Highlights A financial market riot point remains likely over the coming few months to force policymakers, including those in China, to address the economic weakness that a full-tariff scenario will entail. The near-term outlook is bearish for China-related assets, but investors should stay cyclically bullish in anticipation of a strong reflationary response. It is not clear whether further monetary easing will occur over the coming year, given that monetary conditions have already eased substantially. But an RRR cut coupled with a benchmark lending rate cut is now a real possibility, and would signal that the monetary policy dial has been turned to “maximum stimulus”. Monthly credit growth needs to be approximately 2.8-3 trillion RMB per month in May and June in order to be consistent with a 2015/2016-magnitude policy response. May’s number may fall short of this, but that would set up June as a make-it or break-it month for credit creation. Chinese credit growth surged in 2012, but economic activity did not significantly accelerate. A repeat of this scenario is a risk to our cyclically bullish stance, but three reasons suggest it is not likely to occur. Investors should stay long USD-CNH over the cyclical horizon despite warnings from Chinese policymakers not to short the RMB. Feature Tensions between China and the U.S. have worsened materially over the past two weeks, in line with our view that an actual trade agreement this year (not just continued negotiations) is much less likely. The Huawei blacklist, stalled negotiations, a sharp escalation in preparatory nationalist rhetoric in China, and President Xi Jinping’s declaration in a Jiangxi province speech that the country is embarking on a new “Long March”1 significantly diminishes the possibility of a deal that addresses the U.S.’ structural concerns. Chart 1A Market Riot Point Is Coming This implies that any agreement would require President Trump to capitulate and accept a temporary deal relating simply to the balance of trade between the two countries. It is possible that this occurs over the coming 6-12 months (in time for Trump to attempt a declaration of victory before the 2020 election), but it is not likely to occur before real economic (and thus financial market) pain arrives. This supports our view that a major financial market riot point is likely over the coming few months to force policymakers, including those in China, to address the economic weakness that a full-tariff scenario will entail (Chart 1). Given this, we would not recommend a long position in Chinese stocks, either in absolute terms or relative to the global benchmark, for investors with a time horizon of less than 3 months. However, over a strictly cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) time horizon, we would recommend staying long/overweight Chinese stocks (in hedged currency terms) on the basis that policymakers will ultimately respond as needed, lest they face an unstable deceleration in economic activity that may become difficult to stop. In this week’s report we address the following three questions facing China-exposed investors over the coming year, before concluding with a brief note about the RMB: Can the PBOC provide more of a reflationary impulse if needed, and if so, how? How can investors tell whether policymakers are stimulating as required from the monthly credit data? What are the odds that China will stimulate aggressively and the economy does not meaningfully reaccelerate? How Can The PBOC Ease Further? We argued in our May 15 Weekly Report that a 2015/2016-magnitude policy response will again be required in order for policymakers to be confident that the upcoming trade shock will be overcome.2 In our view, this response, instead of aggressive and broad-based bank lending, will likely have to come in the form of quasi-fiscal spending, e.g. a significant increase in infrastructure-oriented local government bond issuance (which we include as “credit” in our adjusted total social financing calculation). However, we have received several questions from clients asking about the outlook for monetary policy in a full-tariff scenario, particularly the question of what the PBOC can do to provide even more of a reflationary response. Most investors would simply assume that the PBOC would cut interest rates even further, and this is certainly a possible outcome over the coming year. But even if the PBOC were to cut interest rates, it is not always clear to investors what rate should or will be cut. Confusion surrounding China’s monetary policy landscape has been high ever since the PBOC established an interest rate corridor system in 2015, and a review of what has occurred over the past 2½ years is warranted in order to better understand the implications of future policy decisions. A 2015/2016-magnitude policy response will again be required in order for policymakers to be confident that the upcoming trade shock will be overcome. Chart 2The Simple (But Incomplete) View Of China's New Monetary Regime Chart 2 outlines how China’s new monetary regime is officially described by the PBOC. The benchmark lending rate, China’s “old” policy rate that established a base regulated rate for banks to price their loans, was replaced in 2015 with a corridor system. The target rate in this system is the 7-day interbank repo rate, which can be seen in Chart 2 is often at the low end of the corridor. However, we explained in a February 2018 Special Report why Chart 2 is only half of the story.3Charts 3 - 5 show the other half: Chart 3 shows that while the 7-day repo rate rose in late-2016 and 2017, the rise was fairly small (on the order of 60 basis points). By contrast, the 3-month repo rate surged, which appears to have been caused by macro-prudential policy changes aimed at severely curtailing the issuance of wealth management products by non-depository financial institutions. Chart 4 highlights that there is a strong (and leading) relationship between changes in China’s 3-month interbank repo rate and 1) changes in the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate and 2) changes in the gap between the weighted-average interest rate and the benchmark rate. Chart 5 shows that China’s weighted average interest rate can be successfully modelled by a regression on the benchmark lending rate and the 3-month interbank repo rate. Chart 3The 3-Month Repo Rate Has Been More Important Than The 7-Day Chart 4A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates And Economy-Wide Rates The relationships shown in Charts 3 - 5 are weaker if the 3-month repo rate is replaced with the 7-day rate, highlighting that while the latter is the new de jure policy rate in China, the former has been the de facto policy and market-driven lending rate among banks and non-financial institutions over the past 2½ years. Chart 5The Benchmark Lending And 3-Month Repo Rates Explain Effective Lending Rates Our framework for examining China’s monetary policy environment leads us to conclude that there are three things the PBOC can do to meaningfully ease further, were they to decide to do so: The most impactful action that the PBOC could take is to cut the benchmark lending rate. While banks in China are no longer required to price loans in reference to the benchmark rate, in practice many still do. Roughly 2/3rds of loans in China have been priced at an interest rate above the benchmark over the past year, and Chart 5 noted that the weighted average interest rate is a direct function of the benchmark rate. As such, a cut to the benchmark rate is likely to feed directly into lower lending rates. Chart 3 showed that the substantial spread between the 3-month and 7-day repo rates that prevailed from late-2016 to mid-2018 has all but disappeared, implying that the PBOC cannot lower interest rates much further by dialing back on macro-prudential regulation. Instead, if it wants interbank rates to fall meaningfully, lowering the corridor around the 7-day rate by cutting the floor (the PBOC’s 7-day reverse repo rate) will likely be required. This would be carried out with further reductions to the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Third, while Chart 5 showed that our model for the weighted average lending rate has done a very good job over the past few years, it is clear that a gap has opened up between the actual rate and that predicted by the model. The most likely explanation of this gap is that it is due to a risk premium applied by banks, possibly in response to the re-orientation of riskier funding demands that had previously been fulfilled by the shadow banking sector to on-balance sheet loans from depository institutions. It is not clear what policy tools are at the PBOC’s disposable to reduce the gap, but doing so has the potential to lower average interest rates by a non-trivial amount. The relative easiness of monetary conditions is the key difference between today and 2012. It is not clear yet which option the PBOC will pursue over the coming year or whether further monetary easing will occur, but an RRR cut coupled with a benchmark lending rate cut is now a real possibility. If it happens, it would be a clear signal for investors that the monetary policy dial has been turned to “maximum stimulus”. Inferring Reluctance Or Capitulation From Monthly Credit Growth The second issue that investors will be wrestling with over the coming few months relates to the question of whether the month-to-month pace of credit growth is consistent with the magnitude of the reflationary response that we believe will be required. To the extent that significantly more monetary easing occurs over the coming year, it is likely to have happened because policymakers were overly reluctant to green-light a renewed and substantial re-acceleration in credit growth and were then forced to fight a destabilizing slowdown in the economy. Chart 6A Strong Credit Response Will Be Required In Response To A Full Tariff Scenario We have used the metric of new credit to GDP as the primary method to judge the relative size of previous credit booms, and have argued that a return to 30% on this measure will likely be required in response to a full 25% tariff scenario (Chart 6). Unfortunately, China’s unique seasonality patterns and the lack of official seasonally adjusted data make it difficult for investors to judge whether incoming credit data is consistent with the required policy response. Previously, we have shown seasonally adjusted measures of credit using a simple application of X12 ARIMA, the statistical seasonal adjustment program used by the U.S. Census Bureau. But Charts 7 and 8 present a different approach. The charts show the average cumulative amount of adjusted total social financing as the calendar year progresses, along with a ±0.5 standard deviation band, based on the 2010 to 2018 period. The thick black line in both charts shows the progress in new credit creation this year, assuming an 8% annual nominal GDP growth rate for the remainder of the year. Chart 7 shows the cumulative progress in credit assuming a 27% new credit to GDP ratio for the year (corresponding to a half-strength credit cycle relative to past episodes), whereas Chart 8 assumes 30%. In our view, these charts are revelatory. First, Chart 7 provides evidence that policymakers have been reluctant to allow credit growth to surge. The chart shows that credit growth ran well above a half-strength credit cycle pace in the first quarter of the year; following this, through either administrative controls or jawboning, policymakers lowered the pace of credit growth in April such that it moved back within the range. By contrast, Chart 8 highlights that the pace of Q1 credit growth was exactly right in a 30% new credit to GDP scenario, and that April fell short. In order to be back within the range by June, Chart 8 suggests that monthly credit growth needs to be on the order of 2.8-3 trillion RMB per month in May and June, just a slightly slower pace than what investors observed in March. It is quite possible that May’s credit number will fall short of 2.8-3 trillion RMB, given that the increase in the second round tariffs only occurred on May 10 and that Chinese policymakers have so far seemed reluctant to pull the trigger. But this also heightens the risk of a serious near-term selloff in the domestic equity market, and would set up June as a make-it or break-it month for credit creation. Stimulus Without A Recovery? Revisiting The 2012 Scenario Chart 9The 2012 Scenario: Strong Credit, But A Modest Improvement In Activity A final question facing investors this year is whether it is possible that the Chinese economy fails to respond to strong efforts by policymakers to stimulate the economy. Chart 9 shows that a similar situation occurred in 2012; while the surge in new credit to GDP did stabilize economic activity and caused a modest uptrend, the economic improvement was much smaller than what the relationship shown in the chart would imply. In our view, there are three reasons to believe that a 2012 scenario will not repeat itself: First, Chart 10 shows that the Q1 rebound in new credit to GDP appears to have halted the decline in investment-relevant Chinese economic activity. There is no basis to suggest that an uptrend in activity has begun, but the fact that the economy has even started to respond to the pickup in credit growth is a positive sign. Second, Chart 11 highlights one important difference between 2012 and today. The chart shows that our leading indicator for China’s economy did not rise as much as new credit to GDP, and that this occurred because monetary conditions remained relatively tight from the beginning of 2012 all the way through to early-2015. This relative tightness in monetary conditions occurred because of fairly elevated interest rates, and due to a persistent rise in the real effective exchange rate. However, the collapse in the weighted average lending rate following the 2015/2016 economic slowdown has eased monetary conditions in a lasting way, suggesting that a similar rise in new credit to GDP should have a strongly positive effect on Chinese economic growth. This also underscores our earlier point: monetary policy has already largely returned to 2015/2016 levels, meaning that it is fiscal/administrative action to boost credit growth that is missing. Third, Chart 12 highlights that the pace of inventory accumulation represents another key difference between the current economic environment and that of 2012. The chart shows that the change in China’s level of industrial inventories relative to exports (both measured in value terms) rose sharply in 2011 and 1H 2012, only to slow significantly over the following year (which may have weighed on the rebound in activity in 2012 and 2013). In contrast, the chart shows that inventories have recently been contracting at their fastest pace relative to exports since 2011, implying that the drag on production from potential destocking may be minimal. Chart 10A (Very) Tentative Sign Of Stabilization Chart 11Monetary Conditions Are Considerably Easier Today There are, however, two caveats to the above analysis. First, on the inventory front, Chart 12 shows that the level of industrial inventories to exports is fractionally higher than it was in 2012, even though it has declined significantly from its 2017 high. The level of inventories has been rising relative to exports for some time, and thus the “equilibrium” level is not clear. But to the extent that a prolonged trade war with the U.S. requires meaningfully lower inventory levels in China, then destocking may become more of a drag than we expect. Second, Chart 11 shows that while monetary conditions are much easier today than they were in 2012, money growth is much weaker. A weaker-than-expected recovery in Chinese economic activity is much more likely if money growth remains weak, although we cannot reasonably envision an outcome where credit growth surges and growth in the money supply does not. A Brief Note On The RMB We noted in our May 15 Weekly Report4 that a significant rise in new credit to GDP and a meaningful decline in the currency would be required to stabilize China’s economy if the U.S. proceeds with 25% tariffs on all imports from China. Consequently, we recommended that investors hedge the inherent RMB exposure from a long US$ cyclical position in Chinese stocks by opening a long USD-CNH trade, with the expectation that a break above 7 in the coming weeks was likely (Chart 13). Chart 12Inventories Have Been Meaningfully Reduced Chart 13In A Full Tariff Scenario, A Defense Of 7 Is Only A Near-Term Event Recently, Xiao Yuanqi, the spokesman for the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, was quoted as saying that “those who speculate and short the yuan will [surely] suffer heavy loss[es]”,5 which many investors took to mean that China will defend USD-CNY = 7 at all costs. In our view this may be true in the short-term, but is unlikely to occur over a 6-12 month time horizon in a full 25% tariff scenario. Policymakers have become much more attuned to sharp declines in the currency after the major episode of capital flight that occurred in 2015 and 2016, and are keen to ensure that any movements in the exchange rate are orderly. However, complete currency stability in the face of a major shock to the export sector means that the required rise in the “macro leverage ratio” to stabilize the economy will be even higher, highlighting that an orderly depreciation in the currency is the lesser of two evils. As such, we interpret these recent comments from policymakers as an attempt to prevent a breach in USD-CNY = 7 over the short-term, and an attempt to control the pace of decline over the longer term in a full-tariff scenario. The conclusion for investment strategy is that China-exposed investors should stay long USD-CNH over the cyclical horizon, but should limit the leverage of the position and should expect frequent short-term reversals. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Is Trump Ready For The New Long March?” dated May 24, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic,” dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy,” dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic,” dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Reuters News, “China’s top banking regulator says yuan bears will suffer ‘heavy losses’,” dated May 25, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations