Money/Credit/Debt

Highlights The FOMC statement reaffirmed that the Fed remains in hiking mode. If the Fed keeps raising rates in line with the "dots," monetary policy will move into restrictive territory by early 2019. By then, the unemployment rate will have fallen to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Unfortunately, history suggests that once unemployment starts rising, it keeps rising. The good news is that today's economic imbalances are not as formidable as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The bad news is that cracks are starting to form. We are especially worried about the health of the U.S. commercial real estate sector. Remain overweight global equities for now, but look to significantly pare back exposure next summer. Feature The U.S. Expansion Is Getting Long In The Tooth Chart 1How Low Can It Go? How Low Can It Go? How Low Can It Go? The current U.S. expansion has now reached eight years, making it the third longest in the post-war era. History teaches that expansions do not die of old age. Rather, they are usually murdered by some combination of Fed tightening and the unwinding of the imbalances that were built up during the boom years. Thinking about the present, there is good and bad news on both fronts. Let's start with the Fed. This week's FOMC statement reaffirmed that the Fed remains in hiking mode. The good news is that real rates are still very low by historic standards, suggesting that the economy is unlikely to stall out this year. The bad news is that the Fed has less scope to raise rates than in the past. Chart 1 shows estimates of the real neutral rate developed by Fed researchers Thomas Laubach and Kathryn Holston, along with John Williams, President of the San Francisco Fed and Janet Yellen's close confidante. Their calculations suggest that the real neutral rate has plummeted over the past decade in the U.S. and the euro area, with lesser declines recorded in Canada and the U.K. In the U.S., the real neutral rate currently stands at 0.4%. Assuming the Fed raises interest rates in line with the "dots," rates will move into restrictive territory in early 2019. Given that monetary policy affects the real economy with a lag of 12-to-18 months, the Fed may not realize that it has raised rates too much until it is too late. The Downside Of A Low Unemployment Rate One might argue that this justifies a "go-slow" approach to tightening monetary policy. There is certainly validity to this view, but it is not without its drawbacks. The unemployment rate has now fallen to 4.3%, 0.4 points below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. As Chart 2 illustrates, the odds of a recession rise when the unemployment rate reaches such low levels. Some commentators have argued that the headline unemployment rate understates the amount of economic slack. We are skeptical that this is the case. Table 1 compares a wide variety of measures of labor market slack with where they stood at the height of the business cycle in 2000 and 2007. The main message of the table is that the unemployment rate today is broadly where one would expect it to be based on these collaborating indicators. Taken together, these indicators suggest that slack is comparable to what it was in 2007, albeit still above the levels seen in 2000. Chart 2 Table 1Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles The Timing Of The Next Recession The Timing Of The Next Recession As we noted last week, the easing in U.S. financial conditions over the past six months is likely to boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 3). If growth does accelerate, the unemployment rate - which is already 0.2 points below where the Fed thought it would be at the end of this year when it made its December 2016 projections - will fall below 4%. There is a high probability that this will fuel inflation, reversing the largely technically-driven decline in most core inflation measures over the past few months. Chart 3U.S.: Easy Financial Conditions Will Support Growth In H2 2017 U.S.: Easy Financial Conditions Will Support Growth In H2 2017 U.S.: Easy Financial Conditions Will Support Growth In H2 2017 The market is not pricing this in at all. In fact, 2-year breakeven inflation rates have tumbled by 87 basis points since March. A bit more inflation would be a welcome development. Not only have market-based projections of inflation fallen since the Great Recession, but long-term survey-based measures have dipped as well (Chart 4). Of course, one can have too much of a good thing. The experience of the 1960s is illustrative in that regard. Chart 5 shows that much like today, inflation in the first half of that decade was well anchored at just below 2%. However, once the unemployment rate fell below 4%, inflation soared. Core inflation rose from 1.5% in early 1966 to nearly 4% in early 1967, ultimately making its way to 6% by 1970. Chart 4Inflation Could Use A Boost Inflation Could Use A Boost Inflation Could Use A Boost Chart 5Inflation In The 1960s Took Off ##br##Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% If the Fed today wants to avoid the same fate, it will have to take steps to lift the unemployment rate back up to NAIRU. Unfortunately, history suggests that it is difficult to raise the unemployment rate a little bit without inadvertently raising it by a lot. Once unemployment starts to rise, a vicious circle tends to erupt where increasing joblessness leads to slower income growth, falling confidence, and ultimately, less spending and higher unemployment. In fact, there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 6). Chart 6Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Imbalances Are Growing The vicious circle described above tends to be amplified when there are large imbalances in the economy. The good news is that today's imbalances are not as formidable as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The bad news is that cracks are starting to form. The ratio of household debt-to-disposable income is still close to post-recession lows, but this is largely because mortgage debt continues to be weighed down by a depressed homeownership rate (Chart 7). In contrast, consumer credit is rebounding: Student debt is going through the roof and auto loans are nearly back to pre-recession levels as a share of disposable income (Chart 8). Not surprisingly, this is starting to translate into higher default rates (Chart 9). The fact that this is happening at a time when the unemployment rate is at the lowest level in 16 years is a cause for concern. Chart 7Low Homeownership Rate Keeping A Lid On Mortgage Debt Low Homeownership Rate Keeping A Lid On Mortgage Debt Low Homeownership Rate Keeping A Lid On Mortgage Debt Chart 8Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Chart 9...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories ...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories ...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories Meanwhile, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen above 2000 levels and is closing in on its 2007 peak (Chart 10). Contrary to the widespread notion that "wages aren't rising," real wages are increasing more quickly than corporate productivity (Chart 11). As the labor market continues to tighten, corporate profitability could suffer, setting the stage for rising defaults and increasing layoffs. Chart 10U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit Chart 11Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Worries About Commercial Real Estate We are particularly worried about the health of the commercial real estate (CRE) market. CRE prices currently stand 7% above pre-recession levels in real terms, having risen by a staggering 82% since the start of 2010 (Chart 12). Financial institutions hold $3.8 trillion in CRE loans, $2 trillion of which are held by banks. As a share of GDP, the outstanding stock of CRE bank loans in most categories is near pre-recession levels (Chart 13). Chart 12Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 13CRE Debt Is Rising CRE Debt Is Rising CRE Debt Is Rising Going forward, the fundamental underpinnings for the CRE market are likely to soften. The retail sector is already under intense pressure due to the shift in buying habits towards eCommerce. CMBX spreads in this space are rising. Vacancy rates in the apartment sector have started to tick higher and rent growth has slowed (Chart 14 and Chart 15). The number of apartment units under construction stands at a four-decade high according to Census data, despite a structurally subdued pace of household formation (Chart 16). Most of these units are likely to hit the market in 2018, which will result in a further increase in vacancy rates. Chart 14Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Chart 15...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam ...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam ...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam Chart 16Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? There are fewer signs of overbuilding in the office sector. Nevertheless, vacancy rates are likely to rise, given the recent increase in the number of new projects in the pipeline. On the flipside, demand growth for new office space is set to weaken, as a tighter labor market leads to slower payroll gains. The Fed estimates that the U.S. needs to add only 80,000 workers to payrolls every month to keep up with a growing labor force, down from about 150,000 in the two decades preceding the Great Recession.1 The secular shift towards increased office density and teleworking will only further depress office demand over time. Chart 17Tighter Lending Standards Could Lead To Lower CRE Prices Tighter Lending Standards Could Lead To Lower CRE Prices Tighter Lending Standards Could Lead To Lower CRE Prices The one bright spot is industrial real estate. Thanks to a revival in U.S. manufacturing, vacancy rates remain low and rent growth is rising. However, if the U.S. economy does accelerate over the remainder of the year, the dollar is likely to strengthen, putting a dent in the profitability of U.S. manufacturing companies. Standing back, how worried should investors be about the CRE sector? For now, there is limited cause for concern. U.S. financial institutions have been tightening lending standards on CRE loans for seven straight quarters. Consequently, the average loan-to-value ratio for newly securitized loans has fallen about four points to 60% since 2015, and is now down eight points compared to 2007. However, if vacancy rates keep rising, real estate prices will fall, leading to a decline in the value of the collateral backing CRE loans. This could prompt lenders to pull back credit, causing prices to fall further (Chart 17). Seasoned real estate investors are no strangers to such vicious cycles, and if the next one begins at a time when growth is slowing because the economy is running out of spare capacity and financial conditions are tightening, it could easily trigger a recession. Fiscal Policy To The Rescue? Could looser fiscal policy delay the day of reckoning? The answer is yes, but much will depend on when the stimulus arrives and what form it takes. The best-case scenario is that fiscal policy is eased just as the economy is beginning to slow of its own accord. A burst of stimulus that arrives on the scene too early would be less desirable, although not necessarily counterproductive, since it would allow the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes, thereby giving it more scope to cut rates later in response to slower growth. In practice, however, calibrating the amount of monetary tightening that is necessary to offset a given amount of fiscal loosening is difficult to achieve. This is especially the case in today's environment where another fight over the debt ceiling looms large, a new health care bill is making its way through the Senate, and Trump's tax agenda remains heavy on promises but short on specifics. Our expectation is that Congress will pass a "balanced" budget which equates revenues with expenditures over the 10-year budget horizon. How this affects growth is hard to predict with any certainty. On the one hand, spending cuts tend to depress aggregate demand more than tax cuts raise demand. In economic parlance, the fiscal multiplier for government spending is larger than for taxes. On the other hand, the tax cuts are likely to be front-loaded, while the spending cuts will be back-dated. If history is any guide, this means that the latter will never see the light of day. In addition, some of the budgetary impact from cutting statutory tax rates will be paid for through dynamic scoring, the questionable practice of assuming that lower personal and corporate tax rates will significantly spur growth. On balance, we expect fiscal policy to turn modestly stimulative over the next few years. However, given the uncertainty involved, there is a risk that the Fed either raises rates too much - thereby choking off growth - or by not enough, causing the unemployment rate to fall to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Both outcomes could trigger a recession. Investment Conclusions Right now, our recession timing model, as well as the models maintained by various regional Fed banks, assign a low probability of a severe slowdown in the coming months (See Box 1 for details). These models, however, tend to send reliable signals only over a fairly short horizon. Looking further ahead, we see a heightened probability of weaker growth in the second half of 2018, which could set the stage for a recession in 2019. The good news is that today's economic imbalances are not as daunting as they were in the late innings of many past economic expansions. Thus, the 2019 recession is not likely to be especially severe. The bad news is that valuations across most markets are quite stretched. Thus, like the 2001 recession, the financial market impact could be disproportionally large compared to the economic impact. We are still overweight global equities, but will be looking to significantly reduce exposure by next summer. Once the equity bear market begins - most likely late next year - a 20%-to-30% retracement in U.S. stocks is probable. Given that correlations across stock markets tend to rise when risk sentiment is deteriorating, it is likely that other global bourses will also suffer if U.S. stocks weaken. Indeed, considering that most stock markets have a beta to the S&P 500 that exceeds one, other regions could suffer even more than the U.S. As the U.S. economy falls into recession, the Fed will stop raising rates. This will cause the dollar to weaken, although not before it has appreciated by about 10% in trade-weighted terms from current levels. Thus, while we remain bullish on the dollar over the next 12 months, we are much less sanguine about the greenback over the long haul. As the dollar weakens, the yen and euro will strengthen, imparting deflationary pressures on those economies. If our timing for the next recession proves correct, neither the ECB nor the BoJ will hike rates for the remainder of the decade. The Bank of England is a tougher call. The neutral rate of interest is higher in the U.K. than in continental Europe. Last week's election results represented a clear rejection of fiscal austerity. A more expansionary fiscal stance would give the BoE some scope to raise rates. A weaker pound has also given the economy a much needed competitive boost. With inflation picking up, it is not surprising that the BoE struck a more hawkish tone this week. Nevertheless, Brexit negotiations are liable to drag on for some time, which will constrain the ability of the BoE to tighten monetary policy. Stay long GBP/EUR and GBP/JPY over the next 12 months, but remain short GBP/USD. Housekeeping Note: Closing Our Tactical S&P 500 Short Hedge As noted above, we remain cyclically overweight global equities over a 12-month horizon. However, on occasion, we have put on a tactical hedge whenever equities appeared to be technically overbought. Such a situation arose six weeks ago. While the stock market did dip briefly shortly after we initiated the trade, it subsequently rallied back. At the time of initiation, we indicated that the trade would have a lifespan of six weeks. The clock has now run out, and we are closing the trade for a loss of 2%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Rhys Bidder, Tim Mahedy, and Rob Valletta, "Trend Job Growth: Where's Normal?" FRBSF Economic Letter, 2016-32, Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco (October 24,2016), and Daniel Aaronson, "Estimating The Trend In Employment Growth," Chicago Fed Letter, No. 312, Federal Reserve Bank Of Chicago (July 2013). BOX 1 The Message From Our Recession Timing Model Chart Box 18Near-Term Recession Risk Remains Low Near-Term Recession Risk Remains Low Near-Term Recession Risk Remains Low Our recession timing model is based on eight variables: The Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator, the Coincident Economic Indicator, the fed funds rate, inflation expectations, the unemployment rate, oil prices, credit spreads, and the yield curve. We use a logistic regression framework to model the probability of a recession. Currently, our model shows that the odds of a recession are low (Chart Box 18, panel 1). Only one of the components, namely, a rising fed funds rate, is signaling a risk of a recession. The various models developed by regional Federal Reserve banks also show very low near-term odds of a recession (panels 2 and 3). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled. However, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture. The dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation since last year. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish. The Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment and overall business activity will remain buoyant. Feature Investors have become less sanguine on China's growth outlook in recent weeks, as the latest macro numbers are no longer unanimously positive. Concerns about a significant relapse in the Chinese economy are re-emerging, and the authorities' recent policy tightening has further heightened investors' anxiety levels. Judging from our recent conversations with clients, "China risk" is now clearly back on the radar. China's growth recovery since early last year played a major role in boosting some global risk assets such as commodities prices and emerging market equities. By the same token, will a China slowdown end the global reflation trade? The Divergence In Manufacturing PMIs Chart 1The Divergences In PMIs The Divergences In PMIs The Divergences In PMIs Investors' anxiety over China's cyclical trend has been amplified by the recent divergence between the official manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) and the one compiled by Caixin Media group, a private source. The official survey for May still showed expansion, while the private PMI dropped slightly below the critical 50 threshold (Chart 1, top panel). Historically such divergences are not uncommon, and the private PMI appears to show sharper swings than its official counterpart, probably due to its smaller sample size and its focus on smaller private firms. Meanwhile, there were some commonalities: the sub-indices of output and new orders for both surveys remained above the expansionary threshold, while input costs and output prices for both dropped into contractionary territory. Taken together, the latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled - consistent with other recent macro variables. Meanwhile, the service industry is still showing solid expansion, according to both surveys, underpinning overall business activity (Chart 1, bottom panel). In short, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Credit "Price" Versus "Volume": What Matters More? A common narrative to describe the reason behind China's ongoing growth moderation is policy tightening on both the monetary and fiscal fronts. As the argument goes, last year's growth recovery was driven by a massive increase in credit and fiscal spending, which has since been scaled back. As this credit and fiscal "impulse" fades away, the Chinese economy will tumble, sending shockwaves across the world. In our view, betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture, and is dangerously misguided. At BCA, we have long paid close attention to credit cycles and their impact on the growth outlook. However, there is no evidence that China's growth recovery since early last year was due to a massive increase in credit expansion and fiscal spending. In fact, total new credit provided by commercial banks and the "shadow banking sector" has been largely stable in recent years, and last year's credit "impulse," measured as the annual change in credit flows, was fairly modest - especially compared with previous bouts of sharp spikes (Chart 2). Similarly, Chinese fiscal spending actually decelerated sharply throughout last year, and dropped by over 10% in December, compared with a year earlier. Even if last year's fiscal retrenchment impacts the economy with a time lag, it is important to note that fiscal spending has already rebounded in recent months, which will become a tailwind for growth down the road. In our view, China's growth recovery since last year has a lot more to do with the "price" of credit rather than "volume." (Chart 3) Real interest rates dropped from double-digit levels that prevailed between 2012 and early 2016 to negative, thanks to a sharp increase in producer prices, while credit growth remained in a broad downtrend. In other words, the dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation. Chart 2Not Much 'Impulse' Not Much 'Impulse' Not Much 'Impulse' Chart 3Credit: 'Price' Matters More Than 'Volume' Credit: 'Price' Matters More Than 'Volume' Credit: 'Price' Matters More Than 'Volume' China's PPI has rolled over, which together with the authorities' attempts to tighten has begun to lift real interest rates. This will likely continue to generate some growth headwinds - a risk that clearly warrants close attention. However, monetary conditions currently are still very accommodative, and there is no reason to expect an overkill to choke off the economy. Why Growth Will Not Falter? Moreover, the bearish argument on China's cyclical outlook is fundamentally rooted in the assumption that the country's economy is dangerously imbalanced1 - a shaky house of cards propped up by policy stimulus that will immediately fall down once the policy pump-priming stops. While the structural profile of the Chinese economy will remain a major global macro issue subject to heated debates going forward, the bearish argument underestimates the economy's resilience, and therefore exaggerates the downside risks. First, it is important to note that China's growth challenges in previous years were to a large extent due to excessively tight monetary conditions, a costly policy mistake that amplified deflationary pressures. Real interest rates were kept at double digits for 5 consecutive years between 2012 and early 2016 while other major central banks were all trying desperately to lower borrowing costs within their respective economies. Furthermore, the trade-weighted RMB appreciated by 20% between 2012 and 2015. In fact, the RMB was the only major currency that appreciated in trade-weighted terms during this period (Chart 4), essentially shouldered deflationary stress for the rest of the world. In addition, Chinese regulators tried hard to block credit flows in an ill-conceived attempt to de-lever - which only prolonged credit intermediation channels and pushed loan demand to even costlier "shadow" institutions.2 All of these factors inflicted dramatic deflationary pain on Chinese manufacturers. Indeed, that the Chinese economy did not implode under the double-whammy of weak global demand and draconian domestic policy tightening - and staged a quick turnaround when monetary conditions eased - underscores the surprising resilience of the Chinese corporate sector. Second, the growth recovery since early last year has significantly improved financial conditions within the corporate sector and eased its balance sheet stress. Overall, companies have increased earnings, reduced inventories and beefed up cash positions (Chart 5). The situation can certainly deteriorate, but the sector is also better prepared for deflationary shocks than in previous years. Chart 4The RMB Shift The RMB Shift The RMB Shift Chart 5Inventory Is Still Very Low Inventory Is Still Very Low Inventory Is Still Very Low Third, even if China's corporate sector, especially industrial enterprises, are indeed as fragile as some bearish analysts claim, Chinese households and the service sector have much healthier fundamentals and therefore are less vulnerable. Consumer confidence has improved significantly in recent months following the growth acceleration, which should further help household consumption. The service sector now accounts for 52% of Chinese GDP, 30% larger than manufacturing. Household consumption and the service sector will provide an important anchor for business activity and prevent a major relapse in economic growth, even if the industrial sector slows more than we currently expect. Finally, the global growth environment is also largely supportive for the Chinese economy. The European economy has been showing some remarkable strength of late, and U.S. growth is likely to pick up after the recent soft patch, as per our U.S. specialists - both of which should bode well for Chinese exports. It is worth noting the recent weaker macro numbers out of China have followed growth disappointments in the U.S. (Chart 6). In fact, the ebbs and flows of "growth surprises" in the world's two largest economies in recent years have been largely in sync, albeit with China experiencing more pronounced volatility. In addition, the risk of an immediate escalation of protectionist backlash between the U.S. and China has also been lowered following President Xi's state visit to the U.S. in April.3 Overall, the Chinese economy is unlikely to slow materially, if the U.S. economy does reasonably well. Chart 6U.S. And China: Synchronized 'Surprises' U.S. And China: Synchronized 'Surprises' U.S. And China: Synchronized 'Surprises' All in all, we expect the Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment. In a reported titled "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6th, we warned that "growth figures coming out of China in the coming months may be viewed as less market friendly."4 Recent Chinese data and investor reactions confirm this judgment. Nonetheless, we maintain the view that the Chinese economy's growth improvement remains largely intact, which will reinforce the upturn in the global business cycle and support global risk assets. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish, and we remain cyclically positive on Chinese equities, particularly H shares. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?" dated March 23, 2017, and "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "Reflecting On The Trump-Xi Summit," dated April 13, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team has a more pessimistic outlook than the BCA house view, which is upbeat on the prospects for China's capex growth and commodity prices. The ongoing liquidity tightening in China amid lingering credit excesses is bound to produce major negative growth surprises. The authorities will reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on the ground becomes visible or the economic data deteriorates significantly. Financial markets will sell off considerably in advance. In Chile, take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade; stay neutral on this bourse within an EM equity portfolio. Feature EM Profit Recovery: How Enduring? EM equities have not only advanced in absolute terms but have also outperformed developed market (DM) share prices considerably since early this year. This outperformance has been rationalized by a recovery in EM earnings per share (EPS). Indeed, EM EPS has revived briskly in recent months (Chart I-1A). Chart I-1AEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) Chart I-1BEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (II) EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (II) EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (II) For this rally to continue, EM EPS would need to continue to expand further. We do not expect this. On the contrary, our bet is that EM EPS growth will slow considerably later this year and most likely contract in early 2018. Our basis is that the growth (first derivative) and impulse (second derivative) of EM & Chinese narrow money (M1) has in the past led their respective profit cycle (Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B). If these relationships hold and EM EPS growth dwindles later this year, EM share prices should begin to sense it now, and start falling back very soon. Interestingly, EM EPS net revisions have failed to rise above the zero line despite the recent rebound in profits (Chart I-2, top panel). This is in contrast to DM EPS net revisions, which have surged well above zero (Chart I-2, middle panel). As a result, recent EM relative outperformance against their DM peers has occurred despite the drop in relative net EPS revisions (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This presages EM equity analysts are not revising upward their forward estimates for EM EPS, despite the ongoing rally in share prices. This is extremely puzzling (and rare) and may be a reflection of recent weakness in commodities prices - or the fact that expectations for EM EPS growth were already elevated. We do not place much emphasis on analysts' EPS revisions because the latter swing with stock prices - they have zero forecasting power for share prices. We highlight this fact simply to counter the common market narrative that EM corporate earnings growth expectations are improving, driving EM bourses higher. Bottom Line: EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS nine months ahead. Importantly, EM equity prices relative to DM shares are at a major technical juncture (Chart I-3). A decisive breakout would be a very bullish technical signal, whereas a failure to break out would be an important warning sign. We continue to bet on the latter. Chart I-2EPS Net Revisions: EM And DM EPS Net Revisions: EM And DM EPS Net Revisions: EM And DM Chart I-3Relative Equity Performance: EM Versus DM Relative Equity Performance: EM Versus DM Relative Equity Performance: EM Versus DM China's Credit Cycle And Commodities Redux Our overarching theme has been and remains that China is tightening liquidity amid a lingering credit bubble. This cannot end well for financial markets that are exposed China's growth. Here we revisit our rationale for a credit slowdown in China and its impact on EM. Chinese interest rates have risen dramatically since last November across the entire yield curve. The 3-month interbank rate and AA- on-shore corporate bond yields both have risen by about 200 basis points since November 1, 2016. Monetary policy works with a time lag, and higher interest rates warrant a slowdown in credit growth (Chart I-4). In turn, it takes only a deceleration in credit growth for the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit - to turn negative. The falling credit and fiscal impulse will consequently lead to a relapse in Chinese import volumes and EM EPS (Chart 5), in turn weighing on commodity prices and non-commodity producing countries like Korea and partially Taiwan. Mainland import volumes contracted mildly in the second half of 2015, as demonstrated in Chart I-5. De facto, from the perspective of the rest of the world, China was in mild recession in late 2015. Not surprisingly, global risk assets in general, and particularly those exposed to China, tumbled. Chart I-4China: Higher Rates Point To##br## Negative Credit Impulse China: Higher Rates Point To Negative Credit Impulse China: Higher Rates Point To Negative Credit Impulse Chart I-5China's Credit Impulse Heralds ##br##Slowdown In Its Imports China's Credit Impulse Heralds Slowdown In Its Imports China's Credit Impulse Heralds Slowdown In Its Imports We expect China import volumes to shrink again by the end of this year or early next. Some sort of replay of 2015 is a real possibility. The broad-based yet mild selloff in commodities since early this year (Chart I-6) amid weakness in the U.S. dollar exchange rate gives us confidence in our view. Chart I-6ABroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (I) Broad-Based Selloff In Commodities (I) Broad-Based Selloff In Commodities (I) Chart I-6BBroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (II) Broad-Based Selloff In Commodities (II) Broad-Based Selloff In Commodities (II) Our colleagues at BCA have attributed the selloff in commodities this year to deleveraging in China's shadow banking system, and to traders worldwide closing their long positions. They expect an improving commodities supply-demand balance to support prices going forward. It makes sense to us to explain the selloff in commodities as having been caused by deleveraging in China's shadow banking system. Yet to be consistent, we should also acknowledge that the rally in commodities last year was to a large extent driven by the same forces in reverse: non-commercial buyers (investors) buying commodities both in China and elsewhere. In short, this signifies there was little improvement in worldwide commodities demand last year. In 2016, rising commodities prices provided a significant boost to commodity-producing countries and underlying corporate profits - and ultimately EM risk assets. The drop in commodities prices this year, if sustained, should lead to the opposite dynamic: income/profits among commodities countries/companies will drop. As such, falling commodities prices amid diminishing investor demand for commodities is bearish for EM risk assets. Where we differ from the majority of our colleagues at BCA is that we expect Chinese credit growth to decelerate, thereby weighing on its capital spending and depressing demand for commodities (please refer to Chart I-5). We have written extensively1 on this topic and will not fully rehash our view that China's annual credit growth will decelerate from the current 12% to somewhere around 8% in the next 12-18 months. In short, China's corporate and household credit-to-GDP ratio cannot rise indefinitely from an already high level of 225% of GDP. Credit growth will likely downshift to a level of sustainable nominal GDP growth, which is probably around 8%. Our main disagreement with our colleagues on structural issues is as follows: we believe China's credit excesses are not a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate but rather the outcome of a speculative credit boom driven by high-risk behavior among creditors and debtors.2 Tightening liquidity amid such speculative excesses creates a very bearish backdrop for risk assets exposed to China's credit cycle. The bullish camp on China has recently pointed to a strong recovery in mainland nominal GDP growth, which in their view suggests that double-digit credit growth in China is not excessive (Chart I-7). However, such a surge in nominal GDP growth has been due to the GDP deflator rising from zero in the fourth quarter of 2015 to 5% in the first quarter of this year. Importantly, the swings in the GDP deflator almost perfectly correlate with the fluctuation in commodities prices (Chart I-8). This proves how much China's economy is exposed to commodities cycles and how much of nominal GDP swings are stipulated by resource price swings. Chart I-7China: Credit And ##br##Nominal GDP Growth China: Credit And Nominal GDP Growth China: Credit And Nominal GDP Growth Chart I-8China's GDP Deflator Is Very Sensitive##br## To Commodities Prices China's GDP Deflator Is Very Sensitive To Commodities Prices China's GDP Deflator Is Very Sensitive To Commodities Prices As commodities prices decline, China's GDP deflator, producer prices and nominal GDP growth will all dwindle. Thereby, China's underlying steady state nominal GDP growth is probably around 8% at best (5.5-6% real growth), with inflation of 2-2.5% (assuming flat commodities prices). If this is indeed the case, corporate and household credit growth of 12% entails a further build-up of leverage and an escalating non-public credit-to-GDP ratio, which already stands at 225% of GDP: corporate debt is 180% and household debt is at 45% of GDP. Bank loans account for 70%, while shadow (non-bank) funding channels (corporate bonds, trust products, entrusted loans, and banker's acceptance) constitute 30% of outstanding non-public credit or 65% of GDP. Both are growing at an annual rate of 11-12.5% (Chart I-9). On the whole, the share of shadow banking is non-trivial and its current growth pace is unsustainable amid ongoing regulatory tightening and rising interest rates. Furthermore, banks are themselves exposed to shadow banking as their claims on non-depository financial institutions have risen exponentially from RMB 3 trillion to RMB 27 trillion over the past five years. In regard to non-standard credit assets,3 our estimates are that banks' off-balance-sheet exposure is RMB 10 trillion compared with RMB 18.3 trillion of their balance-sheet non-standard credit assets. The off-balance-sheet credit exposure to non-standard credit assets is much larger for medium and small banks than the largest five (Table I-1). We discussed these issues in greater detail in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow". Chart I-9Bank Loans And Non-Bank (Shadow) Credit Growth Bank Loans And Non-Bank (Shadow) Credit Growth Bank Loans And Non-Bank (Shadow) Credit Growth Chart I- With banks being forced by regulators to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, their capital adequacy ratios will drop and their ability to sustain double-digit credit growth will be curtailed. Chart I-10Stay With Short Small / Long Large ##br##Banks Equity Trade Stay With Short Small / Long Large Banks Equity Trade Stay With Short Small / Long Large Banks Equity Trade The risks to medium and small banks is greater than to the large five banks. That is why we reiterate our recommendation from October 26, 2016 to short small banks versus large ones (Chart I-10). As a final note, we are often asked whether the government will provide a bail out if things deteriorate. Yes, we concur that policymakers will step in and backstop a financial system to preclude a systemic crisis. However, they are tightening now, and like the rest of us have little visibility. The authorities will meaningfully reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on ground becomes visible or economic data deteriorate considerably. Financial markets will sell off materially in advance. Bottom Line: Investors should not be long China-plays, commodities and EM risk assets when mainland policy tightening is occurring amid lingering speculative credit excesses. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Chilean Markets We recommended receiving 3-year swap rates on November 2, 2016 and this position has panned out with rates dropping by 30 basis points. We now recommend booking profits. The following has led us to conclude that the risk-reward profile of this position is no longer attractive: The improvement in narrow money (M1) growth points in a bottom in the economic activity indicator (Chart II-1). Mining production plunged amid the strikes in the world's largest copper producer Codelco (Chart II-2, top panel) and manufacturing production has also been contracting (Chart II-2, bottom panel). A period of improvement in mining and manufacturing output from a very low base is likely. Chart II-1Book Profits On Receiving ##br##3-Year Swap Rate Position Book Profits On Receiving 3-Year Swap Rate Position Book Profits On Receiving 3-Year Swap Rate Position Chart II-2Chile: Money And Economic##br## Activity Are Bottoming Out Chile: Money And Economic Activity Are Bottoming Out Chile: Money And Economic Activity Are Bottoming Out This will ameliorate overall business conditions and cause the central bank, at least for the time being, to halt the easing cycle. The pace of expansion in employment, wage growth, and consumer credit remains decent (Chart II-3). This will put a floor under household spending growth for now. Odds are that copper prices will decline meaningfully in the next nine months or so, which will cause the Chilean peso to depreciate. Although a depreciating currency will not to lead to materially higher interest rates in Chile, it will limit downside in local rate expectations. Finally, local 3-year swap rates and their spread over U.S. 3-year bond yields are extremely low from a historical perspective (Chart II-4). At this point, there is little value left in Chilean local rates. Chart II-3Chile's Mining And Manufacturing ##br##A Period Of Stabilization Ahead Chile's Mining And Manufacturing A Period Of Stabilization Ahead Chile's Mining And Manufacturing A Period Of Stabilization Ahead Chart II-4Chile: Consumer Spending##br## Is Holding Up Chile: Consumer Spending Is Holding Up Chile: Consumer Spending Is Holding Up Investment Conclusions Chart II-5Chilean Local Rates Spreads Over ##br##U.S. Treasurys: Not Much Value Left Chilean Local Rates Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys: Not Much Value Left Chilean Local Rates Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys: Not Much Value Left We do not expect the central bank to hike but the downside in local rates is limited for the time being. Take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade. As to equities, the outlook for relative performance is balanced; we continue recommending a benchmark weight in Chile for dedicated EM equity portfolios. For absolute return investors, the risk-reward profile is not attractive because our profit margin proxy points to a relapse in corporate earnings (Chart II-5). Unit labor costs are rising faster than the core inflation rate, producing a profit margin squeeze (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Finally, we continue shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar as a bet on lower copper prices. 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?", dated March 23, 2017, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-standard credit assets are banks' claims on corporates that are not classified as loans. For more details please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow", dated June 15, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Reflation Trade: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. New Zealand: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean government bond market. Feature "I know it makes no difference to what you're going through; but I see the tip of the iceberg, and I worry about you." - Rush Is The Liquidity Party Starting To Wind Down? Global financial markets continue to enjoy the "sweet spot" of a solidly expanding global economy, but without enough inflation pressure to force central banks to slam on the monetary brakes. That backdrop is starting to change, though. Odds are rising that the European Central Bank (ECB) will begin tapering its bond buying next year, with some hints of that possibly being announced as soon as next week's monetary policy meeting. At the same time, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) - faced with the operational constraints of buying an ever-increasing share of Japanese financial assets - is focused on targeting long-term interest rates rather than increasing liquidity. Even the Federal Reserve is now talking about reducing its massive balance sheet later this year. The liquidity tailwind to global growth and risk assets is now at risk of becoming a headwind. Already, the growth rate of the major central bank balance sheets has rolled over and is on course to decelerate further over the next year (Chart of the Week). Importantly, this downshift in global liquidity momentum is happening as signs of slowing growth have appeared in some major economies like China and the U.S. (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekLiquidity Tailwind To Risk##BR##Assets Is Fading Liquidity Tailwind To Risk Assets Is Fading Liquidity Tailwind To Risk Assets Is Fading Chart 2Growth Momentum##BR##Already Starting To Cool Off Growth Momentum Already Starting To Cool Off Growth Momentum Already Starting To Cool Off We remain concerned that the Chinese economy will see a policy-induced deceleration in the 2nd half of the year. However, we still expect the U.S. to rebound after the soft patch of growth in the first quarter, and we see nothing in the Euro Area data to suggest that the current solid expansion is at risk of fading quickly. This should allow inflation expectations to drift upward toward the central bank targets given the apparent lack of spare capacity on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 3). Chart 3Fed & ECB Facing##BR##Economic Capacity Constraints Fed & ECB Facing Economic Capacity Constraints Fed & ECB Facing Economic Capacity Constraints We still expect the Fed to deliver another two rate hikes before year-end and the ECB to begin its exit strategy from the current extraordinary monetary policies by slowing the pace of asset purchases starting early next year. For now, the backdrop will remain supportive for the outperformance of growth-sensitive assets like corporate credit and equities over government bonds in the U.S. and Europe over the balance of 2017. However, the early signals sent by "leading leading" indicators such as our Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index (Chart 2, top panel) suggests that liquidity and growth trends will become far more challenging for the markets in 2018. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. Maintain a below-benchmark duration exposure and an overweight allocation to corporate debt in global fixed income portfolios. New Zealand: Safety From A Global Bond Apocalypse? A growing number of the world's most wealthiest (and, arguably, most paranoid) people are reportedly buying real estate in New Zealand as a safe haven place to live if modern civilization collapses.1 While the immediate need for taking such precautions can be debated, there is sound logic in treating New Zealand as a location far removed from the current geopolitical and socio-economic problems of the world. We now see a case for treating New Zealand bonds as a potential "safe haven" market for global fixed income investors. The Economic Backdrop Has Become More Muddled We have been running a SHORT position in New Zealand (paying 12-month OIS rates) in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since last November. Our view then was that the New Zealand economy would surprise to the upside in 2017 and inflation was likely to start drifting upward. This would pressure the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to raise the Official Cash Rate (OCR) from the highly accommodative level of 1.75%. So far, that expectation has not panned out as the RBNZ has held rates steady amid a more uncertain outlook for the New Zealand economy. Growth indicators have been a bit mixed over the past few months, but the current uptick in the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is pointing to real GDP expanding around 3% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 4). If maintained for the full year, this would be slightly above the RBNZ's estimate of potential growth at 2.8%. There are some downside risks, however, given that consumer and business confidence are both below previous cyclical peaks and fiscal policy is expected to be mildly restrictive in 2017 (bottom three panels). The housing market remains a key cyclical wild card. Residential construction has been a significant source of growth over the past few years, driven by a surge in net immigration into New Zealand and declining interest rates (Chart 5). However, the RBNZ is projecting immigration inflows to slow from the current high level, largely due to improving labor market conditions in the developed economies (most notably, Australia, which is the largest source of New Zealand immigrants). Chart 4Stable NZ Growth...For Now Stable NZ Growth...For Now Stable NZ Growth...For Now Chart 5NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out Slower immigration would reduce the demand for New Zealand housing at a time when mortgage rates have already been rising off the record lows seen in 2016 (bottom panel). This has occurred without any rate hikes from the RBNZ, as rising global bond yields have put upward pressure on New Zealand bank funding costs, which have been passed through to higher mortgage rates. The RBNZ is currently projecting growth in house prices to slow sharply from last year's robust 15% pace to just 5% in 2017. The main drivers are higher borrowing costs and the ongoing impact of macro-prudential regulations against high loan-to-value ratio mortgage lending. Importantly, slower housing activity will not only have a direct impact on GDP growth through softer construction, but will also indirectly dampen consumer spending growth via wealth effects. Yet even with this expected drag on growth from housing, the New Zealand economy is still expected to face capacity constraints over the rest of the year. Higher Uncertainty Over Price Pressures Both the RBNZ and the International Monetary Fund estimate that the output gap has fully closed and is projected to move into positive territory this year (Chart 6). At the same time, the current unemployment rate of 4.9% is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment level and the RBNZ projects a further decline in joblessness in 2017 (third panel). Despite this evidence of the economy reaching capacity constraints, both wage growth and price inflation remain subdued and inflation expectations remain well-anchored around 2% - the midpoint of the RBNZ's 1-3% target range. Wage costs are particularly depressed, growing only 1% on a year-over-year basis in Q1. This may be related to the rise in the labor force participation rate - up to an all-time high of 70.6% in Q1 from a cyclical low of 68.2% at the end of 2015 - that has increased the available supply of labor. The most recent headline inflation print for Q1 was quite strong, taking the year-over-year growth rate up to 2.2%. Yet in the RBNZ's April Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the central bank took a surprisingly dovish tone, citing uncertainty over the true degree of slack in the economy and downside risks to growth that would prevent a further acceleration of inflation.2 The RBNZ now forecasts inflation to not rise above 2.2% this year and to fall back to 1.1% in both 2018, led by a sharp decline in growth for tradeables, mostly energy and food inflation (Chart 7). Importantly, this forecast includes the recent decline in the trade-weighted New Zealand Dollar (NZD). Non-tradeables inflation is also expected to stabilize on the back of slower housing-related items in the consumer price index. Chart 6RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... Chart 7...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools ...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools ...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools A Weaker Case For Tighter Monetary Policy The official RBNZ projection is that the OCR will stay unchanged at 1.75% until September 2019. The market expectation priced into the NZD OIS curve calls for 27bps of hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 8). Our New Zealand Central Bank Monitor has been suggesting the need for tighter monetary policy since mid-2016, but appears to be rolling over (2nd panel). The diminished rate hike expectations have coincided with a decline in the NZD and a sharp underperformance of New Zealand equities. The markets are giving a consistent signal on softening growth prospects in New Zealand, confirming the central bank's more recent dovish turn. Chart 8Market Expectations Of##BR##RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Market Expectations Of RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Market Expectations Of RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Given the newfound uncertainties over the New Zealand growth and inflation outlook, the case for owning New Zealand interest rate exposure has grown a little bit stronger. Admittedly, we do not envision a major pullback in growth, and inflation may not fall by as much as the RBNZ is expecting given how little spare capacity there appears to be in the economy. Yet there is now just enough uncertainty to keep the central bank on hold for longer than expected, as was noted in the "scenario analysis" section of the April MPS.3 The RBNZ noted that if the level of spare capacity is smaller than currently assumed, then the latest growth forecast will result in inflation eventually moving to 2.0% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2019, resulting in the OCR needing to rise to 2.25% in two years. Alternatively, if housing demand slows even faster than current projections, inflation would be below the 2% target during the next two years and the OCR would need to fall to 1.25% by the end of 2018. Our takeaway from this is that, even in the more positive scenario, interest rates are not expected to rise by much more than the markets are currently discounting. Position For Tighter New Zealand Spreads Versus Treasuries & Bunds The economic risks in New Zealand now appear evenly balanced. This argues for stable monetary policy and diminished bond volatility. Current market forwards for both government bonds and NZD swaps shows that very little movement in interest rates is expected over the next year (Chart 9). We generally agree with this pricing, although the uncertainty over the degree of spare capacity, and underlying inflation pressures, make a directional view on interest rates or the shape of the yield curve an unattractive risk proposition. A more interesting opportunity presents itself in looking at spread trades between New Zealand government bonds versus other developed market sovereign debt. The yield betas for New Zealand versus the U.S. and Germany have fallen steadily over the past year (Chart 10), indicating that New Zealand bonds can be more insulated from the rise in yields that we expect for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds over the latter half of 2017. Given the competitively high yields on offer in New Zealand, even on a currency-hedged basis (bottom panel), we see a case for going long New Zealand interest rate exposure versus U.S. and Germany. Chart 9Higher NZ Bond Yields##BR##Priced Into Forwards Higher NZ Bond Yields Priced Into Forwards Higher NZ Bond Yields Priced Into Forwards Chart 10NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta##BR##With Higher Hedged Yields NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta With Higher Hedged Yields NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta With Higher Hedged Yields At current yield levels, going long New Zealand versus Germany looks more compelling relative to spread compression trades versus U.S. Treasuries. We see strong potential for New Zealand-Germany spreads to tighten faster than the forwards over the next six months (Chart 11), largely through rising German yields as the ECB signals that a tapering of bond purchases is set to begin next year. The downside potential for New Zealand-U.S. spread compression looks less likely from current tight levels, although if Treasury yields rise by as much as we expect in the coming months, some spread tightening should occur here, as well. Chart 11Go Long 5Yr NZ Bonds Vs##BR##USTs and German OBLs Go Long 5yr NZ Bonds vs USTs and German OBLs Go Long 5yr NZ Bonds vs USTs and German OBLs Based on our analysis, we are closing our current NZD rates trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio with a tiny profit of +3bps , and entering two new trades: long 5-year NZD government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries, on a currency-hedged basis; and long 5yr NZD government bonds versus 5-year German government debt, on a currency-unhedged basis.4 We are choosing to hedge the currency exposure back into USD for the former given the view of BCA's currency strategists that the EUR/USD exchange rate is now stretched too far to the upside and is at risk of declining as the Fed delivers on additional rate hikes in the coming months.5 In other words, we see a greater potential for a decline in NZD/USD than NZD/EUR in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation, in contrast to the strong likelihood of additional Fed rate hikes and an ECB taper announcement in the next few months. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: A Bad Moon Rising For Bond Yields Chart 12Markets Not Worried##BR##About The New President Markets Not Worried About The New President Markets Not Worried About The New President The new South Korean president, Moon Jae-In was elected on May 9th, ending a year of political turmoil after the previous president's scandal and impeachment. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy view Moon and his Democratic Party as a major shift to the political left.6 The new president's policy agenda is aimed at economic stimulus for the working class alongside reforms of the country's chaebol industrial giants. Korean financial markets have greeted the election result positively, with the benchmark KOSPI equity index up 2.7%, and the Korean won up 1% versus the U.S. dollar, from the pre-election levels on May 8th. (Chart 12). This is consistent with past market behavior, as the won tends to be less reactive toward domestic events (i.e. after the previous president's impeachment, the won actually strengthened) and more sensitive to international uncertainties (i.e. North Korea-U.S. military tensions, as occurred in mid-March). Korean interest rates, however, have shown little response to the change in leadership in Seoul, with bond yields unchanged since the election. We see this as presenting an opportunity for fixed income investors. Clearly, the new regime in Seoul represents a real change for the Korean people, but it also represents a potential shift in the economic backdrop - namely, through an expected large fiscal stimulus from the new government - that will impart a steepening bias to the Korean interest rate curve. A Sluggish Economy Greets The New President While the steady, if unspectacular, pace of global growth in the past few years has been enough to absorb spare capacity in many countries, South Korea's sub-par economic performance has left the country with a widening output gap (Chart 13). Policymakers are well aware that consumer spending, which contributes about 60% of GDP, has been steadily weakening alongside slowing credit growth. Chart 13Sluggish Growth In South Korea Sluggish Growth In South Korea Sluggish Growth In South Korea The new government will attempt to boost domestic consumption, and thus overall growth, by increasing social welfare spending. Moon's economic agenda calls for raising the minimum wage by 55% by 2020, increasing subsidies for education costs and parental leave, and doubling the basic pension payment for the elderly regardless of their income level. It might prove to be very effective in the short term at boosting consumer spending, but this may not prove to be a sustainable driver of growth in South Korea, where the marginal swings in the economy have historically been driven more by exports. Youth joblessness is another problem that Moon will attempt to tackle with his ambitious economic program. While the labor market may appear healthy, with an overall unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the situation is far more challenging for young adults in South Korea - the jobless rate for those aged 20-29 is 11.3%. One of the reasons for such a high unemployment rate among young South Koreans is that university graduates, of which there are many in this highly-educated nation, expect (and look for) high-paying jobs, but cannot find enough of them.7 The labor market has become more competitive in recent years as weak economic growth has limited the ability of private sector, especially large corporations, to hire as much. To solve this problem, the new government has promised to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. Creating public sector jobs may temporarily solve the high unemployment rate, but in the long run, this will also cause larger fiscal burdens for taxpayers. Position For A Steeper South Korean Yield Curve Headline CPI inflation in South Korea is currently hovering around the 2% target of the Bank of Korea (BoK), while core CPI growth is lower at 1.3%. The BoK has maintain the policy rate at 1.25% since June 2016, with a bias towards additional easing given the lack of sustained inflationary pressure amid weak domestic demand. The BoK did sound a slightly more upbeat tone on the economy at last week's monetary policy meeting, led by the spillover effects from improving global growth rather than a more bullish expectation on the Korean consumer. Importantly, the central bank still expects inflation pressures to remain subdued - no surprise given the large output gap. The BoK did note that it is monitoring several factors in judging future policy decisions: the pace of rate hikes by the Fed, trends in global trade, geopolitical tensions, the pace of household debt accumulation and "the directions of the new government's fiscal policies." The latter may end up being the most important factor, as President Moon is proposing an increase in government spending equal to 0.7% of GDP - an amount equal to ½ of the estimated output gap coming after a 2016 budget surplus of 1% of GDP. This increase in fiscal spending could directly drive up the longer-end of Korean yield curve, as this would result in a narrower budget surpluses and greater KGB issuance. At the same time, the lack of domestic inflation pressures, even with the fiscal stimulus, will keep the BoK on an easing bias that will keep short dated yields well anchored. Therefore, we see the potential for the Korean yield curve to eventually steepen and break the downward-sloping trendline in place since 2014 (Chart 14). We recommend positioning for this move by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the Korean yield curve. Admittedly, this trade is more structural than tactical in nature, as the Moon stimulus policies will take time to unfold. Importantly, a flattening of the 2-year/10-year KGB curve is currently priced into the forwards, meaning that positioning now for a steepener does not incur negative carry (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus =##BR##Steeper Korea Curve More Fiscal Stimulus = Steeper Korea Curve More Fiscal Stimulus = Steeper Korea Curve Chart 15Enter A 2Yr/10Yr##BR##Korean Bond Curve Steepener Enter a 2yr/10yr Korean Bond Curve Steepener Enter a 2yr/10yr Korean Bond Curve Steepener Also, Korean 10-year bond yields are currently exhibiting a strong correlation to similar maturity U.S. Treasuries with a yield beta around 1.0 (bottom panel). Given our view that longer-dated U.S. yields have upside risk from both additional Fed rate increases and higher U.S. inflation expectations, that high yield beta suggests that the Korean yield curve could suffer some of the same cyclical bear-steepening pressures that we expect for U.S. Treasuries in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end curve of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean bond curve. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/29/silicon-valley-new-zealand-apocalypse-escape 2 The central bank noted that its "suite" of output gap estimates, using varying methodologies, have an unusually wide range at the moment between -1.5% and +2%. 3 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-statement 4 These trades can be done using interest rate swaps as well (receiving NZD rates vs paying USD & EUR rates), as swap spreads are expected to remain broadly stable in all three regions. 5 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets" dated May 24 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 According to the OECD, Korea's college enrollment rate was a whopping 87% as recently as 2014. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Distant Early Warning Distant Early Warning Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Feature Chart 1 C1 C1 Senior officials at the Federal Reserve have begun preparing the market for the eventual run down of the central bank's balance sheet. After several rounds of quantitative easing (QE), total assets held by the Fed currently stand at US$4.5 trillion - a dramatic increase from US$900 billion before the global financial crisis. Indeed, efforts to shrink the Fed's balance sheet are essentially reverse QE. As the 2013 'Taper Tantrum" suggests, such a profound change in U.S. monetary policy can have a significant impact on interest rates and broader financial assets, and Fed officials are working hard to properly anchor market expectations. In comparison, how the People's Bank of China manages its balance sheet is much less transparent and less understood by market participants, even though the PBoC has the biggest balance sheet among the world's major central banks (Chart 1). Currently, the PBoC's total assets amount to US$4.9 trillion, compared with about US$4.5 trillion for both the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, its balance sheet has stopped growing since 2015 in local currency terms and has been shrinking in dollar terms, but the impact on the economy and financial markets has so far not been material. Generally speaking, a central bank uses its balance sheet to aid monetary policy. It controls the size and composition of its assets to affect interest rates, and in turn the economy. Through "operation twist" and QE, the Fed significantly increased its holdings of longer-dated Treasury securities and mortgage backed securities (MBS), which currently account for 95% of its assets (Table 1). Therefore, shrinkage of the Fed balance sheet means that the Fed's holdings of long-term securities will gradually be reduced - likely by allowing them to run off at maturity rather than selling them in the open market. This should nonetheless put some upward pressure on long-term risk-free rates going forward. Table 1The Fed's Balance Sheet Shrinking Of The PBoC's Balance Sheet Shrinking Of The PBoC's Balance Sheet In a Special Report we published six years ago, we pointed out the explosion in the PBoC's balance sheet and its unique features compared with other central banks.1 In a nutshell, the PBoC's biggest holdings on its asset side were U.S. Treasurys rather than domestic risk-free assets. The Chinese central bank was essentially engaging in a massive "currency swap" in which it accumulated U.S. Treasurys while dramatically increasing the country's monetary base. Meanwhile, it was also working hard to "sterilize" by forcing commercial banks to maintain an increasingly massive sum of required reserves with the central bank. These policy tools, however, were inherently crude and clumsy, with huge volatility in monetary market rates and overall financial volatility being a key after-effect. This week we are revisiting the PBoC's balance sheet to highlight some major shifts in recent years. Some developments are worth highlighting. Dynamics have completely reversed since 2015, when Chinese official reserves began to fall, leading to a shrinking in the PBoC's balance sheet by about US$500 billion since the all-time peak. The "sterilization" process has also been reversed, as the PBoC has been releasing liquidity back into the domestic financial system. The overall liquidity situation has been largely stable. Normally a decline in the PBoC's foreign asset holdings would lead to a decline in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to offset the liquidity outflows, leading to a simultaneous decline in both sides of the central bank's balance sheet. The PBoC, however, has been resisting shrinking its balance sheet. As its foreign asset holdings (U.S. Treasurys) have been declining, the PBoC has significantly ramped up domestic asset holdings by increasing direct claims on commercial banks through repos and other lending facilities. The central bank appears to be concerned that a lowered RRR will stoke more domestic capital outflows, which risks creating a vicious circle. How the PBoC manages domestic liquidity has seen major shifts in recent history, and will likely continue to evolve going forward. The RRR, as a monetary policy tool, will likely be gradually phased out.2 Over the long run, this will lead to important changes in the PBoC's balance sheet and the way it conducts monetary policy. In the short term, commercial banks' excess reserves are at close to record low levels. The odds are rising that the RRR will be lowered in the coming months, especially if the RMB stabilizes against the dollar, as we expect.3 Finally, it is worth noting that the most aggressive phase of the Fed's QE efforts coincided with the most rapid phase of the PBoC's balance sheet expansion. This means that both central banks were aggressive buyers of U.S. Treasurys and risk-free assets in previous years. Looking forward, if a shrinking Fed balance sheet leads to a sharp increase in U.S. interest rates and a dollar rally, it could force the PBoC to also liquidate its holdings of U.S. Treasurys to stabilize the RMB exchange rate. This means both the Fed and the PBoC could become marginal sellers of Treasurys, which would have a much more profound impact on U.S. interest rates and the growth outlook. Monitoring the PBoC's balance sheet will become increasingly important for Fed watchers. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Delving Into the PBoC'S Balance Sheet," dated July 27, 2011, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The RMB Appreciate Against The Dollar, Again?" dated May 11, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Table 2 offers a simplified balance sheet of the People's Bank of China. Foreign assets still account for 65.6% of its total assets, down from a peak of 83% in 2014. In comparison, most other major central banks' assets are predominantly domestic government bonds. The explosive growth of the PBoC's holding of foreign assets had been the only source of its balance sheet expansion before 2015. In the past two years the PBoC's domestic assets have increased sharply. Overall the PBoC's balance sheet has stayed flat in the RMB terms. PBoC's holding of foreign and domestic assets has been matched by expansion of reserve money (monetary base) on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, including currency issuances (M0 and cash in the vaults of depository institutions) and deposits of commercial banks in the central bank. Commercial banks' reserve deposits at the PBoC have continued to grow even though the PBoC balance sheet expansion has stalled. (Chart 2) Table 2The PBoC's Balance Sheet Shrinking Of The PBoC's Balance Sheet Shrinking Of The PBoC's Balance Sheet Chart 2 C2 C2 PBoC holdings of foreign assets include foreign exchange reserves and gold. Foreign reserves currently account for 63% of PBoC total assets, compared with a peak of 84% in 2014. Official record shows that gold is still a negligible share of its total assets. Other major items on the asset side of the PBoC's balance sheet include claims on the government, commercial banks and other financial corporations. The PBoC's claims on the government (entirely on the central government) account for 4.5% of its total assets. In 2007 the government set up a sovereign wealth management fund to manage part of the country's reserves. The government issued bonds to the PBoC in exchange for foreign exchange reserves, which was used as capital of the investment firm. Legally the PBoC is forbidden to directly hold government bonds. The PBoC's claims on other depository corporations (commercial banks) include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements, which has increased sharply since 2016. The PBoC claims on other commercial banks were a major policy tool to control liquidity in the early 2000s. The central bank's claims on other financial corporations mainly include loans to the asset management firms that the government set up in the late 1990s to deal with bad loans spun off from commercial banks. There has been no change in this item in recent years. (Chart 3 and Chart 4) Chart 3 C3 C3 Chart 4 C4 C4 On the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, the dominant item is reserve money, which includes currency issuances and deposits of depository corporations. Taken together these items account for almost 90% of banks' total liabilities. However, currency issuances (M0 and cash in vault) have been hovering around 20% of the PBoC balance sheet in recent years. Deposits of depository corporations account for about 66%. Deposits of commercial banks in the central bank include required and free reserves. Currency issuance and free reserves make up China's "high power money" that can result in a much larger increase in money supply through the money multiplier. Therefore, adjusting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on banks has been a key policy tool for the PBoC to control "loanable" funds and liquidity. The central bank, however, been reluctant to adjust RRR since 2016 despite continued liquidity outflow. Commercial banks used to hold large amounts of free reserves with the central bank, which however have declined sharply in recent years. The massive reserves of commercial banks in the PBoC offer a critical liquidity buffer for banks at times of crisis. As banks' free reserves have been running thin, there is a building case for an RRR reduction in coming months. (Chart 5 and Chart 6) Chart 5 C5 C5 Chart 6 C6 C6 Other major items on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet include bond issues, government deposits and foreign liabilities. The central bank started to issue bonds (notes) in 2002 as a way to sterilize foreign capital inflows, a tool that has essentially been phased out. Currently, total outstanding bonds amount to RMB 50 billion, a mere 0.1% of the PBoC total liability, compared with almost 30% in 2007. The PBoC's foreign liabilities are deposits of international financial institutions, which account for a negligible share of its total assets. Government deposits account for 8.4% of the central bank's total liabilities, or RMB 2.88 trillion at the end of April 2017. The PBoC regularly auctions off fiscal deposits to commercial banks as a way to adjust interbank liquidity. (Chart 7 and Chart 8) Chart 7 C7 C7 Chart 8 C8 C8 There are four main items on the PBoC's balance sheet that the central bank uses at its discretion to manage domestic liquidity: claims on depository corporations (banks), deposits of depository corporations, liabilities to the government (fiscal deposits) and bond issues. Claims on depository corporations are on the asset side, and include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements. The PBoC has significantly expanded some new liquidity tools, such as various lending facilities and open market operations. These assets are mostly short term, allowing the central bank flexibility to adjust the quantity quickly. Reserve deposits of commercial banks, central bank bond issues and fiscal deposits are on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, but reserve deposits play by far the largest role in the central bank's sterilization efforts. Commercial banks reserve deposits are still hovering around record high levels. (Chart 9 and Chart 10) Chart 9 C9 C9 Chart10 C10 C10 Taken together, the ebbs and flows of the PBoC's sterilization operations coincide with the pace of country's foreign reserve accumulation. The PBoC was able to "sterilize" about 80% of foreign capital inflow before 2015, and it has been quickly adjusting its balance sheet to offset domestic capital outflows in the past two years. All these items on the PBoC's balance sheet should be cross-checked to assess its liquidity operations, rather than focusing on one item. Looking forward, the PBoC's liquidity operations will remain contingent on the situation of cross-border capital flows in the near term, and its monetary independence will remain compromised. Over the long run, a free-floating RMB exchange rate will diminish the purpose of PBoC's precautionary holdings of foreign reserves, which will in turn impact how the central bank manages its balance sheet for domestic considerations. (Chart 11 and Chart 12) Chart 11 C11 C11 Chart 12 C12 C12 Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature EM risk assets refuse to sell off - regardless of new information and developments that historically would have caused these markets to tumble. Indeed, political turmoil and changes in Brazil and South Africa - two high-beta EM markets - have so far had limited impact on flows and market dynamics. Moreover, while our Reflation Confirming Indicator has rolled over, EM share prices have not reacted at all (Chart I-1). EM stocks have also decoupled with the equal-weighted average of global mining and energy equity indexes (Chart I-2). Chart 1Reflation Confirming Indicator And ##br##EM Stocks Reflation Confirming Indicator And EM Stocks Reflation Confirming Indicator And EM Stocks Chart 2Commodities Share Prices And ##br##EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence Commodities Share Prices And EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence Commodities Share Prices And EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence We do not subscribe to the thesis that EM assets have permanently decoupled from both commodities and their domestic credit cycles, and that tried and tested indicators no longer work. Technology and social media share prices have been instrumental to this latest decoupling, as we wrote in last week's report.1 This group of stocks is in a full-blown mania phase, and it is hard to know when this will end. Yet, exponential price moves always occur at the end of a bull market, and are typically followed by bear markets. As we elaborated in last week's report, the investment call on social media and internet stocks is a bottom-up - not macro - call. Top-down analysis can add some value on the semiconductor cycle, and we suggested last week that it is likely topping out. This week new data releases support the thesis that Asian/global trade in general and the semiconductor cycle in particular are already decelerating. Korean exports data for the first 20 days of May, Japanese preliminary manufacturing PMI for May, and Taiwanese manufacturing output volume growth for April have all decelerated (Chart I-3). Finally, one technical piece of evidence that this rally is late is relative weakness in the equal-weighted MSCI equity indexes. In the EM space, the equally-weighted individual stock index has fared poorly against the EM market cap-weighted index since May 2016 (Chart I-4, top panel). In the U.S., the same measure of market breadth has deteriorated since December 2016 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asia's Manufacturing Growth ##br##Is Already Decelerating Asia's Manufacturing Growth Is Already Decelerating Asia's Manufacturing Growth Is Already Decelerating Chart 4The EM And U.S. Equity Rally ##br##Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks The EM And U.S. Equity Rally Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks The EM And U.S. Equity Rally Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks Bottom Line: EM financial markets are in the midst of irrational exuberance. The rally is late, but it is impossible to time the top. The forthcoming selloff will be large and protracted. Beware Of China's Budding Growth Slump Interest rates have risen in China sufficiently enough to cause a major growth slowdown in the mainland economy (Chart I-5). Liquidity tightening amid a lingering credit bubble could not be a more dangerous combination. In this context, financial markets are extremely complacent on EM/China plays. China's liquidity tightening continues, and is bound to create a decisive growth relapse in the months ahead, as well as dampen exports in countries that sell to China (Chart I-6). Chart 5China Growth To Slump China Growth To Slump China Growth To Slump Chart 6Exports To China To Slump Exports To China To Slump Exports To China To Slump Not only is the People's Bank of China (PBoC) guiding interest rates higher, but there is an ongoing regulatory crackdown on the financial system. Regulators are forcing banks to bring Wealth Management Products (WMPs) and other off-balance-sheet items onto their balance sheets. As a result, banks' capital adequacy and risk matrixes will deteriorate, and they will be forced to slow down credit creation. Chart 7EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out Remarkably, policymakers are determined to get things under control. According to The Wall Street Journal,2 key policymakers have issued strongly worded statements. "Strong medicine must be prescribed," said Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CRBC), according to people familiar with the matter. "If the banking industry gets into a mess," he added, "I will resign." He was appointed as the head of the CRBC last October, and likely has a mandate from the President to tackle speculative excesses in the financial system. In its first quarter Monetary Policy Implementation Report,3 the PBoC repeatedly used the phrase "preventing bubbles." Besides, in his statements, the chairman of the PBoC has frequently emphasized the need to normalize credit growth and curb speculative activities. The former head of the insurance regulator, who has been "accommodating" and "tolerant" of risky activities by insurance companies, was jailed last fall for corruption. These are strong indications confirming that policymakers are determined to curb speculative financial activities. Provided how entrenched and large various speculative financial schemes and the credit bubble have become in China, it will be impossible to tackle speculative excesses without a slowdown in overall credit growth and associated harm to the real economy. This is not to say that policymakers are tightening with intentions to cause a growth collapse. Policymakers in all countries always tighten to cap inflation or credit excesses or normalize interest rates - i.e., they never tighten to cause a major shock to the real economy. This applies to Chinese policymakers at the moment, especially ahead of the party Congress later this year. That said, when the existing imbalances in the economy or financial system are sufficiently large, even minor tightening can cause a financial accident or growth relapse. It is not within policymakers' powers to predict or prevent it. They may alter their policy after the fact, but markets will sell off considerably beforehand. We do not know exactly how financial dynamics in China will evolve in the months ahead, but we are certain that the market consensus is too complacent and that EM asset prices are at major risk. Bottom Line: It is impossible to predict financial accidents (stress among specific institutions) but we are certain that China's credit growth and, consequently, capital spending are bound to slow considerably in the coming months. This bodes ill for producers of commodities and industrial goods both within and outside China. Accordingly, EM risk assets will suffer the most. As a final note, EM ex-technology share prices have not yet broken out and we do expect them to relapse from the current levels (Chart I-7). Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?," dated May 17, 2017, link available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Lingling Wei and Chao Deng, "China's War on Debt Causes Stocks to Drop, Bond Yields to Shoot Up and Defaults to Rise," May 5, 2017, The Wall Street Journal. 3 Please refer to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/3307990/3307409/index.html (In Chinese only). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. The recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. Feature Chinese domestic stocks and bonds have taken a beating of late as the authorities ramped up scrutiny to rein in excesses in the country's financial sector. While it is warranted to control accumulated financial risk - especially associated with shadow banking activity - the "campaign" style administrative crackdown has caused widespread confusion and mini-panics among domestic investors. The actions and corresponding reactions illustrate the authorities' primitive control tools, which are increasingly at odds with the rapidly developing financial sector, and how blanket actions can spur undue financial volatility and provoke unintended consequences. For now, we expect the economic fallout to be limited, unless the financial crackdown causes further spikes in interest rates and a sudden halt in credit flows. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher in the absence of a major policy mishap that short-circuits the broad growth improvement and the profit cycle upturn. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless, while the more richly valued bubbly segments of the market will continue to deflate. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. What Do They Want To Achieve? Policymakers' primary focus has been on cracking down on excessive speculation in financial markets and restricting lending activities that are not in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Financial sector deregulation in recent years has increasingly blurred the lines between banks, insurance companies, brokers and trust companies, and regulators are constantly challenged to monitor all the increasingly sophisticated moving parts. From the banking sector's point of view, regulators are concerned that lenders have been aggressively boosting their exposure to other banks and non-bank financial institutions instead of providing credit to the "real economy." Overall commercial banks' claims on other banks and non-bank financial institutions have increased from 12% of their total assets in 2006 to over 25% as of January 2017, while their liabilities to other banks and non-bank financial firms have increased from 7% to 12% (Chart 1). Smaller banks are even more dependent on interbank financing for loanable funds. Interbank transactions and repo activities account for about 14% of smaller lenders' total source of funding, compared with 2% for large banks (Chart 2). Some small banks regularly borrow at lower costs through the interbank market or use negotiable certificate of deposits to purchase "wealth management products" offering higher returns issued by other banks or financial institutions. The duration mismatch leads to constant pressure to roll over these short-term financial instruments. The increasing interdependence among the country's financial institutions also creates the risk of a chain reaction in the financial system should some type of credit event erupt. Chart 1Increasing Interdependence Among Financial Institutions China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications The Chinese authorities have long regarded preventing systemic financial risk as a top priority, and the recent growth improvement has provided a window of opportunity for some housecleaning without a major adverse impact on the economy. Therefore, it is unlikely that regulators will back off from tightening regulatory supervision going forward. Overall, the authorities will continue to discourage overtrading within the financial system, and enforce full disclosure of off-balance-sheet items and shadow lending activities. The saving grace is that tightened macro prudential measures have already begun to curtail banks' aggressive expansion to non-bank financial institutions. Commercial banks' claims to these firms have slowed sharply since last year's peak (Chart 3). Meanwhile, the recent rise in interbank rates should also further discourage the perceived "risk-free" funding arbitrage to play the interest rate gap between long- and short-dated financial assets. All of this reduces the pressure of an escalation in the regulatory crackdown. Chart 2Smaller Banks Depend More On##br## Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Chart 3Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms ##br##Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Should Investors Be Concerned? In essence, banks' rising claims to other financial institutions means a lengthening of the credit intermediation channel, in which financing goes from credit providers through multiple layers of intermediaries to reach final borrowers in the real economy. In other words, banks, instead of lending directly to borrowers, channel loans to trust companies or securities brokers, who in turn transfer the funds to the real economy through "shadow banking" activities such as trust loans or various forms of "wealth management products", typically at higher rates. From this perspective, cracking down on lending excesses within the financial system in of itself should not have a material impact on credit flows to final corporate borrowers. In fact, streamlining the financial intermediation channel holds the promise of increasing accessibility to bank credit for the corporate sector and reducing its funding cost, which should benefit the overall economy in the long run. In the near term, liquidity tightening and the regulatory crackdown could push up interest rates and disrupt credit flows, which should be closely monitored to assess near-term negative impact on the economy. So far, the impact does not appear material. Chart 4Regulatory Crackdown ##br## Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Interbank rates have increased by about 100 basis points across the board since the beginning of this year, and 10-year government bond yields have risen by 50 basis points - both of which pale in comparison to the significant improvement in overall business activity. Nominal GDP growth expanded by 11.8% in the first quarter, compared with 9.6% in Q4, 2016. Furthermore, the central bank early this week re-started its medium-term lending facility (MLF), which was designed to avoid liquidity overkill in the domestic financial sector. Overall, the risk of overtightening of liquidity is not high. The regulatory crackdown since early this year has not had a meaningful impact on credit expansion. Banks' claims to other financial institutions have slowed sharply, but overall loan growth has been rather stable. Importantly, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, pivotal for overall capital spending, have in fact accelerated (Chart 4). In short, increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. We expect the authorities to remain highly vigilant and avoid policy overkill. Reading Market Tea Leaves There have been some notable divergences among different classes of Chinese stocks (Chart 5). Chinext, the domestic small-cap venture board, has suffered heavy losses of late, while large-cap A shares have been much more resilient. Meanwhile, offshore Chinese shares have barely felt any pressure at all. H shares have moved higher of late, while Chinese firms listed in the U.S. have decisively broken out. The divergence between onshore and offshore Chinese stocks' performance confirms the recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Barring major policy mistakes, we expect the Chinese economy to stay buoyant, as discussed in detail in our recent report.1 As such, a few investment conclusions can be drawn. Tighter liquidity will likely continue to place downward pressure on domestic stock prices, but the downside is limited by overall buoyant activity and improving profits. We expect the broad-A share market will remain narrowly range-bound. Overseas-listed Chinese shares are not subject to domestic liquidity constraints, and will likely continue to grind higher supported by growth improvement, profit recovery and low valuation multiples. The small-cap Chinext market has long been viewed as the more speculative segment of the domestic financial market, with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. As such, this market will remain vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Even after the most recent selloff, the bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are still at 38.4 and 4.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. The recent selloff in the onshore corporate bond market has also been driven by liquidity pressure, which in our view is overdone. While it's true that economic acceleration justifies higher yields, corporate spreads have also widened sharply, which is at odds with the broad growth acceleration and profit recovery. In addition, after the most recent selloff, Chinese corporate spreads are significantly higher than in most other major markets (Chart 6). In the near term, tighter liquidity may continue to induce more selling pressure in the domestic bond market. Cyclically we expect Chinese corporate bond spreads to narrow. Chart 5Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Chart 6The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate ##br##Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The headwinds against commodity currencies are still brewing, the selloff is not over. Global liquidity conditions are deteriorating and EM growth will disappoint. The valuation cushion in commodity currencies and EM plays is not large enough to compensate for the red flags emanating from financial markets. The euro is peaking. A capitulation by shorts is likely early next week. A move to 1.12 should be used to sell EUR/USD. Feature Commodity currencies have had a tough nine weeks, weakening by 5% in aggregate, helping boost our short commodity currency trade returns to 3.8%. At this juncture, the key questions on investors' minds is whether or not this trend will deepen and if this selloff will remain playable. We believe the answer to both questions is yes. A Less Friendly Global Backdrop When observed in aggregate, the past 12 months represented a fertile ground for commodity currencies to perform well as both global liquidity and growth conditions were on one of the most powerful upswings in the past two decades, lifting risk assets in the process (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Zenith Is Passing The Zenith Is Passing The Zenith Is Passing Global Liquidity Is Drying When we look at the global liquidity picture, the improvement seems to be over, especially as the Fed, the key anchor to the global cost of money, is more confidently embracing its switch toward a tighter monetary policy. It is true that U.S. Q1 data has been punky at best; however, like the Fed, we think this phenomenon will prove to be temporary. Recently, much ink has been spilled over the weakness in the auto sector. However, when cyclical spending is looked at in aggregate, the picture is not as dire and even encourages moderate optimism. Driven by both corporate and housing investment, cyclical sectors have been growing as a share of GDP (Chart I-2). This highlights that poor auto sales may have been a sector specific development and do not necessarily provide an accurate read on the state of household finances. Chart I-2Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Moreover, the outlook for household income is still positive. Our indicator for aggregate household disposable income continues to point north (Chart I-3). As we have highlighted in recent publications, various employment surveys are suggesting that job growth should improve in the coming months.1 Also, this week's productivity and labor cost report showed that compensation is increasing at a nearly 4% annual pace. This healthy outlook for household income, combined with the consumer's healthy balance sheets - debt to disposable income stands near 14 year lows while debt-servicing ratios are still near 40 year lows - and elevated confidence suggests that house purchases can expand. With the inventory of vacant homes standing at 11 year lows, this positive backdrop, along with the improving household-formation rate, is likely to prompt additional housing starts, lifting residential investment (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Bright U.S. Household ##br##Income Prospects Bright U.S. Household Income Prospects Bright U.S. Household Income Prospects Chart I-4As Households Get Formed,##br## Housing Starts To Pick up As Households Get Formed, Housing Starts To Pick up As Households Get Formed, Housing Starts To Pick up For the corporate sector, the strength in survey data is also likely to result in growing capex (Chart I-5). Not only have "soft" data historically been a good leading indicator of "hard" data, but the outlook for profit growth has also improved substantially. Profit growth is the needed ingredient to realize the positive expectation of business leaders embedded in "soft" data. Profit itself is very often dictated by the trend in nominal revenue growth. The fall in profits in 2016 mostly reflected the fall in nominal GDP growth to 2.5%, which produced a level of revenue growth historically associated with recessions (Chart I-6). As such, the recent rebound in nominal GDP growth, suggests that through the power of operating leverage, profit should also continue to grow, supporting capex in the process. Chart I-5Business Confidence Points ##br##To Better Growth And Capex... Business Confidence Points To Better Growth And Capex... Business Confidence Points To Better Growth And Capex... Chart I-6...Especially As A Key Profit##br## Driver Is Improving ...Especially As A Key Profit Driver Is Improving ...Especially As A Key Profit Driver Is Improving With the most cyclical sector of the U.S. economy still on an upswing, the Fed will continue to increase rates, at least more aggressively than the 45 basis points of tightening priced into the OIS curve over the next 12 months. With liquidity being sucked into the U.S. economic machine, international dollar-based liquidity, which is already in a downtrend, is likely to deteriorate further (Chart I-7). Moreover, global yield curves, which were steepening until earlier this year, have begun flattening again, highlighting that the tightening in global liquidity conditions is biting (Chart I-8). This will represent a continuation of the expanding handicap against global growth, and EM growth in particular. Chart I-7Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor Chart I-8A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity Global Growth Conditions Are Also Past Their Best, Especially In EM Global growth conditions are already showing a few troubling signs, potentially exerted by the tightening in global liquidity. To begin with, while our global leading economic indicator is still pointing north, its own diffusion index - the number of nations with improving LEIs versus those with deteriorating ones - has already rolled over. Normally, this represents a reliable signal that growth will soon peak (Chart I-9). For commodity currencies, the key growth consideration is EM growth. Here too, the outlook looks precarious. The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing. Chinese monetary conditions have been tightening abruptly (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, this tightening seems to be already yielding some results. The issuance of bonds by smaller financial firms has been plunging, which tends to lead the growth in aggregate total social financing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). This is because the grease in the shadow banking system becomes scarcer as the cost of financing rises. Chart I-9Deteriorating Growth##br## Outlook Deteriorating Growth Outlook Deteriorating Growth Outlook Chart I-10Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Are Tightening Chinese Monetary Conditions Are Tightening Chinese Monetary Conditions Are Tightening This situation could continue. Some of the rise in Chinese interbank rates to two-year highs reflects the fact that easing capital outflows have meant that the PBoC can tighten monetary policy through other means. However, the recent focus by the Beijing and president Xi Jinping on financial stability and bubble prevention, suggests that there is a real will to see tighter policy implemented. This means that the decline in total credit growth in China should become more pronounced. As a result, this will weigh on the country's industrial activity, a risk already highlighted by the decline in Manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-11). Additionally, this decline in credit growth tends to be a harbinger of lower nominal GDP growth, and most importantly for EM and commodity producers, a foreboding warning for Chinese imports (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China Industrial ##br##Growth Worry China Industrial Growth Worry China Industrial Growth Worry Chart I-12Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse ##br##Will Weigh On EM Growth Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Will Weigh On EM Growth Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Will Weigh On EM Growth Financial markets are already flashing red signals. The Canadian Venture exchange and various coal plays have historically displayed a tight correlation with Chinese GDP growth.2 Today, they are breaking below key trend lines that have defined their bull markets since the February 2016 troughs (Chart I-13). This message is corroborated by the recent weakness in copper, iron ore, and oil prices. Additionally, the price of platinum relative to that of gold is also breaking down. While the VW scandal has a role to play, this breakdown is also a symptom of the pain on growth created by the tightening in global liquidity conditions. In the past, the message from this ratio have ultimately been heeded by EM stock prices, suggesting that the recent divergence is likely to be resolved with weaker EM asset prices (Chart I-14). Confirming this risk, the sectoral breadth of EM equities has also deteriorated, and is already at levels that in the past have marked the end of stock advances (Chart I-15). At the very least, the narrowing of the EM bull market should prompt investors in EM-related plays to pause and reflect. Chart I-13Two Worrisome Breakdowns##br## On Chinese Plays Two Worrisome Breakdowns On Chinese Plays Two Worrisome Breakdowns On Chinese Plays Chart I-14Platinum's Dark##br## Omen For EM Platinum's Dark Omen For EM Platinum's Dark Omen For EM Chart I-15The Falling Participation ##br##In The EM Rally The Falling Participation In The EM Rally The Falling Participation In The EM Rally This moment of reflection seems especially warranted as EM assets do not have much cushion for unanticipated growth disappointment. The implied volatility on EM stocks is near cycle lows, so are EM sovereign CDS and corporate spreads (Chart I-16). This picture is mimicked by commodity currencies. Even after the recent bout of weakness, the aggregate risk-reversal in options points to a limited amount of concern, and therefore, a growing risk of negative surprises (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Little Cushion##br## In EM Assets Little Cushion In EM Assets Little Cushion In EM Assets Chart I-17Commodity Currency Options##br## Turn Optimistic As Well Commodity Currency Options Turn Optimistic As Well Commodity Currency Options Turn Optimistic As Well If commodity currencies have already depreciated in the face of a slightly soft dollar and perky EM asset prices, we worry that further weaknesses will emerge if the dollar strengthens again and EM assets self-off on the back of less liquidity and more EM growth disappointment. If the price of platinum relative to that of gold was a signal for EM assets, it is also a good indicator of additional stress in the commodity-currency space (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Platinum Raises Concerns ##br##For Commodity Currencies As Well Platinum Raises Concerns For Commodity Currencies As Well Platinum Raises Concerns For Commodity Currencies As Well We remain committed to our trade of shorting a basket of commodity currencies. AUD is the most expensive and most exposed to the Chinese tightening of the group, but that doesn't mean much. The Canadian housing market seems to be under increased scrutiny thanks to the combined assault of rising taxes on non-residents and growing worries about mortgage fraud, which is deepening the underperformance of Canadian banks relative to their U.S. counterparts. If this two-front attack continues, the housing market, the engine of the domestic economy, may also prove to weaken faster than we anticipated. Finally, the New Zealand dollar too is expensive even if domestic economic developments suggest that its fair value may be understated by most PPP metrics. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. economy remains good, but this will deepen the tightening in global liquidity. When combined with the tightening of monetary conditions in China, this suggests that global industrial activity and EM growth in particular could disappoint, especially as cracks in the financial system are beginning to appear. Moreover, EM assets and commodity currencies do not yet offer enough of a valuation cushion to fade this risk. Stay short commodity currencies. Macron In = Buy The Euro? The euro has rallied a 3.6% since early April, mostly on the back of Emmanuel Macron's electoral victories. Obviously, the last big hurdle is arriving this weekend with the second round. The En Marche! candidate still leads Marine Le Pen by a 20% margin. Wednesday's bellicose debate is unlikely to overturn this significant lead. The Front National candidate's lack of substance seems to have weighed against her in flash polls. If anything, her performance might have prompted some undecided Mélanchon voters to abstain or cast a "vote blanc" this weekend instead of picking her. This was her loss, not Macron's win. Does this mean that the euro has much upside? A quick rally toward 1.12 early next week still seems reasonable. New polls are beginning to show that En March! might perform much better than anticipated in the legislative election. Also, the center-right Les Républicains should also perform very well, resulting in the most right wing, pro-market Assemblée Nationale in nearly 50 years. While these polls are much too early to have any reliability, they may influence the interpretation by traders of Sunday's presidential election. However, we would remain inclined to fade any such rally. As we highlighted last week in a Special Report, our EUR/USD intermediate-term timing model shows that the euro is becoming expensive tactically, and that much good news is now in the euro's prices (Chart I-19).3 Additionally, investors have been excited by the rebound in core CPI in the euro area, a development interpreted as giving a carte-blanche to the ECB to hike rates sooner than was anticipated a few months ago. Indeed, currently, the first hike by the ECB is estimated to materialize in 27 months, versus the more than 60 months anticipated in July 2016. We doubt that market participants will bring the first rate hike closer to the present, a necessary development to prompt the euro to rally given our view on the Fed's tightening stance. We expect the rebound in the European core CPI to prove transient. Not only does European wage dynamics remain very poor outside of Germany, our country-based core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and points to a decelerating euro area core CPI (Chart I-20). Chart I-19EUR/USD: ##br##Good News In The Price EUR/USD: Good News In The Price EUR/USD: Good News In The Price Chart I-20European Core CPI Rebound ##br##Should Prove Transient European Core CPI Rebound Should Prove Transient European Core CPI Rebound Should Prove Transient Additionally, as we argued four weeks ago, tightening Chinese monetary conditions and EM growth shocks weigh more heavily on European growth than they do on the U.S.4 As such, our EM view implies that the euro area's positive economic surprises might soon deteriorate. Therefore, the favorable growth differential between Europe and the U.S. could be at its zenith. Shorting the euro today may prove dangerous, as a violent pop next week is very possible if the last euro shorts capitulate on a positive electoral outcome. Instead, we recommend investors sell EUR/USD if this pair hits 1.12 next week. Moreover, for risk management reasons, despite our view on the AUD, we are closing our long EUR/AUD position at a 6.9% gain this week. Bottom Line: Emmanuel Macron's likely victory this weekend could prompt a last wave of euro purchases. However, we are inclined to sell the euro as economic differentials between the common currency area and the U.S. are at their apex. Moreover, European core CPI is likely to weaken in the coming quarters, removing another excuse for investors to bid up the euro. Close long EUR/AUD. A Few Words On The Yen The yen has sold-off furiously in recent weeks. The tension with North Korea and the rise in the probability of a Fed hike in June to more than 90% have been poisons for the JPY. We are reluctant to close our yen longs just yet. Our anticipation that EM stresses will become particularly acute in the coming months should help the yen across the board. That being said, going forward, we recommend investors be more aggressive on shorting NZD/JPY than USD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models", dated April 28, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The Fed decided to keep the federal funds rate unchanged at the 0.75% - 1% range. The Committee highlighted the Q1 GDP weakness as transitory, as the labor market has tightened more since their last meeting, inflation is reaching its 2% target, and business investment is firming. Continuing and initial jobless claims both beat expectations; However, ISM Manufacturing PMI came in less than expected at 54.8; PCE continues to fluctuate around the 2% target, coming in at 1.8% from 2.1%; ISM Prices Paid came in at 68.5, beating expectations. Furthermore, the Committee expects that "near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced", and that "economic activity will expand at a moderate pace". The market is now pricing in a 93.8% probability of a hike. We therefore expect the dollar to continue its appreciation after the French elections. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Macron's lead over Le Pen has risen after the heated debate between the two rival candidates. We believe these dynamics were a key bullish support for the euro in the run up to elections as the possibility of a Le Pen victory is being completely priced out. Adding to this optimism is a plethora of positive data from Europe. Business and consumer confidences have both pick up. German HICP came in at 2% yoy; Overall euro area headline CPI came in at 1.9%, and core at 1.2%. Nevertheless, labor market data in the peripheries, as well as the overall euro area, was disappointing. We believe this highlights substantial slack in the economy, and will keep the ECB from increasing rates any time soon. We expect the euro to climb in the short run, but the longer-run outlook remains bleak. Look to short EUR/USD at 1.12. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Economic data in Japan has been positive this past week: The unemployment rate went down to 2.8%, outperforming expectations. Retail trade annual growth came in 2.1%, also outperforming expectations. The jobs offer-to-applicants ratio came in at 1.45. This last number is significant, as this ratio has reached it 1990 peak, and it provides strong evidence that the Japanese labor market is very tight. Eventually, this tight labor market will exert pressures on wage inflation. In an environment like Japan, where nominal rates are capped, rising inflation would mean a collapse in real rates and consequently a collapse on the yen. Thus, we are maintaining our bearish view on the yen on a cyclical basis. On a tactical basis, we continue to be positive on the yen, given that a risk-off period in EM seems imminent. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 In spite of the tougher rhetoric coming from Brussels recently, the pound has maintained resilient and has even gain against the U.S. dollar. Indeed, recent data from the U.K. has been positive: Markit Services PMI came in at 55.8, outperforming expectations. Meanwhile, Markit Manufacturing PMI came in at 57.3, crushing expectations. Additionally, both consumer credit and M4 money supply growth also outperformed. Overall we continue to be positive on the pound, particularly against the euro, as we believe that expectations on Britain are too pessimistic, while the ability for the ECB to turn hawkish limited given that peripheral economies are still too weak to sustain tighter monetary conditions. Against the U.S. dollar the pound will have limited upside from now, given that it has already appreciated substantially. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 The RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The Bank also stated that its "forecasts for the Australian economy are little changed." It remains of the opinion that the low interest rate environment continues to support the outlook. This will also be a crucial ingredient to generate a positive outcome in the labor market in the foreseeable future. This past month has been very negative for the antipodean currency, with copper and iron ore prices displaying a similar behavior, losing almost 10% and 25% of their values since February, respectively. With China tightening monetary policy, and dissipating government spending soon to impact the Chinese economy, we remain bearish on AUD. In brighter news, the Bank's trimmed mean CPI measure increased by 1.9% on an annual basis, beating expectations of 1.8%. This is definitely a positive, but economic slack elsewhere could limit this development. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Data for New Zealand was very positive this week: The participation rate came in at 70.6%, outperforming expectations. Employment growth outperformed expectations substantially in the first quarter of 2017, coming in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate also outperformed coming in at 4.9% This recent data confirms our belief that inflationary pressures in New Zealand are stronger than what the RBNZ would lead you to believe. Indeed, non-tradable inflation, which measures domestically produced inflation is at its highest since 2014. Eventually, this will lead the RBNZ to abandon its neutral bias and embrace a more hawkish one, lifting the NZD in the process, particularly against the AUD. Against the U.S. dollar the kiwi dollar will likely have further downside, as the tightening in monetary conditions in China should weigh on commodity prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The oil-based currency has once again succumbed to fleeting oil prices, depreciating to a 1-year low. U.S. crude inventories have recently been declining by less than expected and production in Libya has been increasing. Moreover, headline inflation dropped 0.5% from its January high of 2.1%. The Bank of Canada acknowledged the weak core CPI data in its last monetary policy meeting, but instead chose to focus on stronger economic data to change their stance to neutral. As the weakness in oil prices proves temporary due to another likely OPEC cut, headline inflation should pick up again. However, labor market conditions and economic activity remain questionable based on the weakness of recent data: retail sales are contracting 0.6% on a monthly basis, and the raw materials price index dropped 1.6%. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales growth came in at 2.1%, crushing expectations. However, Aprils PMI underperformed coming in at 57.4 against expectations of 58.3. Additionally, the KOF leading indicator came in at 106, al coming below expectations. EUR/CHF now stands at its highest level since late 2017 and while data has not been beating expectations it still very upbeat. We believe that conditions are slowly being put into place for the SNB to abandon its implied floor, given that core inflation is approaching its long term average. Therefore, once the French elections are over, EUR/CHF will become an attractive short, given that the euro will once again trade on economic fundamentals rather than political risks. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The krone continues to depreciate sharply. This comes as no surprise given that oil is now down 13% in 2017. Overall we expect that oil currencies will outperform metal currencies given that oil prices will have less sensitivity to EM liquidity and economic conditions. That being said, it is hard to be too bullish on oil if China slows anew, even if one believe that the OPEC deal will stay in place . This means that USD/NOK could have additional upside. On a longer term basis, there has been a slight improvement in Norwegian data, as nominal retail sales are growing at a staggering 10% pace, while real retail sales are growing at more than 2%, which are a 5-year and a 2-year high respectively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The April Monetary Policy meeting delivered an unexpected decision, with members deciding to extend asset purchases till the end of the year, while delaying the forecast for a rate hike to mid-2018. Recent inflationary fluctuations and weak commodity prices support the Riksbank's actions. Forecasts for both inflation and the repo rate were lowered for 2018 and 2019. The Riksbank highlighted that "to support the upturn in inflation, monetary policy needs to be somewhat more expansionary", and is prepared to be more aggressive if need be. This increasingly dovish rhetoric by the Riksbank contrasts markedly with the FOMC's hawkish tilt, a dichotomy that will prove bearish for the krona relative to the greenback. Implications for EUR/SEK are a little more blurred, as the ECB will also remain dovish for the foreseeable future. However, Sweden's attentive and cautious stance on its currency's strength will cap any downside in EUR/SEK. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The global credit impulse is 4 months into a mini-downswing, and it is too soon to position for the next mini-upswing. The euro area economy will remain one of the better performers in a global growth pause. Underweight German bunds in a global bond portfolio. Stay long the euro, especially euro/yuan. Go long euro area Financials versus U.S. Financials, currency unhedged, as a first foray into a beaten-up sector. Feature First the good news: the ECB's latest bank lending data indicate that the euro area 6-month bank credit impulse is stabilizing after a modest but clear decline in recent months (Chart I-2). Now the bad news: the global bank credit impulse continues to weaken. The upshot is that the euro area economy - even with 1.5% growth - will remain one of the better performers in what is now a very clear global growth pause. Chart of the WeekThe Global Bond Yield Has Shown ##br##A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern Chart I-2The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The ##br##Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China How To Play The Euro Area's Economic Outperformance In a global growth pause, the best way to play euro area economic outperformance is through relative positions in the bond markets and through currencies. Specifically, underweight German bunds in a global bond portfolio but stay long the euro, especially euro/yuan. The implication for euro area equities is more ambiguous. The Eurostoxx50 has a very low exposure to Technology, which tends to perform defensively in a growth pause. Conversely, the Eurostoxx50 has a high exposure to Financials, whose relative performance reduces to a play on the bond yield (Chart I-3). Given that the global credit impulse is still weakening, it is premature to expect a sustained absolute rally in Financials anywhere. Therefore, the strong knee-jerk absolute rally in European banks after the French election first round is unlikely to last. That said, with the euro area economy likely to outperform in a global growth pause, and euro area Financials still near a 50-year relative low versus U.S. Financials, euro area bank equities can now outperform banks in other markets (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Global Bond Yield = ##br##Financials Vs. Market Global Bond Yield = Financials Vs. Market Global Bond Yield = Financials Vs. Market Chart I-4T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression =##br## Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression = Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression = Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials As a first foray into a beaten-up sector, go long euro area Financials versus U.S. Financials, currency unhedged. (Caveat: all of this assumes that Emanuel Macron beats Marine Le Pen to the French Presidency on Sunday, as we expect.) Don't Rely On Year On Year Comparisons Nature provides many of our units of time. The earth's orbit around the sun gives us a year; the moon's orbit around the earth gives us a month; the earth's rotation on its axis gives us a day. But there is absolutely no reason why economic and financial cycles should follow nature's cycles. Yet most analysts persist at looking for patterns and cycles in economic and financial data using yearly, monthly, or daily rates of change. Unfortunately, by focusing on years, months and days, they risk completely missing some of the strongest patterns and cycles in the economy and markets. Think about a clock pendulum. If you look at it once a second, it will always seem to be in the same position, motionless. You will miss the cycle. Likewise, if an economy regularly accelerates for 6 months and then symmetrically decelerates for 6 months, the yearly rate of change will be a constant, giving the false appearance that nothing is happening. It will miss the cycle. It turns out that the global economy does indeed regularly accelerate and decelerate - and that each half-cycle averages about 8 months. The strongest evidence of this very clear oscillation comes from the remarkably regular wave like pattern in the global bond yield, illustrated in the Chart of the Week and Chart I-5 and Chart I-6. Chart I-5The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A ##br##Regular Wave Like Pattern... The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern... The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern... Chart I-6...Which Is Easier To See ##br##When Detrended ...Which Is Easier To See When Detrended ...Which Is Easier To See When Detrended Furthermore, the acceleration and deceleration of bank credit flows - as measured in the global credit impulse - also exhibits a remarkably regular wave like pattern, with each half-cycle lasting about 8 months. But crucially, a half-cycle length of less than a year means that a year on year analysis would miss this very clear oscillation. Hence, our analysis always uses the 6-month credit impulse (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern Mini Half-Cycles Average Eight Months It is not a coincidence that the bond yield and bank credit impulse exhibit near identical half-cycle lengths. The bond yield and credit impulse cycles are inextricably embraced in a perpetual feedback loop. A higher bond yield will initiate a mini down cycle. All else being equal, the higher cost of credit will weigh on credit flows. This will slow economic growth, which will then show up in GDP (and other hard) data. The bond yield will respond by readjusting down. In turn, a lower bond yield will then initiate a mini up cycle. And so on... But each stage in the sequence comes with a delay. For a change in the cost of credit to register with households and firms and fully impact credit flows, it clearly takes time. The credit flows do not generate instantaneous economic activity either. Fully spending the credit flows also takes time. Once you accept these assumptions of internal regulating feedback combined with delays in economic response, the economy has to be a naturally-oscillating system whose half-cycle length depends on the delays in economic response. And the important point is that these delays have little connection with nature's cycles. For those who are mathematically inclined, Box I-1 shows the differential equations which define the economic mini-cycle and its half-cycle length. Box 1The Mathematics Of Mini-Cycles Why Europe's 1.5% Growth Will Look Stellar Why Europe's 1.5% Growth Will Look Stellar Still, some commentators counter that credit flows don't just depend on the cost of credit. They also depend on so-called "animal spirits" - optimism or pessimism about the future. These commentators point to sentiment and survey data which show that animal spirits have soared. Our response is yes, for credit flows, heightened animal spirits in isolation are indeed a tailwind. But any rise in the cost of credit is a headwind. It follows that the net impact on credit flows depends on the relative strengths of the tailwind from heightened animal spirits and the headwind from the higher cost of credit. It is the net effect on the 6-month credit impulse - rather than heightened animal spirits per se - that determines the cyclical direction of the economy. We would suggest that the tailwind from heightened animal spirits has been countered by an even stronger headwind - the sharpest proportional rise in borrowing costs for at least 70 years (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! As anticipated in our 16th February report The Contrarian Case For Bonds, incoming GDP data from the world's largest economies - the U.S., U.K. and France - now confirm this. First quarter growth (at annualised rates) sharply decelerated to 0.7%, 1.2% and 1.0% respectively. And this is not just about so-called first quarter "residual seasonality" as 6-month growth rates have also lost momentum. The global credit impulse is 4 months into a mini-downswing; the global bond yield is 2 months into a mini-downswing. Previous half-cycles have averaged 8 months, with the shortest at around 5 months. Hence, we feel it is somewhat premature to position for the next mini-upswing. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The rally in Portuguese sovereign bonds appears technically overextended. Go short Portuguese sovereign 10-year bonds versus Spanish sovereign 10-year bonds with a profit target and stop loss of 2.5% . For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 10-Year Bonds: Short Portugal / Long Spain 10-Year Bonds: Short Portugal / Long Spain * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Ongoing monetary tightening in China poses a substantial threat to EM risk assets. Yet financial markets remain highly complacent. Mind the gap between EM risk assets and commodities currencies/various commodities prices. Business conditions in EM ex-China will diverge from the U.S. and European economies and recouple to the downside with China's growth. The pillars of the EM business cycle are China, commodities, and their own domestic credit cycle, rather than the U.S. and Europe. Continue shorting/underweighting the Malaysian currency, stocks and sovereign credit. Feature Chart I-1China: Ongoing Liquidity Tightening China: Ongoing Liquidity Tightening China: Ongoing Liquidity Tightening There is one major underappreciated risk in global financial markets: China's gradual yet unrelenting monetary tightening. Though slow and measured, this policy tightening constitutes a significant risk, particularly for emerging markets. The basis is that it could trigger a disproportionally large negative effect on Chinese growth because it is taking place amid a lingering credit bubble in China.1 Mainland interbank rates and onshore corporate bond yields have risen as the People's Bank of China (PBoC) has reduced its net liquidity injections via open market operations (Chart I-1, top panel). The PBoC's monetary tightening is bound to reduce money/credit growth in China. The bottom panel of Chart I-1 demonstrates that changes in the central bank's claims on commercial banks lead by 3 months asset growth at commercial banks. Diminished liquidity injections by the PBoC will soon push commercial banks to reduce the pace of their balance sheet expansion. Asset growth/loan origination among policy banks2 has already slowed (Chart I-2). On top of this, China's regulatory tightening aimed at curbing speculative (high-risk) financial activity will also curtail commercial banks' loan origination. For example, bank regulators are forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets. As a result, money/credit growth is set to decelerate meaningfully. This, in turn, will cause another slump in this credit-addicted economy. It is very probable that the mini-business cycle in China has already reached its peak - our credit and fiscal impulse heralds further drop in the manufacturing PMI (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Commercial Banks And Policy ##br##Banks' Loan Growth To Slow Further Commercial Banks And Policy Banks' Loan Growth To Slow Further Commercial Banks And Policy Banks' Loan Growth To Slow Further Chart I-3China's Growth Has Rolled Over China's Growth Has Rolled Over China's Growth Has Rolled Over While China's monetary tightening is not a direct risk to domestic demand in the U.S. or Europe, it poses an imminent risk to commodities prices and EM risk assets. Consistent with slowing Chinese manufacturing output growth, commodities prices trading in mainland China have lately tanked. Bottom Line: BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team maintains that ongoing monetary tightening in China poses substantial risks to EM risk assets and commodities. Yet financial markets remain complacent. Perplexing Complacency It is very perplexing that EM risk assets have so far ignored the risks stemming from China's tightening and renewed relapse in commodities prices. It seems portfolio allocation into risk assets, including those in the EM universe, is pushing prices higher irrespective of a major relapse in forward-looking indicators for both China and EM growth. EM stocks, currencies and credit spreads have decoupled from a number of indicators with which they historically had a high correlation: In recent weeks, we have brought to investors' attention that an unsustainable gap has been opening between the commodities currencies index - an equal-weighted average of AUD, NZD and CAD - and both EM exchange rates and EM share prices in local currency terms (Chart I-4A & Chart I-4B). Chart I-4AHeed The Message From Commodities Currencies Heed The Message From Commodities Currencies Heed The Message From Commodities Currencies Chart I-4BHeed The Message From ##br##Commodities Currencies Heed The Message From Commodities Currencies Heed The Message From Commodities Currencies Not only have commodities currencies decisively rolled over, but also commodities prices have begun sliding. Historically, EM risk assets in general and the sovereign credit market in particular have always sold off when commodities prices have drifted lower (Chart I-5). EM equity volatility is back to its lows (Chart I-6). This corroborates reigning complacency in the marketplace. Chart I-5Commodities Prices And ##br##EM Sovereign Spreads Commodities Prices And EM Sovereign Spreads Commodities Prices And EM Sovereign Spreads Chart I-6A Sign Of Complacency A Sign Of Complacency A Sign Of Complacency EM sovereign and corporate spreads have also fallen to their narrowest levels in recent years (Chart I-7). Notably, our valuation model for EM corporate bonds - which is constructed based on our EM Corporate Financial Health Index - posits that EM corporate credit is very expensive (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads Chart I-8EM Corporate Credit Is Expensive bca.ems_wr_2017_05_03_s1_c8 bca.ems_wr_2017_05_03_s1_c8 Finally, EM local currency bond yield spreads over U.S. Treasurys have also dropped a lot, signifying complacency on the part of EM investors (Chart I-9). Chart I-9EM Local Bond Yield Spreads ##br##Over U.S. Treasurys Are Low EM Local Bond Yield Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys Are Low EM Local Bond Yield Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys Are Low Bottom Line: EM financial markets are not cheap, and investors are highly complacent. Mind the gap between EM risk assets and commodities currencies/various commodities prices. Can EM Decouple From China? An oft-asked and relevant question is whether EM ex-China can decouple from China itself. Not for the time being, in our view. On the contrary, as we argued in last week's report titled Toward A Desynchronized World,3 China's slowdown will weigh on the majority of the EM investable equity, currency and credit markets. As a result, growth conditions in EM ex-China will diverge from the U.S. and European economies and recouple to the downside with China's growth. The three pillars of EM ex-China growth are commodities, China and their domestic credit cycles. The primary link is via commodities. As China's growth decelerates and its imports relapse, commodities prices will plunge (Chart I-10). Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia, Malaysia and Indonesia are set to experience negative terms-of-trade shocks as commodities prices deflate. As a result, their currencies will depreciate and growth will suffer. Although Mexico is leveraged to the U.S., oil prices still matter for it. This leaves non-commodities producing economies in Asia and central Europe. The latter is too small to matter for EM benchmarks. Central Europe correlates with Europe's business cycle rather than EM. In emerging Asia, Korea and Taiwan - the largest equity market cap weights after China in the MSCI EM index - sell much more to China than to the U.S. and Europe combined. Korea's shipments to China account for 25% of total exports while those to the U.S. and Europe combined make up 22%. For Taiwan the numbers are 27% and 20%, respectively. Thailand sells to China as much as it does to the U.S. This by and large leaves only three mainstream EM economies that are not substantially exposed to China: India, the Philippines and Turkey (Table I-1). Indian and Philippine stocks are expensive, and these nations confront their own unique problems. Turkey in turn is facing major political, economic and financial predicaments. Chart I-10Industrial Metals Prices To head Lower bca.ems_wr_2017_05_03_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2017_05_03_s1_c10 Table I-1Export To China And U.S. Perplexing Complacency: Underappreciated EM Risk Perplexing Complacency: Underappreciated EM Risk In short, among mainstream EM countries, there are very few plays not exposed to China or commodities and offer a reasonable risk/return profile. Investors also often ask if commodities importing economies in Asia can rally in absolute terms when and as commodities prices drop. Chart I-11 illustrates the Korean and Taiwanese equity indexes have historically (in the past 20 years) been strongly correlated with oil and industrial metals prices. The reason is that commodity price swings partially reflect global growth conditions. Being heavily dependent on exports, Korea and Taiwan are highly sensitive to fluctuations in global growth. We expect global trade to slow down anew, driven by weakness in China/EM imports, even if U.S. and European demand remains resilient. We elaborated on this theme in last week's report.4 Therefore, Korean and Taiwanese export shipments are set to slow as well. We are not bearish on Korean and Taiwanese domestic demand - we are in fact overweight these bourses within the EM equity universe, with a focus on technology and domestic sectors. That said, consumer and business spending in these economies is relatively small in a global context to make a difference for other EM markets. In addition, given these economies' mature phase of development, the pace of their income and domestic demand growth will be moderate. Many EM countries have experienced excessive credit growth in the past 15 years, but their banking systems have not restructured - i.e. banks have not sufficiently provisioned for non-performing loans. Until they do so, domestic loan growth remains at risk of weakening. There has been modest deleveraging in Brazil, Russia and India (Chart I-12). However, there is no evidence that these economies have embarked on a new credit cycle. Chart I-11Korean And Taiwanese Stocks ##br##Correlate With Commodities Korean And Taiwanese Stocks Correlate With Commodities Korean And Taiwanese Stocks Correlate With Commodities Chart I-12Some Moderate Deleveraging ##br##In Brazil, Russia And India Some Moderate Deleveraging In Brazil, Russia And India Some Moderate Deleveraging In Brazil, Russia And India Case in point are Indian state-owned banks: their experience shows that deleveraging can be more protracted and painful than one might initially expect. The reason is that it takes time for banks to acknowledge non-performing loans, be recapitalized and get ready to boost loan growth again. In addition, Brazil and Russia are still commodities plays at the mercy of commodities price dynamics. Besides, Brazil needs to undergo painful fiscal adjustment/reforms. In other developing countries, bank loan growth remains elevated and bank loan-to-GDP ratios continue to rise (Chart I-13). In these economies, credit retrenchment and even a mild deleveraging has not yet occurred. Prominently, as EM currencies come under downward pressure, interest rates in many economies running current account deficits will be pressured higher. This will lead to a slowdown in bank credit growth and will depress demand. Finally, if it were not for the pick-up in Chinese imports, the EM ex-China business cycle and commodities prices would not have ameliorated in the past 12 months. Notably, excluding China, Korea and Taiwan, developing nations' retail sales volumes and new vehicle sales remain dormant (Chart I-14). Similarly, there has not been much recovery in capital spending and, consistently, imports of capital goods in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart I-15). Chart I-13No Deleveraging In Many EMs No Deleveraging In Many EMs No Deleveraging In Many EMs Chart I-14EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Stabilization But No Revival EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stabilization But No Revival EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stabilization But No Revival Chart I-15EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Not Much Of Recovery EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Not Much Of Recovery EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Not Much Of Recovery As credit growth slows or fails to pick up in these economies, domestic demand recovery will be tepid, and will certainly disappoint market expectations. Bottom Line: Given budding divergence between U.S./Europe and Chinese growth, EM ex-China growth will fail to recover and will surprise to the downside. The basis is that the pillars of the EM's business cycle are China, commodities and their own domestic credit cycle, rather than the U.S. and Europe. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November, 23 2016, and January 18, 2017, the links are available on page 16. 2 Policy banks are China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Toward A Desynchronized World", dated April 26, 2017, link available on page 16. 4 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Toward A Desynchronized World", dated April 26, 2017, link available on page 16. Malaysia: Not Out Of The Woods Arenewed relapse in Chinese growth later this year coupled with lower commodities prices will once again expose Malaysia's vulnerabilities. Notably, 26% of Malaysia's exports are related to commodities - mainly crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products and palm oil. Another downleg in the ringgit's value along with lower commodities prices will cause domestic interest rates to rise. However, Malaysia is in no position to tolerate higher interest rates. Leverage has risen considerably in the past ten years in Malaysia, and is very high (Chart II-1A). Indeed, the country has one of the highest debt-servicing costs in the EM universe, according to BIS data (Chart II-1B). Chart II-1A...And Debt Servicing Costs High Leverage... High Leverage... Chart II-1BHigh Leverage... High Leverage... High Leverage... If the Malaysian central bank attempts to cap interest rates by injecting local currency liquidity into the system, the ringgit will plunge even further. Chart II-2 shows that in recent years local interbank rates have tended to rise when the central bank curtailed its net liquidity injection. If on the other hand the Bank Negara of Malaysia (BNM) does not inject liquidity into the banking/financial system, interest rates will rise as the currency depreciates. Interestingly, despite strong inflows into EM generally, the BNM has continued to inject local liquidity into the economy - albeit at a slower pace than in recent years - to keep local rates tame (Chart II-2). Additionally, despite the significant growth slowdown that has occurred in the past two years in Malaysia, banks' NPLs have not risen much (Chart II-3). As banks start acknowledging loan losses and setting provisions for them, their profitability will decline, capital will be eroded, and loan origination will fall. Chart II-2BNM Has Been Injecting Liquidity ##br##To Control Interest Rates BNM Has Been Injecting Liquidity To Control Interest Rates BNM Has Been Injecting Liquidity To Control Interest Rates Chart II-3Malaysian Banks Haven't ##br##Acknowledged Enough Losses Yet Malaysian Banks Haven't Acknowledged Enough Losses Yet Malaysian Banks Haven't Acknowledged Enough Losses Yet Meanwhile, even though global trade and commodities prices have picked in the past 15 months, Malaysia's economy has failed to recover. This reflects the country's underlying economic vulnerability as the borrowing/credit spree of the past decade has come to a halt: Commercial and passenger vehicle sales are shrinking. Retail trade and employment are also still anemic. Property sales volumes and housing construction approvals are collapsing (Chart II-4). Capital expenditures are depressed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). On the external side, the semiconductor/electronics sector has boomed in Asia since early 2016, but Malaysia has failed to benefit much. Indeed, the recovery in Malaysia's electronics sector has been weak compared to other technology hubs such as Taiwan and Korea. This confirms why Malaysia has been losing market share in electronics products to Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Cyclical Growth Remains Anemic Cyclical Growth Remains Anemic Cyclical Growth Remains Anemic Chart II-5Malaysia Is Losing Tech Market ##br##Share To Its Asian Competitors Malaysia Is Losing Tech Market Share To Its Asian Competitors Malaysia Is Losing Tech Market Share To Its Asian Competitors Bottom Line: Continue shorting MYR versus the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Equity investors should continue to underweight Malaysian stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Relative value traders should maintain our long Russian / short Malaysia equity trade. Buy/hold Malaysian CDS or underweight this sovereign credit market within an EM credit portfolio. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor aymank@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations