Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Highlights Global growth will rebound in 2020, led by the US and China, putting upward pressure on global bond yields. Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure. Central banks will stay dovish until policy reflation has clearly turned into inflation, limiting how high bond yields can climb in 2020 but sowing the seeds for a far more bond-bearish backdrop in 2021. Expect mild bear-steepening pressure on global yield curves, led by rising inflation expectations. Accommodative monetary policy and faster growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle. Stay overweight global corporate debt versus sovereign bonds. Returns on global fixed income will be far lower in 2020 than in 2019, given rich valuation starting points. Country and sector selection will be more important in driving fixed income outperformance. For sovereign bonds, favor countries where yields are less sensitive to change in overall global yields; for credit, favor sectors with lower interest rate durations and lower spread volatility. Feature BCA Research’s Outlook 2020 report, outlining the main investment themes for next year from the collective mind of our strategists, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this report, we discuss the broad implications of those themes for the direction of global fixed income markets in 2020. In a follow-up report to be published in the first week of the new year, we will translate those themes into specific recommended allocations and weightings within our model bond portfolio framework. A Summary Of The 2020 Outlook Chart 1Expect A Cyclical Rise In Global Yields In 2020 Expect A Cyclical Rise In Global Yields In 2020 Expect A Cyclical Rise In Global Yields In 2020 The main conclusions from the Outlook 2020 report were cyclically bullish looking out over the next twelve months, but more cautious beyond that. The downturn in global growth seen in 2019 is projected to end in response to several headwinds that have become tailwinds: a small wave of Chinese stimulus and reflation; more stimulative global monetary policies; the substantial easing of global financial conditions as risk assets have rallied worldwide; a fading drag on global manufacturing from inventory destocking; both China (weak growth) and the US (the 2020 US election) have good reasons to de-escalate the trade war in 2020. This backdrop should push global bond yields moderately higher in 2020, while maintaining a backdrop that is once again favorable for risk assets on a relative basis versus government debt (Chart 1). A critical element to this story is the supportive monetary policy backdrop. Central banks worldwide, led by interest rate cuts from the US Federal Reserve and a resumption of asset purchases from the European Central Bank (ECB), are now running more stimulative policies in response to this year’s global manufacturing slump and elevated level of political uncertainty. Policymakers will maintain accommodative monetary policy through 2020 to try and bring depressed inflation expectations back up to central bank targets. This will create a “sweet spot” for global risk assets, with improving economic growth and accommodative monetary policy. A repeat of the spectacular total return numbers seen across the majority of asset classes in 2019 is unlikely, but global equity and credit markets should solidly outperform government bonds. Yet all that monetary stimulus does not come without a price. Policymakers will maintain accommodative monetary policy through 2020 to try and bring depressed inflation expectations back up to central bank targets. This will create a “sweet spot” for global risk assets, with improving economic growth and accommodative monetary policy.  A revival of inflationary pressures in 2021 will force central banks to raise rates much more aggressively. Combined with a China that remains wary of promoting excess leverage, this will drive the current prolonged global business cycle expansion to its recessionary endgame, taking equity and credit markets down with it. This will eventually trigger a new decline in global bond yields as policymakers shift back to easing mode, but from much higher levels than today. Our Four Main Key Views For Global Fixed Income Markets In 2020 The following are the main implications for global fixed income investment strategy based off the conclusions from the 2020 BCA Outlook: Key View #1: Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure. The pickup in global growth that we expect in 2020 has its roots in two locations: China and the US. For China, policymakers are keenly aware that the current growth slowdown cannot continue, as it has already pushed nominal GDP growth below 8% (Chart 2). For an economy as highly leveraged as China, slowing nominal growth is lethal and must be avoided to prevent a surge in private sector defaults and rising unemployment. Already, China has delivered significant policy stimulus in 2019: the reserve requirement ratio has been cut by 400bps; taxes have been cut by 2.8% of GDP; capital spending at state-owned enterprises has increased; the currency has depreciated; and, more recently, monetary policy has been eased via traditional interest rate cuts. These measures have eased our index of Chinese monetary conditions and triggered a surge in the China credit impulse, which leads Chinese import growth (i.e. China’s most direct impact on the global economy) by nine months. There are signs that Chinese growth is already bottoming out, as evidenced by the recent pickup in the China manufacturing PMI. Expect more signs of improvement in the first half of 2020. The BCA global leading economic indicator (LEI) has been rising since January of this year, and the global LEI diffusion index is signaling that the upturn will continue in 2020 (Chart 3). With global financial conditions at highly stimulative levels thanks to the robust performance of risk assets in 2019, the backdrop is already conducive to faster global growth. BCA’s geopolitical strategists are of the view that a “détente” in the US-China trade war is still the most likely base case scenario, which would go a long way in reducing the growth-inhibiting effects of elevated uncertainty (bottom panel). Chart 2A Boost To Global Growth From China In 2020 A Boost To Global Growth From China In 2020 A Boost To Global Growth From China In 2020 Chart 3Lower Uncertainty + Easy Financial Conditions = Faster Growth Lower Uncertainty + Easy Financial Conditions = Faster Growth Lower Uncertainty + Easy Financial Conditions = Faster Growth As for the US, the lagged impact of the Fed’s 75bps of rate cuts this year has boosted domestic liquidity conditions in a pro-growth fashion. The BCA US Financial Liquidity Indicator, which leads not only US growth but also leads the BCA global LEI and commodity prices by 18 months, is already signaling that US economic momentum is set to bottom out in early 2020 (Chart 4). This signal is in addition to the leading properties of US financial conditions (middle panel), which suggests a reacceleration of real GDP growth back above trend is about to unfold. Chinese policy reflation has typically been a good leading indicator for US capex and is heralding a rebound in investment spending (bottom panel). The pickup in global growth would also help revive the dormant euro zone economy, which has been hit hard though plunging export demand and overall weakness in the manufacturing sector. The entire slump in euro area real GDP growth since the start of 2018 can be attributed to plunging net exports, while domestic demand has held steady (Chart 5). The increase in the China credit impulse and our global LEI diffusion index – both leading indicators of euro area export growth – are signaling that euro area export demand is already in the process of bottoming out (bottom two panels) and should gain momentum in the first half of 2020. Chart 4US Growth Is Poised To Accelerate US Growth Is Poised To Accelerate US Growth Is Poised To Accelerate Chart 5The Drag On European Growth From Trade Will Soon End The Drag On European Growth From Trade Will Soon End The Drag On European Growth From Trade Will Soon End This better growth backdrop will put moderate upward pressure on global bond yields in 2020. This better growth backdrop will put moderate upward pressure on global bond yields in 2020. Key View #2: Expect mild bear-steepening pressure on global yield curves, led by rising inflation expectations. While we expect bond yields to drift higher in the next 6-12 months, the upside will be capped with central banks likely to stay dovish until policy reflation has clearly turned into higher inflation. Interest rate markets will not begin to price in expectations of tighter monetary policy without evidence of actual inflation picking up. The Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and other central banks have all stated publicly that they will maintain current accommodative policy settings until realized inflation has sustainably returned to target levels, typically around 2%. This would be a major change in the modus operandi of these policymakers, who have typically signaled rate hikes based simply on forecasts of higher inflation. The implication is that interest rate markets will not begin to price in expectations of tighter monetary policy without evidence of actual inflation picking up (Chart 6). Chart 6Central Banks Will Stay Dovish Until Inflation Sustainably Accelerates Central Banks Will Stay Dovish Until Inflation Sustainably Accelerates Central Banks Will Stay Dovish Until Inflation Sustainably Accelerates A critical ingredient for global inflation to begin moving higher again is a softer US dollar (USD). The year-over-year growth rate of the trade-weighted USD is correlated to global export price inflation and commodity price inflation, more generally (Chart 7). The typical drivers of the USD are all pointing in a more bearish direction: Chart 7The USD Is Critical For Global Reflation The USD Is Critical For Global Reflation The USD Is Critical For Global Reflation Chart 8Global Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Will Drift Higher In 2020 Global Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Will Drift Higher In 2020 Global Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Will Drift Higher In 2020 the Fed has cut interest rates multiple times since the summer and is expanding its balance sheet via repo operations and treasury bill purchases; global (non-US) growth is bottoming out, and capital tends to flow out of the USD into more cyclical currencies in Europe and EM when global growth is accelerating; elevated policy uncertainty, which tends to attract inflows into the safety of the USD, is starting to diminish. The combination of improving global growth and a softer USD would normally be enough to generate a significant increase in global bond yields. Yet we do not expect the sort of move higher in the real component of bond yields signaled by our global LEI diffusion index in 2020 (Chart 8, top panel). While real yields should move higher alongside faster growth, if there is no expected tightening of monetary policy as well, the move in real yields will be more limited. The grind higher in global bond yields that we expect in 2020 will come first through faster inflation expectations and, much later in the year, higher real bond yields when central bankers (starting with the Fed) begin to signal a need to turn more hawkish. The grind higher in global bond yields that we expect in 2020 will come first through faster inflation expectations and, much later in the year, higher real bond yields when central bankers (starting with the Fed) begin to signal a need to turn more hawkish. This suggests that inflation-linked bonds should perform reasonably well in countries where inflation is likely to accelerate the fastest, like the US. Faster inflation expectations will also result in some bear-steepening of global government bond yield curves in the first half of 2020 (Chart 9). There is very little curve steepening discounted in bond forward rates in the developed markets – a consequence of the general flatness of yield curves – which suggests that yield curve steepening trades could prove to be profitable in 2020. Chart 9Expect A Mild Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Expect A Mild Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Expect A Mild Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Chart 10The Fed Has Dis-Inverted The Treasury Curve The Fed Has Dis-Inverted The Treasury Curve The Fed Has Dis-Inverted The Treasury Curve In the case of the US, the Fed’s recent easing actions have pushed short-term interest rates below longer-term Treasury yields, removing the yield curve inversion that sparked recession fears among investors during the summer of 2019 (Chart 10). With the Fed likely to sit on its hands for most of next year, even as US growth and inflation are likely to improve, this will put additional bear-steepening pressure on the US Treasury curve. In Europe, bond markets have already discounted a very significant impact from the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, which only began last month. Investment grade corporate bond spreads, as well as Italy-Germany government bond spreads, have narrowed substantially despite a weak euro area economy (Chart 11, bottom panel). Meanwhile, the term premium on 10-year German bunds is back to the deeply negative levels middle panel) seen when the ECB was expanding its balance sheet at a 30-40% pace, rather than the 5% pace implied by the current announced pace of purchases of 20 billion euros per month (top panel). This potentially leaves longer-term European yields exposed to the same bear-steepening pressures seen in other bond markets, even within the context of a renewed ECB bond-buying program. Chart 11European Bonds Already Discount A Very Dovish ECB European Bonds Already Discount A Very Dovish ECB European Bonds Already Discount A Very Dovish ECB Chart 12The Wild Card For Bonds Markets In 2020: Fiscal Policy The Wild Card For Bonds Markets In 2020: Fiscal Policy The Wild Card For Bonds Markets In 2020: Fiscal Policy A potentially big wild card for global bond markets next year will be fiscal policy, which can also exacerbate yield curve steepening pressures. Any sign of a push toward more government spending, particularly in Europe where there has been such reluctance to open the fiscal taps, would result in a sharper upward move in global bond yields than we are expecting. This is not because of a supply effect related to more government bond issuance that would require higher yields to attract buyers. It is because fiscal stimulus (Chart 12) would push growth to an even faster pace that would bring forward the date when inflation returns to policymaker targets and tighter monetary policy could commence. This would follow a similar path to the curve steepening dynamics described earlier, with a fiscal boost to growth pushing up longer-term inflation expectations before starting to push up short-term interest rate expectations. Key View #3: Stay overweight global corporate debt versus sovereign bonds. Investors should expect another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. The combination of faster global growth, somewhat higher inflation and accommodative monetary policies laid out in the BCA Outlook 2020 report will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle. This means investors should expect another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Low borrowing rates are already helping to extend the credit cycle by making it easier for highly indebted borrowers to service their debts. This can be seen in the US, where interest coverage ratios (using top-down data for the non-financial corporate sector) remain above the levels that have preceded previous recessions (Chart 13). Low borrowing rates are also helping indebted borrowers in Europe, particularly in Italy and Spain where the banking system is now far less exposed to non-performing loans than during the peak years of the 2011-12 European Debt Crisis (Chart 14). Chart 13Low Rates Helping Extend The US Credit Cycle Low Rates Helping Extend The US Credit Cycle Low Rates Helping Extend The US Credit Cycle Chart 14Low Rates Helping Ease Stress In European Banks Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Low Rates Helping Ease Stress In European Banks Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Low Rates Helping Ease Stress In European Banks Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Chart 15A Cyclically Positive Backdrop For Global Corporates A Cyclically Positive Backdrop For Global Corporates A Cyclically Positive Backdrop For Global Corporates According to our checklist of indicators to watch for an end of the corporate credit cycle in the US – tight monetary policy, deteriorating corporate sector financial health, and tightening bank lending standards – only corporate financial health is flashing a warning signal according to our Corporate Health Monitor as we discussed in a recent report.2 In fact, our global Corporate Health Monitor is rolling over – a trend that should continue as growth improves in 2020 – which should support global corporate bond outperformance versus government debt next year (Chart 15). Key View #4: Returns on global fixed income will be far lower in 2020 than in 2019. Country and sector selection will be more important in driving fixed income outperformance in 2020. The start of 2020 looks far different in terms of fixed income valuations compared to the beginning of 2019. For example, the 10yr US Treasury yield started the year at 2.72% and is now 1.83%, while the 10yr German bund yield started this year at 0.24% and is now MINUS-0.31%. These lower yields reflect the slower pace of global economic growth and monetary policy easing delivered by the Fed and ECB. Yet at the same time, corporate credit spreads have narrowed in both the US (the high-yield index OAS is down from 526bps to 360bps) and the euro area (the investment grade index OAS is down from 152bps to 100bps). These massive rallies in global bond markets this year resulted in both lower government bond yields and tighter credit spreads - even with slower global growth that would normally be a trigger for wider spreads/higher risk premiums. Looking at the current valuation of government bond yields in the major developed markets from a long-run perspective, it is difficult to make the case that it is attractive. Medium-term real bond yields remain well below potential GDP growth rates, a consequence of central banks keeping policy rates well below neutral levels suggested by measures like the Taylor Rule (Chart 16). Chart 16Global Government Bonds Are Expensive 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning Without the initial starting point of cheap valuations, fixed income return expectations for 2020 should be tempered. This means that rather than loading up on maximum duration risk and/or credit risk to capture big yield and spread moves, bond investors should be more selective in country, maturity and credit exposure to generate outperformance in 2020. Chart 17Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 For government bonds, that means focusing country exposures on lower-beta markets where yields are less correlated to moves in the overall level of global bond yields. Our preferred way to measure this is to look at the beta of monthly yield changes for the benchmark 10-year government yields of the major developed market countries to the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index yield for the 7-10 year maturity bucket, over a rolling three-year window. We define a “high-beta” bond market as having a yield beta of 1.25 or higher, and a “low-beta” bond market as having a yield beta of 0.75 or lower. Under that definition, global bond investors should underweight higher-beta Canada, the US and Italy, and overweight low-beta Japan and Spain (Chart 17). Bond markets with betas between 1.25 and 0.75 (Germany, Australia, Sweden, the UK) can also be considered on their own fundamental merits. Of that list, we see Germany and Australia having a better chance of outperforming the UK and Sweden, given the greater odds that the Bank of England or Riksbank could signal a need to hike rates in 2020 compared to the ECB or Reserve Bank of Australia. Chart 18Stay Overweight Global Spread Product In 2020, But Be Selective 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning For spread product, that means focusing exposure on sectors that are less risky, either defined by interest rate duration or spread volatility (i.e. spread duration). With credit spreads remaining near the low end of long-run historical ranges for nearly all major markets (Chart 18), it is hard to find examples of spread product being cheap in absolute terms. On a risk-adjusted basis, however, negatively-convex spread product like US and euro area high-yield debt and US agency MBS actually look more interesting in the rising yield environment we expect in 2020, since the interest rate durations of those fixed income sectors fell as bond yields declined in 2019. Thus, we recommend owning high-yield corporates over higher-duration investment grade corporates in the US and euro area, while also favoring US agency MBS over higher-quality credit tiers of US investment grade corporate credit.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game”, dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Lowdown On Low-Rated High-Yield”, dated November 27, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning 2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Below-Benchmark Duration In 2020 H1. Improving global growth and the de-escalation of US/China trade tensions will put upward pressure on bond yields in the first half of 2020, making below-benchmark portfolio duration appropriate. US political risks could re-assert themselves as we head into 2020 H2, leading to a risk-off environment that causes bond yields to fall. We will likely recommend increasing portfolio duration in mid-2020 if the political situation plays out as we expect, or if the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield and 12-month Fed Funds Discounter reach our targets. Barbell Your Treasury Portfolio. The 2/10 Treasury slope will steepen modestly in the coming months, but will remain in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps in 2020. Any steepening will be concentrated in the real yield curve. The TIPS breakeven inflation curve is likely to flatten. Our valuation models suggest that a barbelled Treasury portfolio is the best way to position for this environment. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet and buying a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 30-year bond. Overweight Spread Product. Low inflation expectations will keep the Fed on hold in 2020. This accommodative monetary environment will keep defaults low and credit spreads tight. Spread product will outperform Treasuries in duration-matched terms. Favor High-Yield Versus Investment Grade. Appropriate valuation measures show that high-yield corporate spreads are very attractive in the current environment, while investment grade corporate spreads are tight compared to our fair value estimates. Overweight Mortgage-Backed Securities. Agency MBS look attractive compared to investment grade corporate bonds, especially in risk-adjusted terms. The risk of a refinancing surge in 2020 is minimal and mortgage lending standards are more likely to ease than tighten. MBS spreads have room to tighten in 2020. Overweight TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries. TIPS breakeven inflation rates are well below our target range of 2.3%-2.5%. It will take some time, and likely an overshoot of the Fed’s 2% inflation target, for them to reach that range as expectations adapt only slowly to rising core inflation. But even if they don’t make it back to target, breakevens should still grind higher as the economy recovers in 2020. Feature BCA published its 2020 Outlook on November 22. That report lays out the main macroeconomic themes that our strategists see driving markets next year. This Special Report explains how investors can profit from those themes in US fixed income markets. Specifically, we offer six key US fixed income views for 2020. This report is limited to the six key investment views listed on page 1, and only discusses Fed policy in the context of how it influences those views. Next week we will publish a more comprehensive “Fed In 2020” report that will delve into our outlook for the Fed next year. Outlook Summary First, a brief summary of the main economic views presented in BCA’s 2020 outlook:1 The global manufacturing downturn that persisted throughout 2019 is quickly coming to an end. The following factors will cause global growth to rebound in early 2020: China eased economic policy significantly in 2019. Policymakers cut the reserve requirement ratio by 400 basis points, cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP, increased issuance of local government bonds to finance public infrastructure projects, and boosted capex at state-owned enterprises. The Fed cut rates by 75 bps, and other central banks also eased monetary policy in 2019. The global inventory purge that magnified the industrial sector’s pain in 2019 is exhausted. Both the US and China have incentives to de-escalate the trade war in the first half of 2020. Investors should remain invested in risk assets to take advantage of this favorable global macro environment. But 2020 is likely to be the last year of risk asset outperformance. Today’s accommodative monetary policy will revive inflationary pressures in 2021, and central banks will then be forced to lift rates much more aggressively. China will also continue to resist excess leverage. Neither the business cycle nor the equity bull market will withstand those final assaults in 2021. Key View #1: Below-Benchmark Duration In 2020 H1 Improving global growth and the de-escalation of US/China trade tensions will put upward pressure on bond yields in the first half of 2020, making below-benchmark portfolio duration appropriate. US political risks could re-assert themselves as we head into 2020 H2, leading to a risk-off environment that causes bond yields to fall. We will likely recommend increasing portfolio duration in mid-2020 if the political situation plays out as we expect, or if the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield and 12-month Fed Funds Discounter reach our targets. In prior research we identified the five macroeconomic factors that determine trends in US bond yields.2 They are: (i) global growth, (ii) the output gap, (iii) the US dollar, (iv) policy uncertainty and (v) sentiment. On global growth, the three measures that correlate most strongly with the 10-year Treasury yield are the Global Manufacturing PMI, the US ISM Manufacturing PMI and the CRB Raw Industrials index. As mentioned above, we expect all three of these indicators to move higher in the first half of 2020, but so far we have seen only tentative signs of a rebound. The Global PMI is back above 50 after bottoming at 49.3 in July, but the US ISM remains in contractionary territory and the CRB Raw Industrials index is in a downtrend (Chart 1). All three of these indicators will have to increase for our call to play out. The global manufacturing downturn that persisted throughout 2019 is quickly coming to an end. The same amount of economic growth is more inflationary when the output gap is small than when it is wide. For this reason, we also need some sense of the output gap to make a call on Treasury yields. We have found wage growth to be a useful indicator of the output gap, as evidenced by its strong correlation with the fed funds rate (Chart 2). As long as recession is avoided, strong wage growth will make it difficult for the Fed to aggressively cut rates. The upshot is that Treasury yields will not re-visit their mid-2016 lows until the next recession hits and wage pressures wane. For now, all leading wage growth indicators continue to point up (Chart 2, bottom 2 panels). Chart 1Factor 1: Global Growth Factor 1: Global Growth Factor 1: Global Growth Chart 2Factor 2: The Output Gap Factor 2: The Output Gap Factor 2: The Output Gap   The US dollar is the third important macro factor we consider. A strengthening dollar signals that US yields are de-coupling too far from yields in the rest of the world, making them more likely to fall back down. Conversely, an uptrend in US bond yields is likely to last longer in an environment of dollar weakness. The trade-weighted dollar has been rangebound during the past few months and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has declined significantly (Chart 3). This suggests that US yields have room to move higher. However, we will watch the dollar closely as bond yields rise in 2020 H1. A rapidly appreciating dollar would make us more inclined to fade any increase in US bond yields. The fourth factor we consider is policy uncertainty. It’s no secret that US Treasury securities benefit from flight to safety flows in times of heightened political stress. The tight correlation between the 10-year Treasury yield and the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index demonstrates this nicely (Chart 4). In fact, it is now clear that uncertainty about the US/China trade war caused US yields to reach lower levels this year than was implied by the economic fundamentals alone. Chart 3Factor 3: The US Dollar Factor 3: The US Dollar Factor 3: The US Dollar Chart 4Factor 4: Policy Uncertainty Factor 4: Policy Uncertainty Factor 4: Policy Uncertainty   We see trade tensions continuing to die down as we head into the New Year. President Trump faces an election in November 2020, and he no doubt realizes that an incumbent President with a strong economy has a good chance of winning re-election. He therefore has a strong incentive to support economic growth. However, by the second half of next year, we see two potential political risks that could flare, causing bond yields to fall. First, if Trump finds himself behind in the polls by mid-summer, then he may change his strategy and re-escalate tensions with China or some other foreign policy target. Second, if one of the progressive candidates – Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders – secures the Democratic nomination, stocks will likely sell off, precipitating a flight-to-quality into US bonds. All in all, we see the ebbing of policy uncertainty in the first half of 2020 helping to push bond yields higher. But risks could flare again in the 2020 H2, sending yields back down. Chart 5Factor 5: Sentiment Factor 5: Sentiment Factor 5: Sentiment The final factor we consider when forecasting bond yields is sentiment, and we find the Economic Surprise Index to be the most useful sentiment measure. Chart 5 shows that positive data surprises tend to coincide with rising Treasury yields and vice-versa. We also know that long periods of positive data surprises are more likely to be followed by disappointments, and vice-versa. Though the Surprise Index’s message can change quickly, it is currently close to neutral, sending no strong signal for bond yields. Considering our five macro factors together, we conclude that a rebound in global growth and waning political uncertainty will send bond yields higher in the first half of 2020. Investors should keep portfolio duration low in this environment. We may recommend increasing portfolio duration as we approach mid-year if political uncertainty looks set to rise, or if the dollar is appreciating strongly, or if yields reach the targets outlined below. Yield Target #1: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Our Golden Rule of Bond Investing asserts that you should keep portfolio duration low if you expect the Fed to be more hawkish than market expectations, and high if you expect the Fed to be more dovish.3 At present, the overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for 22 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. While economic growth is poised to improve in 2020, the Fed is in no rush to tighten monetary policy with inflation expectations still low. We therefore expect the fed funds rate to stay flat next year. With the market still priced for cuts, this forecast implies that we should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, at least until our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter – the change in the fed funds rate priced into the OIS curve for the next 12 months – rises to zero or above. A rebound in global growth and waning political uncertainty will send bond yields higher in the first half of 2020. Investors should keep portfolio duration low in this environment. Table 1 uses our Golden Rule framework to forecast Treasury index returns in different monetary policy scenarios. Our base case of a flat fed funds rate is consistent with Treasury index total returns of +0.67% to +0.88% in 2020, and excess returns versus cash of between -0.91% and -0.70%. The Appendix at the end of this report discusses how our Golden Rule framework performed in 2019 and in years past. Table 1Treasury Return Projections 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Yield Target #2: Long-Run Fed Funds Rate Expectations Chart 6Target 2.25% To 2.5% Target 2.25% To 2.5% Target 2.25% To 2.5% A second catalyst for increasing portfolio duration would be if the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield converged with estimates of the longer-run neutral fed funds rate. Once recessionary risks move to the backburner, it would be logical for long-dated forward rates to converge to levels that are consistent with market expectations for the long-run neutral fed funds rate. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 2014 and 2017/18, the last two periods of strong global growth (Chart 6). At present, the Fed’s median long-run neutral rate estimate is 2.5%. The New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants estimates a range of 2.19% to 2.50% and its Survey of Primary Dealers estimates a range of 2.25% to 2.56%. A 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield in the range of 2.25% to 2.5% would be a second catalyst for us to increase recommended portfolio duration. For Treasury yields to move sustainably above 2.5% in this cycle, it will be necessary for investors to revise their long-run neutral rate estimates higher. This could very well occur, but probably not within the next six months. Nonetheless, investors should pay close attention to the price of gold and the US housing market for signals that neutral rate estimates might undergo upward revisions. The gold price tends to rise when investors view monetary policy as becoming increasingly accommodative. This can occur because the Fed is cutting rates while neutral rate estimates are unchanged, or because neutral rate estimates are rising and the fed funds rate is unchanged. Chart 7 shows that a drop in the gold price foreshadowed downward revisions to the neutral rate in 2013. A further breakout in gold in 2020 could signal that the neutral rate needs to be revised higher again. The housing market will also provide important clues about the neutral fed funds rate. Last year, housing activity slowed considerably once the 30-year mortgage rate rose about 4% (Chart 8). Activity bounced back this year after rates fell, but it will be important to see what happens to housing once the mortgage rate rises back to 4% and above. If an above-4% mortgage rate leads to another downdraft in housing, it would send a strong signal that current neutral rate estimates are roughly correct. However, if housing activity continues to improve with a mortgage rate above 4%, it would suggest that upward neutral rate revisions are required. Chart 7Gold Leads The Neutral Rate... Gold Leads The Neutral Rate... Gold Leads The Neutral Rate... Chart 8...And So Does Housing ...And So Does Housing ...And So Does Housing   There is at least one good reason to think that housing activity might not slow once the mortgage rate rises above 4%. There is currently an excess of supply at the upper-end of the housing market, and a lack of supply at the low-end. This has resulted in price deceleration for new homes, as homebuilders shift construction to the lower-end of the market where demand is stronger (Chart 8, bottom panel). This supply side re-adjustment could make the housing market more resilient to higher mortgage rates in 2020. Key View #2: Barbell Your Treasury Portfolio The 2/10 Treasury slope will steepen modestly in the coming months, but will remain in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps in 2020. Any steepening will be concentrated in the real yield curve. The TIPS breakeven inflation curve is likely to flatten. Our valuation models suggest that a barbelled Treasury portfolio is the best way to position for this environment. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet and buying a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 30-year bond. In thinking about how the slope of the Treasury curve will respond as global growth improves in 2020, it’s useful to look at what happened in two recent episodes of strengthening global growth – 2012/13 and 2016/17. Charts 9A, 9B and 9C illustrate how the 2/10 slope responded in those periods, and show the breakdown between changes in the real and inflation components of yields. The actual slope changes are provided in Table 2. In 2012/13, the 2/10 slope steepened dramatically as global growth rebounded, with almost all of the steepening coming from the real yield curve. It’s not difficult to understand why. The economic outlook was improving, but the Fed was still two years away from lifting interest rates. As such, the Fed’s dovish forward guidance kept a firm lid on short-maturity yields even as long-dated yields rose. In contrast, we can look at the 2016/17 episode. The 2/10 slope steepened somewhat early in the 2016/17 global growth recovery, but ended up 45 bps flatter by the time that the Global PMI peaked. This time, both the real and inflation components contributed to curve flattening. The key difference in this episode was that the Fed was quick to turn more hawkish as growth improved. It lifted the funds rate four times, and short-dated yields rose more quickly than those at the long-end. If housing activity continues to improve with a mortgage rate above 4%, it would suggest that upward neutral rate revisions are required. What can be applied from these two episodes to today? One thing that’s clear is that the Fed will not be as quick to tighten policy as it was in 2016/17. As will be discussed in more detail in next week’s report, the Fed wants to keep policy accommodative until inflation expectations are firmly re-anchored around its target. We think the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate needs to rise from its current 1.8% to above 2.3% before that goal is met. However, it’s also conceivable that inflationary pressures will emerge as soon as late-2020, necessitating rate hikes in 2021. If that’s the case, then short-dated yields will sniff that out in advance, imparting some flattening pressure to the curve. All in all, we’re looking for modest curve steepening in the first half of 2020. But with the Fed not completely out of the picture – as was the case in 2012/13 – the 2/10 slope will not rise above 50 bps. We would also recommend positioning for curve steepening via real yields. The cost of 2-year inflation protection is currently below the cost of 10-year inflation protection (Chart 9C), but will probably lead the 10-year higher as inflation expectations slowly adapt to the incoming data. We recommend TIPS breakeven curve flatteners. Chart 9ANominal 2/10 Slope Nominal 2/10 Slope Nominal 2/10 Slope Chart 9BReal 2/10 Slope Real 2/10 Slope Real 2/10 Slope Chart 9CInflation Compensation: 2/10 Slope Inflation Compensation: 2/10 Slope Inflation Compensation: 2/10 Slope Table 22/10 Slope Changes During Two Recent Global Growth Upturns 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Interestingly, we also do not recommend the typical 2/10 steepening trade of going long the 5-year bullet against a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This is because the 2/5/10 butterfly already discounts a huge amount of 2/10 steepening. The 5-year bullet appears 6 bps expensive on our model, meaning that the 2/10 slope needs to steepen by 26 bps during the next six months for a long 5-year, short 2/10 trade to profit (Chart 10).4 Chart 102/5/10 Butterfly Valuation Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Valuation Model 2/5/10 Butterfly Valuation Model Against this valuation backdrop, we recommend owning a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and the 30-year bond, while shorting the 5-year note. This heavily barbelled Treasury allocation adds positive carry to a bond portfolio, and will earn positive returns as long as the 5/30 slope steepens by less than 61 bps during the next six months.5 Further, recent correlations suggest that the 5-year yield will rise by more than either the 2-year or 30-year yields if the market starts to price-in fewer Fed rate cuts, as we expect. Table 3 shows that there has been a positive correlation between changes in the 2/5 Treasury slope and our 12-month discounter during the past six months, and a negative correlation between our discounter and the 5/30 slope. Table 3Correlation Of Monthly Changes In 12-Month Discounter With Monthly Changes In Treasury Curve Slopes 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Key View #3: Overweight Spread Product Low inflation expectations will keep the Fed on hold in 2020. This accommodative monetary environment will keep defaults low and credit spreads tight. Spread product will outperform Treasuries in duration-matched terms. In last year’s Key Views report, we presented a method for splitting the economic cycle into three phases based on the slope of the yield curve.6 We observed that spread product excess returns versus Treasuries tend to be highest in Phase 1 of the cycle, when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is above 50 bps. Spread product excess returns tend to be low, but still positive, in Phase 2 of the cycle when the slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps, and only turn negative in Phase 3 after the 3-year/10-year slope inverts. By our criteria, we remained in Phase 2 of the cycle throughout all of 2019 and spread product did in fact deliver small, but positive, excess returns relative to Treasuries. We expect to remain in Phase 2 throughout most (if not all) of 2020, and therefore advise investors to maintain overweight allocations to spread product versus duration-matched Treasuries. We are looking for modest curve steepening in the first half of 2020. The principal rationale for our call is that accommodative Fed policy will keep the yield curve positively sloped in 2020. It will also give banks the confidence to continue extending credit. And as long as lending standards are sufficiently easy, defaults will remain low and spreads will stay tight. Yes, there are some early indications that we might be transitioning into a Phase 3 environment, an environment that would merit a more defensive stance. For one thing, some parts of the Treasury curve inverted in August, though the specific measure we use in our credit cycle analysis – the monthly average of daily closes of the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope – remained above zero (Chart 11). Also, commercial & industrial (C&I) lending standards tightened in the third quarter. Chart 11Still In Phase 2 Still In Phase 2 Still In Phase 2 However, we expect both of these warning signs to dissipate in the near future. The yield curve has already re-steepened, and while loan officers indicated that they had tightened overall standards on C&I loans in Q3, they continued to loosen the terms on those loans (Chart 11, panel 3). But most importantly, we continue to observe inflation expectations that are far below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 11, bottom panel). As long as this is the case, the Fed will do its best to keep interest rates low and monetary conditions accommodative. In that environment, the yield curve should stay upward sloping and banks will keep the credit taps open. Phase 2 will stay in place and spread product will outperform Treasuries. The poor health of nonfinancial corporate balance sheets is another risk to our positive spread product view. We track corporate balance sheet health using both aggregate top-down data from the US Financial Accounts (Chart 12A) and by looking at the median firm in our own bottom-up sample of high-yield issuers (Chart 12B). In both cases, we see that debt-to-profit and debt-to-asset ratios are elevated, indicating that firms are carrying a lot of debt on their balance sheets relative to history. However, both samples also show that interest coverage ratios are strong. Solid interest coverage is the result of low interest rates and the Fed’s accommodative monetary policy. It tells us that defaults won’t occur until inflation expectations rise and the Fed turns more restrictive. That may not happen until 2021. Chart 12ACorporate Health: Top-Down Corporate Health: Top-Down Corporate Health: Top-Down Chart 12BCorporate Health: Bottom-Up Corporate Health: Bottom-Up Corporate Health: Bottom-Up   The downside is that an extended period of accommodative monetary policy and few defaults means that firms will continue to build up debt and whittle away the equity cushion in corporate capital structures. The end result will be greater losses during the next default cycle. Our Preferred Spread Sectors Within US spread product, we recommend an overweight allocation to high-yield corporate bonds to take advantage of the favorable macro environment. Within investment grade sectors, we advise only a neutral allocation to corporate bonds (see Key View #4), but recommend overweighting Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (see Key View #5), Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Local Authority and Foreign Agency debt. Chart 13 shows a snapshot of the risk/reward trade-off between investment grade spread products. The vertical axis displays the option-adjusted spread as a simple proxy for 12-month expected excess returns. The horizontal axis displays our own risk measure called the Risk Of Losing 100 bps.7 This measure calculates the spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus duration-matched Treasuries, then adjusts for each sector’s historical spread volatility. Chart 13Excess Return Bond Map: Main Investment Grade Sectors 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 13 imposes no macro view, but it does reveal that Foreign Agency debt offers an attractive expected return for its level of risk. Agency CMBS and Agency MBS also offer attractive expected returns for their respective risk levels. USD-denominated Sovereign bonds offer high expected returns, but are also the riskiest of the sectors in Chart 13. We recommend an underweight allocation to USD-denominated Sovereigns with the exception of Mexican and Saudi Arabian bonds, which look attractive on a risk/reward basis. Chart 14 replicates Chart 13 but with the USD-denominated Sovereign bonds of different countries. Only Mexico and Saudi Arabia stand out as being attractively priced. Chart 14Excess Return Bond Map: USD-Denominated EM Sovereigns 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 15Favor Long-Maturity Munis Favor Long-Maturity Munis Favor Long-Maturity Munis We also maintain a positive outlook on Municipal bonds, particularly at the long-end of the Aaa-rated curve. Municipal / Treasury yield ratios look attractive compared to history, especially at long maturities (Chart 15). While many state and local governments face long-run problems related to underfunded pensions, these issues won’t be exposed until revenue growth falters in the next downturn. For now, state & local government balance sheets are healthy enough to keep muni upgrades outpacing downgrades (Chart 15, bottom 2 panels). Key View #4: Favor High-Yield Over Investment Grade Appropriate valuation measures show that high-yield corporate spreads are very attractive in the current environment, while investment grade corporate spreads are tight compared to our fair value estimates. We noted above that, despite the favorable macro environment for spread product, we recommend an overweight allocation to high-yield corporate bonds but only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. The reason for the disparity is valuation. Our preferred valuation measure is the 12-month breakeven spread. This is the spread widening required for the sector to lose money versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. This measure is superior to the simple index option-adjusted spread because it controls for time-varying index duration. We also re-calculate the investment grade and high-yield bond indexes so that they have constant distribution between the different credit tiers over time. Charts 16A and 16Bshow 12-month breakeven spreads for our re-constituted investment grade and high-yield indexes as percentile ranks versus history. The investment grade spread has been tighter only 11% of the time since 1995, while the high-yield spread has been tighter 67% of the time. Chart 16AIG Valuation IG Valuation IG Valuation Chart 16BHY Valuation HY Valuation HY Valuation   From our analysis of the three phases of the cycle, we also know that spreads tend to tighter in Phase 2 of the cycle than in Phases 1 or 3. Since we are currently in Phase 2, we would expect spreads to be near the bottom of their historical distributions. With this knowledge, we derive spread targets for each corporate credit tier based on the median breakeven spreads witnessed in prior Phase 2 periods. We then use current index duration to calculate option-adjusted spread targets for each credit tier and the overall investment grade and high-yield indexes (Charts 17A and 17B). Notice that all investment grade spreads are below their Phase 2 targets, while high-yield spreads are well above. Chart 17AIG Spread Targets IG Spread Targets IG Spread Targets Chart 17BHY Spread Targets HY Spread Targets HY Spread Targets   We also observe that Caa-rated spreads are extremely cheap relative to target, and have been widening rapidly. We are more inclined to view this as an opportunity to buy Caa-rated bonds than as a warning sign for overall corporate bond performance, as we discussed in a recent report.8 Key View #5: Overweight Mortgage-Backed Securities Agency MBS look attractive compared to investment grade corporate bonds, especially in risk-adjusted terms. The risk of a refinancing surge in 2020 is minimal and mortgage lending standards are more likely to ease than tighten. MBS spreads have room to tighten in 2020. We noted above that Agency MBS offer an attractive trade-off between risk and expected return. Specifically, Chart 13 shows that MBS offer expected returns that are similar to Aa and Aaa corporates, but with less risk of losing 100 bps versus Treasuries. For further evidence of the attractiveness of MBS spreads, we note that while the zero-volatility spread for conventional 30-year Agency MBS is not all that elevated compared to history, it is being held down by very low expected prepayment losses (aka option costs) (Chart 18). The OAS, the best proxy for MBS expected return, stands at 48 bps. This is reasonably elevated compared to history and very close to the spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds. Past periods when the MBS OAS was close to the Aa-rated corporate bond spread were followed by MBS outperformance (Chart 18, bottom panel). We recommend an overweight allocation to high-yield corporate bonds but only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. The reason for the disparity is valuation. We noted that expected prepayment losses are low, and this is for good reason. Mortgage refinancing activity will remain depressed throughout 2020. First, with the Fed likely to go on hold for 2020 and then lift rates in 2021, the mortgage rate is more likely to rise than fall. Higher mortgage rates will keep refis down. Second, most homeowners have already had multiple opportunities to refinance their mortgages during the past few years, as evidenced by the fact that the MBA Refinance Index didn’t rise that much in 2019, even as the mortgage rate declined 106 bps (Chart 19). Chart 18MBS Spreads MBS Spreads MBS Spreads Chart 19Refi Risk Is Minimal Refi Risk Is Minimal Refi Risk Is Minimal   Tightening bank lending standards for residential mortgages can also lead to wider MBS spreads, but lending standards are more likely to ease than tighten in 2020. FICO scores for approved mortgages have not come down at all since the financial crisis (Chart 19, panel 3), and loan officers consistently claim that lending standards are tighter than the average since 2005 (Chart 19, bottom panel). With standards already so tight, modest easing is more likely than rapid tightening. Key View #6: Overweight TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries TIPS breakeven inflation rates are well below our target range of 2.3%-2.5%. It will take some time, and likely an overshoot of the Fed’s 2% inflation target, for them to reach that range as expectations adapt only slowly to rising core inflation. But even if they don’t make it back to target, breakevens should still grind higher as the economy recovers in 2020. Our target range for both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remains 2.3%-2.5%. But it could take quite some time for that target to be met. The reason is that inflation expectations adapt only slowly to changes in the actual inflation data. We explained this dynamic in a report from last year, and also created a fair value model for the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate based on long-run trends in the actual inflation data.9 At present, our Adaptive Expectations Model pegs fair value for the 10-year breakeven rate at 1.9%, 20 bps above the current level of 1.7%, but well short of our end-of-cycle 2.3%-2.5% target (Chart 20). We could see the 10-year breakeven reaching 1.9% in the coming months as global growth recovers, but it will take a more sustained uptrend in the actual inflation data to move higher than that. A more sustained uptrend in actual inflation could take some time to develop. This year’s increase in core CPI inflation has been concentrated in the core goods component (Chart 21). This component of core inflation tracks import prices with a lag, and it is very likely to fall back down in 2020. Any sustained breakout in core inflation will require more strength from the core services (ex. Shelter and medical care) component (Chart 21, panel 3), something that hasn’t happened yet this cycle. Chart 20Adaptive Expectations Model Adaptive Expectations Model Adaptive Expectations Model Chart 21The Components Of Core CPI The Components Of Core CPI The Components Of Core CPI   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Appendix: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Our Golden Rule of Bond Investing says that we should determine what change in the fed funds rate is priced into the overnight index swap curve for the next 12 months, and then decide whether the Fed will deliver a hawkish or dovish surprise relative to that expectation. We contend that if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise, then a below-benchmark portfolio duration positioning will pay off. Conversely, if the Fed delivers a dovish surprise, then an above-benchmark portfolio duration positioning will profit. Chart A1 shows how the Golden Rule has performed in every calendar year going back to 1990. We include year-to-date performance for 2019. In 30 years of historical data, our Golden Rule performed well in 22. It provided the wrong recommendation in 8 years, though 3 of those years were during the zero-lower-bound period between 2009 and 2015 when 12-month rate expectations were essentially pinned at zero.10 At the beginning of this year, the market was priced for 7 bps of rate cuts in 2019. The funds rate actually fell by 84 bps, leading to a dovish surprise of 77 bps. Based on a historical regression, we would expect a dovish surprise of 77 bps to coincide with a Treasury index yield that falls by 52 bps. In actuality, the index yield fell by 81 bps, more than our Golden Rule predicted. Chart A2 shows how close changes in the Treasury index yield have been to our Golden Rule’s prediction in each of the past 30 years. This regression between the change in Treasury index yield and the monetary policy surprise is the main source of error in our Treasury return forecasts. Based on our expected -52 bps index yield change, we would have expected the Treasury index to deliver 5.9% of total return in 2019 and to outperform cash by 3.4%. In actuality, the index earned 7.9% of total return and outperformed cash by 5.6%. Charts A3 and A4 show how index total and excess returns have performed relative to our Golden Rule’s expectations in each of the past 30 years. Chart A1The Golden Rule’s Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record Chart A2Treasury Index Yield Changes Versus Fed Funds Surprises 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart A3Treasury Index Total Returns Versus The Golden Rule’s Predictions 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart A4Treasury Index Excess Returns Versus The Golden Rule’s Predictions 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income   Footnotes 1    Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game”, dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Kitchen”, dated April 9, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4   For more details on our butterfly spread valuation models please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5   The 2/5/30 valuation model is not shown in this report. Please see US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, “Mixed Messages”, dated December 3, 2019, for a recent update of all our yield curve models. 6   Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7   For further details on how this measure is calculated please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Perspective On Risk And Reward”, dated October 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8   Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9   For further details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10  We say the Golden Rule “worked” if a dovish surprise coincided with positive Treasury index excess returns versus cash, or if a hawkish surprise coincided with negative Treasury excess returns versus cash.

Highlights Our take on the key macro drivers of financial markets is quite similar to last year’s, … : Monetary policy is still accommodative; lenders are ready, willing and able; and the expansion remains intact. ... because the Fed and other central banks have reset the monetary policy clock, … : At this time last year, we projected that the Fed would be on the cusp of tightening monetary policy enough to induce a recession by the middle of 2020. Three rate cuts later, we now expect that policy won’t become restrictive until 2021. … pushing the inflection points investors care about further out into the future: The next recession won’t begin before monetary policy settings are tight, and stocks won’t peak until about six months before the recession starts. We are keeping close tabs on the trade negotiations and potential election outcomes, but we expect that 2020 will be another rewarding year for riskier assets: The equity bull market is likely to last for all of next year, and spread product will keep cranking out excess returns over Treasuries and cash for a while longer, too. Overweight equities and spread product. Feature Mr. and Ms. X made their annual visit to BCA last month, giving us an opportunity to gather our thoughts for 2020, while reviewing how our calls turned out in 2019. Both BCA and US Investment Strategy got the asset allocation conclusion right – overweight equities and spread product, while underweighting Treasuries – but the Fed did the opposite of what we expected heading into 2019, putting us on the wrong side of the Treasury duration call for most of the year. We still think investors are overly complacent about the potential for future inflation, but we concede that the future remains further off than we initially expected. Monetary policy settings got more accommodative nearly everywhere in the world in 2019, ... Our Outlook 2020 theme, as detailed in the year-end edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, is Heading into the End Game,1 and it is clear that the expansion is in its latter stages. We do not think that the end of the expansion, the equity bull market, or credit’s extended stretch of positive excess returns is at hand, however. The full-employment/low-inflation sweet spot is still in place, and the Fed has no plans to get in the expansion’s way, even if inflation begins to gain some traction. Its biggest policy priority is trying to get inflation expectations back to the 2.3 – 2.5% range consistent with its inflation target. Chart 1Globalization Hits A Wall Globalization Hits A Wall Globalization Hits A Wall Central banks around the world followed the Fed’s lead this year, cutting their policy rates in an attempt to shield their economies from potentially worsening trade tensions. Though no central banker would say it out loud, joining the rate-cutting parade also helped to defend against currency appreciation, as no one wants a strong currency when growth is in such short supply. The upshot is that global central banks are deliberately promoting reflation. That’s a supportive policy backdrop for risk assets, and while it may well lead to a bigger hangover down the road, it will ramp up the party now. Exogenous challenges remain. Trade tensions are a thorn in businesses’, consumers’ and investors’ sides. Even if US-China tensions die down, a belligerent US administration appears bent on using tariffs and other trade barriers as a cudgel to force concessions from other nations. The trade tailwind that boosted economic growth and investment returns across the last two decades has been stilled (Chart 1). Saber rattling by the US, or mischief from the usual rogue-state and non-state suspects, could also keep markets on edge. The looming election could give investors heartburn, and clients around the world remain anxious about the prospects of a Warren administration. Exogenous risks abound, but it is not our base case that a critical mass will coalesce to disrupt our view that generous-to-indulgent monetary policy settings will delay the day of reckoning, and keep the bull market going all the way through the coming year. As The Cycles Turn From our perspective, the practice of investment strategy is properly founded on the study of cycles. The key cycles – the business cycle, the credit cycle, and the monetary policy cycle – determine how receptive the macroeconomic backdrop is for taking investment risk. Investments made when the backdrop supports risk taking have a much better likelihood of generating excess returns over Treasuries and cash than investments made against an unfriendly macro backdrop. We therefore start every investment decision with an assessment of the key cycles. Determining whether the economy is expanding or contracting may seem like an academic debate with little practical application when the official business cycle arbiters don’t even determine the beginning and ending dates of recessions until well after the fact.2 Equity bear markets reliably coincide with recessions, however, and over the last 50 years, they have begun an average of six months before their onset (Chart 2). An investor who recognizes that a recession is at hand has a good chance of outperforming his/her competitors as long as s/he aggressively adjusts portfolio allocations in line with that recognition. Chart 2Bear Markets Rarely Occur Outside Of Recessions, ... Bear Markets Rarely Occur Outside Of Recessions, ... Bear Markets Rarely Occur Outside Of Recessions, ... Our key view, then, is that the start of the next recession is at least 18 to 24 months away. Tight monetary policy is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for a recession (Chart 3), and we consider the Fed’s current monetary policy settings to be easy, especially after this year’s three rate cuts. A recession can’t begin until the Fed reverses those three cuts and, per our estimate of the equilibrium rate, tacks on at least three additional hikes. Tightening along those lines is decidedly not on the Fed’s 2020 agenda. Chart 3... And Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight ... And Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight ... And Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight Our recession judgment compels us to be overweight equities. Even if the next recession begins exactly halfway through 2021, history suggests that 2020 returns will be robust. Over the last 50 years, the S&P 500 has peaked an average of six months before the start of a recession, and returns heading into the peak have been quite strong, especially in the last four expansions (Table 1). Those results are consistent with bull markets’ tendency to sprint to the finish line (Chart 4). Table 1Stocks Don't Quit Until A Recession Is Near 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet Chart 4Bull Markets End In Stampedes 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet The Fed Funds Rate Cycle We estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate is currently around 3¼%, and project it will approach 3½% by the end of next year. If we are correct that the Fed’s main policy aim is to prod inflation expectations higher, it follows that it will remain on hold at 1.75% well into 2020. A desire to avoid even the appearance of meddling in the election may well keep the FOMC sidelined until its November and December meetings. The implication is that monetary policy will have no chance to cross into restrictive territory before the first half of 2021. The bottom line for investors is that the day when the economy and markets will have to confront tight monetary conditions has been indefinitely postponed. The Fed has effectively deferred the inflections in the business cycle and the equity market to some point beyond 2020. A longer stretch of accommodation would also continue to fuel the equity bull market, as Phases I and IV of the fed funds rate cycle, in which the fed funds rate is below our estimate of equilibrium (Chart 5), have been equities’ historical sweet spot. Over the last 60 years, the S&P 500 has accrued all of its real returns when policy was easy (Table 2), while Treasuries have shined when it’s tight (Table 3). Chart 5The Fed Funds Rate Cycle 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet Table 2Equities Love Easy Policy, … 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet Table 3… When They Leave Treasuries Far Behind 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet 2020 Key Views: No Inflection Yet The Credit Cycle Our 30,000-foot view of the credit cycle is based on the banking mantra that bad loans are made in good times. When an expansion has been going on for a while, loan officers focus more on maintaining market share than lending standards, while managers of credit funds attract more assets, pushing them to find a home for their new inflows. Banks and bond managers are thereby pro-cyclical at the margin, keeping the good times going by lending to increasingly marginal borrowers and/or relaxing the terms on which they will lend. (They’re conversely stingy when real-time conditions are bad.) Lenders’ lagging/coincident focus keeps lending standards and borrower performance closely aligned in real time (Chart 6). Chart 6Standards Are Coincident In Real Time, ... Standards Are Coincident In Real Time, ... Standards Are Coincident In Real Time, ... Standards are a contrarian indicator over longer periods, though, because shoddily underwritten loans eventually show their true colors. We find a solid fit between corporate bond default rates and lending standards in the preceding 20 quarters (Chart 7). Lending standards tightened slightly in 2015, but were still quite easy in an absolute sense. A majority of banks tightened standards in 2016 amidst the oil rout, which could point to marginally better 2020-21 performance, but post-2010 standards have hardly been stringent. Chart 7... And Leading Over Five-Year Periods ... And Leading Over Five-Year Periods ... And Leading Over Five-Year Periods The stock of outstanding loans and bonds is therefore vulnerable. The relaxation of corporate bond covenants so soon after the financial crisis has not escaped the notice of bearish investors and reporters. It is not enough for an investor to identify a vulnerability, however; s/he also has to identify the catalyst that is going to cause a rupture. The challenge is that ultra-accommodative monetary policy delays the formation of negative catalysts. To the utter torment of an observer with an attraction to the Austrian School of Economics’ survival-of-the-fittest ethic, it is not at all easy to default in a ZIRP/NIRP world. The stock of $12 trillion of bonds with negative nominal yields (down from August’s $17 trillion peak) has ginned up a fervent search for yield among large institutional investor constituencies that have to meet a fixed distribution schedule, like life insurers and pension funds. These income-starved investors help explain why nearly any borrower, no matter how sketchy, can draw a crowd of would-be lenders simply by offering an incremental 50 or 75 basis points of yield. Borrowers default when no one is willing to roll over their maturing obligations; they get even more leveraged when lenders are climbing over each other to lend to them. It is also hard to default when central banks are deliberately pursuing reflation. Inflation makes debt service easier, and central banks are all-in for reflation as a means to bolster inflation expectations, defend against further trade tensions, and to ensure currency strength doesn’t undermine exports. The credit cycle is well advanced, and the Austrians may be at least partially vindicated when the ensuing selloff is worse than it would otherwise have been for having been delayed, but it looks to us like it has more room to run. The rapture remains out of reach for Austrian School devotees, who slot between Tantalus and New York Knicks fans on the cosmic persecution scale. Bonds We remain bearish on Treasuries and reiterate our below-benchmark duration recommendation, though we recognize that the 10-year Treasury yield is unlikely to rise beyond the 2.25-2.5% range in the next year. There’s only one more rate cut to price out of the OIS curve, and neither inflation expectations nor the term premium will return to normal levels quickly. The intermediate- and long-term outlook for the Federal budget is grim, given the size of the deficit while unemployment is at a 50-year low (Chart 8), but Dick Cheney will maintain the upper hand over deficit hawks for 2020 and several years beyond. We do think investors are complacent about inflation’s eventual return, though, and continue to advocate for TIPS over nominal Treasuries. It is tough to default in a ZIRP/NIRP world, when several institutional investor constituencies have a voracious appetite for yield. Chart 8The Budget Outlook Is Grim The Budget Outlook Is Grim The Budget Outlook Is Grim Chart 9IG Spreads Are Wafer Thin IG Spreads Are Wafer Thin IG Spreads Are Wafer Thin Our benign near-term view of the credit cycle makes us comfortable continuing to overweight spread product, subject to our US Bond Strategy colleagues’ preferences. They are only neutral on investment-grade corporates, given their scant duration-adjusted spread over Treasuries (Chart 9). They recommend overweighting high-yield corporate bonds instead, given that high-yield spreads still offer ample positive carry. They also recommend agency mortgage-backed securities as a high-quality alternative to investment-grade corporates, noting that their low duration (three years versus nearly eight for corporates) offers better protection against rising rates. Equities With monetary policy still accommodative, and the expansion still intact, the cyclical backdrop is equity-friendly. If we’re correct that policy won’t turn restrictive until early to mid-2021 at the earliest, the bull market should be able to continue through all of 2020. We do not foresee a return to double-digit earnings growth, but the upward turn in leading indicators across a wide swath of countries outside of the US suggests that a revival in the rest of the world could help S&P 500 constituents grow earnings by mid-single digits, via a pickup in non-US demand and some softening in the dollar. Net share retirements could even nudge earnings growth into the high single digits. If earnings multiples hold up (they’ve expanded at a 5.5% annual rate in Phase IV of the fed funds rate cycle, and don’t typically contract until Phase II), S&P 500 total returns could reach the high single digits, easily putting them ahead of prospective Treasury returns. Multiple expansion isn’t required to support an overweight equities recommendation, but we would not be at all surprised if it occurred. Bull markets often get silly as they sprint to the finish line, and it would be unusual if some froth didn’t bubble up before this bull market, the longest of the postwar era, calls it quits. The Dollar We expect the dollar to weaken against other major currencies in 2020. As the rest of the world finds its footing and begins to accelerate, the growth differential between the US and other major economies will narrow. The dollar will attract less safe-haven flows as the rest of the world’s major economies escape stall speed. Though we expect the countercyclical dollar will rally again when the next recession hits, weakening in 2020 is consistent with our constructive global growth view. Putting It All Together We are sanguine about the US economy, which continued to trundle along at a trend pace in 2019 despite a series of headwinds. It withstood 4Q18’s sharp equity selloff and bond-spread blowout that tightened financial conditions and made corporate and investor confidence wobble. It withstood the 35-day federal government shutdown that lasted nearly all of January. It kept marching forward despite the trade war with China, and it overcame, at least for now, the angst over the inverted yield curve. If the economy continued to expand at roughly its trend pace despite those obstacles, it may not really have needed 25-basis-point rate cuts in July, September and October. The thread connecting our macro views and investment recommendations is the idea that monetary policy settings are highly accommodative and are likely to stay that way until the 2020 election. We expect that risk assets will outperform against an accommodating monetary backdrop. The naysayers are as likely to be confounded by central banks in 2020 as they have been throughout the entire ZIRP/NIRP era. The scolds scouring the data to try to find signs of excesses, and the Chicken Littles who have been frightened by clickbait headlines and strategists deliberately pursuing pessimistic outlier strategies, get one thing right. The market selloffs when the equity and credit bull markets end will be worse than they would have been if the Fed and other central banks were not deliberately attempting to reflate their economies. But their timing is likely to be as bad now as it has been all throughout 2019 (and for the entire post-crisis period for card-carrying, sandwich-board-wearing Austrians). You can’t fight the Fed, much less the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, the Reserve Banks of Australia and New Zealand, and a broad swath of all of the rest of the world’s central banks.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the December 2019 Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game,” available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2 The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee announced in December 2008 that the last recession began in December 2007. It announced in September 2010 that it had ended in June 2009.

Highlights We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within an EM equity portfolio. Fixed-income investors should consider purchasing 5-year local currency government bonds. The balance-of-payments adjustment is probably over. Hence, the currency will be stable, allowing inflation and interest rates to drop. Feature The country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Chart I-1Pakistani Stocks: The Worst Is Over Pakistani Stocks: The Worst Is Over Pakistani Stocks: The Worst Is Over We downgraded Pakistani equities in March 2017  and put this bourse on our upgrade watch list this past May (Chart I-1). In the past two years, the country has been going through a severe balance-of-payments crisis and a correspondingly painful adjustment. In recent months, the country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Today we are upgrading Pakistani stocks to overweight within an EM equity portfolio and recommend buying 5-year local currency government bonds. The worst is over for the economy and its financial markets for the following reasons. First, the country’s balance-of-payments position will improve. In real effective exchange rate (REER) terms, the Pakistani rupee has depreciated 15% over the past two years (Chart I-2). This will boost exports and cap imports, narrowing both trade and current account deficits further (Chart I-3).   Chart I-2Considerable Depreciation In Pakistani Rupee… Considerable Depreciation In Pakistani Rupee... Considerable Depreciation In Pakistani Rupee... Chart I-3…Will Boost Exports And Cap Imports ...Will Boost Exports And Cap Imports ...Will Boost Exports And Cap Imports We expect exports to grow 5-10% next year. The country’s competitiveness has improved considerably, with its top commodities exports all having shown impressive growth in volume terms, despite weakening global growth (Chart I-4). Besides, in order to boost exports, the government has reduced the cost of raw materials and semi-finished products used in exportable products by exempting them from all customs duties in fiscal 2020 (July 2019 – June 2020). The government has also promised to provide sales tax refunds to the export sector. Chart I-4Increasing Competitiveness In Pakistan Exports Increasing Competitiveness In Pakistan Exports Increasing Competitiveness In Pakistan Exports In addition, falling oil prices will help reduce the country’s import bill. Remittance inflows – currently equaling 9% of GDP – have become an extremely important source of financing for Pakistan’s trade deficit. In the past 12 months, remittances sent from overseas have risen to US$22 billion, and have covered most of the US$28 billion trade deficit.   Financial inflows are also likely to increase in 2020 and will be sufficient to finance the current account deficit. The IMF will disburse roughly US$2 billion to Pakistan. Other multilateral/bilateral lending/grants and planned issuance of Sukuk or Euro bonds will provide the government with much-needed foreign funding.  As the economy recovers, net foreign direct inflows are also likely to increase. Net foreign direct investment received by Pakistan has grown 24% year-on-year in the past six months, with 56% of the increase coming from China. Overall, the improvement in Pakistan’s balance-of-payments position will continue, resulting in a refill of the country’s foreign currency reserves. Odds are that the central bank will purchase foreign currency from the government as the latter gets foreign funding. This will provide the government with local currency to spend. At the same time, the central bank’s purchases of these foreign exchange inflows will boost the local currency money supply – a positive development for the economy and stock market. Chart I-5 shows that the Pakistani stock market closely correlates with swings in the nation’s narrow money growth. The Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Chart I-5Pakistan: Ameliorating Balance-Of-Payments Position Will Benefit Stock Prices Pakistan: Ameliorating Balance-Of-Payments Position Will Benefit Stock Prices Pakistan: Ameliorating Balance-Of-Payments Position Will Benefit Stock Prices Chart I-6Pakistan: Improving Fiscal Balance Pakistan: Improving Fiscal Balance Pakistan: Improving Fiscal Balance Second, Pakistan’s fiscal balance also shows signs of improvement. Pakistan and the IMF have agreed to set the target for the overall budget and primary deficits at 7.2% of GDP and 0.6% of GDP, respectively, for the current fiscal year (Chart I-6). This will be a considerable improvement from the 8.9% of GDP and 3.3% of GDP, respectively, last fiscal year. In early November, the IMF praised Pakistan for having successfully managed to post a primary budget surplus of 0.9% of GDP during the first quarter (July 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019) of its current fiscal year. The authorities are determined to maintain strict fiscal discipline. The country’s tax-to-GDP ratio is at about 12%, one of the lowest in the world, so there is room to expand the tax base. Third, the Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Both headline and core inflation seem to have peaked (Chart I-7). Headline inflation fell to 11% in October, which already lies within the central bank’s target range of 11-12% for the current fiscal year. The policy rate is currently 225 basis points higher than headline inflation. As inflation drops and the currency finds support, interest rates will be reduced to facilitate the economic recovery. In addition, there has been much less public debt monetization by the central bank. After borrowing Rs3.16 trillion from the central bank in the previous fiscal year, the federal government has curtailed such borrowing to only Rs122 billion in the first three months of this fiscal year. Diminishing debt monetization will also help ease domestic inflation. Chart I-7Inflation Has Peaked Inflation Has Peaked Inflation Has Peaked Chart I-8Manufacturing Activity Is Likely To Recover Soon Manufacturing Activity Is Likely To Recover Soon Manufacturing Activity Is Likely To Recover Soon Fourth, manufacturing activity in Pakistan has plunged to extremely low levels, comparable to the 2008 Great Recession (Chart I-8). With a more stabilized local currency, easing domestic inflation and interest rate reductions, Pakistan’s economic activity is set to recover soon from a very low base.  Finally, Phase II of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is set to begin this month. Under Phase II of the CPEC, five special economic zones will be established with Chinese industrial relocation. Phase II will also bring forward dividends from Phase I projects. The nation’s infrastructure facilities built by China over the past several years have enhanced the productive capacity of the Pakistani economy. The significant increase in electricity supply and improved railway/highway transportation will promote higher productivity/efficiency gains. Bottom Line: We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within the emerging markets space. Both absolute and relative valuations of Pakistani stocks appear attractive (Charts I-9 and I-10). Chart I-9Pakistani Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive In Absolute Terms... Pakistani Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive In Absolute Terms... Pakistani Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive In Absolute Terms... Chart I-10…And Relative To EM Equities ...And Relative To EM Equities ...And Relative To EM Equities Meanwhile, we recommend going long Pakistani 5-year local currency government bonds currently yielding 11.5%, as we expect interest rates to drop quite a bit (Chart I-11).  Chart I-11Go Long Pakistani 5-Year Local Currency Government Bonds Go Long Pakistani 5-Year Local Currency Government Bonds Go Long Pakistani 5-Year Local Currency Government Bonds   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights China’s PMIs continue to flash a positive signal, but the hard data trend remains negative. There has been a notable improvement in China’s cyclical sectors (versus defensives) over the past month, but broad equity market performance has been flat-to-down. China’s lackluster equity index performance in the face of rising PMIs suggests that investors can afford to wait for an improvement in the hard economic data before tactically upgrading to overweight. Cyclically, we continue to recommend an overweight stance towards both the investable and A-share markets versus the global benchmark, favoring the former over the latter. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, China’s November PMIs were clearly positive, and the rise in the official manufacturing PMI above the 50 mark is notable. However, the odds continue to favor a bottoming in the economy in Q1 rather than Q4, in large part because China’s “hard” economic data has continued to deteriorate during the time that the Caixin PMI has been signaling an expansion in manufacturing activity. In this vein, China’s November update for producer prices and total imports have high potential to be market-moving, and should be closely monitored. Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Within financial markets, China’s cyclical sectors have outperformed defensives, which is consistent with the positive message from China’s PMIs. But China’s broad equity markets have been flat-to-down versus the global index over the past month, suggesting that investors can afford to wait for confirmation of a hard data improvement before upgrading their tactical stance to overweight (from neutral). Cyclically, we continue to recommend an overweight stance towards both the investable and A-share markets, but favor the former over the latter in a trade truce scenario. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Both measures of the Li Keqiang index (LKI) that we track indicated no obvious improvement in Chinese economy activity in October. The BCA China Activity indicator, a broader coincident measure of China’s economy, also moved sideways in October and (for now) remains in a downtrend. Thus, based on the “hard data”, Chinese economic activity has not yet bottomed. Chart 1A Moderate Strength Economic Recovery Will Begin In Q1 A Moderate Strength Economic Recovery Will Begin In Q1 A Moderate Strength Economic Recovery Will Begin In Q1 The components of our LKI leading indicator continue to tell a story of easy monetary conditions and sluggish money & credit growth (Chart 1). The indicator itself remains in an uptrend, but it is a shallow one that does not match the intensity of previous credit cycles. While the uptrend in the indicator suggests that China’s economy will soon bottom, the shallow pace suggests that the coming rebound in growth will be less forceful than during previous economic recoveries. The uptrend in headline CPI is a notable macro development, with prices having risen 3.8% year-over-year in Oct (the fastest pace in almost eight years). This rise has been driven almost entirely by a surge in pork prices, which have risen over 60% relative to last year (panel 1 of Chart 2). While some investors have questioned whether the rise in headline inflation will cause the PBoC to tighten its stance at the margin, we argued with high conviction in our November 20 Weekly Report that this will not occur.1 Panel 2 of Chart 2 shows that periods of easy monetary policy line up strongly with periods of deflating producer prices, arguing that the PBoC will see through transient shocks to headline inflation. China’s October housing market data highlighted three points: housing sales are modestly improving, the pace of housing construction has again deviated from the trend in sales, and housing price appreciation is slowing in Tier 2 and Tier 3 markets. For now, we are inclined to discount the surge in floor space started, given previous divergences that proved to be unsustainable. The bigger question is whether investors should be concerned about slowing housing prices. Chart 3 shows that floor space sold and property prices have been negatively correlated over the past three years, in contrast to a previously positive relationship. Deteriorating affordability and tight housing regulations have contributed to this shift in correlation, which helps explain why the PBoC’s Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program has been so closely related to housing sales over the past few years. While the growth in PSL injections is becoming less negative, it has not risen to the point that it would be associated with a strong trend in sales. As such, we continue to see poor affordability as a threat to further housing price appreciation, absent stronger funding assistance. Poor affordability will continue to be a headwind for China’s housing market. Chart 2The PBoC Will See Through Transient Shocks To Headline Inflation The PBoC Will See Through Transient Shocks To Headline Inflation The PBoC Will See Through Transient Shocks To Headline Inflation Chart 3Poor Affordability Will Continue To Weigh On Housing Demand Poor Affordability Will Continue To Weigh On Housing Demand Poor Affordability Will Continue To Weigh On Housing Demand Chart 4Investors Need To See Concrete Signs Of A Hard Data Improvement Investors Need To See Concrete Signs Of A Hard Data Improvement Investors Need To See Concrete Signs Of A Hard Data Improvement China’s November PMIs were quite positive, which legitimately increases the odds that China’s economy is beginning the process of recovery. However, we see two reasons to believe that the odds continue to favor a bottoming in the economy in Q1 rather than Q4. First, while they improved in November, several important elements of the official PMI remain in contractionary territory, particularly the new export orders subcomponent. Second, while the Caixin PMI has now been above the 50 mark for 4 consecutive months, China’s hard data has continued to deteriorate since the summer (Chart 4). Given the historical volatility of the Caixin PMI, we advise investors to wait for concrete signs of a hard data improvement before firmly concluding that China’s economy is recovering. Over the last month, China’s investable stock market has rallied roughly 1% in absolute terms, while domestic stocks have fallen about 3%. In relative terms, A-shares underperformed the global benchmark, while the investable market moved sideways. In our view, the underperformance of China’s domestic market reflects increased sensitivity to monetary conditions and credit growth compared with the investable market,2 and a weaker credit impulse in October appears to have been the catalyst for A-share underperformance. Over the cyclical horizon, earnings will improve in both the onshore and offshore markets in response to a modest improvement in economic activity, suggesting that an overweight stance is justified for both markets. But we think the investable market has more upside potential in a trade truce scenario. The outperformance of cyclical versus defensive sectors is sending a positive signal, but investors can afford to wait for better economic data before tactically upgrading. Chart 5A Positive Sign From Cyclicals Versus Defensives A Positive Sign From Cyclicals Versus Defensives A Positive Sign From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Within China’s investable stock market, it is quite notable that cyclicals have outperformed defensives over the past month on an equally-weighted basis (Chart 5). Interestingly, key defensive sectors such as investable health care and utilities have sold off significantly, and equally-weighted cyclicals have also outperformed defensives in the domestic market. The outperformance of cyclicals and underperformance of defensives is consistent with the positive message from China’s PMIs, but the fact that this improvement is occurring against the backdrop of flat-to-down relative performance for China’s equity market suggests that investors can afford to wait for confirmation of a hard data improvement before upgrading their tactical stance to overweight. In this vein, China’s November update for producer prices and total imports have high potential to be market-moving, and should be closely monitored. China’s government bond yields fell slightly in November, potentially reflecting expectations of further modest easing. Our view that monetary policy will likely remain easy over the coming year even in a modest recovery scenario suggests that Chinese interbank rates and government bond yields are likely to range-trade over the coming 6-12 months. We expect onshore corporate bonds to continue to outperform duration-matched government bonds in 2020. Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads eased modestly over the past month. Despite continued concerns about onshore corporate defaults, the yield advantage offered by onshore corporate bonds have helped the asset class generate a 5.4% year-to-date return in local currency terms. Barring a substantial intensification of the pace of defaults, we expect onshore corporate bonds to continue to outperform duration-matched government bonds in 2020. The RMB has moved sideways versus the US dollar over the last month. USD-CNY had fallen below 7 in October following the announcement of the intention to sign a “phase one” trade deal, but the move ultimately proved temporary given the deferral of an agreement. We would expect the RMB to appreciate following a deal of any kind (a truce or something more), and it is also likely to be supported next year by improving economic activity. Still, it would not be in the PBoC’s best interests to let the RMB appreciate too rapidly, because an appreciating Chinese currency would act as a deflationary force on China’s export and manufacturing sectors. As such, we expect a modest downtrend in USD-CNY over the coming year.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Questions From The Road: Timing The Turn," dated November 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated November 27, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Economy & Inflation: The macro backdrop in Japan remains bond friendly for JGBs; growth momentum is only starting to bottom out, but will lag the recovery heralded by improving global leading economic indicators, while inflation remains closer to 0% than the BoJ's 2% target. BoJ Options: The BoJ has limited policy choices available to provide more stimulus, with negative policy rates crushing Japanese bank profitability and the central bank already owning massive amounts of JGBs and ETFs. 2020 Japan Bond Strategy: Dedicated bond investors should overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios over the next year, as a complement to an overall below-benchmark duration exposure. Expect some mild yield curve steepening pressure if the BoJ attempts to use its limited remaining policy tools, like targeting shorter maturities for its asset purchases, to try and alleviate the pressure on banks from negative rates and a flat yield curve. Feature Chart 1The Role Of Japan In Global Bond Investing Is Complex The Role Of Japan In Global Bond Investing Is Complex The Role Of Japan In Global Bond Investing Is Complex In a year where the majority of global bond markets have delivered stellar returns, Japanese fixed income performance has predictably languished in 2019 compared to the other developed economies. Despite a cyclically weak economy with very low inflation, Japanese government bond (JGB) yields have been locked in narrow ranges at or below 0% throughout the year. Monetary policy is a big reason for that, as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has run of out of fresh stimulus options to try and push JGB yields even lower. In this Special Report, we make the case for owning JGBs as a low-beta, defensive asset in global fixed income portfolios over the next 6-12 months – a period when improving growth is expected to exert upward pressure on global bond yields, but where JGB yields are expected to remain anchored with Japan likely to lag the global upturn (Chart 1). The Japanese Growth & Inflation Backdrop Is No Threat To JGBs Japan’s economy has suffered alongside the global industrial downturn in 2019, with the Japanese manufacturing PMI struggling below 50 for seven consecutive months. Both business investment and exports have been contracting, in response to the slump in global and trade and increase in uncertainty related to the US-China tariff war. The underlying trend in consumer spending – the largest component of Japan’s economy – is more difficult to interpret, however, because of the volatility surrounding the October hike in the consumption tax. On October 1st, Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s government finally passed its long-desired hike in the consumption tax rate from 8% to 10%, in a bid to begin chipping away at Japan’s massive fiscal debt burden. The timing of the move, which had been twice delayed previously, appears ill-advised given the overall weakness in the economy. That can be seen in the response of consumer demand to the tax increase. Japanese consumers, quite rationally, front-loaded purchases in September in advance of the tax hike, but that surge was followed by a collapse in nominal retail sales in October of -14% on a month-over-month basis (Chart 2). This was much larger than the decreases seen after the previous consumption tax increases in 1997 and 2014. This may seem surprising given that the Japanese unemployment rate is a stunningly low 2.4%, suggesting a tight labor market that should be boosting wage growth and consumer confidence. Quite the opposite is happening, however, as consumer confidence is depressed and wage growth is contracting in real terms (bottom panel). Even more unusual is that real disposable income growth for Japanese households is now up to 5% (year-over-year), after stagnating for much of the previous decade. The acceleration is due to more people, especially women and senior citizens, having joined the labor force and found work – on a “per worker” basis, income growth is much less impressive and is more in line with stagnant wage growth. Therefore, unless there is clear acceleration of wages, a sustainable improvement in aggregate consumption is not expected. In the absence of an unlikely consumer boom, a pickup in global trade and manufacturing activity is a necessary requirement to stabilize the Japanese economy where the manufacturing sector is relatively larger than that of other major developed countries (20% of GDP).1 On that front, the news is getting better with the recent improvement seen in the global manufacturing PMI, global ZEW and our own global leading economic indicator (LEI). Looking at the overall conditions in Japan's manufacturing sector, however, there are still mixed signals indicating that a true bottom has been reached (Chart 3): Chart 2Challenging Times For Japanese Consumers Challenging Times For Japanese Consumers Challenging Times For Japanese Consumers Chart 3A Trough In Japanese Manufacturing A Trough In Japanese Manufacturing A Trough In Japanese Manufacturing the Markit manufacturing PMI did rise modestly in November, but remains at only 48.9 (top panel); the most recent Tankan survey from the BoJ showed that both large and small firms in the manufacturing sector expect business conditions to worsen (second panel); real capital spending growth did perk up in the third quarter in the GDP accounts, but additional gains are unlikely given the still moderate reading on manufacturing business confidence (third panel); machine tool orders continue to contract on a year-over-year basis, although the growth in domestic orders may be stabilizing; foreign orders remain depressed due to weakening Chinese demand for automotive and electronic equipment (bottom panel). Chart 4Japan"s Non-Manufacturing Sector Is Struggling Japan"s Non-Manufacturing Sector Is Struggling Japan"s Non-Manufacturing Sector Is Struggling Turning to the services sector, which accounts for around 80% of the Japanese economy, the data also show only moderate growth. This is mainly because demand for services is less influenced by global economic conditions, and more related to the tight labor market and rising household income growth. Even given that better fundamental backdrop, however, it is still not clear that services can drive growth in the Japanese economy in 2020 (Chart 4): Chart 5Past The Worst For Japanese Exports Past The Worst For Japanese Exports Past The Worst For Japanese Exports while the Tankan survey of large non-manufacturing firms has stayed at the same high level seen since 2014, the data for smaller firms has weakened steadily throughout 2019; the Markit services PMI index has remain solidly above the 50 boom/bust line all year long, yet overall sales for non-manufacturers contracted by -3.1% on a year-over-year basis in the third quarter of the year according to Japan’s Ministry of Finance. One potential ray of hope for Japanese growth comes from exports. While growth in total nominal exports is still contracting by –9.2% on a year-over-year basis, the recent pickup in our global LEI is heralding a potential bottoming in export momentum (Chart 5). In particular, the emerging market sub-component of our global LEI is signaling a potentially sharp pickup in demand for Japanese exports to Asia (middle panel). A similar optimistic message is given regarding Chinese demand, based on the modest improvement in the OECD China LEI (bottom panel). Yet these developments are still in the early stages and could be derailed by a breakdown of the US-China trade negotiations (not the base case scenario of BCA’s geopolitical strategists). Summing it all up, the Japanese economy remains in a fragile state after absorbing multiple blows from trade uncertainty, contracting global manufacturing activity and, more recently, an ill-timed hike in the consumption tax. While some data is showing signs of bottoming, the momentum is unlikely to be strong enough in 2020 to generate much upward pressure on Japanese bond yields. Japanese Inflation Remains A No-Show Japan remains the poster child for the global low inflation backdrop of the post-crisis decade. Even an economy with an unemployment rate near record lows can still not generate inflation sustainably above 0%. Headline CPI inflation is now at only 0.2%, while and core CPI inflation is slightly higher at 0.7% (Chart 6). The former is being dragged down by the lagged impact of lower oil prices and the stubbornly firm Japanese yen. More worrisome, however, is that services CPI inflation dipped slightly below 0% in November (middle panel), in line with the contraction seen in the domestic corporate goods prices and import prices indices (bottom panel). Chart 6Inflation Remains WELL Below The BoJ"s Target Inflation Remains WELL Below The BoJ"s Target Inflation Remains WELL Below The BoJ"s Target Chart 7Not A Consistent Story From Japanese Inflation Expectations Not A Consistent Story From Japanese Inflation Expectations Not A Consistent Story From Japanese Inflation Expectations Market-based inflation expectations, measured using either CPI swap rates or breakevens from inflation-linked bonds, are also hovering close to 0% (Chart 7). In a bit of a surprise, survey-based measures of inflation expectations produced by the BoJ are closer to the 2-3% range, even though realized inflation only reached that range once, on an annual calendar year basis, since 1991 – in 2014, unsurprisingly another year with a consumption tax increase. The market-based inflation indicators are more important for bond investors, however. It will take a sustained increase in realized inflation before the JGB market begins to worry about inflation again. Perhaps that can begin to happen in 2020 if Japanese and global growth improves, coming alongside some yen weakness. More likely, next year will be another year of mushy inflation readings from Japan as the economy tries to emerge from the slowdown seen in 2019 and the unnecessary tightening of fiscal policy coming from the consumption tax hike (which is likely to cause a temporary, but not sustained, blip in realized inflation rates in 2020). Bottom Line: The macro backdrop in Japan remains bond friendly for JGBs; growth momentum is only starting to bottom out, but will lag the recovery heralded by improving global leading economic indicators, while inflation remains closer to 0% than the BoJ's 2% target. There’s Not Much New The BoJ Can Do The BoJ remains in a bind with regards to future monetary policy decisions. Inflation remains far below its target, while the economy is struggling to generate above-potential growth. Yet unemployment remains exceptionally low and, by the BoJ’s own estimates, Japan’s economy is operating with no spare capacity (i.e. the output gap is a positive number). For a traditional central bank that believes in the tradeoff between spare capacity/unemployment and inflation, like the BoJ, the data is sending a very confusing message about the next policy move. Can A Weaker Yen Solve Japan’s Low Inflation Problem? Chart 8The Balance Of Payments Remains Yen-Supportive The Balance Of Payments Remains Yen-Supportive The Balance Of Payments Remains Yen-Supportive The BoJ’s job in setting the right policy to get Japanese inflation higher would be made a lot easier if the yen were not so stubbornly firm. On a trade-weighted basis, the yen is 10.1% above the low seen in 2018 and 22.9% above the 2015 low (Chart 8). This has happened despite the disappointing performance of the Japanese economy and the negative interest rates that have typically made the yen a good funding currency for global carry trades. While there has been likely been some safe-haven demand for the yen given the global growth uncertainties and sharp decline in non-Japanese bond yields in 2019, the root cause for the yen strength is more fundamental. Our colleagues at BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy published a Special Report last week, reviewing the balance of payments of the major global currencies.2 Going through the components for Japan, the current account balance remains firmly positive at 3.4% of GDP, despite the fact that the trade balance is now negative. The main reason for that is the steady 4% of GDP in the investment income balance – an inevitable result given Japan’s massive net foreign asset position. On the capital account side, there has been a steady increase in net foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows over the past several years, as more Japanese companies have moved productive capacity offshore (and fewer foreign companies invest in Japan). In addition, portfolio outflows have been gaining momentum with Japanese investors ramping up their purchases of foreign long term assets. Add it all up and Japan's basic balance (the current account plus net FDI) is now negative for the first time since 2015 (bottom panel). Thus, Japan’s balance of payments may now finally be in a position to generate some yen weakness that can help boost domestic inflation – if some of the uncertainties over global growth and the US-China trade negotiations begin to dissipate, as we expect in 2020. So what can the BoJ do? The BoJ has maintained a negative policy interest rate for 45 months since cutting rates below zero in February 2016. Yet according to our BoJ Monitor, there is still a need for additional monetary policy easing to combat weak growth and inflation (Chart 9). Chart 9The BoJ"s Policy Options Are Limited The BoJ"s Policy Options Are Limited The BoJ"s Policy Options Are Limited Interest rate markets do not expect the BoJ to do much with short-term interest rates in 2020, with only -5bps of cuts discounted in the Japanese overnight index swap (OIS) curve. BoJ officials have not outright dismissed the possibility that another rate cut could happen, but policymakers have learned that negative rates are lethal for the profits of the banking system. That can be seen in Japan, where bank profits have contracted -19.4% over the past year as negative borrowing rates have become more deeply entrenched. Other parts of the Japanese financial system, like insurance companies and pension funds that need income to meet payouts and liabilities, also suffer from negative interest rates on domestic fixed income assets. Therefore, the BoJ cutting policy rates deeper into negative territory is a very unlikely outcome, even if the economy and inflation continue to struggle, as the risks to the financial system would be worsened. So what else can the BoJ do to provide further monetary stimulus, if necessary? The choices are limited. The BoJ could alter its forward guidance to signal to the market that rates will remain low for a very long time, but that would have a limited effect with rate levels already so low. The central bank could also ramp up its pace of asset purchases, but that will also prove difficult as it owns nearly 50% of outstanding JGBS and nearly 80% of outstanding ETFs. Buying more assets would likely not generate any easier financial conditions, and would simply further disrupt the liquidity of Japan’s financial markets. A March 2019 academic study found that the impact on Nikkei 225 stock returns from the BoJ ETF buying has grown smaller over time despite the increased purchase amounts.3 Chart 10More Room For The BoJ To Buy Shorter Maturity Bonds Japanese Government Bonds In 2020: Boring, But Useful Japanese Government Bonds In 2020: Boring, But Useful The BoJ could lower its “Yield Curve Control” target yield for 10-year JGBs to below 0%, but that would also prove difficult as the BoJ already owns a whopping 75% of all outstanding 10-year JGBs (Chart 10) – a figure that would likely need to increase if global bond yields continue to drift higher in 2020, as we expect, forcing the BoJ to buy more 10-year JGBs to ensure that yields do not rise. A unique option might be for the BoJ to purchase foreign bonds. This would potentially help further weaken the yen, which would help increase exports and inflation. Although given the current global backdrop of populism and trade protectionism, a policy specifically designed to weaken the yen would likely not be greeted warmly by other countries. In our view, there is only one plausible option that the BoJ could consider to ease policy further in 2020 to fight low inflation – choosing a different maturity point for its Yield Curve Target. For example, instead of targeting a 10-year JGB near 0%, the BoJ could target a 5-year JGB near 0%. The BoJ owns a lower share of outstanding bonds in that part of the curve (around 45%, by our calculations). The net result could be a steeper JGB curve, which could help ease the drag on profits of the Japanese banks from negative longer-term yields and a flat curve (Chart 11). One thing is for certain: none of the conditions that we have long believed would be necessary before the BoJ would consider abandoning its yield curve target and letting yields rise – a USD/JPY exchange rate between 115 and 120; core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation both above 1.5%; and clear signs of JGB overvaluation - are currently in place (Chart 12). The BoJ has to continue to stay accommodative, even if other central banks turn less dovish as global growth improves in 2020. Chart 11Shifting BoJ Purchases Could Generate A Steeper JGB Curve Shifting BoJ Purchases Could Generate A Steeper JGB Curve Shifting BoJ Purchases Could Generate A Steeper JGB Curve Chart 12These Must ALL Happen Before The BoJ Lifts Its JGB Yield Target These Must ALL Happen Before The BoJ Lifts Its JGB Yield Target These Must ALL Happen Before The BoJ Lifts Its JGB Yield Target   Bottom Line: The BoJ has limited policy choices available to provide more stimulus, with negative policy rates crushing Japanese bank profitability and the central bank already owning massive amounts of JGBs and ETFs. Overweight Low-Beta JGBs In Global Bond Portfolios In 2020 Chart 13Overweight Low-Beta JGBs In 2020 Overweight Low-Beta JGBs In 2020 Overweight Low-Beta JGBs In 2020 As we have discussed in previous reports, yield betas of developed market sovereign bonds to changes in the “global” bond yield are a good tool to use when considering fixed income country allocation decisions when yields are rising everywhere.4 We are currently recommending overweight allocations to government bonds in countries with more dovish central banks and/or where yields are low in relative terms – namely, Germany, Japan and Australia. Not by coincidence, those are also countries whose government bonds have the lowest yield betas among the major developed economies. The rolling 52-week yield betas for JGB yields to the “global” yield (defined as the yield-to-maturity of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index) is shown in Chart 13. We show the betas for different maturity “buckets” across the yield curve, and we also present the same betas for US Treasuries and German government bonds for comparison. The betas for JGBs are consistent but positive across the entire yield curve, around 0.5 or less. German yields have a similar beta at shorter maturities but a beta close to 1.0 at the longer-end of the curve. US Treasuries, to no surprise, are the highest beta market, with yield betas of 1.5 or more across the entire yield curve. The positive low beta for JGBs means that Japanese bond yields will still move in the same direction as global yields, but with far less volatility. Thus, during the period when global government bonds are rallying, low-beta markets like Japan underperform versus global benchmarks. That has been the story in 2019, when much of the world needed to ease monetary policy but Japan was already at very accommodative policy settings. When global yields are rising, however, lower beta markets should see smaller yield increases and better relative performance. That will be the story for JGBs in 2020, given the strong likelihood that Japan will lag the global economic rebound that we expect next year and the BoJ will be forced to, once again, be the most dovish central bank among the major economies. Bottom Line: Dedicated bond investors should overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios over the next year, as a complement to an overall below-benchmark duration exposure. Expect some mild yield curve steepening pressure if the BoJ attempts to use its limited remaining policy tools, like targeting shorter maturities for its asset purchases, to try and alleviate the pressure on banks from negative rates and a flat yield curve.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Based on the value added from manufacturing as % of GDP. Other countries, by comparison: China: 29%; Germany: 21%; World: 16%; US: 11%. Source: United Nations and World Bank. 2 Please see BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, “Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor” dated November 29, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Kimie Harada and Tatsuyoshi Okimoto, "The BOJ’s ETF Purchases and Its Effects on Nikkei 225 Stocks", RIETI Discussion Paper Series 19-E-014, March 2019. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, " Cracks Are Forming In The Bond-Bullish Narrative", dated October 23, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Chart 1Manufacturing PMIs Track Bond Yields Manufacturing PMIs Track Bond Yields Manufacturing PMIs Track Bond Yields November’s manufacturing PMI data were released yesterday, giving us an update for two of our preferred global growth indicators: the Global Manufacturing PMI and the US ISM Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Unfortunately, the two indicators sent conflicting signals, providing us with very little clarity on the global growth outlook. On the positive side, the Global Manufacturing PMI jumped back above 50 for the first time since April. China is the largest weighting in the global index, and its PMI rose for the fifth consecutive month. Conversely, the US ISM Manufacturing PMI dipped further into contractionary territory in November – from 48.3 to 48.1. Optimistically, the index’s inventory component contracted by more than the new orders component, meaning that the difference between new orders and inventories rose to its highest level since May. The difference between new orders and inventories often leads the overall ISM index by several months. All in all, we continue to see tentative signs of stabilization in our preferred global growth indicators. But a more significant rebound will be necessary to push bond yields higher in the first half of next year, as we expect. Stay tuned. Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 63 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +494 bps. We consider three main factors in our credit cycle analysis: (i) corporate balance sheet health, (ii) monetary conditions and (iii) valuation.1 On balance sheets, our top-down measure of gross leverage is high and rising (Chart 2). In contrast, interest coverage ratios remain solid, propped up by the Fed’s accommodative stance. With inflation expectations still depressed, the Fed can maintain its “easy money” policy for some time yet. The third quarter’s tightening of C&I lending standards is a concern, because it suggests that monetary conditions may not be sufficiently stimulative for banks to keep the credit taps running (bottom panel). But the yield curve, another indicator of monetary conditions, has steepened significantly since Q3, suggesting that lending standards will soon move back into “net easing” territory. For now, we see valuation as the main headwind for investment grade credit spreads. Spreads for all credit tiers are below our targets, with the Baa tier looking less expensive than the others (panels 2 & 3).2 As a result, we advise only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds, with a preference for the Baa credit tier. We also recommend increasing exposure to Agency MBS in place of corporate bonds rated A or higher (see page 7). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Mixed Messages Mixed Messages High-Yield Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +671 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 22 bps on the month and currently sits at 370 bps, 131 bps above our target (Chart 3). Ba and B rated junk bonds outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 79 bps and 76 bps, respectively, in November. But Caa-rated credit underperformed Treasuries by 89 bps. This continues the trend of Caa underperformance that has been in place since late last year (panel 3). We analyzed the divergence between Caa and the rest of the junk bond universe in last week’s report and came to two conclusions.3 First, the historical data show that 12-month periods of overall junk bond outperformance are more likely to be followed by underperformance if Caa is the worst performing credit tier. Second, we can identify several reasons for this year’s Caa underperformance that make us inclined to downplay any potential negative signal. Specifically, we note that the Caa credit tier’s exposure to the shale oil sector is responsible for the bulk of this year’s underperformance (bottom panel). With elevated spreads, accommodative monetary conditions and a looming recovery in global economic growth, we expect junk spreads to tighten during the next 6-12 months.    MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +22 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 3 bps on the month, as a 5 bps tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was offset by a 2 bps increase in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). We recommend an overweight allocation to Agency MBS, particularly relative to corporate bonds rated A or higher, for three reasons.4 First, expected compensation is competitive. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS is now 50 bps (Chart 4). This is very close to its pre-crisis average and only 3 bps below the spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (panel 4). Also, spreads for all investment grade corporate bond credit tiers trade below our targets. Second, risk-adjusted compensation heavily favors MBS. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency MBS plot well to the right of investment grade corporates. This means that the sector is less likely to see losses versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. Finally, the macro environment for MBS remains supportive. Mortgage lending standards have barely eased since the financial crisis (bottom panel), and most homeowners have already had at least one opportunity to refinance their mortgages. This burnout will keep refi activity low, and MBS spreads tight (panel 2). Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +197 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 36 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +513 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 24 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +245 bps. Meanwhile, Foreign Agencies outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +266 bps. Domestic Agencies outperformed by 11 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +51 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +36 bps. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to USD-denominated sovereign bonds, given that spreads remain expensive compared to US corporate credit (Chart 5). However, we noted in a recent report that Mexican and Saudi Arabian sovereigns look attractive on a risk/reward basis.5 This is also true for Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities, as shown in the Bond Map in Appendix C. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service also thinks that worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, and that bond yields embed too high of a risk premium (bottom panel).6 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 70 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +6bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 4% in November, and currently sits at 83% (Chart 6). We upgraded municipal bonds in early October, as yield ratios had become significantly more attractive, especially at the long-end of the Aaa curve (panel 2).7 Specifically, 2-year and 5-year M/T yield ratios are somewhat below average pre-crisis levels at 68% and 72%, respectively. However, M/T yield ratios for longer maturities (10 years and higher) are all above average pre-crisis levels. M/T yield ratios for 10-year, 20-year and 30-year maturities are 84%, 93% and 97%, respectively. Fundamentally, state & local government balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both of these trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outnumber downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted higher in November, steepening out to the 7-year maturity and flattening beyond that. The 2/10 Treasury slope was unchanged on the month. It currently sits at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps to end the month at 59 bps (Chart 7). In a recent report we discussed the 6-12 month outlook for the 2/10 Treasury slope.8 We considered the main macro factors that influence the slope of the yield curve: Fed policy, wage growth, inflation expectations and the neutral fed funds rate. We concluded that the 2/10 slope has room to steepen during the next few months, as the Fed holds down the front-end of the curve in an effort to re-anchor inflation expectations. However, we see the 2/10 slope remaining in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps, owing to strong wage growth and downbeat neutral rate expectations. Despite the outlook for modest curve steepening, we continue to recommend holding a barbelled Treasury portfolio. Specifically, we favor holding a 2/30 barbell versus the 5-year bullet, in duration-matched terms. This position offers strong positive carry (bottom panel), due to the extreme overvaluation of the 5-year note, and looks attractive on our yield curve models (see Appendix B). TIPS: Overweight   Chart 8TIPS Market Overview Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 47 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -70 bps.The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.62%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.73%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s target. The divergence between the actual inflation data and inflation expectations remains stark. Trimmed mean PCE inflation has been fluctuating around the Fed’s target for most of the year (Chart 8). However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain stubbornly low. As we have pointed out in prior research, it can take time for expectations to adapt to a changing macro environment.9 That being said, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 29 bps too low according to our Adaptive Expectations Model, a model whose primary input is 10-year trailing core inflation (panel 4). It is highly likely that the Fed will have to tolerate some overshoot of its 2% inflation target in order to re-anchor inflation expectations near desired levels. We anticipate that the committee will do so, and maintain our view that long-dated TIPS breakevens will move above 2.3% before the end of the cycle. ABS: Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +74 bps. Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 34 bps; its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS rank among the most defensive US spread products and also offer more expected return than other low-risk sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. However, we remain wary of allocating too much to consumer ABS because credit trends continue to shift in the wrong direction. The consumer credit delinquency rate is still low, but has put in a clear bottom. The is true for the household interest expense ratio (panel 3). Senior Loan Officers also continue to tighten lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising delinquencies (bottom panel). All in all, our favorable outlook for global growth causes us to shy away from defensive spread products, and deteriorating ABS credit metrics are also a cause for concern. Stay underweight. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +221 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 1 bp on the month. It currently sits at 72 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but somewhat above levels seen in 2018 (Chart 10). The macro outlook for commercial real estate (CRE) is somewhat unfavorable, with lenders tightening loan standards (panel 4) in an environment of tepid demand. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks saw slightly stronger demand for nonfarm nonresidential CRE loans in Q3, after four consecutive quarters of falling demand (bottom panel). CRE prices are still not keeping pace with CMBS spreads (panel 3). Despite the poor fundamental picture, our Excess Return Bond Map shows that CMBS offer a reasonably attractive risk/reward trade-off compared to other bond sectors (see Appendix C). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +107 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month, and currently sits at 54 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer a compelling risk/reward trade-off. An overweight allocation to this high-rated sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 26 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index.   To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of November 29 2019) Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of November 29, 2019) Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 45 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 45 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of November 29, 2019) Mixed Messages Mixed Messages Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Corporate Bond Investors Should Not Fight The Fed”, dated September 17, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   For details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Perspective On Risk And Reward”, dated October 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Malaysia, Mexico & Central Europe”, dated October 31, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 7  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com   Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Feature Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game In late November, BCA Research published its 2020 Outlook titled Heading Into The End Game, an annual discussion between BCA’s managing editors and the firm’s longstanding clients Mr. and Ms X.1 We recommend GAA clients read that document for a full analysis of the macro and investment environment we expect in 2020. In this Monthly Portfolio Outlook, we focus on portfolio construction: how we would recommend positioning a global multi-asset portfolio for the 12-month investment horizon in light of that analysis. First, a brief summary of the BCA macro outlook. We believe the global manufacturing cycle is starting to bottom out, partly because of its usual periodicity of 18 months from peak to trough, and also because of easier financial conditions, and some moderate fiscal and credit stimulus from China (Chart 1).  Central banks will remain dovish next year despite accelerating growth. The Fed, in particular, worries that inflation expectations have become unanchored (Chart 2) and, moreover, will be reluctant to raise rates ahead of the US presidential election. This environment implies a moderate rise in long-term interest rates, with the US 10-year Treasury yield rising to 2.2-2.5%. Chart 1Reasons To Expect A Rebound Reasons To Expect A Rebound Reasons To Expect A Rebound Chart 2Unanchored Inflation Expectations Worry The Fed Unanchored Inflation Expectations Worry The Fed Unanchored Inflation Expectations Worry The Fed For an asset allocator, this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks like a very positive environment for risk assets (Chart 3). We, therefore, remain overweight equities and underweight fixed income. We have discussed over the past few months the timing to turn more risk-on and pro-cyclical in our recommendations.2 Since we are increasingly confident about the probability of the manufacturing cycle turning up, this is the time to make that change. Consequently, the shifts we are recommending in our global portfolio, shown in the Recommended Allocation table and discussed in detail below, add to its beta (Chart 4).   Chart 3A Positive Environment For Risk Assets A Positive Environment For Risk Assets A Positive Environment For Risk Assets Chart 4Raising The Beta Of Our Portfolio Raising The Beta Of Our Portfolio Raising The Beta Of Our Portfolio Chart 5Some Signs Of Risk-On Still Missing Some Signs Of Risk-On Still Missing Some Signs Of Risk-On Still Missing Nonetheless, we still have some concerns. China’s stimulus (particularly credit growth) remains half-hearted compared to previous cyclical rebounds in 2012 and 2016. We expect a “phase one” ceasefire in the trade war. But even that is not certain, and it would not anyway solve the long-term structural disputes. To turn fully risk-on, we would want to see signs of a clear rebound in commodity prices and a depreciation of the US dollar, which have not yet happened (Chart 5). The 2020 Outlook proposed some milestones to monitor whether our scenario is playing out and whether we should turn more or less risk-on. We summarize these milestones in Table 1. Given these uncertainties, to hedge our pro-cyclical positioning we continue to recommend an overweight in cash, and we are instituting an overweight position in gold. Table 1Milestones For 2020 Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Chart 6Recessions Are Caused By Inflation Or Debt Recessions Are Caused By Inflation Or Debt Recessions Are Caused By Inflation Or Debt How will this cycle end? All recessions in modern history have been caused either by a sharp rise in inflation, or by a debt-fueled asset bubble (Chart 6). The Fed will likely fall behind the curve at some point as, after further tightening in the labor market, inflation starts to pick up. How the Fed reacts to that will determine what triggers the recession. If – as is most likely – it lets inflation run, that could blow up an asset bubble (and it was the bursting of such bubbles which caused the 2000 and 2007 recessions); if it decides to tighten monetary policy to kill inflation, the recession would look more like those of the 1970s and 1980s. But it is hard to see either happening over the next 12-18 months. Equities: As part of our shift to a more pro-risk, pro-cyclical stance, we are cutting US equities to underweight, and raising the euro zone to overweight, and Emerging Markets and the UK to neutral. US equities have outperformed fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 7) – except during the two periods of accelerating global growth, in 2012-13 (when Europe did better) and 2016-17 (when EM particularly outperformed). The US today is expensive, particularly in terms of price/sales, which looks more expensive than the P/E ratio because the profit margin is at a record high level (Chart 8). The upside for US stocks in 2020 is likely to be limited. In 2019 so far, US equities have risen by 29% despite earnings growth close to zero. Multiples expanded because the Fed turned dovish, but investors should not assume further multiple expansion in 2020. Our rough model for US EPS growth points to around 8% next year (sales in line with nominal GDP growth of 4%, margins expanding by a couple of points, plus 2% in share buybacks). Add a dividend yield of 2%, and US stocks might give a total return of 10% or so. Chart 7US Doesn't Always Outperform US Doesn't Always Outperform US Doesn't Always Outperform Chart 8US Equities Are Expensive US Equities Are Expensive US Equities Are Expensive To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Euro zone stocks have a higher weighting in sectors we like such as Financials and Industrials (Table 2). European banks, in particular, look attractively valued (Chart 9) and offer a dividend yield of 6%, something investors should find appealing in this low-yield world. EM is more closely linked to China and commodities prices, which are not yet sending strong positive signals. We worry about the excess of debt in EM (Chart 10), which remains a structural headwind: the IMF and World Bank put total external EM debt at $6.8 trillion (Chart 11). Table 2Equity Sector Composition Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Chart 9Euro Zone Banks Are Especially Cheap Euro Zone Banks Are Especially Cheap Euro Zone Banks Are Especially Cheap Chart 10EM Debt Remains A Headwind EM Debt Remains A Headwind EM Debt Remains A Headwind Japan is another likely beneficiary of a cyclical recovery. But, before we turn positive, we want to see (1) signs of a stabilization of consumption after the recent tax rise (retail sales fell by 7% year-on-year in October), and (2) clarification of a worrying new investment law (which will require any investor which intends to “influence management” to get prior government approval before buying as little as a 1% stake in many sectors). For an asset allocator this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks very positive for risk assets. We raise the UK to neutral. The market has been a serial underperformer over the past few years, but this has been due to the weak pound and derating, rather than poor earnings growth (Chart 12). It now looks very cheap and, with the risk of a no-deal Brexit off the table, sterling should rebound further. The UK is notably overweight the sectors we like (Table 2). However, political risk makes us limit our recommendation to neutral. Although the Conservatives look likely to win a majority in this month’s general election, which will allow them to push through the negotiated Brexit deal, subsequent arguments over the future trade relationship with the EU will be divisive. Chart 116.8 Trillion In EM External Debt $6.8 Trillion In EM External Debt $6.8 Trillion In EM External Debt Chart 12The UK Has Been Derated Since 2016 The UK Has Been Derated Since 2016 The UK Has Been Derated Since 2016   Fixed Income: We remain underweight government bonds. Stronger economic growth is likely to push up long-term rates (Chart 13). Nonetheless, the rise in yields should be limited. The Fed looks to be on hold for the next 12 months, but the futures market is not far away from that view: it has priced in only a 60% probability of one rate cut over that time. The gap between market expectations and what the Fed actually does is what our bond strategists call the “golden rule of bond investing”. US inflation is also likely to soften over the next few months due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth and appreciating dollar. We do not expect the 10-year US Treasury to rise above 2.5% – the current FOMC estimate of the long-run equilibrium level of short-term rates (Chart 14). Chart 13Growth Will Push Up Rates... Growth Will Push Up Rates... Growth Will Push Up Rates...   Chart 14...But Only As Far As 2.5% ...But Only As Far As 2.5% ...But Only As Far As 2.5%   Within the fixed-income universe, we remain positive on corporate credit. But US investment-grade bond spreads are no longer attractive and so we downgrade them to neutral (Chart 15). Investors looking for high-quality bond exposure should prefer Agency MBS, which trade on an attractive spread relative to Aa- and A-rated corporate bonds. European IG should do better since spreads are not so close to historical lows, risk-free rates should rise less than in the US, and because the ECB is increasing its purchases of corporate bonds. Chart 15US IG Spreads Are Close To Historical Lows Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game Chart 16US Caa Bonds Have Some Catching Up To Do The Puzzling Case Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds US Caa Bonds Have Some Catching Up To Do The Puzzling Case Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds US Caa Bonds Have Some Catching Up To Do We continue to like high-yield bonds, both in the US and Europe. But we would suggest moving down the credit curve and increasing the weight in Caa-rated bonds. These have underperformed this year (Chart 16), mainly because of technical factors such as their overweight in the energy sector and relatively smaller decline in duration.3 With a stronger economy and rising oil prices, they should catch up to their higher-rated HY peers in 2020. To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Currencies: Since the US dollar is a counter-cyclical currency (Chart 17), we would expect it to weaken against more cyclical currencies such as the euro, and commodity currencies such as the Australian dollar and Canadian dollar. But it should appreciate relative to the yen and Swiss franc, which are the most defensive major currencies. We expect EM currencies to continue to depreciate. Most emerging markets are experiencing disinflation (Chart 18), which will push central banks to cut rates and inject liquidity into the banking system. This will tend to weaken their currencies. Overall, we are neutral on the US dollar. Chart 17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency Chart 18Disinflation Will Push EM Currencies Down Further Disinflation Will Push EM Currencies Down Further Disinflation Will Push EM Currencies Down Further     Commodities: Industrials metals prices are closely linked to Chinese stimulus (Chart 19). A moderate recovery in Chinese growth should be a positive, and so we raise our recommendation to neutral. But with question-marks still lingering over the strength of the rebound in the Chinese economy, we would not be more positive than that. Oil prices should see moderate upside over the next 12 months, with supply tight and demand growth recovering in line with the global economy. Our energy strategists forecast Brent crude to average $67 a barrel in 2020 (compared to a little over $60 today). Chart 19Metals Prices Depend On China Metals Prices Depend On China Metals Prices Depend On China Chart 20Gold: Short-Term Negatives, But Remains A Good Hedge Gold: Short-Term Negatives, But Remains A Good Hedge Gold: Short-Term Negatives, But Remains A Good Hedge   Gold looks a little overbought in the short term, and less monetary stimulus and a rise in rates next year would be negative factors (Chart 20). Nonetheless, we see it as a good hedge against our positive economic view going awry, and against geopolitical risks. If central banks do decide to let economies run hot next year and ignore rising inflation, gold could do particularly well. We, therefore, raise our recommendation to overweight on a 12-month horizon.     Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    Please see "Outlook 2020," dated November 22 2019, available at bcaresearch.com 2   Please see, for example, last month’s GAA Monthly Portfolio Update, “Looking For The Turning-Point,” dated November 1, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3   For a more detailed explanation, please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Signs Or Buying Opportunity,” dated 26 November 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

An analysis on Brazil is available below. Feature Chart I-1Poor Performance By EM Stocks, Currencies And Commodities bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c1 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c1 I had the pleasure of meeting again with a long-term BCA client Ms. Mea last week during my trip to Europe. Ms. Mea and I meet on a semi-annual basis, where she has the opportunity to query my analysis and view. In our latest meeting, she was more perplexed than usual by the global macro developments and financial market dynamics. Ms. Mea: All the seemingly positive news on the trade front is pushing up global share prices. In fact, a substantial portion -if not all -of the global equity price gains have occurred on days when there has been positive news surrounding the US-China trade negotiations. Given EM financial markets were the most damaged by the trade war, one would have thought that EM markets would outperform in a rally stemming from progress in negotiations. Yet this has not occurred. EM currencies have failed to advance (a number of currencies are in fact breaking down), EM sovereign credit spreads are widening and the relative performance of EM vs. DM share prices has relapsed (Chart I-1). What is causing this disconnect? Answer: The disconnect is due to a somewhat false narrative that the global trade and manufacturing recession as well as the EM/China slowdown were primarily caused by the US-China trade confrontation. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The latter can only partially be attributed to the US-China trade tariffs and tensions. Chart I-2 illustrates that mainland exports are not contracting while imports excluding processing trade1 are down 5% from a year ago. This implies that China’s growth slump has not been due to a contraction in its exports but rather due to weakness in its domestic demand. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The basis as to why mainland exports have held up so well is because Chinese exporters have been re-routing their shipments to the US via other countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. Critically, the key force driving EM currencies and risk assets has been Chinese imports (Chart I-3). Mainland imports continue to shrink, with no recovery in sight. This is the reason why EM risk assets and currencies have performed so poorly, even amid the global risk-on environment. Chart I-2Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chart I-3China Imports Drive EM Currencies bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c3 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c3   Ms. Mea: Are you implying that a ceasefire in the trade war will not help Chinese growth rebound, and in turn support EM economies? The “Phase One” agreement and possible reductions in US tariffs on imports from China may help the Middle Kingdom’s exports, but not its imports. Crucially, the Chinese authorities will likely be reluctant to augment their credit and fiscal stimulus if there is a “Phase One” deal with the US. Absent greater stimulus, China’s domestic demand is unlikely to stage a swift recovery. In the case of a “Phase One” agreement, a mild improvement in business confidence in China and worldwide is likely, but a major upswing is doubtful. The basis is that business people around the world have witnessed the struggles faced by the US and China in their negotiations. They will likely doubt the ability of both nations to reach a structural resolution – and rightly so. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. Importantly, global investors are miscalculating China’s negotiating strategy and tactics. We put much greater odds than many other investors on the possibility that China will continue to drag out the negotiations without signing the “Phase One” agreement. This could easily derail the global equity rally. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. China’s shipments to the US have been around 3.3% of GDP, even before the trade war began. The value-added to the economy/income generated from China’s exports to the US is less than 3% of its GDP. In contrast, capital spending accounts for the largest share (42%) of China’s GDP. In turn, investment outlays are driven by the credit cycle and fiscal spending, rather than by exports. Chart I-4China: Stimulus And Business Cycle bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c4 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c4 Ms. Mea: Turning to stimulus in China, the authorities have been easing for about a year. By now, the cumulative effect of this stimulus should have begun to revive the mainland’s domestic demand. Why do you still think China’s business cycle has not reached a bottom? Answer: Indeed, our credit and fiscal spending impulse has been rising since January. Based on its historical relationship with business cycle variables – it leads those variables by roughly nine months – China’s growth should have troughed in August or September (Chart I-4). However, the time lags between the credit and fiscal spending impulse and economic cycle are not constant as can be seen in Chart I-4. On average, the lag has been nine months but has also varied from zero (at the trough in early 2009) to 18 months (at the peak in 2016-‘17). Relationships in economics – as opposed to those in hard sciences – are not constant and stable. Rather, correlations and time lags between variables vary substantially over time. In addition, the magnitude of stimulus is not the only variable that should be taken into account. The potential multiplier effect is also significant. One way to proxy the multiplier effect is via the marginal propensity to spend by households and companies. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Our proxies for Chinese marginal propensity to spend by companies and households have been falling (Chart I-5). This entails that households and businesses in China remain downbeat, which caps their expenditures, in turn offsetting the positive impact of stimulus. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Without rapidly rising property prices and construction volumes, boosting sentiment and growth will prove challenging. We discussed the current conditions and outlook of China’s property market in last week’s report. Construction is the single largest sector of the mainland economy, and it is in recession: floor area started and under construction are all shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: A Weak Multiplier Effect China: A Weak Multiplier Effect China: A Weak Multiplier Effect Chart I-6China Construction Is In Recession China Construction Is In Recession China Construction Is In Recession   It is difficult to envision an improvement in manufacturing and a rebound in demand for commodities/materials and industrial goods without a recovery in construction. Notably, Chart I-6 displays the most comprehensive data on construction, as it encompasses all residential and non-residential construction by property developers and all other entities. Ms. Mea: Why are some global business cycle indicators turning up if, as you argue, the global manufacturing slowdown originated from Chinese domestic demand and the latter has not yet turned around? Answer: At any point of the business cycle, it is possible to find data that point both up and down. Our ongoing comprehensive review of global business cycle data leads us to conclude that the improvement is evident only in a few circumstances, and is not broad-based. In particular: In China and the rest of EM, there is no domestic demand recovery at the moment. China and EM ex-China capital goods imports are shrinking (Chart I-7). Chinese consumer spending is also sluggish (Chart I-8). The rise in China’s manufacturing Caixin PMI over the past several months is an aberration. Chart I-7EM/China Capex Is Very Weak EM/China Capex Is Very Weak EM/China Capex Is Very Weak Chart I-8No Recovery For Chinese Consumers No Recovery For Chinese Consumers No Recovery For Chinese Consumers     In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, narrow and broad money growth are underwhelming (Chart I-9). These developments signify that EM policy rate cuts have not yet boosted money/credit and domestic demand. We elaborated on this in more detail in our recent report. The basis for such poor transmission is banking-system health in many developing countries. Banks remain saddled with non-performing loans (NPLs). The need to boost provisions and fears of more NPLs continues to make banks reluctant to lend. Besides, real (inflation-adjusted) lending rates are high, discouraging credit demand. In the US and euro area, consumption – outside of autos – as well as money and credit growth have never slowed in this cycle. The slowdown has largely been due to exports and the auto sector. The latter may be bottoming in the euro area (Chart I-10). This might be behind the improvement in some business surveys in Europe. Chart I-9EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart I-10Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over? Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over? Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over?   European business survey data are mixed, but the weakest segment - manufacturing – remains lackluster. In particular, Germany’s IFO index for business expectations and current conditions in manufacturing have not improved (Chart I-11, top panel). Similarly, the Swiss KOF economic barometer remains downbeat (Chart I-11, top panel). The only improvement is in Belgian business confidence, and a mild pickup in the euro area manufacturing PMI (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-11European Manufacturing And Business Confidence European Manufacturing And Business Confidence European Manufacturing And Business Confidence   In the US, shipping and carload data are rather grim. They are not corroborating the marginal improvement in the US manufacturing PMI. Overall, at this point there are no signs that domestic demand is recovering in China and the rest of EM, which have been the epicenter of the slowdown. The improvement is limited to some data in the US and Europe. Consistently, US and European share prices have been surging, while EM equities have dramatically underperformed. Ms. Mea: What about lower interest rates driving multiples expansion in both DM and EM equities? Answer: Concerning multiples expansion, our general framework is as follows: So long as corporate profits do not contract, lower interest rates will likely lead to equity multiples expansion. However, when corporate earnings shrink, the latter overwhelms the positive effect of a lower discount rate on multiples, and share prices drop along with lower interest rates. DM corporate profits are flirting with contraction, but are not yet contracting meaningfully. Hence, it is sensible that US and European stocks have experienced multiples expansion. In contrast, EM corporate earnings are shrinking at a rate of 10% from a year ago as illustrated in Chart I-12. The basis for an EM profit recession is the downturn in Chinese domestic demand and consequently imports. EM per-share earnings correlate much better with Chinese imports (Chart I-13, top panel) than US ones (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12EM Profits And Share Prices EM Profits And Share Prices EM Profits And Share Prices Chart I-13EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US   In fact, we have documented numerous times in our reports that EM currencies and share prices correlate well with China’s business cycle/global trade/commodities prices, more so than with US bond yields. This does not mean that EM share prices are insensitive to interest rates. They are indeed sensitive to their own borrowing costs, but not to US Treasury yields. Chart I-14 demonstrates that EM share prices move in tandem with inverted EM sovereign US dollar bond yields and EM local currency bond yields. Similarly, emerging Asian share prices correlate with inverted high-yield Asian US dollar corporate bond yields (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-14EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields Chart I-15Chinese Bond Yields Herald Relapse In EM Stocks And Currencies bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c15 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c15 In short, EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Looking forward, exchange rates hold the key. A relapse in EM currencies will push up both the US dollar and local currency bond yields in many EMs. That will in turn warrant a setback in EM share prices. Ms. Mea: What about the correlation between EM performance and Chinese local rates? Answer: This is an essential relationship. Chart I-15 demonstrates that EM share prices and currencies have a strong positive correlation with local interest rates in China. The rationale is that all of them are driven by China’s business cycle. Relapsing interest rates in China are presently sending a bearish signal for EM risk assets and currencies. Ms. Mea: What does all this mean for investment strategy? A few weeks ago, you wrote that if the MSCI EM equity US dollar index breaks above 1075, you would reverse your recommended strategy. How does this square with your fundamental analysis that is still downbeat? Answer: My fundamental analysis on EM/China has not changed: I do not believe in the sustainability of this EM rebound in general, and EM outperformance versus DM in particular. The key risk to my strategy on EM stems from the US and Europe. It is possible that US and European share prices continue to rally. EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Notably, the high-beta segments of the US equity market and the overall Euro Stoxx 600 index are flirting with major breakouts (Chart I-16A and I-16B). If these breakouts transpire, the up-leg in US and European share prices will be long-lasting. This will also drag EM share prices higher in absolute terms. This is why I have placed a buy stop on the EM equity index. Chart I-16AUS High-Beta Stocks High-Beta Stocks High-Beta Stocks Chart I-16BEuropean Equities: At A Critical Juncture European Equities: At A Critical Juncture European Equities: At A Critical Juncture   That said, I have a strong conviction that EM will continue to underperform DM, even in such a scenario. Hence, I continue to recommend underweighting EM versus DM in both global equity and credit portfolios. As we have recently written in detail, the global macro backdrop and financial market dynamics in such a scenario will resemble 2012-2014, when EM currencies depreciated, commodities prices fell and EM share prices massively underperformed DM ones (Chart I-17). Further, I am not arguing that the current global trade and manufacturing downtrends will persist indefinitely. The odds are that the global business cycle, including China’s, will bottom sometime next year. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January (please refer to Chart I-12 on page 8). This is an unprecedented historical gap, making EM stocks, currencies and credit markets vulnerable to continued disappointments in EM corporate profitability. Ms. Mea: What market signals give you confidence in poor EM performance going forward? Answer: Even though the S&P 500 has broken to new highs, multiple segments of EM financial markets have posted extremely disappointing performance. These include: Small-cap stocks in EM overall and emerging Asia as well as the EM equal-weighted equity index have struggled to rally (Chart I-18). Chart I-17EM Underperformed During 2012-14 Bull Market bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c17 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_28_s1_c17 Chart I-18Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen   Various Chinese equity indexes – onshore and offshore, small and large – have failed to advance and continue to underperform the global equity index. EM ex-China currencies and industrial commodities prices have remained subdued (please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1). Ms. Mea: Would you mind reminding me of your country allocation across various EM asset classes such as equities, credit, currencies and fixed-income? Answer: Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our equity underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa and Colombia. We continue recommending to short an EM currency basket including ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Today, we add the BRL to our short list (please refer to the section below on Brazil). As to the country allocation within EM local currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios, investors can refer to our asset allocation tables below that are published at the end of each week’s report and are available on our web site. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Brazil: Deflationary Pressures Warrant A Weaker BRL The Brazilian real is breaking below its previous support. We recommend shorting the BRL against the US dollar. The primary macro risk in Brazil is not inflation but rather mounting deflationary pressures. Inflation has fallen to very low levels, to the bottom of the central bank’s target range (Chart II-1). Deflation or low inflation is dangerous when there are high debt levels. The Brazilian government is heavily indebted. With nominal GDP growth still below government borrowing costs and a primary budget balance at -1.3% of GDP, the public debt trajectory remains unsustainable as we discussed in previous reports (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Chart II-2Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable   The cyclical profile of the economy is very weak as shown in Chart II-3. Tight fiscal policy and a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves have caused money growth to slow. That in turn entails a poor outlook for the economy, which will reinforce the deflationary trend. Accordingly, Brazil needs to reflate its economy to boost nominal GDP, which is the only scenario where the nation escapes a public debt trap. Yet, fiscal policy is straightjacketed by the spending cap rule, which stipulates that government spending can only grow at the previous year’s IPCA inflation rate. Federal government spending is set to grow only at the low nominal rate of 3.4% in 2020. Hence, monetary policy is the sole tool available for policymakers to reflate. Both bond yields and bank lending rates remain elevated in real terms. This hampers any recovery in the business cycle. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend by companies and consumers is declining, foreshadowing weaker economic activity ahead (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Chart II-4Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining   The central bank is determined to reduce interest rates further. As such, they cannot control the exchange rate. Indeed, the Impossible Trinity thesis states that in an economy with an open capital account (like in Brazil), the authorities cannot control both interest and exchange rates simultaneously. Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes stated in recent days that tight fiscal and easy monetary policies are consistent with a lower currency value. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. In fact, currency depreciation is another option to boost nominal growth that the nation desperately needs. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. Commodities prices remain an important driver of the Brazilian real (Chart II-5). These have failed to rebound amid the risk-on regime in global financial markets. This suggests that the path of least resistance for commodities prices is down, which is bad news for the real. Brazil’s current account deficit is widening and has reached 3% of GDP (Chart II-6). Notably, not only are export prices deflating but export volumes are also shrinking (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Chart II-5BRL And Commodities Prices BRL And Commodities Prices BRL And Commodities Prices Chart II-6Widening Current Account Deficit Widening Current Account Deficit Widening Current Account Deficit   Chart II-7The BRL Is Not Cheap The BRL Is Not Cheap The BRL Is Not Cheap Meanwhile, the nation’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $190 billion, all-time highs. As the real depreciates, foreign currency debtors (companies and banks) will rush to acquire dollars or hedge their dollar liabilities. This will reinforce the weakening trend in the currency. Finally, the Brazilian real is not cheap - it is close to fair value (Chart II-7). Hence, valuation will not prevent currency depreciation. Bottom Line: We are initiating a short BRL / long US dollar trade. Investors should remain neutral on Brazil within EM equity, local bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Investors with long-term horizon should consider the following strategy: long the Bovespa, short the real. This is a bet that Brazil will succeed in reflating the economy at the detriment of the currency. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Processing trade includes imports of goods that undergo further processing before being re-exported.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations