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High-Yield

Highlights A number forward-looking indicators for EM corporate profits point to a major deceleration in the next several months, and potentially a contraction early next year. The most reliable forward-looking indicators for EM EPS have been EM/China narrow and broad money growth and they herald a bearish outlook for EM EPS. We continue deciphering the differences between China's various money and credit aggregates. Irrespective of which money measure we use, and regardless of their past track record, all of them are currently extremely weak and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. We recommend shifting the underweight EM corporate and sovereign credit position versus U.S. high-yield to underweight versus U.S. investment-grade corporate credit. Feature Chart I-1Asian Exports And EM EPS The recovery in EM earnings per share (EPS) has been instrumental to the EM stock rally this year. As such, the equity strategy at the moment hinges on the outlook for corporate profits. In this report, we revisit coincident and leading indicators for EM profits. At the moment, EM corporate profit growth still appears robust, though several forward-looking indicators point to a major deceleration in the next several months, and potentially a contraction early next year. Korean and Taiwanese exports can be used as proxy for global trade. The latest data for July reveal that the sum of Taiwanese exports and Korean total exports excluding vessels has rolled over (Chart I-1). Historically, the U.S. dollar values of both economies' exports have correlated with EM EPS, and Chart I-1 entails that EM EPS growth will roll over very soon. The reason why we exclude vessel exports in the case of Korea is because vessel shipments are one-off occurrences and when they take place, they distort export growth. This was the case in the last several months - vessel (shipbuilding) exports surged by 75% from a year ago, distorting the annual growth rate of total exports. Overall, Korea's and Taiwan's overseas shipments in the past three months have averaged about 10%, which is lower than the mid-teen growth rates recorded earlier this year. In China, export growth is close to 9% in the past three months, and it is also rolling over. On a similar note, Korea's and Taiwanese shipments-to-inventory ratios lead EM EPS cycles, and they are presently sending a downbeat message (Chart I-2). China's import growth has relapsed, as suggested by both Chinese trade data and their counterparties export data to China (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Asia's Shipment-To-Inventory Ratios And EM EPS Chart I-3Exports To China And Chinese Imports The recovery in Chinese imports has been responsible for a considerable part of the recovery in global trade. Importantly, Chinese import cycles correlate very well with EM EPS growth (Chart I-4). The key pillar of our view remains that Chinese imports will contract going forward, which will depress both advanced and developing countries' shipments to China. Exports to China are much more important for EM than DM economies, and deteriorating sales to China will weigh considerably on EM profits and currencies. The most reliable forward-looking indicators for EM EPS have been EM/China narrow and broad money growth. Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B demonstrate that both EM narrow (M1) growth and China's broad money impulse (the second derivative) - herald a major slump in EM EPS. This is the main reason behind our negative stance on EM share prices and other risk assets. Chart I-4Chinese Imports And EM EPS Chart I-5AChina Broad Money Impulse And EM EPS Chart I-5BEM Narrow Money And EM EPS Both narrow and broad money growth in China have already relapsed, and it is a matter of time until economic growth and imports downshift enough to produce a major selloff in EM risk assets. We discuss China's monetary aggregates in the section below. Finally, if Chinese imports and commodities prices relapse, any reasonable strength in DM domestic demand will not be sufficient to preclude a meaningful EM slowdown. The basis is that exports to the U.S. and EU only make up 7% of GDP for China, 8% for Korea and 11% for Taiwan. While exports to China account for 10% of Korean GDP and 15% of Taiwanese GDP. The same holds true for most East Asian countries. With the exceptions of India and Turkey, non-Asian EM countries are primarily commodities producers. These two have their own idiosyncratic problems. Most of our analysis is not applicable to smaller central European economies that are leveraged to the EU business cycle. That said, neither Turkey, India, nor central European markets have large enough financial markets to make a difference in the EM benchmarks. The above is the primary reason behind our bearish view on EM growth and profits. That said, there are a few other interesting considerations regarding EM corporate profits dynamics. First, EM share prices lead EM EPS by six to nine months. Therefore, to be bullish on EM stocks, it is not sufficient to expect EM EPS growth to be robust over the next three months. Rather, to be bullish on EM stocks at the current juncture, one should have a bullish view on EM EPS by the end of this year and into the early part of 2018. Consistently, we believe that EM EPS growth will decelerate materially by the end of this year and shrink in the early part of 2018. Second, the top-line shrinkage in 2015 and the consequent recovery for EM exporters has been mostly driven by prices rather than volumes. Chart I-6A illustrate that Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese manufacturing production growth is rather muted. Chart I-6ACorporate Pricing Power Chart I-6BAsian Manufacturing Production Price fluctuations affect profits much more than output volume changes. Therefore, if global tradable goods prices deflate - at the moment they have rolled over (Chart I-6B) - EM EPS will contract materially. Third, in EM excluding China, Korea and Taiwan, there has been little economic recovery, as evidenced by Chart I-7. Along the same lines, the latest (July) manufacturing PMI for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has dropped below the crucial 50 line (Chart I-7, bottom panel). This and the majority of other economic aggregates we use are equity market-cap weighted averages, so they are relevant to investors. This corroborates the fact that outside China, Korea and Taiwan there has been little genuine growth improvement in EM domestic demand - despite the decent recovery in global trade. This challenges the prevailing widespread consensus of a synchronized global economic recovery/expansion. This is also consistent with the fact that the overwhelming EM profit recovery has occurred in technology and resource sectors while domestic sectors have not seen much of corporate earnings recovery (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##No Strong Recovery Chart I-8EM Sectors' EPS: Exporters ##br##Have Outperformed Domestic Finally, bottom-up equity analysts have recently downgraded their EPS estimates for listed EM companies (Chart I-9). Typically, analysts alter their forecasts simultaneously with swings in share prices. Hence, the latest decoupling is puzzling. Chart I-9EM EPS And Analysts' Net Revisions Notably, EM net EPS revisions have failed to move into positive territory in the past 7 years. This entails that analysts' expectations have been chronically high in recent years, and/or that companies have failed to deliver profits that match these projections. Bottom Line: The EM EPS outlook is downbeat, and listed companies profits will likely contract early next year. Deciphering China's Money Puzzle Based on our assessment of multiple measures, our conclusion with respect to Chinese broad money growth is as follows: Irrespective of which measure we use, and regardless of their individual past track records, all Chinese monetary growth aggregates are currently weak (Chart 10), and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. In recent weeks, we have been working to understand differences among various measures of money growth in China. Our motivation is because neither M2 nor total social financing and fiscal spending - variables that we relied on last year - did a good job of forecasting the duration and magnitude of China's economic and profit revival in the past 12 months. In our July 26 report,1 we introduced the concept of broad money calculated using commercial banks' assets. We called it credit-money. This week, we discuss a different broad money calculation based on commercial banks' liabilities, and refer to it as deposit-money. Deposit-money is an aggregate of non-financial companies' time and demand deposits, household deposits, transferable and other deposits, other liabilities, bonds issued and liabilities to non-depository financial corporations. This measure is broader than official broad money (M2) because the latter includes only non-financial companies' time and demand deposits, household deposits and some of liabilities to non-depository financial corporations. In brief, our deposit-money calculation is more comprehensive than the official broad money figures (M2). In turn, banks' credit-money is the sum of commercial banks' claims on companies, households, non-bank financial institutions and all levels of government, as well as banks' foreign assets. Also, we deduct government deposits at the central bank (see July 26 Emerging Markets Strategy report1 for more details). Chart I-10 illustrates the differences between credit-money, deposit-money, total social financing and M2. Based on our calculations, deposit-money grew faster in 2015-'16 than both M2 and total social financing. Yet its current and ongoing slowdown is as bad as that of credit-money or M2. Chart I-10Dichotomy Among Various Money And Credit Aggregates In China The reason why M2 growth has lagged behind deposit-money growth since the middle of 2015 until now is the fact that the latter's components that are not included in the official M2 measure have outpaced M2 growth by a wide margin since late 2015. The main components of deposit-money are shown in Chart I-11. This is one of the main reasons why we missed the latest China-play rally - we relied on the official measure of money and credit published by the PBoC that has been much tamer than the broader money and credit, as banks have originated credit and hence money in a way that official monetary aggregates have not captured. In addition, banks' credit-money and deposit-money measures should theoretically be identical, but this has not been the case in China in recent years. Deposit-money is larger and it may well be more comprehensive than credit-money (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China: Components Of Deposit-Money Aggregate Chart I-12The Outstanding Stock And Flow Of Money Understanding these discrepancies is an ongoing work-in-progress for us, and we will be refining these measures going forward. For now, we would say that these differences are probably due to banks' efforts to misrepresent/hide their assets and liabilities to meet the regulatory ratios and avoid penalties, as well as maximize short-term profits. All that said, the gaps between M2 and deposit-money has recently narrowed: both deposit-money and M2 growth and their impulses are at all-time lows (Chart I-13). Furthermore, we expect deposit-money to slow further because of the lagged impact of higher interest rates and regulatory tightening that is intended to curb commercial banks' ability to originate more money via shadow banking activities. Finally, as can be seen from Chart I-14A, Chart I-14B and Chart I-15, deposit-money's impulse - its second derivative - leads many cyclical economic variables such as nominal GDP, producer prices, freight index, and imports. Chart I-13China: Two Measures Of Broad Money Chart I-14ADeposit-Money Leads Real Business Cycle Chart I-14BDeposit-Money Leads Real Business Cycle There are several other data points from China's real economy that portend developing weakness. Specifically, car sales growth has almost ground to a halt, real estate floor space sold and started are decelerating (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Deposit-Money Leads Metals Prices And Construction Chart I-16China: More Signs Of Slowdown Bottom Line: Regardless of which money measure we use, and regardless of their past track record, all of them are currently weak and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. This gives us confidence in reiterating our negative view on China plays (including commodities) and EM. Credit Markets Strategy We have been recommending a strategy of shorting/underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit versus U.S. high-yield (HY) credit and this strategy has shown strong performance, producing 15% gains with low volatility since August 2011 (Chart I-17). However, today we recommend shifting the underweight EM corporate and sovereign credit position from U.S. HY to U.S. investment grade (IG) corporate credit. The primary reason is that credit spreads are extremely tight and odds favor credit spreads widening in both U.S. and EM. Chart I-18 shows that when U.S. TIPS yields rise U.S. IG usually outperforms U.S. HY on an excess return basis. We expect U.S. Treasurys and TIPS yields to grind higher in the near term because U.S. growth and inflation are much stronger than the bond market is currently pricing in. Chart I-17Book Gains On This Strategy Chart I-18Higher U.S. Bond (TIPS) Yields Warrant Rotation Rising U.S. bond yields also warrants EM credit underperformance versus U.S. IG because the EM credit benchmark is riskier than U.S. IG. While the two segments have similar durations, the duration times spread measure of risk is greater for EM credit. Furthermore, U.S. HY spreads have narrowed versus both EM sovereign and corporate spreads since early 2016 (Chart I-19, top panel). Hence, there is little value favoring the former versus EM credit. In contrast, U.S. IG spreads versus both EM sovereign and corporate credit are appealing historically (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Therefore, there is a valuation aspect to this strategy change. Relative spread differences have historically correlated quite well with the subsequent 12-month return. Given where relative spreads are, the subsequent 12-month return for investing in U.S. IG relative EM credit is positive (Chart I-20, top panel) but it is negative for investing in U.S. HY versus EM credit (Chart I-20, bottom panel). Chart I-19EM Credit Offers Value Relative ##br##To U.S. HY But Not Versus U.S. IG Chart I-20Projected Returns Of EM Credit ##br##To Both U.S. IG And HY As to the rationale of favoring U.S. credit to EM credit, this is consistent with our theme that the growth outlook, corporate leverage, and health of the banking system are in much better shape in the U.S. than in EM. Bottom Line: Book profits on the short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long U.S. HY credit position. Institute a new position: short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long U.S. IG corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd", dated July 26, 2017, link available on page 18. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Highlights GFIS Portfolio: The GFIS model bond portfolio has lagged its benchmark index since inception last September and since our previous performance update in April. All of that underperformance can be accounted for this month, however, given the risk-off moves seen in global financial markets. As investors begin to shift their attention away from the current geopolitical blustering over North Korea and back towards the solid global economic upturn, our current tilts should begin to outperform again. Risk Management: We have successfully raised the amount of overall portfolio risk (tracking error) since our last portfolio performance update in April. The tracking error remains below our self-imposed limit of 100bps, however, giving us the ability to make further adjustments to our tilts as opportunities arise. Tactical Overlay: Our Tactical Overlay trades have delivered a positive average return over the past year, led by the current open trades that have produced an average gain of +30bps. Feature In this Special Report, we are presenting a performance update for our Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. We did the first such update back in mid-April, and we will continue to publish periodic portfolio reviews going forward. As a reminder to our readers, the GFIS model portfolio is intended to be a tool for us to both communicate and evaluate our fixed income investment recommendations. By putting actual weightings to each of our country and sector calls, against a bond benchmark index with an overall portfolio risk limit, we are aiming to express the convictions of our views in a manner more in line with the actual day-to-day portfolio trade-offs faced by bond managers. The model portfolio is a relatively new addition to the GFIS service, starting only in September 2016, thus the return history is still limited. We have built out several pieces of the GFIS model portfolio framework over the past year, and the process is nearing completion. We now have a custom performance benchmark index that reflects the universe of fixed income sectors that we regularly cover in GFIS (essentially, the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index plus riskier fixed income classes like High-Yield corporates). We also have performance measurement metrics and a way to regularly present the portfolio returns, while we have also added a risk management (tracking error) element to help size our relative tilts. The final piece will be to incorporate our corporate bond sector recommendations within the model portfolio, both as a source of potential return and a use of our risk budget (tracking error). We intend to add that final element in the coming weeks. Overall Performance Review: Winners & Losers Chart 1GFIS Model Portfolio Performance As of August 11th, the GFIS model portfolio has produced a total return of +0.93% (hedged into U.S. dollars) since inception on September 20, 2016 (Chart 1). This has underperformed our custom benchmark index by -14bps. Since our last performance review on April 18th, the model portfolio has lagged the benchmark by -10bps. The portfolio has suffered in the risk-off environment seen so far in August, with a -14bp underperformance seen month-to-date, equal to the entire underperformance since inception. Our core structural positions of maintaining a below-benchmark duration stance, while staying underweight government bonds versus overweight spread product, have all suffered of late (bottom two panels). Our government bond country allocation has been the biggest overall drag on returns (Table 1) since last September (-26bps versus our benchmark). Japan (+5bps) and Spain (+3bps) have been the biggest positive contributors since inception, while Italy, the U.K. and France have a combined underperformance of -31bps. That more than accounts for the entire underperformance of the government bond sleeve of the model portfolio since inception (Chart 2). Since our last portfolio update in April, our government bond allocations have lagged our benchmark index by -29bps. Small gains in Spain and Germany (+2bps each) have been dwarfed by underperformance in the U.S. (-16bps), Italy (-10bps) and France (-5bps). Across almost every country, our below-benchmark duration positioning has translated into a bear-steepening yield curve bias, as we have been recommending substantially reduced exposure to the 10+ year maturity buckets in the major countries (U.S., Germany, France, Italy, and Japan). The bull-flattening of global yield curves between March and June, led by a downturn in inflation expectations, was more than large enough to offset any of the potential benefits from our country allocation. Yield curves did began to bear-steepen in July after the European Central Bank (ECB) sent signals that a tapering of its asset purchase program next year was increasingly likely. That move has quickly reversed this month, however, as financial markets have shifted to a risk-off stance on the back of rising geopolitical tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Table 1A Detailed Breakdown Of The GFIS Model Portfolio Chart 2GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country The news is better with regards to our global spread product allocations. Those have delivered a total return of +1.41% since last September (beating the benchmark by +12bps) and +0.98% since the last performance review in April (+19bps versus the benchmark). Our allocations to U.S. Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) have combined for a +30bps outperformance since September and a +23bps outperformance since April (Chart 3). Euro Area corporate debt has been a modest drag, with the combined allocation to IG and HY debt underperforming by -7bps since September and -3bps since April. Emerging Market corporate debt contributed -2bps of underperformance, while U.K. IG corporates added +1bp of excess return. Chart 3GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution Among other spread sectors, U.S. Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) have generated a -12bps contribution to our excess return, although this entirely came from a period immediately after the inception of our model portfolio (Sept-Nov 2016) where we briefly moved to a tactical overweight stance. We have since maintained a structural underweight posture on U.S. MBS, but this has barely generated any relative performance (-1bp) since our last portfolio review in April. Net-net, the GFIS model portfolio has generally performed in line with where our recommendations are concentrated, both in absolute terms and on a relative basis between sectors. Our below-benchmark stance on overall duration has suffered as the government bond yield curves have exhibited more volatility than trend. At the same time, our structural overweights on global corporate debt, favoring the U.S. over non-U.S. equivalents, have contributed positively to the overall portfolio performance. In Charts 4-7, we show the relative performance of some individual countries and sectors that are part of our GFIS benchmark index. We specifically singled out our major asset allocation calls between sectors made over the past year, with a vertical line drawn at the date when the change was recommended. The data shown in all three charts is the relative performance of each tilt on a duration-adjusted basis and (where applicable) hedged back into U.S. dollars, indexed to 100 at the date of implementation in our model portfolio. Shown this way, we can evaluate the success of the timing of our calls. Our shift to an overweight stance on U.S. corporate debt versus U.S. Treasuries both for IG and HY in the first quarter of this year can be judged a success both in terms of timing and magnitude, with IG outperforming Treasuries by 217bps and HY outperforming by 826bps (Chart 4). Within our HY allocation, we left some performance on the table by concentrating our overweights on the higher-rated credit tiers (bottom panel), but this was a move we felt comfortable with (and still do) as a way of staying a bit up in quality at a time when lower-rated spreads were looking fully valued. In terms of our cross-Atlantic credit allocation, we shifted to an overweight stance on U.S. corporates versus Euro Area equivalents back on January 31st of this year (Chart 5). Since then, U.S. IG has underperformed Euro Area IG by -142bps, but U.S. HY has outperformed by a much larger 581bps. Taken together, these positions have contributed positively to the overall performance of the model portfolio. We continue to like U.S. corporates over Euro Area corporates from a valuation standpoint, thus we are keeping this tilt in the portfolio. Chart 4Our Overweights On##BR##U.S. Corporates Have Done Well Chart 5Our Combined Tilt Towards##BR##U.S. Corporates Has Outperformed With regards to our other major spread sector tilts, our shift to an underweight stance on U.S. MBS versus Treasuries back in November has essentially been a wash (Chart 6). Looking ahead, the combination of unattractive valuations and, more importantly, reduced buying of Agency MBS by the Federal Reserve as it begins to shrink its balance sheet will weigh on MBS performance in the next 6-12 months - we are staying underweight. At the same time, we are maintaining our long-held overweight stance on U.K. IG corporates versus Gilts (bottom panel). The Bank of England will be keeping interest rates unchanged over the next year given mixed readings on U.K. economic growth and the lingering uncertainties over the Brexit negotiations, thus going for the added carry of corporates versus expensive Gilts still makes sense. As for our cross-country government bond allocations, our underweight stance on Italy versus Spain, and our overweight stance on Japan versus Germany, have been volatile while delivering no excess performance (Chart 7). Chart 6Sticking With Our Tilts On##BR##U.S. MBS & U.K. IG Chart 7Our Cross-Country Government Bond##BR##Tilts Have Been Volatile Looking ahead, we continue to expect the global growth backdrop to be supportive of spread product over government debt over the next 6-12 months, particularly with central banks unlikely to shift to a restrictive monetary stance. At the same time, we should soon begin to claw back some of the underperformance of the government bond sleeve of the GFIS model portfolio coming from our below-benchmark duration stance, for several reasons: Our colleagues at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service do not expect the current standoff between Pyongyang and Washington to devolve into a shooting war, even though the tough talk on both sides will likely continue for some time. As the military tensions begin to subside, this should reverse some of the safe-haven bid for government bonds seen in the past couple of weeks, causing yields to drift higher. The solid global growth backdrop, confirmed by the still-rising trend in leading economic indicators, will continue to force central banks to slowly shift to a less dovish policy stance. U.S. inflation will begin to rebound in the next few months, led by the lagged impact of the U.S. dollar weakness seen in 2017 and continued tightening of the U.S. labor market. This will prompt the Fed to hike rates in December and deliver more hikes in 2018, which is NOT currently priced into U.S. Treasuries. We expect the ECB to soon signal a reduction of the size of its asset purchase program starting in 2018, which will put upward pressure on core Euro Area bond yields, and widen Peripheral European spreads, as the market moves to price in a smaller amount of future bond supply that will be absorbed by the central bank. The combination of modest increases in global inflation, a rebound in investor risk sentiment, and an ECB taper announcement should all place bear-steepening pressures on developed market yield curves (ex-Japan). This will benefit the curve-steepening bias we have in the U.S., Euro Area and U.K., while also supporting our country allocation of a maximum overweight to low-beta Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). Net-net, we see no reason to alter any of current portfolio tilts at the moment based on any change in our market views. Bottom Line: The GFIS model bond portfolio has lagged its benchmark index since inception last September and since our previous performance update in April. Our overweight credit allocations have performed well but our below-benchmark duration tilts have not. All of that underperformance can be accounted for this month, however, given the risk-off moves seen in global financial markets. As investors begin to shift their attention away from the current geopolitical blustering over North Korea and back towards the solid global economic upturn, our current tilts should begin to outperform again. A Very Brief Comment On Our Risk Management Framework In our prior portfolio update in April, we noted that the initial sizes we placed on the tilts in the GFIS model portfolio proved to be far too small to generate any meaningful outperformance.1 After that, we increased the sizes of our all our existing positions in the portfolio. We later introduced a "risk budget" into our framework that would allow us to measure the tracking error (excess volatility versus the GFIS benchmark index) of our portfolio to ensure that we were taking adequate levels of risk.2 So far, our changes have had the desired effect of raising the tracking error of the portfolio to more realistic levels to try and generate outperformance. The average allocations to our government bond underweights and our spread product overweights have increased since that April portfolio review (Chart 8). This has helped raise the tracking error of the model portfolio to 61bps from 25bps in April (Chart 9). This is still below our risk limit of 100bps of tracking error, giving us room to add positions to the model portfolio if we see opportunities come up. Chart 8We've Increased The Sizes Of##BR##Our Tilts Since April ... Chart 9...Which Has Boosted The Tracking##BR##Error Of The Model Portfolio Bottom Line: We have successfully raised the amount of overall portfolio risk (tracking error) since our last portfolio performance update in April. The tracking error remains below our self-imposed limit of 100bps, however, giving us the ability to make further adjustments to our tilts as opportunities arise. Tactical Overlay Bets Have Been Helpful In addition to our GFIS model bond portfolio, we also are running recommended trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. These are positions that typically have a shorter-term investment time horizon (0-6 months) than those in the model portfolio. They can also be in less-liquid markets that are not included in the custom bond benchmark index for the model portfolio, like U.S. TIPS or New Zealand government bonds. The Overlay is intended to produce ideas for more tactical traders than portfolio managers, although the trades can also be viewed as a compliment to the model bond portfolio. The performance of our Tactical Overlay can be seen in Table 2 (for our current open trades) and Table 3 (for our past closed trades). We have shown the trade performance going back to the inception date of our model bond portfolio in September 2016, to facilitate apples-for-apples comparisons. We are currently working on developing a trade sizing and risk management framework along the lines of our model portfolio. For now, we can only present average return numbers and not a meaningful cumulative return measure. Table 2The Current Open GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Are Performing Well Table 3The Closed GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Have Been A Mixed Bag Our closed Overlay trades since last September generated only an average total return of a mere +1bp, but this weighed down by a large losing position on shorting Portuguese government bonds versus German Bunds. The average trade return would have been +21bps, on fifteen closed trades, excluding that Portuguese bet. The notable winners were long positions in 10-year French government bonds versus German Bunds (+130bps), a long position on Australian Semi-Government debt versus Federal government debt (+159bps) and a long positon on Korean 5-year government bonds vs. 5-year JGBs on a currency-unhedged basis (+195bps). The other notable loser besides the Portuguese trade was a failed long position on Japanese CPI swaps (-111bps). The current open Overlay trades have performed much better, delivering an average gain of +30bps. 14 of the current 16 open trades have a positive gain, thus the batting average is solid. Notable winners are an overweight on U.S. TIPS versus U.S. Treasuries (+197bps) and our Canada/U.K. 2-year/30-year yield curve box trade (+110bps). The only serious losing trade at the moment is our long position in 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year German debt (-123bps), although this is the only trade in the table that is currency UN-hedged and is a bet on a stronger New Zealand dollar versus the euro as well as a relative bond spread trade. Net-net, our Tactical Overlay trades have generated a positive average return since last September. In the next few months, we will look to introduce a weighting scheme and risk budget for the Overlay trades to better present these trades as a true complement to our model bond portfolio. Bottom Line: Our Tactical Overlay trades have delivered a positive average return over the past year, led by the current open trades that have produced an average gain of +30bps. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding A Risk Management Framework To Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated June 20th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Appendix - Selected Sectors From The GFIS Model Portfolio
Highlights Chart 1Too Close For Comfort The Fed is in the midst of tightening policy, but with inflation still below target it wants to ensure that overall policy settings remain accommodative. In the language of central bankers, the Fed wants to keep the real fed funds rate below its equilibrium level, the level that applies neither upward nor downward pressure to price growth. The equilibrium fed funds rate cannot be calculated with precision, but one popular estimate shows that policy settings are dangerously close to turning restrictive (Chart 1). While an announcement of balance sheet reduction is almost certain to occur next month, with the real fed funds rate so close to neutral, rate hikes are probably on hold until the gap widens. Higher inflation will widen the gap by causing the real fed funds rate to fall, and we are confident that core inflation will rise in the coming months (see page 11 for further details). This will permit the Fed to deliver more than the currently discounted 28 bps of rate increases during the next 12 months. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 60 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 209 bps. The financial press is littered with stories highlighting extremely unattractive corporate bond valuations, but we think this storyline is exaggerated. In fact, the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index is somewhat wider than is typically observed in the early stages of a Fed tightening cycle (Chart 2). We calculate that in the early stages of the prior two Fed tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 & June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 86 bps and traded in a range between 66 bps and 104 bps.1 Viewed in this context, the current spread of 102 bps looks somewhat cheap. That being said, corporate balance sheet health is worse than is typically seen during the early stages of a tightening cycle and this will limit spread compression from current levels. But all in all, excess returns to corporate bonds should be consistent with carry during the next 6-12 months, with higher inflation and tighter Fed policy being pre-conditions for material spread widening. In a recent report2 we showed that bank bonds (both senior and subordinate) still offer a spread advantage compared to other similarly risky sectors (Table 3). Banks also continue to make progress shoring up their balance sheets and the outlook for bank profits is starting to brighten. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 83 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 448 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 12 bps to end the month at 352 bps, 8 bps above the 2017 low. We calculate that in the early stages of the prior two Fed tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 & June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 342 bps and traded in a range between 259 bps and 394 bps. This puts the current junk spread almost in line with the average witnessed during other similar monetary environments. In contrast, the VIX index, which co-moves with junk spreads (Chart 3), is well below levels seen during the early stages of the prior two tightening cycles. The VIX currently sits at 10, and its historical range in similar monetary environments is between 11 and 17, with an average of 13.3 In this way, there would appear to be more room for investment grade corporate bond spreads to tighten than junk spreads, especially on a volatility-adjusted basis. Despite somewhat more stretched valuations than in investment grade, high-yield still offers reasonable compensation relative to expected defaults. At present, our estimated default-adjusted spread is 206 bps, only slightly below its historical average (panel 3). This is based on an expected default rate of 2.8% during the next 12 months and an expected recovery rate of 48% (bottom panel). MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 4 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS yield declined 3 bps in July, as a small 1 bp increase in the rate component was offset by a 4 bps tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) held flat. Index OAS has been in a widening trend since bottoming at 15 bps last September (Chart 4). Since then, MBS have returned 43 bps less than duration-equivalent Treasury securities. The Bloomberg Barclays Aaa-rated Credit index has outperformed Treasuries by 71 bps during that same timeframe. The back-up in OAS reflects, in large part, the market pricing in the upcoming wind-down of the Fed's balance sheet, set to be announced next month. However, we think OAS still have further to widen to catch up with the rising trend in net issuance. According to Flow of Funds data, net MBS issuance totaled $83 billion in the first quarter. If that pace continues for the rest of the year, then 2017 will be the strongest year for MBS issuance since 2009. While higher mortgage rates since the end of 2016 present a drag, at least so far, home sales have not shown much weakness (bottom panel). This is unlike the 2013 taper tantrum when home sales fell sharply following the surge in rates. We are underweight MBS on the expectation that the housing market will remain resilient in the face of higher rates, allowing issuance to continue its uptrend. However, we are closely tracking the spread advantage in MBS compared to Aaa-rated credit which is finally starting to look attractive (panel 3). Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 42 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 149 bps. Sovereigns and Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 81 bps and 112 bps, respectively. The low-beta Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors each outperformed by 5 bps. The Foreign Agency sector outperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 56 bps. USD-denominated sovereign bonds have underperformed the Baa-rated U.S. Corporate index (their closest comparable in terms of risk) during the past three months even though the U.S. dollar has continued its trend lower (Chart 5). But despite this recent underperformance, the Sovereign index still does not offer a spread advantage over the Baa-rated U.S. Corporate index (panel 3). Further, while our Emerging Markets Strategy service still looks favorably upon the Mexican peso relative to other emerging market currencies, it does not expect the peso to continue its recent appreciation versus the U.S. dollar.4 We share this opinion, and expect the broad trade-weighted dollar to appreciate as U.S. growth rebounds in the back-half of the year.5 In our cross-sectional model, which adjusts spreads for credit rating and duration. Local Authorities and Foreign Agencies continue to look attractive compared to most U.S. corporate sectors. In contrast, the Sovereign and Supranational sectors appear expensive. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in July (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Munis have outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 186 bps year-to-date. The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 2% in July, breaking below 85%. The average yield ratio remains extremely tight relative to its post-crisis trading range (Chart 6). There is more compensation available at the long-end of the muni curve than at the short-end (panel 2), and investors should continue to favor long maturities over short maturities on the Aaa Muni curve. Our early estimate, based on the recently released second quarter National Accounts data, shows that state & local government net borrowing probably moved higher in Q2 (panel 3), making the recent decline in yield ratios appear even more tenuous. The increase in net borrowing stems largely from a $21 billion drop in income tax revenues and a $20 billion decline in transfer receipts from the federal government. Income tax revenue should recover in the next two quarters,6 and we expect net borrowing will also start to decline. However, it is unlikely that net borrowing will fall by enough to justify current muni valuations. On July 6, the state House of Illinois overrode Governor Bruce Rauner's veto to finally pass a $36 billion budget. The move was sufficient for Moody's and S&P to both subsequently affirm the state's investment grade rating. The 10-year Illinois General Obligation bond yield declined 102 bps on the month, despite only a 1 bp drop in the 10-year Treasury yield. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull steepened in July. The 2/10 slope steepened 3 bps and the 5/30 slope steepened 10 bps. We currently recommend two tactical trades designed to profit from movements in the Treasury curve. First, we have been recommending a short position in the July 2018 fed funds futures contract since July 11.7 From current levels, we calculate this trade will deliver an un-levered return of 28 bps if there are two hikes between now and then, and 53 bps if there are three hikes. Our second recommendation is a long position in the 5-year bullet versus a short position in a duration-matched 2/10 barbell, a trade designed to profit from a steepening of the 2/10 yield curve. It remains our view that inflation and inflation expectations, and not Fed tightening, are the main determinants of the slope of the yield curve. We expect the 2/10 slope to steepen as inflation rebounds during the next few months. Two weeks ago we published a Special Report 8 that explained our rationale for taking views on the slope of the curve using butterfly trades. It also explained our butterfly spread valuation model, and how we use that model to determine how much steepening/flattening is currently discounted in the yield curve. According to our model, the curve is priced for 9 bps of 2/10 steepening during the next six months (Chart 7). Our recommended butterfly trade will earn positive returns if the curve steepens by more than that. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 39 basis points in July. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 9 bps on the month and, at 1.8%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. Core inflation has moved sharply lower since February, but the fact that our Phillips Curve model of core inflation has not rolled over makes us inclined to view the downtrend as transitory. Also, during the past few weeks we have seen some preliminary signs that inflation is on the cusp of rebounding. Year-over-year core PCE inflation ticked higher in June for the first time since January. The PCE diffusion index, which has a good track record capturing near-term swings in core PCE, moved sharply higher (Chart 8). The prices paid components of the ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys increased from 55 to 62 and from 52.1 to 52.7, respectively, in July. We expect stronger realized inflation will lead TIPS breakevens higher during the next few months. However, even in a scenario where core inflation fails to rebound, the downside in breakevens from current levels is limited. The reason is that if inflation remains very low, the Fed will most likely refrain from hiking rates in December. Such a dovish capitulation from the Fed would put upward pressure on breakevens at the long-end of the curve. We discussed this possible scenario in more detail in a recent report.9 ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 59 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS held flat on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. The Federal Reserve released its Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey last week. It showed that credit card lending standards moved back into "net tightening" territory after having eased the previous quarter (Chart 9). Auto loan lending standards tightened on net for the fifth consecutive quarter. Tightening lending standards are usually a response to deteriorating credit quality, and thus tend to correlate with higher losses and wider spreads. In that regard, net loss rates for auto loans continue to trend higher, and Moody's data show that the cumulative loss rate for prime auto loans originated in 2017 is worse than for any vintage since 2009, for loans with the same age. Conversely, the mild tightening in credit card lending standards has so far not translated into rising charge-offs (Chart 9), but the situation bears close monitoring. For now, we are content to remain overweight ABS given the attractive spread pick-up compared to other similarly risky sectors. However, we also recommend investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, even though auto loans now once again offer an attractive spread differential, after adjusting for differences in duration and spread volatility (panel 3). Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 39 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 96 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 4 bps on the month, and remains below its average pre-crisis level. The Fed's Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that lending standards for all classes of commercial real estate (CRE) loans tightened, on net, for the eighth consecutive quarter. The survey also reported that demand for CRE loans is on the decline (Chart 10). The combination of tighter lending standards and weak loan demand suggests that credit concerns continue to mount in the private CMBS space. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 65 bps. The average option-adjusted spread for the Agency CMBS index held flat on the month but, at 49 bps, the sector continues to look attractive compared to other similarly risky alternatives.10 Not only does the sector offer attractive spreads, but the agency guarantee and the lower delinquency rate in multi-family loans compared to other CRE loans (panel 5) makes its risk/reward profile particularly appealing. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.62% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.63%. The U.S. PMI bounced back in July, after having trended lower for most of this year. The Chinese PMI also increased last month, while the Eurozone reading moderated somewhat from a very high level (panel 4). Overall, the Global PMI came in at 52.7 in July, up from 52.6 in June. Bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar has also fallen sharply in recent weeks (bottom panel). Bearish dollar sentiment in an environment of expanding global growth sends a very bond-bearish signal. It means that the entire world is participating in the global expansion and any increase in Treasury yields is less likely to be met with an influx of foreign buying. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.26%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Range calculated using monthly data, specifically the final day of each month. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Snapback", dated July 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Ranges for junk spread and VIX calculated using monthly data, specifically the final day of each month. 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The Case For A Major Top In EM", dated July 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 5 Mexico carries the largest weight in the Sovereign index, accounting for 23% of market cap. 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Snapback", dated July 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights Near record high levels for stocks are not an impediment to gains in the stock-to-bond ratio in the next 12 months. Minutes from June's FOMC meeting confirmed that policymakers agree that monetary policy should continue to normalize in the coming quarters. None of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Solid ISM and industrial production readings herald bullish profit growth in the second half the year. Treasury yields are headed higher in 2017, supporting our stocks over bond view. Within the U.S. bond market, we prefer short over long duration and investment-grade and high-yield bonds over high-quality debt; MBS will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed pares its balance sheet. Feature U.S. stocks will continue to reach all-time highs if inflation remains low, the economic backdrop fosters EPS growth and the Fed only gradually raises rates. We expect these conditions to stay in place in the second half of 2017 and into 2018, allowing stocks to outrun bonds. We note below that neither valuations nor technicals are flashing a red warning sign. Chart 1 shows that most of the time, even when equities are at record highs, valuations are above average (but not extreme) and the Fed is slowly removing accommodation, stocks can still rise. Moreover, none of the indicators that provided leading information in the past now warn of an equity bear market. Chart 1Macro Conditions Favorable For More Gains In Equities Chart 2Labor Market Strong But Wages Still Stagnant The June jobs report suggests that the environment of solid economic growth and still muted wage pressures remains in place, a positive backdrop for equity markets. The report showed that the economy added 222,000 jobs in June, well above the consensus forecast of 178,000. Prior months were also revised higher by 47,000 pushing the 3-month moving average up to 180,000 jobs per month. This is right in line with the 187,000 jobs per month averaged in 2016. Despite robust payroll gains, the unemployment rate actually ticked higher in June, from 4.3% to 4.4%, as previously sidelined workers were drawn back into the labor force. Meanwhile, wage growth continues to underwhelm, rising only 0.2% in June with the year-over-year growth rate holding steady at 2.5%. The deceleration in the 3 month change in average hourly earnings from 2.7% in December 2016 to 1.9% in June challenges the Fed's view on inflation (Chart 2). The recent moderation in wage growth is not yet severe enough to prevent the Fed from delivering one more rate hike before year-end. However, if the labor force participation rate continues to increase, and especially if this increase occurs alongside a rising unemployment rate, then the Fed's forecast of gradually accelerating wages will come into question. Fed Minutes: No Change To Our Base Case Minutes from June's FOMC meeting show that the debate among policymakers over monetary policy centers on the timing and pace of normalization in the coming quarters. The minutes did not provide any new insight about the Fed's plans to shrink its balance sheet. This will be done using caps on the monthly amount of principal repayments from the Fed's security holdings that will not be rolled over. These caps will rise over time on a pre-set path. The FOMC is still debating the timing of the start of this process. The FOMC was reasonably pleased with the tone of recent economic data, which support the view that GDP has bounced back from a soft patch in the first quarter. The June manufacturing and services ISM surveys, released since the FOMC meeting, undoubtedly reinforced policymakers' confidence in the underlying growth trajectory (see below for more details). The FOMC participants discussed at length the recent pullback in core measures of consumer price inflation. Most policymakers are willing for the time being to believe that inflation is driven primarily by temporary one-off factors. Others are worried that it will be more enduring. The moderation in three-month rates of change of prices this year was widespread across sectors of the CPI (i.e. it is not merely the result of one-offs). Inflation according to the Fed's favored measure, the core PCE price index, has also moderated this year although the disinflation has not been as broadly based as in the CPI (Chart 3). Much of the FOMC's debate focused on the relationship between labor market tightness and inflation. The doves want to see inflation rise closer to the 2% target before tightening even more. The hawks worry that the relationship could be non-linear, which means that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge in inflation. At a minimum, an undershoot could boost risks to financial stability by promoting excess risk-taking in the financial markets. The minutes reveal that the worries about the impact of easing financial conditions on financial stability have intensified since the start of the year. Inflation forecasting has been particularly tricky since the Great Recession for both the Fed and other economic prognosticators. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain the sudden and broadly-based inflation deceleration, even in sectors that have nothing to do with oil prices, shifts in the currency or wage growth. That said, the model shown in the top panel of Chart 4 suggests that core CPI inflation will edge higher in the coming months. This reflects the acceleration in ECI wage growth (feeding into higher core services inflation) and in core goods inflation (reflecting rising import prices), which more than offset the slight moderation in our projection for shelter inflation. Chart 3Inflation Readings Must##BR##Improve In Next Few Months Chart 4Core CPI Should Edge Higher##BR##In Coming Months Bottom Line: The minutes did not change our base case outlook; the FOMC will announce in September that it will begin to shrink the Fed's balance sheet shortly thereafter. The next rate hike will occur in December. Nonetheless, this forecast hangs importantly on the assumption that core inflation edges higher in the coming months. We think it will, but uncertainty is high. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer The FOMC's seeming determination to stick with the current tightening timetable raises question marks over the equity market, especially given elevated valuations. Chart 5Equity Bear Market Indicators BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report1. He noted that no two bear markets are the same and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, extreme overvaluation is not present and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart 5: Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverted. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are usually substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also well above the zero line, a threshold that in the past has warned of a downturn in stock prices. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is due to the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data, such as the leading economic indicator and ISM, have been unreliable bear market signals. We do not see anything that indicates that a recession is on the horizon. U.S. growth will remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical Conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40- week moving average and our composite technical indicator, all are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it is a bad sign when EPS growth tops out. This is often preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but we are closely watching industrial production. Bottom Line: The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the indicators that have provided leading information in the past warn of an equity bear market. ISM Above 50 Supports 2H Profit Outlook The elevated level of ISM sets the stage for EPS growth to gather speed in the second half of 2017. Industrial production is a good proxy for sales of S&P 500 companies (Chart 6). A rollover in the 12-month change in IP would challenge our view. However, strong readings on the ISM, which tracks IP, suggest that IP should accelerate in the next six months (Chart 6, panel 1). Chart 6Solid Backdrop For Earnings And Sales At 57.8 in June, the ISM has rebounded from the recent low of 47.9 in 2015. Investors wonder if it will roll over again or simply fluctuate at a high level. The leading components of ISM, including the new orders index and the new orders-to-inventory ratio, indicate that the ISM will remain above 50 in the months ahead (Chart 7). Moreover, the new export orders component of the ISM has also surged. The implication is that foreign demand (rather than domestic consumer or business spending) is leading the U.S. manufacturing sector. In fact, the 3- and 12-month change in the industrial production indices in advanced economies outside the U.S. have outpaced domestic growth (Chart 8). Chart 7IP Poised To Accelerate Chart 8U.S. IP Lagging Other Developed Markets Bottom Line: Firm readings on ISM are an indication that our bullish profit story for 2017 remains intact. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds. Inflection Point The increase in Treasury yields since late June indicates that growth expectations had become overly pessimistic. Our assessment is that U.S. growth will remain above trend for the rest of 2017. The implication for investors is that Treasury bond yields will move higher, the yield curve will bear-steepen, and that credit will outperform Treasuries in the second half of 2017. Moreover, we expect MBSs to underperform. According to our U.S. Bond Strategy service2, Treasury yields are poised to follow the economic surprise index higher in the coming months. Extreme net long positioning in the futures market supports the view. The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.52%. Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.45% (Chart 9). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Small positive excess returns, consistent with carry, remain the most likely scenario for investment- grade credit, where we recommend an overweight. We do not see the potential for much spread tightening from current levels. However, a large spread widening would be equally unlikely given the favorable backdrop of steady growth and muted inflation. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. We expect the decline in the 12-month trailing speculative default rate to continue for the rest of the year, aided by a moderation in energy sector defaults (Chart 10, bottom panel). This means that the current compensation offered by junk spreads in excess of expected default losses stands at 221 bps, in line with its historical average (Chart 10, panel 3). In last week's Weekly Report3 our U.S. Bond Strategy team showed that a default-adjusted spread of 221 bps is consistent with excess returns close to 150 bps during the next 12 months. Chart 9Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 10High-Yield Market Overview Our Energy Sector Strategy team stated in a Weekly Report4 last week that our base case of $50-$60/bbl WTI crude oil prices by the end of 2017 should keep high-yield energy spreads contained. We remain underweight MBSs. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared with previous levels, and they appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance. While refinancing activity will remain depressed, we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Bottom Line: Rates have bounced up after undershooting between March and the end of June. Loftier inflation readings are needed to sustain the bounce. Higher rates in the rest of 2017 support our stocks-over-bond stance. Within the U.S. bond market, we favor short duration over long, and credit over high-quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasurys as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market, " dated January 24, 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Inflection Point", dated July 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "HY Debt Update: Offshore Drilling & Transportation Getting Left Behind", dated July 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The long-term interests of both Chinese policymakers and foreign investors are aligned regarding the Chinese onshore bonds. There is a strong case for higher demand for Chinese bonds going forward. The Bond Connect program may not immediately lead to a massive influx of foreign capital into the Chinese onshore bond market, but it holds the promise of improving the efficiency of China's financial system over the long run, making the economy less dependent on the banking sector for financial intermediation. Chinese domestic bonds will become increasingly more "investable" to foreigners, and investors' interest in Chinese bonds will only grow. This week we review some basics of this asset class. Feature The Bond Connect program, which launched early this week, has established another channel for foreign investors to tap into China's massive onshore bond markets. Like Chinese A shares' inclusion in the MSCI indices announced last month, the Bond Connect scheme offers little near term impact but marks yet another milestone in China's financial market liberalization. Together with some existing channels, the new program opens up China's vast fixed-income assets to world financial markets, which have yet to be explored by global investors. There is a clear case for rising interest among global investors in Chinese onshore bonds going forward. This also holds the promise of improving the efficiency of China's financial system over the long run. It Takes Two To Tango For Chinese regulators, the benefits of opening up the bond market to foreigners are straightforward. First, it helps develop a deep and more efficient bond market, which is instrumental in allowing market forces to set interest rates for the overall economy.1 Although already one of the largest in the world, the Chinese bond market is primarily for the government and government-related entities. Corporate issuers also tend to be state-owned enterprises, which overwhelmingly carry investment-grade ratings from local rating agencies - i.e. little differentiation in credit quality (Chart 1). The primitive state of the corporate bond market (and financial markets in general) is a key reason why China's financial resources are predominantly channeled by the banking sector. A key target of China's financial sector reforms is to improve the efficiency of financial markets and reduce the reliance on the banking sector. Along with the Bond Connect initiative, Chinese regulators also granted access to overseas rating agencies to its domestic bond market, which should also help Chinese investors properly price credit risks. Chart 1Outstanding Corporate Bonds##br## By Credit Ratings Second, it also facilitates further internalization of the RMB, as it offers a vast asset class for foreign investors to park their RMB exposure. A major consideration for the Chinese authorities to internationalize the RMB has been to reduce exchange rate risk for domestic entities both for trade and financing. Governments and companies in the developed world mostly issue bonds in their respective local currencies, while developing countries typically issue bonds in foreign "hard currencies" such as the dollar and the euro, which makes them vulnerable to exchange rate volatility. By joining the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket, the Chinese authorities aim to foster the RMB to be an international "hard currency." This, together with a sufficiently deep and efficient RMB bond market, allows Chinese corporate borrowers to issue local currency bonds that are immune to exchange rate fluctuations. Finally, there is clearly a short-term intention to support the RMB exchange rate. The newly established Connect program only allows for "northbound" flows, meaning foreigners are only able to purchase onshore bonds through Hong Kong. This is designed to offset domestic capital outflows and mitigate any downward pressure on the RMB exchange rate. A reciprocal "southbound" channel that allows domestic investors to purchase foreign bonds will inevitably be established. However, the timing will be contingent on conditions of cross-border capital flows and exchange rate performance. For foreign investors, the Connect program and onshore RMB bonds will also prove attractive. Unlike existing programs facilitating foreign bond purchases such as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), RMB QFII (RQFII) and foreign eligible institutions' direct participation in the onshore interbank bond market, the Bond Connect program bypasses China's often lengthy and complicated regulatory procedures, making it easier and more flexible for foreign investors to directly hold Chinese onshore bonds. Holding RMB fixed income assets offers diversification benefits. Foreigners' exposure to Chinese bonds is practically nonexistent, which will inevitably increase. It is worth noting that foreign holdings in most emerging countries' bonds have been rising over time, despite exchange rate fluctuations (Chart 2). The volatility of the RMB exchange rate against the dollar is the smallest among SDR currencies, and Chinese onshore bonds offer the highest yields - both of which will prove attractive for foreign bond investors over the long run (Chart 3). China's structurally higher economic growth should also deliver higher returns for investors over the long run. Chart 4 shows that total returns of Chinese stocks and bonds have been almost identical since 2004 (when Chinese bond data became available) - both of which significantly outperformed global benchmarks. However, the volatility of Chinese stocks has been much greater than bonds. In other words, Chinese bonds offer an attractive risk-return trade off for investors to capitalize on China's growth outlook. Chart 2Foreign Holdings Of Chinese Bonds ##br##Are Set To Grow Chart 3China's Yield Advantage Chart 4Chinese Bonds: A Long Term Play ##br##To Capitalize On Chinese Growth All in all, the Bond Connect program may not immediately lead to a massive influx of foreign capital into the Chinese onshore bond market. However, it is clear that the long-term interests of both Chinese policymakers and foreign investors are aligned, which builds a strong case for higher demand for Chinese bonds going forward. A Synopsis Of The Chinese Onshore Bond Market Regardless of any near-term considerations, Chinese domestic bonds, and onshore assets in general, will become increasingly more "investable" to foreigners, and investors' interest in Chinese bonds will only grow. It is useful to review some basics of this asset class. At the onset, China's total outstanding bonds currently stand at RMB 69 trillion, or US$10.2 trillion, the majority of which are issued by government and related entities (Table 1). Treasurys and bonds issued by policy banks are backed by the central government. Municipal bonds issued by local governments are not explicitly backed by Beijing, but in reality the odds of a local government defaulting on its bonds are very low. Bonds issued by the corporate sector account for about 20% of the market, but corporate issuers also tend to be state-owned enterprises. Bonds and Certificates of Deposits (CDs) issued by banks are also state-owned. The Bond Connect program allows foreigners to tap into Chinese onshore bonds traded in the interbank market (CIBM), where the majority of Chinese bond transactions take place. CIBM hosts about 70% of total Chinese onshore bonds, while the rest are listed on securities exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) markets (Chart 5). Chinese bonds are primarily held by commercial banks (and credit co-ops), accounting for about 65% of total outstanding bonds. In recent years, investment funds have become increasingly active, currently holding 15% of the market, compared with 10% three years ago. This, together with increasing foreign participation, will over time help improve the efficiency of the onshore bond market. Table 1Chinese Bond Market Breakdown Chart 5Where Are The Bonds Traded? Bond issuance increased sharply in previous years, mostly boosted by municipal bonds and more recently by banks' CDs (Chart 6). The Chinese authorities' regulatory tightening to rein in financial excesses has led to a notable slowdown in overall bond issuance, which is likely to be temporary.2 Overall, the country's financial reforms will continue to encourage bond issuance and reduce the economy's overreliance on the banking sector for financial intermediation. Chart 6The Growing Importance Of Bond Market The importance of bond issuance for the corporate sector to raise capital has been increasing in recent years, but is still marginal. Currently, corporate bond issuance accounts for over 10% of total social financing (TSF), up from practically zero in the early 2000s (Chart 7). As stated earlier, corporate bonds are primarily issued by state-owned enterprises or listed firms, while small and private enterprises' access to bond issuance is still very restrictive. Maturities of the majority of Chinese corporate bonds are less than five years, while long-dated corporate bonds are rare. Corporate bonds with over 10-year maturities account for about 1% of total outstanding bonds (Chart 8). Chart 7The Growing Importance Of Corporate Bonds Chart 8Maturity Profile China's bond market liberalization measures have allowed some ETFs to be established to track the onshore bond market - a trend that is set to accelerate going forward with the latest Bond Connect scheme (Table 2). Onshore bonds will likely follow A shares to progressively enter major international bond indexes over time, which will further stoke global investors' interest. Table 2ETFs For Chinese Onshore Bonds An Update On The Chinese Economy Chart 9The Economy Will Remain Resilient Recent growth numbers from China confirm that the economy has remained resilient amid the regulatory crackdown by Chinese regulators. Both official and privately sourced manufacturing PMI numbers have improved, and both have moved above the 50 threshold. The regained momentum is also reflected in the rebound in raw materials prices in the global market (Chart 9, top panel). The regained strength in the Chinese economy, in our view, is probably due to easing in monetary conditions, primarily through the exchange rate. Although the RMB has stopped depreciating against the dollar of late, it has relapsed in trade-weighted terms, thanks to weakness in the greenback. This has led to a period of easing in monetary conditions, which in turn has helped the economy reflate (Chart 9, bottom panel). Looking forward, we maintain the view that China's business activity will remain reasonably buoyant. It is not realistic to expect growth figures, measured by year-over-year growth rates, to accelerate in perpetuity, but downside risks in the economy will remain low. China's growth improvement since early last year was primarily due to easing in monetary conditions rather than a massive dose of fiscal and monetary stimuli,3 and it is highly unlikely that the authorities will tighten their overall policy stance significantly, causing major growth problems. As such, we remain positive on both the economy and Chinese H shares. Overall, China's growth performance has been largely in line with our expectations outlined in our 2017 outlook report published in January.4 We will offer a mid-year revisit on the cyclical trends of the economy and financial markets next week. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength," dated June 22, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength," dated June 22, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside?” dated June 08, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Chart 1Too Pessimistic On Growth Treasury yields bounced sharply last week and the yield curve steepened. As a result the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index posted a negative return in June, only the second month of negative Treasury returns so far in 2017. Last week's increase in yields could signal that growth expectations have finally become overly pessimistic. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service has calculated that after the U.S. Economic Surprise Index rises above 40, its average peak to trough decline lasts 90 days. Given that the surprise index peaked above 40 in mid-March, a bottoming-out in the coming weeks would be right on schedule (Chart 1). Net speculative positioning in the futures market has also capitulated, swinging sharply from net short to net long. In recent years, extreme net long positioning has led to higher Treasury yields during the following three months (bottom panel). Our assessment is that U.S. growth will remain above trend for the remainder of the year, and the Treasury curve will continue to bear-steepen as the economic data start to outperform downbeat expectations. Stay at below-benchmark duration, in curve steepeners, overweight spread product versus Treasuries, and overweight TIPS versus nominals. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 50 basis points in June. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 4 bps to end the month at 109 bps. Though below its historical mean, the investment grade spread is actually somewhat elevated compared to the early stages of prior Fed tightening cycles (Chart 2). We calculate that in the early stages of the past two tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 & June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 90 bps and traded in a range between 66 bps and 107 bps. While spreads are currently more attractive than is typical for this stage of the cycle, there is good reason for investors to demand some extra risk premium. In a recent report1 we observed that non-financial corporate debt as a percent of GDP is already as high as it was during the past two recessions. Further, the majority of this debt has been issued to finance direct payments to shareholders (dividends & buybacks) as opposed to capital investment. This unfavorable shift in corporate capital structures means that bond investors should demand somewhat greater compensation. All in all, we do not see potential for much spread tightening from current levels. However, a large spread widening would be equally unlikely given the favorable back-drop of steady growth and muted inflation. Small positive excess returns, consistent with carry, remains the most likely scenario. Energy debt underperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 12 bps in June. The sector still looks cheap after adjusting for credit rating and duration (Table 3), and our commodity strategists remain bullish on oil. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 35 basis points in June. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp to end the month at 364 bps, 20 bps above its 2017 low. Energy sector spreads widened sharply in June, alongside falling oil prices, once again de-coupling from the overall index spread (Chart 3). Junk-rated energy credits underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 190 bps in June, while the High-Yield index excluding energy outperformed by 70 bps. In a report published today,2 our Energy Sector Strategy service takes a detailed look at credit risk among high-yield energy issuers, concluding that while the worst of the energy bankruptcy cycle is behind us, $23 billion of high-yield energy debt remains in distress. 91% of that distressed debt is in the Exploration & Production and Offshore Drilling & Transportation sectors. The continued moderation in energy sector defaults will ensure that the overall speculative grade default rate trends lower for the rest of the year, probably settling below 3% (bottom panel). The decline in defaults means that the current compensation offered by junk spreads in excess of expected default losses stands at 221 bps, right in line with its historical average (panel 3). In last week's report,3 we showed that a default-adjusted spread of 221 bps is consistent with excess returns close to 150 bps during the next 12 months. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -20 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 11 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps increase in the rate component and a 6 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). This was partially offset by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). In last week's report,4 we examined the risk/reward trade-off in different Aaa-rated spread products. We found that despite some recent widening in MBS OAS, you still need to move into 4% coupons or higher to find competitive spreads relative to Aaa-rated corporates, consumer ABS, agency CMBS and non-agency CMBS. Further, MBS OAS are still too tight compared to the trend in net issuance (Chart 4), and even though depressed refi activity will continue to hold down the option cost component of spreads, it is unlikely that a lower option cost will be able to completely offset wider OAS during the next 12 months. The Fed released more details about its balance sheet run-off plan at the June FOMC meeting. We now know that the Fed will start by allowing only $4 billion of MBS per month to run off its balance sheet, but this cap will increase by $4 billion every 3 months until it reaches $20 billion per month. This means that even if the Fed starts to wind down its balance sheet following the September meeting, which is our base case expectation, then it will still be some time before a significant amount of extra supply shifts into the private market. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +107 bps. Sovereigns and Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 65 bps and 73 bps, respectively. The low-beta Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors outperformed by 2 bps and 10 bps, respectively. The Foreign Agency sector underperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 4 bps, alongside the dip in oil prices. A weakening U.S. dollar has led to the outperformance of USD-denominated sovereign debt so far this year. Year-to-date, the Sovereign index has outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 300 bps. This is better than the equivalently-rated Baa U.S. Corporate index, which has outperformed by 195 bps year-to-date. However, there are already signs that the trade-weighted dollar is starting to moderate its downtrend (Chart 5), and we expect the trade-weighted dollar will strengthen as the economic data surprise to the upside in the back half of the year, as discussed on the first page of this report. Granted, the Mexican peso continues to strengthen versus the dollar (panel 3) and this currency pair is particularly important since Mexico is the largest issuer in the Sovereign index. On the heels of its recent outperformance, the Sovereign sector once again looks expensive compared to U.S. corporate sectors, after adjusting for credit rating and duration. Meanwhile, the Local Authority and Foreign Agency sectors continue to look cheap. Supranationals and Domestic Agencies offer very little additional compensation relative to Treasuries, and as we discussed last week,5 there are better options available for investors in need of high-quality spread product. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 18 basis points in June (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Last month we observed that Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratios had become very tight, and we advised reducing municipal bond exposure to underweight. The average M/T yield ratio ticked higher in June, but at 85%, it remains more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis average (Chart 6). There is more compensation available at the long-end of the muni curve than at the short-end (panel 2), and investors should continue to favor long maturities over short maturities on the Aaa Muni curve. The National Association of State Budget Officers recently released its Fiscal Survey of the States and it showed that overall general fund expenditures are expected to increase by only 1% in the 2018 fiscal year, the slowest rate of growth since 2009/10. Meanwhile, 23 states have already enacted mid-year budget cuts in 2017. Budget cutting measures are clearly a response to disappointing tax revenues, which should bounce back somewhat in fiscal year 2018.6 This will help reduce net borrowing, though probably not by enough to justify current municipal bond valuations (panel 3). The state of Illinois avoided a ratings downgrade to junk this week, as the State House of Representatives voted to approve an income tax increase. This measure will keep the rating agencies at bay for now, but a downgrade is still possible in the coming months if the state fails to pass a budget for fiscal year 2018. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened for most of June, before suddenly reversing course and bear-steepening late in the month. The 2/10 slope flattened 15 basis points between the end of May and June 26, and then steepened 15 bps between June 26 and the end of the month. All told, the 2/10 slope was unchanged in June, while the 5/30 slope flattened 17 bps. The abrupt transition from bull-flattening to bear-steepening was prompted by comments from European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi that suggested a much more hawkish bias from the ECB. Higher rate expectations in the rest of the world should put downward pressure on the U.S. dollar, and historically, bearish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar has led to a steeper U.S. yield curve (Chart 7, bottom panel). This correlation has not held up so far this year, and we suspect this is because a weaker dollar has not translated into higher U.S. inflation and inflation expectations, as it usually does. We have previously made the case that inflation and inflation expectations, and not Fed tightening, are the main determinants of the slope of the yield curve (panel 4).7 As such, we attribute the bulk of this year's curve flattening to disappointing core inflation which has dragged TIPS breakevens lower. This should reverse in the coming months.8 Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 86 basis points in June. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate fell 8 bps on the month and, at 1.75%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. In a recent report9 we outlined three possible scenarios for Treasury yields between now and the end of the year based on the interaction between incoming inflation data and Fed policy. In our base case scenario inflation will start to rebound in the coming months, heeding the message from our Phillips Curve model (Chart 8), leading to wider TIPS breakevens and keeping the Fed on its current tightening path. Even if realized inflation remains depressed, the next most likely scenario is that the Fed will capitulate later this year and adopt a shallower expected rate hike path. Such a dovish reaction from the Fed would lend support to long-maturity breakeven wideners, even though real yields would decline. The least likely scenario, in our view, is one where realized inflation remains low but the Fed sticks to its hawkish rhetoric. This is also the scenario that would lead to the most downside in the cost of inflation protection. May PCE inflation data were released last Friday, with year-over-year core PCE decelerating from 1.50% to 1.39%, and trimmed mean PCE decelerating from 1.70% to 1.66% (panel 4). One bright spot is that our PCE Diffusion Index swung sharply into positive territory. Historically, this index has a strong track record signaling turning points in core inflation (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +54 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 2 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Despite low spreads relative to history, in a recent report10 we showed that Aaa-rated ABS appear quite attractive compared to other Aaa-rated spread product. Specifically, Aaa consumer ABS offer greater compensation per unit of duration than Agency bonds, agency MBS and Aaa Credit. They offer similar compensation per unit of duration to Agency CMBS, but less than non-Agency Aaa CMBS. Within consumer ABS, auto loan-backed securitizations offer slightly greater compensation than the credit card-backed variety (Chart 9). However, we still prefer credit card ABS over auto loan ABS. While credit card charge-offs remain historically low, auto net loss rates are rising. Auto lending standards also moved deeper into "net tightening" territory in the first quarter, according to the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey, while credit card lending standards dipped back into "net easing" territory (bottom panel). We continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within an overall overweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +57 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 1 bp on the month, and remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). In last week's report,11 we showed that non-agency CMBS offer by far the most compensation per unit of duration of any Aaa-rated spread sector. However, we are concerned that non-agency CMBS spreads will widen on a 6-12 month horizon. Commercial real estate lending standards are tightening and property prices are decelerating. Both of these developments tend to correlate with wider spreads. Despite lower spreads, we are much more comfortable in the Agency CMBS market. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +54 bps. Agency CMBS offer somewhat lower spreads than their non-agency counterparts, but this sector should be more insulated from spread widening in the months ahead. Not only do these securities benefit from agency backing, but they also mostly comprise multi-family loans. Multi-family property prices have been stronger than those in the retail and office sectors, and delinquencies have been lower (bottom 2 panels). Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.52% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.45%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound. The U.S. PMI has dipped lower in recent months, but remains firmly entrenched above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, the Eurozone PMI continues to surge ahead. China's PMI sent a worrying signal when it dipped below 50 in May, but it bounced back to 50.4 last month (bottom panel). Overall, the Global PMI came in at 52.6 in June, no change from the prior month. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.35%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "HY Debt Update: Offshore Drilling & Transportation Getting Left Behind", dated July 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights Recommended Allocation Risk assets have continued to outperform, despite soft inflation data and falling interest rates. Either inflation will pick up again, amid decent growth, and the Fed (and, to a degree, other central banks) will tighten, or the Fed will capitulate and stay on hold. Either scenario should be good for risk assets. No indicator signals a recession on the horizon, and so we continue to expect equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. Within equities, we favor DM over EM; we maintain a pro-cyclical sector tilt, but rotate out of Tech into Financials, which are cheaper and should benefit from steeper yield curves. In fixed income, we prefer credit to government bonds, but trim our overweight in investment grade credit as spreads are unlikely to contract further. We are overweight TIPS and Japanese inflation-linked bonds. Feature Overview How To Square Lower Rates And Rising Equities One of the basic principles of BCA's Global Asset Allocation service is that it is highly unusual for equities to underperform bonds for any extended period except in the run-up to, and during, recessions (Chart 1). After the recent decline in long-term interest rates and softness in inflation, we find investors worldwide becoming increasingly nervous about the outlook. We see nothing in the data, however, to indicate a recession in the coming 12 months. Of the three historically most reliable recession indicators - PMIs, credit spreads, and the yield curve (Chart 2) - only the last raises some concerns, but it is still far from inverting, which is the requirement for a recession signal. None of the formal recession models is flashing a warning signal either (Chart 3). Chart 1Stocks Outperform Except Ahead Of Recession Chart 2Usual Recession Signals Still Absent Chart 3Recession Risk Models Not Rising Either Nonetheless, market action in recent months has been unusual. Bond yields have fallen (with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield slipping to 2.2% from 2.6%), and the dollar has weakened, but risk assets have continued to perform well, with global equities giving a total return of 13% year to date and 4% in Q2. Can this desynchronization continue? We see three possible scenarios:1 Chart 4Market Expects Fed To Be Dovish Reflation returns. The Fed proves to be right that the recent weak inflation data is temporary. Inflation picks up and the Fed raises rates more quickly than the market is currently pricing in (which is only 25 bps over the next 12 months, Chart 4). Initially, the rebound in inflation might be a shock for risk assets but, as long as the Fed is tightening because it is confident about growth and unconcerned about global risk, over 12 months risk assets such as equities should continue to outperform. The Fed capitulates. Inflation fails to rebound and the Fed tightens only in line with what the market is currently pricing in. This could be good for risk assets, as long as the soft inflation is not accompanied by disappointing data on growth. The U.S. dollar would probably weaken further, which should be positive for EM assets and commodities. A policy mistake. The Fed pushes stubbornly ahead with tightening even though inflation fails to rebound. Bond yields fall and the yield curve moves closer to inverting. This would be negative for risk assets, which would start to price in the risk of recession. We think the first scenario is the most likely. Leading indicators of employment suggest the recent sluggish wage growth should prove temporary (Chart 5). The softness in U.S. PCE inflation probably reflects mostly the weak economic growth last year and the recent fall in commodity prices (as well as special factors in telecoms, healthcare and autos). Even if reflation pushes the Fed to tighten more quickly - followed by central banks in the euro area, U.K, and Canada, which have also sounded more hawkish recently - this should not fundamentally undermine the case for risk assets, given how easy monetary policy remains everywhere (Chart 6). It would represent merely a step towards "normalization". Chart 5Sluggish Wage Growth Should Be Temporary Chart 6Real Rates Still Negative Everywhere While scenario (2) would also probably be generally positive for risk assets, the correct portfolio allocation would be different. Under scenario (1) - our central view - the dollar would appreciate, causing commodities and EM assets to underperform, higher beta markets (such as the euro area and Japan) and cyclical sectors would perform the best, and in bond markets investors should be underweight duration and overweight TIPS. Scenario (2) would suggest a less aggressive positioning in equities, with income-generating assets outperforming as bond yields stay low at around current levels. Scenario (3), which we see only as a tail risk, would point to an outright defensive stance. What should investors watch for over the coming months? Besides the trends in inflation and wages discussed above, we would be concerned to see any slippage in global growth expectations, which have so far continued to rise despite the softness in inflation and wages (Chart 7). The most likely cause of this would be a Chinese slowdown, though recent comments by Premier Li Keqiang ("we continue to implement a proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy....[but] will not resort to massive stimulative measures") seem to confirm our view that Chinese growth may slow a little further, but that the authorities will not allow it to collapse ahead of the Party Congress in the fall. As potential upside catalysts for risk assets we see: a rebound in crude oil prices (driven by a drawdown in inventories over coming months as the OPEC production cuts reduce supply, Chart 8), progress on a U.S. tax cut (which BCA's Geopolitical Strategy still expects to come into effect from early 2018), and further surprises in earnings growth (where analysts continue to revise up their forecasts, Chart 9). Chart 7No Signs Of Global Growth Slipping Chart 8Oil Inventories To Draw Down Chart 9Earnings Continue To Be Revised Up Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking Why Haven't Inflation And Wages Picked Up? Chart 10Just A Temporary Phenomenon? Eight years into an expansion, U.S. inflation remains stubbornly below 2% on every measure and has even slowed in recent months (Chart 10, panel 1). And, despite headline unemployment of only 4.3% (below the Fed's estimate of 4.6% for the Nairu), wage growth also remains sluggish (panel 3). The Fed's view is that inflation has been pulled down by special factors: weak auto sales, the introduction of unlimited cell phone data packages (which lower hedonically-adjusted prices), and drugs companies which raised prices before last year's U.S. presidential election (panel 2). We agree that these factors are likely to be temporary. But the recent weak wage growth is more puzzling. Wages have trended up since 2012, suggesting that the Phillips Curve is not dead. But the relationship seems to have weakened. With U6 unemployment (which includes marginally attached workers and those working part-time who would like full-time jobs) currently at only 8.4%, one would have expected wage growth to be 1 ppt higher than it is (panel 4). Changes in the structure of the workforce may partly explain this (the growing proportion of low-wage service jobs, the "gig economy"). Last year's weak corporate profits may also be a factor. But, with the labor market clearly very tight, we expect wages - and therefore core inflation - to pick up again over the next 12 months. What To Do When VIX Is So Low? After two brief spikes earlier in the year, VIX has declined to 11.4, closer to the historical low of 9.3 reached in 1993, than the historical average of 19.5. In fact, asset price volatilities have been low across the board in fixed income, currencies and commodities, even though the latter two are not at the same extreme low levels as equities and fixed income (Chart 11). However, the VIX futures curve is still in steep contango, which means that getting the timing wrong would make it very costly to go long the volatility index. In addition, correlation among the index members of the S&P 500 is very low, and so are cross-market equity correlations. We do not forecast a recession until 2019, so a sharp reversal in VIX is unlikely, but brief spikes are possible, implying possible corrections in S&P 500 given the inverse correlation between the two. As such, we recommend four strategies for investors who are concerned that markets are too complacent: Focus on security selection, and rotate into cheaper sectors from expensive ones without altering the pro-cyclical bias. Our preferred way is to buy the much cheaper Financials by selling the more expensive Tech; Allocate a portion of funds to the minimum volatility style as it has been relatively oversold; Raise cash and buy a call spread on the S&P 500; Buy longer-dated VIX futures and sell shorter-dated futures to mitigate the rolling cost. Chart 11Are Investors Too Complacent? Chart 12Overweight To Neutral Have Technology Stock Run Too Far? Technology stocks have outperformed the broad market by 33% since April 2013 and investors are increasingly skeptical about whether the run-up can continue. In this Quarterly, we cut our weighting in the Tech sector from Overweight, but we believe it deserves no lower than a Neutral weighting for the following reasons: Sales & Earnings: New order growth is improving alongside rising consumer spending on technology (Chart 12, panel 2). Sales are growing at 5% YoY and this is likely to continue. Pricing power has also recovered over the past year. These factors should support margins and earnings growth. Valuations: Investors are worried about valuation. However, the recent rally has not led to an expansion of relative forward P/E, which is below the historical average (panel 4). Sector relative performance over the past four years has moved in line with its superior return on equity. Breadth: Improving breadth suggests that relative outperformance should be sustainable. An increasing number of firms are participating in the rally, as seen by the improving advances/declines ratio (panel 3). However, we also have some concerns. For example, a handful of large-cap technology firms have generated the bulk of the stock price performance. However, these firms currently trade at 23x.2 earnings compared to 60x.3 for the top firms at the peak of the TMT bubble in 2000. Additionally, the five largest stocks in the sector comprise only 13% of the index, compared to 16% at the peak of the 2000 bubble. Our recommendation, then, is that investors should hold this sector in line with benchmark. Are Canadian Banks At Risk Due To The Housing Bubble? Chart 13Canadian Housing Puzzle The recent problems at Home Capital Group have drawn investors' attention to the Canadian housing market. Home Capital's shares fell by 70% in April after regulators accused the mortgage lender of being slow to disclose fraud among its brokers. However, the issue is unlikely to have wider consequences: the event took place two years ago and had no impact on the lender's assets. Home Capital lends only to individuals with reliable collateral, and accounts for only 1% of total mortgage loans. We don't see imminent risks to the housing and banking sectors, since the economy is recovering and monetary policy remains loose. Vancouver and Toronto home prices have surged for almost a decade (Chart 13, panel 1). After Vancouver introduced a 15% foreign buyer tax in July 2016, house prices initially pulled back but quickly recovered. A similar tax in Ontario this April is also likely to have limited impact. Cautious macro-prudential rules should ensure banks' health: mortgage insurance is required for down-payments under 20%, and the gross debt service ratio (total housing costs over household income) cannot exceed 32%. However, the rise in house prices has caused household debt to run up (Chart 13, panel 2). Carolyn Wilkins, Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, hinted in a speech in June that the central bank may soon raise rates. Tighter monetary policy could hurt mortgage borrowers who have enjoyed low interest payments for years (Chart 13, panel 3). Over the longer-term, therefore, we are concerned about the level of household debt, and recommend a cautious stance toward Canadian bank stocks. Global Economy Overview: Goldilocks continues, with global growth prospects still good (PMIs in developed economies generally remain around 55 - see Chart 14 panel 2 and Chart 15 panel 1), but inflation surprising on the downside in recent months. The wild card is China, where growth has slowed since Q1, when GDP reached 6.9%, and it is unclear whether the authorities will ease fiscal and monetary tightening to cushion the slowdown. Chart 14Growth Prospects Generally Remain Good Chart 15But Inflation Expectations Have Fallen U.S.: Growth has been weaker than the over-heated consensus expected, pushing down the Citigroup Economic Surprise Indexes (CESI) sharply (Chart 14, panel 1). However, prospects remain positive for the next 12 months: the Manufacturing ISM is at 54.9, retail sales are growing at 3.8% YoY, and capex has begun to reaccelerate (Chart 14, panel 5). The Fed's Nowcasts point to Q2 GDP growth at 1.9%-2.7% QoQ annualized. With expections now lowered, the CESI is likely to bottom around here. Euro Area: Growth has been stronger than in the U.S, with the PMI continuing to accelerate to 57.3. However, this is largely due to the euro area's strong cyclicality and exposure to global growth. Domestic momentum remains weak in most countries, with region-wide wage growth only 1.4% YoY. European PMIs are likely to roll over in line with the U.S. ISM. But GDP growth for the year is not likely to fall much from the 1.9% achieved in Q1. Japan remains a dual-paced economy, with international sectors doing well (exports rose by 14.9% YoY in May and industrial production by 5.7%) but domestic sectors stagnating, as wage growth remains sluggish (up just 0.5% YoY). Bank of Japan policy will remain ultra-easy, but there is scant sign of fiscal stimulus or structural reform. Emerging Markets: China is showing clear signs of slowdown, with the Caixin Manufacturing PMI falling below 50 (Chart 15, panel 3). The PBoC has tightened monetary policy, causing corporate bond yields to rise by 100 bps since the start of the year and the yield curve to invert. However, with the 19th Communist Party Conference scheduled for the fall, the authorities will prioritize stability: there are signs they are increasing fiscal spending. Elsewhere, many emerging markets are characterized by sluggish growth but falling inflation, which may allow central banks to cut rates. Interest rates: Inflation has softened recently, with U.S. core PCE inflation slowing to 1.4% and euro zone core CPI to 1.1%. We agree with the Fed that the recent weak inflation was caused by temporary factors and, with little slack in the labor market, core PCE will rise to 2% by next year, causing the Fed to hike in line with its dots. In the euro zone, however, the output gap remains around -2% of GDP and countries such as Italy could not bear tightening, so the ECB will taper only gradually next year and not raise rates soon. Chart 16Powered by Earnings and Margin Improvement! Global Equities In Q2 2017 the price gain in global equities was driven entirely by earnings growth, as forward earnings grew by 3.5% while the forward PE multiple barely changed. This is distinctively different from the equity rally in 2016 when multiple expansion dominated earnings growth (Chart 16). The scope of the improvement in earnings so far in 2017 has been wide. Not only are forward earnings being revised up, but 12-month trailing earnings growth has also come in very strong, with 90% of sectors registering positive earnings growth. Margins improved in both DM and EM. Equity valuation is not cheap by historical standards but, as an asset class, equities are still attractively valued compared to bonds given how low global bond yields are. We remain overweight equities versus bonds even though we are a little concerned about the extremely low volatility in all asset classes (see "What Our Clients Are Asking" on page 8). Within equities, we maintain our call to favor DM versus EM despite the 7% EM outperformance year-to-date, which was supported by attractive valuations and the weak U.S. dollar. BCA's house view is that the USD will strengthen versus EM currencies over the coming 12 months. Within EM, we have been more positive on China and remain so on a 6-9 month horizon, in spite of China's 6.7% outperformance versus EM. Our upgrade of euro area equities to overweight at the expense of the U.S. in our last Quarterly Portfolio Outlook proved to be timely as the euro area outperformed the U.S. by 641 bps in Q2. We continue to like Japan on a currency hedged basis (see next page). Sector-wise, we maintain a pro-cyclical tilt. However, we are taking profit on our overweight in Technology (downgrade to neutral) and upgrading Financials to overweight from neutral. Japanese Equities: Maintain Overweight, With Yen Hedge We upgraded Japanese equities to overweight in June 2016 (please see our Quarterly Report, dated June 30, 2016 and our Special Report, dated June 8, 2016) on a currency hedged basis. These positions have worked very well as the yen is down by 10% and MSCI Japan has gained 32% in yen term, outperforming the global benchmark by 12% in local currency terms, but in line with benchmark in USD (Chart 17). Going forward, we recommend clients continue to overweight Japanese equities in a global portfolio and hedge the JPY exposure. Reasons: First, since December 2012 when Abenomics started, MSCI Japanese equities have gained 82% in yen terms, but earnings have risen by much more, with a 180% increase. Valuation multiples have contracted, in stark contrast to other major equity markets where multiple expansion has led to stretched valuations. Second, divergent monetary policy between the BOJ and the Fed will put more downside pressure on the JPY. More importantly, weak fundamentals, as evidenced by falling inflation and a slowing in GDP growth, are likely to push the BOJ to resort to more extraordinary policy measures, such as debt monetization, which would further weaken the JPY, boosting exports and therefore the export sector dominated Japanese equity market. Note that our quant model is still underweight Japan, but has become slightly less so compared to six months ago. We have overridden the model because 1) the model is unhedged in USD terms and, more importantly, 2) the model cannot capture potential policy action such as debt monetization. Chart 17Japanese Equities: Remain Overweight Chart 18Financials Vs Tech: Trading Places Sector Allocation: Upgrade Financials to Overweight by Downgrading Tech to Neutral. We have been overweight Technology since July 2016 (please see our Monthly Update, July 29, 2016) and the sector has outperformed the global benchmark by 11.8%, of which 9% came this year. In line with our general concern on asset valuations, we are taking profit on the Tech overweight and use the proceeds to fund an overweight in the much cheaper Financials sector. As shown in Chart 18, the relative total return performance of Financials vs. Technology is back to extreme levels (panel 1), while the relative valuation of Financials measured by price to book has reached an extremely cheap level (panel 2). Also, Financial shares offer a good yield pick-up over Tech even though this advantage is in line with the historical average (panel 3). BCA's house view calls for higher interest rates and steeper yield curves over the next 9-12 months. Financial earnings benefit from a steepening yield curve. If history is any guide, we should see more aggressive analysts' earnings revisions going forward in favor of Financials (panel 4). Overall, our sector positioning retains its tilt towards cyclicals vs. defensives. (Please see Recommended Allocation table on page 1), in line with the tilt from our quant model. Within the cyclical sectors, however, we have overridden the model on Financials and Tech since the momentum factor is a major driver in the model and we judge that momentum has probably run too far. Chart 19MSCI ACW: Factor Relative Performance Smart Beta Update: In Q2, an equal-weighted multi-factor portfolio outperformed the global benchmark (Chart 19, top panel). Among the five most enduring factors - size, value, quality, minimum volatility, and momentum - quality and momentum factors continued the Q1 trend of outperformance, while value continued to underperform. It's worth noting that the underperformance of minimum volatility stabilized in the last two months of the quarter, indicating that the extremely low market vol has caught investor attention and some investors have started to seek protection by moving into the low vol space, albeit gradually. Value has continued to underperform growth, and small caps to underperform large caps. We maintain our neutral view on styles and prefer to use sector positioning to implement the underlying themes given the historically close correlation between styles and cyclicals versus defensives (bottom two panels). As show in Table 1, however, even though value has underperformed growth across the globe, small caps in Japan and the euro area have consistently outperformed large caps year-to-date, the opposite to that in the U.S., in line with the higher beta nature of these two markets. Table 1Divergence In Style Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. U.S. bond yields declined significantly in Q2 to below fair value levels in response to weaker "hard data" (Chart 20, top panel). But weakness in Q1 U.S. GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories, both of which are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. In addition, after the June rate hike, we expect the Fed to deliver another rate hike by year end, while the market is pricing in only 14 bps of rate rise. Maintain overweight TIPS vs. Treasuries. As the nominal 10-year yield fell, so did 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation. In terms of relative valuation, now TIPS is fairly valued vs. the nominal bonds (panel 2). However, our U.S. Bond Strategy's core PCE model, which closely tracks the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate (panel 3), is sending the message that inflationary pressures are building in the economy and that core PCE should reach the Fed's 2% target later this year. This suggests that the bond markets are not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic backdrop. Overweight Inflation-linked JGBs (JGBi) vs. Nominal JGBs. Inflation in Japan has been falling despite strong GDP growth. However, the labor market has not been this tight since the mid-1990s, with the unemployment rate at 3.1% and jobs-to-applicants ratio at 1.49, both post-1995 extremes (Chart 21, panel 2). BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy service believes that wage pressures, in addition to the inflationary effect of a weakening yen, could lead inflation higher. Accordingly, inflation-linked JGBs offer good value relative to nominal JGBs (Chart 21, panel 1). Chart 20Inflationary Pressures Are Building Chart 21Overweight JGBi Vs JGB Corporate Bonds Given our expectations that global growth will remain robust over the coming 12 months, pushing the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield above 3%, we continue to favor credit over government bonds. However, U.S. corporate health has deteriorated further in the past two quarters (Chart 22) and so, when the next recession comes, returns from corporate credit may be particularly bad. We cut our double overweight in investment grade debt to single overweight. The spread over Treasuries of U.S. IG credit has fallen to around 100 bps. Given high U.S. corporate leverage currently, it is unlikely that the spread will tighten any further to reach previous lows (Chart 23), so investors will benefit only from the carry. Moreover, the ECB is likely to reduce its bond buying from January 2018 and, though it is unclear whether it will taper corporate as well as sovereign purchases, this represents a potential headwind for European credit. Remain overweight high yield debt. U.S. junk bonds have been remarkably resilient in the face of falling oil prices and the subsequent blowout in energy bond spreads. The default-adjusted spread is just over 200 bps (Chart 24), based on Moody's default assumption of 2.7% over the next 12 months and a recovery rate of 47%. Historically, a spread of this size has produced an excess return over the following year 74% of the time, for an average of 84 bps. Chart 22U.S. Corporate Health Deteriorating Chart 23IG Spreads Unlikely To Tighten Further Chart 24Junk Spreads Give Sufficient Reward Commodities Chart 25Mixed Feelings Towards Commodities Secular Perspective: Bearish: We continue to hold a negative secular outlook for commodities (Chart 25). A gradual shift towards a service-led economy in China, combined with sluggish global growth, will prevent demand from rising further. This lack of demand, together with record high inventory levels for major commodities, keep us from turning bullish. Cyclical Perspective: Neutral We are positive on oil because we believe that inventories will continue to draw. We are negative on base metals due to weak demand and excess supply. We are somewhat bullish on precious metals based on the political uncertainties ahead. Energy: Bullish OPECextended its production cuts for another nine months, carrying the cuts through to Q1, when the oil price is typically seasonally weak. We expect demand growth will increasingly outpace production growth in 2017, producing inventory drawdowns. The current weakness in the crude price is largely due to investors' concerns over shale production. However, the OPEC cut of 1.2 MMb/d, supplemented by an additional 200,000 - 300,000 b/d of voluntary restrictions on non-OPEC oil, are enough to offset any spurt in shale production. Base metals: Bearish China is slowly tightening monetary policy and, following the 19th Communist Party Congress later this year, reflationary stimulus will probably continue to wind down. We have seen a cooling in the Chinese property market along with a slowdown in the manufacturing sector. The Caixin manufacturing PMI, a key indicator for metals demand, fell below 50 in May for the first time in 11 months. At the same time, inventories for copper and iron ore have risen. Precious metals: Long-term Bullish Inflation has not picked up as we expected, which may prevent the gold price from rising further in 2017. However, we expect inflation to move higher going into 2018. As a safe haven, gold is also a good hedge against geopolitical risks. We believe that the political risks in 2018 are underestimated, especially the Italian general election (probably in March or April). Currencies Chart 26Fed Will Support The Dollar In 2017, the U.S. dollar (Chart 26) has weakened by 5% on a trade-weighted basis. However, we believe that the soft patch in inflation and wage data that caused this weakness is temporary and that underlying economic momentum remains strong. Following its rate hike in June, the Fed kept its forecast for core PCE in 2018 and 2019 at 2%. As inflation and wage pressures return, market expectations will converge with the Fed's forecast. The subsequent improvement in relative interest rates will support the dollar. Euro: The euro is up by 8% versus the dollar so far this year. The ECB is likely to continue to set policy for the weakest members of the euro zone, in the absence of a major pickup in inflation. While economic activity has improved, inflation has recently fallen back again, along with the oil price. The ECB is particularly sensitive to political uncertainty surrounding the upcoming Italian elections and the fragility of the Italian banking system. This suggests that the ECB will only gradually taper its asset purchases starting early next year, but will not move to raise rates until at least mid-2019. This is likely to cause the euro to weaken over the coming months. Yen: The yen has strengthened by 4% versus the dollar year to date. With core core inflation in Japan struggling to stay above 0%, we think it highly likely that the BOJ will continue its yield curve control policy. If, as we expect, U.S. long-term interest rate trend up in the coming months, relative rates will put downward pressure on the yen. Our FX strategists expect the USD/JPY at 125 within 12 months. EM Currencies: With Chinese growth likely to remain questionable over the coming months, emerging market currencies will lack their biggest tailwind. Terms of trade will continue to turn negative as commodity prices weaken. EM monetary authorities will mostly be easing policy in order to support growth. With rates kept low, relative monetary policy is likely to will force EM currencies, especially those for commodity exporters, to depreciate from current levels. Alternatives Chart 27Attractive Risk-Return Profile Return Enhancers: Favor private equity vs. hedge funds In 2016, private equity returned 9%, whereas hedge funds managed only a 3% return (Chart 27). Strong performance led to private equity funds raising $378 bn last year, the highest level of capital secured since the Global Financial Crisis. By contrast, hedge funds have underperformed global equities and private equity since the financial crisis of 2008-09. However, investors have become increasingly concerned with valuation levels in private markets. Our recommendation is that investors should continue to overweight private equity vs hedge funds, since we do not see a recession as likely over the next 12 months. Within the hedge fund space, we would recommend overweighting event-driven funds over the cycle, and macro funds heading into a recession (please see our Special Report, dated June 16, 2017). Inflation Hedges: Favor direct real estate vs. commodity futures In 2016, direct real estate returned 9%, whereas commodity futures achieved 12%. Given the structural nature of this recommendation, investors need to look past recent short-term moves in commodity prices. Low interest rates will keep borrowing cheap, making the spread between real estate and fixed income yields continue to be attractive. Moreover, with 48% of institutional investors currently below their target allocation for real estate, there is a lot of potential for further capital allocations to the asset class. With regards to the commodity complex, the long-term transition of China to a services-based economy will lead to a structural decline in commodity demand. Investors should continue to overweight direct real estate vs commodity futures on a 3-5 year target horizon. Volatility Dampeners: Favor farmland & timberland vs. structured products In 2016, farmland and timberland returned 9% and 3% respectively, whereas structured products returned 2%. Farmland and timberland will continue to benefit from favorable global demographic trends, as a growing population and improving prosperity in the developing world increase food consumption. However, increased volatility in lumber and agriculture prices have made investors concerned about cash flows. With regards to structured products, increasing rates and deteriorating credit quality in the auto loan market will slow credit origination. Given that the Fed will start unwinding its balance sheet this year, increased supply will put upward pressure on spreads. Investors can reduce the volatility of a multi-asset portfolio with the inclusion of farmland and timberland. Risks To Our View We explained the two alternative scenarios to our main view in the Overview section of this Quarterly. There are three other specific areas where our views differ notably from the consensus: Strong dollar. Our view is predicated on the Fed tightening policy more than the market currently expects, and the ECB less. Interest rate differentials (Chart 28) certainly point to a stronger USD, and speculative positions have reversed from being very dollar-long at the start of the year. But the euro momentum could continue for a while, especially given mixed messages from Mario Draghi, for example when he said in late June that "the threat of deflation is gone and reflationary forces are at play." Crude oil back at $55. Our Energy strategists believe that the oil price is currently being driven by supply, not demand. They argue that OPEC production cuts will hold and cause inventories to draw down rapidly over the coming six months. However, speculative positioning in oil has shifted from very long to significantly short since the start of the year. The risk is that U.S. oil production continues to accelerate (Chart 29), as fracking technology improves and availability of capital for oil producers remains easy. Negative on EM. Our 12-month EM view is predicated on a stronger dollar, higher U.S. interest rates, slowing Chinese growth, and falling commodity prices. We could be wrong about these drivers. Falling inflation in emerging markets such as Brazil (Chart 30) could allow central banks to cut rates aggressively, which might temporarily boost growth. Chart 28Rate Differentials Suggest Strong Dollar Chart 29Oil Bears Point To U.S. Output Chart 30Sharp Fall In Brazilian Inflation 1 Our U.S. Bond Strategists explain the detailed thinking behind these three scenarios in their Weekly Report "Three Scenarios for Treasury Yields In 2017," dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Market-cap weighted average of Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook. 3 Market-cap weighted average of Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Intel, Oracle and Lucent. Recommended Asset Allocation
Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Geopolitical Calendar
Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Feature The BCA Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - designed to assess the financial well-being of companies - is one of our most reliable indicators that is also extremely popular with our clients. That is no surprise, as the CHMs have a solid track record in signaling broad turning points in company credit quality. This makes them useful in determining asset allocation recommendations on Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) corporate bonds. Chart 1U.S. Corporates Outperforming, ##br##Despite Worsening Credit Quality In this Weekly Report, we present the "top-down" CHMs based on corporate data from national income (i.e. "GDP") accounts for the U.S., Euro Area and the U.K. We also show the "bottom-up" CHMs constructed using the actual reported financial data of individual companies in the U.S., Euro Area and Emerging Markets (EM). The CHMs are shown in a chartbook format that allows for quick visual analysis and comparisons. Going forward, we will publish this CHM Chartbook on a quarterly basis as a regular part of Global Fixed Income Strategy. The broad conclusion from looking at the CHMs is that corporate credit quality has been steadily improving in Europe, the U.K. and in the EM universe over the past couple of years, in sharp contrast to the worsening financial health of highly-levered U.S. companies. Bond investors seem to be ignoring the relative message sent by our CHMs, however, as U.S. corporate debt has outperformed other developed credit markets since the beginning of 2016 (Chart 1). An Overview Of The BCA Corporate Health Monitors The BCA Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is an indicator designed to assess the underlying financial strength of the corporate sector for a country. The Monitor is an average of six financial ratios similar to those used by credit rating agencies to evaluate individual companies. However, we calculate our ratios using top-down (national accounts) data for profits, interest expense, debt levels, etc. The idea is to treat the entire corporate sector as if it were one big company, and then look at the credit metrics that would be used to assign a credit rating to it. Importantly, only data for the non-financial corporate sector is used in the CHM, as the metrics used to measure the underlying health of banks and other financial firms are different than those for the typical company. The six ratios used in the CHM are shown in Table 1 below. To construct the CHM, the individual ratios are standardized, added together, and then shown as a deviation from the medium-term trend. That last part is important, as it introduces more cyclicality into the CHM and allows it to better capture major turning points in corporate well-being. Largely because of this construction, the CHM has a very good track record at heralding trend changes in corporate credit spreads (both for Investment Grade and High-Yield) over many cycles. Top-down CHMs are now available for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. The CHM methodology was extended in 2016 to look at corporate health by industry and by credit quality.1 The financial data of a broad set of individual U.S. and Euro Area companies was used to construct individual "bottom-up" CHMs using the same procedure as the more familiar top-down CHM. Some of the ratios differ from those used in the top-down CHM (see Table 1), largely due to definitional differences in data presented in national income accounts versus those from actual individual company financial statements. The bottom-up CHMs analyze the health of individual sectors, and can be aggregated up into broad CHMs for Investment Grade and High-Yield groupings to compare with credit spreads. An EM version of the bottom-up CHM was introduced by the BCA Emerging Markets Strategy team last September, which extends the CHM analysis to EM hard-currency corporate debt.2 Table 1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs U.S. Corporate Health Monitors: Still Deteriorating Chart 2Top-Down U.S. CHM: Still Deteriorating Our top-down CHM for the U.S. has been flashing a deteriorating state of corporate health since mid-2014 (Chart 2). That trend had been showing signs of stabilization last year, but the Q1/2017 data worsened on the back of lower profit margins and returns on capital. The latter now sits just above 5% - a level last seen during the 2009 recession. Corporate leverage, as measured in our top-down CHM using the value of debt versus equity, does not look to be a problem. The story is quite different when using alternative measures like net debt/EBITDA, however, with U.S. leverage exceeding the highs from the Telecom bubble of the early 2000s. While booming equity values certainly flatter the leverage ratio in our top-down CHM, a strong stock market should, to some degree, reflect a better backdrop for growth in corporate profits and creditworthiness. Even against this positive backdrop, however, other credit indicators are flashing some warning signs that leave our top-down CHM in the "deteriorating health" zone. Interest coverage and debt coverage ratios, while still above the lows seen during past recessions, are steadily falling. This does raise concerns for U.S. corporate health if U.S. bond yields begin to climb again, as we expect. However, given the historically low interest rate backdrop for corporate debt, a bigger threat to interest coverage ratios and overall credit quality would come from an economic slump that damages company profits. That is not going to be a problem for the rest of this year, but weaker growth is a more likely outcome in 2018 as the Fed continues its monetary tightening cycle. Our bottom-up CHMs for U.S. IG (Chart 3) and U.S. HY (Chart 4) have shown a bit of improvement in recent quarters relative to the signal from our top-down CHM. This is likely related to the growing gap between corporate profits as reported in the U.S. national accounts data, which are slowing, compared to the reported earnings of publicly traded companies, which are accelerating. Also, leverage in the bottom-up CHMs uses the book value of equity, which is more readily reported by individual companies, and is thus much higher than the measure used in our top-down CHM. Return on capital is at multi-decade lows for both IG and HY corporates, although profit margins look to be in much better shape for IG names relative to HY issuers. HY margins have enjoyed a cyclical improvement, however, largely due to better earnings from HY energy companies (Chart 4, panel 4). Interest coverage and debt coverage are depressed, with HY issuers in much worse shape than IG. Chart 3Bottom-Up U.S. Investment Grade CHM: ##br##Deteriorating Chart 4Bottom-Up U.S. High-Yield CHM: ##br##Some Cyclical Improvement The cumulative message from our top-down and bottom-up U.S. CHMs is that U.S. corporate health has enjoyed some cyclical improvement over the past few quarters, but the state of balance sheets is slowly-but-steadily worsening. High corporate leverage will become a major problem during the next U.S. recession, but is not a major factor weighing on credit spreads at the moment (Chart 5). We are maintaining our overweight stance on U.S. IG and higher-rated U.S. HY, both of which should continue to outperform Treasuries over the next few months, but a repeat performance is far less likely next year. Chart 5No Signs Of Concern##br## In U.S. Corporate Credit Spreads Chart 6Top-Down Euro Area CHM:##br## Improving Euro Area Corporate Health Monitors: Solid Improvement Our top-down Euro Area CHM has been showing steady improvement since 2013, driven by strong profit margins and rising interest and debt coverage ratios (Chart 6). The ultra-stimulative monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) have likely played a large role in helping lower corporate borrowing costs and boosting the interest coverage ratio. The average coupon on bonds in the Bloomberg Barclays Euro-Aggregate Investment Grade corporate index is now down to a mere 2.3% - a far cry from the 5% level that prevailed during the peak of the 2011 Euro Debt crisis or the 3.5% level just before the ECB began its asset purchase program in 2015. Return on capital has fallen over the past decade and now sits at 8%, although profit margins remain quite strong on our top-down CHM measure. Short-term liquidity is at a record high, suggesting no imminent problems for European corporate borrowers. Our bottom-up CHMs for Euro Area IG (Chart 7) and HY (Chart 8) are telling a broadly similar story to the top-down CHM. The bottom-up CHMs have steadily improved in the past couple of years, most notably for domestic issuers of Euro-denominated debt.3 Some improvement in the bottom-up aggregates for operating margins and interest coverage ratios is providing a boost to European credit quality. Chart 7Bottom-Up Euro Area Investment Grade CHMs Chart 8Bottom-Up Euro Area High-Yield CHMs The bottom-up measure of leverage for domestic IG issuers has been steadily declining since the 2009 recession, a sign that European companies have been much more cautious in managing their balance sheet risk than their U.S. counterparts. The same cannot be said for Euro Area domestic HY issuers, where all the individual ratios are at weak absolute levels. When splitting our bottom-up Euro Area IG company list into issuers from core Europe versus countries on the Periphery (Chart 9), the "regional" European CHMs tell broadly similar stories of improving credit quality. The fact that even Peripheral issuers are seeing rising interest coverage and liquidity ratios, despite much higher levels of leverage than in the core, is an indication of how the ECB's low interest rate policies and asset purchase programs (which include buying corporate debt) have helped support the European corporate sector. Net-net, our Euro Area CHMs are sending a signal that there are no immediate stresses on corporate balance sheets or profitability. This is already reflected in the current low level of corporate bond yields and spreads, though (Chart 10). A bigger threat to Euro Area corporates comes from monetary policy. The ECB is under increasing pressure to consider announcing a tapering of its asset purchases - likely to include slower buying of corporates - starting in 2018. There is a risk of a negative market reaction that could undermine future Euro Area corporate bond performance. Because of this, we continue to prefer U.S. corporate debt over Euro Area equivalents, despite the large gap between the U.S. and European top-down CHMs (Chart 11). Chart 9Bottom-Up Euro Area IG CHMs: ##br##Core Vs. Periphery Chart 10Euro Area Corporate Bonds ##br## Have Had A Great Run Chart 11Relative CHMs Starting ##br##To Turn Less Favorable For U.S. Credit U.K. Corporate Health Monitor: Solid Balance Sheet Fundamentals The top-down U.K. CHM has steadily improved over the past couple of years, led by rising profit margins, higher interest coverage and very robust liquidity (Chart 12). Return on capital is low relative to its history, which is consistent with the trends seen in the U.S. and Euro Area and likely reflects the global low productivity backdrop. Fundamental analysis of U.K. corporates may not be of much use at the moment given the extremely accommodative monetary policy environment provided by the Bank of England (BoE). Low interest rates, combined with BoE asset purchases (which include a small amount of corporate debt) and a steep fall in the Pound in the aftermath of the Brexit-driven political uncertainty, are all helping keep the U.K. economy afloat. The BoE is now having to deal with a currency-driven climb in U.K. inflation, with three members of the BoE policy committee even calling for a rate hike at the latest policy meeting. The political backdrop after last year's Brexit vote and this month's closer-than-expected U.K. election result remains too volatile for the BoE to seriously consider any imminent tightening of monetary policy. While it can be debated how much the Brexit uncertainty is truly weighing on the U.K. economy, the BoE is unlikely to take any risks on triggering a growth slowdown by becoming too hawkish, too soon - even with the relatively high level of currency-driven inflation. A combination of a strong CHM and a dovish BoE will allow U.K. corporate debt, both IG and HY, to continue to outperform Gilts. We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to U.K. corporates even though, as in the other countries shown in this report, valuations are not cheap (Chart 13). We have not yet constructed bottom-up versions of the CHM for U.K. corporates to allow us to make any additional comments on the relative merits of U.K. IG and HY debt. This is something we intend to look into for future reports. Chart 12U.K. Corporate Balance Sheets ##br##Are In Good Shape... Chart 13...Which Is Already Reflected In ##br##Tight Credit Spreads Emerging Market Corporate Health Monitor: Cyclically Strong, Structurally Weak The CHM for EM corporates built by our Emerging Markets Strategy team is purely a bottom-up measure. The financial data from 220 EM companies in over 30 countries is used to construct the EM CHM. Only firms that issue U.S. dollar-denominated bonds are included, with banks and other financials also omitted in a similar fashion to the CHMs for the developed economies. A shorter list of financial ratios is used in the EM CHM than the developed CHMs, including: Profit margins Free cash flow to total debt: Liquidity Leverage Unlike the developed CHMs, the ratios are not equally weighted in the construction of the EM CHM. Profit margins and cash flow/debt combined represent 75% of the EM CHM. The weightings are designed to optimize the performance of the EM CHM versus the actual spread movements in the J.P. Morgan CEMBI benchmark index for EM corporate debt. Chart 14EM Corporate Health: Cyclically Solid... The EM CHM is currently pointing to very strong fundamental underpinnings for EM corporates with the indicator at the most credit-positive level in a decade (Chart 14). That recent strength is a modest cyclical improvement after a multi-year deterioration in all the individual EM CHM components (Chart 15). The uptick in global commodity prices in 2016 played a major role in the improvement in the growth-sensitive components (top two panels). However, the biggest structural headwind for EM corporates is the unrelenting rise in balance sheet leverage (bottom panel) - a problem that could come to the forefront if the recent slump in commodity prices persists or developed market interest rates begin to rise more sharply as central banks become marginally less accommodative. For now, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to EM hard currency debt, as the positive message sent by the EM CHM appears fully priced into the current low level of EM yields and spreads (Chart 16). Chart 15...But Structurally More Challenged Chart 16EM Corporate Debt Is Not Cheap Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Section II of The Bank Credit Analyst, "U.S. Corporate Health Gets A Failing Grade", dated February 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red" dated September 14 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Given the large share of non-European issuers in the Euro-denominated corporate debt market, we have split our sample set of companies in our bottom-up Euro Area CHMs into "domestic" and "foreign" issuer groups. This allows a more precise analysis of the corporate health of European-domiciled companies. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

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