c6 bca.ems_wr_2017_09_13_s1_c6 Chart 7Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Given the latest relapse in Brazil's nominal GDP growth, the pace of amelioration in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions could stall (Chart I-8). In turn, Brazilian banks' share prices seem to move inversely with the rate of change in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions (Chart I-9A & Chart I-9B). If these relationships hold, we might be close to a peak in Brazilian bank share prices. Chart 8Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Chart 9ABrazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Brazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Brazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Chart 9BBrazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Brazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Brazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Finally, the pace of economic recovery will likely disappoint because the Brazilian economy is facing numerous headwinds: High borrowing costs - the real prime lending rate is 12.5% and the policy rate in the real terms is 6.8%, while public banks' lending rates are set to rise due to the TJLP reform that will remove the government budget's subsidy for borrowers. With 50% of outstanding credit being earmarked credit (previously subsidized by the government and provided by public banks), the impact on economic activity will be non-trivial; Lower government spending, as 2018 government expenditure growth cannot exceed the 2017 June headline inflation rate of 3%. Besides, the fiscal balance is so disastrous that risks to taxes are to the upside, not downside. Furthermore, the recently augmented 2017 year-end fiscal primary deficit target of BRL 159 billion is smaller than the deficit of BRL 182 billion for the past 12 months. This entails government spending cuts are likely this year, which will weigh on growth. The Brazilian exchange rate is not cheap. The nation needs a cheaper currency to reflate its economy. Lingering political uncertainty amid the corruption scandals and upcoming presidential elections in fall 2018 will continue to weigh on capital spending and employment, which have not yet recovered. Bottom Line: Our overarching negative view on EM, China and commodities heralds staying cautious on Brazil's financial markets despite the early signs of domestic economic recovery. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Copper Versus Money/Credit In China - Which One Is Right?", dated September 6,. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Bonds As A Safe Haven: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. ECB: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Canada: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Stay underweight Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Feature Fade The Doomsday Trade Investors have had a lot of depressing news to process over the past several weeks. From threats of nuclear war with North Korea, to fears of a U.S. government shutdown over the debt ceiling, to the potential of Biblical flooding from hurricanes in Texas and Florida, the environment has not been conducive to risk-taking. This has triggered a flight into safe-haven assets like gold and U.S. Treasuries as investors have looked to protect portfolios from "existential" risks (Chart of the Week). Yet despite this rapid run-up in the value of save-havens, risky assets like equities and corporate credit have performed relatively well since the most recent peak in bond yields in early July (Table 1). Chart of the WeekFalling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand,##BR##Not Slower Growth Falling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand, Not Slower Growth Falling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand, Not Slower Growth Table 1Changes In Risk Assets Since##BR##U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. This move toward safety and risk aversion has widened the disconnect between global bond yields and economic fundamentals - specifically, growth momentum and central bank guidance - to extreme levels. Investors are now underestimating the potential for additional rate hikes in the U.S. in 2018, and are not fully appreciating the likelihood that the European Central Bank (ECB) will slow the pace of its asset purchases next year. Investors plowing money into government bonds now can only be rewarded if global monetary policy was set to ease, which would only be the case if global growth was slowing. That is not happening right now, even in the U.S. where the most apocalyptic headlines have been occurring. While the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma will likely weigh on U.S. growth in the next few months, the underlying trend remains one of steady above-potential growth that is boosting both corporate profits and household incomes. More globally, depressed investor sentiment, indicated by measures such as the global ZEW survey, has helped drive bond yields lower despite the steady upturn in leading economic indicators (Chart 2). When looking at indicators of actual economic activity, like manufacturing PMIs, the growth story looks far stronger. As a sign of how much this "sentiment versus reality" divergence has distorted bond yields, look no further than our own valuation model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. This model, which only uses the global manufacturing PMI and sentiment towards the U.S. dollar as inputs, indicates that the current "fair value" of the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.67%, nearly 60bps higher than market levels seen as this publication went to press (Chart 3). This is a level of overvaluation that even exceeds the extreme levels seen after the U.K. Brexit vote in July of 2016. Chart 2Bond Investors Are##BR##Ignoring Strong Growth Bond Investors Are Ignoring Strong Growth Bond Investors Are Ignoring Strong Growth Chart 3U.S. Treasuries Are##BR##Now Extremely Overvalued U.S. Treasuries Are Now Extremely Overvalued U.S. Treasuries Are Now Extremely Overvalued In Table 2, we present a decomposition of the 10-year yield changes in the major Developed Markets since that recent peak in U.S. Treasury yields on July 7th. As can be seen in the first two columns of the table, yields declined everywhere but Canada where the central bank has been hiking interest rates (as we discuss later in this report). Yet the vast majority of the yield decline has come from falling real yields and not lower inflation expectations. This has also occurred via a bull-flattening move in government bond yield curves (again, ex-Canada where the curve has bear-flattened), which suggests it is risk-aversion that has driven yields lower. Table 2Developed Market Bond Yield Changes Since U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. The relative lack of movement in inflation expectations is a bit surprising given how strongly global oil prices have risen, denominated in any currency (see the final column of Table 2). When plotting the Brent oil price (in local currency terms) vs. the 10-year market-based inflation expectations (from inflation-linked bonds or CPI swaps), some notable divergences stand out. Inflation expectations in the U.S., U.K., Australia and even Japan look around 10-20bps too low relative to where they were the last time oil prices were at current levels (Charts 4 & 5). Meanwhile, inflation expectations are largely in lines with levels implied by oil and currency levels in the Euro Area and Canada. Most importantly, expectations are depressed in all countries, largely because actual inflation has stayed stubbornly low. Chart 4Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (1) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (1) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (1) Chart 5Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (2) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (2) Inflation Expectations Vs Oil Prices (2) The lack of realized inflation in places with allegedly "full employment" economies like the U.S. has led to questions over the usefulness of frameworks like the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) in predicting inflation. A reduced link between the NAIRU and inflation does appear in many countries, but not necessarily in all countries when viewed in aggregate. Chart 6The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet In Chart 6, we present an indicator that shows the percentage of OECD economies (34 in total) that have an unemployment rate below the NAIRU rate. Currently, there are 67% of the countries in this list with unemployment rates under the OECD estimate of NAIRU, which is back to levels seen before the 2009 Great Recession. During that pre-crisis period, global inflation rates were accelerating for both goods and services inflation (bottom two panels). While the correlation between this global NAIRU indicator and realized inflation rates declined in the years after the recession, the linkages have improved over the past couple of years. This may be a sign that there is a "global NAIRU level" (or global output gap) that is more important in determining global inflation rates than individual country NAIRU measures. Or put more simply, investors are downplaying the NAIRU concept just at the time when it could be expected to strengthen. If that were the case, inflation expectations around the world would be too low, although it will take some evidence of faster realized inflation (especially in the U.S. and Europe) before the markets begin to discount that in bond yields. In the meantime, markets have become even too pessimistic on growth prospects and the implications for bond yields. Investors have driven down rate hike expectations in the U.S. and U.K. (and, to a lesser extent, the Euro Area) during this latest bond market rally, dragging longer-term bond yields down with them (Chart 7). Yet growth in the developing world is showing little signs of slowing down outside of the U.K., with leading economic indicators still pointing to a continued steady expansion (Chart 8). Even if central bankers are starting to question how fast their economies can grow before inflation pressures pick up in a meaningful way, they are unlikely to stand by and see faster growth prints without responding with less stimulative monetary policies. Chart 7Not Much Tightening Priced##BR##(Except For Canada)... Not Much Tightening Priced (except for Canada)... Not Much Tightening Priced (except for Canada)... Chart 8...Despite Improving Growth##BR##In Most Countries ...Despite Improving Growth In Most Countries ...Despite Improving Growth In Most Countries Net-net, bond markets are now discounting too pessimistic of an outcome for both global growth and inflation. We continue to see more upside risks for global yields on a 6-12 month horizon, although it will take some signs of faster global inflation (not just growth) before bond yields respond. Bottom Line: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. September ECB Meeting: All Systems Go For A 2018 Taper Last week's ECB meeting provided no changes on interest rates or the size of asset purchases, but plenty of clues on the central bank's next move. A reduction in the size of the ECB's asset purchase program in 2018, to be announced next month, is now highly probable - even with a strengthening euro. The ECB's GDP forecast for 2017 was revised higher from the June forecasts (2.2% vs. 1.9%), while the projections for 2018 (1.8%) and 2019 (1.7%) were unchanged. Meanwhile, the inflation forecast for 2017 was left unchanged at 1.5% and the forecasts for the next two years were only revised slightly lower (2018: 1.2% vs. 1.3%, 2019: 1.5% vs. 1.6%). The fact that the 14% rise in euro versus the U.S. dollar seen so far in 2017 was not enough to move the needle much on the ECB's projections speaks volumes about the central bank's confidence in the current European economic expansion, as well as its comfort level with the rising currency. That makes sense when looking at the euro rally more broadly, as the currency has only gone up 6% in trade-weighted terms year-to-date. Simply put, the ECB does not yet seem overly worried that the strengthening euro represent a serious threat to the economy that could cause a more prolonged medium-term undershoot in Euro Area inflation. ECB President Mario Draghi did make references to currency volatility as being something that should be closely monitored with regards to the growth and inflation outlook. Right now, the realized volatility of the euro has been quite subdued, even as the currency has steadily appreciated (Chart 9). At the same time, our Months-to-Hike indicator has also fallen as the market has pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike. That hike is still not expected until late 2019 - pricing that we agree with. However, the fact that the euro can appreciate with such low volatility alongside a slightly-more-hawkish repricing of ECB rate expectations suggests that the market thinks that a move towards reduced monetary stimulus in the Euro Area is credible. That will remain true until the rising euro starts to become a meaningful drag on the economy or inflation, which is not evident in the broad Euro Area data at the moment (Chart 10). Chart 9A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? Chart 10No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro Draghi did note that the "bulk of decisions" regarding the ECB's asset purchase program would likely take place in October. That means a reduction in the size of the monthly purchases starting in January of next year, but without any changes in short-term interest rates (the ECB reiterated that rates will stay at current levels until after the end of the asset purchase program). Nonetheless, the ECB is incrementally moving towards a less accommodative policy stance that will continue to put upward pressure on the euro and, eventually, trigger a move toward higher longer-term Euro Area bond yields. Bottom Line: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Maintain an underweight medium-term stance on Euro Area government debt. Bank Of Canada: Shock Hawks The Bank of Canada (BoC) continues to confound investors with a surprisingly hawkish policy bias. Another 25bp rate hike was delivered at last week's monetary policy meeting, a move that was not fully discounted by the market, bringing the BoC Overnight Rate up to 1%. The Bank cited the impressive strength of the Canadian economy, as well as the more synchronous global expansion that was supporting higher industrial commodity prices, as reasons for the rate hike. With Canadian real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in the 2nd quarter, in a broad-based fashion across all components, perhaps policymakers can be forgiven for feeling that interest rate settings are still too stimulative for an economy with a potential growth rate of only 1.4% (the most recent BoC estimate). In the statement announcing the rate hike, it was noted that the level of Canadian GDP was now higher than the BoC had been expecting after the last Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) published in July. The BoC was already projecting that the output gap in Canada would be closed by the end of 2017. Thus, a higher realized level of GDP suggests an output gap that will be closed even sooner than the BoC was forecasting. This alone would be enough to move sooner on rate hikes for a central bank that focuses so much on its own measures of the output gap when making inflation projections. However, at the moment, there is not much inflation for the central bank to worry about. Chart 11The Great White North The Great White North The Great White North Headline CPI inflation sits at 1.2%, well below the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target band, while the various measures of core inflation that the BoC monitors are between 1.3% and 1.7%. Annual wage growth accelerated to the faster growth rate of the year in August, but still only sits at 1.7% even with the unemployment rate now down to a nine-year low of 6.2%. Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar has appreciated 13% vs. the U.S. dollar, and 10% on a trade-weighted basis, since bottoming out in early May. This move has been supported by growth and interest rate differentials that favor Canada. This is especially true versus the U.S. where the 2-year gap between Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates is now positive at +21bps - the highest level since January 2015 (Chart 11). The BoC acknowledged this in last week's policy statement, suggesting acceptance of a strong loonie as a reflection of a robust Canadian economy that requires higher interest rates. The strength in the Canadian dollar will likely weigh on import price inflation in the coming months, and act as a drag on overall inflation. This will not trigger any move by the BoC to back off from its hawkishness unless there is also some weakness in the Canadian economic data. For a central bank that focuses so much on the output gap in its assessment of its own policy stance, the inflationary impact from a booming economy will far outweigh the disinflationary effects of a stronger currency. It remains to be seen if the BoC will be proven right on delivering actual rate hikes with inflation well below target. This is a problem that many central banks are facing at the moment, but the robust Canadian economy is forcing the BoC's hand. An appreciating currency may limit the number of rate hikes that the BoC eventually undertakes, but given its own assessment that that terminal interest rate is around 3%, there are plenty of additional hikes that the BoC can deliver before getting anywhere close to "neutral". The key risk will come from the spillover effects on the overheated Canadian housing market from the interest rate increases. Already, house prices are coming off the boil in the most overheated markets like Toronto, where median home values are down 20% since April due to regulatory changes aimed at reducing leveraged speculation in Canadian housing. It remains to be seen how much the BoC hikes will exacerbate the latest downturn in house price inflation and, potentially, have spillover effects on consumer confidence given high levels of household indebtedness. For now, we do not recommend fighting the BoC, with Canadian leading economic indicators still accelerating and the BoC's own business surveys showing that the economy is likely to remain strong. While there are already 50bps of rate hikes priced next twelve months, this would only take the Overnight Rate to 1.5% - still a stimulative level in the eyes of the central bank. This could also create additional strength in the loonie, although that impact should be lessened if the Fed comes back into play and delivers additional rate hikes in 2018, as we expect. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance on Canadian government bonds, with yields likely to surpass the relatively modest increases currently priced into the forwards (Chart 12, top panel). We also continue to advise an underweight allocation to Canadian government bonds in hedged global fixed income portfolios (middle panel). We also are staying with our winning Canadian trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio, where are positioned for wider Canada-U.S. bond spreads and a flatter Canadian yield curve (Chart 13). Chart 12Stay Underweight##BR##Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Chart 13Sticking With Our Tactical##BR##Canadian Bond Trades Sticking With Our Tactical Canadian Bond Trades Sticking With Our Tactical Canadian Bond Trades Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Maintain an underweight stance on Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Monetary Policy: A prominent Fed Governor has acknowledged that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. This is an important signal and suggests that the Fed will keep policy easy enough for inflation expectations to recover. TIPS: The combination of a Fed that communicates a desire for higher inflation expectations and an end to the current downtrend in realized core inflation will send TIPS breakevens wider. Yield Curve: Higher inflation expectations will cause the yield curve to steepen on a 6-12 month horizon. Although steepener trades no longer appear cheap on our model, we remain overweight the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Feature Chart 1Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Flight To Safety Focused In Real Yields Bond markets digested two important events last week. The first was a politically driven flight to safety. The 10-year yield fell 10 bps (Chart 1) and the average junk spread widened 8 bps as the daily U.S. Policy Uncertainty index1 averaged 121 for the week, its second-highest reading since February. As we have noted in past reports,2 historically the best strategy has been to fade politically driven flights to safety. The second, and more significant, event was a speech3 given by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in which she suggested that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. As is explained below, this acknowledgement represents an important change in tone from the Fed. One that reinforces our outlook for higher Treasury yields, a steeper yield curve and wider TIPS breakevens on a 6-12 month horizon. You Had One Job The key passage from Governor Brainard's speech is the following: Nonetheless, a variety of measures suggest underlying trend inflation may be lower than it was before the crisis, contributing to the ongoing shortfall of inflation from our objective. To understand the significance of this statement we need some background on how the Fed thinks about inflation. FOMC members tend to apply an expectations-augmented Phillips curve framework to the task of forecasting inflation (Chart 2). Fed Chair Janet Yellen explained this approach in a September 2015 speech.4 In Yellen's words: ...economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from a longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations. [...] An important feature of this model of inflation dynamics is that the overall effect that variations in resource utilization, import prices, and other factors will have on inflation depends crucially on whether these influences also affect long-run inflation expectations. In other words, the Fed's model distinguishes between core inflation's long-run trend and its cyclical fluctuations. Cyclical fluctuations are driven by: Resource utilization (usually measured as the unemployment rate minus its estimated natural rate) Non-oil import prices Idiosyncratic shocks In contrast, core inflation's long-run trend is purely a function of long-term inflation expectations. In the Fed's view, monetary policy can be used effectively in response to shifts in the cyclical drivers of inflation. However, if inflation expectations were to become unanchored, then inflation's long-run trend would be altered and monetary policy would become less effective. In a sense, the worst possible outcome would be if inflation expectations became un-anchored to the downside. Once again, in Janet Yellen's own words: Anchored inflation expectations were not won easily or quickly: Experience suggests that it takes many years of carefully conducted monetary policy to alter what households and firms perceive to be inflation's "normal" behavior, and, furthermore, that a persistent failure to keep inflation under control - by letting it drift either too high or too low for too long - could cause expectations to once again become unmoored. This describes precisely the conventional wisdom as to why the Japanese economy has experienced two decades of deflation despite reasonably high levels of resource utilization. Policymakers did not act quickly or strongly enough following the burst stock market bubble of 1989-91, and this allowed deflationary expectations to become entrenched. In this sense the Japanese experience provides a roadmap for what could happen in the U.S. if the Fed doesn't act quickly to bring inflation expectations back up to target levels. It is true that not all measures of U.S. inflation expectations currently display weakness. For example, the measure we used in our expectations-augmented Phillips curve in Chart 2 - median 10-year PCE expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters - appears stable in recent years. However, Governor Brainard pointed to several measures that suggest inflation expectations have already declined (Chart 3). Chart 2The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 3Still Well Anchored? Still Well Anchored? Still Well Anchored? Comparing the three-year period ending in the second quarter of this year with the three-year period ended just before the financial crisis, 10-year-ahead inflation compensation based on TIPS [...] yields is ¾ percentage point lower. Survey-based measures of inflation expectations are also lower. The Michigan survey measure of median household expectations of inflation over the next five to 10 years suggests a ¼ percentage point downward shift over the most recent three-year period compared with the pre-crisis years, similar to the five-year, five-year forward forecast for the consumer price index from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.5 Investment Implications In our view, there are two important facts to keep in mind: In the Fed's model of inflation it is crucial that long-term inflation expectations do not fall. Otherwise, the odds of replicating the Japanese scenario start to increase. A prominent Fed Governor has now suggested that U.S. inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. Chart 4The Market's Rate Hike Expectations The Market's Rate Hike Expectations The Market's Rate Hike Expectations Taken together, these two facts have important investment implications. First, the two facts suggest that TIPS breakevens will move wider. While the Japanese experience has taught us that "open mouth operations" become less effective once deflationary expectations are entrenched, they should still have some impact in the States. Notice that the decline in Treasury yields that followed Brainard's comments last week was concentrated in the real component. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate actually rose 2 bps (Chart 1). The combination of a Fed that communicates a desire for higher inflation expectations and an end to the current downtrend in realized core inflation (see "Economy & Inflation" section below) will be enough to send long-dated TIPS breakevens wider on a 6-12 month horizon. Second, a Fed that is committed to staying accommodative for as long as is necessary to ensure that inflation expectations move higher will cause the yield curve to steepen (see section titled "Inflation Expectations Drive The Curve" below). Third, a Fed that is more committed to fighting deflation should bias Treasury yields lower. However, inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy are strong enough that the Fed will be able to move inflation expectations higher while still delivering more rate hikes than are currently priced into the curve. At present, the overnight index swap curve is discounting that the next 25 basis point rate hike will not occur until November 2018 (Chart 4)! Bottom Line: A prominent Fed Governor has acknowledged that inflation expectations have become un-anchored to the downside. This represents an important signal about the future path of policy and reinforces our view that the Treasury curve will bear-steepen during the next 6-12 months, led by wider TIPS breakevens. Inflation Expectations Drive The Curve Our research6 shows that inflation expectations are the most important driver of changes in the slope of the yield curve. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom which states that the curve flattens when the Fed hikes rates, and steepens when it cuts rates. While the correlation between Fed rate moves and the slope of the curve is undeniable, the relationship results purely from the fact that the Fed responds to changes in inflation. The link between inflation expectations and the yield curve is the dominant relationship. To see this we look at Charts 5 and 6. Both charts show monthly changes in the 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate plotted against monthly changes in the nominal 2/10 slope. Chart 5 shows all available historical data, and we observe a strong positive correlation. In fact, 63% of monthly observations fall into either the top-right or bottom-left quadrants indicating that wider breakevens correlate with a steeper curve and vice-versa. Chart 52/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year / ##br##5-Year Forward (February 1999-Present) Open Mouth Operations Open Mouth Operations Chart 62/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year / 5-Year Forward ##br##During Fed Tightening Cycles (June 1999 To May 2000 & June 2004 To June 2006) Open Mouth Operations Open Mouth Operations The more important question, however, is whether this correlation still holds when the Fed is raising rates. Chart 6 focuses only on prior rate hike cycles and still shows a strong positive correlation. 73% of the monthly observations fall into either the top-right or bottom-left quadrants, although in this case there are more observations in the bottom-left quadrant because typically the Fed lifts rates with the goal of sending inflation and inflation expectations lower. In this respect the current rate hike cycle is unique. The Fed is in the process of lifting rates, but as Brainard's speech shows, it still critically needs inflation expectations to rise. We conclude that the Fed will stay easy enough, long enough, for long-dated TIPS breakevens to return to their pre-crisis trading range between 2.4% and 2.5%. An upward adjustment to this range will occur alongside a steeper 2/10 curve. Unit Labor Costs And The Yield Curve The logic presented above also suggests an inverse relationship between the slope of the curve and wage growth. In a world where inflation expectations are well anchored, stronger wage growth encourages the Fed to tighten policy more quickly, this causes the yield curve to flatten. Conversely, softer wage growth leads to a steeper curve. Our research shows that unit labor costs are the measure of wage growth that correlates most closely with the slope of the curve. The reason is that unit labor costs actually measure both wage growth (compensation per hour) and labor productivity (output per hour). Put differently, the yield curve can flatten because labor compensation is rising and the Fed is tightening policy (bear flattening) or it can flatten because productivity is falling and investors are discounting a slower pace of potential growth and a lower terminal fed funds rate (bull flattening). Unit labor costs capture both of these dynamics. Last week saw second quarter productivity growth revised higher from 0.9% to 1.5% and unit labor cost growth revised down from 0.6% to 0.2% (Chart 7). We expect that productivity will continue to experience a modest late-cycle bounce. Usually, payroll growth starts to moderate late in the business cycle as the labor market tightens. The cost of labor typically rises and encourages firms to substitute capital for workers. This late-cycle boost in capital spending tends to correlate with stronger productivity growth (Chart 8), and this dynamic looks to be in full swing at the moment. Payroll growth has been decelerating since early 2015, and durable goods orders have picked up sharply since the end of last year (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 7Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Weakness In Unit Labor Costs Chart 8Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound Productivity: Look For A Late-Cycle Rebound A modest late-cycle upswing in productivity growth will put downward pressure on unit labor costs and lead to curve steepening. How To Position For Steepening We have been expressing our yield curve view via a long position in the 5-year bullet and a short position in a duration-matched 2/10 barbell since last December.7 So far that trade has returned +28 bps, even though the 2/10 slope has flattened more than 50 bps since its inception. The reason our curve steepener has outperformed even as the curve has flattened is that, when we initiated our trade, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread was discounting an even larger curve flattening. Put differently, the 5-year bullet looked extremely cheap on the curve (Chart 9).8 Chart 92/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Spread Fair Value Model This state of affairs has now changed. Our fair value model shows that the 5-year bullet appears slightly expensive compared to the barbell, or alternatively, that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for a 20 bps steepening of the 2/10 slope during the next six months. According to our model, the 2/10 slope will have to steepen by more than 20 bps during the next six months for our trade to outperform from current levels. Bottom Line: Higher inflation expectations will cause the yield curve to steepen on a 6-12 month horizon. Although steepener trades no longer appear cheap on our model, we remain overweight the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell for now. Economy & Inflation Updates received during the past few weeks indicate that U.S. growth is running solidly above trend, and may even be accelerating. Real second-quarter GDP growth was revised higher from 2.6% to 3%. Second quarter labor productivity growth was also revised higher, as was discussed above. Even following a lackluster August employment report, our back-of-the-envelope tracking estimate for U.S. growth - the sum of year-over-year growth in aggregate hours worked and average quarterly productivity growth since 2012 - is running at 2.7%, well above the Fed's 1.8% estimate of trend (Chart 10). Survey measures also suggest that growth has further upside in the second half of the year, at least according to a simple growth model based on the ISM non-manufacturing survey, our own BCA Beige Book Monitor and a composite of new orders surveys (Chart 11). Chart 10Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Growth Tracking Above-Trend... Chart 11...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside ...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside ...And Surveys Suggest Further Upside But bond markets are not getting the message. The 10-year yield is stuck at 2.12%, and the markets seem to be saying that the link between stronger growth and rising inflation has been permanently broken. We disagree and think that investors are simply underestimating the often long and variable lags between economic growth and inflation. Chart 12Inflation Lags Growth Inflation Lags Growth Inflation Lags Growth Chart 12 shows that real GDP growth has tended to lead core inflation by about 18 months, while changes in year-over-year core CPI (the second derivative of prices) have tended to follow the ISM Manufacturing index with a lag of about 12 months. All signs suggest that the recent downtrend in inflation is nothing more than a reaction to the growth deceleration seen between mid-2015 and mid-2016. Now that growth has re-accelerated, inflation is poised to move higher. Bottom Line: Bond markets are priced as though the link between growth and inflation is broken. We expect they will be proven wrong as inflation regains its uptrend during the next few months. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 The daily policy uncertainty index measures the number of news items related to economic uncertainty. For further details please see www.policyuncertainty.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What We Know About Uncertainty", dated July 12, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170905a.htm 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170905a.htm 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 For further details on how butterfly trades respond to changes in the yield curve, and on how we use our fair value yield curve models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Beige Book highlights disconnect between inflation words and inflation data. Peak in auto sales is not a harbinger of recession. Capital spending still trending higher. Inflation and inflation surprise will need to move higher before Fed hikes again. Big disconnect between 10-year yield and our fair value model. Feature Disconnect On Inflation Chart 1Beige Book Monitors Support##BR##Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation The Beige Book released on September 6 supports the Fed's base case outlook for the economy and inflation. It also keeps the Fed on track to begin trimming its balance sheet in September and boost rates by another 25 basis points in December if the CPI and PCE inflation readings turn higher. Our quantitative approach to the qualitative data in the Beige Book points to an acceleration in GDP and inflation, less business unease from a rising U.S. dollar, and ongoing improvement in real estate, both commercial and residential (Chart 1). At 64%, the BCA Beige Book Monitor was still near its cycle highs in September, providing further confirmation that economic growth was sturdy in the first two months of Q3. The Fed noted that "the information included in the report was primarily collected before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Gulf Coast." However, there was a mention of the storm's clout based on preliminary assessments of business and banking contacts across several districts. The U.S. dollar should not be much of an issue in the Q3 earnings season, according to the Beige Book. The greenback seems to have faded as a concern for small businesses and bankers, in sharp contrast with 2015 and early 2016 when Beige Book references to a strong dollar surged. The Q3 earnings reporting season will provide corporate managements with another forum to discuss the currency's impact on their operations. The 2% decline in the dollar over the past 12 months suggests that the dollar may even provide a small lift to Q3 results (Chart 1, panel 4). Remarkably, business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) has moved lower in 2017. The implication is that the business community is largely ignoring the lack of progress by Washington policymakers on Trump's agenda (Chart 1, panel 5). Echoing the market's disagreement with the Fed on inflation, the big disconnect in the Beige Book showed up in the number of inflation words (Chart 1, panel 3). Expressions of inflation dipped between the July and September reports. That said, a wide disconnect remains between the elevated inflation mentions and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The Beige Book backs the Fed's assertion that the economy will expand around 2% this year and inflation will mount in the coming months, supporting a gradual removal of policy accommodation. Policy uncertainty in Washington and worries over the dollar seem to be fading. The divide between the quantity of inflation words in the Beige Book and measured inflation remains unresolved. Neither the soft data in the Beige Book nor the hard data on the economy suggest that an economic downturn is nigh. Recession Not Imminent Some investors have concluded that the peak in auto sales, a key component of consumer spending on durable goods, suggests that a recession is imminent (Chart 2). We take a different view. Zeniths in consumer durable goods, followed closely by consumer services, were primary harbingers of economic downturns in the post-WWII period. However, expenditures on autos, light trucks and other durables tend to peak seven quarters before the onset of recession. Consumer spending on nondurable goods and services provide less of a warning, topping out just five and four quarters out, respectively. The implication for investors is that the peak in auto sales suggests that a recession is still several years away (Chart 3, panels 1-4). Chart 2Vehicle Sales May##BR##Have Peaked Vehicle Sales May Have Peaked... Vehicle Sales May Have Peaked... Chart 3Consumer Spending And##BR##Housing Prior To Recessions Consumer Spending And Housing Prior To Recessions Consumer Spending And Housing Prior To Recessions Housing investment provides an even earlier indication that a recession is on the horizon (Chart 3, panel-panel 5). Housing peaked 17 quarters before the start of the 2007 recession and 20 quarters, on average, before the onset of the 2001 and 1991 recession. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing provided seven quarters of warning before a downturn commenced. While housing's contribution to overall economic growth plunged in Q2, we expect housing to provide fuel for the next few years as pent up demand from the depressed household formation rate since the GFC is worked off. The implication from our upbeat view on housing is that the next recession is still several years away. Bottom Line: We expect the next recession to be triggered by an over aggressive Fed, not by imbalances in one of more segments of the economy. It is premature to say that the economy is headed into recession based on a peak in auto sales. Stay long stocks versus bonds, but we recommend that clients be prudent, paring back any overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. Business Capital Spending Still Up Elevated readings on capex in the first half of the year should persist into the second half. Corporate managements may be postponing investment decisions until they have more clarity on federal tax policy and the Trump administration's plans for infrastructure investment. In short, corporations continue to struggle with how much and when to spend, rather than whether to invest at all. The key supports for sustained corporate spending stayed in place despite the soft July factory orders report and lackluster C&I loan growth. BCA's model for capex (based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate) suggests lending is poised to climb on a 12-month basis (Chart 4) despite the softening of C&I loan growth since November 2016. Moreover, the 3.3% month-over-month (m/m) drop in factory orders in July masked an upward revision to orders in June and a substantial 1.0% m/m gain in core orders. Core shipments, which feed directly into GDP, rose 1.2% m/m in July. Almost all of the weakness in orders and shipments in July was linked to a 71% plunge in the volatile aircraft orders segment. BCA's research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles get underway only when businesses see evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. Consumer expenditures averaged an above-trend 2.7% in 1H. We anticipate that household spending will continue to improve in the second half of 2017.1 Moreover, recent readings on core durable goods orders and shipments show that the uptrend that began in mid-2016 persists, despite recent monthly wiggles in the data (Chart 5). Chart 4BCA Capex Model Points##BR##To Further Improvement BCA Capex Model Points To Further Improvement BCA Capex Model Points To Further Improvement Chart 5Capital Spending##BR##Remains In An Uptrend Capital Spending Remains In An Uptrend Capital Spending Remains In An Uptrend CEO confidence, still a primary support for capex, recently soared to a 13-year high in Q1, but retreated modestly in Q2. The last reading on this survey was in mid-July, and the dip in sentiment reflects the lack of legislative progress in Washington (Chart 5, top panel). The next CEO survey is set for mid-October. The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 stands in sharp contrast with the easing of concerns around policy in the Beige Book. Chart 6Surprising Drop In Policy##BR##Uncertainty This Year Surprising Drop In Policy Uncertainty This Year Surprising Drop In Policy Uncertainty This Year Surprisingly, the chaos in Washington during the first eight months of the Trump administration has not led to an increase in economic policy uncertainty (Chart 6). Instead, after rising sharply in the wake of the Brexit vote in mid-2016 and the U.S. presidential election in November, policy uncertainty has ebbed. While uncertainty over economic policy remains elevated relative to the past few years, the concern under Trump is surprisingly subdued. This metric is in line with the Beige Book's assessment of Trump's impact on sentiment. A series of business-friendly legislative wins for the GOP and President Trump would further reduce any qualms. Even so, a failure by Congress to boost the debt ceiling and fund the U.S. government later this month would increase business worries/fears. Late last week, Trump cut a deal with Congressional Democrats to extend the debt ceiling for three months and is in talks to do away with it altogether. Bottom Line: The fundamentals still support solid business spending. However, BCA's positive capex outlook in the U.S. could be blemished if the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending in the next several months. Inflation Surprise And The Fed Chart 7The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise We expect inflation surprise to move higher, which could spur the Fed to resume its rate hike campaign. A disconnect has opened between economic surprise and inflation surprise.2 In the past 13 years, there have been 15 periods when economic surprise has climbed after a trough. The inflation surprise index temporarily increased in 13 of those episodes. For example, in the aftermath of the oil price peak in the U.S. in mid-2014, both economic surprise and inflation surprise diminished through early 2015 and then began climbing. However, today's inflation surprise index has rolled over while economic surprise has gained. The inflation surprise index escalated during previous tightening regimes when the economy was at full employment and the Fed funds rate was in accommodative territory (Chart 7). The last time those conditions were in place, which was in 2005, the Fed was wrapping up a rate increase campaign that began in mid-2004. Mounting inflation surprise also accompanied most of the Fed's rate increases from mid-1999 through mid-2000 under similar conditions. In late 2015, as the current set of rate hikes commenced, the inflation surprise index was on the upswing, the economy was close to full employment and the Fed funds rate was accommodative. What Does This Mean For The Fed? The above analysis underscores that economic growth is in good shape and it is likely to remain so for the next year at a minimum, barring any nasty shocks. Normally, the positive U.S. (and global) growth backdrop would place upward pressure on bond yields. It has not been the case this time. Investors appear skeptical of the ability of strong economic growth to generate higher inflation. The attitude seems to be "we will believe it when we see it". Some on the FOMC are taking a similar attitude. Lael Brainard, a FOMC governor, presented an interesting speech last week that makes this point. She speculated that inflation has been lower post-Lehman for structural reasons related partly to a drop in long-term inflation expectations. The Fed has been reluctant in the past to even hint that inflation expectations have become unmoored, because that could reinforce the trend, thus making it harder for the Fed to move inflation up to target. Brainard, a voting member of the committee with a dovish bias, argued that unemployment may have to undershoot the full employment level for longer than normal because low inflation expectations will be a persistent headwind. She also implied that the central bank should allow inflation to temporarily overshoot the 2% target. At a minimum, she wants to see evidence of rising inflation and inflation expectations before the Fed delivers the next rate hike. In the past, Brainard's speeches have sometimes heralded shifts in the FOMC's consensus. An example is her December 1, 2015 speech at Stanford.3 It is not clear if this is the case this time, but it does reinforce the view that a strong economy and a falling unemployment rate is not enough to justify another rate hike this year according to the consensus on the FOMC. Bottom Line: Our inflation indicators are pointing mildly up. Nonetheless, timing the upturn in inflation is difficult and the Fed will not hike in December without at least a modest rise in inflation (together with higher inflation expectations). We are short duration because Treasuries are overvalued and market expectations for Fed rate hikes over the next year are overly complacent (see next section). Nonetheless, a rise in yields may not be imminent. Disconnect On Duration The Global Manufacturing PMI reached a more than 6-year high in August, climbing from 52.7 in July to 53.1 last month (Chart 8, panel 3). Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to plunge (Chart 8, bottom panel). Together, these two factors suggest that global growth is accelerating and becoming broader based. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service4 views the improving global economic backdrop as an extremely bond-bearish development. A wide global recovery means that when U.S. data turns surprisingly positive, it is less likely that any increase in Treasury yields will be met with an influx of foreign demand and surge in the dollar. Our Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.67% (Chart 8, top panel). Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68% (not shown). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. After adjusting for changes in credit rating and duration over time, the average spread offered by the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index is fairly valued relative to similar stages of past business cycles. However, the Aaa-rated portion of the market looks expensive. Further, strong Q2 profit growth likely foreshadows a decline in net leverage. This lengthens the window for corporate bond outperformance. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. In the early stages of the previous two Fed tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 and June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 342 bps and traded in a range between 259 bps and 394 bps. This puts the current junk spread (378 bps) almost in line with the average achieved during other similar monetary conditions (Chart 9). We continue to favor a "buy on the dips"5 approach in the high-yield market. Chart 8Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 9High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview Regarding high-yield valuation, our estimated default-adjusted spread stands at 245 bps. Historically, this level is consistent with excess returns of just under 3% versus duration-matched Treasuries over the subsequent 12 months. Our estimated default-adjusted spread is based on an expected default rate of 2.6% and recovery rate of 49% (Chart 9, bottom panel). We remain underweight MBSs; While MBS are starting to look more attractive, especially relative to Aaa credit, we think it is still too soon to buy. The Fed will announce the run-off of its balance sheet when it meets later this month. The market has been pricing in this eventuality for most of the year, leading to a significant widening in MBS OAS. More recently, the option cost component of MBS spreads has joined in, widening alongside falling mortgage rates and expectations of rising prepayments. Bottom Line: Rates have tested their post-election lows, but BCA's fair value model suggests a bounce higher, which supports our stocks-over-bonds stance. In terms of U.S. bonds, we favor short duration over long and credit over high quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy ryans@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Surprise, Surprise", August 28, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20151201a.htm 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On," September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips," March 28, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A supply/demand imbalance has created a playable opportunity in the niche refining energy sub-index. Increase exposure to overweight. Safe haven demand is supporting gold mining equities, but shifting macro forces suggest that it will soon be time to move to the sidelines. Global gold miners are now on downgrade alert. Recent Changes Lift the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index to overweight today. Put the global gold mining equity index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Table 1 Still Goldilocks Still Goldilocks Feature The S&P 500 moved laterally last week as sustained geopolitical uncertainty offset encouraging economic data. Synchronized global growth coupled with the related global liquidity-to-growth transition remain the dominant macro themes. Dovish Fed speeches triggered a recalibration of market rate hike expectations and a lower 10-year Treasury yield. As long as lower bond yields reflect a less hawkish Fed rather than a deflationary relapse, they should underpin stock prices. Encouragingly, the latest ISM manufacturing survey catapulted higher to a level last seen in early 2011, diverging steeply from the bond market, as manufacturing optimism reigns supreme (Chart 1). The labor market confirmed this data. The most cyclical parts of the U.S. economy are firing on all cylinders, with manufacturing and construction job creation comprising 1/3 of nonfarm payroll growth last month (Chart 2). This is the highest reading since July 2011. Chart 1Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Chart 2Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Meanwhile, despite the Trump administration's shortcomings, America's CEOs are going against the grain. Capex is up smartly for the second consecutive quarter adding to real GDP growth and our capital spending model remains upbeat heralding additional outlays for the remaining two quarters of the year (Chart 3). Similarly, regional Fed surveys of capex intentions point to a sustainable pickup in capital spending in the coming months (Chart 3). Still generationally low interest rates, a less hawkish sounding Fed, coupled with a tamed greenback (Chart 4) and synchronized global growth have combined to revive animal spirits. The implication is that profit growth rests on solid foundations, a message corroborated by our S&P 500 EPS growth model (Chart 5). Chart 3CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue Chart 4Dollar... Dollar… Dollar… Chart 5...And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag Adding it up, the macro backdrop remains favorable for stocks. In fact, it represents a goldilocks equity scenario. This week we continue to add some cyclicality to our portfolio by further boosting a niche energy play. We also update our view on a portfolio hedge. Buy Refiners For A Trade In early July, we lifted refiners to neutral and locked in impressive gains for our portfolio, but three reasons kept us at bay and prevented us from turning outright bullish on this niche energy sub-sector.1 Namely, all-time high refining production, high refined product stocks and breakneck pace refinery runs were offsetting the nascent recovery in gasoline consumption, rising crack spreads and a mini V-shaped recovery in industry shipments. Net, we posited that a balanced EPS outlook would prevail in coming quarters. Hurricane Harvey has significantly changed this calculus and now clearly refiners are in a sweet earnings spot for at least the remainder of the year, compelling us to lift exposure to overweight. Severe refinery shutdowns are likely to return industry production levels to what prevailed early in the decade, representing a major, albeit temporary, setback (Chart 6). This production curtailment will result in sizable petroleum products inventory drawdowns and a likely halt (if not reversal) in refined product net exports in order to satisfy domestic demand. The longer it takes for refinery production to return to normalcy, the greater the inventory whittling down. Historically, relative share price momentum has been inversely correlated with inventory growth and the Harvey-related inventory clear-out is heralding additional relative performance gains (bottom panel, Chart 7). It is notable that both industry net exports and inventories had already been receding since the beginning of 2017, suggesting that hurricane Harvey will only accelerate a downtrend that was already in place. Chart 6Hurricane Related Blues... Hurricane Related Blues… Hurricane Related Blues… Chart 7... Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads Taken together, this represents an ultra-bullish pricing power backdrop for the U.S. refining industry, at a time when capacity additions are also likely to, at least, pause for breath (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 8Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Indeed, refining margins have jumped recently and will likely remain elevated as the Brent/WTI spread is widening anew (middle panel, Chart 7). Surging crack spreads are synonymous with higher earnings for this extremely capital-intensive and high operating leverage industry. Nevertheless, the refining supply disruptions only tell half the story. Refined product demand is exploding higher, pushing all-time highs and signaling that a substantial supply/demand imbalance is in the works (top panel, Chart 8). Typically this gets resolved via higher gasoline prices, further boosting industry EPS prospects (third panel, Chart 8). As a result, we expect a re-rating phase in relative valuations in the coming months, reversing the year-to-date deflation in the relative price-to-sales ratio. The second panel of Chart 8 shows that relative valuations and refined product consumption move in lockstep, and the current message is to expect a catch up phase in the former. In sum, a playable rally in refiners is in the offing on the back of a budding profit recovery that has yet to filter through analysts' EPS estimates (bottom panel, Chart 8). The longer-than-usual hurricane Harvey-related refining production disruptions, along with the spike in refined product demand, have created an exploitable opportunity. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index (PSX, VLO, MPC, ANDV) to overweight. What To Do With Gold Mining Equities? Gold and gold mining equities serve as great portfolio hedges especially in times of duress. Recent geopolitical jitters surrounding North Korea along with inaction in Washington and the substantial year-to-date selloff in the U.S. dollar have served as catalysts for gold to shine anew, hitting one-year highs. So is it time to trim exposure to shiny metal equities? The short answer is not yet. Real yields are sinking courtesy of a moderately less hawkish Fed (top panel, Chart 9). The probability of a December Fed hike has now collapsed to 30%, and the 5th hike this cycle is only priced in for next June. This is keeping a bid under gold and gold miners, as zero yielding bullion and near-zero yielding gold mining equities appear at the margin relatively more appealing. The equity risk premium has also stopped falling owing largely to the lower 10-year Treasury yield (bottom panel, Chart 9), representing another source of support for global gold miners. Meanwhile, policy uncertainty in the U.S. and around the globe is hooking up especially given North Korea's unpredictability, Washington's polarization, the upcoming German elections and, most importantly, the looming Chinese Congress. Historically, the policy uncertainty index and relative performance have been joined at the hip and the current message is positive for bullion related stocks (middle panel, Chart 9). Similarly, the Philly Fed's Partisan Conflict Index2 ("The Partisan Conflict Index tracks the degree of political disagreement among U.S. politicians at the federal level by measuring the frequency of newspaper articles reporting disagreement in a given month. Higher index values indicate greater conflict among political parties, Congress, and the President.") and bullion enjoy a tight positive correlation since the early 1980s (Chart 10), likely warning that the precious metal's run has more upside in the short term. Chart 9Shining Shining Shining Chart 10Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Moreover, demand for safe haven assets remains upbeat as evidenced by recent flows into gold-related ETFs. Positioning in the commodity pits are also signaling that more gains are in store for gold and the relative share price ratio (Chart 11). Nevertheless, there are some pockets of weakness that are pointing to a more cautious stance toward this portfolio hedge. The improving U.S. economic backdrop is weighing on gold mining equities (ISM manufacturing shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 12). Not only U.S. growth, but also synchronized global growth suggests that eventually demand for bullion will subside. In fact, global growth expectations continue to perk up (GDP expectations shown inverted, Chart 12), and G10 economic surprises are also shooting higher, anchoring gold and gold related equities (economic surprise index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 12). Chart 11Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Chart 12Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Tack on the inevitable liquidity withdrawal once the Fed starts to wind down its balance sheet later this month, and the handoff from liquidity-to-growth represents a bearish backdrop for gold and gold mining equities. Chart 13 shows that the Fed's balance sheet is positively correlated with bullion's relative performance versus the broad commodity complex, warning that the recent push toward multi-decade highs in relative performance are on borrowed time. Finally, our relative EPS model for the global gold mining index encapsulates most of these macro forces and suggests that relative profit growth will gravitate lower in the coming months (Chart 14). Chart 13Watch The Fed's Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Chart 14EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish Bottom Line: While our confidence in maintaining the gold-related equity portfolio hedge has fallen a notch, we are staying patient before moving to the sidelines. Put the global gold mining index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the July 10, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "SPX 3,000?", available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conflict-index Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Dear Client, I have been visiting clients in Europe this week, so today's report is somewhat shorter than usual. We will be back next week with an exciting Special Report on the macro effects of bitcoin and other virtual currencies. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlights Global growth remains strong and broad-based. U.S. GDP growth will accelerate over the next few quarters thanks to the easing in financial conditions so far this year. The market is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. This is far too low. Go short the Dec-2018 fed funds futures contract. The euro has strengthened more this year than one would have expected based solely on the change in interest rate differentials. Positioning shifts are the likely culprit. In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. based on 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. We will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 any time over the next three weeks. Feature Global Economy Firing On All Cylinders The global economy continues to chug along. All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007. Usually, economists are too optimistic about growth prospects. This has not been the case over the past 12 months. Consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have marched higher during this time, led by the euro area, Japan, and a number of emerging economies (Chart 1). U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these too are likely to be revised higher. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM indices improved in August. The same goes for core capital goods orders, consumer confidence, retail sales, and homebuilder sentiment. The employment report was on the weak side, but it was probably distorted by seasonal factors - August payrolls have now fallen short of expectations for seven years in a row, a suspiciously long streak. Hiring intention surveys and perceptions of job availability both remain strong. The net share of households who see jobs as "plentiful" as opposed to "hard to get" rose further in August. It is now well above its pre-recession peak (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Chart 2A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market Fed Rate Expectations Are Too Dovish The Treasury market remains oblivious to these developments, focusing only on the failure of inflation to rise. This could prove to be a fatal mistake. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 3). Trying to infer the true level of economic slack from today's inflation rate is like trying to read the speedometer of an automobile when there is a 30-second delay between what the dial says and when you step on the accelerator. Many market participants and a number of Fed officials have argued that interest rates are already close to neutral, implying little need for further rate hikes. We agree that the neutral rate is lower than in the past, but their argument misses a crucial point. Even if the Fed knew what the level of the neutral rate is - which, of course, it doesn't - it would still need to get the timing right. If the Fed waits too long to bring rates up to neutral, the unemployment rate will end up falling below NAIRU. This could force the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it (or the markets) would like. Such an outcome now looks increasingly likely. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters (Chart 4). This could cause the unemployment rate to fall to 3.5% by next summer, leaving it below its 2000 lows and more than a full point below most estimates of NAIRU. If this were to happen, it would prompt the Fed to turn up the hawkish rhetoric. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth The market is not giving enough weight to such an outcome. The December-2018 fed funds futures contract is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. That is much too low. We recommend that clients short this contract and are initiating a new tactical trade to this effect. ECB Will Take It Easy In contrast to the U.S., euro area financial conditions have tightened this year. During his press conference, Mario Draghi expressed confidence in the growth outlook, but acknowledged the risks to the region from a stronger currency. He noted that "the recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability." As we predicted last week, the ECB trimmed its 2018 inflation forecast from 1.3% to 1.2%, and its 2019 forecast from 1.6% to 1.5%. Chart 5 shows the market's estimate of the gap in terminal interest rates between the U.S. and the euro area using 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates. The gap has narrowed by around 50 bps since the start of the year. However, EUR/USD has strengthened more than one would have expected based solely on the movement in interest rate differentials. Specifically, the market now expects U.S. five-year yields to be 78 basis points higher in 2022 than in the euro area. This is precisely the same gap that prevailed last October. Yet, EUR/USD was $1.10 back then. Today, it is $1.20. Shifts in positioning help explain why the euro has strengthened so much. Traders were heavily short the euro at the start of this year. Today, they are heavily long (Chart 6). Looking out, with few euro shorts left, EUR/USD is likely to trade off the interest rate gap between the two regions. Chart 5U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed Chart 6Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Chart 7Fiscal Policy Is More Stimulative In The U.S. Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. That seems rather low to us. Trend growth is faster in the U.S., the banking system is in better shape, and fiscal policy is more stimulative (Chart 7). All this suggests that the real neutral rate is substantially higher in the U.S. As such, we will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 at any time over the next three weeks, with a stop of $1.24 and a year-end target of $1.15. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades