Inflation/Deflation

Highlights A perfect storm has engulfed global energy markets. Strong economic growth, adverse weather conditions, and politically-induced supply disruptions have caused energy prices to surge. Fortunately, the global economy has become less vulnerable to energy shocks. Not only has the energy intensity of the global economy declined over the past few decades, but central banks are now less inclined to respond to higher energy prices by raising interest rates. Stock returns have been positively correlated with oil prices over the past decade. This suggests that equities can withstand the current level of oil prices. Markets are betting that energy prices will come down. Yet, given the diminished feedback loop between higher energy prices and slower economic growth, energy prices can stay elevated for longer than the market is discounting. We remain long the December 2022 Brent Crude futures contract as well as the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. Value stocks are a cheap and effective hedge against higher-than-expected inflation. A Perfect Storm For Energy Markets Global energy prices have soared (Chart 1). The price of crude, having fallen into negative territory in April 2020, currently trades at over $80 per barrel. Natural gas prices have jumped more than three-fold in the UK and across much of continental Europe since March. In the US, the price of natural gas has doubled. Chart 1Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Chart 2Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels   A perfect storm has driven up energy prices. The reopening of the global economy has supported energy demand. A surge in spending on goods has depleted inventories, forcing producers to ramp up output. Global industrial production is 8% higher than in January 2020 (Chart 2). Merchandise trade has recovered more quickly than expected (Chart 3). Chinese exports are up 28% from the start of the pandemic (Chart 4). Electricity consumption in China is running 7.5% above trend (Chart 5).   Chart 3World Trade Has Recovered Faster Than Expected The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 4China's Export Sector Is Booming China's Export Sector Is Booming China's Export Sector Is Booming Chart 5Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China   Weather has amplified the tightness in energy markets. A cold snap across the Northern Hemisphere this spring depleted natural gas supplies (Chart 6). Compounding the problem, a lack of wind reduced energy production by European wind farms, leading to a shift toward natural gas and coal for power generation. A hot summer in Northern Asia raised electricity demand. Flooding in China and Indonesia curbed coal output, while a drought in Brazil reduced hydroelectric generation. Chart 6Natgas Storage Remains Tight The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Political Factors Policy developments have contributed to the dislocations in energy markets. China has been trying to wean itself off coal, which still accounted for 63% of electricity generation in 2020 (Chart 7). For a while, Australian coal imports made up for the lack of domestic coal production, but those disappeared last year following a diplomatic row between the two nations (Chart 8). To fill the energy gap, China has stepped up purchases of natural gas from Russia. Chart 7China Has Been Trying To Shift Away From Coal The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 8A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories Never one to miss an opportunity, Russia has taken advantage of the natural gas shortage by pushing Germany to approve the newly completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The US$11 billion pipeline carries gas directly to Germany. Built under the Baltic  Sea, it bypasses Ukraine and thus deprives the NATO-allied government in Kyiv of as much as $2 billion a year in transit fees. The pipeline was backed by outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel and has the strong support of the German public (Chart 9). However, opposition from the US has kept the project in limbo. Texas Senator Ted Cruz has blocked approval for President Biden’s nominees to various departmental posts in an effort to halt the pipeline. Chart 9Germans Say "Ja" To Nord Stream 2 The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Cruz has justified his actions on foreign policy grounds. However, economics has probably also played a role: The US is Europe’s top supplier of liquefied natural gas. Texas exported 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas last year. It’s Not Just ESG Years of subpar investment in the energy sector have exacerbated the crisis. Globally, oil and gas capex is down 60% since 2014 (Chart 10). Proven global oil reserves increased by only 6% between 2010 and 2020, having risen by 26% over the preceding decade. Gas reserves followed a similar trajectory, increasing by only 5% between 2010 and 2020 compared to 30% over the prior ten years (Chart 11). It would be easy to blame ESG for this predicament, but the truth is that energy had been a lousy sector for investors until recently. The shares of global energy companies have risen just 25% since March 2009, compared to 315% for the MSCI All-Country World Index (Chart 12). Chart 10Energy Producers Have Not Been Investing Much In New Capacity The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 11Oil And Gas Reserves Have Barely Grown Over The Past Decade The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences   The Global Economy Is Less Dependent On Energy Could the jump in energy prices torpedo growth? It is possible, but the bar for an energy-induced recession is much higher than in the past. The energy intensity of the global economy has fallen steadily over time, especially in advanced economies. Today, the US generates three-times as much output for every joule of energy consumed than it did in 1970 (Chart 13). Chart 12Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Chart 13The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time   In the US, household spending on energy has declined from a peak of 8.3% of disposable income in 1980 to 3.5% in August 2021, the latest month of data. Chart 14When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production,The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production,The USA Is Now #1 While the recent run-up in energy prices will push up that number towards 4% in October, US consumers are well positioned to absorb the blow. Last week’s “disappointing” September jobs report saw private-sector employment rise by 317,000. Combined with an increase in the average length of the workweek, aggregate hours worked rose by 0.8% on the month – equivalent to 1,036,000 new private-sector jobs. Improved conditions for energy producers will also help insulate the US economy. The US now produces over 11 million barrels of oil per day, more than Saudi Arabia (Chart 14). Higher energy costs will exact more of a toll on European growth. However, as Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, recently argued, the region is likely to weather the storm given current strong growth momentum. Central Banks No Longer Fret Over Higher Oil Prices Helping matters is the fact that central banks are no longer responding to rising energy prices like they once did. Up until the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed would often lift rates whenever oil prices jumped (Chart 15). Since then, the Fed has looked through oil price fluctuations, a sensible strategy considering that core inflation is no longer highly correlated with oil prices (Chart 16). Chart 15Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Chart 16Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To Core Inflation No Longer Driven By Oil Prices Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To Core Inflation No Longer Driven By Oil Prices Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To     The ECB has also changed tack. Jean-Claude Trichet disastrously hiked rates when oil prices reached $140/bbl in 2008, just as the global economy was heading off a cliff. Having failed to learn from his mistake the first time around, he then pushed the ECB to raise rates two times in 2011, helping to set off the euro area debt crisis. Mario Draghi and Christine Lagarde have followed a different course. In her speeches, Lagarde has pushed back on any talk that the ECB will expedite policy normalization. “The lady isn’t tapering,” she said on September 9th, echoing Margaret Thatcher’s famous proclamation. Energy Prices Should Come Off The Boil, But Geopolitics And The Weather Are Wild Cards Chart 17US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels Looking out, a number of factors should help restore balance to the energy market. The US rig count, while still far below its 2014 highs, has doubled since last year (Chart 17). It usually takes 6-to-9 months for a newly deployed rig to start producing output. China has instructed 170 coal mines to expand capacity. It has also allowed utilities to charge higher prices, helping to stave off bankruptcies across the sector. In addition, it is releasing some Australian coal from storage, potentially a first step towards restarting imports. Still, there are many wild cards at play that could cause energy prices to rise further. In addition to uncertainty over Chinese energy policy and the ongoing dispute over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the situation in Iran remains volatile. Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, believes that Iran could secure enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear device by the end of the year. In his opinion, “a crisis over Iran is imminent.” Any disruption of Middle Eastern energy flows will add to global supply bottlenecks and price pressures. Furthermore, there is continued uncertainty about OPEC’s strategy. So far, OPEC and its partners have been reluctant to boost production. The general feeling among market participants is that OPEC would increase output if oil prices rose towards $100/bbl for fear that excessively high prices would expedite the adoption of electric vehicles. At this point, however, that electric horse has left the barn. OPEC may simply decide that it is better to wrangle out as much revenue from its reserves while they still have value. Weather also remains a wild card. The US Climate Prediction Center estimates that there is a 70%-to-80% chance that La Niña will return this winter. La Niña typically results in colder temperatures across much of Western and Northern Europe, which would lead to higher electricity demand. Investment Implications Markets are betting that energy prices will come down. The futures curves are in backwardation (Chart 18). Investors expect oil, gas, and coal prices to decline over the coming months (Chart 19). Chart 18Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Chart 19Investors Expect Commodity Prices To Fall The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences     One does not need to bet on higher energy prices these days to make money from being long energy futures; one only needs to bet that prices will not fall as much as currently discounted. Given the diminished feedback loop between higher energy prices and slower economic growth, the view of BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service, led by Bob Ryan, is that energy prices can stay elevated for longer than the market is discounting. Chart 20Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil We remain long the December 2022 Brent Crude futures contract as well as the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. Stock returns have been positively correlated with oil prices over the past decade (Chart 20). This suggests that equities can withstand the current level of oil prices. Some stocks will do better than others, however. Energy and banks are overrepresented in value indices (Table 1). Energy stocks will do well if oil prices remain buoyant (Chart 21). For their part, banks should also outperform the market if bond yields continue to drift higher (Chart 22). Table 1Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 21Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Chart 22Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Chart 23Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices     In fixed-income portfolios, we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds. Chart 23 shows that the 5y/5y forward TIPS breakeven inflation is highly correlated with oil prices. Thus, overweighting TIPS remains an effective hedge against an oil spike.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com       Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Special Trade Recommendations The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences

Highlights The surge in energy prices going into the Northern Hemisphere winter – particularly coal and natgas prices in China and Europe – will push inflation and inflation expectations higher into the end of 1Q22 (Chart of the Week).  Over the medium-term, similar excursions into the far-right tails of price distributions will become more frequent if capex in hydrocarbon-based energy sources continues to be discouraged, and scalable back-up sources of energy are not developed for renewables. It is not clear China will continue selectively relaxing price caps for some large electricity buyers, which came close to bankrupting power utilities this year and contributed to power shortages.  The current market set-up favors long commodity index products like the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF.  We remain long both. Higher energy and metals prices also will work in favor of long-only commodity index exposure over the medium term. Longer-term supply-chain issues will be sorted out. Still, higher costs will be needed to incentivize production of the base metals required to decarbonize electricity production globally, and  to keep sufficient supplies of fossil fuels on hand to back up renewable generation.  This will cause inflation to grind higher over time. Feature Back in February, we were getting increasingly bullish base metals on the back of surging demand from China. Most other analysts were looking for a slowdown.1 The metals rally earlier this year drew attention away from the fact that China had fundamentally altered its energy supply chain, when it unofficially banned imports of Australian thermal coal. It also altered global energy flows and will, over the winter, push inflation higher in the short run. Building new supply chains is difficult under the best of circumstances. But last winter had added dimensions of difficulty: A La Niña drawing arctic weather into the Northern Hemisphere and driving up space-heating demand; flooding in Indonesia, which limited coal shipments to China; and a manufacturing boom that pushed power supplies to the limit. Over the course of this year, Chinese coal inventories fell to rock-bottom levels and set off a scramble for liquified natural gas (LNG) to meet space-heating and manufacturing demand last winter (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekEnergy-Price Surge Will Lift Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Lift Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Lift Inflation Chart 2Coal Shortage China China Power Outages: Another Source Of Downside Risk Coal Shortage China China Power Outages: Another Source Of Downside Risk Coal Shortage China While this was evolving, the volume of manufactured exports from China was falling (Chart 3), even while the nominal value of these exports was rising in USD terms (Chart 4).  This is a classic inflationary set-up: More money chasing fewer goods.  This is occurring worldwide, as supply-chain bottlenecks, power rationing and shortages, and falling commodity inventories keep supplies of most industrial commodities tight.  China's export volumes peaked in February 2021, and moved lower since then.  This likely persists going forward, given the falloff of orders and orders in hand (Chart 5). Chart 3Volume Of China's Exports Falls … Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Chart 4… But The Nominal USD Value Rises Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Chart 5China's Official PMIs, Export And In-Hand Orders Weaken Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Space-heating and manufacturing in China are both heavily reliant on coal. Space-heating north of the Huai River is provided for free, or is heavily subsidized, from coal-fired boilers that pump heat to households and commercial establishments. This is a practice adopted from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and expanded until the 1980s, according to Fan et al (2020).3 Manufacturing pulls its electricity from a grid that produces 63% of its power from coal. China's coal output had been falling since December 2020, which complicated space heating and electricity markets, where prices were capped until this week. This meant electricity generators could not recover skyrocketing energy costs – coal in particular – and therefore ran the risk of bankruptcy.4 The loosening of price caps is now intended to relieve this pressure. Competition For Fuels Will Continue Europe was also hammered over the past year by a colder-than-normal winter brought on by a La Niña event, which sharply drew natgas inventories. The cold weather lingered into April-May, which slowed efforts to refill storage, and set off a scramble to buy up LNG cargoes (Chart 6). Chart 6The Scramble For Natgas Continues Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher This competition has lifted global LNG prices to record levels, and continues to drive prices higher. Longer-term, the logic of markets – higher prices beget higher supply, and vice versa – virtually assures supply chains will be sorted out. However, the cost of energy generally will have to increase to incentivize production of the base metals needed to pull off the decarbonization of electricity production globally, and to keep sufficient supplies of fossil fuels on hand to back up renewable generation. This will cause inflation to grind higher over time. Decarbonization is a strategic agenda for leading governments, especially China and the European Union. China is fully committed to renewables for fear of pollution causing social unrest at home and import dependency causing national insecurity abroad. In the EU, energy insecurity is also an argument for green policy, which is supported by popular opinion. The US has greater energy security than these two but does not want to be left behind in the renewable technology race – it is increasing government green subsidies. The current set of ruling parties will continue to prioritize decarbonization for the immediate future. Compromises will be necessary on a tactical basis when energy price pressures rise too fast, as with China’s latest measures to restart coal-fired power production. The strategic direction is unlikely to change for some time. Investment Implications Over time, a structural shift in forward price curves for oil, gas and coal – e.g., a parallel shift higher from current levels – will be required to incentivize production increases. This would provide hedging opportunities for the producers of the fuels used to generate electricity, and the metals required to build the infrastructure needed by the low-carbon economies of the future. We continue to expect markets to remain tight on the supply side, which will make backwardation – i.e., prices for prompt-delivery commodities trade higher than those for deferred delivery – a persistent feature of commodities for the foreseeable future.  This is because inventories will remain under pressure, making commodity buyers more willing to pay up for prompt delivery. The current market set-up favors long commodity index products like the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF. We remain long both, given our expectation. Over the short term, inflation will be pushed higher by the rise in coal and gas prices.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), industrial consumption of natgas in the US is on track to surpass its five-year average this year. Over the January-July period, US natgas consumption average 22.4 BCF/d, putting it 0.2 BCF/d over its five-year average (2016-2020). US industrial consumption of natgas peaked in 2018-19 at just over 23 BCF/d, according to the EIA (Chart 7). The EIA expects full-year 2021 industrial consumption of natgas to be 23.1 BCF/d, which would tie it with the previous peak levels. Base Metals: Bullish Following a sharp increase in refined copper usage in China last year resulting from a surge in imports, the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) is expecting a 5% decline this year on the back of falling imports. Globally, the ICSG expects refined copper consumption to be unchanged this year, and rise 2.4% in 2022. Refined copper production is expected to be 25.9mm MT next year vs. 24.9mm MT this year. Consumption is forecast to grow to 25.6mm MT next year, up to 700k MT from the 24.96mm MT usage expected this year. Precious Metals: Bullish Lower-than-expected job growth in the US pushed gold prices higher at the end of last week on the back of expectations the Fed will continue to keep policy accessible as employment weakened. All the same, gold prices remain constrained by a well-bid USD, which continues to act as a headwind, and only minimal weakening of the 10-year US bond yield, which dipped slightly below the 1.61% level hit earlier in the week (Chart 8). Ags/Softs: Neutral This week's USDA World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) were mostly neutral for grains and bearish for soybeans. Global ending bean stocks are expected to rise almost 5.4% in the USDA's latest estimate for ending stocks in the current crop year, finishing at 104.6mm tons. Corn and rice ending stocks were projected to rise 1.4% and less than 1%, ending the crop year at 301.7mm tons and 183.6mm tons, respectively. According to the department, global wheat ending stocks are the lone standout, expected to fall 2.1% to 277.2mm tons, the lowest level since the 2016/17 crop year. Chart 7 Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher Chart 8 Uncertainty Weighs On Gold Uncertainty Weighs On Gold   Footnotes 1     Please see Copper Surge Welcomes Metal Ox Year, which we published on February 11, 2021.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     China’s move to switch to Indonesian coal at the beginning of this year to replace Aussie coal was disruptive to global markets.  As argusmedia.com reported, this was compounded by weather-related disruptions in Indonesian exports earlier this year.  It is worthwhile noting, weather-related delays returned last month, with flooding in Indonesia's coal-producing regions again are disrupting coal shipments.  We expect these new trade flows in coal will take a few more months to sort out, but they will be sorted. 3    Please see Maoyong Fan, Guojun He, and Maigeng Zhou (2020), " The winter choke: Coal-Fired heating, air pollution, and mortality in China," Journal of Health Economics, 71: 1-17.  4    In August and September, the South China Morning Post reported coal-powered electric generators petitioned authorities to relax price caps, because they faced bankruptcy from not being able to recover the skyrocketing cost of coal. Please see China coal-fired power companies on the verge of bankruptcy petition Beijing to raise electricity prices, published by scmp.com on September 10, 2021. This month, Shanxi Province, which provides about a third of China's domestically produced coal, was battered by flooding, which forced authorities to shut dozens of mines, according to the BBC. Please see China floods: Coal price hits fresh high as mines shut published by bbc.co.uk on October 12, 2021. Power supplies also were lean because of the central government's so-called dual-circulation policies to reduce energy consumption and the energy intensity of manufacturing. This is meant to increase self-reliance of the state. Please see What is behind China’s Dual Circulation Strategy? Published by the European think tank Bruegel on September 7, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations

Highlights As US inflation proves to be not-so-transitory, US interest rate expectations will rise. Slowing Chinese domestic demand and rising US interest rate expectations will support the US dollar. The net impact from China’s slowdown and higher US interest rate expectations on mainstream EM will be currency depreciation. Rising mainstream EM nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates do not often lead to domestic currency appreciation A strengthening dollar vis-à-vis EM currencies is bad news for EM fixed-income markets – both local currency bonds and credit markets. Feature This report discusses EM local currency (domestic) bonds and US dollar bonds (credit markets). To begin with, we reiterate our main macro themes since January this year: (1) a slowdown in China and (2) rising US inflationary pressures and higher US bond yields. These macro themes will create tailwinds for the US dollar, at least for the next several months. A strengthening dollar is bad news for EM fixed-income markets. China’s Slowdown China’s slowdown will continue to unfold. China’s credit (TSF1 excluding equity) growth has slowed further in September (Chart 1, top panel). Similarly, household mortgages are also decelerating sharply (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 1China's Money And Credit Are Decelerating China's Money And Credit Are Decelerating China's Money And Credit Are Decelerating Chart 2Curtailed Financing For Property Developers = Less Construction Activity Curtailed Financing For Property Developers = Less Construction Activity Curtailed Financing For Property Developers = Less Construction Activity     China's ever-important property market and construction activity will contract in the months ahead. Property sales were down by 20% in September from a year ago. Property developers in recent years have been relying on pre-construction sales as a major source of financing. With pre-sales drying up and borrowing restrained by both government regulations and creditors’ unwillingness to lend, property developers will be unable to sustain the current pace of construction and completion (Chart 2). Chart 3Red Flags For EM ex-TMT Stocks Red Flags For EM ex-TMT Stocks Red Flags For EM ex-TMT Stocks For the same reason, property developers have curtailed their purchases of land. Land sales have been a major source of local government revenues – it is estimated to account for 45% of local government revenues including managed (off-balance sheet) funds. The upshot will be that local governments will be unable to ramp up their infrastructure spending to offset shrinking property construction. Altogether, these will have negative implications for the mainland’s industrial economy and raw materials. Notably, global material stocks have rolled over decisively even though CRB Raw Materials price index has yet to peak (Chart 3, top panel). Global industrial stocks in general and machinery stocks in particular have also relapsed. Finally, Chinese non-TMT share prices have dropped by 20% from their February high and EM ex-TMT equity prices have formed a head-and-shoulder pattern, which often precedes a major gap down (Chart 3, bottom panel). These equity market signals are foreshadowing a slowdown in China’s “old economy”. Bottom Line: The shockwaves emanating from the slowdown in China will hinder growth in Asia and commodity-producing economies in the rest of EM. This is positive for the US dollar because among major economic blocks, the US economy is the least exposed to the mainland economy. US Interest Rates Will Be Repriced US bond yields will continue marching higher, supporting the US dollar. The reasons for higher bond yields are as follows: Investors and commentators can differ on their assessment of the US inflation outlook. However, one thing that we should all agree on is that uncertainty over the US inflation outlook is extraordinarily high. Heightened uncertainty requires a higher risk premium in bonds, i.e., a wider bond term premium. Surprisingly, until August, the term premium on US bonds was very subdued (Chart 4). In brief, the US bond term premium will rise to reflect uncertainty around the inflation outlook, which will push bond yields higher. US wages hold the key to the inflation outlook. We believe that wage growth will surprise to the upside as many companies have strong order books but are struggling to hire. As people gradually return to the labor force, employers have a once in a decade chance to attract qualified employees. Hence, companies will likely compete with one another by offering higher wages to attract the most qualified candidates. The job quit rate is the highest it has been since the early 2000s. This rate also points to higher wages (Chart 5). Chart 4High Inflation Uncertainty Heralds Higher Bond Term Premium And Yields High Inflation Uncertainty Heralds Higher Bond Term Premium And Yields High Inflation Uncertainty Heralds Higher Bond Term Premium And Yields Chart 5US Wage Growth Will Accelerate US Wage Growth Will Accelerate US Wage Growth Will Accelerate   Three factors that had suppressed US bond yields will likely be reversing: US commercial banks have been major buyers of US Treasurys and agency securities; the US Treasury has depleted its account at the Fed due to the debt ceiling but will now begin issuing more bonds to fill in this account; the Fed has been purchasing $80 billion of US government bonds each month; however, the Fed is preparing to taper and therefore reduce these purchases. Chart 6US Banks Have Been Buying Bonds En Masse US Banks Have Been Buying Bonds En Masse US Banks Have Been Buying Bonds En Masse US commercial banks’ holdings of US government and agency securities has risen to 19% of their total assets – on par with their early 1990s all-time high (Chart 6, top panel). In turn, the share of loans and leases has fallen to an all-time low (Chart 6, middle panel). As US banks begin to expand their lending, they will likely reduce the pace of their buying of US Treasurys. This along with the US Treasury issuing more paper to increase its depleted Treasury General Account at the Fed (Chart 6, bottom panel) and the Fed’s tapering will likely push up US bond yields. Current shortages are the result of excessive demand, rather than producers operating below capacity.2 The fact is that the supply/shipment of goods is booming, at least from Asia/China to the US. This will prove to be inflationary, and therefore lead to higher bond yields. Chinese shipments to the US continue to thrive – in September, export values were up by 30.5% from a year ago (Chart 7, top panel). Given that US import prices from China are rising at an annual rate of 3.8%, China’s export volume to the US has grown to about 26.7% from last September when it was already booming. Consistently, inbound containers unloaded at the Long Beach and LA ports have surged to all-time highs (Chart 7, bottom panel). Hence, US ports are not operating below capacity, it is excessive demand for goods that has created these bottlenecks. Finally, concerning semiconductors, shortages are due to excessive demand not a failure to produce. Global semiconductor production has been growing rapidly over the past two years. A silver lining is that a capitalistic system will eventually expand production and meet demand. Although we broadly agree with this expectation, it will take a couple of years for this to take place. In the interim, we can expect to see higher prices, at least for goods, and rising inflation expectations. Bottom Line: As US inflation proves to be not-so-transitory, US interest rate expectations will rise, which will support the US dollar. The broad-trade weighted US dollar has been correlated with US TIPS yields (Chart 8). Chart 7Shipments From Asia To The US Have Been Booming Shipments From Asia To The US Have Been Booming Shipments From Asia To The US Have Been Booming Chart 8High US Rates Will Support The Dollar High US Rates Will Support The Dollar High US Rates Will Support The Dollar   EM Domestic Bonds Chart 9EM Inflation Has Been Spiking EM Inflation Has Been Spiking EM Inflation Has Been Spiking EM domestic bond yields have been rising as inflation in EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan (herein referred as mainstream EM) has been surging (Chart 9). Even if commodity prices roll over, EM interest rate expectations will likely continue rising for now because of higher US bond yields and EM currency weakness. Many clients have been asking whether rising mainstream EM policy rates and local bond yields will support EM currencies. We do not think so. In high-yielding interest rate markets such as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Russia and Turkey, neither short- nor long-term rates have been positively correlated with the value of their currencies (Chart 10 and 11). Chart 10Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Brazil And Mexico Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Brazil And Mexico Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Brazil And Mexico Chart 11Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Russia And South Africa Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Russia And South Africa Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Russia And South Africa Chart 12Higher EM Inflation-Adjusted Bond Yields Do Not Lead To EM Currency Appreciation Higher EM Inflation-Adjusted Bond Yields Do Not Lead To EM Currency Appreciation Higher EM Inflation-Adjusted Bond Yields Do Not Lead To EM Currency Appreciation Further, in these markets real (inflation-adjusted) rates also have not been positively correlated with their currencies (Chart 12). As illustrated in Charts 11, 12 and 13, there has been no positive correlation between both EM nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates and their currencies. Rather, there has often been a negative correlation. The basis is that exchange rates drive interest rate expectations, not vice versa. Currency depreciation leads to higher inflation expectations and rising interest rates. Conversely, exchange rate appreciation dampens inflation expectations paving the way for declining interest rates. Bottom Line: The net impact China’s slowdown and higher US interest rate expectations on mainstream EM domestic bonds will be currency depreciation with little room for their central banks to cut rates. As a result, local bonds’ risk-reward factor remains an unattractive tradeoff. EM Credit Markets As we laid out in A Primer on EM USD Bonds report  on April 29, EM exchange rates and their business cycle are the key drivers of EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads. If EM currencies drop, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads will widen (Chart 13). The basis is that foreign currency debt servicing will become more expensive as EM currencies depreciate. As EM growth disappoints, EM credit spreads will widen too (Chart 14). Chart 13EM Credit Spreads And EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads And EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads And EM Currencies Chart 14EM Profit Expectations And EM Corporate Spreads EM Profit Expectations And EM Corporate Spreads EM Profit Expectations And EM Corporate Spreads   In addition, the continuous carnage in Chinese offshore corporate bonds will heighten odds of a material selloff in this EM credit. Chinese property companies’ USD bonds make up a more than half of China’s offshore USD corporate bond index and a large part of the EM corporate bond index. Poor performance of the EM corporate bond index could trigger outflows from this asset class. Investment Recommendations Slowing Chinese domestic demand and rising US interest rate expectations will support the US dollar. As the interest rate differential between China and the US narrows, the CNY will likely experience a modest setback versus the greenback (Chart 15). Even small RMB weakness could produce a non-trivial depreciation in EM exchange rates. The latter is negative for EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets. Absolute-return investors should stay on the sidelines of EM domestic bonds. For dedicated investors in this asset class, our recommended overweights are Mexico, Russia, Korea, India, China, Korea, Malaysia and Chile. EM credit markets will continue to underperform their US counterparts (Chart 16). Credit investors should continue underweighting EM credit versus their US counterparts, a strategy we have been recommending since March 25, 2021. Chart 15CNY/USD And The Interest Rate Differential CNY/USD And The Interest Rate Differential CNY/USD And The Interest Rate Differential Chart 16EM Credit Markets Are Underperforming Their US Peers EM Credit Markets Are Underperforming Their US Peers EM Credit Markets Are Underperforming Their US Peers   Finally, EM ex-TMT share prices correlate with inverted EM USD corporate bond yields (Chart 17). Higher EM corporate bond yields (shown inverted in Chart 17) entail lower EM ex-TMT share prices. Chart 17High EM USD Bond Yields Herald Lower Share Prices High EM USD Bond Yields Herald Lower Share Prices High EM USD Bond Yields Herald Lower Share Prices In turn, China’s TMT stocks remain vulnerable as we have argued in past reports. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Total Social Financing. 2 We made a similar case for Chinese electricity shortages in last week’s report. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Cross-Atlantic Policy Divergence: A steadily tightening US labor market means that the Fed remains on track to formally announce tapering next month. Meanwhile, the ECB is signaling that they are in no hurry to do the same given scant evidence that surging energy prices are seeping into broader European inflation. This leads us to make the following changes to our tactical trade portfolio – taking profits on the 10-year French inflation breakeven spread widener; while switching out of the long December 2023 Euribor futures trade into a 10-year US Treasury-German Bund spread widening trade. Surging Antipodean Inflation: Australia and New Zealand are both seeing higher realized inflation, but market-based inflation expectations are falling in the former and rising in the latter. This leads us to make the following changes to our tactical trades: taking profits on the Australia-US 10-year spread widener; entering a new 10-year Australia inflation breakeven spread widener; and closing the underwater 2-year/5-year New Zealand curve flattening trade. Feature This week, we present a review of the shorter-term recommendations currently in our list of Tactical Overlay trades. These are positions that are intended to complement our strategic Model Bond Portfolio, with shorter holding periods – our goal is no longer than six months - and sometimes in smaller markets that are outside our usual core bond market coverage. As can be seen in the table on page 17, we typically organize these ideas by the type of trade (i.e. yield curve flatteners or cross-country spread wideners). Yet for the purposes of this review, we see two interesting themes that better organize the current trades and help guide our decision to keep them or enter new ones. Playing A Hawkish Fed Versus A Dovish ECB Federal Reserve officials have spent the past few months signaling that a tapering of bond purchases was increasingly likely to begin before year-end given the steadily improving US labor market. The September payrolls report released last Friday, even with the headline employment growth number below expectations for the second consecutive month, does not change that trajectory. Chart of the WeekCyclical UST Curve Flattening Pressures Cyclical UST Curve Flattening Pressures Cyclical UST Curve Flattening Pressures The US unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in September, continuing the uninterrupted decline from the April 2020 peak of 14.8% (Chart of the Week). The pace of that decline has accelerated in recent months, although the Delta variant surge in the US has created distortions in both the numerator and denominator of the unemployment rate. Now that the US Delta wave has crested and case numbers are falling, growth in both employment and the labor force should start to accelerate in the next few payrolls reports. This will result in a faster pace of US job growth, albeit with a slower decline in the unemployment rate, likely starting as soon as the October jobs report. The US Treasury curve has already been reshaping in preparation for a less accommodative Fed, with flattening seen beyond the 5-year point (middle panel). We have positioned for a more hawkish Fed, and a flatter Treasury curve, in our Tactical Overlay via a butterfly trade. Specifically, we are short a 5-year Treasury bullet versus a long position in a 2-year/10-year barbell, all using on-the-run cash Treasuries. That trade was initiated on June 22, 2021 and has so far generated a small profit of +0.27%. Our butterfly spread valuation model for that 2/5/10 Treasury butterfly shows that the 5-year bullet has not yet reached an undervalued extreme versus the 2/10 barbell (Chart 2). We are keeping this trade in our Tactical Overlay, as the current 2/5/10 butterfly spread of 23bps is still 6bps below the +1 standard deviation level implied by our model. Chart 2Stay In Our 2/5/10 UST Butterfly Trade Stay In Our 2/5/10 UST Butterfly Trade Stay In Our 2/5/10 UST Butterfly Trade Moving across the Atlantic, our trades have been the mirror image of our Fed recommendations, positioning for a continued dovish, reflationary ECB policy bias. We have expressed that via two trades: long 10-year French inflation breakevens and long December 2021 Euribor futures. We continue to see no reason for the ECB to follow the Fed’s path towards imminent tapering and signaling future rate hikes. Growth momentum has cooled in the euro area, with both the Markit composite PMI and the ZEW growth expectations index having peaked in June (Chart 3). At the same time, inflation expectations have picked up. The 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate has risen to 1.8%, still below the ECB’s 2% inflation target but well above the 2020 low of 0.7% (middle panel). Markets are focusing on the higher inflation and not the slowing growth, with the EUR overnight index swap (OIS) curve now pricing in 12bps of rate hikes in 2022 (bottom panel). We see that as a highly improbable outcome. There is little evidence that the latest pickup in euro area realized inflation is broadening out beyond surging energy price inflation and supply-constrained goods inflation (Chart 4). Euro area headline CPI inflation hit a 13-year high of 3.0% in August, with the “flash” estimate for September showing a further acceleration to 3.4%. Yet core inflation only reached 1.6% in August - a month when the trimmed mean euro area CPI inflation rate calculated by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy was a scant 0.2%. Chart 3ECB Will Not React To This Cyclical Bout Of Inflation ECB Will Not React To This Cyclical Bout Of Inflation ECB Will Not React To This Cyclical Bout Of Inflation Chart 4Euro Area Inflation Upturn Is Not Broad-Based Euro Area Inflation Upturn Is Not Broad-Based Euro Area Inflation Upturn Is Not Broad-Based While the September flash estimate of core inflation did perk up to 1.9%, the trimmed mean measure shows that the rise in euro area inflation to date has not been broad based. Like the Fed, ECB officials have indicated that they view this pick-up in inflation as “transitory”, fueled by soaring energy costs and base effect comparisons to low inflation in 2020. Signs that higher inflation was feeding into “second round” effects like rising wage growth might change the ECB’s thinking. From that perspective, the recent increase in labor strike activity in Germany is a potentially worrisome sign, but the starting point is one of low wage growth – the latest available data on euro area wage costs showed a -0.1% decline during Q2/2021. Chart 5Close Our Long Dec/23 Euribor Futures Trade Close Our Long Dec/23 Euribor Futures Trade Close Our Long Dec/23 Euribor Futures Trade We have been trying to fade ECB rate hike expectations via our long December 2023 Euribor futures trade. That position, initiated on May 18, 2021 has generated a small loss of -0.11% (Chart 5). We still expect the ECB to keep rates on hold in 2022, and most likely 2023, so there is the potential for that trade to recover that underperformance. However, that position has now reached the six-month holding period “re-evaluation” limit that we have imposed on our Tactical Overlay trades. Thus, we are closing that trade this week. In its place, we are initiating a new tactical trade to position for not only persistent ECB dovishness but a more hawkish Fed – a US Treasury-German Bund spread widening trade using 10-year bond futures. The specific details of the trade (futures contracts, duration-neutral weightings on each leg of the trade) can be found in the table on page 17. This new UST-Bund trade is attractive for three reasons: Our valuation model for the Treasury-Bund spread - which uses relative policy interest rates, relative unemployment, relative inflation and the relative size of the Fed and ECB balance sheets as inputs – shows that the spread is currently undervalued by more than one full standard deviation, and fair value is rising (Chart 6). The technical backdrop for the Treasury-Bund spread has turned more favorable for wideners, with the spread having fallen back to its 200-day moving average and the 26-week change in the spread now down to levels that preceded past turning points in the spread (Chart 7). Chart 6Enter A New 10yr UST-Bund Spread Widening Trade Enter A New 10yr UST-Bund Spread Widening Trade Enter A New 10yr UST-Bund Spread Widening Trade Relative data surprises are pointing to relatively higher US yields and a wider Treasury-Bund spread, with the Citigroup Data Surprise Index for the US now rising and the euro area equivalent measure falling (Chart 8). Chart 7UST-Bund Technical Backdrop Positioned For Widening UST-Bund Technical Backdrop Positioned For Widening UST-Bund Technical Backdrop Positioned For Widening Chart 8Relative Data Surprises Favor Wider UST-Bund Spread Relative Data Surprises Favor Wider UST-Bund Spread Relative Data Surprises Favor Wider UST-Bund Spread While we are entering a new trade to play for a relatively dovish ECB, we are also choosing to take the substantial profit in our tactical trade in French inflation breakevens. Specifically, we are closing our 10-year French inflation breakeven spread widening position – long a 10-year cash OATi bond, short 10-year French bond futures – with a solid gain of +6.3%. Chart 9Take Profits On Our Long 10yr French Breakevens Trade Take Profits On Our Long 10yr French Breakevens Trade Take Profits On Our Long 10yr French Breakevens Trade We have held this trade for nine months, a bit longer than our typical tactical trade holding period. We did so because French 10-year breakevens continued to look cheap on our valuation model. Now, the breakeven spread has risen to fair value (Chart 9), prompting us to take our gains and move on. Diverging Inflation Expectations In Australia & New Zealand Playing Fed/ECB policy divergence was the first main theme of this Tactical Overlay trade review. The second broad theme is also a divergence, between inflation expectations in New Zealand (which are rising) and Australia (which are falling). This trend leads us to close two existing trades and enter a new position. Chart 10An Inflation-Induced Bear Steepening Of Yield Curves An Inflation-Induced Bear Steepening Of Yield Curves An Inflation-Induced Bear Steepening Of Yield Curves In New Zealand, we are closing out our 2-year/5-year government bond yield curve flattener trade, initiated on July 21, for a loss of -0.32%. While we were correct in our expectation of ramped-up hawkishness from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), we were caught offside by persistently sticky inflation which has become a headache for global central bankers. With supply squeezes and high commodity prices not going away anytime soon, sovereign curves have bear-steepened across developed markets, driven by rising long-dated inflation expectations (Chart 10). This global steepening pressure also hit the New Zealand curve, to the detriment of our domestic RBNZ-focused flattener trade. There was also a technical component to the steepening in the New Zealand 2-year/5-year curve (Chart 11). With the 2-year/5-year curve having dipped far below its 200-day moving average and the 26-week rate of change at stretched levels, the flattener was already “overbought” when we entered the trade. Despite a steady stream of hawkish messaging from the RBNZ, leading to an actual rate hike last week, technicals did win out in the short term as the 2-year/5-year spread steepened back up towards the 200-day moving average. Chart 11The NZ 2s/5s Curve Has Also Steepened Due To Technical Factors The NZ 2s/5s Curve Has Also Steepened Due To Technical Factors The NZ 2s/5s Curve Has Also Steepened Due To Technical Factors On the positive side, our decision to implement this trade as a duration-neutral “butterfly”, selling a 2-year bond, and using the proceeds to buy a weighted combination of a 5-year bond and a 3-month treasury bill with an equivalent duration to the 2-year bond, worked as intended with the butterfly underperforming as the underlying 2-year/5-year curve steepened. Looking forward, technicals are still some distance from turning favorable and will remain a headwind for the flattener trade. Implied forward rates are also not in our favor, with markets already pricing in some flattening, making this a negative carry trade. Over a cyclical horizon – i.e. beyond our normal six-month holding period for tactical trades - we still expect the shorter-end of the New Zealand to flatten. The experience of past hiking cycles shows that the 2-year/5-year curve tends to continue flattening during policy tightening, usually leveling out at 0bps before re-steepening (Chart 12). Considering that we have already been in this trade for three months, however, we do not believe our initial curve flattening bias will play out successfully over the remainder of our six-month tactical horizon. While we are closing out our flattener trade, we will investigate ways to better express our bearish cyclical view on New Zealand sovereign debt in a future report. Turning to Australia, we are closing out our long Australia/short US spread trade, implemented using 10-year bond futures, taking a healthy profit of +2.1%. We have held this trade for longer than our typical six-month holding period (the trade was initiated on January 26, 2021) because our Australia-US 10-year spread valuation model has continued to flash that the spread was too wide to its fair value (Chart 13). The model has been signaling that the spread should be negative, yet Australian yields have been unable to trade below US yields for any sustained length of time in 2021. Furthermore, the model-implied fair value is now starting to bottom out, suggesting a diminishing tailwind from the relative fundamental drivers of the spread embedded in our model. Chart 12The NZ 2s/5s Curve Will Flatten Over A Cyclical Horizon The NZ 2s/5s Curve Will Flatten Over A Cyclical Horizon The NZ 2s/5s Curve Will Flatten Over A Cyclical Horizon Chart 13Take Profits On Our 10-Yr Australia-US Spread Narrowing Trade Take Profits On Our 10-Yr Australia-US Spread Narrowing Trade Take Profits On Our 10-Yr Australia-US Spread Narrowing Trade Chart 14Inputs Into Our Australia-US Spread Model Inputs Into Our Australia-US Spread Model Inputs Into Our Australia-US Spread Model The inputs into our 10-year spread model are relative policy interest rates, core inflation, unemployment and the size of central bank balance sheets (to incorporate QE effects) for Australia and the US. Of these variables, the biggest drivers of the decline in the fair value since the start of the COVID pandemic in 2020 have been relative inflation and the relative size of the Fed and Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) balance sheets as a percentage of GDP (Chart 14). Both of those trends are related. Persistently underwhelming Australian inflation – despite accelerating inflation in the US and other developed economies over the past year – has forced the RBA into a pace of asset purchases relative to GDP that exceeded even what the Fed has done since the pandemic started (bottom panel). However, Australian inflation finally began catching up to the rising trends seen elsewhere in the spring of this year, with headline CPI inflation jumping from 1.1% to 3.8% on a year-over-year basis during Q2. Australian bond yields have traded more in line with US yields since that mid-year pop in inflation, preventing the Australia-US spread from narrowing below zero and converging to our model-implied fair value. This is despite a severe COVID wave that forced much of Australia into the kind of severe lockdowns that the nation avoided during the worst of the global pandemic in 2020. With Australian inflation now moving higher and converging towards US levels, economic restrictions starting to be lifted thanks to a rapid vaccination campaign, and the RBA having already done some tapering of its asset purchases before the Fed, the fundamental rationale for holding our Australia-US trade is no longer valid, leading us to take profits. The convergence to fair value in our spread model is now more likely to come from fair value rising rather than the actual spread falling. The pickup in Australian inflation also leads us to enter a new trade Down Under. This week, we are initiating a new trade, going long 10-year Australia inflation breakevens, implemented by going long a 10-year cash inflation-linked bond and selling 10-year bond futures. The details of the new trade are shown in the table on page 17. Despite the uptick in realized Australian inflation, breakevens have actually been declining over the past several months, falling from a peak of 247bps on May 13 to the current 208bps. That move has accelerated more recently due to a rise in Australian real yields that has coincided with markets pricing in more future RBA rate hikes. Our 24-month Australia discounter, which measures the total amount of tightening over the next two years discounted in the AUD OIS curve, now shows that 104bps of rate hikes are expected by the fourth quarter of 2023 (Chart 15, bottom panel). This has occurred despite Australian wage growth remaining well below the 3-4% range that the RBA believes is consistent with underlying Australian inflation returning sustainably to the RBA’s 2-3% target band (top two panels). Chart 15Market Expectations For The RBA Are Too Hawkish Market Expectations For The RBA Are Too Hawkish Market Expectations For The RBA Are Too Hawkish Chart 16Go Long 10-Yr Australian Inflation Breakevens Go Long 10-Yr Australian Inflation Breakevens Go Long 10-Yr Australian Inflation Breakevens Australian real bond yields have begun to move higher in response to this more hawkish market policy expectation that seems overdone, helping push breakeven inflation even lower more recently. This has helped unwind some of the overvaluation of 10-year inflation breakevens from earlier in 2021. Our fundamental model for the 10-year Australian breakeven showed that the spread was over two standard deviations above fair value to start 2020 (Chart 16). The decline in the spread since that has largely eliminated that overvaluation, providing a better entry point for a new breakeven spread widening trade. With survey-based measures of inflation expectations rising even as breakevens fall back to fair value (bottom panel), we see a strong case for adding a new Australian inflation trade to our Tactical Overlay.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A Thematic Update Of Our Tactical Trades A Thematic Update Of Our Tactical Trades Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Dear Client, Owing to BCA’s Annual Investment Conference next week, there will be no report on Wednesday, October 20. We will return to our regular publication schedule on Wednesday, October 27. Please note that there will be a China Outlook panel discussion at 9 AM on Thursday, October 21. We hope you will join us for the event. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist   Highlights In the next six to nine months, the long-end of the yield curve will likely drop as investors start to price in weaker-than-expected economic growth amid measured stimulus. China’s 10-year government bond yields are set to structurally shift to a lower bound as domestic demand decelerates along with the nation’s total population. Policymakers will favor lower borrowing costs to reduce stress due to high debt levels among companies, central and local governments, and households. National savings are not a constraint for a country to lower domestic bond yields. China will continue to open domestic financial markets to global investors. The country’s large foreign exchange reserves limit the risk to its internal markets from extreme volatility in foreign fund flows. Feature In the past two decades policy rates in advanced economies have been brought close to zero and bond yields have dropped to extremely low levels. The yields on China’s government bonds, however, have remained well above their peers in advanced economies and in neighboring countries (Chart 1). Chart 1China's Government Bond Yields Far Above Other Major Economies China's Government Bond Yields Far Above Other Major Economies China's Government Bond Yields Far Above Other Major Economies Moreover, despite China’s growth slowing from double to mid-single digits, yields on China’s 10-year government bonds have remained at around 2006 levels. China’s working-age population continues to decline and its total population is estimated to start falling in the next five years. China’s demographic headwinds, combined with high leverage in the private sector at around 220% of GDP, will cap the upside in yields. In this report we share our views on China’s short rates and long-term bond yields on a cyclical basis (next six to nine months) and in the next five years. The Cyclical Outlook The yield curve will likely flatten with China’s long-term government bond yields dropping more than short-term rates in next six to nine months. This will occur in the expectation of a further growth slowdown in at least the next two quarters. Meanwhile, the downside is limited on the short-end of the curve, given it is more sensitive to the PBoC’s guidance and monetary authorities will ease policy only gradually. Stimulus in the next two quarters may also disappoint. Credit growth will bottom in Q4 this year, but the rebound will be modest. Stronger issuance in local government bonds in the next two quarters will be offset by sluggish bank loan impulse. Chinese policymakers will refrain from using stimulus for the property market as a counter-cyclical policy tool to revive the economy. Restrictions will be maintained on bank lending to the real estate sector including mortgages and these controls will limit the rebound in credit expansion. Furthermore, infrastructure investment will improve modestly in the next two quarters, but local governments remain under pressure to deleverage, which will limit their incentive and capacity to spend. Chart 2Stimulus In 2018/19 Was Very Measured Stimulus In 2018/19 Was Very Measured Stimulus In 2018/19 Was Very Measured We maintain our view that the current policy backdrop is shaping up to resemble that of H2 2018 and 2019. At that time, even though the central bank maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance and kept liquidity conditions ample, the size of the stimulus was measured and the economy was lackluster (Chart 2). Recent liquidity injections by the PBoC through open market operations should not be viewed as monetary easing because they represent the bank’s efforts to keep policy rates steady, at best (Chart 3). The central bank provided the interbank system with substantial financing to avoid liquidity crunches following the May 2019 Baoshang Bank takeover and the November 2020 Yongcheng Coal company debt default (Chart 4). In both cases, 10-year bond yields did not fall by as much as short rates, reflecting investors’ expectations that the liquidity injections and resulting drop in short rates were not long-lasting. Chart 3Recent PBoC Liquidity Injections Intended To Keep Policy Rates Steady Recent PBoC Liquidity Injections Intended To Keep Policy Rates Steady Recent PBoC Liquidity Injections Intended To Keep Policy Rates Steady Chart 4APBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults PBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults PBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults Chart 4BPBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults PBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults PBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults Our view on China’s bond yields will not change with the liftoff of US Fed policy rates,  even if the Fed hikes rates earlier and by more than anticipated. The Fed’s policy has little bearing on China’s long-dated yields, which are driven by domestic business cycles and monetary policy (Chart 5). Concerning the exchange rate, we believe that the RMB will modestly depreciate in the next six to nine months, given that the China-US nominal and real interest rate differentials will narrow (Chart 6). While some depreciation in the currency is modestly reflationary for China’s exporters, it will not be enough to offset weaknesses in domestic demand. Chart 5Domestic Economic Fundamentals Drive Yields On China's Government Bonds Domestic Economic Fundamentals Drive Yields On China's Government Bonds Domestic Economic Fundamentals Drive Yields On China's Government Bonds Chart 6China-US Rate Differentials Are Set To Narrow China-US Rate Differentials Are Set To Narrow China-US Rate Differentials Are Set To Narrow Chart 7Pipeline Inflationary Pressures in China Remain Elevated Pipeline Inflationary Pressures in China Remain Elevated Pipeline Inflationary Pressures in China Remain Elevated Inflation remains a risk to our cyclical view on the 10-year bond yield. While the economy is weakening, pipeline inflationary pressures remain elevated (Chart 7).  We do not foresee that the PBoC will change its modestly dovish policy stance because of inflationary pressures stemming from supply-side bottlenecks. However, supply constraints will not abate soon and consequently, pipeline inflationary pressures and producer price inflation may not subside in the next six months. Thus, fixed-income investors may start to price in higher inflation, which could prevent long-duration bond yields from declining by much. Bottom Line: In the coming months, the long-end of the yield curve will likely drop as investors start to price in weaker-than-expected economic growth and very measured stimulus. The short-end of the curve will have limited downside potential because there is only a slim chance of aggressive monetary easing. Bond Yields Are On A Structural Downtrend Bond yields in China will likely downshift in the next three to five years. Our secular outlook for government bond yields is based on the country’s demographic trends, inflation, productivity growth and debt levels. While China’s long-term bond yields have persistently averaged below nominal GDP growth, in the past decade the gap has significantly narrowed as economic growth slowed while yields remained within a tight range (Chart 8).  This contrasts with other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies where interest rates have moved to a lower range in proportion with economic growth rates (Chart 9). Chart 8China's Economic Growth Has Downshifted But Yields Have Not... China's Economic Growth Has Downshifted But Yields Have Not... China's Economic Growth Has Downshifted But Yields Have Not... Chart 9...In Contrast With Other Asian Manufacturing-Based Economies ...In Contrast With Other Asian Manufacturing-Based Economies ...In Contrast With Other Asian Manufacturing-Based Economies China’s long-dated bond yields will also downshift in the next three to five years given the nation’s declining long-term potential output growth, based on the following: Chart 10Wages Have Risen In China Wages Have Risen In China Wages Have Risen In China A shrinking workforce can be inflationary due to higher labor costs and we expect Chinese workers’ compensation will continue to increase in the next five years (Chart 10). However, wage inflation will likely be offset by labor productivity, which has remained robust. The nation’s unit-labor cost (ULC), measured by the wages paid for each employee to produce one unit of output, has been flat to slightly down in the past decade despite strong wage growth (Chart 11). Similarly, ULC has sagged in Japan and is muted in South Korea (countries with shrinking labor forces) due to fast-growing labor productivity. This contrasts with the US, where ULC has risen even though the labor force has expanded in the past 10 years (Chart 12) China’s labor productivity will not likely undergo a significant decline in the next five years, particularly if China successfully maintains the manufacturing sector’s share in its aggregate economy, because productivity growth in this sector is usually higher than in others. Chart 11ULC Has Been Relatively Flat ULC Has Been Relatively Flat ULC Has Been Relatively Flat Chart 12ULC Muted In Asian Economies Compared With US ULC Muted In Asian Economies Compared With US ULC Muted In Asian Economies Compared With US   Meanwhile, China’s total population will shrink within the next five years, which will likely bring powerful disinflationary forces that will more than offset price increases created by labor shortages. Disinflation will cap the upside in interest rates/bond yields. Chart 13Japan's Household Consumption Share Fell Sharply When Total Population Started Shrinking Japan's Household Consumption Share Fell Sharply When Total Population Started Shrinking Japan's Household Consumption Share Fell Sharply When Total Population Started Shrinking A shrinking total population can significantly reduce demand, as evidenced in Japan in the past two decades. Japan’s working-age population started falling in the early 1990s, but the country’s household consumption share in GDP fell sharply after its total population peaked in 2010 and the urban population growth started contracting (Chart 13). In other words, Japan’s rapidly falling demand more than offset a muted increase in wage growth. China’s housing demand may have already peaked and the decline will gather speed in the next five years (Chart 14). Long-term growth in household consumption moves in tandem with housing and, therefore, will also downshift in the coming years (Chart 15). In the next five years or longer, China’s de-carbonization efforts will require shutting down production of many old economy enterprises.  Policymakers may keep low interest rates to accommodate such a transformation. Furthermore, amid the geopolitical confrontation with the US, Beijing will need lower interest rates to support the manufacturing sector and to undertake an industrial upgrade. Chart 14China's Demand For Housing Is On A Structural Downshift... China's Demand For Housing Is On A Structural Downshift... China's Demand For Housing Is On A Structural Downshift... Chart 15...Along With Consumption ...Along With Consumption ...Along With Consumption The main risk to our view is that China’s total factor productivity1 growth could accelerate to more than offset a declining total population. This would boost real per capita income and result in higher potential growth in the economy. In this scenario, long-duration bond yields could climb.  However, total factor productivity growth will need to outpace the rate of a shrinking labor pool and capital formation to prop up growth in the aggregate economy (Chart 16A and 16B). This is a daunting mission that Japan and South Korea, where productivity growth has been on par with China, have failed to accomplish. Chart 16AChina's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth China's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth China's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth Chart 16BChina's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth China's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth China's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth Chart 17China Cannot Drastically Improve Its Productivity Growth In The Next Five Years China’s Interest Rates: Will They Join The Race To Zero? China’s Interest Rates: Will They Join The Race To Zero? It is unrealistic to expect that China will drastically improve its productivity growth.  Productivity level is much higher now than it was 10-20 years ago when China’s manufacturing sector accounted for more than 40% of GDP (Chart 17). Even though China’s manufacturing share in the economy will stabilize and even increase from the current 27% of the economy, it cannot boost the sector drastically, particularly because its export market share cannot expand much further due to rising geopolitical tensions. In short, sectors of the economy where productivity gains have been most rapid – manufacturing sector including exports that drove China’s productivity in the past 20 years - cannot fully offset the deceleration in other growth drivers going forward. The service sector will grow, but it is much more difficult to achieve fast productivity gains in the service sector. All in all, productivity and economic growth will moderate as China’s growth model shifts from capital-intensive infrastructure and real estate to services. Bottom Line: In the next five years, China’s 10-year government bond yields are more likely to structurally move to a lower bound as final demand falls along with the nation’s total population. Savings, Debt And Interest Rates China’s national savings rate is one of the highest in the world, but it will drop as the population ages. Thus, some economists may argue that a structural decline in the national savings rate will lead to higher interest rates in the long run. Chart 18Lower Savings Rates Do Not Necessarily Herald Higher Interest Rates Lower Savings Rates Do Not Necessarily Herald Higher Interest Rates Lower Savings Rates Do Not Necessarily Herald Higher Interest Rates However, there is no empirical evidence that national savings drive interest rates. There has not been an inverse relationship between national savings rates and government bond yields in either Japan or the US, as illustrated in the middle and bottom panels of Chart 18.  There are more periods of positive rather than negative correlation between savings rates and bond yields. Note that China’s national savings rate and its interest rates also are not inversely related; a rising saving rate does not lead to lower interest rates and vice versa (Chart 18, top panel). This empirical evidence is in line with special reports published by BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy that concluded the following: Banks cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households “savings.” In an economy with banks, one does not need to save in the form of a deposit in a bank in order for a bank to lend money to another entity. In any economy, new money originates by commercial banks “out of thin air” when they lend to or buy assets from non-banks. Hence, there is little relationship between national savings (flow concept in economics) and money supply growth (a flow variable too) (Chart 19). The term “savings” in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy’s capital stock, not deposits at banks. China’s banking system has an enormous amount of deposits, created by the banks “out of thin air” and not from households’ savings. The above factors explain why Japan’s government bond yields and national savings rate have been falling since 1990 (Chart 18 on Page 12, bottom panel). A lack of demand for borrowing was not why bond yields fell. A reason why China’s bond yields will likely be in a secular decline is that commercial banks will purchase government and corporate bonds en masse as they have done in the past 10 years (Chart 20). To do so, commercial banks will not use existing deposits, but rather they will create new deposits/money “out of thin air.” Chart 19There Is Little Relationship Between National Savings And Money Growth There Is Little Relationship Between National Savings And Money Growth There Is Little Relationship Between National Savings And Money Growth Chart 20China's Commercial Banks Will Continue To Purchase Government And Corporate Bonds China's Commercial Banks Will Continue To Purchase Government And Corporate Bonds China's Commercial Banks Will Continue To Purchase Government And Corporate Bonds The same is true for the banks’ purchases of corporate bonds. In China, commercial banks own about 75% of government (including local government) bonds and 20% of onshore corporate bonds. To avoid a spike in bond yields, Chinese regulators could relax the limitations on commercial banks to purchase government and corporate bonds. The upshot will be a lack of crowding out and no upward pressure on bond yields despite a large bond issuance. Chart 21China's Debt-To-GDP Ratio And Service Costs Have More Than Doubled In The Past 10 Years China's Debt-To-GDP Ratio And Service Costs Have More Than Doubled In The Past 10 Years China's Debt-To-GDP Ratio And Service Costs Have More Than Doubled In The Past 10 Years What are the implications of high indebtedness on interest rates? China’s domestic debt-to-GDP ratio has jumped from 120% of GDP in 2008 to 260% (Chart 21, top panel). This includes local currency borrowing by/debt of government, enterprises and households. Critically, the debt-service ratio2 for enterprises and households has more than doubled from 10% of disposable income in 2008 to over 20% (Chart 21, bottom panel). China cannot afford much higher interest rates because enterprises and households will struggle and will not be able to service their debts. Mortgage rates in China are at around 5.5%, the one-year prime lending rate for companies is 3.85% and onshore corporate bond yields are 3.7%. These are not particularly low borrowing costs given both high indebtedness and the outlook for structurally slower economic growth. Onshore borrowing costs may be brought down further in the years ahead to rule out debt distress among households, enterprises and local governments. Since 2015 and prior to the pandemic, China’s debt-service ratio has been mostly flat despite a rising debt-to-GDP ratio.3 This has been achieved through declining interest rates. In the next five years policymakers will likely maintain a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, lower bond yields are all but inevitable to decrease the debt-servicing burden. In addition, China’s “common prosperity” policy means larger government spending/deficits. However, to cap the government debt-to-GDP ratio, bond yields should be kept down. This is another reason why China’s will opt for lower interest rates/bond yields. Bottom Line: The high level of debt among local governments, companies and households means that borrowing costs in China will be reduced in the years ahead. National savings are not a constraint in any country for commercial banks to expand credit and/or to buy bonds. China will encourage its banks to buy government and corporate bonds to trim yields amid continuous heavy bond issuance. Will China’s Financial Opening Continue? In the current environment which geopolitical tensions are rising between China and the West, many global investors are concerned whether China will impose tighter capital controls and even seize foreign assets. Despite these challenges, China has continued to make progress opening its domestic markets. The nation seems to be sticking to its key policy goals of attracting foreign capital and internationalizing the RMB; both aspects require open access and repatriation of foreign capital. In addition, the share of foreign holdings in onshore securities is very low and thus, poses limited risk to China’s onshore financial markets during global economic or geopolitical crises. China’s current exposure to foreign capital flows is much smaller than its Asian neighbors during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, as well as Russia during the geopolitical standoff in 2014-2016 following the capture of Crimea.4 Despite years of easing access to financial markets, foreign ownership (mostly concentrated in government bonds) remains at only around 3-4% of China’s entire onshore bond market. Furthermore, unlike other Asian economies in 1997-98, China has large foreign exchange reserves to buffer shocks from foreign fund flows. In recent years its capital control mechanism has also been successful in preventing implicit capital outflows and stabilizing the RMB exchange rate. We expect Chinese policymakers to feel confident in continuing their financial opening because they have the capability and sufficient funds to safeguard the economy against retrenchments by global investors. Bottom Line: China will continue to open its domestic financial markets, albeit gradually, to global investors. The country’s domestic financial markets have limited exposure to the extreme volatility of foreign capital flows. Investment Conclusions Chart 22The RMB Still Has Upside Structurally, But Will Modestly Depreciate On A Cyclical Basis The RMB Still Has Upside Structurally, But Will Modestly Depreciate On A Cyclical Basis The RMB Still Has Upside Structurally, But Will Modestly Depreciate On A Cyclical Basis We are constructive on China’s government bonds, both cyclically and structurally. In the next six to nine months, the yield curve will likely flatten, with long-duration bond yields dropping faster than the short-end. China’s 10-year government bond yield will structurally shift to a lower range in the next five years, driven by the impact of falling population on domestic demand, and the country’s rising debt levels and debt-servicing costs. Although the RMB still has upside structural potential, in the next 6 to 12 months the currency will likely modestly depreciate against the US dollar (Chart 22).   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is a measure of productive efficiency,  determining how much output can be produced from a certain amount of inputs. 2Defined by BIS as the ratio of interest payments plus amortizations to income. 3Despite a rising debt load, debt-servicing costs were contained due to (1) LGFV debt swap as new provincial government bonds had lower yields than LGFV bonds and (2) a large decline in the prime lending rate and mortgage rates. 4Foreign investors held more than 40% of local currency bonds in Indonesia, and over 20% in Malaysia. Foreign ownership accounted for 26% of Russia’s local currency bonds in 2014. Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Highlights In this report, we take a close look at corporate margins by analyzing their key drivers: The general level of economic activity, trends in labor costs and productivity, borrowing costs, tax rates, depreciation charges, the exchange rate, and corporate pricing power. The likely contraction of margins next year will be driven by a combination of factors: First and foremost, a slowdown in top-line growth and a decline in corporate pricing power.  In the meantime, the tight labor market is putting upward pressure on wage growth despite a peak in productivity improvement. Input costs are also on the rise with PPI soaring, cutting into corporate profitability. Depreciation is already rising on the back of the recent recovery in capex. Interest expense has bottomed in the face of rising rates, and the potential healing of corporate balance sheets is leading to re-leveraging to raise capital for capex and buybacks.  The US corporate tax rate is bound to increase based on news from Capitol Hill.   The model above encapsulates all of these moving parts (Chart 1) and reiterates that the path of least resistance is lower for US corporate margins. S&P 500 operating margins are likely to contract in 2022. Feature Profits Have Rebounded S&P 500 earnings growth has rebounded vigorously from the pandemic low. Operating earnings-per-share stand 32% YoY above the January 2020 pre-pandemic high (Chart 2). Margins have also exceeded pre-pandemic levels of 11.7% reaching 14.4% in September (Chart 3). The basic story behind a rebound in profitability is well understood: Companies have cut costs aggressively, productivity has improved, lower interest rates have reduced debt servicing burdens, a weaker dollar has boosted overseas earnings, and corporate pricing power has strengthened. Gauging the direction of change for each of these various factors will help us assess whether profits can continue growing, and whether operating margins can continue expanding. Chart 1After An Impressive Surge, Margins Are Set To Decline Marginally Worse Marginally Worse Chart 2Profits Have Rebounded Vigorously Profits Have Rebounded Vigorously Profits Have Rebounded Vigorously Chart 3Margins Are Above Pre-pandemic High Margins Are Above Pre-pandemic High Margins Are Above Pre-pandemic High Sneak Preview: We expect profit margins to contract in 2022 NIPA Operating Margins vs S&P 500 Operating Margins The market tends to focus on S&P 500 earnings and these can be measured on a reported or operating basis, with the latter removing the effects of one-off charges. In order to better understand the path of S&P 500 margins, we aim to relate profits to the economic cycle; to do so, we analyze the data from the national income and product accounts (NIPA) because they are fully integrated with GDP and any related series. National non-financial after-tax profits without the inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and the capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj)1 are conceptually closest to S&P 500 profits as they measure the after-tax worldwide earnings of US corporations. Fortunately, the S&P and equivalent national income measures of operating profits broadly track each other over the long run, although the S&P data display greater volatility. The NIPA profit margin series is 70% correlated with S&P 500 operating profit margins. While this level of correlation indicates that long-term trends in NIPA profits and S&P earnings are broadly similar, short-term annual and quarterly growth rates can differ dramatically. The Key Drivers Of Profitability A number of factors can influence the path of profits: The general level of economic activity, including trends in borrowing costs, tax rates, depreciation charges, the exchange rate, productivity, and corporate pricing power. It clearly would be most bullish if productivity had been the main driver because any future benefits from the other four sources will be limited. Interest rates will normalize at some point, and effective tax rates seem more likely to rise than fall from current levels, and we should hope for faster depreciation in line with increased capital spending. In addition, the downside in the dollar is constrained by the desire of other countries to maintain competitive exchange rates. Corporate pricing power is the sole mitigating factor against these cost pressures. In this report, we will methodically go through and assess the outlook for each of these profit drivers, and their cumulative effect on profit margins for the next year or so. Revenue Growth Is A Key To Margin Expansion The EBITD measure of domestic non-financial profits excludes the impact of changes in taxes, interest rates and depreciation charges and is thus the series that is most directly affected by the underlying economic cycle and by productivity. Moreover, because it covers only domestic profits, it is not overly influenced by exchange-rate movements. GDP growth and NIPA EBITD margin expansion move in tandem. The post-pandemic rebound in economic growth has underpinned margin recovery (Chart 4). However, real GDP forecasts have recently been cut from 6.5%  to just under 6% for 2021, and to 4% in 2022 (Chart 5). Slower growth suggests that the pace of margin expansion will also slow. Chart 4EBITD Margins Usually Track GDP EBITD Margins Usually Track GDP EBITD Margins Usually Track GDP Chart 5GDP Growth Is Expected To Slow GDP Growth Is Expected To Slow GDP Growth Is Expected To Slow Cost Drivers Of Profits Labor Expense As Percentage Of Sales Has Been Falling Looking at the expense side of the NIPA Income Statement, we note that labor costs are singlehandedly the largest expense, hovering around 50% of sales, dwarfing all the other expense items (Chart 6). The NIPA EBITD margin allows us to gauge the effect of changes in labor costs on the bottom line.  Chart 6Labor Costs Are The Largest Expense Labor Costs Are The Largest Expense Labor Costs Are The Largest Expense After the initial spike to 54% of sales at the beginning of the pandemic, explained by rapidly falling sales and an inability of companies to rapidly reduce employee numbers, labor costs as a percentage of sales have been reverting to historical levels.  This is a curious phenomenon as wages have recently been on the rise: The number of open positions has been exceeding the number of job seekers by over a million, indicating that jobs are plentiful.  As a result, the quit rate has exploded (Chart 7). To attract and retain workers, businesses have been raising compensation, leading to average weekly earnings rising by more than 5% year over year. As a result, wages-to-sales have been trending up (Chart 8). Chart 7Quit Rate Exploded Pushing Wages Up Quit Rate Exploded Pushing Wages Up Quit Rate Exploded Pushing Wages Up Chart 8Wages-to-Sales Have Been Trending Up Wages-to-Sales Have Been Trending Up Wages-to-Sales Have Been Trending Up If companies must pay more for labor, why has the labor expense as percentage of sales fallen? To answer this question, we will look at the selling prices over unit labor costs as a proxy for the EBITD margin (Chart 9) to examine the underlying profitability as a function of labor costs. However, since the beginning of the pandemic, this stable relationship has broken down, with selling prices falling over unit labor costs, while margins have been expanding. Digging deeper, we notice that NIPA sales prices have rebounded (Chart 10) due to a surge in inflation and a rise in a corporate pricing power (Chart 11), while unit labor costs dived. This can be attributed to a pandemic productivity surge (Chart 12), making it cheaper to produce each additional unit.  Chart 9A Proxy For EBITD Margin A Proxy For EBITD Margin A Proxy For EBITD Margin Chart 10Sales Prices Are Up, Unit Labor Costs Are Down Sales Prices Are Up, Unit Labor Costs Are Down Sales Prices Are Up, Unit Labor Costs Are Down Chart 11US Corporate Power Is Waning US Corporate Power Is Waning US Corporate Power Is Waning Chart 12Productivity Has Peaked Productivity Has Peaked Productivity Has Peaked However, after rising for months, the ability of companies to raise prices further has been diminished by consumers’ income increasing slower than inflation, reducing their purchasing power.  Improvements in productivity have also peaked and are unlikely to propel margins higher.  Input Costs Are Soaring While cost of goods sold (COGS) is not one of the lines in the NIPA income statement, we would be remiss not to mention that input costs have been on the rise. The most recent reading in PPI was up 8.3% YoY (Chart 13). The price of oil has been surging as well. An increase in the cost of materials definitely has an adverse effect on corporate margins. We will quantify the effects of the year-on-year percentage of PPI on margins later in this report. Chart 13Input Prices Have Soared Input Prices Have Soared Input Prices Have Soared Other Drivers Of Profitability: Depreciation, Interest And Taxes Switching gears to other costs, interest, taxes, and depreciation expenses are likely to increase going forward. Capex Is Rising, So Will Depreciation Expense Depreciation expense is the second largest expense in the cost structure, constituting some 15% of sales. Between mid-2009 and mid-2012, depreciation charges fell sharply, curtailed by weak investment growth during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) economic downturn. Similarly, the same story unfolded during the 2015 manufacturing slowdown, and the pandemic-induced recession (Chart 14). Today, growth in US domestic fixed investment has rebounded at rates comparable to the 2000 and 2010 recoveries. The trend will continue: According to the Philly Fed Manufacturing Survey, capex intentions have been rising (Chart 15). As a result, depreciation expense is set to climb, cutting into margins and earnings. Chart 14Capex Surge Will Lead To Higher Depreciation Capex Surge Will Lead To Higher Depreciation Capex Surge Will Lead To Higher Depreciation Chart 15More Capex Is Under Way More Capex Is Under Way More Capex Is Under Way Interest Costs Set To Increase With Rising Rates Interest charges are small compared to other expenses, never rising above 5% of sales. There has been quite a lot of variability in interest charges in recent years, reflecting swings in both interest rates and the level of corporate borrowing (Chart 16). Falling interest costs provided a boost to profits between 2008 and 2010, as well as during the trade war and the pandemic. Also, corporations have been de-leveraging, but this trend is about to turn: As the corporate sector heals, it is likely to re-leverage, whether to finance capex or buybacks. With interest rates set to rise, interest costs are likely to become a drag on profits (Chart 17).   Chart 16Higher Rates And Corporate Re-Leveraging Will Push Interest Costs Up Higher Rates And Corporate Re-Leveraging Will Push Interest Costs Up Higher Rates And Corporate Re-Leveraging Will Push Interest Costs Up Chart 17Corporate Debt Has Bottomed Corporate Debt Has Bottomed Corporate Debt Has Bottomed Effective Tax Rates Are Likely To Increase Effective tax rates have fallen from about 18% in 2014-2017 to 12% in January 2018 because of the Trump Administration’s tax reform and remain low by historical standards (Chart 18). Meanwhile, taxes paid have also been hit by the 2020 downturn thanks to temporary tax breaks, and have not yet rebounded to pre-pandemic levels, thereby aiding margin expansion. However, given the Biden Administration’s push to increase the US corporate tax rate and eliminate loopholes, chances are that tax expenses will rise. Chart 18Effective Tax Rates Are Low By Historical Standards Effective Tax Rates Are Low By Historical Standards Effective Tax Rates Are Low By Historical Standards Overseas Profits So far, we have focused on the domestic drivers of changes in margins.  Yet for many US corporations, especially the ones in the S&P 500, overseas profits are a key source of profits. Many industries derive a substantial share of sales from abroad, and for Technology, this number stands as high as 58%.  Historically, overseas profits have been a tremendous source of growth (Chart 19) thanks to rising exposure to fast-growing emerging economies, a weaker dollar, and the transfer of operations to low-tax regimes. However, recently this trend has turned due to closing loopholes allowing companies to locate headquarters in lower tax regime jurisdictions, tax reform, foreign profits amnesty, and unified global pressure to tax US multinationals. Onshoring of manufacturing production is another emerging trend that is likely to improve the efficiency of supply chains but will add to production expenses, chipping away at corporate profitability. The US dollar has been weakening during the pandemic, giving a boost to profits thanks to both lower prices of the American goods and translation effects (Chart 20). Chart 19Overseas Profits Are Trending Down Overseas Profits Are Trending Down Overseas Profits Are Trending Down Chart 20USD TRW Is Strengthening USD TRW Is Strengthening USD TRW Is Strengthening Hence, we conclude that the share of overseas profits is unlikely to change and is not going to become an engine for profit growth for US corporations. Where Next For Profits? The clear implication from the above analysis is that profits have ceased to benefit from earlier benign trends in depreciation charges, interest costs, and tax rates. Looking ahead, these factors, are destined to become modest headwinds for profit growth. Sales growth is also likely to slow as GDP growth returns to trend, with overseas profits less of a source of growth. And importantly, productivity growth and pricing power have peaked and turned, depriving the economy of its key drivers of margin expansion. S&P 500 The obvious question is how all the factors affecting NIPA margins translate into the forecast for change in S&P 500 operating margins. S&P 500 margins are subject to the same profit drivers as the NIPA accounts. In order to forecast the effect of these factors on the year-on-year changes in operating margins, we have built a simple regression model that uses year-on-year changes in average hourly earnings (AHE) to capture the cost of labor; high-yield option-adjusted spreads (OAS) to capture the cost of borrowing; year-on-year PPI as a change in cost of input materials; the trade-weighted USD as an indicator capturing change in foreign profits; and, lastly, the BCA pricing power indicator to measure companies’ ability to pass on these costs to their customers (Table 1).   Table 1Regression To Predict Operating Margins YoY% Marginally Worse Marginally Worse The model forecast of margin growth peaked in August 2021 and is about to slow into the balance of the year (Chart 21). Margins will contract outright in December 2021-January 2022. The growth rate for margins in January 2022 is -65% year on year.  In January 2021, operating margins were 7.2%. Incorporating a negative year-on-year growth rate, we arrive at margins of only 2.6%, which is certainly very low. The caveat here is that our objective is to predict the direction of change as opposed to working out a point estimate of future margins. In other words, there is a wide confidence interval around any forecast of earnings given the unpredictability of movements in the exchange rate, productivity and the general level of economic activity. However, our assumptions are conservative, and the model clearly points to a margin contraction in 2022. Chart 21After An Impressive Surge, Margins Are Set To Decline Marginally Worse Marginally Worse And lastly, why will margins contract? What is the main culprit that would make things worse? The answer is an increase in input and labor costs (PPI and AHE), both of which are no longer being offset by a corporate pricing power: The ability of corporations to pass on their costs to customers has diminished, and margins are going to take a hit (Chart 22 & Table 2). Chart 22Increase In Costs Is No Longer Offset By Pricing Power Marginally Worse Marginally Worse Table 2Contributions To Margins Growth Marginally Worse Marginally Worse Bottom Line Earnings growth and profit margins are of paramount importance to the performance of equities – as we wrote in a report in August, the key driver of returns has shifted from multiple expansion to earnings growth. Despite the recent pullback, the S&P 500, trading at 20.5x forward multiples, is still expensive. Our analysis shows that S&P 500 operating margins are likely to contract in 2022 because of rising wages, a slowdown in productivity, increases in interest and depreciation expenses, and potential tax hikes. On the revenue side, US GDP growth is slowing, and corporate pricing power is waning, making it difficult to pass on rising costs to customers. Impending margin contraction does not bode well for the strong performance of US equities in the year ahead.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Profits before tax reflect the charges used in tax accounting for inventory withdrawals and depreciation. The inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and the capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj) are used to adjust before-tax profits to NIPA asset valuation concepts. The IVA adjusts inventories to a current-cost basis, which is similar to valuation of inventory withdrawals on a last-in/first-out basis. The CCAdj adjusts tax-reported depreciation to the NIPA concept of economic depreciation (or “consumption of fixed capital”), which values fixed assets at current cost and uses consistent depreciation profiles based on used asset prices. Recommended Allocation

Highlights Gold prices will continue to be challenged by conflicting information flows regarding US monetary policy; higher inflationary impulses from commodity prices and supply-chain bottlenecks; global economic policy uncertainty, and risks to EM economic growth (Chart of the Week). Concern over the likely tapering of the Fed's asset-purchase program this year, rate hikes next year and fiscal-policy uncertainty will support rising interest-rate risk premia and a stronger USD. These will remain headwinds for gold. Going into the Northern Hemisphere's winter, risk premia in fossil-fuel prices are at or close to their zeniths, as is the Bloomberg commodity index. This will keep short-term inflation elevated. Heightened geopolitical tensions – particularly between Western democracies and China – will keep the USD well bid by risk-averse investors. The commodity-induced element of PCEPI inflation will be transitory. Uncertainty over US monetary policy and rising geopolitical tensions, however, will remain part and parcel of gold fundamentals indefinitely. The trailing stop on our long 1Q22 natural gas call spread – long $5.00/MMBtu call vs. short $5.50/MMBtu call – was elected, leaving us with a 20% gain. We will not be re-setting the spread at tonight's close, due to the difficulty in taking a price view in markets with extremely high weather-related uncertainty. Feature The quality of information informing the analysis of gold markets is highly uncertain at present. US monetary policy uncertainty and the future of Fed chairman Jerome Powell keep expectations twitchy when it comes issues like the tapering of the Fed's asset-purchase program. Our colleagues at BCA's US Bond Strategy expect the Fed will announce a taper in asset purchases by November 2021 which will end in June 2022.1 But the tapering really is not, in our estimation, as big a deal as inflation and inflation expectations, which will drive the Fed's rate-hiking timetable. Chart of the WeekUncertainty Weighs On Gold Uncertainty Weighs On Gold Uncertainty Weighs On Gold The first Fed rate hike expected by our bond desk likely will come at the end of next year. Our colleagues expect the Fed will want to check off three criteria before increasing interest rates (Table 1). The inflation targets – actual and expected – already have been checked off, leaving the labor market's recovery as the only outstanding issue on our internal checklist. By December 2022, once the maximum employment criterion has been met, the Fed will commence with rate hike.2 Subsequent rate hikes will depend on inflation expectations. Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold Uncertain Inflation Expectations The higher inflation that checks off our bond desk's list resulted from COVID-19-impacted services and tight auto markets (Chart 2). We also find evidence commodities feed into inflation expectations and realized inflation, both of which are key variables for the Fed (Chart 3). Transitory effects – chiefly supply-chain bottlenecks and a global scramble for coal, gas and oil – have lifted realized inflation in 2H21, and have taken the Bloomberg commodity index to record levels (Chart 4). Nonetheless, given the fundamental backdrop for the key industrial commodities – chiefly oil, gas, coal and base metals – the inflationary impulse from commodity markets could persist indefinitely into the future, in our estimation. In order to incentivize the investment in base metals needed to literally build out the renewable energy infrastructure, the grids that support it and the electric vehicles that will supplant internal-combustion-engine technology, higher energy and metals prices will be required for years.3 This will be occurring as the production of traditional energy sources – i.e., fossil fuels – winds down due to lower investment over the next 10-20 years. This also will result in higher and more volatile oil and gas prices. Chart 2Inflation Meets Fed Targets Inflation Meets Fed Targets Inflation Meets Fed Targets Chart 3Commodities Feed Into Inflation Expectations Commodities Feed Into Inflation Expectations Commodities Feed Into Inflation Expectations All of these real-economy factors will feed into higher inflation over time, which will present the Fed with difficult choices regarding monetary policy and interest rates. Chart 4Record Commodity Index Levels Record Commodity Index Levels Record Commodity Index Levels USD Strength Suppresses Inflation And Gold Prices  It is worthwhile noting the current USD strength is suppressing inflation. However, it is not suppressing commodity prices entirely, as Chart 4 shows. The transitory weather-related price increases in energy commodities will pass, either when winter ends or if a less severe winter hits the Northern Hemisphere. We continue to expect a lower dollar, as the Fed's accommodative monetary policy remains in place. Even after the Fed tapers its asset-purchase program, policy will remain loose. The large fiscal packages that most likely will be approved by the US Congress will swell the US debt and budget deficits, which likely will weaken the USD over time. On a purchasing-power-parity basis (PPP) we also expect a weaker dollar (Chart 5). We also are expecting the availability of more efficacious vaccines in EM economies to boost economic activity, which will strengthen incomes and local currencies vis-à-vis the USD. Chart 5Weaker USD Expected On A PPP Basis Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold The risk to this USD view – which would support gold prices – remains the heightened geopolitical tensions between Western democracies and China, which will keep political uncertainty elevated and will keep the USD well bid by risk-averse investors. Persistent USD strength would restrain inflation, and weaken the case for owning gold. Investment Implications We remain bullish gold over the medium- and long-term, expecting higher inflation and inflation expectations to lift demand for this safe haven. However, persistent commodity-induced inflation could force the Fed to tighten monetary policy more than is currently expected to get out ahead of higher inflation and inflation expectations. This could lead to stagflation, wherein inflation runs high but growth stalls as interest rates move higher. Persistent geopolitical risk also will keep risk-averse investors well bid for the USD. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish First-line US natural gas prices were down ~ 9% as we went to press, following reports Russia would make more gas available to European buyers. This report apparently was later contradicted by a Gazprom official, who said Russian inventories still were being filled ahead of winter.4 WTI crude oil prices came close to hitting a seven-year high early in the trading day Wednesday, then promptly retreated (Chart 6). The news flow is indicative of the extreme sensitivity of gas and oil buyers going into the coming winter. Base Metals: Bullish Earlier this week, the Peruvian government struck an deal with MMG Ltd, owner of the Las Bambas mine, and the local community around the site, which reportedly will involve hiring local residents to provide services to the mine, including helping transport minerals and maintaining key transit roads. The community had been protesting to seek more of the income from the mine, and created blockades en route to the site, which threatened ~ 2% of global copper supply. Peru's newly elected president, TK Castillo, rose to power on the promise to redistribute mining wealth to Peruvian citizens. This was his first negotiation with a mining company since his election in July. MMG’s major shareholder is China Minmetals Corp. The Leftist president will need to balance the interests of local stakeholders on the one hand, while ensuring the world’s second largest copper producing nation is still attractive to international miners. Precious Metals: Bullish In 2021, the World Platinum Investment Council expects the platinum to swing to a physical surplus of 190k oz, which reverses an earlier forecast for a deficit made in the Council's 1Q21 report (Chart 7). Demand is forecast to increase year-over-year, spurred by increases in automotive, industrial and jewelry demand. On the supply side, growth in South Africa's mined output growth will keep markets in a surplus for 2021. According to SFA Oxford, gross palladium demand and refined supply for 2021 are expected to be at 10.03mm oz, and 6.77mm, respectively. Palladium balances (ex-ETFs) are projected to remain in a physical deficit of 495k ounces for 2021. Chart 6 WTI LEVEL GOING UP WTI LEVEL GOING UP Chart 7 Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold Conflicting Signals Challenge Gold   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Damage Assessment, published by BCA Research's US Bond Strategy on September 28, 2021. 2     Please see 2022 Will Be All About Inflation, published by BCA Research's US Bond Strategy on September 14, 2021, which notes the concept of maximum employment is not a well-defined term. 3    Please see La Niña And The Energy Transition, which we published last week. 4    Please see Energy price surge sends shivers through markets as Europe looks to Russia published by reuters.com on September 6, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations

Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  The global economy will continue to grow at an above-trend rate over the next 12 months and central banks will remove accommodation only slowly.But the second year of a bull market is often tricky: Growth slows after its initial rebound, and monetary policy starts to be tightened, amid rising inflation.Equities are likely to outperform bonds over the next 12 months, driven by improving earnings, but at a slower pace than over the past year and with higher volatility.We continue to recommend only a cautiously optimistic stance on equities, with an overweight in US equities, and underweight in Europe. Our sector overweights are a mix of cyclicals (Industrials), plays on higher rates (Financials), and selective defensives (Health Care).China is likely to announce a stimulus to cushion the impact from Evergrande, which might push up oversold Chinese stocks. We close our underweight on Chinese equities, but raise them only to neutral as the real estate sector looks vulnerable. That could be bad news for commodities and the rest of Emerging Markets, which we cut to underweight.The Fed is likely to announce tapering this quarter, and raise rates in December 2022. This is likely to push up 10-year Treasury yields to 2-2.25% by then, and so we remain underweight duration.Investment-grade credit is expensive, but B-rated high-yield bonds still look attractive as defaults continue to decline. EM corporate debt is riskier post-Evergrande, but higher-rated sovereign dollar debt offers a good spread pickup.OverviewThe second year of a bull market is often tricky. Growth starts to slow after its initial rebound, and central banks move towards tightening policy. This does not signal the end of the bull market, but equity returns in Year 2 are typically lacklustre (Table 1).That is exactly the situation markets face now. Growth has been surprising on the downside, and inflation on the upside over the past few months (Chart 1). Table 1Year 2 Of Bull Markets Often Has Only Weak Returns Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify   Chart 1Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside  Our basic investment stance remains that the global economy will continue to grow at an above-trend rate over the next 12 months (as the consensus forecasts – Chart 2), and that central banks will remove accommodation only slowly. We can see no signs of a recession on the 18-to-24-month horizon and, as Chart 3 shows, equities almost always outperform bonds except during and in the run-up to recessions. Chart 2But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend   Chart 3Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions  This justifies a moderately pro-risk stance, with overweights in equities and (selectively) credit, and a big underweight in government bonds. But the risks to this sanguine view are rising, and the next few months could be choppy. Stay bullish, but keep a close eye on what could go wrong.The slowdown in growth is largely because manufacturing boomed last year and now simply the pace of growth is decelerating. Manufacturing PMIs are (mostly) still above 50, but have fallen from their peaks (Chart 4). Supply-chain bottlenecks have also dented production. And consumers will spend less on durables and more on services, as lockdowns are eased.We have emphasized that the $2.5 trillion of excess savings in the US will boost spending over coming quarters. But enhanced unemployment benefits have now ended and most of the savings left are with richer households who have a lower propensity to spend (see page 9 for more on this). Covid also remains a risk: Cases are stickily high in some countries and consumers are still not 100% confident about going out to dine and for entertainment (Chart 5). Chart 4PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50 PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50 PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50   Chart 5Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out  China is an increasing risk to growth. Its economy has been slowing all year as a result of monetary tightening (Chart 6) and this may be exacerbated by the fallout from Evergrande. The Chinese authorities are likely to announce a stimulus package to offset the slowdown (which is why we are neutralizing our underweight on Chinese equities). But the stimulus will probably be only moderate and targeted, and they will not allow a renewed boom in real estate (as we explain on page 11), which has been a significant driver of Chinese growth in recent years (Chart 7). This could hurt the economies of Emerging Markets and other commodity producers, which depend on Chinese demand. Chart 6China Has Been Slowing All Year China Has Been Slowing All Year China Has Been Slowing All Year   Chart 7Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth  At the same time that growth is slowing, inflation is proving a little stickier and broader-based than was expected. Measures of underlying inflation pressure, such as trimmed-mean CPIs, suggest that it is no longer only pandemic-related prices that are rising in the US and some other countries (Chart 8). Rising shipping charges (container rates are up 228% this year) are pushing up the cost of imported goods. And the first signs are emerging that labor shortages, especially in restaurants and shops, are causing wage rises (Chart 9). Chart 8Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries   Chart 9The First Signs Of Wage Rises? The First Signs Of Wage Rises? The First Signs Of Wage Rises?  Unsurprisingly, then, central banks are starting to wind down their asset purchases and even raise rates. Norges Bank was the first developed central bank to hike this cycle in September. New Zealand may follow in Q4. And the Fed has pretty clearly signaled that it, too, will announce tapering before year-end. And this is not to mention Emerging Market central banks, many of which have had to raise rates sharply in the face of soaring inflation (Chart 10).A shrinking of excess liquidity is another common phenomenon of the second stage of expansions, as monetary policy starts to be tightened and liquidity is directed more towards the real economy and less towards speculation. This, too, often caps the upside for risk assets, though it doesn’t usually cause them to collapse (Chart 11). Chart 10EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply   Chart 11Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up   Table 2Who Will Raise Rates When? Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  While there are many factors that might cause market jitters over the coming months, the underlying picture is that robust growth is likely to continue and central banks will remain cautious about tightening too quickly. Excess savings will propel consumption, companies will need to increase capex to fulfill that demand, and the impact of fiscal stimulus is still coming through (Chart 12). The big central banks won’t raise rates for some time: The Fed perhaps in late-2022, but the ECB and the Bank of Japan not over the forecast horizon (Table 2). Decent growth and easy policy remains a positive backdrop for risk assets over the 12-month horizon. Chart 12Fiscal Stimulus Is Still Coming Through Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify   Garry Evans, Senior Vice PresidentChief Global Asset Allocation Strategistgarry@bcaresearch.comWhat Our Clients Are AskingHow Worried Should We Be About Inflation?Since the beginning of the year, we have argued that the current period of high inflation will be transitory. The market has adopted this view, with 5-year/5-year forward inflation expectations remaining at 2.2%. Chart 13Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory  However, we have grown worried about the possibility that inflation might be stickier at a higher level than we initially expected. Specifically, while it is true that prices of supply-constrained items – such as used cars – have started to ease, there are signs that higher inflation has began to broaden. Core CPI excluding pandemic-related items and cars has started to pick up, with its 6-month rate of change reaching its highest level in more than a decade (Chart 13, panel 1). Meanwhile 42% of the PCE basket grew at an annual rate of more than 5% in July, compared to just 24% in March.Currently, we are watching the behavior of prices in the housing and labor markets to check if our worries are justified. We pay particular attention to these sectors because price pressures in housing and labor can be self-sustaining, giving rise to inflationary spirals if left unchecked.What is happening to inflation in these areas? So far, the signals are mixed. Even though wage growth remains within the historical norm for now, any further advance in wages will take us to a decade high (Chart 13, panel 2). Likewise, annual growth of shelter cost remains low, though its 6-month change suggests that it will soon begin to rise to its pre-pandemic levels (Chart 13,  panel 3).Our base case continues to be that high inflation is transitory. That being said, we have positioned our portfolio to hedge for the risk that this view is wrong. We have given an overweight to real estate in our alternatives portfolio and within equities. Will Consumers Really Spend All Those Savings? Chart 14Low-Income Households Did Not Save Much Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  Generous unemployment benefits and the year-long lockdown have pushed up US excess savings over the past 18 months to an estimated $2.5 trillion, and the household savings ratio to 9.6% (Chart 14, panel 1). The consensus is that these savings will bolster consumer spending and support broad economic growth over the coming quarters. However, this expectation is based on the assumption that all consumers have accumulated savings, whereas the reality is a bit different.Survey results from the US Census Bureau show that households earning under $75,000, which have the highest propensity to consume, have almost entirely spent their first stimulus checks and three-quarters of their second and third checks on expenses and paying off debt. Even for those earning over $75,000, only 50% of those stimulus receipts have gone into savings (Chart 14, panel 2).With the labor market still not back to full employment (albeit mostly because of labor supply issues), enhanced unemployment benefits coming to an end, fears of further Covid variants and lockdowns, and higher inflation, could precautionary savings rise? The years following the Global Financial Crisis suggest that they might: The savings rate rose from 3% at the onset of the GFC to 8% five years after it (Chart 14, panel 3). A similar attitude among consumers this time could put a dent in US growth, given that consumption makes up about 70% of GDP.This raises the risk that consumption might slow over the coming quarters. In our latest Monthly Portfolio Outlook, we highlighted that consumption is shifting away from goods towards services. While value added from manufacturing is only 11% of GDP, the effect on markets might be bigger, since goods producers make up about 40% of US market cap. What Is The Risk Of A Big Upside Surprise In US Employment?The recovery of the labor market remains at the center of investors’ and Fed officials’ attention. The reluctance to return to the workforce mostly reflects overly generous unemployment benefits and fears of getting infected. With the fourth wave of the pandemic showing signs of cresting and benefits expiring, the consensus is that the unemployment gap will soon shrink. We would, however, question whether the labor market can surprise significantly to the upside and recover faster than the market currently implies. A swift recovery would push up bond yields and bring forward the Fed’s liftoff date, which could hurt the outlook for risk assets. Chart 15The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside  The number of men not in the labor force but who want a job has fallen back to the pre-pandemic level (Chart 15, panel 1). The sharp decline in this indicator in August coincided with the expiration of unemployment benefits in some Republican states. The overall Federal pandemic benefits program expired in early September. This should push even more people to return to the workforce (Chart 15, panel 2).However, there are still close to 3.5 million women (almost half a million above the pre-pandemic level) who are not in the labor force but would like a job: Some of these are keen to return to the workplace once they deem it safe for their children to get vaccinated and return to school. With governments eager to speed up vaccination rollouts and Pfizer’s recent announcement showing positive results of its Covid vaccine in trials on children under the age of 12, more women should return to the workforce.It is also worth noting that some of the most hard-hit sectors – such as leisure & hospitality – have already recovered over 80% of the jobs lost since February 2020. For sectors yet to reach such a high recovery rate, for example education & health services, returning workers have room to choose from jobs. For every job lost since the onset of the pandemic, there are now 2.1 job openings (Chart 15, panel 3). What Is The Risk Of Contagion From Evergrande?In September, Chinese property developer Evergrande failed to make an interest payment on an overseas bond issue. What would be the consequences for the Chinese and global economy if it went bankrupt? Chart 16Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted  Evergrande is big. Its debts are $306 billion, 2% of Chinese GDP. It has yet to build 1 million units that have already been paid for. It employs 200,000 people. And the issue is bigger. For years, investors have worried about China’s corporate debt, which is 160% of GDP (Chart 16). Chinese companies have issued almost $1 trillion of bonds in foreign currencies. The property market plays an outsized role in the economy: It comprises 66% of household wealth (versus 24% in the US); real estate and related industries amount to some 30% of GDP.The government will likely rescue Evergrande. But it faces a dilemma: For years it has been trying to reduce bad debt and stabilize house prices. It cannot bail out Evergrande’s creditors without undermining those efforts.It will probably aid apartment buyers, who have paid upfront for Evergrande properties, and make arrangements for domestic banks to swap their debt for equity or land holdings. But it won’t bail out equity owners or foreign bond holders. It will also not ease real-estate market restrictions, such as the “three red line” rules on property companies’ leverage. Such a package could damage Chinese individuals’ confidence in property, and foreigners willingness to provide capital to the industry.China may also announce a stimulus package to bolster the economy. But local governments are dependent on land sales for around a third of their income (Chart 17). If the property market is weak, the transmission mechanism of stimulus may be damaged. Finally, Chinese housing sales are highly correlated to global commodities prices, which may fall as a result (Chart 18). Chart 17Local Governments Depend On Land Sales Local Governments Depend On Land Sales Local Governments Depend On Land Sales   Chart 18A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities  BCA Research’s EM and China strategists do not see Evergrande as  likely to trigger a systemic crisis or crash, but it will reinforce the chronic credit tightening that has been underway in China.1Is It Time To Overweight Japanese Equities?Japanese equities staged a strong rally in the third quarter, outperforming the MSCI global equity index by about 5% in US dollar total return terms. On an absolute basis, the MSCI Japan price index in USD is near its 1989 historical high, even though the local-currency index is still more than 30% below its 1989 all-time high.We have been underweight Japanese equities in our global equity portfolio since July 2019, mainly due to unfavorable structural forces such as the aging population and chronic deflationary pressures. Japanese equities have tended to stage counter-trend bounces, some of which were quite significant in magnitude (Chart 19, panel 1). We therefore recommend clients move to the sidelines to avoid the potentially short-lived but sharp upside risk, supported by the following two considerations:First, foreign investors play a significant role in the Japanese equity market. The fact that MSCI Japan in USD terms is near its all-time high could trigger more foreign buying, given the positive correlation between the price index and price momentum (Chart 19, panels 3 and 5).Second, Japanese equities are among the cheapest globally, trading at a large discount to the global index. Currently, the discount is larger than its 3-year moving average, making it risky to underweight Japan.So why not overweight Japanese equities?The Japanese equity index is dominated by Industrials. It should benefit from our favorable view on this sector. However, Japan’s machinery and machine tool industries have heavy reliance on Asia, especially China. Orders from China have already rolled over with the Chinese PMI now in contractionary territory. In the meantime, the rolling-over of the US and European PMIs also does not bode well for orders from the other two large regions (Chart 20). Chart 19Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral   Chart 20Japan's Heavy External Reliance Japan's Heavy External Reliance Japan's Heavy External Reliance  We expect that China will eventually inject stimulus into its economy in a measured fashion such that the negative spillover to Japan and Europe may be limited. That’s why we are also taking profit in our underweight position on China after the recent sharp selloff in the offshore Chinese equity index (see page 18).Global EconomyOverview: The developed world continues to see strong growth, albeit at a slower pace than nine months ago. This is causing a more persistent – and more broad-based – rise in inflation, especially in the US, than was previously expected. However, the Fed is unlikely to raise rates for at least another 12 months, and the ECB and BOJ not on the forecast horizon. The biggest risk to global economic growth is the slowdown in China and now the troubles at Evergrande. We assume that the Chinese government will launch a stimulus to cushion the slowdown, but it may be less effective than the market expects. Chart 21US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend  US: Growth has been slowing relative to expectations all year (Chart 21, panel 1). Nonetheless, it is still well above trend. The September Markit PMIs remained high at 60.5 for manufacturing and 54.4 for services. Although consumer confidence has fallen back a little because of the third Covid wave in some southern states, retail sales in August were still up 15% year-on-year and 1.8% (ex autos) month-on-month. Growth seems set to remain above trend, as consumers spend their $2.5 trillion of excess savings, companies increase capex to ease supply-chain bottlenecks, and the government rolls out more fiscal spending. The IMF forecasts 4.9% real GDP growth in 2022, after 7.0% this year. Euro Area growth also remains robust, with the manufacturing and services PMIs at 58.7 and 56.3 respectively in September. Vaccination levels have risen (more quickly than in the US) and, as a consequence, lockdowns and international travel restrictions have been largely eased. Inflation pressures remain more restrained than in the US, with core CPI at only 1.6% (mainly pushed up by pandemic-related shortages) and the trimmed-mean CPI barely above zero. The ECB persuaded the market that its tapering, announced in September, is very dovish, and it is certainly true that – with its new 2% symmetrical inflation target – the ECB is not set to raise rates any time soon. The IMF’s forecasts are for 4.6% real GDP growth this year, and 4.3% next.Japan has generally lagged the recovery in the rest of the world, due to its structural headwinds, but it is now seeing some more robust data. Industrial production is up 12% year-on-year and exports 26%, although the PMIs still remain somewhat depressed at 51.2 for manufacturing and 47.4 for services in September. Japan’s initial slow vaccine rollout has recently accelerated and the percent of double-vaccinated adults now exceeds the US. This suggests that sluggish consumption (with retail sales up only 2% year-on-year) might start to recover. Markets got excited about the prospects for fiscal stimulus ahead of the general election, which has to be held by the end of November. We do not see new LDP leader Fumio Kishida, who is likely to win that election, making any significant change in policy. Chart 22China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply  Emerging Markets: China’s slowdown – and the government’s possible reaction to it with a large stimulus – dominate the outlook for Emerging Markets. Both China’s manufacturing and services PMIs are now below 50 (Chart 22, panel 3), and retail sales, industrial production and fixed-asset investment all surprised sharply on the downside last month. We expect an easing of policy, but only a moderate one. Elsewhere in Emerging Markets, central banks continue to struggle with the puzzle of whether they need to raise rates (as Russia, Brazil and Mexico have done) in the face of rising inflation and falling currencies, despite continuing underlying weakness in their economies. Interest Rates: US inflation looks stickier than believed three months ago, with a broadening of inflation away from just pandemic-affected items (see “How Worried Should We Be About Inflation?" on page 8). But inflation expectations are still well under control (Chart 22, panel 4) and so the Fed is likely to begin tapering only in December and not raise rates until end-2022. This will most likely cause a moderate rise in long-term rates with the 10-year US Treasury yield rising to 1.7% by year-end and 2-2.25% by the time of the first Fed rate hike. Inflation elsewhere in developed economies looks more subdued (except in the UK and Canada), and so long-term rates are likely to rise somewhat more slowly there.Global Equities Chart 23Watch Earning Revisions Watch Earning Revisions Watch Earning Revisions  Global equities ended the quarter more or less flat after a very strong performance in the first eight months of the year and a volatile September. Earnings growth continued its strong trend from the first half, powered by margin improvement in both the DM and EM universes. Consequently, the forward PE multiple contracted further (Chart 23).Going forward, despite worries about the potential spillover to the global economy and global financial markets from China’s Evergrande fiasco, the “earnings-driven” theme will likely continue. BCA’s global earnings model points to over 40% earnings growth for the next 12 months, and all sectors have positive forward earnings estimates. However, net revisions by analysts seem to be cresting as the global manufacturing PMI has rolled over from a very high level. Even though valuation is less stretched than at the beginning of the year, equities are still expensive by historical standards. In addition, central banks are preparing for an eventual withdrawal of their massive liquidity injections and there is still plenty of uncertainty concerning Covid variants. GAA has been cautiously optimistic so far this year with overweights on equities and cash relative to bonds, and overweight US equities relative to Japan, Europe and China. These positions have panned out well. After adjustments made in April and July, our sector portfolio has been well positioned by overweighting Industrials, Financials, Real Estate and Healthcare, underweighting Materials, Utilities and Consumer Staples, and being neutral on Tech, Consumer Discretionary and Communication Services. We have not made any changes to our sector recommendations this quarter.In accordance with our long-held belief of “taking risk where risk will likely be rewarded the most,” we make the following adjustments to our country allocations: close the underweights in China and Japan and the overweight in the UK; and initiate one new position: Underweight EM-ex-China. Overall, our country portfolio has a defensive tilt with an overweight in the US (defensive) and underweights in the euro area and EM-ex China (cyclical), while being neutral on the UK, Japan, Australia and Canada.  Country Allocation: Upgrade MSCI China And Japan, Downgrade UK And EM-ex-China. We have been underweight MSCI China and overweight the UK since April 2021, and underweight Japan since July 2019.The China underweight generated outperformance of 23% and the UK overweight -2%, while the Japanese position produced an outperformance of 7%. Chart 24Favor China vs The Rest of The EM Favor China vs The Rest of The EM Favor China vs The Rest of The EM  While the fate of Evergrande Group, China’s second largest property developer, remains uncertain, our view is that the government will come up with a restructuring plan to minimize damaging ripple effects on the Chinese economy. This view is supported by the behavior of the domestic A-share market and also the CNY/USD, which has diverged from the offshore equity market (Chart 24, Panel 5).BCA Research’s house view is that China will now stimulate its economy, but only at a measured pace. This means that further underperformance of MSCI China is likely to be limited relative to the global benchmark, as shown in Chart 24, panel 1. The ongoing deleveraging in the Chinese real estate sector, however, means that activity in the sector will probably slow further, reducing demand for construction materials. This may put a dent on the strength of metal prices, therefore negatively impacting the ex-China EM equity index, as shown in panel 2.Moreover, the relative performance of China vs non-China EM is approaching a very oversold level while the relative valuation measure is at an extreme (Chart 24, panels 3 and 4). As such, we switch our positioning by upgrading Chinese equities to neutral from underweight and downgrade EM ex China to underweight from neutral. This implies an overall underweight to Emerging Markets.We also close the UK overweight to support an upgrade in Japan (see more details on page 13). The UK overweight was largely based on a positive view of the GBP, which has now risen to fair value.Government Bonds Chart 25Watch Inflation In 2022 Watch Inflation in 2022 Watch Inflation in 2022  Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration. Global bond yields ignored the sharp rise in core inflation in Q3. The US 10-year Treasury yield actually declined in the first two months of the quarter in response to the muted inflation readings in non-Covid related segments of the economy. Even with the fast run-up in yields in September, the US 10-year yield finished the quarter at 1.52%, only about 5 bps higher than the level on June 30th (Chart 25).We have advised clients to focus on the jobs market to determine when the Fed will lift the Fed Funds Rate off its zero bound because of the Fed’s emphasis on “maximum employment” as a pre-condition for this. However, the Fed has not clearly defined what “maximum employment” means. According to calculations by our US bond strategists, the US unemployment rate will fall to 3.8%, with a 63% participation rate, by the end of 2022 if job creation averages a reasonably achievable 414,000 per month until then. Our bond strategists think that the Fed will be forced to clarify its definition of “maximum unemployment” over the coming months and, as we get close to it next year, the key indicator to watch will shift back to inflation. If inflation remains high, then the Fed will be quicker to declare that the labor market is at “maximum employment”, and vice versa.Currently, the overnight index swap curve indicates the first rate hike will be in January 2023 with a total rate increase of 123 bps by the end of 2024. BCA Research’s house view is that the Fed will announce its first hike in December 2022 and will hike at a faster pace than what is priced in by the market. This is based on our view that unemployment will likely reach 3.5% by end-2022 with inflation above the Fed’s target. This would suggest that long-term rates will rise too, and so bond investors should remain below benchmark duration.Corporate BondsSince the beginning of the year, investment-grade credit has provided roughly 200 basis points of excess return over duration-matched Treasurys, while high-yield bonds have generated almost 600 basis points. Chart 26Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit  We continue to have a neutral allocation to investment-grade credits within the fixed-income category. While supportive monetary policy should generally favor spread product, we believe there is much better value to be found outside investment-grade bonds, since these bonds are currently trading at historically high valuation levels (Chart 26, panel 1).We think valuations look much more attractive in the high-yield space, and as a result remain overweight within the fixed-income category. Our US Bond Strategy service expects the share of defaults in the space to fall to between 2.3% and 2.8% – below the default rate currently priced in by the market (Chart 26, panel 2). Within high yield, we prefer B-rated bonds since they offer the most attractive spread pickup on a risk-adjusted basis.What about EM debt? Currently we are cautious on EM corporate debt. The default of Chinese real estate developer Evergrande is likely to have ripple effects throughout EM credit markets and currencies. There are already signs of considerable strains, with EM corporate spreads starting to rise (Chart 26, panel 3).  We recommend that investors focus on EM sovereign issuers such as Mexico, Russia, and Malaysia, given that they provide a significant yield pickup over US bonds with comparable credit ratings, and are less likely to default than their corporate counterparts.CommoditiesEnergy (Overweight): Oil prices are likely to remain close to current levels for the remainder of this year. However, recovering demand – particularly from Emerging Markets – and production discipline by the OPEC 2.0 coalition should support prices over the next two years. Given this backdrop, our Commodity & Energy strategists expect the price of Brent crude to average $75 and $80 per barrel in 2022 and 2023 respectively, with WTI trading $2-$4/bbl lower. Chart 27Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term  Industrial Metals (Neutral): Industrial metals’ prices have bifurcated. Those relating to alternative energy, such as copper, nickel and cobalt, continue to rise and are up 30% on average since the beginning of the year. Iron ore on the other hand has taken a colossal hit, falling over 53% from its May high. The knock-on effects of accelerating Chinese production cuts and softening economic activity, as well as Evergrande’s debt woes, will continue to put downward pressure on prices. In the short-term, we do not expect a significant rebound. However, in the longer-term, demand will recover – particularly if China implements significant stimulus – and supply will remain tight, which will help metal prices to recover.Precious Metals (Neutral): Gold prices did not react positively to the decline in US real rates over the past quarter. In fact, gold prices are slightly down, by ~1.5% since the start of July (Chart 27, panel 4). We expect real rates to rise as economic growth and the labor market recover and the Fed turns slightly more hawkish, while inflation moderates as base and pandemic effects abate. Rising real rates are a negative factor for the gold price. Nevertheless, inflation is likely to be a bit stickier than the market is currently pricing in, and we therefore maintain a neutral exposure to gold, since it is a good inflation hedge.CurrenciesUS Dollar Chart 28Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet  Since we went from underweight to neutral on the dollar in April, the DXY has risen by only 1%. Our position remains the same for this quarter. On the one hand, momentum – one of the most reliable indicators for cyclical movements in the dollar – has turned firmly positive. Moreover, pain in the Chinese real-estate sector should weight on commodities and emerging markets – a development which historically has been bullish for the USD (Chart 28, panel 1). However, not all is good news for the greenback. Relative growth and inflation trends are starting to rebound in the rest of the world vis-à-vis the US (Chart 28, panel 2). Additionally, speculators are now firmly overweight the USD, and it remains expensive by 11% relative to PPP fair value. We believe that these forces could eventually be strong enough for the dollar bear market to resume. As a result, we are putting the US dollar on downgrade watch. Canadian DollarWe believe that there is upside to the Canadian dollar. Canada’s employment market is recovering faster than in the US, which should prompt the BoC to normalize interest rates before the Fed. Additionally, while many commodities are likely to suffer as China’s real estate market slows, oil should hold up relatively well since its demand is not as dependent on the Chinese economy. As a result, we are upgrading the CAD from neutral to overweight. Australian DollarWe remain underweight the AUD. While it is true that the AUD is now cheap on a PPP basis, weakness in iron ore from a slowing Chinese real-estate market should continue to weigh on the Aussie dollar. Chinese YuanWe are negative on the yuan on a cyclical basis. Interest-rate differentials should start moving against this currency (Chart 28, panel 3). While the Fed is likely to tighten policy as the labor market enters full employment, Chinese authorities will ease monetary policy to avert a full-blown crisis in their real-estate market.Alternatives Chart 29Outlook Remains Favorable For Private Equity And Real Estate Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  Return Enhancers: With public markets expensive and unlikely to provide investors with more than single-digit returns, the focus has shifted to alternative assets, particularly private equity (PE). Performance continues to be impressive, with an annualized return of 59% in Q4 2020 (Chart 29, panel 1). This supports our previous research that funds raised during recessions and early in expansions tend to outperform those raised late-cycle. Distributions from existing positions should allow limited partners (LPs – the investors who provide capital to PE funds) to commit to newer funds. Data from Preqin shows that more than $610 billion has been raised so far during 2021 (Chart 29, panel 2). We continue to favor Private Equity over Hedge Funds.Inflation Hedges: Last year’s inflationary pressures should moderate over the coming months as base effects and supply chain bottlenecks abate. Given this backdrop, we maintain our positive view on real estate versus commodity futures. Commodity prices have already shot up over the past 18 months and have limited upside from current levels: Energy prices are up by 61% since the beginning of the year, industrial metals 24%, and agriculture 17%. Over the past 15 years, REITs outperformed commodity futures when inflation was between 0% and 3% (Chart 29, panel 3). There are opportunities within the real-estate sector, despite our concerns about weaknesses in some segments of commercial real estate such as prime office property in major cities.Volatility Dampeners: We continue to favor farmland and timberland over structured products, particularly mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Farmland offers attractive yields and should continue to provide the best portfolio protection in the event of any market distress. MBS spreads, on the other hand, while wider than the pre-pandemic level, remain tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancing (Chart 29, panel 4).Risks To Our ViewOur main scenario is based on a Goldilocks-like view of the world: That growth will be robust, but not so strong as to push up inflation further and cause central banks to turn hawkish. The risks, therefore, are that the environment turns out to be either too hot or too cold. Chart 30A Resurgence Of Covid A Resurgence Of Covid A Resurgence Of Covid  What could cause growth to slow? Covid remains the biggest risk. Cases are still high in many countries, and could rise again as people socialize indoors during the colder months (Chart 30). A more virulent strain is not inconceivable. Governments will be reluctant to impose lockdowns again, but consumers might become wary about going out.We have written elsewhere (see page 11) about the risks coming from a China slowdown and the aftermath of the Evergrande affair. A policy mistake is not improbable: The Chinese authorities want to stimulate the economy, but at the same time keep a lid on property prices. That will be a hard balance to achieve. Slower Chinese growth would hurt commodity producers and many Emerging Markets. Other risks to growth include fiscal tightening as employment-support schemes end and countries look to repair their budget positions (Chart 31), consumers building up precautionary savings and not spending their excess cash (see page 9), and problems caused by rising energy prices.Our view remains that the currently high inflation is transitory. But it is proving quite sticky and could remain high for a while. Inflation expectations are well anchored for the moment (Chart 32) but could rise above central banks’ comfort-zones if recorded core inflation in the US, for example, currently 3.6%, stays above 3% for another 12 months. This could bring forward the date of the first Fed rate hike (currently priced in for January 2023), raise long-term rates and, in turn, push up the dollar. A combination of rising US rates and a stronger dollar would have very negative consequences for heavily indebted Emerging Market economies. Chart 31Fiscal Drag Fiscal Drag Fiscal Drag   Chart 32Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations   Footnotes1 Please see China Investment Strategy Report "The Evergrande Saga Continues," dated September 29, 2021 and Emerging Markets Strategy Report "On Chinese Internet Stocks, Real Estate And Overall EM," dated September 16, 2021,  available at https://www.bcaresearch.com/GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights The current burst of inflation in developed economies is due to a (negative) supply shock rather than a (positive) demand shock. Consumer complaints of “poor buying conditions” mean that higher prices will cause demand destruction. Hence, it is extremely dangerous for central banks to respond with the signalling of tighter policy that leads to higher bond yields. The upper limit to the 10-year T-bond yield is no higher than 1.8 percent. Hence, this yield level would be a good cyclical entry point into both stocks and bonds. Continue to underweight consumer discretionary versus the market, given the very tight connection between weaker spending on durables and the underperformance of the goods dominated consumer discretionary sector. Commodities whose prices have not yet corrected are at much greater risk than those whose prices have corrected. Hence a new cyclical recommendation is to go underweight tin versus iron ore. Fractal analysis: Netflix versus Activision Blizzard, and AUD/NZD. Feature Chart of the Week"Buying Conditions Are Poor" "Buying Conditions Are Poor" "Buying Conditions Are Poor" The current burst of inflation in developed economies is due to a (negative) supply shock rather than a (positive) demand shock. Getting this diagnosis right is crucial, because responding to supply shock generated inflation with tighter monetary policy is extremely dangerous. Responding to supply shock generated inflation with tighter monetary policy is extremely dangerous. The current burst of inflation cannot be due to a demand shock. If it was, aggregate demand would be surging. But it is not. For example, in the US, both consumer spending and income lie precisely on their pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-2). Furthermore, consumers are complaining that high prices for household durables, homes, and cars have caused “the poorest buying conditions in decades”, according to the University of Michigan’s latest consumer sentiment survey. If a positive demand shock was boosting incomes relative to prices, consumers would not be making this complaint. Given that they are making this complaint, there is the real risk of demand destruction. Meanwhile, employment remains far below its pre-pandemic trend. For example, in the US, by about 8 million jobs (Chart I-3). How can demand be on trend, but employment so far below trend? As an economic identity, the answer is that productivity has surged. Yet this should come as no surprise, because after recessions, productivity always surges. Chart I-2Demand Is On Trend... Demand Is On Trend... Demand Is On Trend... Chart I-3...But Employment Is Well Below Trend ...But Employment Is Well Below Trend ...But Employment Is Well Below Trend After Recessions, Productivity Always Surges As we explained in What The Olympics Teaches Us About Productivity Growth, productivity growth comes from better biology (which improves both our physical and intellectual capacity), better technology, and finding better ways to do the same thing. Of these three drivers, the first two are continuous processes but the third, finding better ways to do the same thing, is a step function whose up-steps come after disruptive changes in the economy such as recessions (Chart I-4). Chart I-4After Recessions, Productivity Always Surges After Recessions, Productivity Always Surges After Recessions, Productivity Always Surges To do things better, a recession is the necessary catalyst for the wholesale adoption of an existing technology. For example, the mass manufacturing of autos already existed well before the Great Depression, but the Depression catalysed its wholesale adoption. Likewise, word processors existed well before the dot com bust, but the 2000 recession finally killed the office typing pool. In the same way, the technology for remote meetings and online shopping has been around for years, but the pandemic has catalysed its wholesale adoption. Of course, it is sub-optimal to meet people remotely or shop online all the time. But it is also sub-optimal to do these things in-person all the time. The most productive way is some hybrid of remote and in-person, which will differ for each person. The pandemic has given us the opportunity to find this personally optimal hybrid, and thereby to boost our productivity. The current boost to productivity could be larger than those after previous recessions because the pandemic has reshaped the entire economy. The current boost to productivity could be larger than those after previous recessions because the pandemic has forced us all to challenge our best practices. This is different from previous post-recession periods where transformations were focussed in one sector. For example, the 80s recession reshaped manufacturing, the dot com bust changed the technology sector, and the 2008 recession transformed the financial sector. By comparison, the current transformation is reshaping the entire economy. Yet, if productivity is booming, why has inflation spiked? The answer is that we have experienced a massive and unprecedented (negative) supply shock. It’s A Supply Shock, Not A Demand Shock To repeat, there has been no positive shock in aggregate demand. Yet there has been a massive shock in the distribution of this demand. Pandemic restrictions on socialising, interacting, and movement meant that leisure, hospitality, in-person shopping, and travel services were unavailable. As spending on services slumped, consumers shifted their firepower to items that could be enjoyed within the pandemic’s confines; namely, durable goods (Chart I-5). Chart I-5A Massive Displacement In The Distribution Of Demand Led To Supply Shocks A Massive Displacement In The Distribution Of Demand Led To Supply Shocks A Massive Displacement In The Distribution Of Demand Led To Supply Shocks The problem is that modern supply chains have few, if any, built-in redundancies. They are always working ‘just in time’ and cannot cope with any surge in demand. To make matters worse, the type of goods in high demand also shifted: for example, from electronic goods during full lockdown – to cars when lockdowns eased, and people required local mobility. These shifting spikes in demand stressed and indeed snapped fragile supply chains, resulting in skyrocketing prices for durables. To assess the contribution to overall inflation, we need to gauge the deviation from the pre-pandemic trend. Relative to where they would have been, prices are higher by 0.5 percent for services, 1 percent for non- durables, but by a staggering 10 percent for durables. It follows that most of the current burst of inflation is due to the supply shock for durables (Chart of the Week). But now, consumer complaints that “buying conditions are poor” imply that high prices risk demand destruction as people wait for better conditions (lower prices) to make non-essential purchases. In any case, as we learn to live with the pandemic, the shock in the distribution of demand is easing. Meaning that the abnormally high spending on durable goods has a long way to fall. Furthermore, supply bottlenecks always clear as output responds with a lag. This risks unleashing a flood of supply just as higher prices have destroyed demand. Add to this mix a slowdown, or worse a slump, in China’s real estate and construction sector as we highlighted last week in The Real Risk Is Real Estate (Part 2). And the irony is that, for many global sectors, there could be a demand shock after all but it would be a negative demand shock. Three Investment Recommendations As consumers’ current complaints of poor buying conditions testify, the higher prices that come from a supply shock eventually lead to demand destruction. Hence, it is extremely dangerous for central banks to respond with tighter policy, including the signalling of tighter policy that leads to higher bond yields. The higher bond yields will, with a lag, choke demand just as the supply bottlenecks ease and unleash a flood of supply. Resulting in a deflationary shock for the economy, stock market, and commodities (Chart I-6). Chart I-6When Supply Shocks Ease, Prices Slump When Supply Shocks Ease, Prices Slump When Supply Shocks Ease, Prices Slump On this basis, we are making three investment recommendations: The upper limit to the 10-year T-bond is no higher than 1.8 percent, as we detailed in Stocks, Not The Economy, Will Set The Upper Limit To Bond Yields. Hence, this yield level would be a good cyclical entry point into both stocks and bonds. Continue to underweight consumer discretionary plays versus the market, given the very tight connection between spending on durables and the relative performance of the goods dominated consumer discretionary plays in the stock market. As supply shocks always ultimately ease, those commodities whose prices have not yet corrected are at much greater risk than those commodities whose prices have corrected. Specifically, the price of industrial metals such as tin are at their most stretched versus iron ore in a decade (Chart I-7). Moreover, this fragility is confirmed by fractal analysis (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-7Tin Is Very Stretched Versus Iron Ore Tin Is Very Stretched Versus Iron Ore Tin Is Very Stretched Versus Iron Ore Chart I-8Tin Is Fragile Tin Is Fragile Tin Is Fragile Chart I-9Tin Versus Iron Ore Is Fragile Tin Versus Iron Ore Is Fragile Tin Versus Iron Ore Is Fragile Hence, as a new cyclical recommendation, go underweight tin versus iron ore. Netflix Versus Activision Blizzard, And AUD/NZD Are Susceptible To Reversal In pure entertainment plays, the strong outperformance of Netflix versus Activision Blizzard has been fuelled by the delta wave of the virus, which helped Netflix, combined with the Chinese crackdown on gaming companies, which weighed down the whole gaming sector including Activision. The gaming company was also hit by a discrimination lawsuit, which it has now settled. Fractal analysis suggests that this strong outperformance is now fragile. Accordingly, the recommended trade is to short Netflix versus Activision Blizzard, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Netflix Versus Activision Blizzard Is Susceptible To Reversal Netflix Versus Activision Blizzard Is Susceptible To Reversal Netflix Versus Activision Blizzard Is Susceptible To Reversal Meanwhile, in foreign exchange, the recent sell-off in AUD/NZD has reached fragility on the 130-day dimension which has reliably signalled previous reversal points (Chart I-11). Hence, the recommended trade is long AUD/NZD, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 2 percent. Chart I-11AUD/NZD Is Likely To Rebound AUD/NZD Is Likely To Rebound AUD/NZD Is Likely To Rebound   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural And Thematic Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations