Middle East

Investors should de-risk tactically in expectation of shocks and surprises ahead of the US election and an uncertain aftermath. Democratic victory with a gridlocked Congress is our base case but would bring minor tax hikes and nuclear brinksmanship with Russia. A Republican single-party sweep offers huge tax cuts but also a global trade war. Recession looms regardless.

Investors should buy protection against further volatility. The shakeup in early August was a taste of things to come. The US election is a pivotal moment in modern history that will drive up uncertainty, while other countries take advantage of US division and distraction.

The decision by GeoMacro team on July 2 to short USDJPY and underweight equities has proven to be prescient. We still do not like the market setup from here on out. A recession would, obviously, be negative for risk assets. But even if investors avoid that scenario, the transition from cash- to leverage-driven growth is unlikely without a significant Fed rate-cutting cycle.

The war in the Middle East is expanding, upgrading our subjective odds of a major oil supply shock to 37% and underscoring our 60% odds of Republican victory in November. Volatility should spike again as investors contemplate the prospect of rising oil prices amid slowing US and global growth. Tactically investors should stay overweight energy stocks relative to other cyclicals and favor oil producers in the Americas rather than Middle East.

Investors should overweight US assets and de-risk their portfolios in anticipation of a major increase in policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk surrounding the US election and its global ramifications.

In Section I, we examine some concerning signs of US economic weakness that emerged in June. We also discuss portfolio positioning in the face of falling interest rates and cross-check our recommended US equity overweight in the face of extremely optimistic expectations about AI’s impact on growth. We conclude that defensive positioning continues to be warranted. In Section II, we dig into those optimistic expectations for AI. We find that the US equity market is significantly overvalued unless the deployment of AI technology causes a 10-to-20 year productivity surge in line with what occurred during the IT revolution of the 1990s, with persistently high margins on the revenue generated from the improvement in growth. We doubt that AI will end up truly boosting economic activity by this magnitude.