Persian (Gulf)
Given its gloomy economic outlook, Iran is looking to expand ties with its neighbors in an attempt to soften the blow from the sanctions. Earlier this year president Hassan Rouhani and Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi signed several preliminary trade…
Highlights In Indonesia, investors are ignoring the weakness in global growth, which is an important driver of the country’s financial markets. The Indonesian currency, equities and local currency bonds all remain vulnerable. We continue to recommend underweighting Indonesian assets for now. In Turkey, additional adjustments in the exchange rate and interest rates are unavoidable. Stay put/underweight Turkish financial markets. In the UAE, the economy is set to improve marginally this year. We recommend overweighting UAE equities and corporate spreads within their respective EM portfolios. Feature Indonesia: The Currency And Bank Stocks Are At Risk Indonesian financial assets have benefited from the Federal Reserve’s dovish turn and corresponding fall in U.S. bond yields (Chart I-1, top panel). Moreover, the market is cheering President Joko Widodo’s lead in the presidential vote tally. Yet investors are ignoring the budding weakness in industrial metals prices, which has historically been an important driver of Indonesia’s exchange rate (Chart I-1, middle panel). Going forward, the Indonesian currency, equities and local currency bonds all remain vulnerable: Falling global growth in general and Chinese imports in particular will intensify Indonesia’s exports contraction and worsen the country’s already wide current account deficit. In turn, the latter will induce currency depreciation, which will then lead to higher interbank rates (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Global Growth Matters For Indonesian Markets Chart I-2Falling Current Account Deficit = Higher Local Rates Upward pressure on local interbank rates will cause a slowdown in domestic private loan growth. The Indonesian central bank – Bank Indonesia (BI) – has been attempting to lower interbank rates, which have been hovering above the central bank's policy rate (Chart I-3). To achieve this, the central bank has substantially increased excess reserves in the banking system (Chart I-4). It has done so by purchasing central bank certificates from commercial banks, conducting foreign exchange swaps and providing repo lending. Chart I-3A Sign Of Liquidity Strains Chart I-4Bank Indonesia Is Injecting Liquidity Yet by expanding banking system liquidity so aggressively, BI risks renewed currency depreciation. Like any central bank in a country with an open capital account, BI cannot expect to have full control over the exchange rate while simultaneously targeting local interest rates. The Impossibly Trinity dilemma dictates that a central bank needs to choose between controlling the two. Yet investors are ignoring the budding weakness in industrial metals prices, which has historically been an important driver of Indonesia’s exchange rate. Therefore, if BI continues to inject local currency liquidity to cap or bring down interest rates (interbank rates), the resulting excess liquidity could encourage and facilitate speculation against the rupiah. Scratching below the surface, the recent strong outperformance of Indonesian equities has been entirely due to the surge in the country’s bank share prices (Chart I-5, top panel). Remarkably, the performance of Indonesian non-financial as well as small-cap stocks has been especially dismal (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). This is an upshot of poor profitability among Indonesia’s non-financial listed companies (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Indonesian Bank Stocks Are The Only Outperformers Chart I-6Falling Non-Financial Corporate Profitability Furthermore, deteriorating financial health of non-financial corporates, especially small companies, will lead to higher NPLs on banks’ books. Notably, Indonesian banks are more heavily exposed to businesses than to households. As NPLs rise anew, Indonesian commercial banks will need to lift their bad-loan provisioning levels, generating a major profit relapse (Chart I-7). Importantly, Indonesian commercial banks have been boosting their profits by reducing NPL provisions since early 2018. Reversing this will materially affect their earnings. Chart I-7Indonesian Bank Share Prices Are Vulnerable Additionally, bank stocks are vulnerable due to falling net interest income margins. Moreover, their share prices are overbought and not cheap. To be clear, we are not negative on Indonesia’s structural outlook. The above-mentioned alarms are more near-to-medium terms issues. Still, foreign ownership of local currency bonds and stocks – at 38% each – are high, and could be a major source of potential outflows if the rupiah depreciates. This would cause Indonesian stocks and local currency bonds to sell off severely. Bottom Line: The global growth slowdown/commodities downturn and the U.S. dollar upturn are not yet over. Consequently, foreign flows into EM will diminish, which will be particularly negative for Indonesian financial markets. We recommend investors continue underweighting Indonesian equities and avoid Indonesian local currency bonds for now. We continue to recommend a short position in the IDR versus USD. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey’s Foreign Debt Bubble: The Worst Is Not Yet Behind Us Turkish financial assets, and the currency especially, will remain under selling pressure in the coming months. Additional adjustments in the exchange rate and interest rates - as well as in the real economy and current account balance - appear unavoidable. The key imbalance remains the gap between foreign debt obligations (FDOs) and the availability of foreign currency to meet these debt obligations. Turkey’s FDOs in 2019 are equivalent to $180 billion (Chart II-1). FDOs measure the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months. This consists of $15 billion in interest payments, $65 billion in debt amortization and $100 billion in maturing short-term (under one year) claims. In theory, these debt obligations can either be rolled over, or the nation should generate current account and capital account surpluses and use these surpluses to pay down FDOs. Even though the current account deficit is shrinking, it is still in a deficit of $18 billion. Net FDI inflows remain weak at US$10 billion. Hence, it appears that Turkey’s only options are either to roll over maturing foreign currency debt or to lure foreign investors into local currency assets and use the surplus in net portfolio inflows to meet these FDOs. The central bank’s foreign currency reserves excluding both commercial banks’ deposits at the Central Bank of Turkey and FX swaps now stand at $13 billion. However, due to a lack of credibility in the Turkish government’s macro policies - in addition to the ongoing deep economic recession and heightened financial market volatility - external creditors will be unwilling to roll over the debt. In fact, net portfolio flows into government debt and equities have tumbled for the same reason. Typically, when foreign funding dries up temporarily, a country can use its foreign exchange reserves to meet its FDOs. However, Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves have already plummeted to extremely low levels (Chart II-2). The central bank’s foreign currency reserves excluding both commercial banks’ deposits at the Central Bank of Turkey and FX swaps now stand at $13 billion. This is negligible compared with the $180 billion FDO figure due in 2019. Chart II-1Turkey: A Large Foreign Debt Servicing Burden Chart II-2Foreign Exchange Reserves Are Too Small The recent plunge in the central bank’s net foreign exchange reserves excluding swaps (i.e. net international reserves) has put many pertinent metrics at record lows. In particular, net international reserves are at a precarious level relative to both total imports and external debt (Chart II-3). Finally, the net international reserves-to-broad money supply ratio has fallen to 7% (from 15% in 2014) despite the fact that the massive lira depreciation reduced the U.S. dollar measure of broad money supply (Chart II-4). Chart II-3FX Reserves Do Not Cover Imports Or External Debt Chart II-4Low Coverage Of Broad Money By International Reserves The currency will have to depreciate further and interest rates will have to move higher to shrink domestic demand/imports more. This is needed to generate a current account surplus that could be used to service FDOs, or that otherwise entices foreign creditors to be willing to roll over foreign debt or invest in Turkey. Finally, while the adjustment in the real economy is advanced, it is unlikely to be over, due to the large foreign debt bubble. Importantly, with large foreign and local currency debt obligations coming due for both companies and households - in addition to the deterioration in economic activity and higher interest rates - NPLs are bound to rise (Chart II-5). This is especially likely to occur because a lot of borrowing has been used in the property market both for construction and purchases. Notably, real estate volumes are shrinking, and prices are deflating in real terms (Chart II-6). Chart II-5NPLs Will Rise A Lot Chart II-6Turkey: Real Estate Is In Free Fall Bottom Line: The macro adjustment in Turkey is not yet complete. The country still lacks foreign currency supply to service its enormous 2019 FDOs. Further currency depreciation and higher interest rates are required to depress domestic demand/imports and push the current account into surplus. Stay put / underweight Turkish financial markets. The authorities are becoming desperate, and the odds of capital control enforcement are not negligible. While such an outcome is not possible to forecast with any certainty or time frame, investors should consider this very real risk. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Overweight UAE Equities And Corporate Bonds Over the next six to nine months, we believe both UAE equities and corporate spreads will outperform their respective emerging market (EM) benchmarks. The UAE economy is set to improve marginally this year (Chart III-1). It will benefit from expansionary fiscal policy, rising oil output, a buoyant tourism sector, a resilient banking sector and less of a drag from the real estate sector. First, sizable fiscal spending will lead to rising non-oil economic growth. The UAE’s federal budget spending for 2019 will increase by 17.3% from a year ago, much higher than the 5.5% year-on-year growth in 2018. Second, UAE oil output could increase by 15% later this year from current levels (Chart III-2). The U.S. announced on April 22 that all Iran sanction waivers will not be extended beyond the early-May expiration date. The U.S. administration also stated that it has secured pledges from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to increase their oil production in order to offset disrupted supply from Iran. Rising oil output will mitigate the negative impact of potentially lower oil prices on the UAE’s economy. Chart III-1Improving UAE Economy Chart III-2Rising Oil Output Third, the outlook for the tourism sector is also positive. The number of tourists is set to rise as Expo 2020 approaches. The government is targeting 20 million visitors in 2020, 26% higher than last year’s levels. The UAE is building theme parks, museums, hotels and infrastructure to attract more tourists. The UAE economy is set to improve marginally this year. Fourth, the UAE’s banking sector will enjoy rising credit growth, robust profitability and improved asset quality this year. The banking system has been in consolidation mode since January 2016, with a 15% reduction in branches and a 14% drop in the number of employees. This has improved the banking sector’s profitability by cutting operating costs and increasing efficiency. The improving growth outlook will lift credit growth. The central bank’s most recent Credit Sentiment Survey suggests banks’ lending standards for both business and personal loans are loosening (Chart III-3). In addition, UAE banks enjoy large capital buffers. Despite rising non-performing loans (Chart III-4), UAE banks still reported a Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio of 17% as of December 2018. Chart III-3Credit Growth Is Likely To Increase Chart III-4Rising NPLs, But Still Large Capital Buffers Lastly, the real estate markets in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi have suffered from oversupply (from both mushrooming supply and weaker demand) over the past several years. Property prices have already fallen over 20% in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi from their 2014 peaks (Chart III-5). Odds are high that the most dangerous phase of the property market downturn is behind us. Chart III-5Real Estate Adjustment Is Advanced In addition, the government’s efforts to attract people to stay in the country longer will somewhat offset the ongoing exodus of expatriates. Last May, the UAE introduced a new visa system that will allow investors, innovators and talented specialists in the medical, scientific, research and technical fields to stay in the country for up to 10 years. Overall, a potential bottom in property demand and restrained supply will likely make the real estate sector less of a drag on this bourse this year. Finally, the authorities are also more open to increasing the foreign ownership cap in the banking sector, albeit not up to 100%. For example, in early April, the largest UAE lender – First Abu Dhabi Bank – obtained regulatory approval to increase its foreign ownership limit to 40% from 25%. This has boosted foreign equity purchases and has supported the equity index. Bottom Line: We recommend an overweight position in UAE equities within an EM portfolio this year (Chart III-6). For fixed income investors, we recommend overweighting UAE corporate credit in an EM corporate credit portfolio. UAE corporate credit is a lower beta market and will outperform as EM corporate spreads widen (Chart III-7). Most UAE-dollar corporate bonds have been issued by banks. Banks in the UAE do not suffer from structural overhangs, and the cyclical downturn in the property market is well advanced. This is why they have been, and will remain, a lower beta sector within an EM corporate credit portfolio. Chart III-6Overweight UAE Equities Within An EM Portfolio Chart III-7UAE Corporate Credit Will Likely Outperform EM Benchmark Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why? In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time. It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome. With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha. Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2 Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3 Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008). William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4 Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix France Appendix U.K. Appendix Germany Appendix Italy Appendix Spain Appendix Russia Appendix Korea Appendix Taiwan Appendix Turkey Appendix Brazil What’s On The Geopolitical Radar? Geopolitical Calendar
KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. …
Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2 The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD. We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption. KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4 For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in
OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production CutsTable 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick InTable 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market. Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut. Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019. KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November. Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019. OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019. We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3 China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4 In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions. One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions. 5 Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6 The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market. It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling. Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7 Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption. We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018