Money/Credit/Debt

Highlights Our take on the key macro drivers of financial markets hasn’t evolved much since we laid it out this summer, … : Monetary policy is still accommodative; lenders are ready, willing and able; and the expansion remains intact. ... but the inflection points are getting nearer: The good times won’t last forever, though. The Fed is resolutely tightening policy, BBB-heavy investment-grade issuance has the corporate bond market flirting with a plague of fallen angels, and the global economy is slowing. Our strategy remains more cautious than our outlook for now, … : Although we think the equity bull market has another year to run, and the expansion will stretch into 2020, we are only equal-weight equities, while underweighting bonds and overweighting cash. … but we’re alert to opportunities to get more aggressive: Investment-grade and high-yield bonds are unlikely to offer an attractive risk-reward profile, but the S&P 500 shouldn’t decline much more if the economy holds up. Feature Mr. and Ms. X’s annual visit is an occasion for every BCA service to look toward the coming year, mindful of how it could improve on the one just past. The theme we settled on in last year’s discussion, Policy and Markets on a Collision Course, began asserting itself in earnest in October, and appears as it will be with us throughout 2019. The Fed is nearing its fourth rate hike this year, on the heels of three in 2017, and markets are warily contemplating the tipping point at which higher interest rates begin to interfere with activity. The yield curve has become a constant worry (Chart 1), with short rates moving in step with the fed funds rate while yields at the long end have been just one-half as sensitive (Chart 2). Chart 1Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ... Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ... Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ...   Chart 2... As The Curve Has Steadily Flattened 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? Trade tensions are an even thornier policy challenge. After flitting on and off investors’ radar earlier in the year, trade barriers have been a major source of angst in recent months as central banks, investor polls and company managements increasingly cite them among their foremost concerns. Unfortunately, our geopolitical strategists do not expect relief any time soon. They see trade as just one aspect of an extended contest for supremacy between China and the U.S. Late-Cycle Turbulence, our 2019 house theme, pairs nicely with Policy-Market Collision. The gap between our terminal fed funds rate expectation and the money market’s is huge, and leaves ample room for a repricing of the entire yield curve. Trade has been a roller coaster, capable of inducing whiplash in 140 characters or less, and it may already have brought global manufacturing to the brink of a recession. Oil lost 30% in two months at the stroke of a pen; its immediate fate is in the hands of OPEC, but the caprice with which Iranian sanctions may or may not be re-imposed is likely to feed uncertainty. As we advised Mr. and Ms. X a few weeks ago, investors should stay nimble; there is no point to committing to a twelve-month strategy right now.1 The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Our equilibrium fed funds rate model estimates that the equilibrium fed funds rate, the rate that neither encourages nor discourages economic activity, is currently around 3%. It projects that the equilibrium rate will approach 3¼% by the middle of 2019, and 3⅜% by year end. The implication is that policy is comfortably accommodative now, and will not cross into restrictive territory for another 12 months – assuming that the Fed hikes four times next year, in line with our ambitious expectation. If the Fed steps back from its gradual pace, and only hikes three times in 2019 (as per the dots), or just once (as per the money market), the day when the economy and markets will have to confront tight monetary conditions will be pushed even further into the future. Stretching monetary accommodation until late next year would seem to forestall the arrival of the next recession until at least the first half of 2020. Tight policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession, as recessions have only occurred when the policy rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium over the six decades covered by our model. A longer stretch of accommodation would also continue to nourish the equity bull market and discourage allocations to Treasuries. Over the last 60 years, the S&P 500 has accrued all of its real returns when policy was easy (Table 1), while Treasuries have wilted, especially in the current phase of the fed funds rate cycle (Table 2). Table 1Equities Flourish When Policy’s Easy ... 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last?   Table 2... While Treasuries Stumble 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? The Business Cycle The state of policy is one of the three components in our simple recession indicator. Neither of the other two is sounding the alarm, either. Our preferred 3-month-to-10-year segment of the Treasury yield curve is still comfortably upward sloping, even if it has been steadily flattening and we expect it to invert late next year (Chart 3). Year-over-year growth in leading economic indicators decelerated slightly last month, but remains well above the zero line that has reliably preceded past recessions. Chart 3Flattening, But Not Yet Flat Flattening, But Not Yet Flat Flattening, But Not Yet Flat The Credit Cycle Anyone following the credit cycle would do well to start with the axiom that bad loans are made in good times. Its converse is just as true: good loans are made in bad times. Loan officers are every bit as susceptible to the recency bias as other human beings, and they tend to extrapolate from the freshest observations when assessing a borrower’s prospects. When things are good, lenders assume they will continue to be good, and let their guard down by lending to marginal borrowers and/or relaxing the terms on which they will lend. When things are bad, on the other hand, loans have to be underwritten so tightly that they squeak. The upshot is that lending standards and loan performance are tightly bound up with one another. In the near term, standards and performance are joined at the hip; over a five-year period, standards lead performance as a contrary indicator. Defaults almost certainly bottomed for the cycle in 2014, to judge by speculative-grade bonds (Chart 4, top panel), and loans (Chart 4, bottom panel). Standards reliably followed, and the proportion of lenders easing standards for corporate borrowers, as per the Fed’s senior loan officer survey, spiked (Chart 5). Chart 4Weakening, But Not Yet Weak Weakening, But Not Yet Weak Weakening, But Not Yet Weak   Chart 5Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... The 2012 and 2014 peaks in willingness suggest that performance is due to erode (Chart 6). We do not foresee a step-function move higher in defaults, or a sudden collapse in loan availability, but we do expect some fraying at the edges. Given how tight spreads remain, any weakness at the margin could go a long way to wiping out much, if not all, of spread product’s excess return. The bottom line is that the credit cycle is well advanced, and investors should expect borrower performance and lender willingness to weaken from their current levels. Chart 6... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term ... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term ... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term Bonds We have written at length on our bearish view on rates and Treasuries.2 The key pillar supporting our rationale is the gap between our terminal fed funds rate estimate, 3.5-4%, and the market’s view that the Fed will not go beyond 2.75%, if indeed it gets to that level at all (Chart 7). The gap is big enough to drive a truck through, and leaves a lot of room for yields to shift higher all along the curve, even if the Fed were to slow its 25-bps-a-quarter tempo, as the Wall Street Journal suggested it might in a report last Thursday. We continue to believe that inflation is the inevitable outcome once surging aggregate demand collides with limited spare capacity, and that the Fed will be forced to push the fed funds rate to 3.5% and beyond. Chart 7Something's Gotta Give Something's Gotta Give Something's Gotta Give Our view that the credit cycle has already passed its peak drives our view on spread product. Though we remain constructive on the economy and the outlook for corporate earnings, we are not enamored of the risk-reward offered by corporate bonds. Although high-yield spreads blew out by nearly 125 bps from early October to late November, high yield still does not look cheap (Chart 8, bottom panel). The same holds for investment-grade spreads, which remain near the bottom of their long-term range despite widening by over 50 bps (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8Spreads Are Still Tight Spreads Are Still Tight Spreads Are Still Tight Bottom Line: We recommend that investors underweight fixed income within balanced portfolios, while underweighting Treasuries and maintaining below-benchmark duration. We recommend benchmark holdings in spread product, but we expect to downgrade it to underweight before the end of the first half. Equities With monetary policy still accommodative, and the expansion still intact, the cyclical backdrop is equity-friendly. If we’re correct that policy won’t turn restrictive for another twelve months or so, the bull market should have about another year to go. We downgraded equities to equal weight as a firm in mid-June nonetheless, on signs of global deceleration and the potentially malign effects of tariffs and other impediments to global trade. U.S. Investment Strategy fully supported that decision, but we are alert to opportunities to upgrade equities to overweight within U.S. portfolios if prices decline enough to make the prospect of a new cycle high attractive on a risk-reward basis. The risk-reward requirement implies that the fall in price would have to occur without a material weakening of the fundamental backdrop. For now, we think the fundamental supports remain stable, as per the equity downgrade checklist we constructed to keep tabs on them. The checklist monitors recession indicators, none of which betray any concern now; factors that may weigh on corporate earnings; inflation measures, because higher inflation could motivate the Fed to hike more quickly than planned, with adverse consequences for the bull market; and signs of overexuberance (Table 3). Table 3Equity Downgrade Checklist 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? The earnings-pressure section focuses on the key factors that might signal margin contraction – wage growth, dollar strength and rising bond yields – but none of them look especially problematic now. While we think compensation gains will eventually push the Fed to go beyond its own terminal rate estimates, they have not yet picked up enough to cause concern. The dollar has paused in its advance, mostly marking time since the end of October. Only BBB corporate yields have gotten closer to checking the box (Chart 9). BCA’s preferred margin proxies remain in good shape, on balance (Chart 10), and our EPS profit model is calling for robust profit growth across all of next year (Chart 11). Chart 9Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure   Chart 10In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ... In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ... In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ...   Chart 11... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely ... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely ... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely Oil’s plunge has pulled both headline CPI and longer-run inflation expectations lower. Although we think that the inflation respite is merely a head fake, and that oil will soon regain its footing (please see below), the run of harmless inflation data has the potential to soothe some market concerns about the Fed. If the Fed itself takes the data at face value, it may signal that the current 25-bps-a-quarter gradual pace could be slowed. As for exuberance, the de-rating the S&P 500 has endured since its forward multiple peaked at 18.5 in January suggests that it’s not a problem. We are not living through anything remotely resembling an equity mania. Bottom Line: BCA’s mid-June downgrade of global equities from overweight to equal-weight was timely. We remain equal-weight in balanced U.S. portfolios, but are more likely to upgrade U.S. equities than downgrade them, given the supportive cyclical backdrop. Oil We devoted our report two weeks ago to the oil outlook and its implications for the economy. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s bullish 2019 view has not changed: it still sees a market in a tight supply/demand balance with high potential for supply disruptions and a smaller-than-usual inventory reserve to make up the slack. The unexpected release of over a million barrels a day of Iranian output has played havoc with oil prices, but does not provoke the growth concerns that declining demand would. Provided OPEC is able to agree on production cuts, and abide by them going forward, our strategists see Brent and WTI averaging $82 and $76/barrel across 2019. The Dollar We remain bullish on the dollar, though it will find the going rougher than it did in 2018. Traders have built up sizable net long positions, so it will take more for the greenback to extend its advance than it did to begin it. Ultimately, we think desynchronization between the U.S. and the rest of the major DM economies will keep the dollar moving higher. If the U.S. does not continue to outgrow the currency-major economies by a healthy margin, and/or the Fed does not respond to that growth by hiking rates to prevent overheating, the dollar’s advance may be nearly played out. Putting It All Together Three major assumptions underpin our views: The U.S. economy is at risk of overheating in its second year of markedly above-trend growth fueled by fiscal stimulus, and the Fed will respond to that risk by decisively raising rates. There will be a noticeable global slowdown, but it will not go far enough to turn into a recession. The U.S. will remain mostly immune to the global slump. We will be positioned well if all of these assumptions are validated by events, though timing is always uncertain. Financial-market volatility often increases late in the cycle, and we expect the backdrop to remain fluid. We are trying to maintain a fluid mindset in kind, monitoring the incoming data to make sure our cyclical assessments still apply, while remaining alert to opportunities created by significant price swings. Although we are neither traders nor tacticians, we want to retain some flexibility, and are trying to resist mentally locking in our positioning for the entire year. We are particularly focused on the monetary policy backdrop and the transition from accommodative to restrictive policy, which has historically been critically important for asset allocation. Our main goal is to anticipate the approach of inflection points in the key cycles – business, credit and monetary – as adeptly as we can. We are also resolved to look through the noise of one-off price swings and the blather that has already been clogging the airwaves. We seek to help our clients formulate a strategy for navigating the turbulence without being swept up in it. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see the December 2018 Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence,” available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the July 30, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy, “The Rates Outlook,” the September 17, 2018; U.S. Investment Strategy, “What Would It Take To Change Our Bearish Rates View?” and the November 5, 2018; U.S. Investment Strategy, “Checking In On Our Rates View,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Downside risks to EM assets remain substantial. Stay put. EM stocks, credit and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts in the first half of 2019. The key and necessary condition for a new secular EM bull market to emerge is the end of abundant financing. The latter is imperative to compel corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization as well as structural reforms. The cyclical EM outlook hinges on China’s business cycle. The slowdown in China is broad-based and will deepen. The slowdown in China/EM will likely lead to global trade contraction. The latter is negative for global cyclicals yet bullish for the U.S. dollar. Feature As we head into 2019, the past decade is shaping up to be a lost one for emerging markets (EM) assets. In particular: EM stocks have underperformed DM markets substantially since the end of 2010 (Chart I-1). In absolute terms, EM share prices are at the same level as they were in early 2010. Chart I-1EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM currencies have depreciated substantially since 2011, and the EM local currency bond index (GBI-EM) on a total-return basis has produced zero return in U.S. dollar terms since 2010 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? Finally, EM sovereign and corporate high-yield bonds have not outperformed U.S. high-yield corporate bonds on an excess-return basis. Will 2019 witness a major reversal of such dismal EM performance? And if so, will it be a structural or cyclical bottom? The roots underneath this lost decade for EM stem neither from trade wars nor from Federal Reserve tightening. Therefore, a structural bottom in EM financial markets is contingent neither on the end of Fed tightening nor the resolution of current trade tussles. We address the issues of Fed tightening and trade wars below. A Lost Decade: Causes And Remedies What led to a lost decade for EM was cheap and plentiful financing. When the price of money is low and financing is abundant, companies and households typically rush to borrow and spend unwisely. Capital is misallocated and, consequently, productivity and real income growth disappoint – and debtors’ ability to service their debts worsens. This is exactly what has happened in EM, as easy money splashed all over developing economies since early 2009. There have been three major sources of financing for EM: Source 1: Chinese Banks Chinese banks have expanded their balance sheets by RMB 198 trillion to RMB 262 trillion (or the equivalent of $28.8 trillion) over the past 10 years (Chart I-3, top panel). When commercial banks expand their balance sheets by lending to or buying an asset from non-banks, they create deposits (money). Consistently, the broad money supply has expanded by RMB 175 trillion to RMB 234 trillion (or the equivalent of $25.5 trillion). Chart I-3Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Notably, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has increased commercial banks’ excess reserves by RMB 1.5 trillion to RMB 2.8 trillion (or the equivalent of $0.22 trillion) (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Hence, the meaningful portion of money supply expansion has been due to the money multiplier – money created by mainland banks – not a provision of excess reserves by the PBoC (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Not only has such enormous money creation by commercial banks generated purchasing power domestically, but it has also boosted Chinese companies’ and households’ purchases of foreign goods and services. The Middle Kingdom’s imports of goods and services have grown to $2.5 trillion compared with $3.2 trillion for the U.S. (Chart I-5). China’s spending has boosted growth considerably in many Asian, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and even select advanced economies. Chart I-5Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Source 2: DM Central Banks’ QE By conducting quantitative easing, the central banks of several advanced economies have crowded out investors from fixed-income markets, incentivizing them to search for yield in EM. The Fed, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have in aggregate expanded their balance sheets by $10 trillion (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Quantitative Easing In DM Quantitative Easing In DM Quantitative Easing In DM This has led to massive inflows of foreign portfolio capital into EM, and reflated asset prices well beyond what was warranted by their fundamentals. Specifically, since January 2009, foreign investors have poured $1.5 trillion on a net basis into the largest 15 developing countries excluding China, Taiwan and Korea (Chart I-7, top panel). For China, net foreign portfolio inflows amounted to $560 billion since January 2009 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Chart I-7Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Source 3: EM Ex-China Banks EM ex-China began expanding their balance sheets aggressively in early 2009, originating new money (local currency) and thereby creating purchasing power. This was especially the case between 2009 and 2011. Since that time, money creation by EM ex-China banks has decelerated substantially due to periodic capital outflows triggering currency weakness and higher borrowing costs. Out of these three sources, China’s money/credit cycles remain the primary driver of EM. The mainland’s imports from developing economies serves as the main nexus between China and the rest of EM. Essentially, Chinese money and credit drive imports, influencing growth and corporate profits in the EM universe (Chart I-8). Chart I-8China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports In turn, EM business cycle upturns attract international capital. Meanwhile, credit creation by local banks in EM ex-China – primarily in economies with high inflation or current account deficits – is a residual factor. In these countries, domestic credit creation is contingent on a healthy balance of payments and a stable exchange rate. The latter two, in turn, transpire when exports to China and international portfolio capital inflows are improving. The outcome of easy financing is over-borrowing and capital misallocation. The upshot of the latter is usually lower efficiency and productivity growth. Not surprisingly, productivity growth in both China and EM ex-China has decelerated considerably since 2009 (Chart I-9). EM return on assets has dropped a lot in the past 10 years and is now on par with levels last seen during the 2008 global recession (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Chart I-10... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital ... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital ... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital Accordingly, the ability to service debt by EM companies has deteriorated considerably in the past decade – the ratios of cash flows from operations to both interest expenses and net debt have dropped (Chart I-11). Chart I-11EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt These observations offer unambiguous confirmation that money has been spent inefficiently – i.e., misallocated. Credit booms and capital misallocations warrant a period of corporate restructuring and banking sector recapitalization. Without this, a new cycle cannot emerge. A secular bull market in equities and exchange rates arises when productivity growth and hence income-per-capita growth accelerates, and return on capital begins to climb. This is not yet the case for most developing economies. The end of cheap and abundant financing is imperative to compel corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization as well as structural reforms. These are necessary conditions to create the foundation for a new secular bull market. Ironically, the best remedy for an addiction to easy money is a period of tight money. For example, U.S. share prices would not be as high as they currently are if the U.S. did not go through the Lehman crisis. This 10-year bull market in U.S. equities was born from the ashes of the Lehman crisis. Vanished financing and the private sector’s tight budgets in 2008-‘09 compelled corporate restructuring as well as a focus on efficiency and return on equity. Has EM financing become scarce and tight? Cyclically, China’s money creation and credit flows have slowed, pointing to a cyclical downturn in EM share prices and commodities (please see below for a more detailed discussion). International portfolio flows to EM have also subsided since early this year. There has been selective corporate restructuring post the 2015 commodities downturn, including in the global/EM mining and energy sectors, China steel and coal industries as well as among Russian and Brazilian companies. However, there are many economies and industries where corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization and structural reforms have not been undertaken. Yet from a structural perspective, China’s money and credit growth remain elevated and excesses have not been purged. Besides, international portfolio flows to EM have had periodic “stop-and-gos” but have not yet retrenched meaningfully (refer to Chart I-7 on page 4). Consequently, structural overhauls and corporate restructuring in China/EM have by and large not yet occurred – in turn negating the start of a new secular bull market. Bottom Line: Conditions for a structural bull market in EM/China are not yet present. EM/China: A Cyclical Bottom Is Not In Place From a cyclical perspective, China is an important driving force for the majority of EM economies, and its deepening growth slowdown will continue to weigh on EM growth and global trade. In fact, odds are that global trade will contract in the first half of 2019: In China, tightening of both monetary policy as well as bank and non-bank regulation from late 2016 has led to a deceleration in money and credit growth. The latter has, with a time, lag depressed growth since early this year. Policymakers have undertaken some stimulus since the middle of this year, but it has so far been limited. Stimulus also works with a time lag. Besides, even though the broad money impulse has improved, the credit and fiscal spending impulse remains in a downtrend (Chart I-12). Therefore, there are presently mixed signals from money and credit. Chart I-12China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities As illustrated in Chart I-12, the bottoms in the money and combined credit and fiscal spending impulses, in July 2015, preceded the bottom in EM and commodities by six months and their peak led the top in financial markets by about 15 months in January 2018. Besides, in 2012-‘13, the rise in the money and credit impulses did not do much to help EM stocks or industrial commodities prices. Hence, even if the money as well as credit and fiscal impulses bottom today, it could take several more months before the selloff in EM financial markets and commodities prices abates. Additionally, the ongoing regulatory tightening of banks and non-bank financial institutions will hinder these institutions' willingness and ability to extend credit, despite lower interest rates. We discussed in a recent report that both the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism and the time lag between policy easing and a bottom in the business cycle are contingent on the money multiplier (creditors' willingness to lend, and borrowers' readiness to borrow) and the velocity of money (the marginal propensity to spend among households and companies). Growth in capital spending in general and construction in particular have ground to a halt (Chart I-13). Chart I-13China: Weak Capital Spending China: Weak Capital Spending China: Weak Capital Spending Not only has capital spending decelerated but household consumption has also slowed since early this year, as demonstrated in the top panel of Chart I-14. Chart I-14China: A Broad-Based Slowdown China: A Broad-Based Slowdown China: A Broad-Based Slowdown Finally, mainland imports are the main channel in terms of how China’s growth slowdown transmits to the rest of the world. Not surprisingly, EM share prices and industrial metals prices correlate extremely well with the import component of Chinese manufacturing PMI (Chart I-15). Chart I-15China's Imports And EM And Commodities China's Imports And EM And Commodities China's Imports And EM And Commodities Bottom Line: The slowdown in China is broad-based, and our proxies for marginal propensity to spend by households and companies both point to further weakness (Chart I-14, middle and bottom panels). Constraints And Chinese Policymakers’ Dilemma Given the ongoing slowdown in the economy, why are Chinese policymakers not rushing to the rescue with another round of massive stimulus? First, policymakers in China realize that the stimulus measures of 2009-‘10, 2012-‘13 and 2015-‘16 led to massive misallocations of capital and fostered both inefficiencies and speculative excesses in many parts of the economy – the property markets being among the main culprits. Indeed, policymakers recognize that easy money does not foster productivity growth, which is critical to the long-term prosperity of any nation. For China to grow and prosper in the long run, the economy’s addiction to easy financing should be curtailed. Second, policymakers are currently facing a dilemma. The real economy is saddled with enormous debt and is slowing. This warrants lower interest rates – probably justifying bringing down short-term rates close to zero. Yet, despite enforcing capital controls, it seems the exchange rate has been correlated with China’s interest rate differential with the U.S. since early 2010 (Chart I-16). Given the ongoing growth slowdown and declining return on capital in China, there are rising pressures for capital to exit the country. Notably, the PBoC’s foreign exchange reserves of $3 trillion are only equivalent to 10-14% of broad money supply (i.e., all deposits in the banking system) (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chart I-17China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits The current interest rate differential is only 33 basis points. If the PBoC guides short-term rates lower and the Fed stays on hold or hikes a few more times, the spread will drop to zero or turn negative. Based on the past nine-year correlation, the narrowing interest rate spread suggests yuan depreciation. This will weigh on EM and probably even global risk assets. In a scenario where policymakers prioritize defending the yuan’s value, they may not be able to reduce borrowing costs and assist indebted companies and households. As a result, the downtrend in the real economy would likely worsen. Consequently, EM and global growth-sensitive assets will drop further. Given the constraints Chinese policymakers are facing, reducing interest rates and allowing the yuan to depreciate further is the least-bad outcome. Yet this will rattle Asian and EM currencies and risk assets. What About The Fed And Trade Wars? The Fed and EM: Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are relevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The primary driver of EM economies are their own domestic fundamentals as well as global trade – not just U.S. growth. Historically, the correlation between EM risk assets and the fed funds rate has been mixed, albeit more positive than negative (Chart I-18). On this chart, we have shaded the five periods over the past 38 years when EM stocks rallied despite a rising fed funds rate. Chart I-18The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective There were only two episodes when EMs crashed amid rising U.S. interest rates: the 1982 Latin American debt crisis and the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis. Yet it is vital to emphasize that these crises occurred because of poor EM fundamentals – elevated foreign currency debt levels, negative terms-of-trade shocks, large current account deficits and pegged exchange rates. Dire EM fundamentals also prevailed before the Asian/EM crises of 1997-1998. However, these late-1990s crises occurred without much in the way of Fed tightening or rising U.S. bond yields. Trade Wars: China’s current growth slowdown has not originated from a decline in its exports. In fact, Chinese aggregate exports and those to the U.S. have been growing at a double-digit pace, largely due to the front running ahead of U.S. import tariffs. More importantly, China’s exports to the U.S. and EU account for 3.8% and 3.2% of its GDP, respectively (Chart I-19). Total exports amount to 20% of GDP, with almost two-thirds of that being shipments to developing economies. This compares with capital spending that makes up 42% of GDP and household consumption of 38% of GDP. Hence, capital expenditures and household spending are significantly larger than shipments to the U.S. Chart I-19Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy There is little doubt that the U.S.-China confrontation has affected consumer and business sentiment in China. Nevertheless, the slowdown in China has - until recently - stemmed from domestic demand, not exports. Investment Recommendations It is difficult to forecast whether the current EM down leg will end with a bang or a whimper. Whatever it is, the near-term path of least resistance for EM is to the downside. “A bang” scenario – where financial conditions tighten substantially and for an extended period – would likely compel corporate and bank restructuring as well as structural reforms. Therefore, it is more likely to mark a structural bottom in EM financial markets. “A whimper” scenario would probably entail only moderate tightening in financial conditions. Thereby, it would not foster meaningful corporate restructuring and structural reforms. Hence, such a scenario might not mark a secular bottom in EM stocks and currencies. In turn, the EM cyclical outlook hinges on China’s business cycle. If and when Chinese policymakers reflate aggressively, the mainland business cycle will revive, producing a cyclical rally in EM risk assets. At the moment, Chinese policymakers are behind the curve. With respect to investment strategy, we continue to recommend: Downside risks to EM assets remain substantial. Stay put. EM stocks, credit and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts in the first half of 2019. The slowdown in China/EM will likely lead to global trade contraction. The latter is negative for global cyclicals yet bullish for the U.S. dollar. For dedicated EM equity portfolios, our overweights are: Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our underweights are: South Africa, Peru, Indonesia, India, the Philippines and Hong Kong stocks. We are neutral on the remaining bourses. In the currency space, we continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR and KRW. The latter is a play on RMB depreciation. The full list of our recommendation across EM equity, fixed-income, currency and credit markets is available on pages 14-15. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given the recent turbulence in financial markets. Our investments have done poorly in the past year and, with hindsight, I wish I had followed my instincts to significantly cut our equity exposure at the end of 2017, although we did follow your advice to move to a neutral stance in mid-2018. I remain greatly troubled by economic and political developments in many countries. I have long believed in open and free markets and healthy political discourse, and this all seems under challenge. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I also am pleased to have this opportunity to talk through the key issues that will influence our investment strategy over the coming year. As I am sure you remember, I was more optimistic than my father about the outlook when we met a year ago but things have not worked out as well as I had hoped. In retrospect, I should have paid more attention to your view that markets and policy were on a collision course as that turned out to be a very accurate prediction. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded my father that we should have a relatively high equity exposure and that was the correct stance. However, this success led us to maintain too much equity exposure in 2018, and my father has done well to resist the temptation to say “I told you so.” So, we are left with a debate similar to last year: Should we move now to an underweight in risk assets or hold off on the hope that prices will reach new highs in the coming year? I am still not convinced that we have seen the peak in risk asset prices as there is no recession on the horizon and equity valuations are much improved, following recent price declines. I will be very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our central theme for 2018 that markets and policy would collide did turn out to be appropriate and, importantly, the story has yet to fully play out. The monetary policy tightening cycle is still at a relatively early stage in the U.S. and has not even begun in many other regions. Yet, although it was a tough year for most equity markets, the conditions for a major bear market are not yet in place. One important change to our view, compared to a year ago, is that we have pushed back the timing of the next U.S. recession. This leaves a window for risk assets to show renewed strength. It remains to be seen whether prices will reach new peaks, but we believe it would be premature to shift to an underweight stance on equities. For the moment, we are sticking with our neutral weighting for risk assets, but may well recommend boosting exposure if prices suffer further near-term weakness. We will need more clarity about the timing of a recession before we consider aggressively cutting exposure. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your optimism. My list of concerns is long and I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: That is always interesting to do, although sometimes rather humbling. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflationary pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets.  The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the probability of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the Euro Area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China’s economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their “dots” projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal have real 10-year government bond yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The Euro Area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. As already noted, the broad theme that policy tightening – especially in the U.S. – would become a problem for asset markets during the year was supported by events. However, the exact timing was hard to predict. The indexes for non-U.S. developed equity markets and emerging markets peaked in late-January 2018, and have since dropped by around 18% and 24%, respectively (Chart 1). On the other hand, the U.S. market, after an early 2018 sell-off, hit a new peak in September, before falling anew in the past couple of months. The MSCI All-Country World index currently is about 6% below end-2017 levels in local-currency terms. Chart 1Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out We started the year recommending an overweight in developed equity markets but, as you noted, shifted that to a neutral position mid-year. A year ago, we thought we might move to an underweight stance in the second half of 2018 but decided against this because U.S. fiscal stimulus boosted corporate earnings and extended the economic cycle. Our call that emerging markets would underperform was on target. Although it was U.S. financial conditions that tightened the most, Wall Street was supported by the large cut in the corporate tax rate while the combination of higher bond yields and dollar strength was a major problem for many indebted emerging markets. Overall, it was not a good year for financial markets (Table 1). Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence As far as the overall macro environment was concerned, we were correct in predicting that the IMF was too pessimistic on economic growth. A year ago, the IMF forecast that the advanced economies would expand by 2% in 2018 and that has since been revised up to 2.4% (Table 2). This offset a slight downgrading to the performance of emerging economies. The U.S., Europe and Japan all grew faster than previously expected. Not surprisingly, inflation also was higher than forecast, although in the G7, it has remained close to the 2% level targeted by most central banks. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Despite widespread fears to the contrary, the data have supported our view that Chinese growth would hold above a 6% pace in 2018. Nevertheless, a slowdown currently is underway and downside risks remain very much in place in terms of excessive credit and trade pressures. Another difficult year lies ahead for the Chinese authorities and we will no doubt return to this topic later. As far as our other key forecasts are concerned, we were correct in our views that oil prices and the U.S. dollar would rise and that the market would be forced to revise up its predictions of Fed rate hikes. Of course, oil has recently given back its earlier gains, but we assume that is a temporary setback. On the sector front, our macro views led us to favor industrials, financials and energy, but that did not work out well as concerns about trade took a toll on cyclical sectors. Overall, there were no major macro surprises in 2018, and it seems clear that we have yet to resolve the key questions and issues that we discussed a year ago. At that time, we were concerned about the development of late-cycle pressures that ultimately would undermine asset prices. That story has yet to fully play out. It is hard to put precise timing on when the U.S. economy will peak and, thus, when asset prices will be at maximum risk. Nevertheless, our base case is that there likely will be a renewed and probably final run-up in asset prices before the next recession. Late-Cycle Challenges Mr. X: This seems like déjà-vu all over again. Since we last met, the cycle is one year older and, as you just said, the underlying challenges facing economies and markets have not really changed. If anything, things are even worse: Global debt levels are higher, inflation pressures more evident, Fed policy is moving closer to restrictive territory and protectionist policies have ratcheted up. If it was right to be cautious six months ago, then surely we should be even more cautious now. Ms. X: Oh dear, it does seem like a repeat of last year’s discussion because, once again, I am more optimistic than my father. Obviously, there are structural problems in a number of countries and, at some point, the global economy will suffer another recession. But timing is everything, and I attach very low odds to a downturn in the coming year. Meanwhile, I see many pockets of value in the equity market. Rather than cut equity positions, I am inclined to look for buying opportunities. BCA: We sympathize with your different perspectives because the outlook is complex and we also have lively debates about the view. The global equity index currently is a little below where it was when we met last year, but there has been tremendous intra-period volatility. That pattern seems likely to be repeated in 2019. In other words, it will be important to be flexible about your investment strategy. You both make good points. It is true that there are several worrying problems regarding the economic outlook, including excessive debt, protectionism and building inflation risks. At the same time, the classic conditions for an equity bear market are not yet in place, and may not be for some time. This leaves us in the rather uncomfortable position of sitting on the fence with regard to risk asset exposure. We are very open to raising exposure should markets weaken further in the months ahead, but also are keeping careful watch for signs that the economic cycle is close to peaking. In other words, it would be a mistake to lock in a 12-month strategy right now. Mr. X: I would like to challenge the consensus view, shared by my daughter, that the next recession will not occur before 2020, and might even be much later. The main rationale seems to be that the policy environment remains accommodative and there are none of the usual imbalances that occur ahead of recessions. Of course, U.S. fiscal policy has given a big boost to growth in the past year, but I assume the effects will wear off sharply in 2019. More importantly, there is huge uncertainty about the level of interest rates that will trigger economic problems. It certainly has not taken much in the way of Fed rate hikes to rattle financial markets. Thus, monetary policy may become restrictive much sooner than generally believed. I also strongly dispute the idea that there are no major financial imbalances. If running U.S. federal deficits of $1 trillion in the midst of an economic boom is not an imbalance, then I don’t know what is! At the same time, the U.S. corporate sector has issued large amounts of low-quality debt, and high-risk products such as junk-bond collateralized debt obligations have made an unwelcome reappearance. It seems that the memories of 2007-09 have faded. It is totally normal for long periods of extremely easy money to be accompanied by growing leverage and increasingly speculative financial activities, and I don’t see why this period should be any different. And often, the objects of speculation are not discovered until financial conditions become restrictive. Finally, there are huge risks associated with rising protectionism, the Chinese economy appears to be struggling, Italy’s banks are a mess, and the Brexit fiasco poses a threat to the U.K. economy. Starting with the U.S., please go ahead and convince me why a recession is more than a year away. BCA: It is natural for you to worry that a recession is right around the corner. The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion. Economists have a long and sad history of failing to forecast recessions. Therefore, a great deal of humility is warranted when it comes to predicting the evolution of the business cycle. The Great Recession was one of the deepest downturns on record and the recovery has been fairly sluggish by historic standards. Thus, it has taken much longer than usual for the U.S. economy to return to full employment. Looking out, there are many possible risks that could trip up the U.S. economy but, for the moment, we see no signs of recession on the horizon (Chart 2). For example, the leading economic indicator is still in an uptrend, the yield curve has not inverted and our monetary indicators are not contracting. Our proprietary recession indicator also suggests that the risk is currently low, although recent stock market weakness implies some deterioration. Chart 2Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' The buildup in corporate debt is a cause for concern and we are not buyers of corporate bonds at current yields. However, the impact of rising yields on the economy is likely to be manageable. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole – defined as the profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid – is still above its historic average (Chart 3). Corporate bonds are also generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. The impact of defaults on the economy tends to be more severe when leveraged institutions are the ones that suffer the greatest losses. Chart 3Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind We share your worries about the long-term fiscal outlook. However, large budget deficits do not currently imperil the economy. The U.S. private sector is running a financial surplus, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 4). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its budget deficit. If anything, the highly accommodative stance of fiscal policy has pushed up the neutral rate of interest, giving the Fed greater scope to raise rates before monetary policy enters restrictive territory. The impetus of fiscal policy on the economy will be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018, but it will still be positive (Chart 5). Chart 4The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit Chart 5U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 The risks to growth are more daunting outside the U.S. As you point out, Italy is struggling to contain borrowing costs, a dark cloud hangs over the Brexit negotiations, and China and most other emerging markets have seen growth slow meaningfully. The U.S., however, is a relatively closed economy – it is not as dependent on trade as most other countries. Its financial system is reasonably resilient thanks to the capital its banks have raised over the past decade. In addition, Dodd-Frank and other legislation have made it more difficult for financial institutions to engage in reckless risk-taking. Mr. X: I would never take a benign view of the ability and willingness of financial institutions to engage in reckless behavior, but maybe I am too cynical. Even if you are right that debt does not pose an immediate threat to the market, surely it will become a huge problem in the next downturn. If the U.S. federal deficit is $1 trillion when the economy is strong, it is bound to reach unimaginable levels in a recession. And, to make matters worse, the Federal Reserve may not have much scope to lower interest rates if they peak at a historically low level in the next year or so. What options will policymakers have to respond to the next cyclical downturn? Is there a limit to how much quantitative easing central banks can do? BCA: The Fed is aware of the challenges it faces if the next recession begins when interest rates are still quite low. Raising rates rapidly in order to have more “ammunition” for counteracting the downturn would hardly be the best course of action as this would only bring forward the onset of the recession. A better strategy is to let the economy overheat a bit so that inflation rises. This would allow the Fed to push real rates further into negative territory if the recession turns out to be severe. There is no real limit on how much quantitative easing the Fed can undertake. The FOMC will undoubtedly turn to asset purchases and forward guidance again during the next economic downturn. Now that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon into unorthodox monetary policy without generating high inflation, policymakers are likely to try even more exotic policies, such as price-level targeting. The private sector tends to try to save more during recessions. Thus, even though the fiscal deficit would widen during the next downturn, there should be plenty of buyers for government debt. However, once the next recovery begins, the Fed may feel increasing political pressure to keep rates low in order to allow the government to maintain its desired level of spending and taxes. The Fed guards its independence fiercely, but in a world of increasingly political populism, that independence may begin to erode. This will not happen quickly, but to the extent that it does occur, higher inflation is likely to be the outcome. Ms. X: I would like to explore the U.S.-China dynamic a bit more because I see that as one of the main challenges to my more optimistic view. I worry that President Trump will continue to take a hard line on China trade because it plays well with his base and has broad support in Congress. And I equally worry that President Xi will not want to be seen giving in to U.S. bullying. How do you see this playing out? BCA: Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires are likely to be disappointed. President Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It also forces the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger U.S. trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a trade agreement with them. The new USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to NAFTA, with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China. This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit and China will fill that role. For his part, President Xi knows full well that he will still be China’s leader when Trump is long gone. Giving in to Trump’s demands would hurt him politically. All this means that the trade war will persist. Mr. X: I see a trade war as a major threat to the economy, but it is not the only thing that could derail the economic expansion. Let’s explore that issue in more detail. The Economic Outlook Mr. X: You have shown in previous research that housing is often a very good leading indicator of the U.S. economy, largely because it is very sensitive to changes in the monetary environment. Are you not concerned about the marked deterioration in recent U.S. housing data? BCA: Recent trends in housing have indeed been disappointing, with residential investment acting as a drag on growth for three consecutive quarters. The weakness has been broad-based with sales, the rate of price appreciation of home prices, and builder confidence all declining (Chart 6). Even though the level of housing affordability is decent by historical standards, there has been a fall in the percentage of those who believe that it is a good time to buy a home. Chart 6Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing There are a few possible explanations for the weakness. First, the 2007-09 housing implosion likely had a profound and lasting impact on the perceived attractiveness of home ownership. The homeownership rate for people under 45 has remained extremely low by historical standards. Secondly, increased oversight and tighter regulations have curbed mortgage supply. Finally, the interest rate sensitivity of the sector may have increased with the result that even modest increases in the mortgage rate have outsized effects. That, in turn, could be partly explained by recent tax changes that capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while lowering the limit on the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. The trend in housing is definitely a concern, but the odds of a further major contraction seem low. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record levels and the same is true for the inventory of homes. The pace of housebuilding is below the level implied by demographic trends and consumer fundamentals are reasonably healthy. The key to the U.S. economy lies with business investment and consumer spending and these areas are well supported for the moment. Consumers are benefiting from continued strong growth in employment and a long overdue pickup in wages. Meanwhile, the ratio of net worth-to-income has surpased the previous peak and the ratio of debt servicing-to-income is low (Chart 7). Last year, we expressed some concern that the depressed saving rate might dampen spending, but the rate has since been revised substantially higher. Based on its historical relationship with U.S. household net worth, there is room for the saving rate to fall, fueling more spending. Real consumer spending has grown by 3% over the past year and there is a good chance of maintaining that pace during most of 2019. Chart 7U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy Turning to capital spending, the cut in corporate taxes was obviously good for cash flow, and surveys show a high level of business confidence. Moreover, many years of business caution toward spending has pushed up the average age of the nonresidential capital stock to the highest level since 1963 (Chart 8). Higher wages should also incentivize firms to invest in more machinery. Absent some new shock to confidence, business investment should stay firm during the next year. Chart 8An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. As discussed earlier, that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. Ms. X: I share the view that the U.S. economy will continue to grow at a healthy pace, but I am less sure about the rest of the world. BCA: You are right to be concerned. We expected U.S. and global growth to diverge in 2018, but not by as much as occurred. Several factors have weighed on CEO confidence outside of the U.S., including trade wars, a strong dollar, higher oil prices, emerging market turbulence, the return of Italian debt woes, and a slowdown in the Chinese economy. The stress has shown up in the global manufacturing PMI, although the latter is still at a reasonably high level (Chart 9). Global export growth is moderating and the weakness appears to be concentrated in capex. Capital goods imports for the major economies, business investment, and the production of investment-related goods have all decelerated this year. Chart 9Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Our favorite global leading indicators are also flashing yellow (Chart 10). BCA’s global leading economic indicator has broken below the boom/bust line and its diffusion index suggests further downside. The global ZEW composite and the BCA boom/bust indicator are both holding below zero. Chart 10Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Current trends in the leading indicators shown in Chart 11 imply that the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain a key theme well into 2019. Among the advanced economies, Europe and Japan are quite vulnerable to the global soft patch in trade and capital spending. Chart 11Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue The loss of momentum in the Euro Area economy, while expected, has been quite pronounced. Part of this is due to the dissipation of the 2016/17 economic boost related to improved health in parts of the European banking system that sparked a temporary surge in credit growth. The tightening in Italian financial conditions following the government’s budget standoff with the EU has weighed on overall Euro Area growth. Softer Chinese demand for European exports, uncertainties related to U.S. trade policy and the torturous Brexit negotiations, have not helped the situation. Real GDP growth decelerated to close to a trend pace by the third quarter of 2018. The manufacturing PMI has fallen from a peak of 60.6 in December 2017 to 51.5, mirroring a 1% decline in the OECD’s leading economic indicator for the region. Not all the economic news has been bleak. Both consumer and industrial confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with a resumption of above-trend growth. Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017, the EC survey on firms’ export order books remains at robust levels (Chart 12). Importantly for the Euro Area, the bank credit impulse has moved higher.The German economy should also benefit from a rebound in vehicle production which plunged earlier this year following the introduction of new emission standards. Chart 12Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster We interpret the 2018 Euro Area slowdown as a reversion-to-the-mean rather than the start of an extended period of sub-trend growth. Real GDP growth should fluctuate slightly above trend pace through 2019. Given that the Euro Area’s output gap is almost closed, the ECB will not deviate from its plan to end its asset purchase program by year end. Gradual rate hikes should begin late in 2019, assuming that inflation is closer to target by then. In contrast, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is unlikely to change policy anytime soon. The good news is that wages have finally begun to grow at about a 2% pace, although it required extreme labor shortages. Yet, core inflation is barely positive and long-term inflation expectations are a long way from the 2% target. The inflation situation will have to improve significantly before the BoJ can consider adjusting or removing the Yield Curve Control policy. This is especially the case since the economy has hit a bit of an air pocket and the government intends to raise the VAT in 2019. Japan’s industrial production has stalled and we expect the export picture to get worse before it gets better. We do not anticipate any significant economic slack to develop, but even a sustained growth slowdown could partially reverse the gains that have been made on the inflation front. Ms. X: We can’t talk about the global economy without discussing China. You have noted in the past how the authorities are walking a tightrope between trying to unwind the credit bubble and restructure the economy on the one hand, and prevent a destabilizing economic and financial crisis on the other. Thus far, they have not fallen off the tightrope, but there has been limited progress in resolving the country’s imbalances. And now the authorities appear to be stimulating growth again, risking an even bigger buildup of credit. Can it all hold together for another year? BCA: That’s a very good question. Thus far, there is not much evidence that stimulus efforts are working. Credit growth is still weak and leading economic indicators have not turned around (Chart 13). There is thus a case for more aggressive reflation, but the authorities also remain keen to wean the economy off its addiction to debt. Chart 13China: No Sign Of Reacceleration China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to about 260% of GDP at present (Chart 14). As is usually the case, rapid increases in leverage have been associated with a misallocation of capital. Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, the result has been overcapacity in a number of areas. For example, the fact that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant is a reflection of overbuilding. Meanwhile, the rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs. Chart 14China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising Chinese exports are holding up well so far, but this might only represent front-running ahead of the implementation of higher tariffs. Judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 15). Chart 15Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer The most likely outcome is that the authorities will adjust the policy dials just enough to stabilize growth sometime in the first half of 2019. The bottoming in China’s broad money impulse offers a ray of hope (Chart 16). Still, it is a tentative signal at best and it will take some time before this recent easing in monetary policy shows up in our credit impulse measure and, later, economic growth. A modest firming in Chinese growth in the second half of 2019 would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China. Chart 16A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 Ms. X: If you are correct about a stabilization in the Chinese economy next year, this presumably would be good news for emerging economies, especially if the Fed goes on hold. EM assets have been terribly beaten down and I am looking for an opportunity to buy. BCA: Fed rate hikes might have been the catalyst for the past year’s pain in EM assets, but it is not the underlying problem. As we highlighted at last year’s meeting, the troubles for emerging markets run much deeper. Our long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries; EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart 17). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 17EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... Decelerating global growth has exposed these poor fundamentals. EM sovereign spreads have moved wider in conjunction with falling PMIs and slowing industrial production and export growth. And it certainly does not help that the Fed is tightening dollar-based liquidity conditions. EM equities usually fall when U.S. financial conditions tighten (Chart 18). Chart 18...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions Chart 19 highlights the most vulnerable economies in terms of foreign currency funding requirements, and foreign debt-servicing obligations relative to total exports. Turkey stands out as the most vulnerable, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. In contrast, Emerging Asia appears to be in better shape relative to the crisis period of the late 1990s. Chart 19Spot The Outliers OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence The backdrop for EM assets is likely to get worse in the near term, given our view that the Fed will continue to tighten and China will be cautious about stimulating more aggressively. Our base case outlook sees some relief in the second half of 2019, but it is more of a “muddle-through” scenario than a V-shaped economic recovery. Mr. X: Perhaps EM assets could enjoy a bounce next year if the Chinese economy stabilizes, but the poor macro fundamentals you mentioned suggest that it would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold proposition. I am inclined to avoid the whole asset class in 2019. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: Let’s turn to fixed income now. I was bearish on bonds in 2018, but yields have risen quite a bit, at least in the United States. The Fed has lifted the fed funds rate by 100 basis points over the past year and I don’t see a lot of upside for inflation. So perhaps yields have peaked and will move sideways in 2019, which would be good for stocks in my view. BCA: Higher yields have indeed improved bond value recently. Nonetheless, they are not cheap enough to buy at this point (Chart 20). The real 10-year Treasury yield, at close to 1%, is still depressed by pre-Lehman standards. Long-term real yields in Germany and Japan remain in negative territory at close to the lowest levels ever recorded. Chart 20Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed We called the bottom in global nominal bond yields in 2016. Our research at the time showed that the cyclical and structural factors that had depressed yields were at an inflection point, and were shifting in a less bond-bullish direction. Perhaps most important among the structural factors, population aging and a downward trend in underlying productivity growth resulted in lower equilibrium bond yields over the past couple of decades. Looking ahead, productivity growth could stage a mild rebound in line with the upturn in the growth rate of the capital stock (Chart 21). As for demographics, the age structure of the world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging is beginning to drain that pool as people retire and begin to consume their nest eggs (Chart 22). The household saving rates in the major advanced economies should trend lower in the coming years, placing upward pressure on equilibrium global bond yields. Chart 21Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Chart 22Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Cyclical factors are also turning against bonds. U.S. inflation has returned to target and the Fed is normalizing short-term interest rates. The market currently is priced for only one more rate hike after December 2018 in this cycle, but we see rates rising more than that. Treasury yields will follow as market expectations adjust. Long-term inflation expectations are still too low in the U.S. and most of the other major economies to be consistent with central banks’ meeting their inflation targets over the medium term. As actual inflation edges higher, long-term expectations built into bond yields will move up. The term premium portion of long-term bond yields is also too low. This is the premium that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. Our estimates suggest that the term premium is still negative in the advanced economies outside of the U.S., which is not sustainable over the medium term (Chart 23). Chart 23Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low We expect term premia to rise for two main reasons. First, investors have viewed government bonds as a good hedge for their equity holdings because bond prices have tended to rise when stock prices fell. Investors have been willing to pay a premium to hold long-term bonds to benefit from this hedging effect. But the correlation is now beginning to change as inflation and inflation expectations gradually adjust higher and output gaps close. As the hedging benefit wanes, the term premium should rise back into positive territory. Second, central bank bond purchases and forward guidance have depressed yields as well as interest-rate volatility. The latter helped to depress term premia in the bond market. This effect, too, is beginning to unwind. The Fed is letting its balance sheet shrink by about $50 billion per month. The Bank of England has kept its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds constant for over a year, while the ECB is about to end asset purchases. The Bank of Japan continues to buy assets, but at a much reduced pace. All this means that the private sector is being forced to absorb a net increase in government bonds for the first time since 2014 (Chart 24). Chart 25 shows that bond yields in the major countries will continue to trend higher as the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets becomes a thing of the past. Chart 24Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Chart 25QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices Ms. X: I’m not a fan of bonds at these levels, but that sounds overly bearish to me, especially given the recent plunge in oil prices. BCA: Lower oil prices will indeed help to hold down core inflation to the extent that energy prices leak into non-energy prices in the near term. Nonetheless, in the U.S., this effect will be overwhelmed by an overheated economy. From a long-term perspective, we believe that investors still have an overly benign view of the outlook for yields. The market expects that the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years will only be slightly above today’s spot yield, which itself is still very depressed by historical standards (Chart 26). And that also is the case in the other major bond markets. Chart 26Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Of course, it will not be a straight line up for yields – there will be plenty of volatility. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. Duration should be kept short at least until the middle of 2019, with an emphasis on TIPS relative to conventional Treasury bonds. We will likely downgrade TIPS versus conventionals once long-term inflation expectations move into our target range, which should occur sometime during 2019. The ECB and Japan will not be in a position to raise interest rates for some time, but the bear phase in U.S. Treasurys will drag up European and Japanese bond yields (at the very long end of the curve for the latter). Total returns are likely to be negative in all of the major bond markets in 2019. Real 10-year yields in all of the advanced economies are still well below their long-term average, except for Greece, Italy and Portugal (Chart 27). Chart 27Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Within global bond portfolios, we recommend being underweight bond markets where central banks are in a position to raise short-term interest rates (the U.S. and Canada), and overweight those that are not (Japan and Australia). The first ECB rate hike is unlikely before the end of 2019. However, the imminent end of the asset purchase program argues for no more than a benchmark allocation to core European bond markets within global fixed-income portfolios, especially since real 10-year yields in parts of continental Europe are the furthest below their long-term average. We are overweight gilts at the moment, but foresee shifting to underweight in 2019, depending on how Brexit plays out. Ms. X: What about corporate bonds? I know that total returns for corporates will be poor if government bond yields are rising. But you recommended overweighting corporate bonds relative to Treasurys last year. Given your view that the next U.S. recession is more than a year away, it seems reasonable to assume they will outperform government bonds. BCA: We were overweight corporates in the first half of 2018, but took profits in June and shifted to neutral at the same time that we downgraded our equity allocation. Spreads had tightened to levels that did not compensate investors for the risks. Recent spread widening has returned some value to U.S. corporates. The 12-month breakeven spreads for A-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds are almost back up to their 50th percentile relative to history (Chart 28). Still, these levels are not attractive enough to justify buying based on valuation alone. As for high-yield, any rise in the default rate would quickly overwhelm the yield pickup in this space. Chart 28Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside It is possible that some of the spread widening observed in October and November will reverse, but corporates offer a poor risk/reward tradeoff, even if the default rate stays low. Corporate profit growth is bound to decelerate in 2019. This would not be a disaster for equities, but slowing profit growth is more dangerous for corporate bond excess returns because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. As discussed above, at a macro level, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the U.S. corporate sector is decent by historical standards. However, this includes mega-cap companies that have little debt and a lot of cash. Our bottom-up research suggests that interest coverage ratios for firms in the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index will likely drop close to multi-decade lows during the next recession, sparking a wave of downgrade activity and fallen angels. Seeing this coming, investors may require more yield padding to compensate for these risks as profit growth slows. Our next move will likely be to downgrade corporate bonds to underweight. We are watching the yield curve, bank lending standards, profit growth, and monetary indicators for signs to further trim exposure. You should already be moving up in quality within your corporate bond allocation. Mr. X: We have already shifted to underweight corporate bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Even considering the cheapening that has occurred over the past couple of months, spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. Equity Market Outlook Ms. X: While we all seem to agree that corporate bonds are not very attractive, I believe that enough value has been restored to equities that we should upgrade our allocation, especially if the next recession is two years away. And I know that stocks sometimes have a powerful blow-off phase before the end of a bull market. Mr. X: This is where I vehemently disagree with my daughter. The recent sell-off resembles a bloodbath in parts of the global market. It has confirmed my worst fears, especially related to the high-flying tech stocks that I believe were in a bubble. Hopes for a blow-off phase are wishful thinking. I’m wondering if the sell-off represents the beginning of an extended bear market. BCA: Some value has indeed been restored. However, the U.S. market is far from cheap relative to corporate fundamentals. The trailing and 12-month forward price-earnings ratios (PER) of 20 and 16, respectively, are still far above their historical averages, especially if one leaves out the tech bubble period of the late 1990s. And the same is true for other metrics such as price-to-sales and price-to-book value (Chart 29). BCA’s composite valuation indicator, based on 8 different valuation measures, is only a little below the threshold of overvaluation at +1 standard deviation because low interest rates still favor equities on a relative yield basis. Chart 29U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap It is true that equities can reward investors handsomely in the final stage of a bull market. Chart 30 presents cumulative returns to the S&P 500 in the last nine bull markets. The returns are broken down by quintile. The greatest returns, unsurprisingly, generally occur in the first part of the bull market (quintile 1). But total returns in the last 20% of the bull phase (quintile 5) have been solid and have beaten the middle quartiles. Chart 30Late-Cycle Blow-Offs Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Of course, the tricky part is determining where we are in the bull market. We have long viewed financial markets through the lens of money and credit. This includes a framework that involves the Fed policy cycle. The historical track record for risk assets is very clear; they tend to perform well when the fed funds rate is below neutral, whether rates are rising or falling. Risk assets tend to underperform cash when the fed funds rate is above neutral (Table 3). Table 3Stocks Do Well When The Fed Funds Rate Is Below Neutral OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence We believe the fed funds rate is still in easy territory. This suggests that it is too early to shift to underweight on risk assets. We may even want to upgrade to overweight if stocks become cheap enough, as long as Fed policy is not restrictive. That said, there is huge uncertainty about the exact level of rates that constitutes “neutral” (or R-star in the Fed’s lingo). Even the Fed is unsure. This means that we must watch for signs that the fed funds rate has crossed the line into restrictive territory as the FOMC tightens over the coming year. An inversion of the 3-month T-bill/10-year yield curve slope would be a powerful signal that policy has become tight, although the lead time of an inverted curve and declining risk asset prices has been quite variable historically. Finally, it is also important to watch U.S. profit margins. Some of our research over the past couple of years focused on the late-cycle dynamics of previous long expansions, such as the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. We found that risk assets came under pressure once U.S. profit margins peaked. Returns were often negative from the peak in margins to the subsequent recession. Mr. X: U.S. profit margins must be close to peak levels. I’ve seen all sorts of anecdotal examples of rising cost pressures, not only in the labor market. BCA: We expected to see some margin pressure to appear by now. S&P 500 EPS growth will likely top out in the next couple of quarters, if only because the third quarter’s 26% year-over-year pace is simply not sustainable. But it is impressive that our margin proxies are not yet flagging an imminent margin squeeze, despite the pickup in wage growth (Chart 31). Chart 31U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat Margins according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data peaked in 2014 and have since diverged sharply with S&P 500 operating margins. It is difficult to fully explain the divergence. The NIPA margin is considered to be a better measure of underlying U.S. corporate profitability because it includes all companies (not just 500), and it is less subject to accounting trickery. That said, even the NIPA measure of margins firmed a little in 2018, along with the proxies we follow that correlate with the S&P 500 measure. The bottom line is that the macro variables that feed into our top-down U.S. EPS model point to a continuing high level of margins and fairly robust top-line growth, at least for the near term. For 2019, we assumed slower GDP growth and incorporated some decline in margins into our projection just to err on the conservative side. Nonetheless, our EPS model still projects a respectable 8% growth rate at the end of 2019 (Chart 32). The dollar will only be a minor headwind to earnings growth unless it surges by another 10% or more. Chart 32EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts The risks to EPS growth probably are to the downside relative to our forecast, but the point is that U.S. earnings will likely remain supportive for the market unless economic growth is much weaker than we expect. None of this means that investors should be aggressively overweight stocks now. We trimmed our equity recommendation to benchmark in mid-2018 for several reasons. At the time, value was quite poor and bottom-up earnings expectations were too high, especially on a five-year horizon. Also, sentiment measures suggested that investors were overly complacent. As you know, we are always reluctant to chase markets into highly overvalued territory, especially when a lot of good news has been discounted. As we have noted, we are open to temporarily shifting back to overweight in equities and other risk assets. The extension of the economic expansion gives more time for earnings to grow. The risks facing the market have not eased much but, given our base-case macro view, we would be inclined to upgrade equities if there is another meaningful correction. Of course, our profit, monetary and economic indicators would have to remain supportive to justify an upgrade. Mr. X: But you are bearish on bonds. We saw in October that the equity market is vulnerable to higher yields. BCA: It certainly won’t be smooth sailing through 2019 as interest rates normalize. Until recently, higher bond yields reflected stronger growth without any associated fears that inflation was a growing problem. The ‘Fed Put’ was seen as a key backstop for the equity bull market. But now that the U.S. labor market is showing signs of overheating, the bond sell-off has become less benign for stocks because the Fed will be less inclined to ease up at the first sign of trouble in the equity market. How stocks react in 2019 to the upward trend in yields depends a lot on the evolution of actual inflation and long-term inflation expectations. If core PCE inflation hovers close to or just above 2% for a while, then the Fed Put should still be in place. However, it would get ugly for both bonds and stocks if inflation moves beyond 2.5%. Our base case is that this negative dynamic won’t occur until early 2020, but obviously the timing is uncertain. One key indicator to watch is long-term inflation expectations, such as the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 33). It is close to 2% at the moment. If it shifts up into the 2.3%-2.5% range, it would confirm that inflation expectations have returned to a level that is consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. This would be a signal to the Fed that it is must become more aggressive in calming growth, with obvious negative consequences for risk assets. Chart 33Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Mr. X: I am skeptical that the U.S. corporate sector can pull off an 8% earnings gain in 2019. What about the other major markets? Won’t they get hit hard if global growth continues to slow as you suggest? BCA: Yes, that is correct. It is not surprising that EPS growth has already peaked in the Euro Area and Japan. The profit situation is going to deteriorate quickly in the coming quarters. Industrial production growth in both economies has already dropped close to zero, and we use this as a proxy for top-line growth in our EPS models. Nominal GDP growth has decelerated sharply in both economies in absolute terms and relative to the aggregate wage bill. These trends suggest that profit margins are coming under significant downward pressure. Even when we build in a modest growth pickup and slight rebound in margins in 2019, EPS growth falls close to zero by year-end according to our models. Both the Euro Area and Japanese equity markets are cheap relative to the U.S., based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart 34). However, neither is above the threshold of undervaluation (+1 standard deviation) that would justify overweight positions on valuation alone. We think the U.S. market will outperform the other two at least in the first half of 2019 in local and, especially, common-currency terms. Chart 34Valuation Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: It makes sense that U.S. profit growth will outperform the other major developed countries in 2019. I would like to circle back to emerging market assets. I understand that many emerging economies have deep structural problems. But you admitted that the Chinese authorities will eventually stimulate enough to stabilize growth, providing a bounce in EM growth and asset prices next year. These assets seem cheap enough to me to warrant buying now in anticipation of that rally. As we all know, reversals from oversold levels can happen in a blink of an eye and I don’t want to miss it. BCA: We are looking for an opportunity to buy as well, but are wary of getting in too early. First, valuation has improved but is not good enough on its own to justify buying now. EM stocks are only moderately undervalued based on our EM composite valuation indicator and the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 35). EM currencies are not particularly cheap either, outside of Argentina, Turkey and Mexico (Charts 36A and 36B). Valuation should only play a role in investment strategy when it is at an extreme, and this is not the case for most EM countries. Chart 35EM Stocks Are Not At Capitulation Levels... bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35   Chart 36A…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Chart 36B…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Second, corporate earnings growth has plenty of downside potential in the near term. Annual growth in EM nonfinancial EBITDA, currently near 10%, is likely to turn negative next year, based on our China credit and fiscal impulse indicator (Chart 37). And, as we emphasized earlier, China is not yet pressing hard on the gas pedal. Chart 37EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside Third, it will take time for more aggressive Chinese policy stimulus, if it does occur, to show up in EM stocks and commodity prices. Trend changes in money growth and our credit and fiscal impulse preceded the trough in EM stocks and commodity prices in 2015, and again at the top in stocks and commodities in 2017 (Chart 38). However, even if these two indicators bottom today, it could take several months before the sell-off in EM financial markets and commodity prices abates. Chart 38Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Finally, if Chinese stimulus comes largely via easier monetary policy rather than fiscal stimulus, then the outcome will be a weaker RMB. We expect the RMB to drift lower in any event, because rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. will move against the Chinese currency next year. A weaker RMB would add to the near-term headwinds facing EM assets. The bottom line is that the downside risks remain high enough that you should resist the temptation to bottom-fish until there are concrete signs that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about boosting the economy. We are also watching for signs outside of China that the global growth slowdown is ending. This includes our global leading economic indicator and data that are highly sensitive to global growth, such as German manufacturing foreign orders. Mr. X: Emerging market assets would have to become a lot cheaper for me to consider buying. Debt levels are just too high to be sustained, and stronger Chinese growth would only provide a short-term boost. I’m not sure I would even want to buy developed market risk assets based solely on some Chinese policy stimulus. BCA: Yes, we agree with your assessment that buying EM in 2019 would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold strategy. Still, the combination of continued solid U.S. growth and a modest upturn in the Chinese economy would alleviate a lot of investors’ global growth concerns. The result could be a meaningful rally in pro-cyclical assets that you should not miss. We are defensively positioned at the moment, but we could see becoming more aggressive in 2019 on signs that China is stimulating more firmly and/or our global leading indicators begin to show some signs of life. Besides upgrading our overall equity allocation back to overweight, we would dip our toes in the EM space again. At the same time, we will likely upgrade the more cyclical DM equity markets, such as the Euro Area and Japan, while downgrading the defensive U.S. equity market to underweight. We are currently defensively positioned in terms of equity sectors, but it would make sense to shift cyclicals to overweight at the same time. Exact timing is always difficult, but we expect to become more aggressive around the middle of 2019. We also think the time is approaching to favor long-suffering value stocks over growth stocks. The relative performance of growth-over-value according to standard measures has become a sector call over the past decade: tech or financials. The sector skew complicates this issue, especially since tech stocks have already cracked. But we have found that stocks that are cheap within equity sectors tend to outperform expensive (or growth) stocks once the fed funds rate moves into restrictive territory. This is likely to occur in the latter half of 2019. Value should then have its day in the sun. Currencies: Mr. X: We don’t usually hedge our international equity exposure, so the direction of the dollar matters a lot to us. As you predicted a year ago, the U.S. dollar reigned supreme in 2018. Your economic views suggest another good year in 2019, but won’t this become a problem for the economy? President Trump’s desire to lower the U.S. trade deficit suggests that the Administration would like the dollar to drop and we could get some anti-dollar rhetoric from the White House. Also, it seems that the consensus is strongly bullish on the dollar which is always a concern. BCA: The outlook for the dollar is much trickier than it was at the end of 2017. As you highlighted, traders are already very long the dollar, implying that the hurdle for the greenback to surprise positively is much higher now. However, a key driver for the dollar is the global growth backdrop. If the latter is poor in the first half of 2019 as we expect, it will keep a bid under the greenback. Interest rates should also remain supportive for the dollar. As we argued earlier, current market expectations – only one more Fed hike after the December meeting – are too sanguine. If the Fed increases rates by more than currently discounted, the dollar’s fair value will rise, especially if global growth continues to lag that of the U.S. Since the dollar’s 2018 rally was largely a correction of its previous undervaluation, the currency has upside potential in the first half of the year (Chart 39). Chart 39U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued A stronger dollar will dampen foreign demand for U.S.-produced goods and will boost U.S. imports. However, do not forget that a rising dollar benefits U.S. consumers via its impact on import prices. Since the consumer sector represents 68% of GDP, and that 69% of household consumption is geared toward the (largely domestic) service sector, a strong dollar will not be as negative for aggregate demand and employment as many commentators fear, unless it were to surge by at least another 10%. In the end, the dollar will be more important for the distribution of U.S. growth than its overall level. Where the strong dollar is likely to cause tremors is in the political arena. You are correct to point out that there is a large inconsistency between the White House’s desires to shore up growth, while simultaneously curtailing the trade deficit, especially if the dollar appreciates further. As long as the Fed focuses on its dual mandate and tries to contain inflationary pressures, the executive branch of the U.S. government can do little to push the dollar down. Currency intervention cannot have a permanent effect unless it is accompanied by shifts in relative macro fundamentals. For example, foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s merely had a temporary impact on the yen. The yen only weakened on a sustained basis once interest rate differentials moved against Japan. This problem underpins our view that the Sino-U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve meaningfully next year. China will remain an easy target to blame for the U.S.’s large trade deficit. What ultimately will signal a top in the dollar is better global growth, which is unlikely until the second half of 2019. At that point, expected returns outside the U.S. will improve, causing money to leave the U.S., pushing the dollar down. Mr. X: While 2017 was a stellar year for the euro, 2018 proved a much more challenging environment. Will 2019 be more like 2017 or 2018? BCA: We often think of the euro as the anti-dollar; buying EUR/USD is the simplest, most liquid vehicle for betting against the dollar, and vice versa. Our bullish dollar stance is therefore synonymous with a negative take on the euro. Also, the activity gap between the U.S. and the Euro Area continues to move in a euro-bearish fashion (Chart 40). Finally, since the Great Financial Crisis, EUR/USD has lagged the differential between European and U.S. core inflation by roughly six months. Today, this inflation spread still points toward a weaker euro. Chart 40Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro It is important to remember that when Chinese economic activity weakens, European growth deteriorates relative to the U.S. Thus, our view that global growth will continue to sputter in the first half of 2019 implies that the monetary policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB has not yet reached a climax. Consequently, we expect EUR/USD to trade below 1.1 in the first half of 2019. By that point, the common currency will be trading at a meaningful discount to its fair value, which will allow it to find a floor (Chart 41). Chart 41Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Mr. X: The Bank of Japan has debased the yen, with a balance sheet larger than Japan’s GDP. This cannot end well. I am very bearish on the currency. BCA: The BoJ’s monetary policy is definitely a challenge for the yen. The Japanese central bank rightfully understands that Japan’s inability to generate any meaningful inflation – despite an economy that is at full employment – is the consequence of a well-established deflationary mindset. The BoJ wants to shock inflation expectations upward by keeping real rates at very accommodative levels well after growth has picked up. This means that the BoJ will remain a laggard as global central banks move away from accommodative policies. The yen will continue to depreciate versus the dollar as U.S. yields rise on a cyclical horizon. That being said, the yen still has a place within investors’ portfolios. First, the yen is unlikely to collapse despite the BoJ’s heavy debt monetization. The JPY is one of the cheapest currencies in the world, with its real effective exchange rate hovering at a three-decade low (Chart 42). Additionally, Japan still sports a current account surplus of 3.7% of GDP, hardly the sign of an overstimulated and inflationary economy where demand is running amok. Instead, thanks to decades of current account surpluses, Japan has accumulated a positive net international investment position of 60% of GDP. This means that Japan runs a constant and large positive income balance, a feature historically associated with strong currencies. Chart 42The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap Japan’s large net international investment position also contributes to the yen’s defensive behavior as Japanese investors pull money back to safety at home when global growth deteriorates. Hence, the yen could rebound, especially against the euro, the commodity currencies, and EM currencies if there is a further global growth scare in the near term. Owning some yen can therefore stabilize portfolio returns during tough times. As we discussed earlier, we would avoid the EM asset class, including currency exposure, until global growth firms. Commodities: Ms. X: Once again, you made a good call on the energy price outlook a year ago, with prices moving higher for most of the year. But the recent weakness in oil seemed to come out of nowhere, and I must admit to being confused about where we go next. What are your latest thoughts on oil prices for the coming year? BCA: The fundamentals lined up in a very straightforward way at the end of 2017. The coalition we have dubbed OPEC 2.0 – the OPEC and non-OPEC producer group led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – outlined a clear strategy to reduce the global oil inventory overhang. The producers that had the capacity to increase supply maintained strict production discipline which, to some analysts, was still surprising even after the cohesiveness shown by the group in 2017. Outside that core group output continued to fall, especially in Venezuela, which remains a high-risk producing province. The oil market was balanced and prices were slowly moving higher as we entered the second quarter of this year, when President Trump announced the U.S. would re-impose oil export sanctions against Iran beginning early November. The oft-repeated goal of the sanctions was to reduce Iranian exports to zero. To compensate for the lost Iranian exports, President Trump pressured OPEC, led by KSA, to significantly increase production, which they did. However, as we approached the November deadline, the Trump Administration granted the eight largest importers of Iranian oil 180-day waivers on the sanctions. This restored much of the oil that would have been lost. Suddenly, the market found itself oversupplied and prices fell. As we move toward the December 6 meeting of OPEC 2.0 in Vienna, we are expecting a production cut from the coalition of as much as 1.4mm b/d to offset these waivers. The coalition wishes to keep global oil inventories from once again over-filling and dragging prices even lower in 2019. On the demand side, consumption continues to hold up both in the developed and emerging world, although we have somewhat lowered our expectations for growth next year. We are mindful of persistent concerns over the strength of demand – particularly in EM – in 2019. Thus, on the supply side and the demand side, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets is higher than it was at the start of 2018. Nonetheless, our base-case outlook is on the optimistic side for oil prices in 2019, with Brent crude oil averaging around $82/bbl, and WTI trading $6/bbl below that level (Chart 43). Chart 43Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Ms. X: I am skeptical that oil prices will rebound as much as you expect. First, oil demand is likely to falter if your view that global growth will continue slowing into early 2019 proves correct. Second, U.S. shale production is rising briskly, with pipeline bottlenecks finally starting to ease. Third, President Trump seems to have gone from taking credit for high equity prices to taking credit for low oil prices. Trump has taken a lot flack for supporting Saudi Arabia following the killing of The Washington Post journalist in Turkey. Would the Saudis really be willing to lose Trump’s support by cutting production at this politically sensitive time? BCA: Faltering demand growth remains a concern. However, note that in our forecasts we do expect global oil consumption growth to slow down to 1.46mm b/d next year, somewhat lower than the 1.6mm b/d growth we expect this year.  In terms of the U.S. shale sector, production levels over the short term can be somewhat insensitive to changes in spot and forward prices, given the hedging activity of producers. Over the medium to longer term, however, lower spot and forward prices will disincentivize drilling by all but the most efficient producers with the best, lowest-cost acreage. If another price collapse were to occur – and were to persist, as the earlier price collapse did – we would expect a production loss of between 5% and 10% from the U.S. shales.  Regarding KSA, the Kingdom needs close to $83/bbl to balance its budget this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates. If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. President Trump’s insistence on higher production from KSA and the rest of OPEC is a non-starter – it would doom those economies to recession, and stifle further investment going forward. The U.S. would also suffer down the road, as the lack of investment significantly tightens global supply. So, net, if production cuts are not forthcoming from OPEC at its Vienna meeting we – and the market – will be downgrading our oil forecast. Ms. X: Does your optimism regarding energy extend to other commodities? The combination of a strong dollar and a China slowdown did a lot of damage to industrial commodities in 2018. Given your view that China’s economy should stabilize in 2019, are we close to a bottom in base metals? BCA: It is too soon to begin building positions in base metals because the trade war is going to get worse before it gets better. Exposure to base metals should be near benchmark at best entering 2019, although we will be looking to upgrade along with other risk assets if Chinese policy stimulus ramps up. Over the medium term, the outlook for base metals hinges on how successfully China pulls off its pivot toward consumer- and services-led growth, away from heavy industrial-led development. China accounts for roughly half of global demand for these base metals. Commodity demand from businesses providing consumer goods and services is lower than that of heavy industrial export-oriented firms. But demand for commodities used in consumer products – e.g., copper, zinc and nickel, which go into stainless-steel consumer appliances such as washers and dryers – will remain steady, and could increase if the transition away from heavy industrial-led growth is successful. Gasoline and jet fuel demand will also benefit, as EM consumers’ demand for leisure activities such as tourism increases with rising incomes. China is also going to be a large producer and consumer of electric vehicles, as it attempts to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although timing the production ramp-up is difficult, in the long term these trends will be supportive for nickel and copper. Mr. X: You know I can’t let you get away without asking about gold. The price of bullion is down about 5% since the end of 2017, but that is no worse than the global equity market and it did provide a hedge against economic, financial or political shocks. The world seems just as risky as it did a year ago, so I am inclined to hold on to our gold positions, currently close to 10% of our portfolio. That is above your recommended level, but keeping a solid position in gold is one area where my daughter and I have close agreement regarding investment strategy. BCA: Gold did perform well during the risk asset corrections we had in 2018, and during the political crises as well. The price is not too far away from where we recommended going long gold as a portfolio hedge at the end of 2017 ($1230.3/oz). We continue to expect gold to perform well as a hedge. When other risk assets are trading lower, gold holds value relative to equities and tends to outperform bonds (Chart 44). Likewise, when other risk assets are rising, gold participates, but does not do as well as equities. It is this convexity – outperforming on the downside but participating on the upside with other risk assets – that continues to support our belief that gold has a role as a portfolio hedge. However, having 10% of your portfolio in gold is more than we would recommend – we favor an allocation of around 5%. Chart 44Hold Some Gold As A Hedge OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Geopolitics Ms. X: I’m glad that the three of us agree at least on one thing – hold some gold! Let’s return to the geopolitical situation for a moment. Last year, you correctly forecast that divergent domestic policies in the U.S. and China – stimulus in the former and lack thereof in the latter – would be the most investment-relevant geopolitical issue. At the time, I found this an odd thing to highlight, given the risks of protectionism, populism, and North Korea. Do you still think that domestic policies will dominate in 2019? BCA: Yes, policy divergence between the U.S. and China will also dominate in 2019, especially if it continues to buoy the U.S. economy at the expense of the rest of the world. Of course, Beijing may decide to do more stimulus to offset its weakening economy and the impact of the trade tariffs. A headline rate cut, cuts to bank reserve requirements, and a boost to local government infrastructure spending are all in play. In the context of faltering housing and capex figures in the U.S., the narrative over the next quarter or two could be that the policy divergence is over, that Chinese policymakers have “blinked.” We are pushing back against this narrative on a structural basis. We have already broadly outlined our view that China will not be pressing hard to boost demand growth. Many of its recent policy efforts have focused on rebalancing the economy away from debt-driven investment (Chart 45). The problem for the rest of the world is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As such, efforts to boost domestic consumption will have limited impact on the rest of the world, especially as emerging markets are highly leveraged to “old China.” Chart 45Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the Trump-Democrat gridlock could yield surprising results in 2019. President Trump is becoming singularly focused on winning re-election in 2020. As such, he fears the “stimulus cliff” looming over the election year. Democrats, eager to show that they are not merely the party of “the Resistance,” have already signaled that an infrastructure deal is their top priority. With fiscal conservatives in the House all but neutered by the midterm elections, a coalition between Trump and likely House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could emerge by late 2019, ushering in even more fiscal stimulus. While the net new federal spending will not be as grandiose as the headline figures, it will be something. There will also be regular spending increases in the wake of this year’s bipartisan removal of spending caps. We place solid odds that the current policy divergence narrative continues well into 2019, with bullish consequences for the U.S. dollar and bearish outcomes for EM assets, at least in the first half of the year. Mr. X: Your geopolitical team has consistently been alarmist on the U.S.-China trade war, a view that bore out throughout 2018. You already stated that you think trade tensions will persist in 2019. Where is this heading? BCA: Nowhere good. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Sino-American relationship has been our premier geopolitical risk since 2012. The Trump administration has begun tying geopolitical and strategic matters in with the trade talks. No longer is the White House merely asking for a narrowing of the trade deficit, improved intellectual property protections, and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Now, everything from surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea to Beijing’s “Belt and Road” project are on the list of U.S. demands. Trade negotiations are a “two-level game,” whereby policymakers negotiate in parallel with their foreign counterparts and domestic constituents. While Chinese economic agents may accept U.S. economic demands, it is not clear to us that its military and intelligence apparatus will accept U.S. geopolitical demands. And Xi Jinping himself is highly attuned to China’s geopolitical position, calling for national rejuvenation above all. We would therefore downplay any optimistic news from the G20 summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. President Trump could freeze tariffs at current rates and allow for a more serious negotiating round throughout 2019. But unless China is willing to kowtow to America, a fundamental deal will remain elusive in the end. For Trump, a failure to agree is still a win domestically, as the median American voter is not asking for a resolution of the trade war with China (Chart 46). Chart 46Americans Favor Being Tough On China OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Could trade tensions spill into rising military friction? BCA: Absolutely. Minor military skirmishes will likely continue and could even escalate. We believe that there is a structural bull market in “war.” Investors should position themselves by being long global defense stocks. Mr. X: That is not encouraging. What about North Korea and Iran? Could they become geopolitical risks in 2019? BCA: Our answer to the North Korea question remains the same as 12 months ago: we have seen the peak in the U.S.’ display of a “credible military threat.” But Iran could re-emerge as a risk mid-year. We argued in last year’s discussion that President Trump was more interested in playing domestic politics than actually ratcheting up tensions with Iran. However, in early 2018 we raised our alarm level, particularly when staffing decisions in the White House involved several noted Iran hawks joining the foreign policy team. This was a mistake. Our initial call was correct, as President Trump ultimately offered six-month exemptions to eight importers of Iranian crude. That said, those exemptions will expire in the spring. The White House may, at that point, ratchet up tensions with Iran. This time, we will believe it when we see it. Intensifying tensions with Iran ahead of the U.S. summer vacation season, and at a time when crude oil markets are likely to be finely balanced, seems like folly, especially with primary elections a mere 6-to-8 months away. What does President Trump want more: to win re-election or to punish Iran? We think the answer is obvious, especially given that very few voters seem to view Iran as the country’s greatest threat (Chart 47). Chart 47Americans Don’t See Iran As A Major Threat OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Let’s turn to Europe. You have tended to dismiss Euroskeptics as a minor threat, which has largely been correct. But don’t you think that, with Brexit upon us and Chancellor Angela Merkel in the twilight, populism in continental Europe will finally have its day? BCA: Let’s first wait to see how Brexit turns out! The next few months will be critical. Uncertainty is high, with considerable risks remaining. We do not think that Prime Minister May has the votes in the House of Commons to push through any version of soft Brexit that she has envisioned thus far. If the vote on the U.K.-EU exit deal falls through, a new election could be possible. This will require an extension of the exit process under Article 50 and a prolonged period of uncertainty. The probability of a no-deal Brexit is lower than 10%. It is simply not in the interest of anyone involved, save for a smattering of the hardest of hard Brexit adherents in the U.K. Conservative Party. Put simply, if the EU-U.K. deal falls through in the House of Commons, or even if PM May is replaced by a hard-Brexit Tory, the most likely outcome is an extension of the negotiation process. This can be easily done and we suspect that all EU member states would be in favor of such an extension given the cost to business sentiment and trade that would result from a no-deal Brexit. It is not clear that Brexit has emboldened Euroskeptics. In fact, most populist parties in the EU have chosen to tone down their Euroskepticism and emphasize their anti-immigrant agenda since the Brexit referendum. In part, this decision has to do with how messy the Brexit process has become. If the U.K. is struggling to unravel the sinews that tie it to Europe, how is any other country going to fare any better? The problem for Euroskeptic populists is that establishment parties are wise to the preferences of the European median voter. For example, we now have Friedrich Merz, a German candidate for the head of the Christian Democratic Union – essentially Merkel’s successor – who is both an ardent Europhile and a hardliner on immigration. This is not revolutionary. Merz simply read the polls correctly and realized that, with 83% of Germans supporting the euro, the rise of the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany (AfD) is more about immigration than about the EU. As such, we continue to stress that populism in Europe is overstated. In fact, we expect that Germany and France will redouble their efforts to reform European institutions in 2019. The European parliamentary elections in May will elicit much handwringing by the media due to a likely solid showing by Euroskeptics, even though the election is meaningless. Afterwards, we expect to see significant efforts to complete the banking union, reform the European Stability Mechanism, and even introduce a nascent Euro Area budget. But these reforms will not be for everyone. Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe will be left on the outside looking in. Brussels may also be emboldened to take a hard line on Italy if institutional reforms convince the markets that the core Euro Area is sheltered from contagion. In other words, the fruits of integration will be reserved for those who play by the Franco-German rules. And that could, ironically, set the stage for the unraveling of the European Union as we know it. Over the long haul, a much tighter, more integrated, core could emerge centered on the Euro Area, with the rest of the EU becoming stillborn. The year 2019 will be a vital one for Europe. We are sensing an urgency in Berlin and Paris that has not existed throughout the crisis, largely due to Merkel’s own failings as a leader. We remain optimistic that the Euro Area will survive. However, there will be fireworks. Finally, a word about Japan. The coming year will see the peak of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s career. He is promoting the first-ever revision to Japan’s post-war constitution in order to countenance the armed forces. If he succeeds, he will have a big national security success to couple with his largely effective “Abenomics” economic agenda – after that, it will all be downhill. If he fails, he will become a lame duck. This means that political uncertainty will rise in 2019, after six years of unusual tranquility. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that 2019 could be even more turbulent for financial markets than the past has been. I accept your opinion that a major global economic downturn is not around the corner, but with valuations still stretched, I feel that it makes good sense to focus on capital preservation. I may lose out on the proverbial “blow-off” rally, but so be it – I have been in this business long enough to know that it is much better to leave the party while the music is still playing! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks surrounding the outlook have risen as we have entered the late stages of this business-cycle expansion. Yet, if global growth does temporarily stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful. The era of hyper-easy money may be ending, but interest rates globally are still nowhere near restrictive territory. This tells me that the final stages of this bull market could be very rewarding. A turbulent market is not only one where prices go down – they can also go up a lot! BCA: The debate you are having is one we ourselves have had on numerous occasions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term returns. While most assets have cheapened over the past year, prices are still fairly elevated. Table 4 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.9% over the next ten years, or 2.8% after adjusting for inflation. That is an improvement over our inflation-adjusted estimate of 1.3% from last year, but still well below the 6.6% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2018. Table 410-Year Asset Return Projections OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Our return calculations for equities assume that profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if underlying changes in the economy keep corporate profits elevated as a share of GDP. Structurally lower real interest rates may also justify higher P/E multiples, although this would be largely offset by the prospect of slower economic growth, which will translate into slower earnings growth. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot hinges on our view that monetary policy in the main economies stays accommodative. This seems like a safe assumption in the Euro Area and Japan, where rates are near historic lows, as well as in China, where the government is actively loosening monetary conditions. It is not such a straightforward conclusion for the U.S., where the Fed is on track to keep raising rates. If it turns out that the neutral interest rate is not far above where rates are already, we could see a broad-based slowdown of the U.S. economy that ripples through to the rest of the world. And even if U.S. monetary policy does remain accommodative, many things could still upset the apple cart, including a full-out trade war, debt crises in Italy or China, or a debilitating spike in oil prices. As the title of our outlook implies, 2019 is likely to be a year of increased turbulence. Ms. X: As always, you have left us with much to think about. My father has looked forward to these discussions every year and now that I am able to join him, I understand why. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That would be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The collision between policy and markets that we discussed last year finally came to a head in October. Rather than falling as they normally do when stocks plunge, U.S. bond yields rose as investors reassessed the willingness of the Fed to pause hiking rates even in the face of softer growth. Likewise, hopes that China would move swiftly to stimulate its economy were dashed as it became increasingly clear that the authorities were placing a high emphasis on their reform agenda of deleveraging and capacity reduction. The ongoing Brexit saga and the stalemate between the populist Italian government and the EU have increased uncertainty in Europe at a time when the region was already beginning to slow. We expect the tensions between policy and markets to be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Despite the deterioration in economic data over the past month, real final domestic demand is still tracking to expand by 3% in the fourth quarter, well above estimates of the sustainable pace of economic growth. Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar should peak midway next year. China will also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which will boost global growth. However, until both of these things happen, emerging markets will remain under pressure. For the time being, we continue to favor developed market equities over their EM peers. We also prefer defensive equity sectors such as health care and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the U.S. will outperform Europe and Japan for the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. A stabilization in global growth could ignite a blow-off rally in global equities. If the Fed is raising rates in response to falling unemployment, this is unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints begin to fully bite in early 2020 and inflation rises well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks will begin to buckle. This means that a window exists next year where stocks will outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks for now, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from current levels without a corresponding deteriorating in the economic outlook. Corporate credit will underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in spreads is unlikely as long as the economy is still expanding, but spreads could still widen modestly given their low starting point. U.S. shale companies have been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices are unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, over the next 12 months, we expect production cuts in Saudi Arabia will push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 26, 2018 ​​​​​​

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given the recent turbulence in financial markets. Our investments have done poorly in the past year and, with hindsight, I wish I had followed my instincts to significantly cut our equity exposure at the end of 2017, although we did follow your advice to move to a neutral stance in mid-2018. I remain greatly troubled by economic and political developments in many countries. I have long believed in open and free markets and healthy political discourse, and this all seems under challenge. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I also am pleased to have this opportunity to talk through the key issues that will influence our investment strategy over the coming year. As I am sure you remember, I was more optimistic than my father about the outlook when we met a year ago but things have not worked out as well as I had hoped. In retrospect, I should have paid more attention to your view that markets and policy were on a collision course as that turned out to be a very accurate prediction. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded my father that we should have a relatively high equity exposure and that was the correct stance. However, this success led us to maintain too much equity exposure in 2018, and my father has done well to resist the temptation to say “I told you so.” So, we are left with a debate similar to last year: Should we move now to an underweight in risk assets or hold off on the hope that prices will reach new highs in the coming year? I am still not convinced that we have seen the peak in risk asset prices as there is no recession on the horizon and equity valuations are much improved, following recent price declines. I will be very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our central theme for 2018 that markets and policy would collide did turn out to be appropriate and, importantly, the story has yet to fully play out. The monetary policy tightening cycle is still at a relatively early stage in the U.S. and has not even begun in many other regions. Yet, although it was a tough year for most equity markets, the conditions for a major bear market are not yet in place. One important change to our view, compared to a year ago, is that we have pushed back the timing of the next U.S. recession. This leaves a window for risk assets to show renewed strength. It remains to be seen whether prices will reach new peaks, but we believe it would be premature to shift to an underweight stance on equities. For the moment, we are sticking with our neutral weighting for risk assets, but may well recommend boosting exposure if prices suffer further near-term weakness. We will need more clarity about the timing of a recession before we consider aggressively cutting exposure. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your optimism. My list of concerns is long and I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: That is always interesting to do, although sometimes rather humbling. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflationary pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets.  The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the probability of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the Euro Area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China’s economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their “dots” projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal have real 10-year government bond yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The Euro Area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. As already noted, the broad theme that policy tightening – especially in the U.S. – would become a problem for asset markets during the year was supported by events. However, the exact timing was hard to predict. The indexes for non-U.S. developed equity markets and emerging markets peaked in late-January 2018, and have since dropped by around 18% and 24%, respectively (Chart 1). On the other hand, the U.S. market, after an early 2018 sell-off, hit a new peak in September, before falling anew in the past couple of months. The MSCI All-Country World index currently is about 6% below end-2017 levels in local-currency terms. Chart 1Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out We started the year recommending an overweight in developed equity markets but, as you noted, shifted that to a neutral position mid-year. A year ago, we thought we might move to an underweight stance in the second half of 2018 but decided against this because U.S. fiscal stimulus boosted corporate earnings and extended the economic cycle. Our call that emerging markets would underperform was on target. Although it was U.S. financial conditions that tightened the most, Wall Street was supported by the large cut in the corporate tax rate while the combination of higher bond yields and dollar strength was a major problem for many indebted emerging markets. Overall, it was not a good year for financial markets (Table 1). Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence As far as the overall macro environment was concerned, we were correct in predicting that the IMF was too pessimistic on economic growth. A year ago, the IMF forecast that the advanced economies would expand by 2% in 2018 and that has since been revised up to 2.4% (Table 2). This offset a slight downgrading to the performance of emerging economies. The U.S., Europe and Japan all grew faster than previously expected. Not surprisingly, inflation also was higher than forecast, although in the G7, it has remained close to the 2% level targeted by most central banks. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Despite widespread fears to the contrary, the data have supported our view that Chinese growth would hold above a 6% pace in 2018. Nevertheless, a slowdown currently is underway and downside risks remain very much in place in terms of excessive credit and trade pressures. Another difficult year lies ahead for the Chinese authorities and we will no doubt return to this topic later. As far as our other key forecasts are concerned, we were correct in our views that oil prices and the U.S. dollar would rise and that the market would be forced to revise up its predictions of Fed rate hikes. Of course, oil has recently given back its earlier gains, but we assume that is a temporary setback. On the sector front, our macro views led us to favor industrials, financials and energy, but that did not work out well as concerns about trade took a toll on cyclical sectors. Overall, there were no major macro surprises in 2018, and it seems clear that we have yet to resolve the key questions and issues that we discussed a year ago. At that time, we were concerned about the development of late-cycle pressures that ultimately would undermine asset prices. That story has yet to fully play out. It is hard to put precise timing on when the U.S. economy will peak and, thus, when asset prices will be at maximum risk. Nevertheless, our base case is that there likely will be a renewed and probably final run-up in asset prices before the next recession. Late-Cycle Challenges Mr. X: This seems like déjà-vu all over again. Since we last met, the cycle is one year older and, as you just said, the underlying challenges facing economies and markets have not really changed. If anything, things are even worse: Global debt levels are higher, inflation pressures more evident, Fed policy is moving closer to restrictive territory and protectionist policies have ratcheted up. If it was right to be cautious six months ago, then surely we should be even more cautious now. Ms. X: Oh dear, it does seem like a repeat of last year’s discussion because, once again, I am more optimistic than my father. Obviously, there are structural problems in a number of countries and, at some point, the global economy will suffer another recession. But timing is everything, and I attach very low odds to a downturn in the coming year. Meanwhile, I see many pockets of value in the equity market. Rather than cut equity positions, I am inclined to look for buying opportunities. BCA: We sympathize with your different perspectives because the outlook is complex and we also have lively debates about the view. The global equity index currently is a little below where it was when we met last year, but there has been tremendous intra-period volatility. That pattern seems likely to be repeated in 2019. In other words, it will be important to be flexible about your investment strategy. You both make good points. It is true that there are several worrying problems regarding the economic outlook, including excessive debt, protectionism and building inflation risks. At the same time, the classic conditions for an equity bear market are not yet in place, and may not be for some time. This leaves us in the rather uncomfortable position of sitting on the fence with regard to risk asset exposure. We are very open to raising exposure should markets weaken further in the months ahead, but also are keeping careful watch for signs that the economic cycle is close to peaking. In other words, it would be a mistake to lock in a 12-month strategy right now. Mr. X: I would like to challenge the consensus view, shared by my daughter, that the next recession will not occur before 2020, and might even be much later. The main rationale seems to be that the policy environment remains accommodative and there are none of the usual imbalances that occur ahead of recessions. Of course, U.S. fiscal policy has given a big boost to growth in the past year, but I assume the effects will wear off sharply in 2019. More importantly, there is huge uncertainty about the level of interest rates that will trigger economic problems. It certainly has not taken much in the way of Fed rate hikes to rattle financial markets. Thus, monetary policy may become restrictive much sooner than generally believed. I also strongly dispute the idea that there are no major financial imbalances. If running U.S. federal deficits of $1 trillion in the midst of an economic boom is not an imbalance, then I don’t know what is! At the same time, the U.S. corporate sector has issued large amounts of low-quality debt, and high-risk products such as junk-bond collateralized debt obligations have made an unwelcome reappearance. It seems that the memories of 2007-09 have faded. It is totally normal for long periods of extremely easy money to be accompanied by growing leverage and increasingly speculative financial activities, and I don’t see why this period should be any different. And often, the objects of speculation are not discovered until financial conditions become restrictive. Finally, there are huge risks associated with rising protectionism, the Chinese economy appears to be struggling, Italy’s banks are a mess, and the Brexit fiasco poses a threat to the U.K. economy. Starting with the U.S., please go ahead and convince me why a recession is more than a year away. BCA: It is natural for you to worry that a recession is right around the corner. The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion. Economists have a long and sad history of failing to forecast recessions. Therefore, a great deal of humility is warranted when it comes to predicting the evolution of the business cycle. The Great Recession was one of the deepest downturns on record and the recovery has been fairly sluggish by historic standards. Thus, it has taken much longer than usual for the U.S. economy to return to full employment. Looking out, there are many possible risks that could trip up the U.S. economy but, for the moment, we see no signs of recession on the horizon (Chart 2). For example, the leading economic indicator is still in an uptrend, the yield curve has not inverted and our monetary indicators are not contracting. Our proprietary recession indicator also suggests that the risk is currently low, although recent stock market weakness implies some deterioration. Chart 2Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' The buildup in corporate debt is a cause for concern and we are not buyers of corporate bonds at current yields. However, the impact of rising yields on the economy is likely to be manageable. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole – defined as the profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid – is still above its historic average (Chart 3). Corporate bonds are also generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. The impact of defaults on the economy tends to be more severe when leveraged institutions are the ones that suffer the greatest losses. Chart 3Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind We share your worries about the long-term fiscal outlook. However, large budget deficits do not currently imperil the economy. The U.S. private sector is running a financial surplus, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 4). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its budget deficit. If anything, the highly accommodative stance of fiscal policy has pushed up the neutral rate of interest, giving the Fed greater scope to raise rates before monetary policy enters restrictive territory. The impetus of fiscal policy on the economy will be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018, but it will still be positive (Chart 5). Chart 4The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit Chart 5U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 The risks to growth are more daunting outside the U.S. As you point out, Italy is struggling to contain borrowing costs, a dark cloud hangs over the Brexit negotiations, and China and most other emerging markets have seen growth slow meaningfully. The U.S., however, is a relatively closed economy – it is not as dependent on trade as most other countries. Its financial system is reasonably resilient thanks to the capital its banks have raised over the past decade. In addition, Dodd-Frank and other legislation have made it more difficult for financial institutions to engage in reckless risk-taking. Mr. X: I would never take a benign view of the ability and willingness of financial institutions to engage in reckless behavior, but maybe I am too cynical. Even if you are right that debt does not pose an immediate threat to the market, surely it will become a huge problem in the next downturn. If the U.S. federal deficit is $1 trillion when the economy is strong, it is bound to reach unimaginable levels in a recession. And, to make matters worse, the Federal Reserve may not have much scope to lower interest rates if they peak at a historically low level in the next year or so. What options will policymakers have to respond to the next cyclical downturn? Is there a limit to how much quantitative easing central banks can do? BCA: The Fed is aware of the challenges it faces if the next recession begins when interest rates are still quite low. Raising rates rapidly in order to have more “ammunition” for counteracting the downturn would hardly be the best course of action as this would only bring forward the onset of the recession. A better strategy is to let the economy overheat a bit so that inflation rises. This would allow the Fed to push real rates further into negative territory if the recession turns out to be severe. There is no real limit on how much quantitative easing the Fed can undertake. The FOMC will undoubtedly turn to asset purchases and forward guidance again during the next economic downturn. Now that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon into unorthodox monetary policy without generating high inflation, policymakers are likely to try even more exotic policies, such as price-level targeting. The private sector tends to try to save more during recessions. Thus, even though the fiscal deficit would widen during the next downturn, there should be plenty of buyers for government debt. However, once the next recovery begins, the Fed may feel increasing political pressure to keep rates low in order to allow the government to maintain its desired level of spending and taxes. The Fed guards its independence fiercely, but in a world of increasingly political populism, that independence may begin to erode. This will not happen quickly, but to the extent that it does occur, higher inflation is likely to be the outcome. Ms. X: I would like to explore the U.S.-China dynamic a bit more because I see that as one of the main challenges to my more optimistic view. I worry that President Trump will continue to take a hard line on China trade because it plays well with his base and has broad support in Congress. And I equally worry that President Xi will not want to be seen giving in to U.S. bullying. How do you see this playing out? BCA: Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires are likely to be disappointed. President Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It also forces the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger U.S. trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a trade agreement with them. The new USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to NAFTA, with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China. This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit and China will fill that role. For his part, President Xi knows full well that he will still be China’s leader when Trump is long gone. Giving in to Trump’s demands would hurt him politically. All this means that the trade war will persist. Mr. X: I see a trade war as a major threat to the economy, but it is not the only thing that could derail the economic expansion. Let’s explore that issue in more detail. The Economic Outlook Mr. X: You have shown in previous research that housing is often a very good leading indicator of the U.S. economy, largely because it is very sensitive to changes in the monetary environment. Are you not concerned about the marked deterioration in recent U.S. housing data? BCA: Recent trends in housing have indeed been disappointing, with residential investment acting as a drag on growth for three consecutive quarters. The weakness has been broad-based with sales, the rate of price appreciation of home prices, and builder confidence all declining (Chart 6). Even though the level of housing affordability is decent by historical standards, there has been a fall in the percentage of those who believe that it is a good time to buy a home. Chart 6Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing There are a few possible explanations for the weakness. First, the 2007-09 housing implosion likely had a profound and lasting impact on the perceived attractiveness of home ownership. The homeownership rate for people under 45 has remained extremely low by historical standards. Secondly, increased oversight and tighter regulations have curbed mortgage supply. Finally, the interest rate sensitivity of the sector may have increased with the result that even modest increases in the mortgage rate have outsized effects. That, in turn, could be partly explained by recent tax changes that capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while lowering the limit on the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. The trend in housing is definitely a concern, but the odds of a further major contraction seem low. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record levels and the same is true for the inventory of homes. The pace of housebuilding is below the level implied by demographic trends and consumer fundamentals are reasonably healthy. The key to the U.S. economy lies with business investment and consumer spending and these areas are well supported for the moment. Consumers are benefiting from continued strong growth in employment and a long overdue pickup in wages. Meanwhile, the ratio of net worth-to-income has surpased the previous peak and the ratio of debt servicing-to-income is low (Chart 7). Last year, we expressed some concern that the depressed saving rate might dampen spending, but the rate has since been revised substantially higher. Based on its historical relationship with U.S. household net worth, there is room for the saving rate to fall, fueling more spending. Real consumer spending has grown by 3% over the past year and there is a good chance of maintaining that pace during most of 2019. Chart 7U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy Turning to capital spending, the cut in corporate taxes was obviously good for cash flow, and surveys show a high level of business confidence. Moreover, many years of business caution toward spending has pushed up the average age of the nonresidential capital stock to the highest level since 1963 (Chart 8). Higher wages should also incentivize firms to invest in more machinery. Absent some new shock to confidence, business investment should stay firm during the next year. Chart 8An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. As discussed earlier, that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. Ms. X: I share the view that the U.S. economy will continue to grow at a healthy pace, but I am less sure about the rest of the world. BCA: You are right to be concerned. We expected U.S. and global growth to diverge in 2018, but not by as much as occurred. Several factors have weighed on CEO confidence outside of the U.S., including trade wars, a strong dollar, higher oil prices, emerging market turbulence, the return of Italian debt woes, and a slowdown in the Chinese economy. The stress has shown up in the global manufacturing PMI, although the latter is still at a reasonably high level (Chart 9). Global export growth is moderating and the weakness appears to be concentrated in capex. Capital goods imports for the major economies, business investment, and the production of investment-related goods have all decelerated this year. Chart 9Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Our favorite global leading indicators are also flashing yellow (Chart 10). BCA’s global leading economic indicator has broken below the boom/bust line and its diffusion index suggests further downside. The global ZEW composite and the BCA boom/bust indicator are both holding below zero. Chart 10Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Current trends in the leading indicators shown in Chart 11 imply that the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain a key theme well into 2019. Among the advanced economies, Europe and Japan are quite vulnerable to the global soft patch in trade and capital spending. Chart 11Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue The loss of momentum in the Euro Area economy, while expected, has been quite pronounced. Part of this is due to the dissipation of the 2016/17 economic boost related to improved health in parts of the European banking system that sparked a temporary surge in credit growth. The tightening in Italian financial conditions following the government’s budget standoff with the EU has weighed on overall Euro Area growth. Softer Chinese demand for European exports, uncertainties related to U.S. trade policy and the torturous Brexit negotiations, have not helped the situation. Real GDP growth decelerated to close to a trend pace by the third quarter of 2018. The manufacturing PMI has fallen from a peak of 60.6 in December 2017 to 51.5, mirroring a 1% decline in the OECD’s leading economic indicator for the region. Not all the economic news has been bleak. Both consumer and industrial confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with a resumption of above-trend growth. Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017, the EC survey on firms’ export order books remains at robust levels (Chart 12). Importantly for the Euro Area, the bank credit impulse has moved higher.The German economy should also benefit from a rebound in vehicle production which plunged earlier this year following the introduction of new emission standards. Chart 12Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster We interpret the 2018 Euro Area slowdown as a reversion-to-the-mean rather than the start of an extended period of sub-trend growth. Real GDP growth should fluctuate slightly above trend pace through 2019. Given that the Euro Area’s output gap is almost closed, the ECB will not deviate from its plan to end its asset purchase program by year end. Gradual rate hikes should begin late in 2019, assuming that inflation is closer to target by then. In contrast, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is unlikely to change policy anytime soon. The good news is that wages have finally begun to grow at about a 2% pace, although it required extreme labor shortages. Yet, core inflation is barely positive and long-term inflation expectations are a long way from the 2% target. The inflation situation will have to improve significantly before the BoJ can consider adjusting or removing the Yield Curve Control policy. This is especially the case since the economy has hit a bit of an air pocket and the government intends to raise the VAT in 2019. Japan’s industrial production has stalled and we expect the export picture to get worse before it gets better. We do not anticipate any significant economic slack to develop, but even a sustained growth slowdown could partially reverse the gains that have been made on the inflation front. Ms. X: We can’t talk about the global economy without discussing China. You have noted in the past how the authorities are walking a tightrope between trying to unwind the credit bubble and restructure the economy on the one hand, and prevent a destabilizing economic and financial crisis on the other. Thus far, they have not fallen off the tightrope, but there has been limited progress in resolving the country’s imbalances. And now the authorities appear to be stimulating growth again, risking an even bigger buildup of credit. Can it all hold together for another year? BCA: That’s a very good question. Thus far, there is not much evidence that stimulus efforts are working. Credit growth is still weak and leading economic indicators have not turned around (Chart 13). There is thus a case for more aggressive reflation, but the authorities also remain keen to wean the economy off its addiction to debt. Chart 13China: No Sign Of Reacceleration China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to about 260% of GDP at present (Chart 14). As is usually the case, rapid increases in leverage have been associated with a misallocation of capital. Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, the result has been overcapacity in a number of areas. For example, the fact that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant is a reflection of overbuilding. Meanwhile, the rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs. Chart 14China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising Chinese exports are holding up well so far, but this might only represent front-running ahead of the implementation of higher tariffs. Judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 15). Chart 15Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer The most likely outcome is that the authorities will adjust the policy dials just enough to stabilize growth sometime in the first half of 2019. The bottoming in China’s broad money impulse offers a ray of hope (Chart 16). Still, it is a tentative signal at best and it will take some time before this recent easing in monetary policy shows up in our credit impulse measure and, later, economic growth. A modest firming in Chinese growth in the second half of 2019 would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China. Chart 16A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 Ms. X: If you are correct about a stabilization in the Chinese economy next year, this presumably would be good news for emerging economies, especially if the Fed goes on hold. EM assets have been terribly beaten down and I am looking for an opportunity to buy. BCA: Fed rate hikes might have been the catalyst for the past year’s pain in EM assets, but it is not the underlying problem. As we highlighted at last year’s meeting, the troubles for emerging markets run much deeper. Our long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries; EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart 17). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 17EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... Decelerating global growth has exposed these poor fundamentals. EM sovereign spreads have moved wider in conjunction with falling PMIs and slowing industrial production and export growth. And it certainly does not help that the Fed is tightening dollar-based liquidity conditions. EM equities usually fall when U.S. financial conditions tighten (Chart 18). Chart 18...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions Chart 19 highlights the most vulnerable economies in terms of foreign currency funding requirements, and foreign debt-servicing obligations relative to total exports. Turkey stands out as the most vulnerable, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. In contrast, Emerging Asia appears to be in better shape relative to the crisis period of the late 1990s. Chart 19Spot The Outliers OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence The backdrop for EM assets is likely to get worse in the near term, given our view that the Fed will continue to tighten and China will be cautious about stimulating more aggressively. Our base case outlook sees some relief in the second half of 2019, but it is more of a “muddle-through” scenario than a V-shaped economic recovery. Mr. X: Perhaps EM assets could enjoy a bounce next year if the Chinese economy stabilizes, but the poor macro fundamentals you mentioned suggest that it would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold proposition. I am inclined to avoid the whole asset class in 2019. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: Let’s turn to fixed income now. I was bearish on bonds in 2018, but yields have risen quite a bit, at least in the United States. The Fed has lifted the fed funds rate by 100 basis points over the past year and I don’t see a lot of upside for inflation. So perhaps yields have peaked and will move sideways in 2019, which would be good for stocks in my view. BCA: Higher yields have indeed improved bond value recently. Nonetheless, they are not cheap enough to buy at this point (Chart 20). The real 10-year Treasury yield, at close to 1%, is still depressed by pre-Lehman standards. Long-term real yields in Germany and Japan remain in negative territory at close to the lowest levels ever recorded. Chart 20Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed We called the bottom in global nominal bond yields in 2016. Our research at the time showed that the cyclical and structural factors that had depressed yields were at an inflection point, and were shifting in a less bond-bullish direction. Perhaps most important among the structural factors, population aging and a downward trend in underlying productivity growth resulted in lower equilibrium bond yields over the past couple of decades. Looking ahead, productivity growth could stage a mild rebound in line with the upturn in the growth rate of the capital stock (Chart 21). As for demographics, the age structure of the world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging is beginning to drain that pool as people retire and begin to consume their nest eggs (Chart 22). The household saving rates in the major advanced economies should trend lower in the coming years, placing upward pressure on equilibrium global bond yields. Chart 21Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Chart 22Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Cyclical factors are also turning against bonds. U.S. inflation has returned to target and the Fed is normalizing short-term interest rates. The market currently is priced for only one more rate hike after December 2018 in this cycle, but we see rates rising more than that. Treasury yields will follow as market expectations adjust. Long-term inflation expectations are still too low in the U.S. and most of the other major economies to be consistent with central banks’ meeting their inflation targets over the medium term. As actual inflation edges higher, long-term expectations built into bond yields will move up. The term premium portion of long-term bond yields is also too low. This is the premium that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. Our estimates suggest that the term premium is still negative in the advanced economies outside of the U.S., which is not sustainable over the medium term (Chart 23). Chart 23Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low We expect term premia to rise for two main reasons. First, investors have viewed government bonds as a good hedge for their equity holdings because bond prices have tended to rise when stock prices fell. Investors have been willing to pay a premium to hold long-term bonds to benefit from this hedging effect. But the correlation is now beginning to change as inflation and inflation expectations gradually adjust higher and output gaps close. As the hedging benefit wanes, the term premium should rise back into positive territory. Second, central bank bond purchases and forward guidance have depressed yields as well as interest-rate volatility. The latter helped to depress term premia in the bond market. This effect, too, is beginning to unwind. The Fed is letting its balance sheet shrink by about $50 billion per month. The Bank of England has kept its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds constant for over a year, while the ECB is about to end asset purchases. The Bank of Japan continues to buy assets, but at a much reduced pace. All this means that the private sector is being forced to absorb a net increase in government bonds for the first time since 2014 (Chart 24). Chart 25 shows that bond yields in the major countries will continue to trend higher as the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets becomes a thing of the past. Chart 24Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Chart 25QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices Ms. X: I’m not a fan of bonds at these levels, but that sounds overly bearish to me, especially given the recent plunge in oil prices. BCA: Lower oil prices will indeed help to hold down core inflation to the extent that energy prices leak into non-energy prices in the near term. Nonetheless, in the U.S., this effect will be overwhelmed by an overheated economy. From a long-term perspective, we believe that investors still have an overly benign view of the outlook for yields. The market expects that the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years will only be slightly above today’s spot yield, which itself is still very depressed by historical standards (Chart 26). And that also is the case in the other major bond markets. Chart 26Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Of course, it will not be a straight line up for yields – there will be plenty of volatility. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. Duration should be kept short at least until the middle of 2019, with an emphasis on TIPS relative to conventional Treasury bonds. We will likely downgrade TIPS versus conventionals once long-term inflation expectations move into our target range, which should occur sometime during 2019. The ECB and Japan will not be in a position to raise interest rates for some time, but the bear phase in U.S. Treasurys will drag up European and Japanese bond yields (at the very long end of the curve for the latter). Total returns are likely to be negative in all of the major bond markets in 2019. Real 10-year yields in all of the advanced economies are still well below their long-term average, except for Greece, Italy and Portugal (Chart 27). Chart 27Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Within global bond portfolios, we recommend being underweight bond markets where central banks are in a position to raise short-term interest rates (the U.S. and Canada), and overweight those that are not (Japan and Australia). The first ECB rate hike is unlikely before the end of 2019. However, the imminent end of the asset purchase program argues for no more than a benchmark allocation to core European bond markets within global fixed-income portfolios, especially since real 10-year yields in parts of continental Europe are the furthest below their long-term average. We are overweight gilts at the moment, but foresee shifting to underweight in 2019, depending on how Brexit plays out. Ms. X: What about corporate bonds? I know that total returns for corporates will be poor if government bond yields are rising. But you recommended overweighting corporate bonds relative to Treasurys last year. Given your view that the next U.S. recession is more than a year away, it seems reasonable to assume they will outperform government bonds. BCA: We were overweight corporates in the first half of 2018, but took profits in June and shifted to neutral at the same time that we downgraded our equity allocation. Spreads had tightened to levels that did not compensate investors for the risks. Recent spread widening has returned some value to U.S. corporates. The 12-month breakeven spreads for A-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds are almost back up to their 50th percentile relative to history (Chart 28). Still, these levels are not attractive enough to justify buying based on valuation alone. As for high-yield, any rise in the default rate would quickly overwhelm the yield pickup in this space. Chart 28Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside It is possible that some of the spread widening observed in October and November will reverse, but corporates offer a poor risk/reward tradeoff, even if the default rate stays low. Corporate profit growth is bound to decelerate in 2019. This would not be a disaster for equities, but slowing profit growth is more dangerous for corporate bond excess returns because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. As discussed above, at a macro level, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the U.S. corporate sector is decent by historical standards. However, this includes mega-cap companies that have little debt and a lot of cash. Our bottom-up research suggests that interest coverage ratios for firms in the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index will likely drop close to multi-decade lows during the next recession, sparking a wave of downgrade activity and fallen angels. Seeing this coming, investors may require more yield padding to compensate for these risks as profit growth slows. Our next move will likely be to downgrade corporate bonds to underweight. We are watching the yield curve, bank lending standards, profit growth, and monetary indicators for signs to further trim exposure. You should already be moving up in quality within your corporate bond allocation. Mr. X: We have already shifted to underweight corporate bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Even considering the cheapening that has occurred over the past couple of months, spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. Equity Market Outlook Ms. X: While we all seem to agree that corporate bonds are not very attractive, I believe that enough value has been restored to equities that we should upgrade our allocation, especially if the next recession is two years away. And I know that stocks sometimes have a powerful blow-off phase before the end of a bull market. Mr. X: This is where I vehemently disagree with my daughter. The recent sell-off resembles a bloodbath in parts of the global market. It has confirmed my worst fears, especially related to the high-flying tech stocks that I believe were in a bubble. Hopes for a blow-off phase are wishful thinking. I’m wondering if the sell-off represents the beginning of an extended bear market. BCA: Some value has indeed been restored. However, the U.S. market is far from cheap relative to corporate fundamentals. The trailing and 12-month forward price-earnings ratios (PER) of 20 and 16, respectively, are still far above their historical averages, especially if one leaves out the tech bubble period of the late 1990s. And the same is true for other metrics such as price-to-sales and price-to-book value (Chart 29). BCA’s composite valuation indicator, based on 8 different valuation measures, is only a little below the threshold of overvaluation at +1 standard deviation because low interest rates still favor equities on a relative yield basis. Chart 29U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap It is true that equities can reward investors handsomely in the final stage of a bull market. Chart 30 presents cumulative returns to the S&P 500 in the last nine bull markets. The returns are broken down by quintile. The greatest returns, unsurprisingly, generally occur in the first part of the bull market (quintile 1). But total returns in the last 20% of the bull phase (quintile 5) have been solid and have beaten the middle quartiles. Chart 30Late-Cycle Blow-Offs Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Of course, the tricky part is determining where we are in the bull market. We have long viewed financial markets through the lens of money and credit. This includes a framework that involves the Fed policy cycle. The historical track record for risk assets is very clear; they tend to perform well when the fed funds rate is below neutral, whether rates are rising or falling. Risk assets tend to underperform cash when the fed funds rate is above neutral (Table 3). Table 3Stocks Do Well When The Fed Funds Rate Is Below Neutral OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence We believe the fed funds rate is still in easy territory. This suggests that it is too early to shift to underweight on risk assets. We may even want to upgrade to overweight if stocks become cheap enough, as long as Fed policy is not restrictive. That said, there is huge uncertainty about the exact level of rates that constitutes “neutral” (or R-star in the Fed’s lingo). Even the Fed is unsure. This means that we must watch for signs that the fed funds rate has crossed the line into restrictive territory as the FOMC tightens over the coming year. An inversion of the 3-month T-bill/10-year yield curve slope would be a powerful signal that policy has become tight, although the lead time of an inverted curve and declining risk asset prices has been quite variable historically. Finally, it is also important to watch U.S. profit margins. Some of our research over the past couple of years focused on the late-cycle dynamics of previous long expansions, such as the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. We found that risk assets came under pressure once U.S. profit margins peaked. Returns were often negative from the peak in margins to the subsequent recession. Mr. X: U.S. profit margins must be close to peak levels. I’ve seen all sorts of anecdotal examples of rising cost pressures, not only in the labor market. BCA: We expected to see some margin pressure to appear by now. S&P 500 EPS growth will likely top out in the next couple of quarters, if only because the third quarter’s 26% year-over-year pace is simply not sustainable. But it is impressive that our margin proxies are not yet flagging an imminent margin squeeze, despite the pickup in wage growth (Chart 31). Chart 31U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat Margins according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data peaked in 2014 and have since diverged sharply with S&P 500 operating margins. It is difficult to fully explain the divergence. The NIPA margin is considered to be a better measure of underlying U.S. corporate profitability because it includes all companies (not just 500), and it is less subject to accounting trickery. That said, even the NIPA measure of margins firmed a little in 2018, along with the proxies we follow that correlate with the S&P 500 measure. The bottom line is that the macro variables that feed into our top-down U.S. EPS model point to a continuing high level of margins and fairly robust top-line growth, at least for the near term. For 2019, we assumed slower GDP growth and incorporated some decline in margins into our projection just to err on the conservative side. Nonetheless, our EPS model still projects a respectable 8% growth rate at the end of 2019 (Chart 32). The dollar will only be a minor headwind to earnings growth unless it surges by another 10% or more. Chart 32EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts The risks to EPS growth probably are to the downside relative to our forecast, but the point is that U.S. earnings will likely remain supportive for the market unless economic growth is much weaker than we expect. None of this means that investors should be aggressively overweight stocks now. We trimmed our equity recommendation to benchmark in mid-2018 for several reasons. At the time, value was quite poor and bottom-up earnings expectations were too high, especially on a five-year horizon. Also, sentiment measures suggested that investors were overly complacent. As you know, we are always reluctant to chase markets into highly overvalued territory, especially when a lot of good news has been discounted. As we have noted, we are open to temporarily shifting back to overweight in equities and other risk assets. The extension of the economic expansion gives more time for earnings to grow. The risks facing the market have not eased much but, given our base-case macro view, we would be inclined to upgrade equities if there is another meaningful correction. Of course, our profit, monetary and economic indicators would have to remain supportive to justify an upgrade. Mr. X: But you are bearish on bonds. We saw in October that the equity market is vulnerable to higher yields. BCA: It certainly won’t be smooth sailing through 2019 as interest rates normalize. Until recently, higher bond yields reflected stronger growth without any associated fears that inflation was a growing problem. The ‘Fed Put’ was seen as a key backstop for the equity bull market. But now that the U.S. labor market is showing signs of overheating, the bond sell-off has become less benign for stocks because the Fed will be less inclined to ease up at the first sign of trouble in the equity market. How stocks react in 2019 to the upward trend in yields depends a lot on the evolution of actual inflation and long-term inflation expectations. If core PCE inflation hovers close to or just above 2% for a while, then the Fed Put should still be in place. However, it would get ugly for both bonds and stocks if inflation moves beyond 2.5%. Our base case is that this negative dynamic won’t occur until early 2020, but obviously the timing is uncertain. One key indicator to watch is long-term inflation expectations, such as the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 33). It is close to 2% at the moment. If it shifts up into the 2.3%-2.5% range, it would confirm that inflation expectations have returned to a level that is consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. This would be a signal to the Fed that it is must become more aggressive in calming growth, with obvious negative consequences for risk assets. Chart 33Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Mr. X: I am skeptical that the U.S. corporate sector can pull off an 8% earnings gain in 2019. What about the other major markets? Won’t they get hit hard if global growth continues to slow as you suggest? BCA: Yes, that is correct. It is not surprising that EPS growth has already peaked in the Euro Area and Japan. The profit situation is going to deteriorate quickly in the coming quarters. Industrial production growth in both economies has already dropped close to zero, and we use this as a proxy for top-line growth in our EPS models. Nominal GDP growth has decelerated sharply in both economies in absolute terms and relative to the aggregate wage bill. These trends suggest that profit margins are coming under significant downward pressure. Even when we build in a modest growth pickup and slight rebound in margins in 2019, EPS growth falls close to zero by year-end according to our models. Both the Euro Area and Japanese equity markets are cheap relative to the U.S., based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart 34). However, neither is above the threshold of undervaluation (+1 standard deviation) that would justify overweight positions on valuation alone. We think the U.S. market will outperform the other two at least in the first half of 2019 in local and, especially, common-currency terms. Chart 34Valuation Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: It makes sense that U.S. profit growth will outperform the other major developed countries in 2019. I would like to circle back to emerging market assets. I understand that many emerging economies have deep structural problems. But you admitted that the Chinese authorities will eventually stimulate enough to stabilize growth, providing a bounce in EM growth and asset prices next year. These assets seem cheap enough to me to warrant buying now in anticipation of that rally. As we all know, reversals from oversold levels can happen in a blink of an eye and I don’t want to miss it. BCA: We are looking for an opportunity to buy as well, but are wary of getting in too early. First, valuation has improved but is not good enough on its own to justify buying now. EM stocks are only moderately undervalued based on our EM composite valuation indicator and the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 35). EM currencies are not particularly cheap either, outside of Argentina, Turkey and Mexico (Charts 36A and 36B). Valuation should only play a role in investment strategy when it is at an extreme, and this is not the case for most EM countries. Chart 35EM Stocks Are Not At Capitulation Levels... bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35   Chart 36A…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Chart 36B…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Second, corporate earnings growth has plenty of downside potential in the near term. Annual growth in EM nonfinancial EBITDA, currently near 10%, is likely to turn negative next year, based on our China credit and fiscal impulse indicator (Chart 37). And, as we emphasized earlier, China is not yet pressing hard on the gas pedal. Chart 37EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside Third, it will take time for more aggressive Chinese policy stimulus, if it does occur, to show up in EM stocks and commodity prices. Trend changes in money growth and our credit and fiscal impulse preceded the trough in EM stocks and commodity prices in 2015, and again at the top in stocks and commodities in 2017 (Chart 38). However, even if these two indicators bottom today, it could take several months before the sell-off in EM financial markets and commodity prices abates. Chart 38Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Finally, if Chinese stimulus comes largely via easier monetary policy rather than fiscal stimulus, then the outcome will be a weaker RMB. We expect the RMB to drift lower in any event, because rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. will move against the Chinese currency next year. A weaker RMB would add to the near-term headwinds facing EM assets. The bottom line is that the downside risks remain high enough that you should resist the temptation to bottom-fish until there are concrete signs that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about boosting the economy. We are also watching for signs outside of China that the global growth slowdown is ending. This includes our global leading economic indicator and data that are highly sensitive to global growth, such as German manufacturing foreign orders. Mr. X: Emerging market assets would have to become a lot cheaper for me to consider buying. Debt levels are just too high to be sustained, and stronger Chinese growth would only provide a short-term boost. I’m not sure I would even want to buy developed market risk assets based solely on some Chinese policy stimulus. BCA: Yes, we agree with your assessment that buying EM in 2019 would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold strategy. Still, the combination of continued solid U.S. growth and a modest upturn in the Chinese economy would alleviate a lot of investors’ global growth concerns. The result could be a meaningful rally in pro-cyclical assets that you should not miss. We are defensively positioned at the moment, but we could see becoming more aggressive in 2019 on signs that China is stimulating more firmly and/or our global leading indicators begin to show some signs of life. Besides upgrading our overall equity allocation back to overweight, we would dip our toes in the EM space again. At the same time, we will likely upgrade the more cyclical DM equity markets, such as the Euro Area and Japan, while downgrading the defensive U.S. equity market to underweight. We are currently defensively positioned in terms of equity sectors, but it would make sense to shift cyclicals to overweight at the same time. Exact timing is always difficult, but we expect to become more aggressive around the middle of 2019. We also think the time is approaching to favor long-suffering value stocks over growth stocks. The relative performance of growth-over-value according to standard measures has become a sector call over the past decade: tech or financials. The sector skew complicates this issue, especially since tech stocks have already cracked. But we have found that stocks that are cheap within equity sectors tend to outperform expensive (or growth) stocks once the fed funds rate moves into restrictive territory. This is likely to occur in the latter half of 2019. Value should then have its day in the sun. Currencies: Mr. X: We don’t usually hedge our international equity exposure, so the direction of the dollar matters a lot to us. As you predicted a year ago, the U.S. dollar reigned supreme in 2018. Your economic views suggest another good year in 2019, but won’t this become a problem for the economy? President Trump’s desire to lower the U.S. trade deficit suggests that the Administration would like the dollar to drop and we could get some anti-dollar rhetoric from the White House. Also, it seems that the consensus is strongly bullish on the dollar which is always a concern. BCA: The outlook for the dollar is much trickier than it was at the end of 2017. As you highlighted, traders are already very long the dollar, implying that the hurdle for the greenback to surprise positively is much higher now. However, a key driver for the dollar is the global growth backdrop. If the latter is poor in the first half of 2019 as we expect, it will keep a bid under the greenback. Interest rates should also remain supportive for the dollar. As we argued earlier, current market expectations – only one more Fed hike after the December meeting – are too sanguine. If the Fed increases rates by more than currently discounted, the dollar’s fair value will rise, especially if global growth continues to lag that of the U.S. Since the dollar’s 2018 rally was largely a correction of its previous undervaluation, the currency has upside potential in the first half of the year (Chart 39). Chart 39U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued A stronger dollar will dampen foreign demand for U.S.-produced goods and will boost U.S. imports. However, do not forget that a rising dollar benefits U.S. consumers via its impact on import prices. Since the consumer sector represents 68% of GDP, and that 69% of household consumption is geared toward the (largely domestic) service sector, a strong dollar will not be as negative for aggregate demand and employment as many commentators fear, unless it were to surge by at least another 10%. In the end, the dollar will be more important for the distribution of U.S. growth than its overall level. Where the strong dollar is likely to cause tremors is in the political arena. You are correct to point out that there is a large inconsistency between the White House’s desires to shore up growth, while simultaneously curtailing the trade deficit, especially if the dollar appreciates further. As long as the Fed focuses on its dual mandate and tries to contain inflationary pressures, the executive branch of the U.S. government can do little to push the dollar down. Currency intervention cannot have a permanent effect unless it is accompanied by shifts in relative macro fundamentals. For example, foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s merely had a temporary impact on the yen. The yen only weakened on a sustained basis once interest rate differentials moved against Japan. This problem underpins our view that the Sino-U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve meaningfully next year. China will remain an easy target to blame for the U.S.’s large trade deficit. What ultimately will signal a top in the dollar is better global growth, which is unlikely until the second half of 2019. At that point, expected returns outside the U.S. will improve, causing money to leave the U.S., pushing the dollar down. Mr. X: While 2017 was a stellar year for the euro, 2018 proved a much more challenging environment. Will 2019 be more like 2017 or 2018? BCA: We often think of the euro as the anti-dollar; buying EUR/USD is the simplest, most liquid vehicle for betting against the dollar, and vice versa. Our bullish dollar stance is therefore synonymous with a negative take on the euro. Also, the activity gap between the U.S. and the Euro Area continues to move in a euro-bearish fashion (Chart 40). Finally, since the Great Financial Crisis, EUR/USD has lagged the differential between European and U.S. core inflation by roughly six months. Today, this inflation spread still points toward a weaker euro. Chart 40Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro It is important to remember that when Chinese economic activity weakens, European growth deteriorates relative to the U.S. Thus, our view that global growth will continue to sputter in the first half of 2019 implies that the monetary policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB has not yet reached a climax. Consequently, we expect EUR/USD to trade below 1.1 in the first half of 2019. By that point, the common currency will be trading at a meaningful discount to its fair value, which will allow it to find a floor (Chart 41). Chart 41Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Mr. X: The Bank of Japan has debased the yen, with a balance sheet larger than Japan’s GDP. This cannot end well. I am very bearish on the currency. BCA: The BoJ’s monetary policy is definitely a challenge for the yen. The Japanese central bank rightfully understands that Japan’s inability to generate any meaningful inflation – despite an economy that is at full employment – is the consequence of a well-established deflationary mindset. The BoJ wants to shock inflation expectations upward by keeping real rates at very accommodative levels well after growth has picked up. This means that the BoJ will remain a laggard as global central banks move away from accommodative policies. The yen will continue to depreciate versus the dollar as U.S. yields rise on a cyclical horizon. That being said, the yen still has a place within investors’ portfolios. First, the yen is unlikely to collapse despite the BoJ’s heavy debt monetization. The JPY is one of the cheapest currencies in the world, with its real effective exchange rate hovering at a three-decade low (Chart 42). Additionally, Japan still sports a current account surplus of 3.7% of GDP, hardly the sign of an overstimulated and inflationary economy where demand is running amok. Instead, thanks to decades of current account surpluses, Japan has accumulated a positive net international investment position of 60% of GDP. This means that Japan runs a constant and large positive income balance, a feature historically associated with strong currencies. Chart 42The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap Japan’s large net international investment position also contributes to the yen’s defensive behavior as Japanese investors pull money back to safety at home when global growth deteriorates. Hence, the yen could rebound, especially against the euro, the commodity currencies, and EM currencies if there is a further global growth scare in the near term. Owning some yen can therefore stabilize portfolio returns during tough times. As we discussed earlier, we would avoid the EM asset class, including currency exposure, until global growth firms. Commodities: Ms. X: Once again, you made a good call on the energy price outlook a year ago, with prices moving higher for most of the year. But the recent weakness in oil seemed to come out of nowhere, and I must admit to being confused about where we go next. What are your latest thoughts on oil prices for the coming year? BCA: The fundamentals lined up in a very straightforward way at the end of 2017. The coalition we have dubbed OPEC 2.0 – the OPEC and non-OPEC producer group led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – outlined a clear strategy to reduce the global oil inventory overhang. The producers that had the capacity to increase supply maintained strict production discipline which, to some analysts, was still surprising even after the cohesiveness shown by the group in 2017. Outside that core group output continued to fall, especially in Venezuela, which remains a high-risk producing province. The oil market was balanced and prices were slowly moving higher as we entered the second quarter of this year, when President Trump announced the U.S. would re-impose oil export sanctions against Iran beginning early November. The oft-repeated goal of the sanctions was to reduce Iranian exports to zero. To compensate for the lost Iranian exports, President Trump pressured OPEC, led by KSA, to significantly increase production, which they did. However, as we approached the November deadline, the Trump Administration granted the eight largest importers of Iranian oil 180-day waivers on the sanctions. This restored much of the oil that would have been lost. Suddenly, the market found itself oversupplied and prices fell. As we move toward the December 6 meeting of OPEC 2.0 in Vienna, we are expecting a production cut from the coalition of as much as 1.4mm b/d to offset these waivers. The coalition wishes to keep global oil inventories from once again over-filling and dragging prices even lower in 2019. On the demand side, consumption continues to hold up both in the developed and emerging world, although we have somewhat lowered our expectations for growth next year. We are mindful of persistent concerns over the strength of demand – particularly in EM – in 2019. Thus, on the supply side and the demand side, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets is higher than it was at the start of 2018. Nonetheless, our base-case outlook is on the optimistic side for oil prices in 2019, with Brent crude oil averaging around $82/bbl, and WTI trading $6/bbl below that level (Chart 43). Chart 43Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Ms. X: I am skeptical that oil prices will rebound as much as you expect. First, oil demand is likely to falter if your view that global growth will continue slowing into early 2019 proves correct. Second, U.S. shale production is rising briskly, with pipeline bottlenecks finally starting to ease. Third, President Trump seems to have gone from taking credit for high equity prices to taking credit for low oil prices. Trump has taken a lot flack for supporting Saudi Arabia following the killing of The Washington Post journalist in Turkey. Would the Saudis really be willing to lose Trump’s support by cutting production at this politically sensitive time? BCA: Faltering demand growth remains a concern. However, note that in our forecasts we do expect global oil consumption growth to slow down to 1.46mm b/d next year, somewhat lower than the 1.6mm b/d growth we expect this year.  In terms of the U.S. shale sector, production levels over the short term can be somewhat insensitive to changes in spot and forward prices, given the hedging activity of producers. Over the medium to longer term, however, lower spot and forward prices will disincentivize drilling by all but the most efficient producers with the best, lowest-cost acreage. If another price collapse were to occur – and were to persist, as the earlier price collapse did – we would expect a production loss of between 5% and 10% from the U.S. shales.  Regarding KSA, the Kingdom needs close to $83/bbl to balance its budget this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates. If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. President Trump’s insistence on higher production from KSA and the rest of OPEC is a non-starter – it would doom those economies to recession, and stifle further investment going forward. The U.S. would also suffer down the road, as the lack of investment significantly tightens global supply. So, net, if production cuts are not forthcoming from OPEC at its Vienna meeting we – and the market – will be downgrading our oil forecast. Ms. X: Does your optimism regarding energy extend to other commodities? The combination of a strong dollar and a China slowdown did a lot of damage to industrial commodities in 2018. Given your view that China’s economy should stabilize in 2019, are we close to a bottom in base metals? BCA: It is too soon to begin building positions in base metals because the trade war is going to get worse before it gets better. Exposure to base metals should be near benchmark at best entering 2019, although we will be looking to upgrade along with other risk assets if Chinese policy stimulus ramps up. Over the medium term, the outlook for base metals hinges on how successfully China pulls off its pivot toward consumer- and services-led growth, away from heavy industrial-led development. China accounts for roughly half of global demand for these base metals. Commodity demand from businesses providing consumer goods and services is lower than that of heavy industrial export-oriented firms. But demand for commodities used in consumer products – e.g., copper, zinc and nickel, which go into stainless-steel consumer appliances such as washers and dryers – will remain steady, and could increase if the transition away from heavy industrial-led growth is successful. Gasoline and jet fuel demand will also benefit, as EM consumers’ demand for leisure activities such as tourism increases with rising incomes. China is also going to be a large producer and consumer of electric vehicles, as it attempts to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although timing the production ramp-up is difficult, in the long term these trends will be supportive for nickel and copper. Mr. X: You know I can’t let you get away without asking about gold. The price of bullion is down about 5% since the end of 2017, but that is no worse than the global equity market and it did provide a hedge against economic, financial or political shocks. The world seems just as risky as it did a year ago, so I am inclined to hold on to our gold positions, currently close to 10% of our portfolio. That is above your recommended level, but keeping a solid position in gold is one area where my daughter and I have close agreement regarding investment strategy. BCA: Gold did perform well during the risk asset corrections we had in 2018, and during the political crises as well. The price is not too far away from where we recommended going long gold as a portfolio hedge at the end of 2017 ($1230.3/oz). We continue to expect gold to perform well as a hedge. When other risk assets are trading lower, gold holds value relative to equities and tends to outperform bonds (Chart 44). Likewise, when other risk assets are rising, gold participates, but does not do as well as equities. It is this convexity – outperforming on the downside but participating on the upside with other risk assets – that continues to support our belief that gold has a role as a portfolio hedge. However, having 10% of your portfolio in gold is more than we would recommend – we favor an allocation of around 5%. Chart 44Hold Some Gold As A Hedge OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Geopolitics Ms. X: I’m glad that the three of us agree at least on one thing – hold some gold! Let’s return to the geopolitical situation for a moment. Last year, you correctly forecast that divergent domestic policies in the U.S. and China – stimulus in the former and lack thereof in the latter – would be the most investment-relevant geopolitical issue. At the time, I found this an odd thing to highlight, given the risks of protectionism, populism, and North Korea. Do you still think that domestic policies will dominate in 2019? BCA: Yes, policy divergence between the U.S. and China will also dominate in 2019, especially if it continues to buoy the U.S. economy at the expense of the rest of the world. Of course, Beijing may decide to do more stimulus to offset its weakening economy and the impact of the trade tariffs. A headline rate cut, cuts to bank reserve requirements, and a boost to local government infrastructure spending are all in play. In the context of faltering housing and capex figures in the U.S., the narrative over the next quarter or two could be that the policy divergence is over, that Chinese policymakers have “blinked.” We are pushing back against this narrative on a structural basis. We have already broadly outlined our view that China will not be pressing hard to boost demand growth. Many of its recent policy efforts have focused on rebalancing the economy away from debt-driven investment (Chart 45). The problem for the rest of the world is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As such, efforts to boost domestic consumption will have limited impact on the rest of the world, especially as emerging markets are highly leveraged to “old China.” Chart 45Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the Trump-Democrat gridlock could yield surprising results in 2019. President Trump is becoming singularly focused on winning re-election in 2020. As such, he fears the “stimulus cliff” looming over the election year. Democrats, eager to show that they are not merely the party of “the Resistance,” have already signaled that an infrastructure deal is their top priority. With fiscal conservatives in the House all but neutered by the midterm elections, a coalition between Trump and likely House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could emerge by late 2019, ushering in even more fiscal stimulus. While the net new federal spending will not be as grandiose as the headline figures, it will be something. There will also be regular spending increases in the wake of this year’s bipartisan removal of spending caps. We place solid odds that the current policy divergence narrative continues well into 2019, with bullish consequences for the U.S. dollar and bearish outcomes for EM assets, at least in the first half of the year. Mr. X: Your geopolitical team has consistently been alarmist on the U.S.-China trade war, a view that bore out throughout 2018. You already stated that you think trade tensions will persist in 2019. Where is this heading? BCA: Nowhere good. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Sino-American relationship has been our premier geopolitical risk since 2012. The Trump administration has begun tying geopolitical and strategic matters in with the trade talks. No longer is the White House merely asking for a narrowing of the trade deficit, improved intellectual property protections, and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Now, everything from surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea to Beijing’s “Belt and Road” project are on the list of U.S. demands. Trade negotiations are a “two-level game,” whereby policymakers negotiate in parallel with their foreign counterparts and domestic constituents. While Chinese economic agents may accept U.S. economic demands, it is not clear to us that its military and intelligence apparatus will accept U.S. geopolitical demands. And Xi Jinping himself is highly attuned to China’s geopolitical position, calling for national rejuvenation above all. We would therefore downplay any optimistic news from the G20 summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. President Trump could freeze tariffs at current rates and allow for a more serious negotiating round throughout 2019. But unless China is willing to kowtow to America, a fundamental deal will remain elusive in the end. For Trump, a failure to agree is still a win domestically, as the median American voter is not asking for a resolution of the trade war with China (Chart 46). Chart 46Americans Favor Being Tough On China OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Could trade tensions spill into rising military friction? BCA: Absolutely. Minor military skirmishes will likely continue and could even escalate. We believe that there is a structural bull market in “war.” Investors should position themselves by being long global defense stocks. Mr. X: That is not encouraging. What about North Korea and Iran? Could they become geopolitical risks in 2019? BCA: Our answer to the North Korea question remains the same as 12 months ago: we have seen the peak in the U.S.’ display of a “credible military threat.” But Iran could re-emerge as a risk mid-year. We argued in last year’s discussion that President Trump was more interested in playing domestic politics than actually ratcheting up tensions with Iran. However, in early 2018 we raised our alarm level, particularly when staffing decisions in the White House involved several noted Iran hawks joining the foreign policy team. This was a mistake. Our initial call was correct, as President Trump ultimately offered six-month exemptions to eight importers of Iranian crude. That said, those exemptions will expire in the spring. The White House may, at that point, ratchet up tensions with Iran. This time, we will believe it when we see it. Intensifying tensions with Iran ahead of the U.S. summer vacation season, and at a time when crude oil markets are likely to be finely balanced, seems like folly, especially with primary elections a mere 6-to-8 months away. What does President Trump want more: to win re-election or to punish Iran? We think the answer is obvious, especially given that very few voters seem to view Iran as the country’s greatest threat (Chart 47). Chart 47Americans Don’t See Iran As A Major Threat OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Let’s turn to Europe. You have tended to dismiss Euroskeptics as a minor threat, which has largely been correct. But don’t you think that, with Brexit upon us and Chancellor Angela Merkel in the twilight, populism in continental Europe will finally have its day? BCA: Let’s first wait to see how Brexit turns out! The next few months will be critical. Uncertainty is high, with considerable risks remaining. We do not think that Prime Minister May has the votes in the House of Commons to push through any version of soft Brexit that she has envisioned thus far. If the vote on the U.K.-EU exit deal falls through, a new election could be possible. This will require an extension of the exit process under Article 50 and a prolonged period of uncertainty. The probability of a no-deal Brexit is lower than 10%. It is simply not in the interest of anyone involved, save for a smattering of the hardest of hard Brexit adherents in the U.K. Conservative Party. Put simply, if the EU-U.K. deal falls through in the House of Commons, or even if PM May is replaced by a hard-Brexit Tory, the most likely outcome is an extension of the negotiation process. This can be easily done and we suspect that all EU member states would be in favor of such an extension given the cost to business sentiment and trade that would result from a no-deal Brexit. It is not clear that Brexit has emboldened Euroskeptics. In fact, most populist parties in the EU have chosen to tone down their Euroskepticism and emphasize their anti-immigrant agenda since the Brexit referendum. In part, this decision has to do with how messy the Brexit process has become. If the U.K. is struggling to unravel the sinews that tie it to Europe, how is any other country going to fare any better? The problem for Euroskeptic populists is that establishment parties are wise to the preferences of the European median voter. For example, we now have Friedrich Merz, a German candidate for the head of the Christian Democratic Union – essentially Merkel’s successor – who is both an ardent Europhile and a hardliner on immigration. This is not revolutionary. Merz simply read the polls correctly and realized that, with 83% of Germans supporting the euro, the rise of the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany (AfD) is more about immigration than about the EU. As such, we continue to stress that populism in Europe is overstated. In fact, we expect that Germany and France will redouble their efforts to reform European institutions in 2019. The European parliamentary elections in May will elicit much handwringing by the media due to a likely solid showing by Euroskeptics, even though the election is meaningless. Afterwards, we expect to see significant efforts to complete the banking union, reform the European Stability Mechanism, and even introduce a nascent Euro Area budget. But these reforms will not be for everyone. Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe will be left on the outside looking in. Brussels may also be emboldened to take a hard line on Italy if institutional reforms convince the markets that the core Euro Area is sheltered from contagion. In other words, the fruits of integration will be reserved for those who play by the Franco-German rules. And that could, ironically, set the stage for the unraveling of the European Union as we know it. Over the long haul, a much tighter, more integrated, core could emerge centered on the Euro Area, with the rest of the EU becoming stillborn. The year 2019 will be a vital one for Europe. We are sensing an urgency in Berlin and Paris that has not existed throughout the crisis, largely due to Merkel’s own failings as a leader. We remain optimistic that the Euro Area will survive. However, there will be fireworks. Finally, a word about Japan. The coming year will see the peak of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s career. He is promoting the first-ever revision to Japan’s post-war constitution in order to countenance the armed forces. If he succeeds, he will have a big national security success to couple with his largely effective “Abenomics” economic agenda – after that, it will all be downhill. If he fails, he will become a lame duck. This means that political uncertainty will rise in 2019, after six years of unusual tranquility. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that 2019 could be even more turbulent for financial markets than the past has been. I accept your opinion that a major global economic downturn is not around the corner, but with valuations still stretched, I feel that it makes good sense to focus on capital preservation. I may lose out on the proverbial “blow-off” rally, but so be it – I have been in this business long enough to know that it is much better to leave the party while the music is still playing! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks surrounding the outlook have risen as we have entered the late stages of this business-cycle expansion. Yet, if global growth does temporarily stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful. The era of hyper-easy money may be ending, but interest rates globally are still nowhere near restrictive territory. This tells me that the final stages of this bull market could be very rewarding. A turbulent market is not only one where prices go down – they can also go up a lot! BCA: The debate you are having is one we ourselves have had on numerous occasions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term returns. While most assets have cheapened over the past year, prices are still fairly elevated. Table 4 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.9% over the next ten years, or 2.8% after adjusting for inflation. That is an improvement over our inflation-adjusted estimate of 1.3% from last year, but still well below the 6.6% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2018. Table 410-Year Asset Return Projections OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Our return calculations for equities assume that profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if underlying changes in the economy keep corporate profits elevated as a share of GDP. Structurally lower real interest rates may also justify higher P/E multiples, although this would be largely offset by the prospect of slower economic growth, which will translate into slower earnings growth. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot hinges on our view that monetary policy in the main economies stays accommodative. This seems like a safe assumption in the Euro Area and Japan, where rates are near historic lows, as well as in China, where the government is actively loosening monetary conditions. It is not such a straightforward conclusion for the U.S., where the Fed is on track to keep raising rates. If it turns out that the neutral interest rate is not far above where rates are already, we could see a broad-based slowdown of the U.S. economy that ripples through to the rest of the world. And even if U.S. monetary policy does remain accommodative, many things could still upset the apple cart, including a full-out trade war, debt crises in Italy or China, or a debilitating spike in oil prices. As the title of our outlook implies, 2019 is likely to be a year of increased turbulence. Ms. X: As always, you have left us with much to think about. My father has looked forward to these discussions every year and now that I am able to join him, I understand why. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That would be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The collision between policy and markets that we discussed last year finally came to a head in October. Rather than falling as they normally do when stocks plunge, U.S. bond yields rose as investors reassessed the willingness of the Fed to pause hiking rates even in the face of softer growth. Likewise, hopes that China would move swiftly to stimulate its economy were dashed as it became increasingly clear that the authorities were placing a high emphasis on their reform agenda of deleveraging and capacity reduction. The ongoing Brexit saga and the stalemate between the populist Italian government and the EU have increased uncertainty in Europe at a time when the region was already beginning to slow. We expect the tensions between policy and markets to be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Despite the deterioration in economic data over the past month, real final domestic demand is still tracking to expand by 3% in the fourth quarter, well above estimates of the sustainable pace of economic growth. Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar should peak midway next year. China will also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which will boost global growth. However, until both of these things happen, emerging markets will remain under pressure. For the time being, we continue to favor developed market equities over their EM peers. We also prefer defensive equity sectors such as health care and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the U.S. will outperform Europe and Japan for the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. A stabilization in global growth could ignite a blow-off rally in global equities. If the Fed is raising rates in response to falling unemployment, this is unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints begin to fully bite in early 2020 and inflation rises well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks will begin to buckle. This means that a window exists next year where stocks will outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks for now, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from current levels without a corresponding deteriorating in the economic outlook. Corporate credit will underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in spreads is unlikely as long as the economy is still expanding, but spreads could still widen modestly given their low starting point. U.S. shale companies have been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices are unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, over the next 12 months, we expect production cuts in Saudi Arabia will push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 26, 2018 ​​​​​​

Highlights So What? A collapse in Venezuelan oil production could cause Brent prices to average $92/bbl next year. Why? Venezuelan oil output is in freefall. Years of mismanagement constrain its production potential, severely denting government revenues. External debt is sky-high. Venezuela faces challenges in repaying its obligations. China and Russia are unlikely to provide the large-scale subsidies necessary to stabilize the regime over a long period. The United States is unlikely to lift sanctions anytime soon. Rather they may expand them. Feature "PDVSA is red, red from top to bottom." - Former Energy Minister Rafael Ramí­rez "It has been an interesting activity, working without payment." - Sergio Requensa, President of the Corporation of Intermediary Industries, on volunteer groups trying to boost oil output. Global oil prices have fallen by 28.5% since their peak on October 4. While the world awaits OPEC 2.0's meeting on December 6 in Vienna, it is important to remember that global spare capacity is low while serious supply risks loom in many corners of the world. One such risk is the deterioration of Venezuela's economic, political and social situation, which has already precipitated steady declines in oil production (Chart 1). The odds of halting or reversing this trend are razor thin. The Nicolás Maduro government has managed to hobble along, but there is no firm basis for projecting a stabilization either of the regime or oil output. Although it is possible that Venezuela will secure enough ad hoc funding to survive another year, we have no solid grounds for arguing that it will. Chart 1On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral In our dominant scenario of steadily declining Venezuelan output, we forecast Brent to average $82/bbl in 2019. The event of a complete collapse could push Brent prices as high as $92/bbl next year (Chart 2). Chart 2A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike Venezuelan Production In Freefall While Venezuelan authorities have stopped reporting official economic data, declining oil production offers clear evidence of a deepening crisis. Venezuela is a founding member of OPEC and was once one of the most prosperous Latin American countries. Decades of gross mismanagement have pushed the country into crisis. Estimated to hold the world's largest crude oil reserves (Chart 3), Venezuela's potential role in global oil markets is massive. Its oilfields have, in the past, accounted for 4% of global oil supply, but have dwindled down to 1% so far this year (Chart 4). Nevertheless, Venezuela's role should not be underestimated. Price risks could be to the upside - on the back of a collapse in output - or to the downside in the unlikely event of production restoration. For now, we project monthly declines will average 35k b/d over the coming year, ending at 681k b/d by the end of 2019. Chart 3Venezuala's Potential Is Unrivaled... Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Chart 4...But Not Captured By Its Dwindling Production Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Continued deterioration in supply comes on the back of decades of economic mismanagement at the hands of former President Hugo Chávez and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela. The failed 2002 coup attempt and related labor strikes at Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) - the state-owned oil and gas company - led to the firing of thousands of employees and their replacement with Chávez loyalists, Chavistas. This event politicized the country's economic engine, catalyzing a steady loss in capital and technical expertise. Furthermore, regulations imposed on the energy sector are unfavorable to international investors. For example, the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law stipulated a massive rise in royalties paid by foreign companies - increasing from a range of 1%-17% to 20%-30%. Today, taxes per barrel in Venezuela are the highest among the major producers and form the largest cost component per barrel of oil and gas (Chart 5). Chart 5High Tax Rate Is Unattractive Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Other damaging state actions include: A law requiring PDVSA to hold at least 60% equity in joint ventures with foreign firms investing in the Venezuelan oil sector; The nationalization of the Orinoco Belt - a highly fertile region home to the world's largest petroleum deposits; Government expropriation of foreign assets; Payment failures to international oil service companies. These events ultimately culminated in today's production freefall, which has continued despite the rebound in oil prices after 2015. Needless to say, falling revenues are deadly for petro states. Caracas relies on oil sales for 95% of the government's revenue. Falling rig counts are an ominous sign (Chart 6). Chart 6An Ominous Sign An Ominous Sign An Ominous Sign To make matters worse, export figures actually understate the dire economic situation. The U.S. EIA estimates that roughly half of Venezuela's oil exports are not generating cash! The Venezuelan government has mortgaged much of its production in exchange for loans from China and Russia in recent years. Under these loans-for-oil schemes, the government secured emergency funding to keep its ailing economy afloat, but sacrificed the long-term ability to ensure its own liquidity. This arrangement also includes shipments to the Vadinar refinery in India, which is owned by Russia's Rosneft (Chart 7). Chart 7U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue This leaves exports to the U.S. as the main source of revenue for the Venezuelan government. The result is a Catch-22: With fewer oil barrels to go around, Venezuela can either satisfy its foreign creditors to keep open the possibility of future lines of credit, or it can sell to the U.S. in return for badly needed cash. For the moment, Venezuela is opting for cash. Despite having been cut by ~20% since last year, exports to the U.S. appear to have hit a floor. According to EIA data, after coming in at 13.21mm bbl in February, they have rebounded slightly averaging 19mm bbl/month since June. This is occurring despite ongoing production declines. This is ultimately unsustainable, as the evidence of mismanagement goes beyond production facilities: A breakdown in domestic refining facilities has necessitated an increase in Venezuela's imports of U.S. crude. The lighter oil is needed as a diluent - to blend with Venezuela's heavy crude, facilitating transportation. This is forcing Venezuela's economy to divert scarce hard currency to these imports. In fact, imports have picked up even amid declining oil production and the deepening economic crisis. Earlier this year, PDVSA's Caribbean assets fell under risk of being handed over to ConocoPhillips as compensation for Chavez's 2007 nationalization of Conoco's facilities. These Caribbean assets include storage facilities, refineries, and export terminals on the islands of Bonaire, Curacao, St. Eustatius, and Aruba. Terminals there account for 17% of the company's exports - mainly destined for Asia (Table 1). To prevent this transfer, Venezuela has agreed to pay the American company $2 billion in compensation, $345 million of which has been paid. If these payments cannot be met, the Caribbean assets will be in jeopardy once again - and Conoco is by no means the only company preparing lawsuits to claim assets in the event of further defaults. Table 1Caribbean Assets At Risk Of Seizure Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Similarly, CITGO - PDVSA's U.S. refiner and crown jewel - is at risk to being handed over to creditors. A loss of control of CITGO would disrupt one of the most reliable sources of cash for Venezuela. While U.S. sanctions prevent CITGO from sending dividends to Venezuela, it is so far still allowed to purchase Venezuelan crude. CITGO's assets include three U.S. refineries with a total capacity of 750k b/d. To complicate matters, several creditors are claiming stakes in the refiner: Crystallex International, a Canadian mining company whose Venezuelan assets were nationalized in 2011, is making claims on CITGO. In August, a U.S. federal judge ruled in favor of Crystallex, giving it permission to seize shares of PDV Holding Inc., which owns CITGO. However, the judge also issued a temporary stay on Crystallex - which is planning to auction the shares - until an appeal is decided. If the appeal is in favor of Crystallex it will encourage additional asset grabs by aggrieved foreign companies. PDVSA has offered bond investors a 51% claim on CITGO to push back maturing payments to 2020. The remaining 49% of CITGO was put up as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan from Rosneft. The risk - which intensifies with each missed payment - is that as Venezuela defaults on its debts, more of its facilities will be seized, further reducing its production, refining, and export potential. This would ultimately accelerate the total collapse of Venezuelan output. Bottom Line: Venezuelan oil production is steadily crumbling. Almost two decades of mismanagement have preceded this outcome and, as such, it cannot be reversed easily. We expect monthly declines to average 35k b/d, with the probability of a complete collapse in output rising with each passing day. A Macroeconomic Mess Venezuelans today are paying the price for the unsustainable external debt amassed over the past decade (Chart 8). Estimates of external debt place it around a staggering $150-$200 billion! Sovereign and PDVSA bonds due next year are estimated to be about $9 billion (Chart 9). This does not even account for payments due from other forms of debt (Table 2). Chart 8Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Chart 9It's Payback Time Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Table 2Yikes! Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Total reserves leave little room for optimism (Chart 10). They now stand at less than $10 billion, down from $43 billion less than a decade ago. Chart 10Reserves Cannot Lend Support Reserves Cannot Lend Support Reserves Cannot Lend Support In projecting the country's ability to make payments in 2019, we looked at several oil-price and production scenarios. All scenarios point to default, as shown in Table 3. Even in the optimistic scenario in which production is flat (which is highly unlikely given that it has been declining at an average monthly rate of 47k b/d so far this year), the country needs $14.8 billion in foreign exchange reserves to cover rising PDVSA expenses plus debt-service costs and its total import bill. This will put Venezuela $6 billion in the red. Table 3All Roads Lead To Default Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop This forecast would become even more somber if we were to include payments due on other forms of debt (e.g. private bonds, loans, etc), for which there is no published repayment schedule. Stability is entirely out of reach for the Venezuelan government alone. Maduro's recovery plan announced earlier this year will do nothing to combat the root of the crisis. For instance, the launch of a cryptocurrency - the "petro" - that is backed by five billion barrels of oil reserves, to which the bolivar will be pegged, is not a viable solution.1 In fact, Venezuela's policy options are extremely limited. Only a massive show of support from China and Russia can realistically bring about a substantial improvement. This would require a commitment to pay: (1) debt servicing and import costs; (2) the operating costs of PDVSA and the funds needed to preserve CITGO and other critical assets; (3) the funding of new investment required to revive the oil sector. Over the past decade, China and Russia have provided loans worth ~ $60 billion and ~ $20 billion, respectively. Of these loans, an estimated $28.1 billion and $9.1 billion remain outstanding for China and Russia, respectively.2 Venezuela has paid off not quite half of its debts to these powerful patrons. The last Chinese loan was in 2016. China stopped the credit tap throughout 2017 and most of 2018 amid Venezuelan instability. While China expressed its intention to extend a $5 billion loan in September, this amount is small by comparison with the double-digit billions of loans and direct investment that China provided annually from 2009-15. It would not cover Venezuela's shortfall of funding in our three scenarios even if it were devoted entirely to paying immediate obligations. Moreover, the Chinese loan has not been finalized.3 Thus, China's diplomatic "return" to Venezuela suggests that Beijing is not willing to provide the large-scale subsidies necessary to stabilize the regime over a long period. Indeed, China's state oil firm Sinopec has joined other foreign companies in suing Venezuela for unpaid debts!4 Moreover, Chinese and Russian funds are hardly likely to exceed the large amount invested over the past decade - and those amounts did not prevent Venezuela from falling into its current crisis. Russia is no longer capable of fully financing a satellite state in the way the Soviet Union financed Cuba in the twentieth century. It is hoping that China will foot most of the bill. While China is probably able to do so in cash terms, it is so far unwilling to pay the strategic price of setting up a Soviet-style power struggle with the United States in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.5 Indeed, plowing tens of billions of additional dollars into Venezuela may be unwise if the U.S. reverts back to its tried and tested strategy of directly intervening in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries. Venezuela, being in South America and on the Atlantic coast, is too far away for China to secure in the event of a showdown with the United States. As such, Beijing must understand that any investment in Venezuela could one day become stranded capital in a traditionally American sphere of influence. In fact, China is concentrated on building its own sphere of influence in Asia. While Venezuela is nominally part of the expansive Belt and Road Initiative, the latter is ultimately directed at making China's outward investment more coherent and expanding influence on the Eurasian continent. Neither of these aims is all that favorable for Venezuela. While China certainly wants privileged access to Venezuelan oil, it does not "need" Venezuelan crude for supply security in the way that is often implied. It frequently re-sells the oil on global markets. Nevertheless, Russia and China can offer debt restructuring and relief. Out of the $9 billion outstanding that is owed to Russia, Moscow has agreed to restructure $3.15 billion to be paid over ten years. Other such restructuring deals could be forthcoming (although, notably, China did not agree to a restructuring when Maduro visited in September). Restructuring will not work with U.S. bondholders. The U.S. imposed sanctions on August 24, 2017 seem to prevent U.S. holders of Venezuelan bonds from participating in such arrangements. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control is unlikely to lift sanctions anytime soon.6 More likely, the United States will expand sanctions, as U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton indicated in a speech in Miami on November 2. There he dubbed Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua the "troika of tyranny" in the western hemisphere. Possible sanctions include: First, the Trump administration has moved to restrict purchases of Venezuelan gold, as the government has been increasing exports to Turkey (and likely China).7 Trump is considering putting Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which will cut off aid and loans. Second, the financial sanctions announced in 2017 could be expanded to cover existing debts, the trading of government and PDVSA bonds on secondary markets, and CITGO's newly issued debt - all areas that the Department of Treasury has so far exempted. Third, sanctions on tanker insurance could impede Venezuela's ability to transport its oil to international destinations. Venezuela does not have the tanker capacity to ship its own oil. Fourth, in the most extreme case, restrictions on U.S. imports of crude oil could punish the Maduro administration. The U.S. is reluctant to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and deal with its second-round effects. But it could ultimately use its leverage as importer to insist that its companies are compensated, one way or another, for Venezuelan defaults. Technically alternative buyers could absorb Venezuela's heavy crude, but the loss of the U.S.'s cash-generating imports would pile more pressure onto an already wobbling regime. Bottom Line: Venezuela has been relying on ad hoc funding to survive thus far. Loans in exchange for oil are now eating up its revenues. President Maduro's recovery plan does not address the root causes of the ongoing macroeconomic mess. All scenarios point to insolvency. A Regime Change Is In Order Hyperinflation and the absence of basic necessities have left Venezuelans pessimistic about their country's future (Chart 11). This is not surprising: A staggering 87% of households are estimated to be below the national poverty line, most of whom are in extreme poverty. GDP per capita is half the level it was only a decade ago (Chart 12). These are the ingredients of a revolutionary brew. Chart 11The Outlook Isn't Rosy The Outlook Isn't Rosy The Outlook Isn't Rosy Chart 12Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half The deepening humanitarian and economic crisis is causing one of the largest outflows of emigrants in recent years. According to the United Nations, 2.6 million Venezuelans live abroad and 1.9 million of them have left since 2015 (Chart 13). Chart 13Venezuelans Are Fleeing Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop The crisis has naturally translated into a massive shift in public opinion against the regime (Chart 14). Maduro's reelection for a second term in May occurred in an environment in which the opposition boycotted the elections and voter turnout was reported at just 46.1%, hardly half of the 80% rate in 2013. Venezuelans have also lost faith in the armed forces and police, which have buttressed the current regime (Chart 15). Chart 14Maduro Lacks Support Maduro Lacks Support Maduro Lacks Support Chart 15Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Opposition parties do not have the power to force a transition to a new government, but under today's extreme circumstances they are not as divided as they were in the past. They all support regime change, domestic resistance, and international pressure. All have refused to participate in any dialogue unless it is to discuss the terms of Maduro's resignation. This means that a fracture within the regime, or an external factor like U.S. action, could tip the balance. Could a military coup provide the way out of the current morass? Ultimately, yes, in the sense that the military is the ultimate arbiter of Venezuelan society over the course of history. But short-term investors should not hold their breath. The Maduro regime has managed to survive as long as it has by ceding ever more power to the army, meaning that, in a sense, the coup has already occurred. Food distribution and oil production are now directly under the control of the military. Once the regime becomes completely fiscally defunct, military leaders may pin the blame on Maduro and reshape or expunge the Socialist Party. The timing, however, is nearly impossible to predict other than to emphasize that the current situation is unsustainable and we do not believe that Beijing will ride to the rescue. One foreboding sign is that Maduro has authorized hikes to domestic gasoline prices, which are heavily subsidized. A hike of this nature prompted the Caracazo social unrest in 1989, which helped motivate the attempted coups of 1992. Another option may be direct U.S. action. While the U.S. has been reluctant to intervene in Latin America since the short-lived, albeit successful, 1989 intervention in Panama, President Trump did raise the idea of a "military option" in August 2017.8 While Trump's comments were largely ignored, and subsequently opposed by the Pentagon itself, the reorientation of U.S. policy towards confronting China may convince the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment to view Venezuela through the prism of a new Cold War. As such, and especially if the humanitarian crisis grows, investors should not completely dismiss the possibility of a U.S. military-backed coup in Venezuela.9 Bottom Line: Opposition parties are not as divided as they were in the past, in a sign that the current regime is failing to maintain control. Given the unsustainability of the economic situation and the military's ever-growing role, odds are in favor of an army takeover at some point. The relevant takeaway for investors is that things will have to get worse before that occurs - adding pressure on global oil supply and leading to additional debt defaults. Investment Implications Declining Venezuelan oil production will continue weighing on global supply. We model monthly production declines of 35kb/d as the dominant scenario in our supply-demand balances. On this basis, we expect Brent to average $82/bbl in 2019 and WTI to trade $6/bbl below that. A complete collapse in Venezuelan production next year could push prices much higher - up to $92/bbl and $86/bbl for Brent and WTI, respectively. While an eventual production collapse is inevitable, Venezuela may be able to hobble along for another year through ad hoc funding. Thus, a premium will be priced into global oil markets in 2019 on the back of falling Venezuelan production - and the risk of its collapse. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Associate pavelb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The U.S. is already considering sanctions targeting the cryptocurrency. Please see Franco Ordonez, "Top lawmakers in Congress push tough new measures against Venezuela," September 24, 2018, available at www.mcclatchydc.com. For the text of an earlier proposal please see "Venezuela Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, and Rule of Law Act of 2018," introduced into the Senate by Senator Robert Menendez (D, NJ) on the foreign relations committee, S. 3486 at www.congress.gov. 2 Please see "Venezuela: Deuda externa per capita del sector público," Prodavinci, available at especiales.prodavinci.com. 3 Please see "China y Rusia desconfían del régimen chavista y aumentan la supervisión de sus inversiones en Caracas," PD América, October 31, 2018, available at www.periodistadigital.com. 4 Please see Jonathan Wheatley, "Sinopec settles with Venezuela's PDVSA, ending 5-year dispute," Financial Times, December 12, 2017, available at www.ft.com. 5 The Monroe Doctrine was reinforced specifically in relation to Venezuela by the "Roosevelt Corollary" in 1902-03. Recently the United States has reasserted the Monroe Doctrine in the face of a widespread perception that China has gained strategic ground on the continent, namely in Venezuela. Please see Vice President Mike Pence, "Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China," the White House, October 4, 2018, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 6 On the contrary, sanctions are expanding. Please see U.S. Treasury Department, "Treasury Targets Venezuelan President Maduro's Inner Circle and Proceeds of Corruption in the United States," September 25, 2018, available at home.treasury.gov. 7 Please see the White House, "Executive Order Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," November 1, 2018, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 8 Please see Jeremy Diamond, "Trump asked advisers about invading Venezuela in 2017," CNN, July 5, 2018; and Dan Merica, "Trump says he won't rule out military option in Venezuela," CNN, August 11, 2017, both available at www.cnn.com. 9 Even the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, has refused to rule out any options, including military intervention. Pro-Maduro commentators have claimed that the U.S., along with Colombia and other enemies of the regime, supported the apparent attempt to assassinate Maduro by drones in August this year. Please see "Venezuela President Maduro survives 'drone assassination attempt,'" BBC, August 5, 2018, available at www.bbc.com. The New York Times has also reported that the Trump administration sent officials to "listen" to rebel Venezuelan military officers proposing a coup attempt. Please see Ernesto Londono and Nicholas Casey, "Trump Administration Discussed Coup Plans With Rebel Venezuelan Officers," NYT, September 8, 2018, available at www.nytimes.com. We Read (And Liked)... The Great Leveler: Violence And The History Of Inequality From The Stone Age To The Twenty-First Century Professor Walter Scheidel's opus - The Great Leveler - introduces the "Four Horsemen" of equality: warfare, revolution, state collapse, and pandemics.10 These four factors, he argues, explain all significant levelling of wealth and income throughout history. And by history, Scheidel really means all of human history. The thesis behind The Great Leveler is that only through the "aid" of the Four Horsemen has wealth ever been distributed more evenly in human societies. In every grand passage in history, one of the four terrible afflictions has tipped the scales away from capital and landholders and in favor of laborers. Otherwise, when there is not war, revolution, state collapse, or pandemics, capital and landholders acquire sufficient wealth and political capital to stave off any attempts at leveling. Scheidel's focus on World War I and II is particularly interesting. He controversially argues that the prosperity and equality that prevailed in the western world after these wars was to a great extent the product of government measures imposed in order to win the conflict. These included nationalization, direct intervention in production, fiscal policy, and inflationary monetary policy. Mass mobilization necessary to wage and win a total war left western societies, and Japan, "levelled" by the time the wars ended. BCA Research was honored to have Professor Scheidel attend our annual Investment Conference in Toronto this September. In the talk, he warned the room full of investors to "be careful what you wish for," since the suppression of inequality has "only ever brought forth sorrow." Furthermore, Scheidel rejected the hypothesis that wealth and income inequality bring about their own demise. They usually grow unchecked until one of the Four Horsemen appears exogenously. The takeaway from Scheidel's work is that income and wealth inequality are, according to the scales of human history, essentially part of human existence. As such, one should neither fret too much about them nor worry that they will lead to serious efforts to curb them. There are two weaknesses in this argument. First, the book is primarily a treatise on medieval history. The vast amount of empirical evidence that Scheidel has carefully collected occurred before societies became democratic, and specifically before universal suffrage. While Scheidel focuses on the effects of the world wars in the twentieth century as the causes of modern leveling, he barely mentions the role played by the spread of the electoral franchise during and after the conflicts. And it is true that democracy has not prevented the rise of income inequality in much of the developed world since the 1980s - that is, since the laissez-faire revolution. However, the end to that story is yet to be written. Which brings us to the second weakness: Scheidel dismisses GINI coefficient data on income inequality. It does not support his thesis. For example, his tables show that the "market GINI" of many western European countries is as high as that in the United States. However, after accounting for redistributive effects, it is in many cases significantly lower. Instead, Scheidel focuses on the wealth accruing to the top 1%. But again, continental European countries have experienced much lower concentration of wealth than the laissez-faire economies of the U.K. and the United States. Yes, there is growth in concentration even in the social democracies of Europe, but it is at a much slower pace than in the countries that have been the most committed adherents of the Reagan-Thatcher revolution. The greatest failing of Scheidel's thesis is that it lacks nuance when it comes to the modern era. Its parsimony over the course of human history is astounding and commendable - it is what makes this a true magnum opus of social science. However, the real world is rarely as parsimonious. The facts are quite different from the theory. Chart 1 shows that the wealth accruing to the top 10% of income distribution in France was higher in the 1950-1970 era than in the U.S., and much higher than in the United Kingdom. Then, the supply-side revolution took hold in the Anglo-Saxon world, while France pursued policies that sought to reverse the causes of the May 1968 social angst. The shift in wealth distribution was jarring. Chart 1No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy From this one example we can draw two conclusions. First, Scheidel is wrong when he says that the march of income inequality is inevitable. It clearly has not been in western Europe in recent memory. Second, Scheidel is also wrong when he argues that the march of income inequality is irreversible. France was once a right-of-center country ruled by elites who saw revenues accrue to their capital and wealth holdings. Then, all hell broke loose in the country, with teenage Baby Boomers joining up with common workers in a (relatively) bloodless socialist revolution. Rather than adopt laissez-faire capitalism with vigor, French policymakers adopted wealth and income taxes that reversed the rising share of income accruing to the top 10%. Only today, after decades of a deliberately orchestrated and significant leveling, are policymakers in France looking in a different direction. Scheidel claims that his book is pessimistic, but that of course depends on the audience. Our audiences tend to be made up of investors, i.e. of savers. As such, Scheidel's thesis is in fact joyous! A historical opus that proves, without a doubt, that income inequality is irreversible short of apocalypse!? Sounds too good to be true! It is. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 10 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 504 pages.

Highlights The October credit and housing market data present a gloomy picture for Chinese domestic demand. Trade remains buoyant, but exports are set to decline materially over the coming months. Many investors are focused too much on external demand and not enough on Chinese domestic demand. China's old economy has been deteriorating for two years, and it is unlikely that exchange rate depreciation alone will reverse this trend. A review of the drivers of credit growth during China's last mini-cycle upswing underscore that the country's monetary transmission mechanism is impaired. This suggests that investors are exposed to fiscal and regulatory policy inertia, as well as time lags once policymakers decide to aggressively stimulate. Chinese stocks may present an excellent buying opportunity over the coming year, but that point has not yet been reached. Stay neutral for now. Feature China's October trade data (released earlier this month) was a frustrating one for investors, as it revealed that market participants will have to wait even further for clarity on the magnitude and duration of the upcoming shock to exports. The strong October trade data has even led to some market participants questioning whether export growth will decelerate at all, a view that we strongly disagree with. It is true that there is no direct reason to expect that the impact of U.S. import tariffs will affect China's non-U.S. exports. But Chart 1 shows that Chinese exports to the U.S. are currently running above the pace that would be predicted by the overall trend in U.S. non-oil imports, a circumstance that is highly unlikely to continue in the face of mutual tariff imposition. Negative export "alpha" would imply a growth rate materially below the dotted line in Chart 1. As such, even though Chinese exports to the U.S. account for only 20% of total exports, the impact of an eventual "reversion to fundamentals" is likely to substantially effect the overall trend in Chinese export growth. Chart 1Export Frontrunning To The U.S. Continues Export Frontrunning To The U.S. Continues Export Frontrunning To The U.S. Continues Given the integrated nature of global trade, persistently strong export growth is also very likely supporting imports. Chart 2 shows that import growth has been closely correlated with domestic industrial activity since 2010, but is now running approximately 10-12 % above would normally be expected. This implies that China's overall trade momentum will weaken considerably over the coming months, which is likely to reverberate through key trade linkages in emerging markets and commodity-producing developed markets. Chart 2Current Import Growth Appears Unsustainable Current Import Growth Appears Unsustainable Current Import Growth Appears Unsustainable October's credit data was also highly significant, as it validated the view that we espoused in our recent report.1 We noted in response to the September credit release that a surge in the 3-month rate of change of adjusted total social financing (TSF) was driven by front-loaded fiscal spending that would not last. Chart 3 shows that special local government bond issuance in October fell by 650 bn RMB relative to the prior month, suggesting that (net) new fiscal stimulus will be required in order for local government bond issuance to materially boost overall credit growth. Chart 3September Was Not The Start Of A New Trend In LG Bond Issuance September Was Not The Start Of A New Trend In LG Bond Issuance September Was Not The Start Of A New Trend In LG Bond Issuance Finally last week's housing data release highlighted that residential sales and construction momentum is faltering (Chart 4), which was likely triggered in part by prior reductions in the PBOC's pledged supplementary lending (PSL) program. We noted in a September Special Report that the pullback in the PSL would negatively impact the housing market on a cyclical basis,2 and October's data certainly supports this view. Chart 4The Housing Market Slowed In October The Housing Market Slowed In October The Housing Market Slowed In October Don't Pin Any Hopes On A Trade "Ceasefire" Against this gloomy economic backdrop market participants have actually been incrementally positive about China over the past few weeks, in anticipation of a possible détente with the U.S. Last week's flurry of optimism about an apparently meaningful resumption in trade talks were somewhat diminished by comments from President Xi and Vice President Pence at the APEC summit over the weekend, but our geopolitical strategists believe that the odds of a short-term "tariff ceasefire" occurring at the G20 summit later this month are genuinely non-trivial (possibly as high as 30-40%). We define a "ceasefire" in this case as a commitment to refrain from any further protectionist action during a renewed period of negotiations, not an immediate and substantive deal that ends the trade war. We agree that any positive actions on the trade front are likely to lead to a short-term boost to Chinese stock prices (and global risk assets more generally). But the key question for investors is whether this will lead to a durable rally lasting several months. In our opinion, three factors argue against this view: A ceasefire probably will not lead to an agreement: There is no indication that either the U.S. or China has changed their positions concerning the dispute, with China reportedly having simply restated their previous offer in advance of the G20 summit. On the U.S. side, attempts to restart negotiations may reflect the desire to give China "one last chance" before moving to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports, which the administration may be planning as a rhetorical counter to any domestic pushback from rising consumer goods prices (the "Walmart effect"). A ceasefire will not roll back tariffs already in place: It is unlikely that the U.S. would impose tariffs on all remaining imports from China (the "third round") while negotiations are taking place. But a near-term shock to Chinese exports is still likely, because the existing tariffs on the first and second round would not be rolled back until a deal is successfully negotiated. It is even possible (albeit unlikely) that the administration will move ahead with the planned increase in the second round tariff to 25% at the end of the year despite the presence of negotiations. A ceasefire alone will not reverse the ongoing slowdown in Chinese domestic demand: The trade war between the U.S. and China is occurring against a backdrop of weaker Chinese domestic demand, a point that we have highlighted numerous times over the past year. As shown in Chart 2 above, the growth momentum of China's old economy peaked well before the trade war began, and a temporary "stay of execution" on the trade front is unlikely to change the downtrend in domestic activity. This last point is important, as it appears that many global investors are focused almost exclusively on China's negative external demand outlook and not nearly enough on weak domestic demand. Chart 5 vividly illustrates this point, by contrasting our new Market-Based China Growth Indicator with our leading indicator for the Li Keqiang Index. Our market-based China Growth Indicator is very similar to the highly informative China Play Index created by BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy service to hedge against a possible countertrend correction in the U.S. dollar,3 but it is somewhat broader, has four asset class subcomponents, and has been built on a deviation from trend basis (see Box 1 for a description). Chart 5The Market Has Lagged The Macro Data Over The Past Three Years The Market Has Lagged The Macro Data Over The Past Three Years The Market Has Lagged The Macro Data Over The Past Three Years Box 1 Introducing The BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator Chart A1 presents the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator, along with its four asset class subcomponents: currencies, commodities, equities, and rates/fixed-income. The purpose of the indicator is to act as a broad proxy of investor expectations for Chinese growth, and to illustrate which asset classes are providing the strongest/weakest growth signals. Chart A1Investors Are Incrementally Positive, But Rates Caution Against Over Optimism Investors Are Incrementally Positive, But Rates Caution Against Over Optimism Investors Are Incrementally Positive, But Rates Caution Against Over Optimism Table A1 presents a list of the series included in each of the asset class subcomponents, all of which were tested to ensure that they were coincident or lead the Bloomberg Li Keqiang index. The indicator is made up of an equally-weighted average of the four asset class subcomponents, and each series is equally-weighted within its respective subcomponent (meaning that the 17 series do not have equal weights in the overall indicator). Table A1Components Of The BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator Trade Is Not China's Only Problem Trade Is Not China's Only Problem Chart A1 highlights that the commodity and equity subcomponents are currently providing the most positive signals, whereas the currency component is in line with the overall indicator. The rates component, which provided the earliest warning sign this cycle that Chinese growth was likely to decelerate, remains the weakest element of the indicator and has not been rising over the past few weeks (in contrast to the other components). The chart shows that price signals from China-related assets generally followed or even anticipated our LKI leading indicator prior to 2015, but that the reverse has been true over the past three years. The gap between the two indicators became extreme earlier in the year, and only closed once investors began to react to the emergence of the trade war. But the key point from the chart is that trade is not China's only problem, as our LKI leading indicator shows that Chinese monetary conditions, money, and credit growth have been deteriorating for the better part of the past two years. Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String? One bullish China narrative that currently prevails in the marketplace is that the odds of "big bang" stimulus rise materially in lockstep with any further deterioration in the macro data. Most recently, several China analysts have speculated that the PBOC will soon cut its benchmark policy rate, which would be an unmistakable sign that the monetary policy dial has been turned towards "maximum reflation". Ultimately, we agree with the view that investors hold a put option issued by the Chinese government, but we have strenuously argued that the strike price is considerably lower than many think. On top of this, investors face another risk, namely a circumstance where the exercise price of the China put is even lower than the government intends it to be. This situation could arise if the PBOC decides to fire its bazooka, but the resulting decline in interest rates does not materially boost credit growth. Such a scenario prevailed in the U.S. several years following the global financial crisis, when many investors characterized the Fed's efforts to boost (or at least stabilize) credit growth as "pushing on a string". Chart 6 illustrates that this actually occurred in China during its last mini-cycle upswing, raising the odds of a repeat incident that results in a meaningful lag between the approval of big bang stimulus and its reflationary effect on financial markets. The chart shows the annual change in total social financing as a share of 4-quarter trailing GDP, including and excluding local government bond issuance (both measures exclude equity financing). Chart 6No Major Acceleration In "Standard" Credit Growth In 2015-2016... No Major Acceleration In "Standard" Credit Growth In 2015-2016... No Major Acceleration In "Standard" Credit Growth In 2015-2016... While adjusted TSF excluding local government bonds technically accelerated as a share of GDP from 2015 to late last year, the rise was tepid at best (in contrast to the 2012/2013 episode). It is clear from the chart that most of the acceleration in overall credit during the 2015/2016 period came from a surge in local government bond issuance, not from "standard" credit. This is an important observation, given that interest rates declined significantly over the period (Chart 7). Chart 7...Despite A Substantial Easing In Monetary Policy ...Despite A Substantial Easing In Monetary Policy ...Despite A Substantial Easing In Monetary Policy From a theoretical perspective, an atypical divergence between interest rates and credit growth can occur either because of abnormal loan demand or loan supply. Chart 8 suggests that it was the latter in China in 2015/2016: loan demand reportedly rose for small/micro, medium, and large enterprises (particularly among small/micro), but the trend in loan approval barely budged (unlike in 2011/2012 when it rebounded sharply). In short, Chart 8 provides support for the view that Chinese banks did not meaningfully ease lending standards during the 2015/2016 episode, despite a substantial easing in monetary policy and (ultimately) a substantial improvement in economic conditions. Chart 8Loan Demand Responded To Lower Rates, But Lending Standards Did Not Loan Demand Responded To Lower Rates, But Lending Standards Did Not Loan Demand Responded To Lower Rates, But Lending Standards Did Not Chart 9 highlights that this almost certainly occurred because of a sharp deterioration in reported bank asset quality that began in 2014. The chart shows that both the non-performing loan and special mention loan ratios rose significantly during this period, the sum of which has only modestly declined. We highlighted the potential for NPL recognition to weigh on credit growth in our two-part joint Special Report with BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service,4 as long as the ongoing financial regulatory crackdown is even half-heartedly implemented. While Chart 8 shows that loan approval modestly ticked higher in Q3, it provides no evidence of stealth easing in financial regulation. Chart 9Banks Did Not Rush To Lend Because Of Deep Concerns Over Asset Quality Banks Did Not Rush To Lend Because Of Deep Concerns Over Asset Quality Banks Did Not Rush To Lend Because Of Deep Concerns Over Asset Quality The key conclusion for investors from these observations is as follows: while China can certainly decide to stimulate aggressively in response to too-weak economic conditions, an impaired monetary transmission mechanism implies that there may be a lag, possibly a substantial one, between the decision to stimulate and its reflationary impact on financial markets. This is of crucial importance to investors aiming to maximize risk-adjusted returns over a 6-12 month time horizon, and weighs heavily on our recommendations. Investment Strategy Recommendations Chart 10 shows our Li Keqiang leading indicator within its component range, a chart that remains at the core of our efforts to predict China's business cycle. The indicator has been built in such a way that a decision of policymakers to push for more local government bond issuance (like in 2015/2016), or an improvement in the efficacy of China's monetary transmission mechanism, are likely to be captured by one or more of its components. Chart 10Only A Narrow Pickup In Our LKI Leading Indicator Only A Narrow Pickup In Our LKI Leading Indicator Only A Narrow Pickup In Our LKI Leading Indicator As we noted in our November 7 Weekly Report,5 the rise in the indicator has been driven by its two monetary conditions components, which have in turn mostly been driven by the substantial weakness in the RMB over the past four months. Given that the ultimate impact of the U.S. tariffs on Chinese exports remains obscured by trade frontrunning, it is unclear if China's exchange rate depreciation will be sufficiently reflationary even to counter the upcoming export shock, let alone reverse the ongoing domestic demand slowdown. As a result, investors should be closely watching for signs of a pickup in money & credit growth, which for now remain absent. Put differently, macrofundamental support for the equity market is lacking. Despite this, Chart 11 highlights that both Chinese A-shares and the investable market are deeply oversold, which in combination with expectations of further monetary stimulus and the potential for a tariff ceasefire have many investors chafing at the bit to go long either market (or both!) over a 6-12 month time horizon. Chart 11Chinese Stocks Are Quite Oversold... Chinese Stocks Are Quite Oversold... Chinese Stocks Are Quite Oversold... Our advice is simply to wait. A trade ceasefire is unlikely to generate more than a short-term boost to stock prices, and our indicators provide the best bet to monitor whether an impaired banking system is responding to any further easing in monetary policy. Finally, while we agree that stocks have priced in a meaningful decline in earnings, that earnings adjustment process has yet to even begin. Chart 12 illustrates the point where Chinese stocks bottomed in relation to the last major decline in earnings, suggesting that stocks need both a valuation discount and earnings clarity before putting in a durable bottom. The latter is missing and may stay missing for several months, highlighting that an outright long position remains premature. Stay tuned! Chart 12...But We Have Yet To Even Begin The Earnings Adjustment Process ...But We Have Yet To Even Begin The Earnings Adjustment Process ...But We Have Yet To Even Begin The Earnings Adjustment Process Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Is China Making A Policy Mistake?", dated October 31, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?", dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus", dated August 3, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 4 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?", dated August 8, 2018, and "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two", dated August 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Checking In On The Data", dated November 7, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Dear Client, Barring any major market developments, we will not be sending you a report next week. Instead, I will be working with my colleagues on BCA's Annual Outlook, which will be published on Monday, November 26. The outlook will feature a wide-ranging discussion with Mr. X and his daughter Ms. X on the key themes that we see shaping global markets in 2019. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The stock market correction has further to run. We would turn more bullish if global equities were to drop another 8% from current levels. A mundane economic identity - savings minus investment equals the current account balance - provides deep market insight into the workings of the global economy. The U.S. economy is suffering from a shortage of savings, which will push up interest rates and the value of the dollar. In contrast, China has a surfeit of savings. Rectifying this will require a weaker yuan. The political impasse between the EU and Italy over next year's budget will be resolved. However, the fact that Italy lacks a readily available outlet for its excess private-sector savings could spell doom for the euro area down the road. Feature The Correction Ain't Over Our MacroQuant model continues to signal downside risks for global equities over the coming weeks (Chart 1). The model is flagging a deterioration in a variety of leading economic indicators, both in the U.S. and abroad, which tends to be bearish for stocks (Chart 2). Global financial conditions have also tightened since the summer due to the rise in government bond yields, higher credit spreads, and a firmer dollar. Chart 1MacroQuant* Model Suggests Caution Is Still Warranted S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy Chart 2Global Growth Indicators Are Deteriorating Global Growth Indicators Are Deteriorating Global Growth Indicators Are Deteriorating Sentiment remains reasonably upbeat, a bearish contrarian indicator. The November Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey revealed that a net 31% of managers were still overweight global stocks. Past major bottoms in 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2016 all saw equity allocations fall into underweight territory. Strikingly, EM allocations rose in November, with a net 13% of fund managers overweight the asset class. This is in stark contrast to 2015 when a net 30% of fund managers were underweight EM stocks. We do not expect the correction which began in October to morph into a full-fledged bear market. Nevertheless, the near-term path of least resistance for stocks remains to the downside. We would only upgrade global equities to overweight if the MSCI All-Country World index were to fall another 8% from current levels, consistent with a price of $64 on the ACWI ETF. At that level, the forward P/E on the index would be back to 2013 levels (Chart 3). Chart 3A Valuation Reset A Valuation Reset A Valuation Reset A Key Macro Identity One of the first identities undergraduate economics students learn is S-I=CA: The difference between what a country saves and invests is equal to its current account balance.1 While it is easy to dismiss this identity as yet another abstract concept that only egghead economists would find interesting, it has real-world implications for investors of all stripes. To see this, it is useful to expand the identity a bit. Total savings is just the sum of private-sector and public-sector savings. Thus, we can write: Private-sector savings = fixed asset investment + government budget deficit + current account balance In other words, the savings that the private sector generates must either be recycled into investment, soaked up by the government through a budget deficit, or exported abroad via a current account surplus. This relationship always holds ex post. But what happens if it does not hold ex ante? Then "something" must adjust to make the relationship hold. In a normal environment, this "something" is interest rates. If there is a shortfall of private-sector savings - that is, if the right-hand side of the equation above exceeds the left-hand side - an increase in rates can restore the identity by encouraging private savings, discouraging investment, and potentially making it more difficult for the government to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy. Higher rates will also produce a stronger currency, leading to a deterioration in the current account balance. The exact opposite will happen if there is an excess of private-sector savings. What happens if there is excessive savings but the central bank cannot lower interest rates either because it lacks monetary independence - i.e., when a country has a currency peg - or because monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal short-term rates? In that case, employment will decline. One cannot save if one does not have a job that generates income. In practice, this can lead to a vicious circle where falling employment causes households to try to save more for precautionary reasons, while discouraging companies from investing in new capacity. The resulting increase in desired savings is likely to lead to further declines in employment. Keynes referred to this outcome as the paradox of thrift: A situation where one person's desire to save more leads to a collective decline in savings because aggregate income shrinks. Let's turn to what all this means for investors today. The U.S.: Trump's Fiscal Policy Is Inconsistent With His Trade Goals The IMF estimates that the U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit will reach 5.6% of GDP next year. The results of the midterm elections are unlikely to change this outcome. While the takeover of the House of Representatives by the Democrats will preclude Congress from passing another round of tax cuts, our geopolitical strategists believe that there is a better than 50% chance that a bipartisan deal will be reached to increase infrastructure spending.2 They point out that Nancy Pelosi mentioned infrastructure five times during her election night address, without mentioning impeachment once. Recent data on U.S. capital spending has been on the soft side (Chart 4). Core capital goods orders have decelerated and capex intention surveys have come off their highs. Residential investment has also been weak, as reflected in declining housing starts and building permits. Chart 4Both Residential And Nonresidential Investment Have Softened Both Residential And Nonresidential Investment Have Softened Both Residential And Nonresidential Investment Have Softened We would tend to fade the weakness in capital spending (Chart 5). The ISM industrial capacity utilization rate is near cycle highs. Rising wages will incentivize firms to substitute labor with capital, leading to more investment spending. The downside risk to home building is also limited, given that residential investment stands at only 3.9% of GDP, well below the high of 6.7% reached in 2005. If anything, the U.S. is not churning out enough fixed capital, as evidenced by the fact that the average age of the capital stock has risen swiftly over the past decade. As my colleague Doug Peta likes to say, you don't get hurt falling out of a basement window. Chart 5Running Out Of Spare Capacity Running Out Of Spare Capacity Running Out Of Spare Capacity Meanwhile, the personal savings rate stands at over 6%, significantly higher than what one would expect based on its typical relationship with household net worth (Chart 6). Chart 6U.S. Household Savings Rate Is High Relative To Wealth S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy The identity described at the outset of this report implies that the trade balance will necessarily deteriorate if the savings rate falls, investment rises, and the budget deficit remains elevated. If President Trump strikes a trade deal with China, he will have no one to blame for a larger U.S. trade deficit. Hence, he has little incentive to make a deal. Protectionism remains popular in the U.S. Midwest, the battleground on which the next presidential election will be fought. Democrat Sherrod Brown won the Ohio Senate race by 6.4% - a state that Trump carried by 8.1% - on a highly protectionist platform. Trump simply cannot afford to go soft on one of his signature issues. China: What To Do With Excess Savings? The slowdown in Chinese growth this year has been concentrated in domestic demand (Chart 7). Exports have held up well. In fact, Chinese exports to the U.S. are up 13% in dollar terms in the first ten months of the year compared with the same period last year. Chart 7China's Domestic Economy Is Weakening China's Domestic Economy Is Weakening China's Domestic Economy Is Weakening Unfortunately, judging from the steep drop in the export component of the Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the coming months (Chart 8). This makes it all the more important for the Chinese authorities to prop up domestic growth. Chart 8China's Export Outlook Is Dire China's Export Outlook Is Dire China's Export Outlook Is Dire China has historically stimulated its economy through debt-financed fixed-investment spending (Chart 9). This made eminent sense when China needed more factories, infrastructure, and modern housing. However, now that China has all this in spades, it is looking for different stimulus options. Chart 9China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Have Gone Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Have Gone Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Have Gone Hand In Hand Our formula reveals what those other options must be. If China wants to reduce investment spending to a more sustainable level, it must either boost consumption, increase the fiscal deficit, or raise net exports. Given a hostile export backdrop, it is therefore no surprise that the Chinese government has been cutting taxes, increasing social transfer payments, and letting the currency slide. The problem is that none of these other forms of stimulus are beneficial to the rest of the world, and in some cases, they may be quite detrimental. The rest of the world relies on Chinese investment, not Chinese consumption. Raw materials and capital goods comprise 80% of Chinese imports. China represents close to half of the world's demand for aluminum, copper, zinc, nickel, and steel (Chart 10). Whether it be services or manufactured goods, what Chinese households consume is generally produced in China. Chart 10China Is The Predominant Source Of Global Demand For Metals China Is The Predominant Source Of Global Demand For Metals China Is The Predominant Source Of Global Demand For Metals A weaker yuan will make the Chinese economy more competitive, but at the expense of other emerging markets. A weaker yuan will also raise the price of imported goods, leading to a lower volume of imports. The implication is that both the magnitude and composition of China's stimulus may disappoint. This week's much weaker-than-expected credit and money data - new CNY loans clocked in at RMB 697 billion in October, well below consensus expectations of RMB 905 billion - validates this view. Italy: Getting To "Yes" Is The Easy Part The showdown between Italy's populist leaders and the EU continues. The Lega-Five Star coalition government promised big tax cuts and generous increases in social spending. It is loath to backtrack on its campaign pledges so soon after the election. As long as there is no contagion from Italy to the rest of Europe, the EU has no incentive to back off. While it will never admit it, the EU establishment would love nothing more than to humiliate the Italians in order to dissuade voters across Europe from electing populist politicians. In the end, we expect the Italian government to give in to the EU's demands. Business confidence has plunged (Chart 11). The economy is again teetering on the brink of recession. Italy's banking system would be technically insolvent if the ten-year BTP yield were to rise above 4% based on a mark-to-market accounting of Italian bank holdings of government debt. Chart 11Italy: Is The Economy Heading For Another Dip? Italy: Is The Economy Heading For Another Dip? Italy: Is The Economy Heading For Another Dip? A political resolution to the ongoing crisis would provide short-term relief. However, it may not solve Italy's problems - indeed, it could exacerbate them. Italy's working-age population is shrinking (Chart 12). This has made companies reluctant to expand capacity. Meanwhile, households are busily saving for retirement. Their motivation to save more would only be amplified by the cuts to pension benefits that the previous caretaker government promised and that the EU is insisting be implemented. The overall private-sector financial balance - the difference between what the private sector saves and invests - reached a surplus of 5.1% of GDP in 2017 (Chart 13). Chart 12The Italian Workforce Is Shrinking S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy S-I=CA In The U.S., China, And Italy Chart 13Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Our formula shows that counterbalancing this private-sector surplus will require a persistent government fiscal deficit or current account surplus. Italy's primary budget balance - its overall budget balance excluding interest payments - hit 1.7% of GDP in 2017 (Chart 14). This primary surplus is necessary to cover the 3.6% of GDP in interest payments that the government has to make, a number that will only rise if the ECB raises rates (hence, our high-conviction view that the ECB will have to keep rates low for years to come). Chart 14Italy Needs A Primary Budget Surplus Italy Needs A Primary Budget Surplus Italy Needs A Primary Budget Surplus Italy runs a modest current account surplus of 2% of GDP. However, its current account balance would be far smaller, and perhaps even negative, if the economy were operating at full employment since stronger domestic demand would suck in more imports. Italy would love to copy Germany, a country which habitually over-saves but exports its excess savings to the rest of the world through a gargantuan 8% of GDP current account surplus. Alas, achieving a larger current account surplus would require either a currency depreciation or productivity-enhancing structural reforms. The former is impossible as long as Italy is a member of the euro area, while the latter has proven to be wishful thinking for as long as people have talked about it. We do not expect Italy to default on its debt or jettison the euro in the near term. But when the next synchronized global downturn arrives - probably in about two years or so - all hell could break loose. Concluding Thoughts An economy facing a shortfall in savings is one where desired spending exceeds income. When the economy has spare capacity, such a savings shortfall is a good thing; it means more demand, more employment, and ultimately, more income. However, once spare capacity is soaked up, a shortage of savings will lead to higher inflation. The U.S. finds itself in the latter situation today. The output gap is fully closed, but growth remains above trend. As we have discussed in past reports, the Fed is likely to raise rates more than the market expects.3 This will lead to higher Treasury yields and a stronger dollar. With that in mind, we are raising our end-year target on our long DXY trade recommendation from 98 to 100, implying another 3% increase from current levels. In the absence of offsetting Chinese stimulus, a stronger dollar will put further pressure on emerging markets. EM equities will likely bottom in the first half of next year once the dollar peaks and global growth stabilizes. Until then, investors should overweight DM stocks relative to their EM peers. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 National savings, S, is equal to Y-C-G, where Y is national income and C and G are household and government consumption, respectively. Substituting this identity into the standard Y=C+I+G+X-M equation yields S-I=X-M. National income includes net foreign earnings. In this case, the trade balance, X-M, is equal to the current account balance. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast," dated November 7, 2018. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Bears Maul Goldilocks," dated October 12, 2018; and "The Next U.S. Recession: Waiting For Godot?" dated October 5, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades