Policy

Executive Summary Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues In this report, we discuss our move last week to shift to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in more detail. Our strongest conviction view on developed market government bonds is underweighting US Treasuries. The outcome of last week’s FOMC meeting, where the Fed committed to a rapid shift to restrictive US monetary policy, supports that position. Our strongest conviction overweight is on Japan, with the Bank of Japan both willing and able to maintain its cap on longer-term JGB yields. We are also overweight countries where it will be difficult for central banks to lift rates as much as markets expect – core Europe, Australia and Canada. The explosion in UK bond yields, and collapse of the British pound, seen after last week’s UK “mini-budget” shows that investors have not lost the power to punish fiscal and monetary policies that are non-credible - like a massive debt-financed tax cut at a time of high inflation. As a result, the Bank of England will now be forced to raise rates much more than we had been expecting, and Gilts will remain extremely volatile in the near-term. Bottom Line: Maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance in global bond portfolios. Stay underweight US Treasuries. Upgrade exposure to government bonds in Japan and Canada to overweight, but tactically downgrade UK Gilts to underweight until a more market-friendly policy mix leads to greater stability of the British pound. Feature We shifted our recommended stance on overall global portfolio duration to below-benchmark in a Special Alert published last week. In this report, we go into the rationale for that move in more detail, and present specific details of that shift in terms of allocations by country across the various yield curves. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyReduce Global Portfolio Duration To Below-Benchmark The global inflation and monetary policy backdrops remain toxic for bond markets. Last week saw interest rate increases from multiple developed economy central banks, including the Fed and Bank of England (BoE). The magnitudes of the rate hikes unnerved bond investors, with even the likes of perennial low yielders like the Swiss National Bank and Riksbank lifting rates by 75bps and 100bps, respectively. The Fed followed up its own 75bp hike by digging in its heels on the need for additional policy tightening after the 300bps of hikes already delivered this year (Chart 1). Fed Chair Jerome Powell strongly hinted that a policy-induced US recession is likely the only way to return overshooting US inflation back to the Fed’s 2% target. This triggered a breakout of the benchmark US 10-year Treasury yield above 3.5%. But the real fireworks in global bond markets occurred after the UK government announced its “mini-budget” last Friday that included massive tax cuts to be funded by debt issuance, triggering a sharp decline in the British Pound and spike in UK Gilt yields – a move that spilled over into other bond markets, pushing government bond yields to cyclical highs in the US and euro area. Chart 1Central Banks Keep Trying To “Out-Hawk” Each Other The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The Global Bond Bear Market Continues Chart 2Yields Are Now Driven By Rate Hike Expectations, Not Inflation Yields Are Now Driven By Rate Hike Expectations, Not Inflation Yields Are Now Driven By Rate Hike Expectations, Not Inflation We had been anticipating another move upward in global bond yields for this cycle, and we shifted to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in advance of the Fed and BoE meetings last week. We see this next move higher in yields as being driven not by rising inflation expectations but by an upward repricing of interest rate expectations, leading to additional increases in real bond yields (Chart 2). Trying to pick a top in bond yields has now become a game of forecasting the level to which policy rates must rise in the current global monetary tightening cycle. On that front, there is still scope for rate expectations, and bond yields, to move higher in most developed market countries, justifying our downgrade of our recommended overall duration exposure to below-benchmark. Shifting rate expectations also lead to the changes in country bond allocations we announced last week. Rate Expectations And Country Bond Allocations Our proxy for medium-term nominal terminal rate expectations in developed market countries, the 5-year/5-year forward overnight index swap (OIS) rate, has been tracking 10-year bond yields very closely in the US and UK and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Chart 3). In those regions, the OIS curves are pricing in an increasing medium-term level of policy rates, leading to markets repricing government bond yields higher. In the US, the OIS curve is pricing in a 2023 peak for the fed funds rate of 4.67%, but with only a modest path of rate cuts in 2024 and 2025, leading to a 5-year/5-year OIS projection of 3.36% as of Monday’s market close. After the Gilt market rout, the UK OIS curve is now pricing in a 2023 peak Bank Rate over 6%, with our medium-term nominal rate proxy settling at 3.69%. In the euro area, the OIS curve is discounting a 2023 peak in the ECB policy rate of 3.22%, with a 5-year/5-year forward OIS rate of 2.7%. For all three of those regions, the market is now pricing in the highest peak in rates for the current tightening cycle. That is not the case in Canada or Australia, where rate expectations and longer-term bond yields are still below cyclical peaks (Chart 4). Japan remains the outlier, with the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control keeping 10-year JGB yields capped at 0.25%, even with the Japan OIS curve pricing in a medium-term terminal rate of 0.75%. Chart 3Rising Yields Reflect Higher Terminal Rate Expectations Rising Yields Reflect Higher Terminal Rate Expectations Rising Yields Reflect Higher Terminal Rate Expectations Chart 4Our High-Conviction Government Bond Overweights Our High-Conviction Government Bond Overweights Our High-Conviction Government Bond Overweights After looking at all the repricing of interest rate expectations and bond yields, we can determine our preferred government bond allocations within our strategic model bond portfolio framework. The US Remains Our Favorite Government Bond Underweight The new set of interest rate forecasts (“the dots”) presented at last week’s Fed meeting showed that the median FOMC member was forecasting the fed funds rate to rise to 4.4% by the end of 2022 and 4.6% by the end of 2023, before falling to 3.9% and 2.9% and the end of 2024 and 2025, respectively. Those are all significant increases from the June dots, where the expectations called for the funds rate to hit 3.4% by end-2022 and 3.8% by end-2023. The median Fed forecasts are now broadly in line with the pricing in the US OIS curve for 2022-2024, although the market expects higher rates than the FOMC in 2025 (Chart 5). Chart 5USTs Still Vulnerable To Additional Fed Hawkish Surprises The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The Global Bond Bear Market Continues There has been a lot of back and forth between the Fed and the markets this year, but the market has generally lagged the Fed interest rate projections for 2023 and 2024 before last week. Market pricing is now in line with the Fed dots, as investors have adjusted to the increasingly hawkish message from Fed officials that are focused solely on slowing growth, and tightening financial conditions, in an effort to bring US inflation down. We see the US Treasury curve as still vulnerable to additional hawkish messaging from the Fed, and a potentially higher-than-anticipated peak in the funds rate versus the FOMC dots. The US consumer is facing a lot of headwinds from higher interest rates and rising food and gasoline prices. However, the latter has fallen 26% from the June 13/2022 peak and is acting as a “tax cut” that also helps reduce US inflation expectations (Chart 6). Consumer confidence measures like the University of Michigan expectations survey have already shown improvement alongside the fall in gas prices, which has boosted real income expectations according to the New York Fed’s Consumer Survey (bottom panel). Even a subtle improvement in consumer confidence due to some easing of inflation expectations can help support a somewhat faster pace of consumer spending at a time of robust labor demand and accelerating wage growth. The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker is now growing at a year-over-year pace of 5.7%, while the ratio of US job openings to unemployed workers remains near a record high (Chart 7). Fed Chair Powell has noted that the Fed must see significant weakening of the US jobs market for the Fed to consider pausing on its current rate hike path. So far, there is little evidence pointing to a loosening of US labor market conditions that would ease domestically-generated inflation pressures. Chart 6Lower Gas Prices Can Provide A Lift To US Consumer Spending Lower Gas Prices Can Provide A Lift To US Consumer Spending Lower Gas Prices Can Provide A Lift To US Consumer Spending Chart 7A Tight US Labor Market Will Keep The Fed Hawkish A Tight US Labor Market Will Keep The Fed Hawkish A Tight US Labor Market Will Keep The Fed Hawkish Chart 8Stay Underweight US Treasuries Stay Underweight US Treasuries Stay Underweight US Treasuries We expect overall US inflation to decelerate next year on the back of additional slowing of goods inflation, but will likely settle in the 3-4% range in 2023 given stubbornly sticky services inflation and wage growth. The Fed should follow through on its current interest rate projections, with a good chance that rates will need to be pushed up even higher in response to resilient labor market conditions in the first half of 2023. The risk/reward still favors higher US Treasury yields over at least the next 3-6 months, particularly with an improving flow of US data surprises and with bond investor duration positioning now much closer to neutral according to the JPMorgan client survey (Chart 8). Bottom Line: The US remains our highest conviction strategic government bond underweight in the developed markets. Recommended Allocations In Other Countries The path for monetary policy rates outside the US shows a similar profile as in the US, with a “front loading” of rate hikes to mid-2023 followed by modest rate cuts over the subsequent two years (Chart 9). The OIS-implied path for the level of rates is nearly identical in the US, Australia and Canada. On the other hand, markets are discounting much lower of levels of policy rates in Europe and Japan compared to the US, and a considerably higher path for rates in the UK (more on that in the next section). Chart 9Markets Priced For Global 'Front-Loaded' Rate Hikes Markets Priced For Global 'Front-Loaded' Rate Hikes Markets Priced For Global 'Front-Loaded' Rate Hikes We would lean against the US-like pricing of interest rates in Australia and Canada. Based on work we published in a recent Special Report along with our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the neutral real interest rate (“r-star”) is estimated to be deeply negative in Australia and Canada after adjusting for the high level of non-financial debt in those countries (Table 1). That financial fragility makes it much less likely that the Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of Australia can raise rates as much as the Fed. Table 1Some Big Swings In Our R* Estimates When Including Debt The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The Global Bond Bear Market Continues US-like interest rates would almost certainly trigger a major downturn in house prices and household wealth given the inflated housing values in those two countries – the growth of which is already slowing rapidly in response to rate hikes delivered in 2022. We are maintaining our overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds, while we upgraded Canada to overweight from neutral after last week’s duration downgrade. Chart 10Move To Overweight Japan Move To Overweight Japan Move To Overweight Japan We are also staying overweight on German and French government bonds, as the ECB is unlikely to deliver the full extent of rate increases discounted in the European OIS curve. Our estimated debt-adjusted r-star is also quite negative in the euro area, suggesting that financial fragility issues (due to high government debt in Italy and high corporate debt in France) will likely limit the ECB’s ability to continue with recent chunky rate increases for much longer. In Japan, we continue to view JGBs as an “anti-duration” instrument, given the Bank of Japan’s persistence in maintaining negative interest rates and yield curve control. That makes JGBs a good overweight when global bond yields are rising and a good underweight when global bond yields are falling (Chart 10). Given our decision to reduce our recommended duration exposure to below-benchmark, the logical follow through decision is to upgrade JGBs to overweight. The only remaining country to consider is our view on UK Gilts, which has now become more complicated. Anarchy In The UK The selloff in the UK Gilt market has been stunning in its ferocity. Dating back to last Thursday’s 50bp rate hike by the BoE, the 10-year UK Gilt yield has jumped 120bps and now sits at 4.52%. The increase in yields was identical at the front-end of the Gilt curve, with the 2-year yield jumping 120bps to 4.68%.  The surge in longer-term Gilt yields stands out to the rise in bond yields seen outside the UK, as it also incorporates an increase in our estimate of the UK term premium – a move that was not matched in other countries (Chart 11). The rise in Gilt yields was also much more concentrated in real yields compared to inflation expectations (Chart 12), as markets aggressively repriced the path for UK policy rates after the UK government’s announced debt-financed fiscal package, including £45bn of tax cuts. Chart 11Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Chart 12The Gilt Market Becomes Unhinged The Gilt Market Becomes Unhinged The Gilt Market Becomes Unhinged The UK’s National Institute for Economic And Social Research (NIESR) estimates that the combined impact of the tax cuts and additional spending measures would increase the UK government deficit by a whopping £150bn, or 5% of GDP. The NIESR also estimated that the fiscal measures, including the previously-announced plan for the UK government to cap energy price increases, would result in positive UK GDP growth in the 4th quarter and also lift annual real GDP growth to 2% over 2023-24. The UK government now faces a major credibility issue with markets on its announced fiscal plans. The sheer size of the package, coming at a time when the US economy was already operating at full employment with high inflation, invites a greater than expected monetary policy tightening response from the BoE. The UK OIS curve now forecasts a peak in rates of 6.3% in October 2023, up from the current 2.25%. That would be a massive move in rates in just one year from a central bank that has been relatively gun shy in lifting rates since the 2008 financial crisis, even during the current inflation overshoot. New UK Prime Minister Liz Truss, and her new Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng, have both noted they would prefer a mix of looser fiscal policy (aimed at boosting the supply side of the economy to lift potential growth) with tighter monetary policy that would prevent asset bubbles and inflation overshoots. While there is certainly merit in any plan designed to boost medium-term growth by lifting anemic UK productivity through supply-side reforms, the timing of the announcement could not have been worse. Just one day earlier, the BoE announced a plan to go forward with the sale of Gilts from its balance sheet accumulated during quantitative easing. The Truss government needs to find buyers for all the Gilts that must be issued to pay for the tax cuts and stimulus, but the BoE will not be one of them. In the end, however, the BoE’s expected path for interest rates matters more than the increase in Gilt supply in determining the level of Gilt yields and the slope of the Gilt curve. The NIESR estimates that the UK public debt/GDP ratio will rise to 92% by 2024-25, versus its pre-budget forecast of 88%. While that is a meaningful increase, the correlation between the debt/GDP ratio and the slope of the Gilt curve has been negative for the past few years (Chart 13, top panel). The stronger relationship is between the slope of the curve and the level of the BoE base rate (bottom panel), which is pointing to an inversion of the 2-year/30-year curve if the BoE follows market pricing and lifts rates to 6%. Our view dating back to the early summer was that a low neutral interest rate would prevent the BoE from lifting rates as much as markets were discounting without causing a deep recession, lower inflation and, eventually, a quick reversal of rate hikes. The huge UK fiscal stimulus package changes that calculus, as the nominal neutral rate that will be needed to bring UK inflation back to target is likely now much higher. We have always believed that when a thesis underlying an investment recommendation is challenged by new information, it is best to adjust the recommendation to reflect the new facts. Thus, this week, we are tactically downgrading UK Gilts to underweight in our model bond portfolio framework. We still see a significant medium-term opportunity to go overweight Gilts, as UK policy rates pushing into the 4-6% range are not sustainable. However, the BoE will likely have no choice to begin lifting rates at a much more aggressive pace to restore UK policy credibility, especially with the British pound under immense selling pressure (Chart 14). Despite rumors of an inter-meeting rate hike by the BoE this week to try and support the pound, that is likely too risky a step for the BoE to take as it would invite a battle with investors and currency speculators. Such a battle would be difficult to win without a more credible and market-friendly medium-term fiscal policy from the Truss government. Chart 13The BoE Matters More Than Debt Levels For Gilts The BoE Matters More Than Debt Levels For Gilts The BoE Matters More Than Debt Levels For Gilts Chart 14Tactically Move To Underweight UK Gilts Tactically Move To Underweight UK Gilts Tactically Move To Underweight UK Gilts   Bottom Line: We will review our UK Gilt stance once there are more clear signals of stability in the pound, but for now, we will step aside and limit our recommended exposure to Gilts – even after the huge selloff seen to date, which likely has more to go. Summarizing All The Changes In Our Model Bond Portfolio All the changes to our recommended duration exposure and country allocations after the past week, including the new weightings in our model bond portfolio, are shown in the tables on pages 14-16. To summarize: We moved the overall recommended global duration exposure to below-benchmark, and shifted the model bond portfolio duration to 0.9 years below that of the custom benchmark index. We increased the size of the US Treasury underweight, and moved Canada and Japan to overweight. We moved the UK to underweight, on top of the reduction in UK duration exposure that was part of last week’s move to reduce overall portfolio duration. We are also cutting exposure to UK investment grade corporates to underweight, as part of an overall move to reduce UK risk in the portfolio. We slightly increased the overweight in Germany. In next week’s report, we will present the quarterly performance review of our model bond portfolio and, more importantly, we will present out scenario-based return expectations after all the changes made this week. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com     GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) The Global Bond Bear Market Continues The Global Bond Bear Market Continues

Dear client, Next week’s report will be on European assets, authored by my colleague Mathieu Savary. We will send that to you Monday, September 26. In that report, Mathieu looks at the European energy market in depth, and concludes the eurozone will survive the winter, but with critical tests in the coming weeks. Mathieu suggests the euro could touch 0.965 in this process. I trust you will find the report insightful. Our regular publication will resume on October 7. Kind regards, Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist Executive Summary Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar Every central bank is stepping up its hawkish rhetoric, but the Fed is still being perceived as having the moat to deliver the most aggressive rate hikes. As long as the market believes the US economy will maintain its superstar status, the dollar has upside. That said, financial conditions are tightening meaningfully in the US. Meanwhile, US inflation has peaked relative to other G10 countries, suggesting the market could price a less aggressive path for Fed interest rates, relative to other central banks. Narrowing interest rate differentials will diffuse US dollar momentum.  The big risk of leaning against dollar strength is a recession that spreads from Europe, the UK, and China and becomes global. The dollar tends to do well during recessions, even after a prolonged bout of strength.  Our core trades remain at the crosses: short EUR/JPY and long EUR/GBP. We are looking to buy NOK/SEK on further weakness and our limit buy on AUD was triggered. Bottom Line: Stay neutral the dollar for now but conditions for a short position continue to accrue. Feature We last published our Month-In-Review report on August 12th, suggesting inflation was still strong globally, and central banks will zone in on their mandate of cooling prices. Since then, bankers have been very busy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) hiked rates by 50bps on August 17. At 3%, New Zealand now has one of the highest policy rates in the G10. The Norges Bank has hiked rates twice since, by 50bps. The policy rate now stands at 2.25%. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) hiked policy rates by 50bps on September 6. The Bank of England (BoE) hiked by 50 bps on September 16th, albeit, below market expectations. The Riksbank hiked rates by 100 bps on September 20. In a rare occurrence, Sweden now has higher rates than the eurozone. The European Central Bank (ECB), the Fed, and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) recently hiked rates by 75 bps. Finally, as a lone wolf, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) stayed pat, but has massively intervened to stabilize the drawdown in the yen. The message is clear, global central banks are on a path to cool inflation and regain credibility. In recent weeks, the Fed has been one of the most aggressive in hiking policy rates (Chart 1). As a result, the 10-year US Treasury yield has risen from 3% to 3.7% in the last month, among the most aggressive in the G10 (Chart 2). Other central banks are also catching up as inflation accelerates outside the US. Specifically, US price gains have peaked relative to their G10 counterparts (Chart 3). Faster rising yields and slowing inflation means that relative real yields continue to bid the dollar higher (Chart 4). Chart 1The Fed Is Very Hawkish Month In Review: Will Relative Rates Continue To Boost The Dollar? Month In Review: Will Relative Rates Continue To Boost The Dollar? Chart 2Interest Rates Rising Meaningfully In The US Month In Review: Will Relative Rates Continue To Boost The Dollar? Month In Review: Will Relative Rates Continue To Boost The Dollar? Chart 3Other Central Banks Need To Play Catch Up Other Central Banks Need To Play Catch Up Other Central Banks Need To Play Catch Up Chart 4Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar Real Yields Still Favor The Dollar This backdrop is highly deflationary. Tightening policy while economic growth is slowing is a toxic cocktail. It explains why the dollar continues to command a bid, as markets believe most central banks cannot engineer a soft landing. The dollar does well in hard landings. In the next few sections, we cover the important data releases over the last month in our universe of G10 countries, and the implications for currency strategy. What is clear is that most foreign central banks are committed to their tightening campaign, which argues for a neutral stance towards the DXY for now, with a view to sell after/if global central banks engineer a recession. US Dollar: Stealth Strength Chart 5US Dollar: Stealth Strength US Dollar: Stealth Strength US Dollar: Stealth Strength The dollar DXY index is up 17.4% year to date. Over the last month, the DXY index is up 3.6% (panel 1). The market focus for the dollar will remain the jobs and employment report. Job gains remain robust. In August, the US added 315K jobs. While the unemployment rate rose to 3.7%, the participation rate also rose from 61.2% to 62.4% (panel 2). Wages continue to rise. Average hourly earnings came in at 5.2% year-on-year in August. The Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker continues to edge higher across all income cohorts (panel 3). Headline inflation decelerated to 8.3% in August, but the core measure did accelerate from 5.9% to 6.3% (panel 4). On September 21, the Fed increased interest rates by 75bps, as expected. Inflows into US assets remain strong. According to TIC data, the US saw $154 bn of inflows in July. Higher interest rates are taking a toll on the housing market. Building permits fell sharply in August, which makes the rebound in housing starts look fleeting. Financial conditions are tightening in the US. From a currency perspective, the dollar is overbought, and sentiment is very bullish (panel 5). That said, as a momentum currency, the dollar will continue to perform well if risk assets fall to the wayside. We remain neutral in the short term, though valuation keeps us bearish over a long-term horizon.  The Euro: Undershooting Parity Chart 6The Euro: Undershooting Parity The Euro: Undershooting Parity The Euro: Undershooting Parity The euro is down 14.2% year to date. Over the last month, the euro is down 2.5%. As we go to press, the euro has broken below 0.97. The main risk for the eurozone remains stagflation: The ZEW Expectations Survey was at -60.7 in September, a bearish development for the euro (panel 1). Consumer confidence deteriorated further in September, to -28.8 for the eurozone (the European Commission measure). The deterioration has been consistent among member countries (panel 2). Inflation remains sticky in the eurozone. Headline CPI accelerated to 9.1% in August. PPI in the euro area was at 37.9% in July, an acceleration from the June reading (panel 3). The trade balance continues to deteriorate, hitting - €40.3bn in July. The preliminary PMI read for September was at 48.5 from 49.6, suggesting the eurozone is already in recession (panel 4). The Sentix confidence index deteriorated in September to -31.8. This remains above the 2020 low but is rapidly catching up to the downside. Despite the above data prints, the ECB lifted interest rates by 75 bps on September 8th. The ECB continues to fight soaring inflation and will need to engineer a recession in the eurozone to achieve its mandate. This is a key risk for the euro. We continue to sell the EUR/JPY cross, while we remain constructive on EUR/GBP (panel 5). Our initial line in the sand was 0.98 for the euro, but as my colleague will argue next week, it could substantially undershoot this level. Stand aside for now.  The Japanese Yen: Currency Intervention Chart 7The Japanese Yen: Currency Intervention The Japanese Yen: Currency Intervention The Japanese Yen: Currency Intervention The Japanese yen is down 19.71% year-to-date. The yen hit an intra-day low of 145.8, forcing intervention by Japanese authorities. That has assuaged selling pressure. Meanwhile, economic data out of Japan has been on the mend. The Eco Watcher’s survey showed that sentiment improved in August. Current conditions rose from 43.8 to 45.5. The outlook component also rose from 42.8 to 49.4. The trade balance in Japan continues to deteriorate, due to soaring energy costs. That said, exports are holding up, rising 22% year-on-year in August (panel 2). Machine tool orders also ticked up. Labor market conditions remain robust. The job-to-applicant ratio rose to 1.29% in July. Inflation is picking up in Japan (panel 3). The nationwide CPI report for august showed an increase in the core-core measure from 1.2% to 1.6%. Headline CPI rose from 2.6% to 3%. The Bank of Japan continues to keep monetary policy on hold. However, the depreciating yen triggered intervention from Japanese authorities. We are short EUR/JPY, a trade that continues to pan out and a call option on a BoJ shift. While inflation expectations remain sticky in Japan, they could overshoot (panel 4). Our thesis is that short-term investors should stand aside on the yen, but longer-term buyers are in for a bargain. The yen is cheap, a favorite short, and the Japanese economy could surprise to the upside (panel 5).  British Pound: Towards Parity? Chart 8British Pound: Towards Parity? British Pound: Towards Parity? British Pound: Towards Parity? The pound is down 19.59% year to date. The depreciation in the pound has picked up pace, with cable now trading near 1.1 (panel 1). The next level of support is the 1985 low of 1.08. Economic data in the UK continues to disappoint. CPI came in at 9.9% in August. The RPI came in at 12.3%. PPI was at 24%. According to BoE forecasts, we will hit double digits in CPI prints soon (panel 2). Nationwide house price inflation remained strong in August, rising 10% year-on-year (panel 3). Retail sales excluding auto and fuel fell 5.4% year-on-year in August (panel 4). Trade data remains weak. The current account is close to a record low (panel 5). The external balance remains negative for the pound. With the new fiscal package of tax cuts, gilt yields are hitting new highs and the cable is selling off. This is because more demand will depress real rates in the UK, if not accompanied by productivity gains. We are maintaining our long EUR/GBP trade. On cable, downside remains but we will be buyers at 1.05.      Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Trade Chart 9Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Trade Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Trade Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Trade The AUD is down 10.14% year-to-date (panel 1). Over the last month, the AUD is down 5.68%. The RBA hiked interest rates by 50bps in August, lifting the official cash rate to 2.35%. We believe further rate increases remain likely. Inflation is accelerating in Australia, as the labor market tightens (panel 2). 59K jobs were added in August. The participation rate also ticked up from 66.4% to 66.6%. While the unemployment rate rose (panel 3), labor market conditions remain the strongest in decades (panel 4). Monetary policy continues to have the desired effect, as home loan issuance declined 7% in July. The manufacturing sector remains strong, with the August manufacturing PMI coming in at 53.8. The external environment continues to weigh on the AUD. In July, the trade balance came in lower than expected at -A$8.7bn vs a forecast of A$14.5bn (panel 5). This was largely driven by commodity prices rolling over and slowing Chinese demand. The headwinds are likely to persist in the near term. That said, our limit buy on AUD/USD was triggered at 0.665. In our view, the AUD already embeds a lot of bad news.          New Zealand Dollar: Stay Short At The Crosses Chart 10New Zealand Dollar: Stay Short At The Crosses New Zealand Dollar: Stay Short At The Crosses New Zealand Dollar: Stay Short At The Crosses The NZD is down 15% year-to-date (panel 1). Over the last month, the NZD is down 6.8%. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand raised its official cash rate (OCR) in August by 50 bps to 3.0%. The RBNZ cited high core inflation (panel 2) and scarce labor resources as the primary reasons and guided towards tighter monetary policy.  Monetary policy continues to be having the desired effect across interest rate sensitive areas of the economy. Home sales continued to slow in August, with REINZ home sales down 18.3% year-over-year. Home price growth is also cratering nationwide (panel 3). There is some evidence of a soft landing in New Zealand. ANZ consumer confidence rose to -85.4 from -81.9. Business confidence also bounced to -47.8 (panel 4).  The Business NZ PMI expanded to 54.9 in August. The external sector however continues to suffer from headwinds. Dairy prices, circa 20% of exports, remained flat in August after falling sharply at the start of the month. New Zealand’s 12-month trailing trade balance remains in deficit. As the NZD is heavily dependent on international trade, headwinds from a slowing Chinese economy will continue to weigh on the currency. We are bearish NZD at the crosses, though it will hold up if the dollar rolls over.    Canadian Dollar: A Hawkish BoC Chart 11Canadian Dollar: A Hawkish BoC Canadian Dollar: A Hawkish BoC Canadian Dollar: A Hawkish BoC The CAD is down 7.5% year to date. Over the last month, it is down 4%. The tightening campaign by the BoC is having the desired effect on economic data. Beginning with the labor market, the unemployment rate ticked up in August to 5.4% (panel 2), the highest level since February of this year. August also marks the third consecutive month of job losses, albeit with a higher labor force participation rate at 64.8%. While inflation in Canada appears to have peaked, it remains sticky. Headline CPI fell to 7% from 7.6%. Core inflation has also declined to 5.8% (panel 3). The housing market continues to slow. Building permits and housing starts are rolling over (panel 4). Notably, building permits declined 6.6% month-over-month against a forecast decline of 0.5%. Housing starts in August fell to 267.4K from 275.2K in July. The incoming prints are a “carte blanch” for the BoC to continue its tightening campaign. In August, it increased its policy rate to 3.25% (panel 5). More hikes are likely forthcoming. The OIS curve shows a peak in the overnight rate at 4% in February next year (panel 5). Ultimately, the CAD benefits from the terms of trade boom (panel 1) and an eventual decline in the US dollar. But as long as the USD remains strong, CAD faces downside.   Swiss Franc: A Haven Chart 12Swiss Franc: A Haven Swiss Franc: A Haven Swiss Franc: A Haven The Swiss Franc is down 7% year-to-date. EUR/CHF broke below 0.95, and the risk is that this level is tested again in the coming days (panel 1). We penned a report earlier this year arguing that Switzerland was an oasis of optimism: Inflation is accelerating, but still sits at 3.5% for August (panel 2). The decline in import prices is encouraging following franc strength (panel 3). Sight deposits are rolling over suggesting the SNB is not intervening to weaken the franc (panel 4). We are buyers of CHF at the crosses.                        Norwegian Krone: Buy On Weakness Chart 13Norwegian Krone: Buy On Weakness Norwegian Krone: Buy On Weakness Norwegian Krone: Buy On Weakness The NOK is down 19.7% year-to-date and 8% over the last month (panel 1). Inflation remains high in Norway. In August, CPI grew 6.5% year-on-year (panel 2). PPI including oil rose 77.3%. The housing market will bear the brunt of rate hikes. Household indebtedness (panel 3), makes the task of policy calibration challenging. Consumer confidence fell to a new low in the third quarter. The good news is that economic activity is robust on the back of Norway’s energy advantage. The current account remains in surplus (panel 5). If global risk sentiment picks up, the krone will be a jewel in the G10. If the risk appetite remains muted, NOK will face strong headwinds.                    Swedish Krona: A Beta Play On The Euro Chart 14Swedish Krona: A Beta Play On The Euro Swedish Krona: A Beta Play On The Euro Swedish Krona: A Beta Play On The Euro SEK is down 23.9% year-to-date. Over the last month, the krona is down 5.6% (panel 1). The Riksbank surprised markets by raising rates by 1% on September 20th (panel 5). Critically, rising inflation was the catalyst. Headline inflation accelerated from 8.5% to 9.8% in August. This is well above target (panel 3). The economic tendency survey rolled over from 101.3 to 97.5. A strong PMI has been a beacon of hope in Sweden but the headline figure dipped from 53.1 to 50.6 in August. The housing market continues to soften (panel 2). The Riksbank’s latest estimate sees a 16% decline in prices this year.  Much like the NOK, the Swedish krona will gyrate along the path of the broad trade-weighted USD. Fundamentally, the krona remains more vulnerable to external shocks due to higher energy dependency and a strong dollar. But it is also incredibly cheap. We are looking for opportunities to be long SEK at the crosses.      Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Turkey is staring into an abyss: economic crisis that will morph into political crisis in the June 2023 election cycle. President Erdoğan will pursue populist economic policies and foreign policy adventurism to try to stay in power, leading to negative surprises and “black swan” risks over the coming 9-12 months. While Erdoğan and the ruling party are likely to be defeated in elections, which is good news, investors should not try to front-run the election given high uncertainty. Neither Turkey’s economy and domestic politics nor the global economy and geopolitics warrant a bullish view on Turkish assets. GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY  Recommendation (TACTICAL) Initiation Date Return LONG JPY/TRY 2022-09-23     Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Bottom Line: The Lira will depreciate further versus the dollar. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Feature Turkey – now technically Türkiye – is teetering on the verge of a national meltdown. The inflation rate is the fastest in G20 countries, both because of a domestic wage-price spiral and soaring global food and fuel prices. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power since 2002, making them highly vulnerable to demands for change in the general election slated for June 18, 2023. Yet Erdoğan is a strongman who won a popular vote to revise the constitution in 2017 and increase his personal power over institutions. His populist Islamist movement is starkly at odds with the country’s traditional elite, including the secular military establishment. Given the poor state of the economy, Erdoğan will likely lose the 2023 election but he could refuse to leave office … or he could win the election and be ousted in a coup d'état, as happened in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980.1 Meanwhile Turkey is beset by foreign dangers – including war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East. Erdoğan will try to use foreign policy to bolster his popular standing. Turkey has inserted itself in various regional conflicts and could instigate conflicts of its own. While global investors are eager to buy steeply discounted Turkish financial assets ahead of what could be a monumental change in national policy in 2023, the country is extremely unstable. It is a source of “black swan” risks. The best bet is to remain underweight Turkish assets unless and until a pro-market election outcome shakes off the two-decade trend toward economic ruin. Turkish Grand Strategy Turkey is permanently at a crossroads. The land-bridge between Europe and Asia, it is secular and cosmopolitan but also Islamist and traditional. Its past consists of the greatness of empires – Byzantine, Ottoman – while its present consists of a frustrating search for new opportunities in a chaotic regional context. The core of the country consists of the disjointed coastal plains around the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and the Sea of Marmara, where Istanbul is located. The Byzantine and Ottoman empires were seated on this strategic location at the juncture of the world’s east-west trade. To secure this area, the Turks needed to control the larger Anatolian peninsula – Asia Minor – to prevent roving Eurasian powers from invading, just as they themselves had originally invaded from Central Asia. During times of greatness the Turks could also expand their empire to control the Balkan peninsula and Danube river valley up to Vienna, Crimea and the Black Sea coasts, and the eastern Mediterranean island approaches. During the Ottoman empire’s golden days Turkish power extended all the way into North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Nile river valley, and Mecca and Medina. The empire – and the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate – collapsed in 1924 after centuries of erosion and the catastrophes of World War I. Subsequently Turkey emerged as a secular republic. It adapted to the post-WWII world order by allying with the United States and NATO, in conflict with the Soviet Union which encircled the Turks on all sides. The Russians are longstanding rivals of Turkey, notably in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Stalin wanted to get his hands on the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Hence alliance with the US and NATO fulfilled one of the primary demands of Turkish grand strategy: a navy that could defend the straits and Turkish interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to usher in an era of opportunity for Turkey. Turkey benefited from democratization, globalization, and foreign capital inflows. But then America’s wars and crises, Russia’s resurgence, and Middle Eastern instability created a shatter-belt surrounding Turkey, impinging on its national security. In this context of limited foreign policy options, Turkey’s domestic politics coalesced around Erdoğan, the AKP, political Islam, and investment-driven economic growth. Erdoğan and the AKP represent the Anatolian, religious, and Middle Eastern interests in Turkey, as opposed to the maritime, secular, and Euro-centric interests rooted in Istanbul. This point can be illustrated by observing that the poorer interior regions have grown faster than the national average over the period of AKP rule, whereas the more developed coastal regions have tended to lag (Map 1). Voting patterns from the 2018 general election overlap with these economic outcomes. The AKP has steered investment capital into the interior to fund infrastructure and property construction while currency depreciation, rather than productivity enhancement, has merely maintained the status quo with the manufacturing export sector in the coastal regions (Chart 1). Map 1Turkey’s Anatolian Model And The Struggle With The Coasts Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Chart 1Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Today Turkey faces three distinct obstacles to its geopolitical expansion: Russian aggression: Russia’s resurgence, especially with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022, threatens Turkey’s interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey must always deal with Russia carefully but over the past 14 years Russia has become belligerent, forcing Turkey to come to terms with Putin while maintaining the NATO alliance. Today Erdoğan tries to mediate the conflict as it does not want to encourage Russian aggression but also does not want NATO to provoke Russia. For instance, Turkey is willing to condone Finland and Sweden joining NATO but only if the West grants substantial benefits to Turkey itself. Ultimately Turkish ties with Russia are overrated. For both economic reasons and grand strategic reasons outlined above, Turkey will cleave to the West (Chart 2). Chart 2Turkey Still Linked To The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​ Chart 3Turkish Energy Ties With Russia Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Western liberal hegemony: The EU and NATO foreclosed any Turkish ambitions in Europe. The EU has consolidated with each new crisis while rejecting Turkish membership. This puts limits on Turkish access to European markets and influence in the Balkans. Turkey has guarded its independence jealously against the West. After the Cold War the US expected Turkey to serve American interests in the Middle East and Eurasia. The EU expected it to serve European interests as an energy transit state and a blockade against Middle Eastern refugees. But Turkish interests were often sidelined while its domestic politics did not allow blind loyalty to the West. This led Turkey to push back against the West and cultivate other options, such as deeper economic ties with Russia and China. Turkish dependency on Russian energy is substantial and Turkey has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s conflict with NATO (Chart 3). Recently Turkey offered to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a military alliance of Asian powers. However, as with trade, Turkish defense and security ties with the Russo-Chinese bloc are ultimately overrated (Chart 4).  There is room for some cooperation but Turkey is not eager to abandon American military backing in a period in which Russia is threatening to control the Black Sea rim, cut off grain exports arbitrarily, and use tactical nuclear weapons. Chart 4Turkey’s Defense Alliance With The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Middle Eastern instability: The Middle East is a potential area for Turkey to increase influence, especially given the AKP’s embrace of political Islam. Turkey benefits from regional economic development and maintains relations with all players. But the region’s development is halting and Turkey is blocked by competitors. The US toppled Iraq in 2003, which strengthened Iran’s regional clout over the subsequent decades. But Iran is not stable and the US has not prevented Iran from achieving nuclear breakout capacity. Turkey cannot abide a nuclear-armed Iran. At the same time, the US continues to support Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, which oppose Turkey’s combination of Islam and democratic populism. Russia propped up Syria’s regime in league with Iran, which threatens Turkey’s border integrity. Developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran have all complicated Turkey’s management of Kurdish militancy and separatism. Kurds make up nearly 20% of Turkey’s population and play a central role in the country’s political divisions. Erdoğan’s Anatolian power base is antagonistic toward the Kurds and regional Kurdish aspirations. China’s strategic rise brings both risks and rewards for Turkey but China is too distant to become the focus of Turkish strategy: China’s dream of reviving the Silk Road across Eurasia harkens back to the glory days of Ottoman power. The Belt and Road Initiative and other investments help to develop Central Asia and the Middle East, enabling Turkey to benefit once again as the middleman in east-west trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade But insofar as China’s Eurasian strategy is successful, it could someday impinge on Turkish ambitions, particularly by buttressing Russian and Iranian power. In recent years Erdoğan has experimented with projecting Turkish power in the Middle East (Syria), North Africa (Libya), the Caucasus (Armenia), and the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus). He cannot project power effectively because of the obstacles outlined above. But he can manipulate domestic and foreign security issues to try to prolong his hold on power. Bottom Line: Boxed in by Russian aggression, western liberal hegemony, and Middle Eastern instability, Turkey cannot achieve its geopolitical ambitions and has concentrated on internal development over the past two decades. However, the country retains some imperial ambitions and these periodically flare up in unpredictable ways as the modern Turkish state attempts to fend off the chaotic forces that loom in the Black Sea, Middle East, North Africa, and Caucasus. The Erdoğan regime is focused on consolidating Anatolian control of Turkey and projecting military power abroad so that the military does not become a political problem for his faction at home. Erdoğan’s Domestic Predicament President Erdoğan has stayed in power for 20 years under the conditions outlined above but he faces a critical election by June 18, 2023 that could see him thrown from power. The result will be extreme political turbulence over the coming nine months until the leadership of the country is settled by hook or by crook. Erdoğan has pursued a strongman or authoritarian leadership style, especially since domestic opposition emerged in the wake of the Great Recession. By firing three central bankers, he has pressured the central bank into running an ultra-dovish monetary policy, producing a 12% inflation rate prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and an 80% inflation rate today. He has also embraced populist fiscal handouts and foreign policy adventurism. Taken together his policies have eroded the country’s political as well as economic stability. From the last general election in 2018 to the latest data in 2022: Real household disposable income  growth has fallen from -7.4% to -18.7% (Chart 6). Chart 6Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling ​​​​​​ Chart 7Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election ​​​​​ The manufacturing PMI has fallen from 49.0 to 47.4 (Chart 7). Consumer confidence has fallen from 92.1 to 72.2 (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election ​​​​​​ Chart 9Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​​ Bad economic news is finally altering public opinion, with polls now shifting against the president and incumbent party: Since the pandemic erupted, Erdoğan’s approval rating has fallen from a peak of 57% to 40% today. Disapproval has Erdoğan’s risen to 54%, leaving him a net negative job approval (Chart 9). Bear in mind that Erdoğan won the election with 52.6% of the vote in 2018, only slightly better than the 51.8% he received in 2014 and well below the 80% that his AKP predecessor received in 2007. Meanwhile the AKP, which never performs as well as Erdoğan himself, has fallen from a 45% support rate to 30% today in parliamentary polls, dead even with the main opposition Republican People’s Party (Chart 10). The AKP won 42.6% of the vote in 2018, down from 49.5% in the second election of 2015, 49.8% in 2011, and 46.6% in 2007. Chart 10Justice And Development Party Neck And Neck With Republican Opposition Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan The gap between Erdoğan and his Republican rivals has narrowed sharply since the global food and fuel price spike began to bite in late 2021 (Chart 11). Chart 11Erdoğan Faces Tough Re-Election Race Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan However, the 2023 election is not straightforward. There are several caveats to the clear anti-incumbent tendency of economic and political data: Soft Economic Landing? The election takes place in nine months, enough time for surprises to salvage Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, given his and his party’s heavily entrenched rule. For example, it is possible – not probable – that Russia will resume energy exports, enabling Europe to recover, and that central banks will achieve a “soft landing” for the global economy. Turkey’s economy would bounce just in time to help the incumbent party. This is not what we expect (see below) but it could happen. Foreign Policy Victories? Erdoğan could achieve some foreign policy victories. He has negotiated a tenuous deal with Russia and Ukraine, along with the UN, to enable grain exports out of Odessa. He could build on this process to negotiate a broader ceasefire in Ukraine. He could also win major concessions from the US and NATO to secure Finnish and Swedish membership in that bloc. If he did he would come off looking like a grand statesman and might just buy another term in office. Unfortunately what is more likely is that Erdoğan will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to distract voters from their bread-and-butter woes, only to destabilize Turkey and the region further. Stolen Election? Erdoğan revised the constitution in 2017 – winning 51.4% of the votes in a popular referendum – to give the presidency substantial new powers across the political system. Using these powers he could manipulate the election to produce a favorable outcome or even cling to power despite unfavorable election results. He does not face nearly as powerful and motivated of a liberal establishment as President Trump faced in 2020 or as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces in 2022. As noted Erdoğan has a contentious relationship with the Turkish military, so while investors cannot rule out a stolen election, they also cannot rule out a military coup in reaction to an attempted stolen election. Thus the election could produce roughly four outcomes, which we rank below from best to worst in terms of their favorability for global investors: 1.  Best Case: Decisive Opposition Victory – 25% Odds – A resounding electoral defeat for the AKP would reverse its unorthodox economic policies in the short term and serve as a lasting warning to future politicians that populism and economic mismanagement lead to political ruin. This outcome would also provide the political capital and parliamentary strength necessary to impose tough reforms and restore a semblance of macroeconomic stability. 2.  Good Case: Narrow AKP Defeat – 50% Odds – A narrow or contested election would produce a weak new government that would at least put a stop to the most inflationary AKP policies. It would improve global investor sentiment around Turkey’s eventual ability to stabilize its economy. The new government would lack the ability to push through structural reforms but it could at least straighten out the affairs of the central bank so as to ensure a cycle of monetary policy tightening, which would stabilize the currency. 3.  Bad Case: Narrow AKP Victory – 15% Odds – A narrow victory would force the AKP to compromise with opposition parties in parliament and pacify social unrest. Foreign adventurism would continue but harmful domestic policies would face obstructionism. 4.  Worst Case: Decisive AKP Victory – 10% Odds – A resounding victory for the ruling party would vindicate Erdoğan and his policies despite their negative economic results, driving Turkey further down the path of authoritarianism, populism, money printing, currency depreciation, and hyper-inflation. He could also be emboldened in his foreign adventurism. Bottom Line: We expect Erdoğan and the AKP to be defeated and replaced. However, Turkey is in the midst of an economic and political crisis and the next 12 months will bring extreme uncertainty. The election could be indecisive, contested, stolen, or overthrown. The aftermath could be chaotic as well as the lead-up. If the AKP stays in power then investors will abandon Turkey and its economy will suffer a historic shock. Therefore investors should underweight Turkey – at least until the next phase in the economic downturn confirms our forecast that the AKP will fall from power. Macro Outlook: Fade The Equity Rally Chart 12Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM The Turkish economy is beset by hyper-inflation. Headline consumer prices are rising at upwards of 80% and core inflation is 65%. Yet Turkish government 10-year bond yields are low and falling: they are down to 11% currently, from a high of 24% at the beginning of the year. Turkish stocks have also outperformed their Emerging Markets counterparts this year in common currency terms even though the lira has been the worst performing EM currency (Chart 12). So, what’s going on in this market? The answer is hidden in the slew of unorthodox policies adopted by the authorities. These measures caused massive distortions in both the economy and the markets. Specifically, late last year, despite very high inflation, the central bank began to cut policy rates encouraging massive loan expansion. As a result, both local currency loans and money supply surged. Which, in turn, completely unhinged inflation (Chart 13). As inflation rose, so did government bond yields. In a bid to keep government borrowing costs low, policymakers changed several bank regulations to force commercial banks to buy government bonds.2  The upshot was that the bond yields stopped tracking inflation and instead began to fall even as inflation skyrocketed. The rampant inflation meant Turkish non-financial firms’ nominal sales skyrocketed. Indeed, sales of all MSCI Turkey non-financials companies have risen by 40% in US dollar terms and 200% in local currency (Chart 14). Chart 13Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation This was at a time when policy rates were being cut. The policy rate has fallen to 12% today from 19% a year earlier. Firms’ local currency real borrowing costs have fallen deeply into negative territory (Chart 15). It helped reduce firms’ costs significantly. Chart 14Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits ​​​​​ Chart 15Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc ​​​​​ Chart 16Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation ​​​​​ Meanwhile, even though wage growth accelerated, it still fell short of inflation, and therefore of nominal sales of the firms (Chart 16). Firms’ wage costs did not rise as much as their prices. All this boosted non-financial firms’ margins. Total profits have risen by 35% in US dollar terms from a year earlier (200% in lira terms). ​​​​​​​ Chart 17The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket ​​​​​​​ On their part, listed financials’ profits have surged by 50% in USD terms and 220% in local currency terms. They benefited both from surging interest income due to rapid loan growth and from massive capital gains on their holding of government securities (see Chart 14 above). All this is reflected in Turkish companies’ earnings per share as well. The spike in EPS has propped up Turkish stocks for past few months. Over the past year, not only have corporate profits and share prices surged, but also house prices have skyrocketed by 170% in local currency terms and 30% in USD terms (Chart 17). In sum, the abnormally low nominal and deeply negative real borrowing costs have produced a money/credit deluge, which has generated a massive inflationary outbreak and has inflated revenues/profits as well as various asset prices. The Lira To Depreciate Further This macro setting is a recipe for a major currency sell-off.  First, Europe – the destination of 90% of Turkish exports – will likely slide into recession over the coming year (Chart 18).  Chart 18A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A fall in exports will widen Turkey’s current account deficit. Notably, imports will not fall much since the authorities are pursuing easy money policy. Second, the lack of credible macro policies as well as political crisis will assure that foreign capital escapes Turkey. Turkey will find the current account deficit nearly impossible to finance. Third, the country’s net foreign reserves, after adjusting for the central bank’s foreign currency borrowings and commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank, stand at minus 30 billion dollars. In other words, the central bank now has large net US dollar liabilities. As such, it has little wherewithal to defend the currency. There are very high odds that the lira depreciation will accelerate in the months ahead. Fourth, the slew of unorthodox measures taken by the Turkish authorities will encourage banks to buy more government local currency bonds to suppress the government’s borrowing costs. When commercial banks buy government securities from non-banks, they create money “out of thin air.” Hence, the ongoing money supply deluge will continue. This is bearish for the currency. Notably, the economy will likely enter into recession next year – and yet core inflation will stay very high (30% and above). Recent unorthodox bank regulations are meant to encourage a certain kind of lending – loans to farmers, exporters, and small and medium-sized businesses – while discouraging other kinds. Consequently, the overall loan growth will likely slow in nominal terms. There are already signs that credit is decelerating on the margin (Chart 19). Given the very high inflation, slower credit growth will likely lead to a liquidity crunch for many businesses – forcing them to curtail their activity.  Chart 19Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations ​​​​​​ Chart 20Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP ​​​​​​ Indeed, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), local currency loan growth has already slipped into negative territory. This is a bad omen for the overall economy: contracting real loan growth is a harbinger of recession (Chart 20). In short, Turkey is looking into an abyss: a recession amid high inflation (i.e., stagflation) as well as a brewing political crisis (with Erdoğan likely doubling down on unorthodox and populist policies). All this point to another period of a large currency depreciation. While the country will likely change direction to avoid the abyss, investors should wait to allocate capital until after the change in direction is confirmed.    Investment Takeaways The Turkish lira will fall much more vis-à-vis the US dollar in the year ahead. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Turkey is involved in an economic crisis that will devolve into a political crisis over the election cycle. While Erdoğan and the AKP are likely to fall from power as things stand today, they are heavily entrenched and will be difficult to remove, creating large risks of an indecisive or contested election in 2023 that will increase rather than decrease policy uncertainty and the political risk premium in Turkish assets. As a strongman leader Erdoğan has consolidated political power in his own hands, so there is no one to take the blame for the country’s economic mismanagement – other than foreigners. Hence there is a distinct risk that his foreign policy adventurism will escalate between now and next year, resulting in significant military conflicts or saber-rattling. These will shake out western investors who try to speculate on the likelihood that the election or the military will oust Erdoğan and produce sounder national and economic policies. That outcome is indeed likely but Erdoğan is not going without a fight. Our Geopolitical Strategy also recommends tactically shorting the lira versus the Japanese yen in light of global slowdown, extreme geopolitical risk, and the Bank of Japan’s desire to prevent the yen from falling too far.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Consulting Editor Footnotes 1      Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, “The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2017, brookings.edu. 2     The central bank replaced an existing 20% reserve requirement ratios for credits with a higher 30% treasury bond collateral requirement. Lenders will have to cut interest rates on commercial loans (except for loans to farmers, exporters, and SMEs). Otherwise, banks will have to maintain additional securities. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias The Fed is pacing a globally synchronized monetary-policy tightening cycle as the war in Ukraine escalates, following Russia’s mobilization of 300k reserve forces. Despite central-bank tightening, the intensification of the war increases the odds of higher inflation.  This will keep the USD well bid. Russia’s threat to cut oil supplies to states observing the G7 price cap will test US and EU resolve as winter sets in.  Retaliatory output cuts by Russia could send Brent crude oil prices above $200/bbl. The Biden administration remains fearful its G7 price cap and EU sanctions on Russian oil exports will spike prices.  The US will make 10mm barrels of crude from its SPR available in November as a palliative.  Our base case Brent forecast is slightly lower, averaging $105/bbl this year from $110/bbl, due to weaker realized prices.  On the back of this, we expect 4Q22 Brent to average $106/bbl, and for 2023 to average $118/bbl, up slightly vs. last month.  WTI will trade $3-$5/bbl lower. Bottom Line: The economic war pitting the EU and its allies against Russia could escalate and widen as more Russian troops pour into Ukraine.  This raises the odds of expanded conflict outside Ukraine, and higher war-driven inflation.  Our baseline forecast for 2023 remains intact, with a strong bias to the upside.  We remain long the COMT and XOP ETFs to retain exposure to commodities. Feature The Fed is pacing a globally synchronized monetary-policy tightening cycle at a time when the war in Ukraine is escalating. Russia’s mobilization of a reported 300k reserve forces raises the spectre of an expansion of the Ukraine war – perhaps crossing into a NATO state’s border – if tactical nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are used. This is a low-probability outcome, but it would increase the odds of significantly higher inflation should it come to pass.1 The US central bank lifted its Fed funds rate 75 bps Wednesday to a range of 3% - 3.25% – and strongly indicated further rate hikes will follow. The Fed is one of numerous banks increasing policy rates. This synchronous monetary-policy tightening has not been observed for 50 years, and raises the odds of a global economic recession, according to the World Bank.2 The World Bank notes that since 1970, recessions have been “preceded by a significant weakening of global growth in the previous year, as has happened recently,” and, importantly, “all previous global recessions coincided with sharp slowdowns or outright recessions in several major economies.” The withdrawal of monetary and fiscal support “are necessary to contain inflationary pressures, but their mutually compounding effects could produce larger impacts than intended, both in tightening financial conditions and in steepening the growth slowdown.” Markets are acting in a manner consistent with this assessment, but, in our view, need to expand the risk set to include a higher likelihood of a war widening beyond Ukraine. While this is not our base case, it is worthwhile recalling the link between war and inflation. Prior to and during the 20th century’s two world wars, then the Korean and Vietnam wars, US CPI inflation rose sharply (Chart 1).3 Price controls and tighter monetary policy were needed to address these inflationary episodes. Chart 1A Wider Ukraine War Would Stoke Inflation Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Stronger USD Remains Oil-Demand Headwind Fed policy will continue to push US interest rates higher, which will push the USD higher on the back of continued global demand for dollar-denominated assets. This will keep the cost of most commodities ex-US higher in local currency terms, which, all else equal, will weaken commodity demand in general, and oil demand in particular. This will be compounded if tighter monetary policy at systemically important central banks (led by the Fed) results in a global recession in 2023. This is especially true for EM oil demand: The income elasticity of EM oil consumption is 0.61, which means a 1% decrease (increase) in real EM GDP translates into a 0.61% decrease (increase) in oil demand, all else equal. In our base case, we expect global oil demand to grow 2.2mm b/d this year and 1.91mm b/d next year, roughly in line with the US EIA’s and IEA’s estimates (Chart 2). We expect EM demand will increase 1.25mm b/d this year, and 1.90mm b/d next year, accounting for almost all of global growth. As before, we expect China’s oil demand growth to be de minimus this year, on the back of its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy. EM remains the key driver of our global oil demand assumptions, which, in our modeling, are a function of real income (GDP). Offsetting the stronger USD effects on demand is gas-to-oil switching demand, resulting from record-high LNG prices this year. This will add 800k b/d to demand globally this winter (November – March). Chart 2Global Oil Demand Holding Up Global Oil Demand Holding Up Global Oil Demand Holding Up Oil Supply Getting Tighter Oil supply will remain challenged this year and next, as core OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – approaches the limit of what it can supply to the market and still retain sufficient spare capacity to meet unexpected supply shocks (Chart 3). Among the anticipated shocks we believe core OPEC 2.0 is aware of is the loss of 2mm b/d of Russian crude oil output over the next year, due to the imposition of EU embargoes on seaborne crude oil and refined products, which will go into effect 5 December 2022 and 5 February 2023, respectively. The continued inability of non-core OPEC 2.0 states to maintain higher production – “The Other Guys” in our nomenclature – is another foreseeable shock (Chart 4). This is becoming acute for OPEC 2.0, given The Other Guys account for most of the 3.6mm b/d of below-quota output currently registered by the producer coalition.4 This is a record gap between expected production and actual production from OPEC 2.0, which was registered in August. Chart 3Core OPEC 2.0 Conserves Supplies Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Chart 4'Other Guys' Production Keeps Falling Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Net, demand will continue to outpace supply in our base case (Chart 5, Table 1). This will require continued inventory draws for the next year or so, as core OPEC 2.0 continues to conserve supplies (Chart 6). Chart 5Demand Continues To Outpace Supply Demand Continues To Outpace Supply Demand Continues To Outpace Supply Chart 6Inventory Will Continue Drawing Inventory Will Continue Drawing Inventory Will Continue Drawing Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Russian Wild Card Battlefield losses in Ukraine are forcing Russia’s military to activate some 300k reserve troops. These losses again are prompting veiled threats to deploy nuclear and perhaps chemical weapons, which drew a sharp warning from US President Biden.5 Further economic losses will begin mounting in a little more than two months, as the first of two major EU oil-import embargoes and a ban on insuring/re-insuring vessels carrying Russian crude and products takes hold. In addition, a US-led G7 price cap on Russian oil purchases will go into effect with the December embargo on seaborne crude imports into the EU.6 We continue to expect Russia will be forced to shut in ~ 2mm b/d of crude oil production by the end of next year – taking output from a little more than 10mm b/d to ~ 8mm b/d.7 Russian’s President Putin already has threatened to cut off oil supplies to anyone abiding by the G7 price cap.8 In our modeling, a unilateral 2mm b/d cut in Russian output – in addition to the lost sales from the EU embargoes and insurance/reinsurance bans – would take Brent prices above $200/bbl (Chart 7). On the downside, a severe global recession that removes 2mm b/d of demand next year could send prices below $60/bbl. Equally plausible cases for either outcome can be made, given current supply-demand fundamentals and the geopolitical backdrop discussed above. This can be seen in the lack of skew in the options markets, which is measured by the difference in out-of-the-money call and put implied volatilities (Chart 8). The skew sits close to zero at present – meaning options buyers are not giving higher odds to a sharp upside or downside move at present.9 Chart 7Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Chart 8Option Skew Shows Up Or Down Moves Equally Likely Option Skew Shows Up Or Down Moves Equally Likely Option Skew Shows Up Or Down Moves Equally Likely In our modeling and analysis, we continue to believe the balance of risk is to the upside. As can be seen in Chart 6, inventories are below the 2010-14 five-year average – OPEC 2.0’s original target when it was formed – which means KSA and the UAE will be able to respond to any demand shocks that cause unintended inventory accumulation (e.g., the sort that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic or the OPEC market-share war of 2015-16). Managing the upside risk is more difficult: KSA and the UAE are close to the limits of what they can supply and still carry sufficient spare capacity to meet unexpected production losses. KSA’s crude oil output is just over 11mm b/d, and the UAE’s is at 3.2mm b/d, according to OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report. This puts both within 1mm b/d of their max production capacity of 12mm and 4mm b/d. Both got close to producing at these max levels in early 2020, when Russia provoked a market share war; this was quickly reversed as a magnitude of the COVID-19 demand destruction became apparent. The only other large producer outside the OPEC 2.0 coalition capable of increasing and sustaining higher output is the US shales, which are producing at 7.8mm b/d and have pushed total US crude oil output to 12.2mm b/d (Chart 9). Leading producers in the shales have foreclosed any sharp increase in output this year, given tight labor markets and services and equipment markets in the US. Chart 9US Shales Close To Max Output US Shales Close To Max Output US Shales Close To Max Output Investment Implications Global crude oil markets remain tight, with demand continuing to exceed supply. The risk that the economic war pitting the EU and its allies against Russia could expand to a more kinetic confrontation involving additional states is higher, as more Russian troops are called up to serve in Ukraine. If the additional troops do not reverse Russia’s battlefield losses – or if Ukraine looks like it will win this war – Putin likely will feel cornered, and get more desperate.10 We believe Putin will first attempt to impose as much economic pain on the West as possible by cutting off all natural gas and oil flows to the EU and states and firms observing the G7 price cap. However, if that does not force the West to relent on its economic war with Russia, a war with NATO could evolve in which tactical nukes or other weapons of mass destruction are employed. At that point, Putin would have concluded there would be nothing he could do to restore Russia’s standing as a world power. Any plume – nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) – that crosses a NATO border likely would be treated as an act of war. NATO would have to act at that point. This is not our expectation, nor is it any part of our base case. But it is a higher non-trivial risk than it was last month or last week. This raises the odds of higher war-driven inflation, as well, which will further complicate central-bank monetary policy at a time of war. Our baseline forecast remains intact, with a strong bias to the upside. We remain long the COMT and XOP ETFs to retain exposure to commodities.   Robert P. Ryan  Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish In its September update, the US EIA reported natural gas consumption will hit record levels in 2022, increasing by 3.6 Bcf/d to just under 87 Bcf/d on average, led by increases in the electric power residential and commercial sectors (Chart 10). US natural gas consumption in the electric power sector will increase in 2022 due to limitations at coal-fired power plants and weather-driven demand. It is expected to decrease in 4Q22 and in 2023, due to more renewable electricity generation capacity. Natural gas consumption in the residential and commercial sectors for 2023 is expected to be similar as 2022 levels. Base Metals: Bullish According to Eurometaux, a consortium of European metal producers, approximately 50% of the EU’s zinc and aluminum production capacity is offline due to high power prices. More operations are expected to shut as European power prices remain elevated and metal prices drop on recessionary fears (Chart 11). The decision to reopen a smelter following a shutdown is expensive and can result in long wait times. This will make the bloc’s manufacturers heavily reliant on metal imports from other states, which likely will lead to higher pollution from these plants. Aluminum supply is particularly vulnerable to this power crisis since one ton needs an eye-watering 15 megawatt-hours of electricity – enough to power five homes in Germany for a year. Precious Metals: Neutral The Fed’s additional 75-bps rate hike will strengthen the USD and weaken gold prices. Geopolitical risk has been a tailwind for the greenback thus far, as investors rush to the USD instead of the yellow metal for safe-haven investments. If this trend continues, along with further Fed rate increases, the additional risk arising from Putin’s reserve force mobilization and possible expansion of the Ukraine war will boost the USD and leave gold in the doldrums.   Chart 10 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Chart 11 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22 Oil Markets Anxiously Enter 4Q22   Footnotes 1     Please see Vladimir Putin mobilises army reserves to support Ukraine invasion, published by ft.com on September 21, 2022. 2     Please see Is a Global Recession Imminent?, published by the World Bank on September 15, 2022.  The report notes, “Policymakers need to stand ready to manage the potential spillovers from globally synchronous withdrawal of policies supporting growth. On the supply-side, they need to put in place measures to ease the constraints that confront labor markets, energy markets, and trade networks.” 3    Please see One hundred years of price change: the Consumer Price Index and the American inflation experience, published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics in April 2014.  4    Please see OPEC+ supply shortfall now stands at 3.5% of global oil demand, published 20 September 2022 by reuters.com. 5    Please see Biden warns Putin over nuclear, chemical weapons, published by politico.eu on September 17, 2022. 6    Please see EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices, which we published on August 18, 2022, for discussion. 7    We include Russia among “The Other Guys” in our balances estimates.  8    Please see Explainer: The G7's price cap on Russian oil begins to take shape, published by reuters.com on September 19, 2022. 9    We use the standard measure of skew – i.e., the difference between 25-delta calls and puts – to determine whether option market participants are discounting a higher likelihood of an up or down move, respectively. 10   Please see CIA director warns Putin's 'desperation' over Russia's failures in Ukraine could lead him to use nukes, published by businessinsider.com on April 15, 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary There’s Value In TIPS There's Value In TIPS There's Value In TIPS A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. While headline inflation has rolled over, there is so far little indication of a slowdown in core price appreciation. We see core CPI reaching 3.6% during the next 12 months, driven by decelerating goods prices but sticky wage growth and services inflation. The TIPS market is discounting an overly sanguine view of headline inflation for the next 12 months, and there is value in owning TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Bottom Line: Investors should reduce portfolio duration to ‘below-benchmark’ and hold a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners. Investors should also overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners. Feature US bond yields continued their ascent last week, spurred on by August’s surprisingly high core CPI print and the perception that the Fed will have to tighten policy even more quickly to bring inflation back down. Currently, the market is discounting that the Fed will lift the funds rate to 4.61% by April of next year and then bring it back down to 4.26% by the end of 2023 (Chart 1). Chart 1Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations This market-implied interest rate path would involve 225 bps of tightening at the next 5 FOMC meetings, or an average rate increase of +45 bps per meeting. With a 75 basis point rate increase looking like a lock for this week, market pricing is consistent with additional 50 basis point increases at the final two meetings of this year (November and December) and then two more 25 basis point rate hikes in Q1 2023. After that, the market anticipates that the tightening cycle will be over. Our view continues to be that the peak in the fed funds rate will occur later than April 2023 and that, while a pause in the Fed’s tightening cycle is likely at some point next year, inflation will be strong enough to preclude outright rate cuts. In terms of investment strategy, last week’s report presented empirical evidence showing that, on average, Treasury yields peak 1-2 months before the last rate hike of the cycle.1 In fact, in the seven Fed tightening cycles that we analyzed, the 10-year Treasury yield always peaked within a window spanning four months before the last rate hike and four months after (Table 1). This analysis suggests that even if the fed funds rate peaks in April, as is implied by the market, bond yields likely have one more leg higher before the end of the cyclical bear market. Table 1Timing Fed Tightening Cycles One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears While we have been consistently highlighting that the market is not pricing-in a sufficiently high average fed funds rate for 2023, we have been recommending an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance on the view that falling inflation could briefly send bond yields lower in the near term. The 10-year Treasury yield did fall back to 2.60% on August 1, but it then rebounded quickly and has continued to head higher since. With Treasury yields unlikely to re-test those depths anytime soon, we recommend shifting to a ‘below-benchmark’ portfolio duration stance to play the final leg higher in bond yields before a US recession ends the cyclical bond bear market. The next section of this report surveys nine cyclical economic indicators and argues that the balance of evidence suggests that the fed funds rate’s peak will occur later than April 2023. Then, the final section of this report discusses our recommended TIPS investment strategy in light of last week’s CPI report and our outlook for inflation. Tracking The Tightening Cycle One of the most useful tools in our arsenal for assessing the state of the interest rate cycle is our Fed Monitor. The Fed Monitor is a composite of 47 economic and financial market variables that has been designed to output a positive value when the data recommend interest rate hikes and a negative value when rate cuts are required. Historically, the Monitor does a good job of lining up with the actual path of the fed funds rate (Chart 2). Chart 2Fed Monitor Says More Tightening Required Fed Monitor Says More Tightening Required Fed Monitor Says More Tightening Required The Fed Monitor is currently down off its highs, but at 1.03 it is well above the zero line. Looking at past tightening cycles, we find that the Monitor has averaged 0.41 on the day of the last rate hike of a cycle, with a range of outcomes spanning -0.49 to +0.93. Notably, the +0.93 upper-end of that range occurred in 1995, a time when the Fed only delivered a modest amount of policy easing before pivoting back to tightening in 1999. The variables in our Fed Monitor can be grouped into three categories: (i) economic growth variables, (ii) inflation variables and (iii) financial market variables. Interestingly, we observe that the Economic Growth component of our Monitor has dipped into negative territory while the Inflation and Financial Conditions components continue to argue for tighter policy (Chart 2, bottom 3 panels). A negative Economic Growth component suggests that we are getting closer to the end of the tightening cycle, but the Fed will likely stay hawkish and tolerate an even deeper negative reading from Economic Growth as long as inflation remains high. In addition to our Fed Monitor, we have identified nine economic indicators (some included in the Fed Monitor and some not) that are particularly relevant for the Fed’s policy stance. In this week’s report, we look at the message these indicators were sending on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. The indicators are: The Sahm Rule: Economist Claudia Sahm has noted that a recession always occurs when the 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises by more than 0.5% off its trailing 12-month low.2 We include the unemployment rate’s deviation from its 12-month low as a measure of labor market utilization. Employment Momentum: We look at the 6-month growth rate in nonfarm payrolls as a measure of momentum in the labor market. Inflation: We use 12-month core PCE as a measure of inflation that is most closely related to the Fed’s target. Inflation Momentum: To measure momentum in inflation we look at the difference between 3-month core PCE and 12-month core PCE. Labor Market Tightness: Using responses from the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey, we look at the number of people who describe jobs as “plentiful” minus the number who describe jobs as “hard to get”. Economic Growth: We use the ISM Manufacturing PMI as a simple measure of the trend in aggregate demand in the US economy. Housing: To assess trends in the housing market we look at the 12-month moving average in housing starts minus the 24-month moving average. Financial Conditions: We use the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index to assess whether financial conditions are accommodative or restrictive. The Yield Curve: We look at the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope to ascertain whether the bond market perceives the monetary policy stance as accommodative or restrictive. Table 2A lists the nine indicators described above and shows their values on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. We also include the current reading from each indicator. Finally, we shade in red every cell that we deem consistent with the Fed stopping its tightening cycle. To make this determination we compare the value on the day of the last rate hike to the median value witnessed on the day of the last hike across all seven tightening cycles. We don’t use median values for the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index or the Treasury slope. Rather, we say that an inverted yield curve and a Financial Conditions reading above 100 are both consistent with the end of rate hikes. Table 2AEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears The last column of Table 2A simply adds up the number of red cells in each row. As of today, we see that only 2 out of nine indicators are consistent with the end of the tightening cycle. The end of a tightening cycle has never occurred with less than four indicators flashing red. Table 2B takes a slightly more sophisticated approach to the same exercise. Rather than simply comparing above or below the median, we rank each indicator as a percentile relative to its value on the day of the last rate hike across seven different tightening cycles. We then combine those percentile ranks with an equal weighting to get an “End of Tightening Score”. Larger values are consistent with a greater likelihood that the tightening cycle will end and lower values are consistent with a lower likelihood. Currently, the End of Tightening Score stands at 28%, lower than on the day of the last rate hike in all of the cycles we analyzed. Table 2BEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles: Percentile Ranks One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears One Last Hurrah For Bond Bears As is the case with our Fed Monitor, the closest End of Tightening Score to today’s occurred in 1995. One key difference between 1995 and today is that core inflation was running much closer to target in 1995. This gave the Fed scope to fine tune its policy stance without risking its inflation fighting credibility. That flexibility is not available to the Fed in today’s high inflation environment. Bottom Line: A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. Investors should set portfolio duration to ‘below benchmark’ and maintain a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners.3 The TIPS Market Is Too Complacent August’s month-over-month core CPI print came in well above expectations at +0.57%, sending bond yields higher and risk assets lower last week. Zooming out, while falling gasoline prices appear to have shifted the trend in headline inflation, there is so far little evidence of a meaningful move down in core or trimmed mean measures of CPI (Chart 3). Chart 3No Slowdown In Core CPI No Slowdown In Core CPI No Slowdown In Core CPI Chart 4Core CPI Forecast Core CPI Forecast Core CPI Forecast In a recent Special Report, we went through the five major components of CPI (energy, food, shelter, goods and services) and came up with 12-month forecasts for both core and headline inflation.4  For core inflation, we forecast that it will fall to 3.6% during the next 12 months (Chart 4). The main driver of the drop will be a return of goods inflation to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4, panel 3). We anticipate only a minor pullback in shelter inflation (Chart 4, panel 2) and that services inflation will remain elevated, driven by strong wage growth (Chart 4, bottom panel). Recently, we have seen some evidence that home prices and rents on new leases are decelerating, no doubt a response to high and rising mortgage rates. That said, we don’t anticipate much pass through from those trends into shelter inflation during the next 12 months. First, home price appreciation leads shelter CPI by 18 months (Chart 5A). This means that we shouldn’t expect falling home prices to meaningfully impact shelter inflation until the end of 2023. Second, rental growth on new leases as measured by Zillow and Apartment List has clearly decelerated, but it is still running much hotter than shelter CPI (Chart 5B). Given the limited historical track record, it’s very difficult to say how much (if any) of the recent deceleration in rental growth will ultimately pass through to the CPI. Chart 5AHome Prices & Shelter CPI Home Prices & Shelter CPI Home Prices & Shelter CPI Chart 5BDecelerating Rents Decelerating Rents Decelerating Rents In our research, we have found that measures of labor market utilization are the most important variables to include in any model of shelter inflation. For ease of forecasting, the model shown in Chart 4 and in the top panel of Chart 6 uses the unemployment rate as its measure of labor market tightness. This model works well, but it arguably understates shelter inflation because it doesn’t include a variable capturing wage growth. If we replace the unemployment rate in our model with the more comprehensive aggregate weekly payrolls measure, then we get a much tighter fit and a model that does a better job explaining the recent surge in shelter CPI (Chart 6, bottom panel).5 All in all, we conclude that our expectation that shelter inflation will fall from 6.3% to 4.7% during the next 12 months may wind up being a tad optimistic. When we combine our forecast for 3.6% core inflation with two scenarios for the oil price – a benign one based on what is priced into the futures curve and another based on the forecasts of our commodity strategists – we get an expected range of 2.1% to 4.7% for headline CPI during the next 12 months (Chart 7). According to our Golden Rule of TIPS Investing, if 12-month headline CPI comes in above the current 1-year CPI swap rate then TIPS will outperform nominal Treasuries during the 12-month investment horizon.6 Chart 6Modeling Shelter Inflation Modeling Shelter Inflation Modeling Shelter Inflation Chart 7There's Value In TIPS There's Value In TIPS There's Value In TIPS At present, the 1-year CPI swap rate is 2.76%, near the bottom of our expected range of outcomes for 12-month headline CPI. It seems to us that a lot of things will have to go right for inflation to come in below market expectations during the next year. For this reason, we think it makes sense for investors to overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in US bond portfolios. Chart 8Own Inflation Curve Flatteners Own Inflation Curve Flatteners Own Inflation Curve Flatteners Additionally, we see a lot of value in owning TIPS breakeven curve flatteners (Chart 8). The 2-year and 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rates are both currently 2.38%, meaning that the 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven slope is at zero. Higher-than-expected inflation during the next 12 months will put more pressure on the front-end of the breakeven curve than the long end, flattening the curve. Further, logic dictates that an inverted inflation curve is more consistent with an environment where the Fed is fighting above-target inflation than a positively sloped one. There will come a time when it makes sense for the inflation curve to move back into positive territory, but that won’t be until the Fed has brought inflation down much closer to its target. Bottom Line: The inflation outlook priced into markets for the next 12 months is too benign. Investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Brief History Of Fed Tightening Cycles”, dated September 13, 2022. 2  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ES_THP_Sahm_web_20190506.pdf 3  For more details on this curve trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Great Soft Landing Debate”, dated August 9, 2022. 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. 5  Aggregate weekly payrolls = nonfarm employment x average weekly hours x average hourly earnings 6   Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran.   Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference.  China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2  Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort.  Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors China's Imports Of Semiconductors China's Imports Of Semiconductors     3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure China's US Dollar Exposure China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets.   Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis.  Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5).   Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire.   However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome.  Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2     US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3    Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com.                                                                                         Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong The HKD is facing its most critical test in several decades. While the peg is likely to survive (Feature Chart), the economic costs for Hong Kong SAR will be far reaching. Critically, monetary policy in Hong Kong SAR is being tailored behind a hawkish Fed, while economic ties with China increasingly warrant easier policy settings. This tug of war will be resolved via a reset in domestic spending and asset prices. Equity shares have been the first shoe to drop. Real estate values and consumer spending will be next. A hypothetical delinking of the peg will see the HKD depreciate since it is expensive on a real effective exchange rate basis. Longer term, the rising use of the RMB in Hong Kong SAR will render the peg a relic. It will also fit with China’s aims to internationalize the RMB. Bottom Line: The HKD peg is likely to survive in the near term, but the economic repercussions from maintaining the linked exchange-rate system will trigger a rethinking by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and mainland authorities. Eventually, HKD could be replaced by the CNY. For now, HKD interest rates are slated to rise further, which will have ramifications for domestic spending and asset prices. Feature Chart 1HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates The Hong Kong dollar (HKD) has been trading on the weak side of its convertibility band since May. In theory, this suggests there is intense pressure for the peg to be delinked, which should lead to a much weaker exchange rate. In practice, interest rates in Hong Kong have failed to keep up with the surge in US rates, which has led to widening interest rate differentials between Hong Kong and the US. As a result, investors have embarked on a massive carry trade, funding USD purchases with HKDs (Chart 1). HKD’s weakness has raised questions about whether the exchange rate could face a crisis of confidence. This will be a severe blow to the HKMA whose sole role is currency stability, with the HKD being the underlying bedrock of Hong Kong’s financial system. In this report, we suggest that the HKD will survive this crisis, just as it has navigated previous shocks since 1983. The brunt of the adjustment will be domestic, first from Hong Kong equities, but spreading to real estate and consumer spending. Longer term, the HKD might become a relic as transactions in Hong Kong are increasingly conducted in RMB. Will The Peg Be Sustained? Historically, currency pegs more often than not fail. Specific to the HKD, the peg is facing its most critical test in decades but is likely to survive for a few reasons. First, every HKD that the region of Hong Kong has ever printed is backed by USD reserves, to the tune of 1.8 times. Quite simply, FX reserves are much higher than the Hong Kong monetary base (Chart 2). This suggests the HKMA’s “convertibility promise” remains credible. Second, Hong Kong also ranks favorably when looking at the ratio of broad money supply to FX reserves. Every 42.3 cents of broad money creation can be backed by foreign currency, a ratio much higher than China and on par with Singapore (Chart 3). With a monetary base fully backed by FX reserves and a broad money-to-FX reserve ratio largely in line with other linked exchange rate systems, our bias is that the peg will remain in place at least over a cyclical horizon (12-18 months). Chart 2In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg Chart 3The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC This credibility will come at a huge cost to the domestic economy, however. By having a fixed exchange rate system and an open capital account, Hong Kong has given up control over domestic monetary policy. Consequently, it must import monetary policy from the US. As interest rates rise in the US, demand for US dollar deposits from Hong Kong concerns goes up, putting downward pressure on the exchange rate. To maintain the convertibility ratio, the HKMA must drain the system of Hong Kong dollars to lift domestic interest rates. This is quite visible not only from the drop in foreign exchange reserves, but also the drawdown in the aggregate balance of domestic banks parked at the HKMA (Chart 4). From May 11 through August, the HKMA has absorbed a total of HKD 213 billion, shrinking the aggregate balance in the banking system by more than 60%. Chart 4Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Historically, the aggregate balance has had to drop much more to restore an equilibrium between interest rates in the US and Hong Kong SAR. The implication is that liquidity will continue to be drained from the system to ultimately defend the peg, and local interest rates will rise. There is one important caveat: Hong Kong SAR’s net international investment position stands at 580% of GDP, much higher than broad money supply. As such, the Hong Kong SAR does not have a solvency problem. What it faces is too much domestic liquidity, which is pushing HKD interest rates lower (Chart 5). Chart 5The HKD Is Facing A Liquidity, Rather Than A Solvency Crisis The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg Ramifications Of The USD Peg When the HKD was tied to the US dollar in 1983, it made economic sense. Hong Kong SAR’s economy was more linked via trade to the US, compared to China (Chart 6). As such, stability vis-à-vis the US dollar was a vital appeal for traders, financiers, and all industries tied to the Hong Kong hub. Since then, there has been a tectonic shift in economic dependence. Exports to China now account for almost 60% of the total, while those to the US have fallen well below 8%. Quite simply, Hong Kong SAR still imports monetary policy from the US, while it is increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy. Nonetheless, there have been a few adjustments. The use of the RMB in Hong Kong SAR has been gradually gaining momentum. RMB deposits have risen to over HKD 800bn. As a share of narrow money supply (M1), it is almost 50% (Chart 7). There are also over 140 licensed banks in Hong Kong allowed to engage in RMB-based business. Chart 6Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Chart 7Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System These links extend beyond just banking turnover. First introduced in 2014, the southbound trading links between China and Hong Kong SAR have become a major conduit for mainland investors to gain exposure to foreign firms. The China-Hong Kong stock connect has now handled over 2.6tn RMB in cumulative flows. This represented as high as 40% of the equity turnover in Hong Kong SAR (Chart 8). Capital account transactions have also been progressively relaxed, and the issuance of RMB bonds has been rising rapidly since 2008. Chart 8Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Hong Kong SAR’s strengthening ties with China comes with some good news. The increase in Chinese domestic liquidity is lowering the cost of capital for local enterprises. At the same time, it might also be fuelling very low domestic interest rates, forcing locals to chase higher rates elsewhere. This does not affect the peg if people sell the RMB to buy other currencies, including the dollar or maybe even the HKD. The bad news is that Hong Kong has now become a high-beta play on China as both economies are inexorably interlinked. Chart 9 shows that consumers in Hong Kong SAR tend to have much more volatile spending patterns compared to China, especially when economic growth is about to slow. One reason is that Hong Kong concerns are highly levered notably to the property market (Chart 10). For example, the debt service ratio in Hong Kong SAR sits at 32% of disposable income, much higher than China or other indebted economies (Chart 11). This makes the economy very vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 9Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Chart 10Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 1) Property Prices In Hong Kong Will Drop Property Prices In Hong Kong Will Drop Chart 11Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) The bottom line is that as the HKMA withdraws domestic liquidity, this will reassert downward pressure on business activity and asset prices, particularly real estate. With private consumption a whopping 65% of GDP, household deleveraging will also prove to be a formidable headwind for domestic spending. Outside interest rates, Hong Kong SAR remains a trade hub. If global trade slows down meaningfully, this will lead to a deterioration in the current account. This triple whammy from slowing global trade, rising interest rates and consumer deleveraging could prove indigestible for Hong Kong assets. Policy Options Chart 12The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong As highlighted above, the HKD peg will remain in place for the foreseeable future, but this will come at a huge cost. The advantage of the HKD peg is that the choice of the nominal anchor, the US dollar, renders it credible. As a financial hub, this is crucial for Hong Kong. Meanwhile, such an anchor also imposes fiscal discipline since government deficits cannot be monetized by money printing. In the case where the government tries to be profligate, the rise in inflation will lower real rates and lead to capital outflows. This will force the HKMA to sell US dollars and absorb local currency. Indeed, over the past several years, government debt in Hong Kong has been close to nil (Chart 12). The drawback of a fixed exchange-rate regime is that Hong Kong SAR has relinquished control over independent monetary policy. Such a union was justified when the economic cycles between the US and Hong Kong SAR were in sync, but now the region needs easier policy settings. The roadmap of the late 1990s could be what is in store for Hong Kong SAR. In short, the peg survived but the region went through a severe internal devaluation. During the Asian crisis, property prices fell by more than 60%. If that were to occur today, it would herald a prolonged period of high unemployment and stagnant wages to realign the region’s competitiveness with its trading partners. Hong Kong SAR stocks have already borne the brunt of an internal adjustment and are trading at very cheap multiples (Chart 13). The MSCI Hong Kong stock index is composed of mostly financials (47% of market cap) and property stocks (21% of market cap). As HKD rates are rising, loan growth in Hong Kong SAR is contracting and net interest margins have collapsed (Chart 14). This does not bode well for the near-term performance of financials. Chart 13Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Chart 14Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough ##br##Reckoning Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough Reckoning Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough Reckoning The good news is that similar to the late 1990s, banks are unlikely to go bust. Hong Kong SAR banks are well capitalized and delinquency rates are quite low, suggesting a banking crisis is unlikely to be a source of pain for the HKD peg (Chart 15). In fact, Hong Kong SAR banks rank favorably among their global peers in terms of capital adequacy (Chart 16). Chart 15Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Chart 16Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 2) The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg Specific to the currency, Hong Kong is also running recurring current account surpluses. This is boosting its FX reserves (Chart 17). That lends credibility to the peg in the near term. The bad news is that as the domestic economy slows down, and global trade comes close to a standstill, these surpluses could evaporate. One cost to Hong Kong is that the peg to the US dollar has made HKD incrementally expensive. Our model shows that the real effective exchange for HKD is about 2.5 standard deviations above fair value (Chart 18). Our view on the US dollar is that we could see depreciation over a 12-to-18-month horizon, but an overshoot in the near term is quite likely. A drop in the US dollar will help realign competitiveness in the HKD. Meantime, the market has also been pushing the currency towards the weaker side of its convertibility band. Chart 17Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Chart 18The HKD Is Expensive The HKD Is Expensive The HKD Is Expensive Longer term, as Hong Kong SAR continues to become more entwined with China, a peg to the CNY will make sense. This process will be the initial step in the region’s official embrace of the RMB system. That said, the process will be gradual since the US dollar remains very much a reserve currency, and the relevance of Hong Kong SAR as a financial center hinges upon easy access to the USD. What is more likely is that any re-pegging to the RMB will come many years down the road, when the yuan has become a fully convertible currency. The de-pegging of the HKD from the USD or adjusting the peg is as much a political discussion as an economic one. Political conditions for this change are not yet present given such a change will have major ramifications for the economy of Hong Kong SAR and will likely also reverberate through financial asset prices. One can imagine a scenario where HKD yields are forced to adjust to a new nominal anchor. Investors have been convinced through almost 30 years of history to treat the HKD as a proxy for the US dollar. That said, the economic pain associated with maintaining the HKD-USD peg will ensure authorities accelerate the use of RMBs in Hong Kong, with a goal of eventually adopting the yuan as the de facto currency. Adopting  a currency board akin to Singapore is another option that makes sense, especially since this would give the HKMA scope to link to cheaper currencies, such as the yen and euro. That said, this is unlikely to be politically palatable, especially for Beijing. A link to the yuan that already does this job makes sense. Finally, there is always the option to fully float the peg, but this would probably increase currency volatility. This is unlikely in the near term. The Goldilocks scenario for policymakers is when the US dollar eventually depreciates against major currencies, easing financial conditions for Hong Kong SAR concerns. This will dovetail nicely with the goals of the monetary authorities, maintain credibility while easing financial concerns for a very levered economy. Investment Conclusions The HKD peg will remain in place, but the financial dislocations will lead to significant internal devaluation in Hong Kong SAR. As US interest rates rise, the HKD will be under considerable pressure. The HKMA will have no choice but to allow HKD interest rates to rise. This will tip the property market and thrust the economy into deflation and a recession. Chinese bonds are the best hedge against this risk. Avoid property and financial shares for the time being. Were the peg to break today, the HKD will depreciate according to our valuation models. This suggests markets are right to push the HKD-linked rate towards the weaker end of the convertibility band. Despite the economic and financial pain, the HKMA will not abandon the peg. That means carry trades will continue to make money. Using the HKD as a funding currency still makes sense in the near term. In long run, the economic pain associated with maintaining the HKD-USD peg will make authorities in Beijing accelerate the use of the RMB in Hong Kong’s special administrative region. The eventual goal will be for Hong Kong SAR to adopt the yuan as its currency.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor  qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong The HKD is facing its most critical test in several decades. While the peg is likely to survive (Feature Chart), the economic costs for Hong Kong SAR will be far reaching. Critically, monetary policy in Hong Kong SAR is being tailored behind a hawkish Fed, while economic ties with China increasingly warrant easier policy settings. This tug of war will be resolved via a reset in domestic spending and asset prices. Equity shares have been the first shoe to drop. Real estate values and consumer spending will be next. A hypothetical delinking of the peg will see the HKD depreciate since it is expensive on a real effective exchange rate basis. Longer term, the rising use of the RMB in Hong Kong SAR will render the peg a relic. It will also fit with China’s aims to internationalize the RMB.​​​​​. Bottom Line: The HKD peg is likely to survive in the near term, but the economic repercussions from maintaining the linked exchange-rate system will trigger a rethinking by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and mainland authorities. Eventually, HKD could be replaced by the CNY. For now, HKD interest rates are slated to rise further, which will have ramifications for domestic spending and asset prices. Feature Chart 1HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates HKD Has Been Tracking Interest Rates The Hong Kong dollar (HKD) has been trading on the weak side of its convertibility band since May. In theory, this suggests there is intense pressure for the peg to be delinked, which should lead to a much weaker exchange rate. In practice, interest rates in Hong Kong have failed to keep up with the surge in US rates, which has led to widening interest rate differentials between Hong Kong and the US. As a result, investors have embarked on a massive carry trade, funding USD purchases with HKDs (Chart 1). HKD’s weakness has raised questions about whether the exchange rate could face a crisis of confidence. This will be a severe blow to the HKMA whose sole role is currency stability, with the HKD being the underlying bedrock of Hong Kong’s financial system. In this report, we suggest that the HKD will survive this crisis, just as it has navigated previous shocks since 1983. The brunt of the adjustment will be domestic, first from Hong Kong equities, but spreading to real estate and consumer spending. Longer term, the HKD might become a relic as transactions in Hong Kong are increasingly conducted in RMB. Will The Peg Be Sustained? Historically, currency pegs more often than not fail. Specific to the HKD, the peg is facing its most critical test in decades but is likely to survive for a few reasons. First, every HKD that the region of Hong Kong has ever printed is backed by USD reserves, to the tune of 1.8 times. Quite simply, FX reserves are much higher than the Hong Kong monetary base (Chart 2). This suggests the HKMA’s “convertibility promise” remains credible. Second, Hong Kong also ranks favorably when looking at the ratio of broad money supply to FX reserves. Every 42.3 cents of broad money creation can be backed by foreign currency, a ratio much higher than China and on par with Singapore (Chart 3). With a monetary base fully backed by FX reserves and a broad money-to-FX reserve ratio largely in line with other linked exchange rate systems, our bias is that the peg will remain in place at least over a cyclical horizon (12-18 months). Chart 2In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg In Theory, The HKMA Can Defend The Peg Chart 3The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC The HKMA Ranks Favorably To The PBoC This credibility will come at a huge cost to the domestic economy, however. By having a fixed exchange rate system and an open capital account, Hong Kong has given up control over domestic monetary policy. Consequently, it must import monetary policy from the US. As interest rates rise in the US, demand for US dollar deposits from Hong Kong concerns goes up, putting downward pressure on the exchange rate. To maintain the convertibility ratio, the HKMA must drain the system of Hong Kong dollars to lift domestic interest rates. This is quite visible not only from the drop in foreign exchange reserves, but also the drawdown in the aggregate balance of domestic banks parked at the HKMA (Chart 4). From May 11 through August, the HKMA has absorbed a total of HKD 213 billion, shrinking the aggregate balance in the banking system by more than 60%. Chart 4Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Liquidity Will Shrink Further In Hong Kong Historically, the aggregate balance has had to drop much more to restore an equilibrium between interest rates in the US and Hong Kong SAR. The implication is that liquidity will continue to be drained from the system to ultimately defend the peg, and local interest rates will rise. There is one important caveat: Hong Kong SAR’s net international investment position stands at 580% of GDP, much higher than broad money supply. As such, the Hong Kong SAR does not have a solvency problem. What it faces is too much domestic liquidity, which is pushing HKD interest rates lower (Chart 5). Chart 5The HKD Is Facing A Liquidity, Rather Than A Solvency Crisis The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg Ramifications Of The USD Peg When the HKD was tied to the US dollar in 1983, it made economic sense. Hong Kong SAR’s economy was more linked via trade to the US, compared to China (Chart 6). As such, stability vis-à-vis the US dollar was a vital appeal for traders, financiers, and all industries tied to the Hong Kong hub. Since then, there has been a tectonic shift in economic dependence. Exports to China now account for almost 60% of the total, while those to the US have fallen well below 8%. Quite simply, Hong Kong SAR still imports monetary policy from the US, while it is increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy. Nonetheless, there have been a few adjustments. The use of the RMB in Hong Kong SAR has been gradually gaining momentum. RMB deposits have risen to over HKD 800bn. As a share of narrow money supply (M1), it is almost 50% (Chart 7). There are also over 140 licensed banks in Hong Kong allowed to engage in RMB-based business. Chart 6Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Hong Kong And China Are Tied To The Hip Chart 7Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System Hong Kong Is Transitioning Into A Defacto RMB System These links extend beyond just banking turnover. First introduced in 2014, the southbound trading links between China and Hong Kong SAR have become a major conduit for mainland investors to gain exposure to foreign firms. The China-Hong Kong stock connect has now handled over 2.6tn RMB in cumulative flows. This represented as high as 40% of the equity turnover in Hong Kong SAR (Chart 8). Capital account transactions have also been progressively relaxed, and the issuance of RMB bonds has been rising rapidly since 2008. Chart 8Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Lots Of Financial Links Between The HKD and RMB Hong Kong SAR’s strengthening ties with China comes with some good news. The increase in Chinese domestic liquidity is lowering the cost of capital for local enterprises. At the same time, it might also be fuelling very low domestic interest rates, forcing locals to chase higher rates elsewhere. This does not affect the peg if people sell the RMB to buy other currencies, including the dollar or maybe even the HKD. The bad news is that Hong Kong has now become a high-beta play on China as both economies are inexorably interlinked. Chart 9 shows that consumers in Hong Kong SAR tend to have much more volatile spending patterns compared to China, especially when economic growth is about to slow. One reason is that Hong Kong concerns are highly levered notably to the property market (Chart 10). For example, the debt service ratio in Hong Kong SAR sits at 32% of disposable income, much higher than China or other indebted economies (Chart 11). This makes the economy very vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 9Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Hong Kong Is Economically More Volatile Than China Chart 10Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 1) Property Prices In Hong Kong Will Drop Property Prices In Hong Kong Will Drop Chart 11Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) Hong Kong Cannot Escape A Hard Landing (Part 2) The bottom line is that as the HKMA withdraws domestic liquidity, this will reassert downward pressure on business activity and asset prices, particularly real estate. With private consumption a whopping 65% of GDP, household deleveraging will also prove to be a formidable headwind for domestic spending. Outside interest rates, Hong Kong SAR remains a trade hub. If global trade slows down meaningfully, this will lead to a deterioration in the current account. This triple whammy from slowing global trade, rising interest rates and consumer deleveraging could prove indigestible for Hong Kong assets. Policy Options Chart 12The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong The Government Could Bail Out Hong Kong As highlighted above, the HKD peg will remain in place for the foreseeable future, but this will come at a huge cost. The advantage of the HKD peg is that the choice of the nominal anchor, the US dollar, renders it credible. As a financial hub, this is crucial for Hong Kong. Meanwhile, such an anchor also imposes fiscal discipline since government deficits cannot be monetized by money printing. In the case where the government tries to be profligate, the rise in inflation will lower real rates and lead to capital outflows. This will force the HKMA to sell US dollars and absorb local currency. Indeed, over the past several years, government debt in Hong Kong has been close to nil (Chart 12). The drawback of a fixed exchange-rate regime is that Hong Kong SAR has relinquished control over independent monetary policy. Such a union was justified when the economic cycles between the US and Hong Kong SAR were in sync, but now the region needs easier policy settings. The roadmap of the late 1990s could be what is in store for Hong Kong SAR. In short, the peg survived but the region went through a severe internal devaluation. During the Asian crisis, property prices fell by more than 60%. If that were to occur today, it would herald a prolonged period of high unemployment and stagnant wages to realign the region’s competitiveness with its trading partners. Hong Kong SAR stocks have already borne the brunt of an internal adjustment and are trading at very cheap multiples (Chart 13). The MSCI Hong Kong stock index is composed of mostly financials (47% of market cap) and property stocks (21% of market cap). As HKD rates are rising, loan growth in Hong Kong SAR is contracting and net interest margins have collapsed (Chart 14). This does not bode well for the near-term performance of financials. Chart 13Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Markets Have Already Discounted A Pessimistic Scenario For Hong Kong Shares Chart 14Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough ##br##Reckoning Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough Reckoning Banks In Hong Kong Are Facing A Tough Reckoning The good news is that similar to the late 1990s, banks are unlikely to go bust. Hong Kong SAR banks are well capitalized and delinquency rates are quite low, suggesting a banking crisis is unlikely to be a source of pain for the HKD peg (Chart 15). In fact, Hong Kong SAR banks rank favorably among their global peers in terms of capital adequacy (Chart 16). Chart 15Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 1) Chart 16Banks In Hong Kong Are Well Capitalized (Part 2) The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg The Future Of The Hong Kong Dollar Peg Specific to the currency, Hong Kong is also running recurring current account surpluses. This is boosting its FX reserves (Chart 17). That lends credibility to the peg in the near term. The bad news is that as the domestic economy slows down, and global trade comes close to a standstill, these surpluses could evaporate. One cost to Hong Kong is that the peg to the US dollar has made HKD incrementally expensive. Our model shows that the real effective exchange for HKD is about 2.5 standard deviations above fair value (Chart 18). Our view on the US dollar is that we could see depreciation over a 12-to-18-month horizon, but an overshoot in the near term is quite likely. A drop in the US dollar will help realign competitiveness in the HKD. Meantime, the market has also been pushing the currency towards the weaker side of its convertibility band. Chart 17Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Balance Of Payments Remain Favorable For The HKD Chart 18The HKD Is Expensive The HKD Is Expensive The HKD Is Expensive Longer term, as Hong Kong SAR continues to become more entwined with China, a peg to the CNY will make sense. This process will be the initial step in the region’s official embrace of the RMB system. That said, the process will be gradual since the US dollar remains very much a reserve currency, and the relevance of Hong Kong SAR as a financial center hinges upon easy access to the USD. What is more likely is that any re-pegging to the RMB will come many years down the road, when the yuan has become a fully convertible currency. The de-pegging of the HKD from the USD or adjusting the peg is as much a political discussion as an economic one. Political conditions for this change are not yet present given such a change will have major ramifications for the economy of Hong Kong SAR and will likely also reverberate through financial asset prices. One can imagine a scenario where HKD yields are forced to adjust to a new nominal anchor. Investors have been convinced through almost 30 years of history to treat the HKD as a proxy for the US dollar. That said, the economic pain associated with maintaining the HKD-USD peg will ensure authorities accelerate the use of RMBs in Hong Kong, with a goal of eventually adopting the yuan as the de facto currency. Adopting  a currency board akin to Singapore is another option that makes sense, especially since this would give the HKMA scope to link to cheaper currencies, such as the yen and euro. That said, this is unlikely to be politically palatable, especially for Beijing. A link to the yuan that already does this job makes sense. Finally, there is always the option to fully float the peg, but this would probably increase currency volatility. This is unlikely in the near term. The Goldilocks scenario for policymakers is when the US dollar eventually depreciates against major currencies, easing financial conditions for Hong Kong SAR concerns. This will dovetail nicely with the goals of the monetary authorities, maintain credibility while easing financial concerns for a very levered economy. Investment Conclusions The HKD peg will remain in place, but the financial dislocations will lead to significant internal devaluation in Hong Kong SAR. As US interest rates rise, the HKD will be under considerable pressure. The HKMA will have no choice but to allow HKD interest rates to rise. This will tip the property market and thrust the economy into deflation and a recession. Chinese bonds are the best hedge against this risk. Avoid property and financial shares for the time being. Were the peg to break today, the HKD will depreciate according to our valuation models. This suggests markets are right to push the HKD-linked rate towards the weaker end of the convertibility band. Despite the economic and financial pain, the HKMA will not abandon the peg. That means carry trades will continue to make money. Using the HKD as a funding currency still makes sense in the near term. In long run, the economic pain associated with maintaining the HKD-USD peg will make authorities in Beijing accelerate the use of the RMB in Hong Kong’s special administrative region. The eventual goal will be for Hong Kong SAR to adopt the yuan as its currency.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor  qingyunx@bcaresearch.com

Listen to a short summary of this report     Executive Summary GIS Projection For The EUR/USD It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro We went long the euro early last week, as EUR/USD hit our buy limit price of $0.99. Despite a near cut-off of Russian gas imports, European gas inventories have reached 84% of capacity – above the 80% target that the EU set for November 1st. The latest meteorological forecasts suggest that Europe will experience a warmer-than-normal winter. This will cut heating usage, likely making gas rationing unnecessary. Currencies fare best in loose fiscal/tight monetary environments. This is what Europe faces over the coming months, as governments boost income support for households and businesses, while ramping up spending on energy infrastructure and defense. For its part, the ECB has started hiking rates. Since mid-August, interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the euro at both the short and long end. Rising inflation expectations make it less likely that the ECB will be able to back off from its tightening campaign as it did in past cycles. A hawkish Fed is the biggest risk to our bullish EUR/USD view. We expect US inflation to trend lower over the coming months, before reaccelerating in the second half of 2023. However, as the August CPI report highlights, the danger is that any dip in inflation proves to be shallower and shorter-lived than previously anticipated. Bottom Line: Although significant uncertainty remains, the risk-reward trade-off favors being long EUR/USD. Our end-2022 target is $1.06.   Dear Client, I will be meeting clients in Asia next week while also working on our Fourth Quarter Strategy Outlook, which will be published at the end of the month. In lieu of our regular report next Friday, you will receive a Special Report from my colleague, Ritika Mankar, discussing the sources of US equity outperformance over the past 14 years and the likely path ahead. Best Regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist It’s Just a Clown Chart 1Investors Are Bullish The Dollar, Not The Euro Investors Are Bullish The Dollar, Not The Euro Investors Are Bullish The Dollar, Not The Euro The scariest part of a horror movie is usually the one before the monster is revealed. No matter how good the special effects, the human brain can always conjure up something more frightening than anything Hollywood can dream up. Investors have been conjuring up all sorts of cataclysmic scenarios for the upcoming European winter. In financial markets, the impact has been most visible in the value of the euro, which has tumbled to parity against the US dollar. Only 23% of investors are bullish the euro at present, down from a peak of 78% in January 2021 (Chart 1). Conversely, 75% of investors are bullish the US dollar. More than half of fund managers cited “long US dollar” as the most crowded trade in the latest BofA Global Fund Manager Survey (“long commodities” was a distant second at 10%). As we discuss below, the outlook for the euro may be a lot better than most investors realize. While my colleagues, Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s chief FX strategist, and Mathieu Savary, BCA’s chief European strategist, are not quite ready to buy the euro just yet, we all agree that EUR/USD will rise over the long haul. Cutting Putin Loose Natural gas accounts for about a quarter of Europe’s energy supply. Prior to the Ukraine war, about 40% of that gas came from Russia (Chart 2). With the closure of the NordStream 1 pipeline, that number has fallen to 9% (some Russian gas continues to enter Europe via Ukraine and the TurkStream supply route). Yet, despite the deep drop in Russian natural gas imports, European natural gas inventories are up to 84% of capacity – roughly in line with past years and above the EU’s November 1st target of 80% (Chart 3). Chart 2Despite A Sharp Drop In Imports Of Russian Natural Gas… It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Chart 3...Europeans Managed To Stock Up On Natural Gas For The Winter Season ...Europeans Managed To Stock Up On Natural Gas For The Winter Season ...Europeans Managed To Stock Up On Natural Gas For The Winter Season   Europe has been able to achieve this feat by aggressively buying natural gas on the open market. While this has caused gas prices to soar, it sets the stage for a retreat in prices in the months ahead. European spot natural gas prices have already fallen from over €300/Mwh in late August to €214/Mwh, and the futures market is discounting a further decline in prices over the next two years (Chart 4). Chart 4The Futures Market Is Discounting A Further Decline In Natural Gas Prices It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Chart 5Futures Prices Of Energy Commodities Provide Some Limited Information On Where Spot Prices Are Heading It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Follow the Futures? Futures prices are not a foolproof guide to where spot prices are heading. As Chart 5 illustrates, the correlation between the slope of the futures curve and subsequent changes in spot prices in energy markets is quite low. Nevertheless, future spot returns do tend to be negative when the curve is backwardated, as it is now, especially when assessed over horizons of around 12-to-18 months (Table 1).   Table 1Energy Commodity Spot Price Returns Tend To Be Negative When The Futures Curve Is Backwardated It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Our guess is that European natural gas prices will indeed fall further from current levels. The latest meteorological forecasts suggest that Europe will experience a milder-than-normal winter (Chart 6). This is critical considering that natural gas accounts for over 40% of EU residential heating use once electricity and heat generated in gas-fired plants are included (Chart 7). Chart 6Meteorological Models Suggest Above-Normal Temperatures In Europe This Winter It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro   Chart 7Natural Gas Is An Important Source Of Energy For Heating Homes In The EU It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro A warm winter would bolster the euro area’s trade balance, which has fallen into deficit this year as the energy import bill has soared (Chart 8). An improving balance of payments would help the euro. Europe is moving quickly to secure new sources of energy supply. In less than one year, Europe has become America’s biggest overseas market for LNG (Chart 9). A new gas pipeline linking Spain with the rest of Europe should be operational by next spring. Chart 8Soaring Energy Costs Have Pushed The Euro Area Trade Balance Into Deficit Soaring Energy Costs Have Pushed The Euro Area Trade Balance Into Deficit Soaring Energy Costs Have Pushed The Euro Area Trade Balance Into Deficit Chart 9Europe Is America's Largest LNG Customer It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro In the meantime, Germany is building two “floating” LNG terminals. It has also postponed plans to mothball its nuclear power plants and has restarted its coal-fired power plants, a decision that even the German Green Party has supported. France is aiming to boost nuclear capacity, which had fallen below 50% earlier this summer. Électricité de France has pledged to nearly double daily production by December. For its part, the Dutch government has indicated it will raise output from the massive Groningen natural gas field if the energy crisis intensifies. Fiscal Policy to the Rescue On the policy front, European governments are taking steps to buttress household balance sheets during the energy crisis, with nearly €400 billion in support measures announced so far (and surely more to come). Although these support measures will be offset with roughly €140 billion of windfall profit taxes on the energy sector, the net effect will be to raise budget deficits across the region. However, following the old adage that one should “finance temporary shocks but adjust to permanent ones,” a temporary spike in fiscal support may be just what the doctor ordered. The last thing Europe needs is a situation where energy prices fall next year, but the region remains mired in recession as households seek to rebuild their savings. Such an outcome would depress tax revenues, likely leading to higher government debt-to-GDP ratios. Get Ready For a V-Shaped Recovery Stronger growth in the rest of the world should give the euro area a helping hand. That would be good news for the euro, given its cyclical characteristics (Chart 10). The European economy is especially leveraged to Chinese growth. It is likely that the authorities will loosen the zero-Covid policy once the Twentieth Party Congress concludes next month, and new anti-viral drugs and possibly an Omicron-specific booster shot become widely available later this year. That should help jumpstart China’s economy. More stimulus will also help. Chart 11 shows that EUR/USD is highly correlated with the Chinese credit/fiscal impulse. Chart 10The Euro Is A Cyclical Currency The Euro Is A Cyclical Currency The Euro Is A Cyclical Currency Chart 11EUR/USD Is Highly Correlated With The Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse EUR/USD Is Highly Correlated With The Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse EUR/USD Is Highly Correlated With The Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse   All this suggests that the prevailing view on European growth is too pessimistic. Even if Europe does succumb to a technical recession in the months ahead, it is likely to experience a V-shaped recovery. That will provide a nice tailwind for the euro. Loose Fiscal/Tight Monetary Policies: The Winning Combo for Currencies Chart 12Fiscal Policy Has Eased Structurally In The Euro Area More Than In Other Advanced Economies It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro A tight monetary and loose fiscal policy has historically been the most bullish combination for currencies. Recall that the US dollar soared in the early 1980s on the back of Paul Volcker’s restrictive monetary policy and Ronald Reagan’s expansionary fiscal policy, the latter consisting of huge tax cuts and increased military spending. While not nearly on the same scale, the euro area’s current configuration of loose fiscal/tight monetary policies bears some resemblance to the US in the early 1980s. Even before the war in Ukraine began, the IMF was forecasting a much bigger swing towards expansionary fiscal policy in the euro area than in the rest of the world (Chart 12). The war has only intensified this trend, triggering a flurry of spending on energy and defense – spending that is likely to persist for most of this decade.   The ECB’s Reaction Function After biding its time, the ECB has joined the growing list of central banks that are hiking rates. On September 8th, the ECB jacked up the deposit rate by 75 bps. Investors expect a further 185 bps in hikes through to September 2023. While US rate expectations have widened relative to euro area expectations since the August US CPI report (more on that later), the gap is still narrower than it was on August 15th. Back then, investors expected euro area 3-month rates to be 233 bps below comparable US rates in June 2023. Today, they expect the gap to be only 177 bps (Chart 13). Real long-term bond spreads, which conceptually at least should be the more important driver of currency movements, have also moved in the euro’s favor. In the past, ECB rate hikes were swiftly followed by cuts as the region was unable to tolerate even moderately higher rates. While this very well could happen again, the odds are lower than they once were, at least over the next 12 months. Chart 13Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Euro Since Mid-August Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Euro Since Mid-August Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Euro Since Mid-August Chart 14Euro Area: Inflation Expectations Have Risen Briskly Euro Area: Inflation Expectations Have Risen Briskly Euro Area: Inflation Expectations Have Risen Briskly For one thing, median inflation expectations three years ahead in the ECB’s monthly survey have risen briskly (Chart 14). The Bundesbank’s own survey paints an even more alarming picture, with median expected inflation over the next five years having risen to 5% from 3% in mid-2021 (Chart 15). Expected German inflation over the next ten years stands at a still-elevated 4%. Whether this reflects Germans’ heightened historical sensitivity to inflation risks is unclear, but it is something the ECB cannot ignore. Structurally looser fiscal policy has raised the neutral rate of interest in the euro area, giving the ECB more leeway to lift rates. A narrowing in competitiveness gaps across the currency bloc has also mitigated the need for the ECB to set rates based on the needs of the weakest economies in the region. Chart 16 shows that collectively, unit labor costs among the countries most afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis a decade ago have completely converged with Germany. Chart 15German Inflation Expectations Are Elevated German Inflation Expectations Are Elevated German Inflation Expectations Are Elevated Chart 16Europe's Periphery Has Closed The Competitiveness Gap With Germany Europe's Periphery Has Closed The Competitiveness Gap With Germany Europe's Periphery Has Closed The Competitiveness Gap With Germany While Italy is still a laggard in the competitiveness rankings, the ECB’s new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) – which allows the central bank to buy sovereign debt with less stringent conditionality than under the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program – should keep a lid on sovereign spreads. This, in turn, will allow the ECB to raise rates more than it otherwise could. Hawkish Fed is the Biggest Risk to Our Bullish EUR/USD View Chart 17Supplier Delivery Times Have Fallen Sharply Supplier Delivery Times Have Fallen Sharply Supplier Delivery Times Have Fallen Sharply Tuesday’s hotter-than-expected August US CPI report pulled the rug from under the euro’s incipient rally, pushing EUR/USD back to parity. We have been flagging the risks of high inflation for several years (see, for example, our February 19, 2021 report, 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again). Our thesis is that inflation will follow a “two steps up, one step down” pattern. We are probably near the top of those two steps now, with the next leg for inflation likely to be to the downside, driven by ebbing pandemic-related supply side-dislocations. Perhaps most notably, supplier delivery times have fallen sharply in recent months (Chart 17). These pandemic-related dislocations extend to the housing rental market. Rent inflation dropped after rent moratoriums were put in place, only to rebound forcefully once the moratoriums were lifted and the labor market tightened. Although official measures of rent inflation will remain elevated for some time, owing to lags in how they are constructed, timelier data on new rental units coming to market already point to a sharp decline in rent inflation (Chart 18). This is something that the Fed is sure to notice. Ironically, falling inflation could sow the seeds of its own demise. Nominal wage growth is currently very elevated, yet because of high inflation, real wages are still shrinking. As inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. This will lift consumer sentiment, helping to buoy consumption (Chart 19). A pickup in consumer spending will cause the economy to overheat again, leading to a second wave of inflation in the back half of 2023. Chart 18Timelier Measures Of Rent Inflation Have Rolled Over Timelier Measures Of Rent Inflation Have Rolled Over Timelier Measures Of Rent Inflation Have Rolled Over Chart 19Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence As we discussed in our August 18th Special Report Dispatches From The Future: From Goldilocks To President DeSantis, the Fed will respond to this second inflationary wave by hiking the Fed funds rate to 5%. This will temporarily push up the value of the dollar, a process that will only stop once the US falls into recession in 2024 and the Fed is forced to cut rates again. Our projected rollercoaster ride for EUR/USD is depicted in Chart 20. We see the euro rising to $1.06 by year-end, peaking at $1.11 in the spring of 2023, falling back to $1.05 by late 2023, and then beginning a prolonged rally in 2024. Chart 20GIS Projection For The EUR/USD It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Chart 21The Dollar Is Very Overvalued Against The Euro Based On PPP The Dollar Is Very Overvalued Against The Euro Based On PPP The Dollar Is Very Overvalued Against The Euro Based On PPP Chart 21 shows that the dollar is 30% overvalued against the euro based on its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate. Thus, there is significant long-term upside to EUR/USD.   Implications for Other Currencies and Regional Equity Allocation Chart 22Stock Markets Outside The US Tend To Fare Best When The Dollar Is Weakening Stock Markets Outside The US Tend To Fare Best When The Dollar Is Weakening Stock Markets Outside The US Tend To Fare Best When The Dollar Is Weakening The strengthening in the euro that we envision over the next six months or so will be part of a broad-based dollar decline. While BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy service sees more upside for the euro than the pound, GBP/USD will likely follow the same trajectory as EUR/USD. The yen is one of the cheapest currencies in the world and should finally gain some traction. If China abandons its zero-Covid policy and increases fiscal support for its economy, the RMB and other EM currencies should strengthen. Stock markets outside the US tend to fare best when the dollar is weakening. This includes Europe. As Chart 22 illustrates, there is a close correlation between EUR/USD and the relative performance of European versus US stocks. Thus, an above-benchmark exposure to international markets is appropriate during the coming months. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on           LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores It’s Time To Buy The Euro It’s Time To Buy The Euro      

Executive Summary Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract The bar for the Fed to stop hiking rates is still very high. US inflation remains broad based. Core inflation is neither about oil and food prices nor is it about the prices of other individual items. The key variables that will determine inflation’s persistence are wages and unit labor costs. US wage growth is very elevated, and unit labor costs are soaring. Unless the US economy experiences a recession, core inflation will not drop below 3.5%. The Fed and the US stock market (and by extension global risk assets) remain on a collision course. The Fed will not make a dovish pivot until the stock market sell off, and equities cannot rally unless the Fed backs off. The imminent global trade contraction is bad news for EM stocks and currencies as well as global cyclicals. Bottom Line: A hawkish Fed amid a global trade/manufacturing recession is producing a bearish cocktail for global risk assets in general and EM risk assets in particular. Feature The majority of investors and strategists have been expecting an easing of US inflation to allow the Federal Reserve to completely halt or considerably slow the pace of its hiking cycle. For example, the Bank of America Global Fund Managers survey from September (taken before the release of the latest US CPI report) revealed that a net 79% of participants see lower inflation in the next 12 months. We at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team have taken a different view. Even though we have been open to the idea that the annual rate of inflation (especially the headline measure) will drop in the months to come, we have been arguing that US core inflation will remain well above the 3.5-4% range for some time. What matters for the Fed’s policy is the level of core inflation, not just a decline in the inflation rate. With core inflation considerably above the Fed’s 2% target, we have maintained that the FOMC will uphold its hawkish bias. Consequently, global risk assets will continue selling off and the US dollar will overshoot. Analyzing the price dynamics of individual items − such as energy, food, shelter or cars – when assessing the outlook for inflation is akin to missing the forest for the trees. Chart 1US Core-Type Inflation Measures Are Very High US Core-Type Inflation Measures Are Very High US Core-Type Inflation Measures Are Very High When inflation is limited to several individual components of the consumption basket, neither central banks nor financial markets should react. This is true both when the prices of these individual components are rising (inflation) and when they are falling (deflation). However, central banks and, hence, financial markets, should respond to broad-based inflation. Therefore, investors need to look at the forest rather than focus on individual trees. In our February 18, 2022 report, we wrote the following: “US inflation has become broad based. Not only is core CPI surging but also trimmed-mean, median and sticky core consumer price inflation has risen substantially. Median and trimmed-mean price indexes would not be rocketing if inflation was limited to select goods or services. Particularly, the aforementioned measures exclude components with extreme price changes. What might have started as a narrow-based relative price shock has evolved into broad-based genuine inflation. The key to the transition from one-off inflation spikes to persistent genuine inflation is wages, more specifically unit labor costs. Unit labor costs are calculated as nominal wages divided by productivity (the latter is output per hour per employee).” All of these points remain valid today. Chart 1 shows that core, median, trimmed-mean and sticky CPI are all rising at very fast annual rates, ranging from 6% to 7.2%. Hence, underlying inflationary pressures remain broad based and persistent in the US economy. As a result, the bar for the Fed to stop hiking rates is very high. Last week, FOMC member Christopher Waller stated that he would need to see month-on-month core inflation prints of around 0.2% for a period of five to six months before he is comfortable with backing off on rate hikes. In the past three months, the monthly rates of various measures of underlying core inflation have ranged between 0.5-0.65%. Even though oil and food prices have relapsed and freight rates have plunged, US core inflation has still surprised to the upside. The point being is that core inflation is neither about oil and food prices nor is it about the prices of other individual items. We have been arguing for some time that the key variables to watch to determine whether inflation will be persistent are wages and unit labor costs. US wage growth is elevated, and unit labor costs are soaring (Chart 2). Finally, companies have raised prices at an annual rate of 8-9% (Chart 3). Chart 2US Labor Costs Have Been Surging US Labor Costs Have Been Surging US Labor Costs Have Been Surging Chart 3US Companies Have Raised Prices At An 8-9% Annual Rate US Companies Have Raised Prices At An 8-9% Annual Rate US Companies Have Raised Prices At An 8-9% Annual Rate     US Stagflation Or Recession? Is the US economy heading into stagflation or recession? How persistent will US inflation prove to be? Over the next several months, US core inflation will prove to be sticky. So, stagflation (weak real growth and high inflation) is the likely outcome over the near term. Beyond this period, say on a 12-month horizon, the US economic outlook is less clear.   Chart 4US Corporate Profit Margins Have Peaked US Corporate Profit Margins Have Peaked US Corporate Profit Margins Have Peaked One thing we are certain of is that faced with surging unit labor costs, US companies will attempt to raise their prices to protect their profit margins and profitability. Our proxy for US corporate profit margins signals that margins are already rolling over (Chart 4). Hence, business owners and CEOs will attempt to raise selling prices further. This will lead to one of two possible scenarios for the US economy in the months ahead. Scenario 1: If customers (households and businesses) are willing to pay considerably higher prices, nominal sales will remain very robust, and profits will not collapse, reducing the likelihood of a recession. Yet, this means that inflation will become even more entrenched, and employees will continue to demand higher wages. A wage-price spiral could unravel. The Fed will have to raise rates by much more than what is currently priced in financial markets. This is negative for US share prices. Scenario 2: If customers push back against higher prices and respond by curtailing their purchases, then sales and output volume will relapse, i.e., the economy will enter a recession. In this scenario, inflation will plummet, corporate margins will shrink (prices received will rise much less than unit labor costs) and profits will plunge. Suffering a profit squeeze, companies will lay off employees, and wage growth will decelerate sharply. Although bond yields will drop significantly, the benefit to equities will be offset by plunging corporate profits. We are not certain which of these two scenarios will prevail: it is hard to determine the point at which US consumers will push back against rising prices. Nevertheless, it is notable that in both scenarios, the outlook for stocks is poor. Bottom Line: Inflation is an inert and persistent phenomenon. The inflation genie has escaped from the bottle. When this happens, it is hard to put the genie back. In short, unless the US economy experiences a recession, core inflation will not drop below 3.5%. Still On A Collision Course On February 18 of this year, we published a piece titled A Collision In The Fog Of Inflation?, arguing that the Fed and the US equity market are on a collision course amidst the fog of inflation. Specifically, we noted that “the Fed will not make a dovish pivot until markets sell off, and markets cannot rally unless the Fed backs off.” This reasoning still applies. Barring a major US growth slump, US core inflation will not drop below 3.5%. Hence, the only way for the Fed to bring core inflation toward its 2% target is to tighten policy further. Financial conditions play a critical role in shaping the trajectory of the US economy. US domestic demand might not weaken sufficiently and, hence, US core inflation will not subside below 3.5% unless financial conditions tighten further (Chart 5). That is why a scenario in which US stocks and bonds rally despite the Fed’s continuous tightening is currently unlikely. Presently, there seems to be a dichotomy between the signal from the US yield curve and share prices. Despite the extremely inverted yield curve, US share prices have not yet fallen to new lows (Chart 6). Chart 5US Financial Conditions Have Room To Tighten Further US Financial Conditions Have Room To Tighten Further US Financial Conditions Have Room To Tighten Further Chart 6The US Yield Curve Is In An Equity Danger Zone The US Yield Curve Is In An Equity Danger Zone The US Yield Curve Is In An Equity Danger Zone Chart 7A Negative Bond Term Premium Amid High Volatility Is Paradoxical A Negative Bond Term Premium Amid High Volatility Is Paradoxical A Negative Bond Term Premium Amid High Volatility Is Paradoxical If US share prices do not break below their June lows, US interest rate expectations will rise further. The basis is that the Fed will not cut rates next year unless the economy is in recession and equities are selling off. In addition, there is a paradox in US long-term bonds. Despite exceptional inflation volatility, the Fed’s QT (reducing its bond holdings) and heightened US bond volatility, the US Treasurys’ term premium − the risk premium on bonds − is close to zero (Chart 7). That is why we expect the US bond market’s selloff to persist with 30-year yields pushing toward 4%. Consequently, US share prices will likely break below the major technical support that held up in the past 12 years (Chart 8). If the S&P 500 breaks below its June low, the next technical support is around 3200. Meanwhile, the US dollar will continue overshooting, as we argued in our recent report. Chart 8The S&P 500: Between Support And Resistance Lines The S&P 500: Between Support And Resistance Lines The S&P 500: Between Support And Resistance Lines Chart 9The EM Equity Index Is Still Above Its Long-Term Technical Support The EM Equity Index Is Still Above Its Long-Term Technical Support The EM Equity Index Is Still Above Its Long-Term Technical Support As for EM share prices, they will likely drop another 13-15% to reach their long-term technical support, as illustrated in Chart 9. Bottom Line: The Fed and the US stock market, and by extension global risk assets, remain on a collision course. A Global Manufacturing Recession Is Looming The latest data have corroborated our theme that global manufacturing and trade are heading into recession: Korean and Taiwanese manufacturing PMI new export orders have plunged well below the important 50 lines (Chart 10). Chinese imports for re-export are already contracting. They lead Chinese exports by three months (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract Global Manufacturing / Trade Will Contract Chart 11Chinese Exports Are About To Shrink Chinese Exports Are About To Shrink Chinese Exports Are About To Shrink Chart 12Emerging Asian Currencies And Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Stock Performance Emerging Asian Currencies And Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Stock Performance Emerging Asian Currencies And Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Stock Performance Chinese import volumes will continue shrinking, and EM ex-China domestic demand will relapse following the ongoing monetary tightening by their central banks. Finally, Emerging Asian currencies have been plunging, and such rapid and large-scale depreciation is a precursor to a global trade/manufacturing recession (Chart 12). Bottom Line: The imminent global trade contraction is bad for EM stocks and currencies as well as global cyclicals. Investment Strategy A hawkish Fed amid a global trade/manufacturing recession is producing a bearish cocktail for EM currencies and risk assets. Absolute-return investors should stay put on EM risk assets. Continue underweighting EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Emerging Asian currencies have more downside given the budding contraction in their exports and the interest rate differential moving further in favor of the US dollar. Commodity prices and commodity currencies remain at risk from the global manufacturing recession and the absence of a revival in Chinese demand. Overall, the US dollar will overshoot in the near term. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN and IDR. In addition, we continue to recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, KRW vs. JPY, and BRL vs. MXN. EM currency depreciation will cause EM credit spreads to widen. Odds are that EM sovereign and corporate bond yields will rise, which is a bearish signal for EM non-TMT stocks, as illustrated in Chart 13. Chart 13EM USD Bond Yields Are Instrumental For EM Share Prices EM USD Bond Yields Are Instrumental For EM Share Prices EM USD Bond Yields Are Instrumental For EM Share Prices Chart 14Beware Of A Breakdown in EM Tech Stocks Beware Of A Breakdown in EM Tech Stocks Beware Of A Breakdown in EM Tech Stocks EM technology stocks are also breaking down. The share prices of TSMC, Samsung and Tencent have all fallen below their long-term technical supports (Chart 14). This negative technical profile coupled with our fundamental assessment point to a further slide in these share prices. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)