Fixed Income

Highlights Late-cycle pressures will keep pushing bond yields higher. Global growth will remain above trend in 2019, keeping unemployment rates low and preventing central banks from turning dovish. The unwind of crisis-era global monetary policies will continue. Slowing central bank asset purchases will worsen the supply/demand balance for government bonds, resulting in gentle upward pressure on yields via higher term premia. It is too early to worry about inverted yield curves. The time to be concerned about the recessionary implications of an inverted U.S. Treasury curve will come after the Fed has lifted real interest rates to above neutral (R*), which should occur in the latter half of 2019. Expect poor corporate bond returns from an aging credit cycle. While default risk is likely to stay benign through 2019, the greater risk for corporates could come from concerns over future credit downgrades, as well as diminished inflows in a “post-QE” world. Feature BCA’s annual Outlook report, outlining the main investment themes that will drive global asset markets in 2019, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this Weekly Report, we discuss the four broad implications of those themes for global fixed income. In a follow-up report to be published next week, we will translate those themes into strategic investment recommendations and allocations within our model bond portfolio framework. Key View #1: Late-Cycle Inflation Pressures Will Keep Pushing Bond Yield Higher The main theme from last year’s BCA Outlook was that markets and policy would collide in 2018. This year’s Outlook concluded that those same frictions would persist in 2019, and for similar reasons. The global economy is likely to see another year of above trend growth, after the current deceleration phase bottoms out in the first half of the year. Tight labor markets will continue to force developed market central banks, who still strongly believe in the Phillips Curve relationship as the best way to forecast inflation, to move toward less dovish monetary policies, putting steady upward pressure on global bond yields. Our own Central Bank Monitors signal a need for tighter monetary policy (Chart of the Week), most notably in the U.S. That may sound strange given the recent softening of global growth momentum and plunge in oil prices. Yet economic survey data (like the global ZEW index) show a huge divergence between actual and expected growth, with real bond yields responding more to the former than the latter (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekStill A Bearish Bond Backdrop Still A Bearish Bond Backdrop Still A Bearish Bond Backdrop   Chart 2Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 The fear of a global economic downturn appears greater than the current reality - a trend likely magnified by the ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions and the sharp fall in oil prices which some are interpreting to be a sign of weaker demand. BCA’s commodity strategists view the oil decline as purely supply driven, and expect that a tighter demand/supply balance will result in oil prices recovering recent losses and rising smartly in 2019. This should lead to a rebound in the inflation expectations component of global bond yields later next year (bottom panel). As was argued in the 2019 BCA Outlook, the conditions for a deep pullback in global growth are not yet in place, especially in the U.S. where consumer fundamentals remain solid (strong income growth, booming net worth and a low debt service ratio). China, where growth is currently slowing, remains the biggest wild card for the world economy, especially given the degree to which emerging market economies are levered to Chinese growth. Yet the most likely outcome is that Chinese authorities will make enough policy adjustments to stabilize the economy in the first half of 2019, which will help put a floor under global growth. With over 80% of OECD economies now with an unemployment rate below estimates of “full employment”, the backdrop today is more conducive to sustained higher inflation than at any point since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Chart 3). This means that actual inflation readings are likely to be stickier to the upside, especially for domestically focused measures like wages and services which are accelerating in many countries. Chart 3Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation From the point of view of global central bankers, this means that as long as global growth does not slow sustainably below trend, then unemployment rates are unlikely to begin to rise. For policymakers who slavishly follow the Phillips Curve when forecasting inflation, that will make it difficult to shift to a more dovish policy bias, even if inflation remains below target for a time thanks to the recent pullback in oil prices (Chart 4). Chart 4Central Banks Who Believe In The Phillips Curve Can’t Turn Dovish 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" The degree of policy bias in 2019 will not be uniform, though, which was also the case in 2018. Central banks in countries with core inflation rates closer to policymaker targets (the U.S., Canada, the U.K. if the Brexit uncertainty fades, Sweden) will be more likely to raise rates than those where inflation is still well below target (Japan, the euro area, Australia). Relative government bond market performance over the course of 2019 should reflect those trends. U.S. Treasury yields will still most likely to see the largest increase from current levels as the Fed will lift rates over the full 2019 calendar by more than markets are currently discounting (only 33bps are currently priced in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap curve – a low hurdle to beat). Key View #2: The Unwind Of Crisis-Era Global Monetary Policies Will Continue Quantitative easing (QE) – central banks buying huge amounts of bonds to help keep yields low enough to sustain economic growth amid weak inflation expectations – has been a dominant feature of global bond markets since the 2009 recession. Policymakers have been forced to engage in such unusual activities to try and boost weak inflation expectations even after policy interest rates have been cut to 0% (and even lower in some cases). Now, a decade later, inflation expectations are more stable and much closer to central bank targets in most countries (except, as always, Japan). That means government bond returns are no longer negatively correlated to equity returns (Chart 5), reducing the value of bonds as a hedge to stocks. Chart 5Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation In the 2019 BCA Outlook, several other reasons were given as to why that correlation has been weakening, including a shift towards more consumption and less savings from aging populations entering their retirement years. The biggest change, however, has been the move from QE to “QT” (quantitative tightening) as central banks buy fewer bonds or, in the case of the U.S. Fed, actually letting bonds run of its massive balance sheet. The new year will bring an end to the net new buying phase of the European Central Bank (ECB) Asset Purchase Program. That represents a loss of €180 billion of liquidity into European bond markets compared to 2018 (twelve months at €15bn per month), both for government debt and investment grade corporates which are also part of the ECB’s program. This will come on top of reduced purchases from the Bank of Japan (BoJ), who will likely buy at a reduced ¥30 trillion pace in 2019 (down from around ¥40 trillion in 2018), and from the Fed who will let $600bn of maturing bonds run off its balance sheet ($360bn of which will be Treasuries). That slowing pace of central bank asset accumulation means that private investors must absorb an even greater supply of government bonds next year. The BCA Outlook estimated that the change in the supply of government bonds available to private investors would equal $1.2 trillion in 2019, a huge increase from the $400bn seen in 2018 (Chart 6). This will come at a time when new government bond issuance is set to increase once again thanks to wider U.S. budget deficits, further worsening the global supply/demand balance for government debt from the major developed economies. Chart 6Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds The reduction in the pace of central bank bond buying will continue to put gentle upward pressure on government bond yields, as has been the case since the pace of ECB purchases peaked in 2016 (Chart 7). More importantly, the diminished central bank liquidity expansion means there will be less money going into risky assets via the portfolio balance channel (i.e. private investors taking the funds earned from selling bonds to central banks and placing that in equity and credit markets). Chart 7Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' This creates a backdrop where volatility spikes will be more frequent, as has been the case in 2018 (bottom panel). Risky asset valuations will also be impacted from reduced inflows from yield-seeking investors who have sold government bonds to central banks. This suggests wider credit spreads and lower equity price/earnings multiples, all else equal (Chart 8). Chart 8Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Of course, all is not equal. A rebound in global growth could trigger a new wave of inflows into global equity and credit markets with valuations having cheapened in recent months. The important point is that, without central bank liquidity propping up asset prices, global risk assets will trade more off fundamentals in 2019 than has been the case during the past couple of years. Key View #3: Too Soon To Worry About Inverted Yield Curves “Yield curve inversions lead to recessions” is a well-known (if not well understood) relationship that has gained almost mythical status among investors. As the widely-watched spread between 2-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury yields (the 2/10 curve) has melted away during the course of 2018 – now sitting at a mere 13bps – the prognosticating power of the curve has many worried that a U.S. recession could be just around the corner. Especially after the Fed has raised the fed funds rate by 200 basis points over the past three years. Those fears are misguided, for several reasons: 1. The Treasury curve segment with the most successful track record in heralding U.S. recessions is the spread between the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate (Chart 9). That spread is still a firmly positive 42bps. We showed in a Special Report published last July that, on average, the length of time between the inversion of the 3-month/10-year Treasury curve and the beginning of a recession is seventeen months.2 Chart 9UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal 2. The slope of the Treasury curve is unusually flat given the level of the fed funds rate measured in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The previous three episodes where the 2-year/10-year Treasury curve has inverted over the past thirty years have occurred when the real fed funds rate was between 300-400bps (Chart 10). The current level of the real funds rate (deflated by headline CPI inflation) is near zero which, in the past, has occurred alongside a 2-year/10-year Treasury curve that had a positive slope between 150-200bps. Chart 10Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... 3. The depressed level of bond term premia is weighing on longer-dated Treasury yields and dampening the slope of the curve. This is happening not only in the U.S., but also in other major bond markets in Germany, the U.K. and Japan (Chart 11). The impact of global QE programs is the most likely common factor. Chart 11...With Global Term Premia Depressed ...With Global Term Premia Depressed ...With Global Term Premia Depressed 4. The 2-year/10-year U.S. Treasury curve has never been inverted without the real fed funds rate being above the neutral real rate, also known as R-star (Chart 12). Chart 12No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* The implication for fixed income investing for 2019 is that it is too soon in the Fed’s monetary tightening cycle to expect an inverted yield curve driven by an overly tight monetary policy. That outcome is more likely by late 2019 after inflation expectations pick up and the Fed delivers at least another 75bps over the course of the year, pushing the funds rate into restrictive territory. Key View #4: Poor Corporate Returns From The Aging Credit Cycle The other major fixed income implication of the 2019 BCA Outlook is that global corporate bond markets are likely to see another year of poor returns (both in absolute terms and relative to government bonds). Spreads remain near historically tight levels across most spread product sectors, suggesting that credit risk premia will need to be repriced higher as the endgame of the multi-year credit cycle draws nearer (Chart 13). Both investors and policymakers have grown increasingly worried about the risks to the U.S. corporate bond market from high corporate leverage. However, as was discussed in the Outlook, U.S. corporate interest coverage remains well above levels that have preceded the end of previous credit cycles and BCA’s models suggest U.S. corporate profit growth will remain solid (albeit much slower than the rapid +20% growth seen in 2018). Chart 13Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy That does not mean that corporate bonds are without risk. With 50% of global investment grade bond indices now rated BBB (one notch above junk), the greater threat to corporates may come from downgrades. While those are less likely in a growing economy, investors in lower-rated investment grade bonds may require higher yields and spreads to compensate for the future risk of losses as those bonds could become “fallen angel” high-yield debt in the next economic downturn. This impact would be magnified as how many large fixed income managers have mandates that forbid investment in bonds rated below investment grade, thus creating forced selling in the event of downgrades. More fundamentally, the outlook for global corporate bonds, with spreads still much closer to historical tights than long-run averages, remains reliant on strong economic growth momentum and supportive monetary policy. On the former, we do not anticipate a move to sub-trend global growth, as discussed earlier, and corporate bond returns could stabilize once the current downtrend in the world economy subsides (Chart 14). This would likely represent a final period of calm, however. Tightening global monetary policies – both Fed hikes and diminished asset purchases – will create a more bearish backdrop for credit in the latter half of 2019 as markets begin to discount slower economic growth in 2020. Chart 14Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the December 2018 edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2019 – Late Cycle Turbulence”, available at bca.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Three Frequently Asked Questions About Global Yield Curves”, dated July 31st 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Below-Benchmark Duration: Below-benchmark duration positions will continue to pay off in 2019 as the Fed delivers more than the 32 bps of rate hikes that are priced into the curve for the next 12 months. While tighter financial conditions will probably necessitate a pause in the Fed’s gradual rate hike cycle at some point next year, this is already more than discounted in current market prices. A further deterioration in housing starts and new home sales, or a significant uptick in initial jobless claims would call our below-benchmark duration view into question. Neutral Corporate Credit: In an environment where the yield curve is quite flat but still positively sloped, excess returns to corporate bonds also tend to be quite low, but still positive on average. Investors should be looking for low, but positive, excess returns from credit on a 12-month investment horizon. However, credit spreads will probably widen further in the near-term and then tighten once the Fed signals a pause and global growth improves. Overweight Munis and Local Authorities: Tax-exempt municipal bond yields are very attractive relative to corporate bonds and both municipal and Local Authority bonds are relatively insulated from the weakness in global growth that will threaten the corporate profit outlook in the coming quarters. Both of these sectors should perform well in 2019. Overweight TIPS: Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have shifted down in recent weeks, but will move higher in 2019, eventually stabilizing in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. The rebound in oil prices that our commodity strategists expect will help, but TIPS outperformance will largely be driven by investor expectations slowly adapting to the new reality that inflation will remain much closer to the Fed’s target than it has in recent years. Yield Curve Inversion In Late 2019: Below-target TIPS breakeven inflation rates and an inverted yield curve cannot coexist. As such, investors should not worry about a sustained inversion of the yield curve until later in 2019. To profit from this view, investors should position for steepeners at the front-end of the curve. We recommend going long the 2-year bullet and short a duration-matched 1/5 barbell. The belly (5-7 year) part of the curve has become very expensive and should be avoided at all costs. Feature BCA published its 2019 Outlook two weeks ago.1 That report lays out the macroeconomic themes that our strategists think will drive markets next year. In this Special Report, we specify how investors should implement those views in the context of a U.S. bond portfolio. Key Views The main conclusions from the 2019 Outlook are: Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. […] that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. […] Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. In the verbiage of monetary policymakers, the BCA view is that U.S. interest rates remain below the neutral level that is consistent with trend GDP growth and stable inflation. This means that the Fed’s rate hike cycle will continue in 2019, and that monetary policy will not turn restrictive until later in the year. It is this view of U.S. interest rates remaining below neutral until late 2019 that drives our portfolio recommendations. Key Risks Given our main premise, the biggest risk to our recommended portfolio allocation is that interest rates move above neutral sooner than we anticipate. We will be monitoring three main risks in the coming months to help us decide whether our main premise needs to be re-evaluated. Risk #1: Housing Since a large amount of leverage is employed in the acquisition of new homes, there is good reason to believe that housing is the main channel through which interest rates impact the real economy. This is validated by the empirical data which show that residential investment, housing starts and new home sales all provide a good indication of when monetary policy turns restrictive and of when Treasury yields peak for the cycle.2 With that in mind, the housing data have clearly deteriorated during the past 6-9 months. However, with the 12-month moving averages of housing starts and new home sales still trending higher, it is too soon to say that housing has peaked for the cycle (Chart 1). Our sense is that the recent deterioration is a result of the sharp move higher in mortgage rates that occurred earlier this year. Now that rates have moderated, the housing data should improve.3 Chart 1The Housing Market Predicts Recessions The Housing Market Predicts Recessions The Housing Market Predicts Recessions A decisive breakdown in the 12-month moving averages of housing starts and new home sales would cause us to question our premise that U.S. interest rates remain below neutral. Risk #2: Jobless Claims With the unemployment rate at 3.7%, the U.S. labor market is in rude health. That being said, a move higher in the unemployment rate would be a clear sign that monetary policy is restrictive and that a recession is right around the corner. In the post-war era, there has never been a case where the 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession taking place. Often, a turn higher in the unemployment rate is preceded by an increase in initial jobless claims, and the 4-week moving average in claims has increased for four consecutive weeks (Chart 2). So far, that increase is no cause for concern. Historically, the 6-month change in jobless claims needs to reach +75k before a recession occurs (Chart 2, bottom panel). Nevertheless, the recent upturn in claims will bear monitoring in the months ahead. Chart 2Initial Jobless Claims Are Worth Monitoring Initial Jobless Claims Are Worth Monitoring Initial Jobless Claims Are Worth Monitoring Risk #3: Weak Foreign Growth & A Strong Dollar It is a bit misleading for us to include weak foreign growth and a strong dollar in the “key risks” section. In fact, our base case outlook involves weak foreign economic growth migrating to the U.S. via a stronger dollar and leading to a mild slowdown in U.S. economic activity during the next few quarters (Chart 3).4 This will probably even cause the Fed to pause its gradual rate hike cycle, but will not bring it to an end. This report also contains our recommendations for how to tactically position for this pause. Chart 3Weak Global Growth Will Drag The U.S. Lower Weak Global Growth Will Drag The U.S. Lower Weak Global Growth Will Drag The U.S. Lower The Awkward Middle Phase When constructing U.S. bond portfolios on a cyclical (6-12 month) investment horizon, we find it useful to split the economic cycle into phases based on the slope of the yield curve. Our economic view informs what phase (or phases) of the cycle will reign during the next 6-12 months, and the phase of the cycle informs our investment posture. We define three phases of the cycle as follows (Chart 4): Chart 4The Three Phases Of The Cycle The Three Phases Of The Cycle The Three Phases Of The Cycle Phase 1: From the end of the prior recession until the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2: When the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps. Phase 3: From when the 3-year/10-year Treasury curve inverts until the start of the next recession.5 Table 1 shows how each U.S. fixed income asset class has performed in each phase. We use excess returns from the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index versus cash to track the returns earned from taking portfolio duration risk. For other fixed income sectors we display excess returns versus duration-matched Treasuries. We also include the performance of the S&P 500 versus the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index. Table 1Risk Asset Performance In Different Yield Curve Regimes 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income As should be clear from the macro view discussed above, we believe that we will remain in Phase 2 of the cycle for the bulk of 2019. With the 3/10 Treasury slope a mere 13 bps at present, temporary curve inversions might occur earlier in the year, but they will not be sustained (see Key View #5 below). The first implication of being in Phase 2 is that corporate bond excess returns (both investment grade and high-yield) are likely to be positive on average, but will be very low. The bulk of corporate bond excess returns are earned in Phase 1 of the cycle when the yield curve is very steep. Excess returns don’t turn decisively negative until after the curve inverts and we enter Phase 3. Like corporate credit, Treasury excess returns are also lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. This makes Phase 2 an awkward one for portfolio positioning. The expected return from taking an extra unit of credit risk is quite low, as is the expected return from taking an extra unit of duration risk. In fact, cash tends to be one of the best performing asset classes in Phase 2. The excess returns from most other spread products present a similar pattern to those from corporate bonds. Elevated excess returns in Phase 1, much lower – though typically still positive – excess returns in Phase 2, negative excess returns in Phase 3. One exception to this pattern is tax-exempt municipal debt which, outside of the mid-1990s cycle, has performed similarly or better in Phase 2 than it has in Phase 1. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals also stick out as being very defensive sectors. They both almost always provide a small positive excess return versus Treasuries, but never provide a large reward. In the remainder of this report we discuss the five key implications for U.S. bond portfolio positioning that follow from remaining in Phase 2 of the cycle for most of 2019. Key View #1: Below-Benchmark Duration We think below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will continue to pay off in 2019. We have already shown that Phase 2 of the cycle tends to coincide with relatively low excess Treasury returns, but the slope of the yield curve is not the best indicator for Treasury returns versus cash. For that, we turn to our Golden Rule of Bond Investing which says that Treasuries tend to underperform (outperform) cash on a 12-month investment horizon when the Fed delivers more (fewer) rate hikes than what was discounted at the beginning of the 12-month period (Chart 5).6 Chart 5The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for only 32 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months. More specifically, the market is pricing-in a rate increase this month, followed by one more in 2019 and then rate cuts in 2020 (Chart 6). Chart 6Market's Rate Expectations Are Too Low Market's Rate Expectations Are Too Low Market's Rate Expectations Are Too Low This extremely depressed market pricing makes us reluctant to increase duration, even tactically. While we do expect U.S. growth to slow during the next few quarters, probably by enough to necessitate a pause in the Fed’s tightening cycle, this pause is already more than reflected in current market prices. Key View #2: Neutral Corporate Credit Cyclical Horizon (6-12 Months) Being in Phase 2 of the cycle warrants a relatively defensive posture toward credit risk. For now, we recommend a neutral allocation to corporate bonds with an up-in-quality bias. We will further reduce exposure to underweight when we transition to Phase 3 of the cycle, likely late in 2019. We also recommend looking at the long-end of the credit curve to increase the average spread of your portfolio.7 Table 2 makes the importance of correctly identifying the phase of the cycle even more apparent. It shows the excess returns to both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds for different investment horizons directly after the 3/10 Treasury slope flattens into a given range. For example, the median excess return to investment grade corporate bonds in the 12 months after the 3/10 slope breaks below 25 bps is -1.02%. Table 2Corporate Bond Performance Given The Slope Of The Yield Curve (1975-Present) 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income As in Table 1, Table 2 shows that excess returns are much higher when the yield curve is steep and that they tend to turn negative after the curve inverts. But unlike the results in Table 1, the analysis in Table 2 includes recessionary periods and makes no attempt to split the cycle into different phases. It is a purely forward looking rule that calculates excess returns after different “trigger points” are reached. For example, the 12-month median excess return of -1.02% after the 3/10 slope breaks below 25 bps is biased downward because of periods when the slope broke below 25 bps and then continued to flatten until it inverted. An environment where the slope stayed range-bound between 0 bps and +25 bps for an extended period – closer to what we expect in 2019 – will deliver somewhat better excess returns. Tactical Horizon (< 6 Months) The phase of the cycle helps us specify our excess return expectations for the next 12 months, and based on our outlook, we expect excess returns will be positive, but close to zero. However, as we write this report, corporate spreads are widening at a fairly rapid clip. We expect the carnage will continue in the near-term, but are monitoring catalysts to initiate a tactical overweight recommendation on corporate credit.8 As they were in 2015, corporate spreads are widening at the moment due to the toxic combination of slowing global growth and relatively hawkish monetary policy. We expect that sometime in early 2019, Fed policy will ease at the margin and this will coincide with a near-term peak in credit spreads and a period of improved global growth. To determine when spreads peak we are monitoring several indicators of global growth and Fed policy that successfully called the last peak in early-2016. On the global growth side, the key indicators are (Chart 7A): The CRB Raw Industrials Index The BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator9 The price of global industrial mining stocks On the monetary policy front, the key indicators are (Chart 7B): The 12-month Fed Funds Discounter The gold price The trade-weighted dollar Chart 7AKey Indicators: Global Growth Key Indicators: Global Growth Key Indicators: Global Growth Chart 7BKey Indicators: Monetary Policy Key Indicators: Monetary Policy Key Indicators: Monetary Policy All in all, our conviction that we will remain in Phase 2 of the cycle for most of 2019 suggests we should maintain a neutral allocation to corporate bonds on a 6-12 month investment horizon, looking for small positive excess returns. In the near-term, we expect spreads will continue to widen in the next few weeks, but will peak once the Fed signals a pause in its rate hike cycle and global growth indicators show some improvement. We are monitoring several catalysts that will help us decide when to initiate a tactical overweight position in corporate bonds. Key View #3: Overweight Munis And Local Authorities The analysis in Table 1 showed that tax-exempt municipal bonds often provide strong excess returns in Phase 2 of the cycle. This makes them an attractive place to position in the current environment, especially given the relative attractiveness of muni yields. Table 3 shows that the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal Index is 2.75%. If we assume even a 30% effective tax rate, the taxable-equivalent yield becomes 3.93%, well above the average yield offered by the Aa-rated Corporate index. Table 3Municipals Are Attractive 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income Another reason to like munis in the current cycle is that state & local government revenues are relatively insulated from weakness in the global economy. As foreign growth weakens and drives up the dollar, corporate profits will suffer much more than state & local government tax revenues. A similar case can be made for the Local Authority sub-index of the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate. This index is comprised largely of taxable municipal debt (and some Canadian provincial debt), and while the average yield is lower than for tax-exempt munis, it is still competitive compared to corporate bonds. But most importantly, the sector is relatively insulated from weak foreign growth and a strong dollar. Municipal bonds and the Local Authority sub-index are important overweights in our recommended portfolio as we head into 2019. Key View #4: Overweight TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries Though long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen in recent weeks, we continue to recommend an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. We believe that both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates will reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5% in 2019. At present, TIPS breakevens are caught between being pulled down by weakening global growth and pushed up by mounting U.S. inflationary pressures (Chart 8). Most recently, weaker global growth has been winning and breakevens have moved lower alongside the plunge in oil prices. Chart 8TIPS Breakevens Face Opposing Forces TIPS Breakevens Face Opposing Forces TIPS Breakevens Face Opposing Forces Taking a step back, it is very unlikely that global growth and commodity prices will continue to fall at their current rates throughout 2019. At some point, a dovish turn from the Fed will lead to some depreciation of the dollar and global growth will stage a rebound. Our commodity strategists also expect a rebound in the oil price. They target an average of $82/bbl for Brent crude oil in 2019.10 In the meantime, core U.S. inflation will continue to print close to the Fed’s 2% target, and maybe even a bit higher in late 2019. At some point, inflation expectations will need to adapt to the new reality of inflation being near the Fed’s target. Historically, this suggests a range of 2.3% to 2.5% for TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Inflation expectations can be slow to adapt to a changing environment, and after several years of the Fed missing its inflation target from below, many investors remain trapped in a deflationary mindset. To get an idea of how long it takes inflation expectations to adjust to changes in the economy, we use our Adaptive Expectations Model of TIPS breakevens (Chart 9).11 The model is based on three factors: Chart 9The Adaptive Expectations Model Of The 10-Year Breakeven Rate The Adaptive Expectations Model Of The 10-Year Breakeven Rate The Adaptive Expectations Model Of The 10-Year Breakeven Rate The 12-month rate of change in headline CPI The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge The 120-month rate of change in core CPI Of the three factors, the 120-month rate of change in core CPI carries the largest weight in the model. In other words, the catalyst for moving TIPS breakeven rates higher will simply be core U.S. inflation continuing to print near the Fed’s target for a prolonged period of time. All in all, investors should maintain overweight allocations to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in 2019, targeting a range of 2.3% to 2.5% for both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. The current slowdown in global growth and commodity prices will not last for the entire year, and U.S. inflationary pressures will continue to mount as the U.S. economy grows at an above-trend pace with a very tight labor market. Key View #5: No Yield Curve Inversion Until Late 2019 The final key view that falls out of our main macro premise, which is that the fed funds rate will remain below neutral for the bulk of 2019, is that the yield curve will not sustainably invert until late 2019. This is also probably the most contentious of our key views, given recent market moves. The main reason why we think the slope of the yield curve will remain quite flat, but positive, for most of 2019 is that sustainable yield curve inversion cannot coexist with below-target TIPS breakeven inflation rates. An inverted yield curve is a signal that the market views monetary policy as overly restrictive. It means that investors expect U.S. growth and inflation to fall in the future, necessitating rate cuts. However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations signal that the market believes that inflation will not sustainably return to the Fed’s target. In other words, for an inverted yield curve and below-target TIPS breakeven inflation rates to coexist, we would have to believe that the Fed would tighten monetary policy into restrictive territory without sufficient inflationary pressures to meet its target. It is difficult to envision the Fed committing such an egregious policy error. In the event that the yield curve does invert while TIPS breakevens are below target, it is much more likely that either the Fed will adopt a more  dovish policy stance, leading to a bull-steepening of the curve; or, inflation will rise leading to higher TIPS breakevens and causing the curve to bear-steepen. In either scenario, it is hard to see how yield curve inversion will last very long without significantly higher TIPS breakevens. We will call an end to Phase 2 of the cycle only when the yield curve is inverted and long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates are above 2.3%. Curve Positioning As for how to position on the yield curve in 2019, the biggest change since the end of last year is that the belly (5-7 year) of the curve is now very expensive (Chart 10). In fact, the 2/5 slope is slightly inverted as we go to press, meaning there is actually negative rolldown in the 5-year note. Chart 10Par Coupon Treasury Curve 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income 2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income By far, the best place to position on the curve is the 2-year maturity point.12 Our model of the 1/2/5 butterfly spread (2-year bullet over duration-matched 1/5 barbell) shows that the 2-year is cheap relative to the 1/5 slope. Conversely, our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread shows that the 5-year bullet has become expensive relative to the 2/10 slope (Chart 11). Chart 11Favor The 2-Year Bullet Favor The 2-Year Bullet Favor The 2-Year Bullet Butterfly trades where you favor the bullet maturity versus the barbell perform well when the curve steepens. For example, the 2-year tends to outperform the 1/5 barbell when the 1/5 slope steepens. At present, the cheapness of the 2-year suggests that the butterfly spread is priced for significant 1/5 flattening in the coming months. Even stability in the 1/5 slope will cause the 2-year to outperform, and our key yield curve recommendation at the moment is to go long the 2-year bullet and short a duration-matched 1/5 barbell.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence”, dated November 27, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners”, dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads”, dated November 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “An Oasis Of Prosperity?”, dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope because it closely approximates the 2-year/10-year slope, but with more back-data. 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “What Kind Of Correction Is This?”, dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads”, dated November 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 A combination of 17 different financial market variables that are highly levered to Chinese growth. Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “The Third Man At OPEC 2.0’s Meeting”, dated November 29, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve”, dated November 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Our take on the key macro drivers of financial markets hasn’t evolved much since we laid it out this summer, … : Monetary policy is still accommodative; lenders are ready, willing and able; and the expansion remains intact. ... but the inflection points are getting nearer: The good times won’t last forever, though. The Fed is resolutely tightening policy, BBB-heavy investment-grade issuance has the corporate bond market flirting with a plague of fallen angels, and the global economy is slowing. Our strategy remains more cautious than our outlook for now, … : Although we think the equity bull market has another year to run, and the expansion will stretch into 2020, we are only equal-weight equities, while underweighting bonds and overweighting cash. … but we’re alert to opportunities to get more aggressive: Investment-grade and high-yield bonds are unlikely to offer an attractive risk-reward profile, but the S&P 500 shouldn’t decline much more if the economy holds up. Feature Mr. and Ms. X’s annual visit is an occasion for every BCA service to look toward the coming year, mindful of how it could improve on the one just past. The theme we settled on in last year’s discussion, Policy and Markets on a Collision Course, began asserting itself in earnest in October, and appears as it will be with us throughout 2019. The Fed is nearing its fourth rate hike this year, on the heels of three in 2017, and markets are warily contemplating the tipping point at which higher interest rates begin to interfere with activity. The yield curve has become a constant worry (Chart 1), with short rates moving in step with the fed funds rate while yields at the long end have been just one-half as sensitive (Chart 2). Chart 1Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ... Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ... Yield Curve Anxiety Has Exploded ...   Chart 2... As The Curve Has Steadily Flattened 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? Trade tensions are an even thornier policy challenge. After flitting on and off investors’ radar earlier in the year, trade barriers have been a major source of angst in recent months as central banks, investor polls and company managements increasingly cite them among their foremost concerns. Unfortunately, our geopolitical strategists do not expect relief any time soon. They see trade as just one aspect of an extended contest for supremacy between China and the U.S. Late-Cycle Turbulence, our 2019 house theme, pairs nicely with Policy-Market Collision. The gap between our terminal fed funds rate expectation and the money market’s is huge, and leaves ample room for a repricing of the entire yield curve. Trade has been a roller coaster, capable of inducing whiplash in 140 characters or less, and it may already have brought global manufacturing to the brink of a recession. Oil lost 30% in two months at the stroke of a pen; its immediate fate is in the hands of OPEC, but the caprice with which Iranian sanctions may or may not be re-imposed is likely to feed uncertainty. As we advised Mr. and Ms. X a few weeks ago, investors should stay nimble; there is no point to committing to a twelve-month strategy right now.1 The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Our equilibrium fed funds rate model estimates that the equilibrium fed funds rate, the rate that neither encourages nor discourages economic activity, is currently around 3%. It projects that the equilibrium rate will approach 3¼% by the middle of 2019, and 3⅜% by year end. The implication is that policy is comfortably accommodative now, and will not cross into restrictive territory for another 12 months – assuming that the Fed hikes four times next year, in line with our ambitious expectation. If the Fed steps back from its gradual pace, and only hikes three times in 2019 (as per the dots), or just once (as per the money market), the day when the economy and markets will have to confront tight monetary conditions will be pushed even further into the future. Stretching monetary accommodation until late next year would seem to forestall the arrival of the next recession until at least the first half of 2020. Tight policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession, as recessions have only occurred when the policy rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium over the six decades covered by our model. A longer stretch of accommodation would also continue to nourish the equity bull market and discourage allocations to Treasuries. Over the last 60 years, the S&P 500 has accrued all of its real returns when policy was easy (Table 1), while Treasuries have wilted, especially in the current phase of the fed funds rate cycle (Table 2). Table 1Equities Flourish When Policy’s Easy ... 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last?   Table 2... While Treasuries Stumble 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? The Business Cycle The state of policy is one of the three components in our simple recession indicator. Neither of the other two is sounding the alarm, either. Our preferred 3-month-to-10-year segment of the Treasury yield curve is still comfortably upward sloping, even if it has been steadily flattening and we expect it to invert late next year (Chart 3). Year-over-year growth in leading economic indicators decelerated slightly last month, but remains well above the zero line that has reliably preceded past recessions. Chart 3Flattening, But Not Yet Flat Flattening, But Not Yet Flat Flattening, But Not Yet Flat The Credit Cycle Anyone following the credit cycle would do well to start with the axiom that bad loans are made in good times. Its converse is just as true: good loans are made in bad times. Loan officers are every bit as susceptible to the recency bias as other human beings, and they tend to extrapolate from the freshest observations when assessing a borrower’s prospects. When things are good, lenders assume they will continue to be good, and let their guard down by lending to marginal borrowers and/or relaxing the terms on which they will lend. When things are bad, on the other hand, loans have to be underwritten so tightly that they squeak. The upshot is that lending standards and loan performance are tightly bound up with one another. In the near term, standards and performance are joined at the hip; over a five-year period, standards lead performance as a contrary indicator. Defaults almost certainly bottomed for the cycle in 2014, to judge by speculative-grade bonds (Chart 4, top panel), and loans (Chart 4, bottom panel). Standards reliably followed, and the proportion of lenders easing standards for corporate borrowers, as per the Fed’s senior loan officer survey, spiked (Chart 5). Chart 4Weakening, But Not Yet Weak Weakening, But Not Yet Weak Weakening, But Not Yet Weak   Chart 5Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... Standards Follow Performance In Real Time ... The 2012 and 2014 peaks in willingness suggest that performance is due to erode (Chart 6). We do not foresee a step-function move higher in defaults, or a sudden collapse in loan availability, but we do expect some fraying at the edges. Given how tight spreads remain, any weakness at the margin could go a long way to wiping out much, if not all, of spread product’s excess return. The bottom line is that the credit cycle is well advanced, and investors should expect borrower performance and lender willingness to weaken from their current levels. Chart 6... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term ... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term ... And Lead Them Over The Intermediate Term Bonds We have written at length on our bearish view on rates and Treasuries.2 The key pillar supporting our rationale is the gap between our terminal fed funds rate estimate, 3.5-4%, and the market’s view that the Fed will not go beyond 2.75%, if indeed it gets to that level at all (Chart 7). The gap is big enough to drive a truck through, and leaves a lot of room for yields to shift higher all along the curve, even if the Fed were to slow its 25-bps-a-quarter tempo, as the Wall Street Journal suggested it might in a report last Thursday. We continue to believe that inflation is the inevitable outcome once surging aggregate demand collides with limited spare capacity, and that the Fed will be forced to push the fed funds rate to 3.5% and beyond. Chart 7Something's Gotta Give Something's Gotta Give Something's Gotta Give Our view that the credit cycle has already passed its peak drives our view on spread product. Though we remain constructive on the economy and the outlook for corporate earnings, we are not enamored of the risk-reward offered by corporate bonds. Although high-yield spreads blew out by nearly 125 bps from early October to late November, high yield still does not look cheap (Chart 8, bottom panel). The same holds for investment-grade spreads, which remain near the bottom of their long-term range despite widening by over 50 bps (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8Spreads Are Still Tight Spreads Are Still Tight Spreads Are Still Tight Bottom Line: We recommend that investors underweight fixed income within balanced portfolios, while underweighting Treasuries and maintaining below-benchmark duration. We recommend benchmark holdings in spread product, but we expect to downgrade it to underweight before the end of the first half. Equities With monetary policy still accommodative, and the expansion still intact, the cyclical backdrop is equity-friendly. If we’re correct that policy won’t turn restrictive for another twelve months or so, the bull market should have about another year to go. We downgraded equities to equal weight as a firm in mid-June nonetheless, on signs of global deceleration and the potentially malign effects of tariffs and other impediments to global trade. U.S. Investment Strategy fully supported that decision, but we are alert to opportunities to upgrade equities to overweight within U.S. portfolios if prices decline enough to make the prospect of a new cycle high attractive on a risk-reward basis. The risk-reward requirement implies that the fall in price would have to occur without a material weakening of the fundamental backdrop. For now, we think the fundamental supports remain stable, as per the equity downgrade checklist we constructed to keep tabs on them. The checklist monitors recession indicators, none of which betray any concern now; factors that may weigh on corporate earnings; inflation measures, because higher inflation could motivate the Fed to hike more quickly than planned, with adverse consequences for the bull market; and signs of overexuberance (Table 3). Table 3Equity Downgrade Checklist 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? 2019 Key Views: Inflection At Last? The earnings-pressure section focuses on the key factors that might signal margin contraction – wage growth, dollar strength and rising bond yields – but none of them look especially problematic now. While we think compensation gains will eventually push the Fed to go beyond its own terminal rate estimates, they have not yet picked up enough to cause concern. The dollar has paused in its advance, mostly marking time since the end of October. Only BBB corporate yields have gotten closer to checking the box (Chart 9). BCA’s preferred margin proxies remain in good shape, on balance (Chart 10), and our EPS profit model is calling for robust profit growth across all of next year (Chart 11). Chart 9Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure Higher Rates Will Exert Some Margin Pressure   Chart 10In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ... In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ... In The Absence Of Margin Pressures, ...   Chart 11... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely ... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely ... 2019 Earnings Could Hold Up Nicely Oil’s plunge has pulled both headline CPI and longer-run inflation expectations lower. Although we think that the inflation respite is merely a head fake, and that oil will soon regain its footing (please see below), the run of harmless inflation data has the potential to soothe some market concerns about the Fed. If the Fed itself takes the data at face value, it may signal that the current 25-bps-a-quarter gradual pace could be slowed. As for exuberance, the de-rating the S&P 500 has endured since its forward multiple peaked at 18.5 in January suggests that it’s not a problem. We are not living through anything remotely resembling an equity mania. Bottom Line: BCA’s mid-June downgrade of global equities from overweight to equal-weight was timely. We remain equal-weight in balanced U.S. portfolios, but are more likely to upgrade U.S. equities than downgrade them, given the supportive cyclical backdrop. Oil We devoted our report two weeks ago to the oil outlook and its implications for the economy. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s bullish 2019 view has not changed: it still sees a market in a tight supply/demand balance with high potential for supply disruptions and a smaller-than-usual inventory reserve to make up the slack. The unexpected release of over a million barrels a day of Iranian output has played havoc with oil prices, but does not provoke the growth concerns that declining demand would. Provided OPEC is able to agree on production cuts, and abide by them going forward, our strategists see Brent and WTI averaging $82 and $76/barrel across 2019. The Dollar We remain bullish on the dollar, though it will find the going rougher than it did in 2018. Traders have built up sizable net long positions, so it will take more for the greenback to extend its advance than it did to begin it. Ultimately, we think desynchronization between the U.S. and the rest of the major DM economies will keep the dollar moving higher. If the U.S. does not continue to outgrow the currency-major economies by a healthy margin, and/or the Fed does not respond to that growth by hiking rates to prevent overheating, the dollar’s advance may be nearly played out. Putting It All Together Three major assumptions underpin our views: The U.S. economy is at risk of overheating in its second year of markedly above-trend growth fueled by fiscal stimulus, and the Fed will respond to that risk by decisively raising rates. There will be a noticeable global slowdown, but it will not go far enough to turn into a recession. The U.S. will remain mostly immune to the global slump. We will be positioned well if all of these assumptions are validated by events, though timing is always uncertain. Financial-market volatility often increases late in the cycle, and we expect the backdrop to remain fluid. We are trying to maintain a fluid mindset in kind, monitoring the incoming data to make sure our cyclical assessments still apply, while remaining alert to opportunities created by significant price swings. Although we are neither traders nor tacticians, we want to retain some flexibility, and are trying to resist mentally locking in our positioning for the entire year. We are particularly focused on the monetary policy backdrop and the transition from accommodative to restrictive policy, which has historically been critically important for asset allocation. Our main goal is to anticipate the approach of inflection points in the key cycles – business, credit and monetary – as adeptly as we can. We are also resolved to look through the noise of one-off price swings and the blather that has already been clogging the airwaves. We seek to help our clients formulate a strategy for navigating the turbulence without being swept up in it. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see the December 2018 Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence,” available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the July 30, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy, “The Rates Outlook,” the September 17, 2018; U.S. Investment Strategy, “What Would It Take To Change Our Bearish Rates View?” and the November 5, 2018; U.S. Investment Strategy, “Checking In On Our Rates View,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Deep-seated economic and political forces will undermine the trade truce between China and the United States. U.S. economic momentum is strong enough to allow the Fed to deliver more rate hikes next year than what the market is discounting. Global growth should stabilize by the middle of next year as China picks up the pace of stimulus and the dollar peaks. Until then, a cautious stance towards global equities and other risk assets is warranted. Global bond yields will fall further in the near term, but will rise by a faster-than-expected pace over a horizon of 6-to-18 months. Feature Trade War Roller Coaster Investors breathed a short-lived sigh of relief following the G20 summit in Buenos Aires this past weekend. During the course of a two-and-a-half hour dinner on the sidelines of the summit, President Donald Trump agreed to postpone raising tariffs from 10% to 25% on $200 billion of Chinese imports by two months to March 1st. For his part, President Xi Jinping pledged to engage in substantive talks to open up the Chinese economy to U.S. imports, while addressing U.S. concerns about forced technology transfers and IP theft. In one of the more ironic moments in history, China also agreed to restrict opioid exports to the West. Unfortunately, the euphoria did not last very long. By Tuesday, President Trump was back to his old self, calling himself “Tariff Man” and ominously warning that “We are going to have a REAL DEAL with China, or no deal at all – at which point we will be charging major Tariffs against Chinese product being shipped into the United States.” News reports indicated that the Chinese were “puzzled and irritated” by Trump’s change in tone. The mood brightened on Wednesday. Trump sounded more conciliatory, perhaps reflecting China’s decision to immediately resume importing soybeans and liquefied natural gas from the United States. By Wednesday night, however, global equities were in turmoil again due to revelations that a high-ranking Chinese tech executive had been arrested in Canada at the behest of the U.S. government on suspicion of violating sanctions against Iran. U.S. stocks recouped some of their losses Thursday afternoon, but the S&P 500 still finished down fractionally for the day. Political Stumbling Blocks To A Trade Deal At times like this, it is crucial to focus on the big picture, which is that major hurdles remain to consummating a trade deal that satisfies both sides. As our geopolitical strategists have argued, the trade war is just as much a tech war.1 China wants access to western technology, but the West, fearful of China’s ascent, is reluctant to provide it. The fact that China has had a history of appropriating western technology without due compensation only makes things worse. It is notable that U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a hawkish report ahead of the summit concluding that China has not substantively changed any of the trade practices that initiated U.S. tariffs.2 Domestic U.S. politics will also undermine prospects for a lasting trade war ceasefire. Protectionism against China remains popular in the U.S., especially in the Midwestern swing states. If Trump agrees on a permanent deal to end the trade war, who will he blame if the trade deficit continues to widen? This is not just idle speculation. Trump’s trade goals are inconsistent with his fiscal policy. Fiscal stimulus will boost aggregate demand, which will suck in more imports. An overheated economy will prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a wider trade deficit. This does not mean that Chinese stocks cannot rally for a few weeks. The MSCI China investable index is in oversold territory, trading at less than 11-times forward earnings, compared to 14-times at the start of the year (Chart 1). Given that China represents nearly one-third of EM stock market capitalization, any sentiment-driven rally that pushes up Chinese stocks is likely to give a solid lift to the aggregate EM equity index (Chart 2). However, for EM equities to put in a durable bottom, two things need to happen: Chinese growth needs to stabilize and the dollar needs to peak. We do not see either happening until the middle of next year. Chart 1Chinese Stocks Have Taken It On The Chin Chinese Stocks Have Taken It On The Chin Chinese Stocks Have Taken It On The Chin Chart 2China Is Large Enough To Give EM A Lift Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Waiting For A Bottom In Chinese Growth The slowdown in Chinese growth this year has been concentrated in domestic demand rather than in trade. Chinese exports to the U.S. have actually increased by 13% in the first ten months of the year compared to the same period last year. A lull in the trade war, a weaker yuan, and lower energy input costs are all beneficial to Chinese exporters. However, the collapse in the new export order component of the Chinese manufacturing PMI suggests that these positive developments will not be enough to prevent exports from decelerating sharply in the first half of 2019 (Chart 3). Chart 3China: An Ominous Sign For Exports China: An Ominous Sign For Exports China: An Ominous Sign For Exports If Chinese growth is to rebound, domestic demand will need to reaccelerate. While the Chinese government has loosened fiscal and monetary policy at the margin, this has not been sufficient to revive animal spirits. Growth continues to sag, as measured by a variety of activity measures (Chart 4). After a brief rebound, credit growth relapsed in October, pushing the year-over-year change to a multi-year low (Chart 5). Chart 4Still Waiting For Growth To Stabilize Still Waiting For Growth To Stabilize Still Waiting For Growth To Stabilize Chart 5The Chinese Credit Spigot Has Not Been Opened The Chinese Credit Spigot Has Not Been Opened The Chinese Credit Spigot Has Not Been Opened Looking out, there is a risk that undue optimism over the resolution of the trade war will prompt the government to redouble its efforts on its reform agenda. This agenda has been focused on reducing debt-financed investment spending – exactly the sort of expenditure commodity producers and capital goods exporters around the world rely on. Ultimately, China will be forced to pick up the pace of stimulus, as it becomes increasingly clear that the economy needs it. However, this is likely to be a story only for the second or third quarter of 2019, suggesting Chinese growth may continue to disappoint until then. No Help From The Fed The equity sell-off on Tuesday was exacerbated by comments by New York Fed President John Williams who noted that the Fed should continue raising rates “over the next year or so.”3 Williams is regarded as one of the thought-leaders at the Federal Reserve. He is also generally seen as a centrist on monetary policy. As such, his words often echo the views of the majority of FOMC members.  Williams said that the U.S. economy was “on a very strong path with a lot of momentum.” We tend to agree with this assessment. Despite weakness in a few areas such as housing, the economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. The Atlanta Fed’s GDP tracker is pointing to growth of 2.7% in the fourth quarter. Personal consumption is set to rise by 3.4%, one full percentage point above the average during the recovery. The manufacturing sector remains robust. The ISM manufacturing index rose to 59.3 in November from 57.7 the prior month. The all-important new orders component jumped 4.7 points to a three-month high of 62.1. The non-manufacturing ISM index also surprised on the upside. Strong wage growth, lower gasoline prices, and a declining savings rate will boost consumer spending next year. High levels of capacity utilization, easing lending standards, and rising labor costs will also support business investment. Residential investment should stabilize as well, given the recent decline in bond yields (Chart 6). We see the fed funds rate rising by 125 basis points through to end-2019. This stands in sharp contrast to current market pricing, which foresees only 40 basis points of hikes during this period (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Residential Investment Should Stabilize U.S. Residential Investment Should Stabilize U.S. Residential Investment Should Stabilize Chart 7The Market Is Ignoring The Fed Dots Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Don’t Fear A Flatter Yield Curve… Yet The flattening of the yield curve would seem like a major rebuke to our positive U.S. economic outlook. The 10-year/2-year Treasury spread has declined to 14 basis points. The 5-year/2-year spread has fallen into negative territory, marking the first notable inversion of any part of the Treasury curve.  How worried should we be? Some concern is clearly warranted. Policymakers have been too quick to downplay the signal from the yield curve in the past. In 2006, they blamed the “global savings glut” for dragging down long-term yields. In 2000, they argued that the U.S. federal government’s budget surplus was reducing the supply of long-term bonds. In both cases, the bond market turned out to be seeing something more ominous than they were. Nevertheless, one should keep two points in mind. First, part of the recent decline in long-term bond yields reflects a fall in inflation expectations stemming from lower oil prices (Chart 8). As we discussed last week, lower oil prices should give consumers more spending power without hurting energy capex to the degree that they did in 2015.4 Chart 8Oil Price Decline Is Dragging Down Inflation Expectations Oil Price Decline Is Dragging Down Inflation Expectations Oil Price Decline Is Dragging Down Inflation Expectations Second, the term premium – the extra compensation that investors demand for buying long-term bonds compared to rolling over short-term bills – is currently negative (Chart 9). This partly stems from the fact that investors see long-term Treasurys as a good hedge against recession risk (i.e., bond prices tend to go up when the economy weakens). Chart 9The U.S. Term Premium Is Negative Partly Because Bonds Are A Good Hedge Against A Weaker Economy The U.S. Term Premium Is Negative Partly Because Bonds Are A Good Hedge Against A Weaker Economy The U.S. Term Premium Is Negative Partly Because Bonds Are A Good Hedge Against A Weaker Economy Quantitative easing has also driven down the term premium. While this effect has diminished as the Fed’s balance sheet has shrunk, estimates by the New York Fed indicate that the 10-year yield is still 65 points lower than it would have been in the absence of asset purchases.5 If the term premium were 84 basis points – the average between 2004 and 2007 – the 10-year/3-month slope would be 195 basis points. Empirically, the 10-year/3-month slope is the best recession predictor of any yield curve measure. It still stands at 50 basis points. If long-term yields stay put and the Fed raises rates once per quarter, this part of the yield curve will not invert until the second half of next year. It usually takes about 12-to-18 months for an inversion in the 10-year/3-month slope to culminate in a recession (Chart 10). In the last downturn, the slope fell into negative territory in February 2006, 22 months before the start of the recession. This suggests that the next recession will not occur until late 2020 at the earliest. Chart 10The U.S. Yield Curve: An Admirable Track Record In Forecasting Recessions The U.S. Yield Curve: An Admirable Track Record In Forecasting Recessions The U.S. Yield Curve: An Admirable Track Record In Forecasting Recessions Investment Conclusions The signal for global equities from our tactical MacroQuant model has improved since early October, mainly because the sell-off has gone a long way towards discounting some of the negative macro developments that have occurred. Nevertheless, the model continues to signal downside risks for global stocks stretching into early 2019 (Chart 11). Chart 11The MacroQuant Equity Score Has Improved, But Is Still In Bearish Territory Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking The model utilizes a “what you see is what you get” approach, meaning that it only relies on observable data rather than estimates of unobservable variables like the neutral rate of interest. Right now, global growth is decelerating and financial conditions have tightened, which has caused the model to turn bearish on the near-term outlook for stocks. If we are correct that China will be forced to step up the pace of stimulus; that worries over Italian debt will fade, at least temporarily, with an agreement over next year’s budget; and that U.S. growth will remain buoyant even in the face of higher rates (implying that the neutral rate is higher than widely believed), then global growth should stabilize by the middle of next year. The dollar tends to weaken whenever global growth accelerates, which should provide a further reflationary impulse to the world economy (Chart 12). Chart 12Accelerating Global Growth Tends To Be Bearish For The Dollar Accelerating Global Growth Tends To Be Bearish For The Dollar Accelerating Global Growth Tends To Be Bearish For The Dollar Equity bull markets typically end about six months before the onset of a recession (Table 1). If the next global recession does not occur for at least another two years, this will provide enough time for a blow-off rally in stocks starting in mid-2019. Hence, investors should stay tactically cautious towards global equities over a 3-month horizon, but be prepared to turn cyclically opportunistic over a 6-to-18 month horizon. Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Sorry, But The Trade Truce Won’t Last And The Fed Will Keep Hiking Over the past few months, we have argued that bond yields will temporarily decline due to slower global growth amid widespread bearish bond sentiment. This has indeed happened. Yields are likely to remain under downward pressure into early 2019, but should then begin to stabilize and move higher, ultimately rising much more than expected as global inflation accelerates. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Truce: Narrative Vs. Structural Shift?” dated December 3, 2018; and “Trump’s Demands On China,” dated April 4, 2018. 2      Please see Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies, And Practices Related To Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, And Innovation,” dated November 20, 2018, available at www.ustr.gov. 3      Jonathan Spicer, “Fed's Williams says rate hikes 'over next year or so' still make sense,” Reuters, December 4, 2019. 4      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Shades Of 2015,” dated November 30, 2018. 5      Please see Brian Bonis, Ihrig, Jane, and Wei, Min, “The Effect of the Federal Reserve’s Securities Holdings on Longer-term Interest Rates,” FEDS Notes, Federal Reserve (April 20, 2017). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Downside risks to EM assets remain substantial. Stay put. EM stocks, credit and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts in the first half of 2019. The key and necessary condition for a new secular EM bull market to emerge is the end of abundant financing. The latter is imperative to compel corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization as well as structural reforms. The cyclical EM outlook hinges on China’s business cycle. The slowdown in China is broad-based and will deepen. The slowdown in China/EM will likely lead to global trade contraction. The latter is negative for global cyclicals yet bullish for the U.S. dollar. Feature As we head into 2019, the past decade is shaping up to be a lost one for emerging markets (EM) assets. In particular: EM stocks have underperformed DM markets substantially since the end of 2010 (Chart I-1). In absolute terms, EM share prices are at the same level as they were in early 2010. Chart I-1EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM For Eight Years EM currencies have depreciated substantially since 2011, and the EM local currency bond index (GBI-EM) on a total-return basis has produced zero return in U.S. dollar terms since 2010 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? A Lost Decade For Investors In EM Local Currency Bonds? Finally, EM sovereign and corporate high-yield bonds have not outperformed U.S. high-yield corporate bonds on an excess-return basis. Will 2019 witness a major reversal of such dismal EM performance? And if so, will it be a structural or cyclical bottom? The roots underneath this lost decade for EM stem neither from trade wars nor from Federal Reserve tightening. Therefore, a structural bottom in EM financial markets is contingent neither on the end of Fed tightening nor the resolution of current trade tussles. We address the issues of Fed tightening and trade wars below. A Lost Decade: Causes And Remedies What led to a lost decade for EM was cheap and plentiful financing. When the price of money is low and financing is abundant, companies and households typically rush to borrow and spend unwisely. Capital is misallocated and, consequently, productivity and real income growth disappoint – and debtors’ ability to service their debts worsens. This is exactly what has happened in EM, as easy money splashed all over developing economies since early 2009. There have been three major sources of financing for EM: Source 1: Chinese Banks Chinese banks have expanded their balance sheets by RMB 198 trillion to RMB 262 trillion (or the equivalent of $28.8 trillion) over the past 10 years (Chart I-3, top panel). When commercial banks expand their balance sheets by lending to or buying an asset from non-banks, they create deposits (money). Consistently, the broad money supply has expanded by RMB 175 trillion to RMB 234 trillion (or the equivalent of $25.5 trillion). Chart I-3Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Enormous Boom In Chinese Banks' Assets And Money Supply Notably, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has increased commercial banks’ excess reserves by RMB 1.5 trillion to RMB 2.8 trillion (or the equivalent of $0.22 trillion) (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Hence, the meaningful portion of money supply expansion has been due to the money multiplier – money created by mainland banks – not a provision of excess reserves by the PBoC (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Attribution Of Rise In Money Supply To Excess Reserves And Money Multiplier Not only has such enormous money creation by commercial banks generated purchasing power domestically, but it has also boosted Chinese companies’ and households’ purchases of foreign goods and services. The Middle Kingdom’s imports of goods and services have grown to $2.5 trillion compared with $3.2 trillion for the U.S. (Chart I-5). China’s spending has boosted growth considerably in many Asian, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and even select advanced economies. Chart I-5Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Imports Of Goods And Services: China And The U.S. Source 2: DM Central Banks’ QE By conducting quantitative easing, the central banks of several advanced economies have crowded out investors from fixed-income markets, incentivizing them to search for yield in EM. The Fed, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have in aggregate expanded their balance sheets by $10 trillion (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Quantitative Easing In DM Quantitative Easing In DM Quantitative Easing In DM This has led to massive inflows of foreign portfolio capital into EM, and reflated asset prices well beyond what was warranted by their fundamentals. Specifically, since January 2009, foreign investors have poured $1.5 trillion on a net basis into the largest 15 developing countries excluding China, Taiwan and Korea (Chart I-7, top panel). For China, net foreign portfolio inflows amounted to $560 billion since January 2009 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Chart I-7Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Cumulative Foreign Portfolio Inflows Into EM And China Source 3: EM Ex-China Banks EM ex-China began expanding their balance sheets aggressively in early 2009, originating new money (local currency) and thereby creating purchasing power. This was especially the case between 2009 and 2011. Since that time, money creation by EM ex-China banks has decelerated substantially due to periodic capital outflows triggering currency weakness and higher borrowing costs. Out of these three sources, China’s money/credit cycles remain the primary driver of EM. The mainland’s imports from developing economies serves as the main nexus between China and the rest of EM. Essentially, Chinese money and credit drive imports, influencing growth and corporate profits in the EM universe (Chart I-8). Chart I-8China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports China's Credit Cycle Leads Its Imports In turn, EM business cycle upturns attract international capital. Meanwhile, credit creation by local banks in EM ex-China – primarily in economies with high inflation or current account deficits – is a residual factor. In these countries, domestic credit creation is contingent on a healthy balance of payments and a stable exchange rate. The latter two, in turn, transpire when exports to China and international portfolio capital inflows are improving. The outcome of easy financing is over-borrowing and capital misallocation. The upshot of the latter is usually lower efficiency and productivity growth. Not surprisingly, productivity growth in both China and EM ex-China has decelerated considerably since 2009 (Chart I-9). EM return on assets has dropped a lot in the past 10 years and is now on par with levels last seen during the 2008 global recession (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Falling Productivity Growth In EM And China =... Chart I-10... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital ... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital ... = Low Profit Margins And Low Return On Capital Accordingly, the ability to service debt by EM companies has deteriorated considerably in the past decade – the ratios of cash flows from operations to both interest expenses and net debt have dropped (Chart I-11). Chart I-11EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt EM: Deteriorating Ability To Service Debt These observations offer unambiguous confirmation that money has been spent inefficiently – i.e., misallocated. Credit booms and capital misallocations warrant a period of corporate restructuring and banking sector recapitalization. Without this, a new cycle cannot emerge. A secular bull market in equities and exchange rates arises when productivity growth and hence income-per-capita growth accelerates, and return on capital begins to climb. This is not yet the case for most developing economies. The end of cheap and abundant financing is imperative to compel corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization as well as structural reforms. These are necessary conditions to create the foundation for a new secular bull market. Ironically, the best remedy for an addiction to easy money is a period of tight money. For example, U.S. share prices would not be as high as they currently are if the U.S. did not go through the Lehman crisis. This 10-year bull market in U.S. equities was born from the ashes of the Lehman crisis. Vanished financing and the private sector’s tight budgets in 2008-‘09 compelled corporate restructuring as well as a focus on efficiency and return on equity. Has EM financing become scarce and tight? Cyclically, China’s money creation and credit flows have slowed, pointing to a cyclical downturn in EM share prices and commodities (please see below for a more detailed discussion). International portfolio flows to EM have also subsided since early this year. There has been selective corporate restructuring post the 2015 commodities downturn, including in the global/EM mining and energy sectors, China steel and coal industries as well as among Russian and Brazilian companies. However, there are many economies and industries where corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization and structural reforms have not been undertaken. Yet from a structural perspective, China’s money and credit growth remain elevated and excesses have not been purged. Besides, international portfolio flows to EM have had periodic “stop-and-gos” but have not yet retrenched meaningfully (refer to Chart I-7 on page 4). Consequently, structural overhauls and corporate restructuring in China/EM have by and large not yet occurred – in turn negating the start of a new secular bull market. Bottom Line: Conditions for a structural bull market in EM/China are not yet present. EM/China: A Cyclical Bottom Is Not In Place From a cyclical perspective, China is an important driving force for the majority of EM economies, and its deepening growth slowdown will continue to weigh on EM growth and global trade. In fact, odds are that global trade will contract in the first half of 2019: In China, tightening of both monetary policy as well as bank and non-bank regulation from late 2016 has led to a deceleration in money and credit growth. The latter has, with a time, lag depressed growth since early this year. Policymakers have undertaken some stimulus since the middle of this year, but it has so far been limited. Stimulus also works with a time lag. Besides, even though the broad money impulse has improved, the credit and fiscal spending impulse remains in a downtrend (Chart I-12). Therefore, there are presently mixed signals from money and credit. Chart I-12China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities China's Stimulus Leads EM And Commodities As illustrated in Chart I-12, the bottoms in the money and combined credit and fiscal spending impulses, in July 2015, preceded the bottom in EM and commodities by six months and their peak led the top in financial markets by about 15 months in January 2018. Besides, in 2012-‘13, the rise in the money and credit impulses did not do much to help EM stocks or industrial commodities prices. Hence, even if the money as well as credit and fiscal impulses bottom today, it could take several more months before the selloff in EM financial markets and commodities prices abates. Additionally, the ongoing regulatory tightening of banks and non-bank financial institutions will hinder these institutions' willingness and ability to extend credit, despite lower interest rates. We discussed in a recent report that both the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism and the time lag between policy easing and a bottom in the business cycle are contingent on the money multiplier (creditors' willingness to lend, and borrowers' readiness to borrow) and the velocity of money (the marginal propensity to spend among households and companies). Growth in capital spending in general and construction in particular have ground to a halt (Chart I-13). Chart I-13China: Weak Capital Spending China: Weak Capital Spending China: Weak Capital Spending Not only has capital spending decelerated but household consumption has also slowed since early this year, as demonstrated in the top panel of Chart I-14. Chart I-14China: A Broad-Based Slowdown China: A Broad-Based Slowdown China: A Broad-Based Slowdown Finally, mainland imports are the main channel in terms of how China’s growth slowdown transmits to the rest of the world. Not surprisingly, EM share prices and industrial metals prices correlate extremely well with the import component of Chinese manufacturing PMI (Chart I-15). Chart I-15China's Imports And EM And Commodities China's Imports And EM And Commodities China's Imports And EM And Commodities Bottom Line: The slowdown in China is broad-based, and our proxies for marginal propensity to spend by households and companies both point to further weakness (Chart I-14, middle and bottom panels). Constraints And Chinese Policymakers’ Dilemma Given the ongoing slowdown in the economy, why are Chinese policymakers not rushing to the rescue with another round of massive stimulus? First, policymakers in China realize that the stimulus measures of 2009-‘10, 2012-‘13 and 2015-‘16 led to massive misallocations of capital and fostered both inefficiencies and speculative excesses in many parts of the economy – the property markets being among the main culprits. Indeed, policymakers recognize that easy money does not foster productivity growth, which is critical to the long-term prosperity of any nation. For China to grow and prosper in the long run, the economy’s addiction to easy financing should be curtailed. Second, policymakers are currently facing a dilemma. The real economy is saddled with enormous debt and is slowing. This warrants lower interest rates – probably justifying bringing down short-term rates close to zero. Yet, despite enforcing capital controls, it seems the exchange rate has been correlated with China’s interest rate differential with the U.S. since early 2010 (Chart I-16). Given the ongoing growth slowdown and declining return on capital in China, there are rising pressures for capital to exit the country. Notably, the PBoC’s foreign exchange reserves of $3 trillion are only equivalent to 10-14% of broad money supply (i.e., all deposits in the banking system) (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chinese Currency And Interest Rates Chart I-17China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits China: Foreign Currency Reserves Are Very Low Compared To Money Supply/Deposits The current interest rate differential is only 33 basis points. If the PBoC guides short-term rates lower and the Fed stays on hold or hikes a few more times, the spread will drop to zero or turn negative. Based on the past nine-year correlation, the narrowing interest rate spread suggests yuan depreciation. This will weigh on EM and probably even global risk assets. In a scenario where policymakers prioritize defending the yuan’s value, they may not be able to reduce borrowing costs and assist indebted companies and households. As a result, the downtrend in the real economy would likely worsen. Consequently, EM and global growth-sensitive assets will drop further. Given the constraints Chinese policymakers are facing, reducing interest rates and allowing the yuan to depreciate further is the least-bad outcome. Yet this will rattle Asian and EM currencies and risk assets. What About The Fed And Trade Wars? The Fed and EM: Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are relevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The primary driver of EM economies are their own domestic fundamentals as well as global trade – not just U.S. growth. Historically, the correlation between EM risk assets and the fed funds rate has been mixed, albeit more positive than negative (Chart I-18). On this chart, we have shaded the five periods over the past 38 years when EM stocks rallied despite a rising fed funds rate. Chart I-18The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective The Fed And EM Share Prices: A Historical Perspective There were only two episodes when EMs crashed amid rising U.S. interest rates: the 1982 Latin American debt crisis and the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis. Yet it is vital to emphasize that these crises occurred because of poor EM fundamentals – elevated foreign currency debt levels, negative terms-of-trade shocks, large current account deficits and pegged exchange rates. Dire EM fundamentals also prevailed before the Asian/EM crises of 1997-1998. However, these late-1990s crises occurred without much in the way of Fed tightening or rising U.S. bond yields. Trade Wars: China’s current growth slowdown has not originated from a decline in its exports. In fact, Chinese aggregate exports and those to the U.S. have been growing at a double-digit pace, largely due to the front running ahead of U.S. import tariffs. More importantly, China’s exports to the U.S. and EU account for 3.8% and 3.2% of its GDP, respectively (Chart I-19). Total exports amount to 20% of GDP, with almost two-thirds of that being shipments to developing economies. This compares with capital spending that makes up 42% of GDP and household consumption of 38% of GDP. Hence, capital expenditures and household spending are significantly larger than shipments to the U.S. Chart I-19Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy There is little doubt that the U.S.-China confrontation has affected consumer and business sentiment in China. Nevertheless, the slowdown in China has - until recently - stemmed from domestic demand, not exports. Investment Recommendations It is difficult to forecast whether the current EM down leg will end with a bang or a whimper. Whatever it is, the near-term path of least resistance for EM is to the downside. “A bang” scenario – where financial conditions tighten substantially and for an extended period – would likely compel corporate and bank restructuring as well as structural reforms. Therefore, it is more likely to mark a structural bottom in EM financial markets. “A whimper” scenario would probably entail only moderate tightening in financial conditions. Thereby, it would not foster meaningful corporate restructuring and structural reforms. Hence, such a scenario might not mark a secular bottom in EM stocks and currencies. In turn, the EM cyclical outlook hinges on China’s business cycle. If and when Chinese policymakers reflate aggressively, the mainland business cycle will revive, producing a cyclical rally in EM risk assets. At the moment, Chinese policymakers are behind the curve. With respect to investment strategy, we continue to recommend: Downside risks to EM assets remain substantial. Stay put. EM stocks, credit and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts in the first half of 2019. The slowdown in China/EM will likely lead to global trade contraction. The latter is negative for global cyclicals yet bullish for the U.S. dollar. For dedicated EM equity portfolios, our overweights are: Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our underweights are: South Africa, Peru, Indonesia, India, the Philippines and Hong Kong stocks. We are neutral on the remaining bourses. In the currency space, we continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR and KRW. The latter is a play on RMB depreciation. The full list of our recommendation across EM equity, fixed-income, currency and credit markets is available on pages 14-15. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations