Fixed Income

Highlights The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have successfully stabilized markets … : Credit spreads have tightened dramatically since March and liquidity has been restored to the US Treasury market. … at very little cost to the central bank: Just the announcement of Fed lending facilities has been enough to push spreads lower in most cases. The facilities themselves have seen very little actual uptake. The only cost borne by the Fed has been a dramatic expansion of its balance sheet due to purchases of Treasury securities. We still want to “buy what the Fed is buying”: In US fixed income, we want to favor those sectors that are eligible for Fed support. This includes corporate bonds rated Ba and higher, municipal bonds and Aaa-rated securitizations. Keep portfolio duration at neutral: The Fed will be much more cautious about raising interest rates than in the past, and could wait until inflation is above its target before lifting off zero. Feature Back in April, we published a detailed explainer of the extraordinary actions taken by the Federal Reserve to combat the pandemic-induced recession.1 This week, we re-visit that Special Report to assess what the Fed has accomplished during the past three months and to speculate about what lies ahead. Overall, the Fed’s response has been highly effective. Stability was restored to financial markets almost immediately after the most dramatic policy interventions were announced, and it turns out that the announcements themselves did most of the work. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s Section 13(3) emergency lending facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities (Table 1). If you are the Fed, it is apparently enough to marshal overwhelming force and announce your willingness to deploy it. Like the ECB demonstrated in the fraught Eurozone summer of 2012, a bazooka can restore order without being fired.2 Table 1Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed The only possible cost borne by the Fed has been an explosion in the size of its balance sheet, mostly attributable to purchases of Treasury securities. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities. This report looks at how the Fed’s actions have influenced (and will influence) interest rates, Treasury market liquidity, the corporate bond market and other fixed income spread products. It also considers the potential impact of the size of the Fed’s balance sheet on the economy and financial markets. Interest Rates The Fed dropped the funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% on March 15, and since then it has aggressively signaled that rates will stay pinned at the zero-lower-bound for a long time. Investors quickly took this message on board (Chart 1). The median estimate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants has the funds rate holding steady at least through the end of 2022. Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve isn’t pricing-in a rate hike until 2024. Chart 1The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 Chart 2Better Signaling From The Fed Better Signaling From The Fed Better Signaling From The Fed The market adjusted much more quickly to the Fed’s zero interest rate policy this year than it did during the last zero-lower-bound episode (Chart 2). The MOVE index of Treasury yield volatility has already plunged to below 50. It took several years for it to reach those levels after the Fed cut rates to zero at the end of 2008. Similarly, the yield curve is much flatter today than it was during the last zero-lower-bound episode. This partly reflects the market’s expectation that rates will stay at zero for longer and partly the downward revisions to estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate that have occurred during the past few years. The bottom line is that the Fed has successfully achieved its goal on interest rate policy. The funds rate is at its effective lower bound and the entire term structure is priced for it to stay there for a very long time. There are two main reasons for this success. First, the Fed’s forward guidance has been more dovish this year than at any point during the last zero-lower-bound episode, with many FOMC participants calling for the Fed to target a temporary overshoot of the 2% inflation target. Second, the market is more skeptical about inflation ever returning to that target, as evidenced by much lower long-dated inflation expectations (Chart 2, bottom panel). What’s Next? The Fed has already made it clear that it won’t pursue negative interest rates. With those off the table, the next step will be for the Fed to make its forward rate guidance more explicit. In all likelihood this will involve the return of some form of the Evans Rule that was in place between 2012 and 2014. The Evans Rule was a commitment to not lift rates at least until the unemployment rate moved below 6.5% or inflation moved above 2.5%.3 The new version of the Evans Rule will be much more dovish. In a recent speech, Governor Lael Brainard favorably cited research suggesting that the Fed should refrain from liftoff until inflation reaches the 2% target.4 That may very well be the rule that ends up becoming official Fed guidance. If the Fed wants to strengthen its commitment to low rates even more, it could follow the Reserve Bank of Australia’s lead and implement a Yield Curve Control policy. This policy would involve setting caps for Treasury yields out to a 2-year or 3-year maturity. The Fed would pledge to buy as many securities as necessary to enforce the caps and would only lift the caps when the criteria of its new Evans Rule are met. While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. For the time being, there is no rush for the Fed to deliver more explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control. As we noted above, bond yields are already pricing-in an extremely lengthy period of zero rates. But these policies will become more important as the economic recovery progresses and market participants start to speculate about an eventual exit from the zero bound. Explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control would then prevent a premature rise in bond yields and tightening of financial conditions. With all that in mind, we would not be surprised to see more explicit (Evans Rule-style) forward guidance rolled out at some point this year, but unless bonds sell off significantly beforehand, it probably won’t have an immediate impact on yields. The same is true for Yield Curve Control, though the odds of that being announced this year are lower as it is a tool with which the Fed is less comfortable. Treasury Market Liquidity Chart 3When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated As the COVID-19 crisis flared in March, there were several tense days when liquidity in the US Treasury market evaporated. Bond yields jumped even as the equity market plunged (Chart 3). Meanwhile, liquidity markers showed that it had become much more difficult to transact in US Treasuries. Treasury Bid/Ask spreads widened dramatically and the iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF (TLT) traded at a huge discount to its net asset value (Chart 3, panel 3). During the past four months, researchers have identified hedge fund selling of Treasuries to meet margin calls and foreign bank selling of Treasuries to meet demands for US dollar funding as the proximate causes of March’s Treasury rout. However, it is clearly a failure of market structure that the Treasury market was unable to accommodate that selling pressure without liquidity disappearing. In a recent paper from The Brookings Institution, Darrell Duffie explains why the Treasury market was unable to maintain its liquidity during this tumultuous period.5 Essentially, he argues that it is the combination of rising Treasury supply and post-2008 regulations imposed on dealer banks that has led to an environment where there is a large and growing amount of Treasury supply, but where dealers have less balance sheet capacity to intermediate trading. To illustrate, Chart 4 shows the ratio between the outstanding supply of Treasury securities and the quantity of Treasury inventories for which primary dealers obtained financing. Quite obviously, the dealers’ intermediation activities have not kept pace with the expanding size of the market. Chart 4Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance What’s Next? Without changes to Treasury market structure or bank capital requirements (Duffie recommends abandoning the system of competing dealer banks altogether and moving all Treasury trades through one central clearinghouse), we are likely to see more episodes like March where a spate of Treasury selling leads to an evaporation of market liquidity. When that happens, the Fed will be forced to step in and buy Treasuries, as it did in March (Chart 3, bottom panel). The goal of that intervention is simply to remove enough supply from the market so that the remaining trading volume can be handled by the dealers. As this pattern repeats itself over time, it will cause the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow. Bottom Line: Unless structural changes are made to the Treasury market or bank capital regulations are rolled back, we should expect more episodes of Treasury market illiquidity like we saw in March. We should also expect the Fed to respond to those episodes with aggressive Treasury purchases, and for the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow over time. Corporate Bonds The Fed’s intervention in the corporate bond market consists of three lending facilities: The Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) where the Fed purchases investment grade corporate bonds and recent Ba-rated fallen angels in the secondary market. This facility also purchases investment grade and high-yield ETFs. The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) where the Fed buys new issuance from investment grade-rated issuers (and recent fallen angels) in the primary market. The Main Street Lending Facility (MSLF) where the Fed purchases loans off of bank balance sheets. The loans must be made to small or medium-sized firms with Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0. Chart 5Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements As mentioned above, these facilities have barely been tapped. As of July 1, the Fed had purchased $1.5 billion of corporate bonds and just under $8 billion of ETFs through the SMCCF, while the PMCCF had not been used at all. However, the impact of the Fed’s promise to back-stop such a large portion of the corporate debt market has been immense. Corporate bond issuance surged following the announcement of the Fed’s facilities, and set monthly post-2008 records in March, April and May (Chart 5). The effect on corporate bond spreads has been just as dramatic. Spreads peaked on March 23, the day that the SMCCF and PMCCF were announced, and have tightened significantly since then. Further underscoring the importance of the SMCCF, PMCCF and MSLF announcements is that those segments of the corporate bond market most likely to have access to the Fed’s lending facilities have seen the most spread compression. Recall that investment grade issuers and recent fallen angels have access to the SMCCF and PMCCF, while the MSLF will benefit most issuers rated Ba or higher. Some B-rated issuers are able to tap the MSLF, but not the majority. Issuers rated Caa or below are much less likely to benefit from any of the Fed’s programs. Table 2 shows how the impact of the Fed’s facilities has played out across the different corporate credit tiers. It shows each credit tier’s option-adjusted spread and 12-month breakeven spread as of March 23 and today. It also shows the percentile rank of those spreads since 2010 (100% indicating the widest spread since 2010 and 0% indicating the tightest). While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. The B-rated and below credit tiers are particularly cheap, with 12-month breakeven spreads all above their 80th percentiles since 2010. Table 2The Fed's Impact On Corporate Spreads Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Chart 6Spread Curve Back To Normal Spread Curve Back To Normal Spread Curve Back To Normal The market impact of the Fed’s corporate lending facilities is also apparent across the corporate bond term structure. In March, the investment grade corporate bond spread slope inverted, as 1-5 year maturity corporate bond spreads widened relative to spreads of securities with more than 5 years to maturity (Chart 6).6 The Fed concentrated its lending facilities on securities with less than 5 years to maturity, and it has successfully re-steepened the corporate spread curve. But the Fed’s corporate lending facilities are not all powerful. As Chair Powell likes to say: “the Fed has lending powers, not spending powers”. So while the promise of Fed lending is a big help, it still means that troubled firms will have to increase their debt loads to survive the economic downturn. Those firms that take on debt may still see their credit ratings downgraded as their balance sheet health deteriorates. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened. Ratings downgrades have jumped during the past few months, as have defaults (Chart 7). There has also been a spike in the number of fallen angels – firms downgraded out of investment grade – but not as big a jump as was seen during the last recession (Chart 7, panel 2). The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have likely prevented some downgrades, but not all. Chart 7Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades What’s Next? The Fed’s lending facilities are responsible for a huge portion of the spread compression we’ve seen since late March. That said, it is a potential problem for corporate bonds that those facilities are scheduled to expire at the end of September. Our sense is that the expiry date will be extended, and that the facilities will only be wound down after a significant period of time where they see zero usage. At that point, the Fed should be able to halt the facilities without unduly impacting markets. In terms of investment implications, we think that the Fed’s back-stop will continue to be the most important driver of corporate bond spreads during the next few months. This means we would avoid chasing the attractive valuations in bonds rated B & below, and would continue to focus our corporate bond exposure on bonds rated Ba and above. We make an exception to our “buy what the Fed is buying” rule when it comes to positioning across the corporate bond term structure. Here, we are inclined to grab the extra spread offered by longer-maturity securities even though Fed secondary market purchases are concentrated at the front-end. Our rationale is that the Fed’s secondary market purchases are already low and will likely decline as time goes on. Meanwhile, if firms with long-maturity debt outstanding need help they can still access the PMCCF if needed.  Other Fed Lending Facilities & Fixed Income Sectors Outside of the three programs geared toward the corporate bond market, the Fed also rolled out emergency lending facilities meant to back-stop: money market mutual funds (MMLF), the commercial paper market (CPFF), the asset-backed securities market (TALF), the municipal bond market (MLF) and the federal government’s new Paycheck Protection Program (PPPLF). Once again, the announcement effect did most of the work for all of these facilities and the Fed managed to quickly restore stability to each targeted market without doing much actual lending. For starters, the MMLF successfully halted a flight out of prime money market funds with a relatively modest $53 billion in loans (Chart 8). The CPFF caused the commercial paper/T-bill spread to normalize with only $4 billion of lending, and the LIBOR/OIS spread also tightened soon after the Fed rolled out its facilities (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. In the asset-backed securities market, the Fed decided that only Aaa-rated securitizations are eligible for TALF. With that in mind, Aaa-rated consumer ABS and CMBS spreads have tightened considerably since TALF’s announcement (Chart 9). Non-Aaa consumer ABS spreads have tightened modestly despite the lack of Fed support. This is because fiscal stimulus has, so far, kept households flush with cash and prevented a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Non-Aaa CMBS, on the other hand, have struggled due to lack of Fed support and a sharp increase in commercial real estate delinquencies. Chart 8Stability Restored Stability Restored Stability Restored Chart 9Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably... Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably... Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably...   The announcement of the MLF also successfully led to compression in municipal bond spreads (Chart 10), though the Aaa muni curve still trades cheap relative to Treasuries. Like the other facilities, the MLF has seen very low take-up. In this instance, low MLF usage results from its expensive pricing. Municipal governments can access loans through the MLF for a period of up to three years at a cost of 3-year OIS plus a fixed spread that varies depending on the municipality’s credit rating. However, current market pricing is well below the MLF rate for all credit tiers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). This means that the MLF provides a nice back-stop in case muni spreads widen again, but it is not currently an effective means of getting cash to struggling state & local governments. Chart 10...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads ...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads ...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads Finally, the PPPLF is a facility that purchases loans made through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) off of bank balance sheets. Essentially, it is an insurance policy designed to make sure that banks have the necessary balance sheet capacity to deliver all of the PPP loans authorized by Congress. It has achieved this goal with relatively little usage. Banks have doled out more than $500 billon of PPP loans and the Fed has purchased only $68 billion. What’s Next? As with the corporate lending facilities discussed above, there is a risk surrounding the scheduled expiry of these other lending facilities at the end of September. Once again, we see the Fed being very cautious in this regard. All facilities will be extended until they have seen long periods of no usage. In the near-term, we think it’s possible that the Fed will make MLF loans cheaper. They will likely feel intense pressure to do so if Congress fails to pass sufficient stimulus to state & local governments in the next bailout package. In terms of investment strategy, we want to stick with what has worked so far. We are overweight Aaa consumer ABS and Aaa CMBS due to the TALF back-stop. We are also overweight municipal bonds, especially in the Aaa-rated space where yields are attractive versus Treasuries and the risk of default is low. We would also advise taking some extra risk in non-Aaa consumer ABS. These securities have no TALF back-stop, but we expect Congress to deliver enough government stimulus to keep the underlying borrowers solvent. The Size Of The Fed’s Balance Sheet As this report has made clear, the Fed’s emergency lending facilities have accomplished a lot during the past four months with the Fed taking very little actual risk onto its balance sheet. But while its usage of the emergency lending facilities has been low, the Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. To restore stability to the Treasury and MBS markets, the Fed avidly bought Treasuries and agency MBS from mid-March to mid-April, ballooning the size of its balance sheet by $2 trillion in just five weeks. Tacked onto the QE programs undertaken to battle the GFC, the Fed’s balance sheet expansion has been massive, and it is roughly six times larger as a share of GDP than it was in the three decades preceding the subprime crisis (Chart 11). Chart 11Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet chart 11 Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet Investors and citizens may ask what that balance sheet expansion has achieved so far, and what it’s likely to achieve going forward. Are there unintended consequences that haven’t yet made their presence felt? What constitutes a normalized Fed balance sheet, and when will the Fed be able to get back to it? The immediate consequence many investors attribute to the balance sheet expansion is higher stock prices (Chart 12). Fans of the balance sheet/equities link are undeterred by the decoupling after 2015, arguing that standing pat/tapering the balance sheet by 15% helped precipitate its vicious sell-off in the fourth quarter of 2018. It probably has not escaped their notice that the spectacular bounce from March’s lows has occurred alongside a 70% balance sheet expansion. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. We don’t think there is much to the observed relationship, however. Correlation is not causation and we have a hard time seeing how the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries, agencies and agency MBS flowed into the equity market. While the Fed’s pre-pandemic QE purchases turbo-charged the size of the monetary base, it only gently expanded the money supply, because the banks that sold securities to the Fed largely handed the proceeds right back to it as deposits (Chart 13). The net effect mainly filled the Fed’s vaults with the new money it had conjured up via its open-market operations. Chart 12Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Chart 13Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply   Banks were not the only counterparties to the Fed’s QE purchases, of course. Fixed income mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds must also have trimmed their holdings to accommodate the Fed. They were likely obligated by prospectus mandates or regulatory oversight to redeploy the proceeds into other bonds. Surely some unconstrained investors turned QE cash into new equity investments, but the larger QE effect on financial markets was likely to narrow credit spreads as dedicated fixed income investors redeployed their proceeds further out the risk curve. Tighter spreads helped reduce corporations’ cost of servicing newly issued debt, boosting corporate profits at the margin, but we think it’s a stretch to say QE drove the equity rally. What’s Next? Chart 14Wave Of Bank Deposits Wave Of Bank Deposits Wave Of Bank Deposits The picture is slightly different today, with the money supply popping amidst frenzied corporate borrowing. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. The largest banks were inundated with deposits in the second quarter (Chart 14), possibly driven by corporations stashing their issuance proceeds in cash just as banks previously stashed their QE proceeds in excess reserves. With households actively paying down their debt and businesses having already pre-funded two or three years of cash needs, the deposits may not be lent out, hemming in the money multiplier and limiting the self-reinforcing magic of fractional-reserve banking. Liquidity that is being hoarded is not available to drive up equity multiples, so we don’t expect the Fed’s new balance sheet expansion will directly boost stock prices any more than we think it did post-crisis. Indirectly, we think it does contribute to economic growth and risk asset appreciation because we view QE and other extraordinary easing measures as a signal that zero interest rate policy will remain in place for a long time. The importance of that signal, and the possibility that nineteen months of tapering at the start of Jay Powell’s term as Fed chair did promote volatility and increased equities’ vulnerability to a sharp downdraft, may well keep the Fed from attempting to normalize the balance sheet any time soon. An outsized Fed balance sheet may well be the new normal, and it may well breed unintended consequences, but we don’t think that kiting stock prices will be one of them. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Associate Editor JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com and usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The Outright Monetary Transactions facility at the heart of ECB President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge was never actually used. The ECB did eventually purchase government securities through a separate facility. But this didn’t occur until 2015, after sovereign bond yields had already fallen. 3 This explicit forward guidance was the brainchild of Chicago Fed President Charles Evans. It was official Fed forward guidance between December 2012 and March 2014. 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200714a.htm 5 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WP62_Duffie_v2.pdf 6 This inversion of the corporate spread curve is typical during default cycles. For more details on this dynamic please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “On The Term Structure Of Credit Spreads”, dated July 10, 2013, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

Highlights US Dollar: The overvalued US dollar is finally cracking under the weight of aggressive Fed policy reflation and non-US growth outperformance coming out of the COVID-19 recession. The US dollar weakness has more room to run, forcing investors to reconsider bond allocation and currency hedging decisions in multi-currency portfolios. Currency-Hedged Bond Yields: For USD-based investors, US Treasuries still offer enough yield such that currency-hedged non-US government bond yields remain less appealing in most countries. The notable exceptions are Germany, France, the UK, Sweden and Japan, where both unhedged and USD-hedged yields are below comparable US yields – stay underweight those sovereign markets versus the US in USD-hedged portfolios. Currency-Hedged Corporates: For corporate bonds, both US high-yield and investment grade offer more attractive yields, in both USD and euros, relative to euro area equivalents. Stay overweight US corporates versus the euro area in USD-hedged and EUR-hedged portfolios. Feature Chart of the WeekStart Hedging USD Exposure? Start Hedging USD Exposure Start Hedging USD Exposure The mighty US dollar (USD), which had remained impervious to plunging US interest rates and surging US COVID-19 cases, is finally breaking down. The DXY index of major developed economy currencies is down -3% so far in 2020, and nearly -10% from the peak seen in March during the worst of the COVID-19 global market rout. Other forms of currency, like precious metals and even Bitcoin, are also surging with the price of gold hitting a new all-time high yesterday. A new USD bear market would represent a major change to the global economic and investment landscape, affecting global economic growth, inflation, corporate profitability and capital flows. We will cover these topics in more detail in the coming weeks and months with the USD entering what appears to be a sustainable bearish trend. In this report, however, we tackle the most basic question for global fixed income investors in light of the new weakening trend for the USD – what to do with non-US bond holdings, and currency hedges, after nearly a decade of generating outperformance by hedging non-US currencies into USD (Chart of the Week). Say Farewell To The USD Bull Market Chart 2These Currencies Have Clearly Broken Out These Currencies Have Clearly Broken Out These Currencies Have Clearly Broken Out The latest breakdown of the USD has been broad-based across the developed market currencies, although some currencies have been faring much better. The biggest moves versus the USD have been for majors like the euro, Australian dollar and Swiss franc, all of which have clearly broken out above their 200-day moving averages (Chart 2). In fact, the 200-day moving averages for those currencies are now moving higher, indicating that the new medium-term trend for those pairs is appreciation versus the USD. Other important currencies like the British pound, Canadian dollar and Japanese yen have gained ground versus the USD, but at a much slower pace (Chart 3). This reflects some of the unique issues within those economies (ongoing Brexit uncertainty in the UK, the pause in the oil price rally in Canada and flailing growth in Japan). Yet even the Chinese yuan, heavily managed by Chinese policymakers, has seen some mild upward pressure versus the greenback (bottom panel). The USD is clearly a currency that wants to weaken further, with the decline broadening in terms of the number of currencies now rising versus the USD. There are numerous reasons why this is happening now and is likely to continue doing so in the months ahead: The USD is clearly a currency that wants to weaken further, with the decline broadening in terms of the number of currencies now rising versus the USD. The Fed’s aggressive rate cuts earlier this year – and even dating back to the 75bps of easing delivered in 2019 – have dramatically reduced the robust interest rate differentials that had previously boosted the USD and attracted global capital flows into the currency (Chart 4). This is true for both nominal and inflation-adjusted real yields. Chart 3These Currencies Are On The Cusp Of Breaking Out These Currencies Are On The Cusp Of Breaking Out These Currencies Are On The Cusp Of Breaking Out Chart 4Low US Rates + Better Non-US Growth = A Weaker USD Low US Rates + Better Non-US Growth = A Weaker USD Low US Rates + Better Non-US Growth = A Weaker USD Chart 5Does The USD Require A COVID-19 Risk Premium? Does The USD Require A COVID-19 Risk Premium? Does The USD Require A COVID-19 Risk Premium? Chart 6Relative QE Trends Are USD-Negative Relative QE Trends Are USD-Negative Relative QE Trends Are USD-Negative Chart 7The USD Is No Longer A High Carry Currency The USD Is No Longer A High Carry Currency The USD Is No Longer A High Carry Currency Economic growth has been rebounding from the COVID-19 shock faster outside the US. The latest round of manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) data for July published last week showed significant monthly increases in the euro area, the UK and even Japan, with only a modest pickup in the US. This boosted the spread between the US and non-US manufacturing PMI, which correlates strongly to the price momentum of the US dollar, to the highest level in nearly three years (bottom panel). The surge in new COVID-19 cases in the southern US states represents a dramatic divergence with the lower number of cases in Europe and other developed countries (Chart 5). While there are some renewed flare-ups of the virus in places like Spain and Japan, the numbers pale in comparison to the explosion of new US cases. With the most affected areas in the US already reestablishing restrictions on economic activity, the gap between US and non-US growth seen in the PMI data is likely to widen in a USD-bearish direction. The Fed has been more aggressive in the expansion of its balance sheet compared to other major central banks like the ECB and Bank of Japan. While not a perfect indicator, the ratio of the Fed’s balance sheet to that of other central banks did coincide with the broad directional moves in the USD during the Fed’s “QE-era” after the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 6). We may be entering another such period, but with a lower impact as many other central banks are also aggressively expanding their balance sheets through asset purchases. Summing it all up, it is clear that the US weakness has further to run over the next few months - and perhaps longer with the Fed promising the keep the funds rate near 0% until the end of 2022. This fundamentally alters bond investing, and currency hedging, considerations, as the carry earned by being long US dollars is now far less attractive than has been the case over the past few years (Chart 7). In the current environment of microscopic global government bond yields, currency fluctuations will dominate the relative return performance between individual countries. Bottom Line: The overvalued US dollar is finally cracking under the weight of aggressive Fed policy reflation and non-US growth outperformance coming out of the COVID-19 recession. The US dollar weakness has more room to run, forcing investors to reconsider bond allocation and currency hedging decisions in multi-currency portfolios. Where Are The Most Attractive Yields Now For USD-Based Investors? Chart 8Puny Bond Yields Across The Developed Markets Puny Bond Yields Across The Developed Markets Puny Bond Yields Across The Developed Markets In the current environment of microscopic global government bond yields, currency fluctuations will dominate the relative return performance between individual countries. That makes the decisions on bond allocation at the country level more challenging, as the relative yields on offer represent a tiny proportion of a bond’s overall return on a currency-unhedged basis. For example, a 30-year US Treasury currently yields 1.25%, while a 30-year German government bond yields -0.08% (Chart 8). While the decision to hold the US Treasury over the German bond should be obvious given that 133bp (annualized) yield differential, the -4.6% decline in EUR/USD seen so far in the month of July alone has already swamped the additional income earned by owning the US Treasury. This example shows why the decision to actively take, or hedge, the currency exposure of a foreign bond relative to a domestic equivalent so important for any global fixed income investor. For someone whose base currency is entering a depreciation trend, like the USD, the currency decision becomes critical – in fact, it is the ONLY decision that matters for the expected return on any unhedged bond allocation. A proper “apples for apples” comparison of the relative attractiveness of yields in different countries, however, needs to be done after adjusting for cost of currency hedging. On that basis, US fixed income assets still look relatively attractive, even in a USD bear market. In Tables 1-4, we present developed market government bond yields across different maturity points (2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year) for twelve countries. In each table, we show the current yield in local currency terms, while also showing the yield hedged into six different currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, CAD, AUD). We calculate the gain/cost of hedging using the ratio of current spot exchange rates and 3-month forward exchange rates. That is an all-in cost of hedging that includes both short-term interest rate differentials and the additional currency funding costs determined by cross-currency basis swaps. Table 1Currency-Hedged 2-Year Government Bond Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 2Currency-Hedged 5-Year Government Bond Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 3Currency-Hedged 10-Year Government Bond Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 4Currency-Hedged 30-Year Government Bond Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Using the example of the 30-year US and German bonds described earlier, that 30-year German yield of -0.08%, hedged into USD, has an all-in yield of +0.74%. This is still well below the 30-year US Treasury yield of 1.25%. Thus, that 30-year EUR-denominated German bond is unattractive compared to the USD-denominated US Treasury, after converting the German bond to a USD-equivalent security through hedging. That relationship holds even if we were to hedge the Treasury into euros. As can be seen in Table 4, the 30-year US Treasury has a EUR-hedged yield of +0.48%, 56bps above the EUR-denominated 30-year German bond yield. Therefore, while owning the US Treasury seems like the riskier bet on an unhedged basis now with the EUR/USD appreciating rapidly, the US bond is the superior yielding bet once currency risk is hedged away. Right now, Italy, Spain and Australia offer the highest yields both in unhedged and USD-hedged terms for most maturities. For those that prefer charts over numbers, much of the data in Tables 1-4 is shown as static snapshots of government bond yields curves in Chart 9 (for local currency, or unhedged, yield curves), while Chart 10 shows all yields hedged into USD. The charts show that there appear to be far more interesting relative value opportunities across countries at varying yield maturities now, but those gaps become smaller after hedging non-US bonds into USD. Chart 9Currency-Unhedged Global Government Bond Yield Curves What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Chart 10USD-Hedged Global Government Bond Yield Curves What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Right now, Italy, Spain and Australia offer the highest yields both in unhedged and USD-hedged terms for most maturities, making those bonds interesting to USD-based investors that choose to either take or hedge the EUR and AUD exposure of those bonds. In Tables 5-8, we take the yield data from the previous tables and show the hedged yields as spreads to the “base yield” of each currency, which is the government bond yield for that country. For example, in Table 3, we can see that for all countries shown, the 10-year yield hedged into GBP terms produces a yield that is above that of the 10-year UK Gilt. This is true even or negative yielding German bunds and Japanese government bonds. Thus, looking purely from a yield perspective, currency-hedged non-UK government bonds look very attractive to a UK bond investor with GBP as the base currency. Table 5Currency-Hedged 2-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 6Currency-Hedged 5-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 7Currency-Hedged 10-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Table 8Currency-Hedged 30-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Chart 11Global Spread Product Yields Are Low Global Spread Product Yields Are Low Global Spread Product Yields Are Low We can try the same analysis above for global spread products like corporate debt. Currency returns still matter for the returns on these assets, but less so given the higher outright yields offered compared to government bonds. Yields are relatively low across investment grade credit, junk bonds, mortgage-backed securities and emerging market debt after the massive rallies seen since March, but remain much higher than the sub-1% levels seen in most of the developed market government bond universe (Chart 11). In Table 9, we show the index yield (using Bloomberg Barclays indices) in both unhedged and currency-hedged terms for the main global credit sectors we include in our model bond portfolio universe. The index yields do not change that much after currency hedging costs are included, but there are some notable differences between corporate bonds of similar credit quality in the US and euro area. Table 9Currency-Hedged Spread Product Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Specifically, for both investment grade and high-yield corporate credit, the yield in the US is higher than that seen in the euro area. This is true for both USD-hedged and EUR-hedged terms, thus making US corporates more attractive simply from a yield perspective without factoring in credit quality. Currency-hedged non-UK government bonds look very attractive to a UK bond investor with GBP as the base currency. Looking within the high-yield universe by credit tiers, US yields are higher than euro area equivalents for Ba-rated bonds, while euro area yields are slightly higher for B-rated debt (Chart 12). Yields on lower-quality Caa-rated debt are similar, both for US yields hedged into euros and vice versa. Chart 12No Major Differences In US & Euro Area Junk Yields What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Within investment grade, there is no contest with US yields higher than euro area equivalents across all credit tiers (Chart 13). Chart 13US IG Yields Are More Attractive Than Euro Area IG (in USD & EUR) What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Summing it all up, the new trend towards USD weakness has not altered much of the relative attractiveness of US fixed income assets on a currency-hedged basis for USD-based investors. This is true even after the sharp fall in US bond yields since March. Bottom Line: In Germany, France, the UK, Sweden and Japan, both unhedged and USD-hedged government bond yields are below comparable US Treasury yields – underweight those sovereign markets versus the US in USD-hedged portfolios. For corporate bonds, both US high-yield and investment grade offer more attractive yields, in both USD and euros, relative to euro area equivalents. Stay overweight US corporates versus the euro area in USD-hedged and EUR-hedged portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Equities and other risk assets face near-term headwinds from the surge in Covid cases in the US Sun Belt and the looming fiscal cliff. We think these problems will be resolved, but the next few weeks could be rough sledding for markets. Government bond yields have moved sideways-to-down since late March even though inflation expectations have rebounded. The resulting decline in real yields has been an important, if rather overlooked, driver of higher equity prices. The failure of government bond yields to rise in line with higher inflation expectations can be attributed to the ongoing dovish shift in monetary policy. Nominal yields are likely to increase modestly over the next two years as growth recovers. However, inflation expectations should rise even more. Hence, real yields may fall further, justifying an overweight position in TIPS and a generally positive medium-term view on equities. As long as there is spare capacity in the economy, fiscal stimulus will not push up real yields. This is because bigger budget deficits tend to raise overall savings, thus creating the resources with which to finance the deficits. Once economies return to full employment in about three years, the fiscal free lunch will end. At that point, the combination of easy monetary and fiscal policies could cause inflation to accelerate. Central banks will welcome higher inflation initially. However, they will eventually be forced to hike rates aggressively if inflation continues to march upwards. When this happens, bond yields will rise sharply, while stocks will tumble. A Curious Divergence Government bond yields have moved sideways-to-down in most developed economies since stocks bottomed in late March (Chart 1). In contrast, inflation expectations have risen. As a result, real yields have declined. In the US, TIPS yields have fallen into negative territory across all maturities (Chart 2). Chart 1Nominal Yields Have Moved Sideways-To-Down, Inflation Expectations Have Risen, And Real Yields Have Declined Nominal Yields Have Moved Sideways-To-Down, Inflation Expectations Have Risen, And Real Yields Have Declined Nominal Yields Have Moved Sideways-To-Down, Inflation Expectations Have Risen, And Real Yields Have Declined Chart 2TIPS Yields Have Fallen Into Negative Territory Across The Board TIPS Yields Have Fallen Into Negative Territory Across The Board TIPS Yields Have Fallen Into Negative Territory Across The Board The decline in real yields has been one of the unsung drivers of higher equity prices this year. The forward P/E ratios of the major US indices have moved closely in line with real yields (Chart 3). Gold prices have also risen, as they are often wont to do when real yields go down (Chart 4). Chart 3Lower Real Yields Have Lifted Stock Multiple Lower Real Yields Have Lifted Stock Multiple Lower Real Yields Have Lifted Stock Multiple Chart 4Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields It is fairly uncommon for inflation expectations to rise without a commensurate increase in nominal bond yields (Chart 5). As a rule of thumb, when the economic data surprise to the upside, as has occurred over the past few months, bond yields go up (Chart 6). Chart 5It Is Unusual For Inflation Expectations To Rise Without A Corresponding Increase In Nominal Bond Yields It Is Unusual For Inflation Expectations To Rise Without A Corresponding Increase In Nominal Bond Yields It Is Unusual For Inflation Expectations To Rise Without A Corresponding Increase In Nominal Bond Yields Chart 6Bond Yields Usually Rise When Economic Data Surprise To The Upside Bond Yields Usually Rise When Economic Data Surprise To The Upside Bond Yields Usually Rise When Economic Data Surprise To The Upside An important exception to this rule occurs when monetary policy is becoming more expansionary. Bond yields tend to follow the path of expected policy rates (Chart 7). When central banks guide rate expectations lower, bond yields can fall, even as the reflationary impulse from lower yields delivers an upward kick to inflation projections. Chart 7ABond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates Bond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates Bond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates Chart 7BBond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates Bond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates Bond Yields Tend To Follow The Path Of Expected Policy Rates The last time such a divergence between yields and inflation expectations occurred was in early 2019. The stock market crash in late 2018 forced the Fed to abandon its plans to hike rates. Jay Powell’s dovish pivot occurred just three months after he said that rates were “a long way” from neutral. The Fed would go on to cut rates by 75 bps over the course of 2019. Real Yields Could Fall Further Chart 8Inflation Expectations Are Still Quite Depressed In Most Countries Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? The key question for investors is how much longer the pattern of rising inflation expectations and stable bond yields can persist. Our sense is that nominal bond yields will rise modestly over the next few years as growth recovers. However, inflation expectations are likely to rise even more, justifying an overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal bonds. Inflation expectations are still quite depressed in most countries (Chart 8). If global growth rebounds, both actual and expected inflation should edge higher. Chart 9 shows that the US ISM manufacturing index leads core inflation by about 12-to-18 months. Higher oil prices should also lift inflation expectations (Chart 10). Will global growth recover? The answer is “yes” if we are talking about a horizon of 12 months or so. That said, as we discuss below, there are some near-term risks to growth. This implies that equities and other risk assets could trade nervously over the next few weeks.   Chart 9Global Growth Recovery Will Lead To Higher Inflation Down The Line Global Growth Recovery Will Lead To Higher Inflation Down The Line Global Growth Recovery Will Lead To Higher Inflation Down The Line Chart 10Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Move In Lockstep Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Move In Lockstep Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Move In Lockstep   Near-Term Risks To Global Growth The two biggest threats to global growth over the coming months are the Covid outbreaks in a number of countries and the possibility that fiscal stimulus will be rolled back, especially in the US, where a “fiscal cliff” is looming. Despite progress in suppressing the virus in Europe, Japan, and most of East Asia, the number of reported daily infections continues to rise globally (Chart 11). In the developed world, the US remains a major hotspot. Although the number of cases appears to have peaked in Arizona, it is still rising in the other Sun Belt states (Chart 12). Among emerging markets, the epicenter has moved from Brazil and Russia to India (Chart 13). Chart 11Despite Progress In Europe, Japan, And Most Of East Asia, The Number Of Covid Infections Continues To Rise Globally Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Chart 12A Second Wave Is A Key Macro Risk Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Chart 13BRICs: Covid Leaving No Stone Unturned Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? While efforts to contain the virus will boost growth in the long run, they will weigh on economic activity in the near term. Over half of the US population lives in states that have either reversed or suspended reopening plans (Chart 14). Chart 14Not So Fast Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Google data on visits to shopping malls, recreation centers, public transport facilities, and office destinations have dipped in recent weeks. The decline in visits has occurred alongside a decrease in the New York Fed’s high-frequency economic activity indicator (Chart 15). Initial unemployment claims also rose this week. At this point, it looks likely that the recovery in US consumer spending will stall in July and August. Chart 15Covid Outbreak Is Weighing On Spending Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? While it is difficult to know what will happen starting in September, our guess is that the pandemic will ebb in the southern states, just like it did in the northeast. This is partly because mask-wearing is becoming more widespread. Back in early March, when most mainstream news sources were tweeting out misinformation such as “Oh, and face masks? You can pass on them,” we noted that both logic and evidence suggest that masks are an effective tool against the virus. Increased testing should also help identify asymptomatic people before they have had the chance to spread the virus to many others. Meanwhile, improved medical care should also help reduce the mortality and morbidity rates from the disease. Just this week, scientists presented the results of a double-blind clinical trial showing that the inhalation of interferon beta, a cytokine used to treat multiple sclerosis, reduced the risk of developing severe Covid symptoms by nearly 80%. Fiscal Cliff Ahead? In addition to the pandemic, investors have to grapple with uncertainty over whether fiscal policy will remain sufficiently accommodative to reflate the economy. Unlike the EU, which managed to cobble together a framework for creating a 750 billion euro pandemic relief fund earlier this week, the US Congress remains deadlocked on the size and complexion of a new stimulus bill. Under current law, US households will stop receiving expanded unemployment benefits at the end of July. These benefits were legislated as part of the original CARES Act and currently total over 4% of GDP. The Paycheck Protection Program for small businesses is also nearly drained, while state and local governments are facing a major cash crunch due to evaporating tax revenues and higher pandemic-related spending needs. We estimate that about $2-to-$2.5 trillion in new stimulus will be necessary to keep fiscal policy from turning unduly restrictive. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has been floating a number of $1.3 trillion. If McConnell gets his way, risk assets will likely sell off. Our guess is that he will not prevail, however. President Trump favors a larger stimulus bill, as do the Democrats. Critically, more than four out of five voters, both nationwide and in swing states, support extending benefits (Table 1). Thus, there is a high probability that Senate Republicans will agree on a much larger package than what they are currently proposing. Table 1There Is Much Public Support For Fiscal Stimulus Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Fiscal Stimulus And Bond Yields Could continued fiscal stimulus deplete national savings, leading to significantly higher real yields? For the next few years, the answer is no. National savings depend not just on how much people spend, but on how much they earn. To the extent that fiscal stimulus raises GDP, it also raises national income. For the global economy as a whole, savings must equal investment. If fiscal stimulus in the major economies prompts firms to undertake more investment spending than they would have otherwise, overall savings will rise. How can that be? The answer is that fiscal stimulus raises private savings by more than it reduces government savings when an economy is operating below its full capacity. From the perspective of the bond market, this means that currently, large budget deficits are self-financing. Bigger budget deficits will produce an even bigger pool of private income, allowing the private sector to buy more government bonds.   Indeed, a premature pullback in fiscal support would almost certainly raise real rates by depressing inflation expectations. If that sounds far-fetched, recall that this is precisely what happened in March. Full Employment And Beyond Chart 16Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic The fiscal free lunch will end only when economies return to full employment. At that point, bigger budget deficits will no longer be able to raise output since everyone who wants to work will already have found a job. Rather, increased government borrowing will crowd out private-sector investment. National savings will decline. If monetary and fiscal policy stay accommodative, inflation could accelerate. Central banks will probably welcome the initial burst of inflation, since they have been lamenting below-target inflation for many years now. However, if inflation continues to march higher, central banks may get spooked and start talking up the prospect of rate hikes. Higher rates would create a lot of problems for debt-saddled governments (Chart 16). It would not be at all surprising if politicians leaned on central banks to keep rates low. Governments could also end up forcing central banks to buy more debt in order to keep long-term yields from rising. In the extreme case, governments could even force central banks to cap yields. While such measures would prevent bond prices from tumbling, this would be cold comfort for bondholders. If central banks were to keep bond yields below their equilibrium level, inflation would rise even further, thus eroding the purchasing power of the bonds. In the end, central banks would still have to raise rates, probably more than they would have had they acted more swiftly to quell inflation. Investment Conclusions To answer the question posed in the title of this report, yes, bond yields will eventually go up. However, they are not likely to rise very much until inflation reaches intolerably high levels. That point is at least three years away. Despite the near-term risks posed by the pandemic and the looming fiscal cliff, investors should remain overweight equities over a 12-month horizon. Given the run-up in some of the large cap US tech names, we suggest shifting equity exposure to other parts of the stock market. The cyclically-adjusted price-earnings ratio is significantly lower outside the US, implying that international stocks are well placed to outperform their US peers over the coming decade (Chart 17). A weaker dollar should also help non-US stocks as well as the more cyclical equity sectors (Chart 18). Chart 17Non-US Stocks: The Place To Be Over The Coming Decade Non-US Stocks: The Place To Be Over The Coming Decade Non-US Stocks: The Place To Be Over The Coming Decade Chart 18A Weaker Dollar Should Boost Non-US Stocks Along With The More Cyclical Equity Sectors A Weaker Dollar Should Boost Non-US Stocks Along With The More Cyclical Equity Sectors A Weaker Dollar Should Boost Non-US Stocks Along With The More Cyclical Equity Sectors Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Current MacroQuant Model Scores Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up? Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up?

Highlights For financials and energy to produce a sustained rally, there must be no relapse in global growth during the autumn and winter of 2020/21. However, with the coronavirus still in play and the usual flu and virus season yet to come, a key hurdle to overcome will be the physical reopening of schools and childcare facilities this September. Hence, for the time being, remain overweight healthcare and technology versus financials and energy. This implies underweight European stocks versus US stocks, and overweight Germany, France, Netherlands and Switzerland within Europe. Play good news in Europe by remaining long EUR, CHF, and SEK versus USD, and long US T-bonds and Spanish Bonos versus German Bunds and French OATs. Fractal trade: Short silver. Feature Chart Of The WeekDenmark's OMX Is At An All-Time High, While The FTSE 100 Is Languishing. Why? Denmark's OMX Is At An All-Time High, While The FTSE 100 Is Languishing. Why? Denmark's OMX Is At An All-Time High, While The FTSE 100 Is Languishing. Why? Once upon a time, the stock market existed as a barometer of the economy. Or at least, a good representation of the size and composition of profits in the host economy. But that time is long gone. Today, a tiny handful of companies are driving the performance of supposedly broad indexes such as the FTSE 100 and the S&P 500. Indeed, we should more accurately call the FTSE 100 the FTSE ‘10’ ignoring the other 90. And we should call the S&P 500 the S&P ‘5’ ignoring the other 495. Meaning that stock markets are no longer stock ‘markets’. Yet many analysts still try and explain the stock market’s performance through traditional top-down macro drivers such as GDP growth, profit margins across the host economy, and so on. The trouble is that when the stock market is dominated by a tiny handful of companies, this 20th century approach is doomed to fail. Today, we must take a more granular approach based on the type of companies that are dominating each stock market. Sector Concentration Is Driving Stock Markets The handful of companies that dominate each stock market tend to be the leaders in their global sector. This means that each stock market is defined by a sector concentration, which has often evolved by chance, based on where companies chose to start up and list. This sector concentration usually has little or no connection with the host economy. For example, Denmark’s OMX index is dominated by Novo Nordisk, a global biotech company. The FTSE 100 is heavily weighted to the oil majors Royal Dutch and BP as well as global bank HSBC, which have only a limited exposure to the UK economy. On the other side of the Atlantic, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook are massively over-represented in the S&P 500 compared with their contribution to the US economy. A crucial defining feature of a stock market turns out to be its exposure to healthcare and technology – whose profits are in major structural uptrends – versus the exposure to financials and energy – whose profits are in major structural downtrends (Charts 2 - 5). Chart I-2Healthcare Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Healthcare Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Healthcare Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Chart I-3Technology Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Technology Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Technology Profits Are In A Structural Uptrend Chart I-4Financial Profits Are In A Structural Downtrend Financial Profits Are In A Structural Downtrend Financial Profits Are In A Structural Downtrend Chart I-5Energy Profits Are In A Structural Downtrend CHART 5 CHART 5 The stock market capitalisation in healthcare and technology stands at 52 percent for Denmark and 40 percent for the US, compared with just 20 percent for Europe and 12 percent for the UK. The flip side is that the stock market capitalisation in financials and energy stands at just 8 percent for Denmark and 11 percent for the US, compared with 21 percent for Europe and 30 percent for the UK. This explains, for example, why Denmark’s OMX is hitting all-time highs while the FTSE 100 is languishing (Chart of the Week). That said, the price of the growing stream of healthcare and technology profits can still fall if it is at an unjustifiably high level. And the price of the shrinking stream of financial and energy profits can still rise if it is at an unjustifiably low level. Hence, the key question is: what determines the prices of these two groups of sectors, one whose profits are in a major uptrend, the other whose profits are in a major downtrend? Healthcare And Tech Performance Hinges On The Bond Yield The price of a rapidly growing profit stream is weighted to the values of the large distant cashflows, making it highly sensitive to the discount rate applied to those distant cashflows. Whereas the price of a rapidly shrinking profit stream is weighted to the values of the large immediate cashflows, making it much more sensitive to the near-term evolution of the economy (Box I-1). Box I-1Bond Yield Sensitivity Versus Economic Sensitivity The End Of The Stock 'Market' The End Of The Stock 'Market' The upshot is that for stocks and sectors whose profits are in a major uptrend, the key driver of the price is the direction of the bond yield. Whereas for stocks and sectors whose profits are in a major downtrend, the key driver is the near-term direction of the world economy (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6Exposure To Healthcare And Technology Determines Bond Yield Sensitivity Exposure To Healthcare And Technology Determines Bond Yield Sensitivity Exposure To Healthcare And Technology Determines Bond Yield Sensitivity Chart I-7Exposure To Financials And Energy Determines Economic Sensitivity Exposure To Financials And Energy Determines Economic Sensitivity Exposure To Financials And Energy Determines Economic Sensitivity Pulling all of this together, the rally in healthcare and technology stocks is extremely vulnerable to a sustained rise in the bond yield. But a sustained rise in the bond yield seems highly unlikely without a breakthrough vaccine or treatment for COVID-19. While the coronavirus is still in play, the long-term hollowing out and scarring in the jobs market will only become apparent in the coming months once furlough schemes and temporary relief programs end. This will force all central banks to remain ultra-dovish and where possible, become more dovish. Meanwhile, for financials and energy to produce a sustained rally, there must be no relapse in global growth during the autumn and winter of 2020/21. However, with the coronavirus still in play and the usual flu and virus season yet to come, a key hurdle to overcome will be the physical reopening of schools and childcare facilities this September. Hence, for the time being, remain overweight healthcare and technology versus financials and energy. This translates to underweight Europe versus the US. And overweight Germany, France, Netherlands and Switzerland within Europe. How To Play Good News In Europe Things have been going right in Europe. First, unlike in the US, the COVID-19 outbreak is subsiding, at least for now. New infections have been steadily declining through the warm summer months (Chart I-8). Chart I-8New Infections Declining In Europe, Rising In The US New Infections Declining In Europe, Rising In The US New Infections Declining In Europe, Rising In The US Second, the ECB has injected ample liquidity into the banking system which, combined with ultra-low interest rates, has permitted a strong expansion in bank lending. Though somewhat disappointingly, the bank lending surveys tell us that the loans are being used for emergency working capital requirements rather than investment. Third, the EU has approved a €750 billion Recovery Fund, over half of which will take the form of grants to the sectors and regions most stricken by the coronavirus crisis. Given that the fund will be financed by jointly issued EU bonds, this amounts to a fiscal transfer to the areas that need the most help. Hence, even if the amount of the stimulus may be smaller than in other parts of the word, it comprises a huge symbolic step towards greater unity in the EU and euro area. Still, despite this trifecta of good news, European stock markets have not outperformed (Chart I-9). This just emphasises that stock market relative performance has little connection with domestic economics and politics. To reiterate, stock market relative performance is almost always the result of the sector concentration of a handful of dominant stocks. Chart I-9Despite Good News In Europe, European Equities Are Not Outperforming Despite Good News In Europe, European Equities Are Not Outperforming Despite Good News In Europe, European Equities Are Not Outperforming Begging the question: how to play the continuation of good news in Europe? The answer is through the currency and fixed income markets, which have a much stronger connection with domestic economics and politics (Chart I-10 and Chart I-11). Chart I-10Play Good News In Europe Via European Currencies... Play Good News In Europe Via European Currencies... Play Good News In Europe Via European Currencies... Chart I-11...And Sovereign Yield Spread Tightening ...And Sovereign Yield Spread Tightening ...And Sovereign Yield Spread Tightening Remain long a basket of EUR, CHF, and SEK versus the USD. Our favourite cross out of these three is long CHF/USD given the haven character of the CHF in periods of market stress. To play bond yield convergence between the US and Europe and between core and periphery Europe, remain long US 30-year T-bonds and Spanish 30-year Bonos versus German 30-year bunds and French 30-year OATs.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System* The spectacular rally in silver is fractally fragile, and at a point which has signalled several trend reversals through the past five years. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short silver, with the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 12.5 percent. In other trades, long GBP/RUB achieved its profit target. Against this, short Germany versus UK and long bitcoin cash versus ethereum reached their stop-losses. Long nickel versus copper reached the end of its holding period in partial loss. The rolling 12-month win ratio now stands at 59 percent. Silver Silver When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields     Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations      

Last Friday, my colleague Dhaval Joshi and I held a webcast discussing investment strategies. The topics of discussion included global equity valuations, mega-cap stocks leadership and the outlook for EM stocks, fixed-income and currencies. You can listen to the webcast recording by clicking here.   An Opportunity In Pakistani Equities And Bonds Pakistani stock prices in US dollar terms are currently 20% lower than their January high and 56% lower than their 2017 high (Chart I-1, top panel). Meanwhile, the government projected a contraction in real GDP during the fiscal year 2019-20 (ending on June 30), the first in 68 years. We believe stock prices have already priced in plenty of negatives, and that Pakistani equities are likely to move higher over the next six months. Strengthening the balance of payments (BoP) position and continuing policy rate cuts will increase investors’ confidence and benefit its stock market (Chart I-2). We also expect the Pakistani bourse to outperform the EM equity benchmark (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1Pakistani Equities: More Upside Ahead Pakistani Equities: More Upside Ahead Pakistani Equities: More Upside Ahead Chart I-2Monetary Easing Will Help Pakistani Equities Monetary Easing Will Help Pakistani Equities Monetary Easing Will Help Pakistani Equities   Chart I-3The Current Account Deficit Is Set To Shrink Further The Current Account Deficit Is Set To Shrink Further The Current Account Deficit Is Set To Shrink Further Balance Of Payments Position Pakistan’s BoP position is set to improve. First, its trade deficit will shrink further, as Pakistan’s export will likely improve more than its imports (Chart I-3). The country’s total exports declined 6.8% year-on-year in June, which is a considerable improvement as compared to the massive 54% and 33% contractions that occurred in April and May, respectively. The country was on a strict lockdown for the whole month of April, which was then lifted in early May. As the number of daily new cases and deaths are falling, the country is likely to remain open, lowering the odds of a domestic supply disruption. In addition, as DM growth recovers, the demand for Pakistani products will improve as well. Europe and the US together account for about 54% of Pakistan’s exports. The government is keen to boost the performance of the domestic textile sector, which accounts for nearly 60% of the country’s total exports. The government will likely approve the industry’s request for supportive measures, including access to competitively priced energy, a lower sales tax rate, quick refunds, and a reduction of the turnover tax rate. Moreover, the government has prepared an incentive package for the global promotion of the country’s information technology (IT) sector, aiming to increase IT service exports from the current level of US$1 billion to US$10 billion by 2023. Currently, over 6,000 Pakistan-based IT companies are providing IT products and services to entities in over 100 countries worldwide. Regarding Pakistan’s imports, low oil prices will help reduce the country’s import bill year-on-year over the next six months. Second, remittance inflows – currently at 9% of GDP – have become an extremely important source of financing for Pakistan’s trade deficit. Even though about half of the remittances sent to Pakistan are from oil-producing regions like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman and Qatar, low oil prices may only have a limited impact on Pakistan’s remittance inflows. For example, when Brent oil prices fell to US$40 in early 2016, remittances sent to Pakistan in the second half of that year declined by only 1.9% on year-on-year terms. Over the first six months of this year, the remittances received by Pakistan still had a year-on-year growth of 8.7%.   At the same time, the government has planned various measures to boost remittances. For example, a “national remittance loyalty program” will be launched on September 1, 2020, in which various incentives would be given to remitters. Strengthening the balance of payments (BoP) position and continuing policy rate cuts will increase investors’ confidence and benefit its stock market. Third, Pakistan will receive considerable financial inflows this year, probably amounting to over US$12 billion1 from multilateral and bilateral sources. This will be more than enough to finance its current account deficit, which was at US$11 billion over the past 12 months. In April, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the disbursement of about US$1.4 billion to Pakistan under the Rapid Financing Instrument designed to address the economic impact of the Covid-19 shock. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have also pledged around US$ 2.5 billion in assistance. The IMF and the Pakistani government are in talks about the completion of the second review for the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. If completed in the coming months, the IMF will likely disburse about US$1 billion to Pakistan in the second half of this year.  In April, G20 countries also awarded Pakistan a suspension of debt service payments, valued at US$ 1.8 billion, which will be used to pay for Pakistan’s welfare programs. In early July, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) received a US$1 billion loan disbursement from China. This came after Beijing awarded Pakistan a US$300 million loan last month. The authorities plan to raise US$1.5 billion through the issuance of Eurobonds over the next 12 months. Other than the funds borrowed by the Pakistani government, net foreign direct inflows, mainly driven by phase II of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), are set to continue to increase over the remainder of this year, having already grown 40% year-on-year during the first six months of this year. About 63% of that increase came from China. Meanwhile, as we expect macro dynamics to improve in the next six months, net portfolio investment is also likely to increase after having been record low this year (Chart I-4). In addition, as the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China is likely to persist over many years, both Chinese and global manufacturers may move their factories from China to Pakistan.2 Bottom Line: Pakistan’s BoP position will be ameliorating in the months to come. Lower Inflation And Monetary Easing Continuous monetary easing is very likely and will depend on the extent of the decline in domestic inflation. Both headline and core inflation rates seem to have peaked in January (Chart I-5). Significant local currency depreciation last year had spurred inflation in Pakistan. Then, early this year, supply disruptions and hoarding behaviors attributed to the pandemic have contributed to elevated inflation. Chart I-4Net Portfolio Investment Inflows Are Likely To Increase Net Portfolio Investment Inflows Are Likely To Increase Net Portfolio Investment Inflows Are Likely To Increase Chart I-5Both Headline And Core Inflation Rates Will Likely Fall Further Both Headline And Core Inflation Rates Will Likely Fall Further Both Headline And Core Inflation Rates Will Likely Fall Further   A closer look at the inflation subcomponents shows that recreation and culture, communication, and education have already fallen well below 5% in the last month. Transport inflation came in negative at 4.4% in June.  The inflation of non-perishable food items was still stubbornly high at 14.9% last month. Increasing the food supply and reducing hoarding will help ease that. This, along with a stable exchange rate and a negative output gap will cause a meaningful drop in inflation. As inflation drops, interest rates will be reduced to facilitate an economic recovery. While the current 7% policy rate is lower than headline inflation, and on par with core inflation, Pakistani interest rates remain much higher than those in many other emerging countries. Investment Recommendations We recommend buying Pakistani equities in absolute terms and continuing to overweight this bourse within the emerging markets space. The stock market will benefit from a business cycle recovery following the worst recession in history, worse than during the 2008 Great Recession (Chart I-6). Fertilizer and cement producers, which together account for nearly 30% of the overall stock market, will benefit from falling energy prices, a significant cut in interest rates and supportive government measures. The government recently approved subsidies to encourage fertilizer output. In the meantime, the country’s construction stimulus package and its easing of lockdown orders will help lift demand for cement over the second half of 2020.  As a result, both fertilizer and cement output are set to increase (Chart I-7). Besides, a cheapened currency will limit fertilizer imports and help cement producers export their output, which will benefit their revenue. Chart I-6Manufacturing Activity In Pakistan Will Soon Rebound Manufacturing Activity In Pakistan Will Soon Rebound Manufacturing Activity In Pakistan Will Soon Rebound Chart I-7Both Fertilizer And Cement Output Are Set To Increase Both Fertilizer And Cement Output Are Set To Increase Both Fertilizer And Cement Output Are Set To Increase   Banks account for about 22% of the overall stock market. Our stress test on the Pakistani banking sector shows it is modestly undervalued at present (Table I-1). Even assuming the worst-case scenario for non-performing loans (NPL), where the NPL ratio would rise to 17.5% from the current 6.6%, the resulting adjusted price-to-book ratio will be only 1.6. Table I-1Stress Test On Pakistani Banking Sector Pakistani, Chilean & Czech Markets Pakistani, Chilean & Czech Markets Both in absolute terms, and relative to EM valuations, Pakistani stocks appear attractive (Charts I-8 and I-9). Finally, foreign investors have bailed out of Pakistani stocks and local currency bonds since 2018, as illustrated in Chart I-4 on page 4. Ameliorating economic conditions will lure foreign investors back. Chart I-8Pakistani Equities: Valuation Measures Are Attractive In Both Absolute Terms… Pakistani Equities: Valuation Measures Are Attractive In Both Absolute Terms... Pakistani Equities: Valuation Measures Are Attractive In Both Absolute Terms... Chart I-9…And Relative To The EM Benchmark ...And Relative To The EM Benchmark ...And Relative To The EM Benchmark   For fixed-income investors, we recommend continuing to hold the long Pakistani local currency 5-year government bonds position, which has produced a 12% return since our recommendation on December 5th 2019. We expect interest rates to drop another 100 basis points (Chart I-5, bottom panel, on page 5).  Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Chile: Not Out Of The Woods Copper prices have staged an impressive rally in the past four months, but the performance of Chilean markets remains lackluster (Chart II-1). While the red metal has broken above its January highs, Chile’s equities and currency are still trading 25% and 5% below their January peak, respectively.    The government’s mismanagement of the pandemic has reignited and heightened the existing socio-political discontent, thus increasing the fragility of the situation. We therefore recommend that investors maintain a cautious stance on Chilean assets. As for dedicated EM portfolios, we recommend moving this bourse from neutral to underweight: First, the lockdowns resulting from the pandemic have revealed the precarious financial condition of low and middle-class households. The lack of savings among these groups prevented workers from self-isolating for more than a couple of weeks. The urge for them to return to work enabled the outbreak to escalate in May. Consequently, these social groups have suffered from infections, and Chile has rapidly become one of the worst affected countries in the world in terms of per-capita COVID-19 cases and deaths. Chart II-2 shows that, as a share of total population, Chile tops the region in terms of cummulative cases and deaths. Moreover, Chile has the eighth highest COVID-19 infections per capita in the world, even though its testing rate per capita is lower than that of Europe and the US. Chart II-1Chilean Markets Have Been Much Weaker Than Copper Chilean Markets Have Been Much Weaker Than Copper Chilean Markets Have Been Much Weaker Than Copper Chart II-2The Pandemic Has Hit Chile Hard The Pandemic Has Hit Chile Hard The Pandemic Has Hit Chile Hard   Chart II-3The Economy Is In The Doldrums The Economy Is In The Doldrums The Economy Is In The Doldrums Given the wide spread of the virus, Chile has implemented harsher quarantine measures than the rest of the region, which means that the economic reopening and recovery will start from a lower level of activity. The inability of President Pinera’s administration to protect low and middle-class households from being exposed to the virus has renewed a nation-wide distrust in the government. According to Cadem, one of the country’s most cited polling companies, President Pinera’s approval rating has fallen back to just 17%, not far from the lows seen during last year’s violent social unrest. In sum, these recent events have confirmed our major theme for Chile, discussed in our December Special Report. It reads as follows: Chile’s political elite has been greatly underestimating the depth and gravity of the popular frustration and has been reluctant to address the issue in a meaningful way. Consequently, Chile is set to experience a renewal in protests and a rise in political volatility as the date of the referendum on the Constitution, which is scheduled to take place in October, nears. Second, Chile is experiencing its worst recession in modern history. Chart II-3shows that the economy was already in a slump at the beginning of the year, and the economic lockdown has caused double-digit contractions in many sectors. Further, business confidence never fully recovered from last year’s social protests and has been plummeting deeper since the start of the pandemic (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Chart II-4Banks' NPLs Are Set To Rise Banks' NPLs Are Set To Rise Banks' NPLs Are Set To Rise While President Pinera’s decision to prioritize small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) has been popular among the middle class, the reality is that Chile remains a highly oligopolistic market, dominated by large companies. The failure to support these businesses will prevent a revival in business sentiment, hiring and investment and, hence, prolong the economic downtrend. This unprecedent economic contraction has caused a rapid surge in non-performing loans (NPLs), which will hurt banks’ capital profits and tighten lending standards. NPLs will rise much further given the record depth of this recession (Chart II-4). Moreover, bank stocks compose 25% of the MSCI Chile index, so a hit to banking profitability will exert downward pressure on the equity index. Third, even though fiscal and monetary stimuli have been large and were implemented rapidly, they are probably insufficient to produce a quick recovery. The government first announced a fiscal plan between March 19 and April 8 worth US$ 17 billion (or 6% of GDP), the third largest in the region. However, it is still quite small compared to that of OECD members. Excluding liquidity provisions for SMEs and tax reductions, the size of new government spending in 2020 is only 3.5% of GDP. On June 14, the government devised another fiscal plan, worth US$ 12 billon (or 5% of GDP). However, it will be spread out over the next 24 months – only 1.5% of GDP of additional stimulus will be injected over the next 12 months. This extra kick in spending seems too small given the depth of the recession.  In terms of monetary policy, the Chilean central bank has already reached the limits of its orthodox toolkit. The monetary authorities have cut the policy rate by 125 basis points since November of last year, but they have reached the constitutional technical minimum of 0.5%. The central bank is now using alternative tools to stimulate the economy, such as offering cheap lending to SMEs and a US$ 8 billion quantitative easing program for buying financial institutions’ bonds, as the Constitution forbids the purchasing of government and non-financial corporate debt. In a nutshell, the overall efficiency of these monetary policies will be subdued as the main drags on the economy are downbeat business and consumer confidence stemming from ongoing socio-political tensions, not high interest rates. Chile is shrouded in a cloud of political uncertainty. Monetary policy has reached its limits, and fiscal stimulus is insufficient for now. Fourth, higher copper prices will help on the margin, but will not bail out the Chilean economy.  Even with the latest rally in copper prices, Chilean copper exports will continue contracting in US$ terms. The latest increase in prices will be more than offset by output cuts caused by social distancing rules and reduced staff in mines all over the country.  Bottom Line: Chile is shrouded in a cloud of political uncertainty. Monetary policy has reached its limits, and fiscal stimulus is insufficient for now. Investment recommendations Chart II-5Our CLP vs. USD Trade Our CLP vs. USD Trade Our CLP vs. USD Trade Continue shorting the CLP relative to a basket of the CHF, EUR and JPY. We closed our short CLP/USD on July 9th with a 29% profit (Chart II-5) and began shorting it versus an equal-weighted basket of the CHF, EUR and JPY. Within an EM equity portfolio, downgrade Chilean stocks from neutral to underweight. An ailing economy and political uncertainty will divert capital from the country despite attractive equity valuations. For an EM local bond portfolio, we are also downgrading Chile from neutral to underweight, as the risk of renewed currency depreciation is too large to ignore and downside in yields is limited due to the zero bound. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com The Czech Republic: Pay Rates And Go Long The Currency An opportunity to bet on higher longer-term interest rates and on a stronger currency has emerged in the Czech Republic (Chart III-1). Consumer price inflation is above the central bank’s 2% target and will continue to rise, which will necessitate higher interest rates (Chart III-2). The latter will lead to currency appreciation. Chart III-1Pay Rates And Go Long CZK vs. USD Pay Rates And Go Long CZK vs. USD Pay Rates And Go Long CZK vs. USD Chart III-2Inflation Is Above The CB Bands Inflation Is Above The CB Bands Inflation Is Above The CB Bands   The Czech authorities’ strong fiscal and monetary support of the economy amid the COVID recession will keep both labor demand and, thereby, wages supported. In turn, core inflation will likely prove resilient in the near term and will rise over the coming 12-18 months, putting upward pressure on long-term interest rates. First, Prime Minister Andrej Babis is determined to promote a rapid economic recovery, as there are upcoming elections scheduled for next year. In early July, the government approved another spending program that will in part finance infrastructure projects and promote job creation in the non-manufacturing sector. The bill is expected to boost infrastructure spending by 140 billion koruna (or 2.5% of GDP) in 2020, and is part of a multi-decade national investment plan to increase domestic productivity. In particular, the construction sector will benefit from a massive uplift in domestic capex that will go towards upgrading the transport network. This will produce a job boom in the construction industry which should mitigate the employment losses in manufacturing and tourism. Second, shortages continue to persist in the labor market. Our labor shortage proxy is at an all-time high, suggesting that labor shortages will continue to facilitate faster wage growth (Chart III-3). Interestingly, Chart III-4 suggests that overall job vacancies have plateaued but have not dropped. This signifies pent-up demand for labor. Critically, this hiring challenge is likely to make industrial firms reluctant to shed workers amid the transitory pandemic-induced manufacturing downturn. Chart III-3Labor Shortages = Wages Higher Labor Shortages = Wages Higher Labor Shortages = Wages Higher Chart III-4Job Vacancies Are Holding Up JOB VACANCIES ARE HOLDING UP... JOB VACANCIES ARE HOLDING UP...   Either way, competition for labor in manufacturing and other sectors will keep a firm bid on both wages and unit labor costs in the medium to long term (Chart III-5). Third, low real interest rates will promote domestic credit growth (Chart III-6), helping support final domestic demand which, in turn, will lift inflation. Chart III-5Structural Pressure On Labor Costs ...STRUCTURAL PRESSURE ON LABOR COSTS ...STRUCTURAL PRESSURE ON LABOR COSTS Chart III-6Low Rates Will Bolster Domestic Demand Low Rates Will Bolster Domestic Demand Low Rates Will Bolster Domestic Demand   Similarly, residential real estate prices and rents will continue to grow at a hefty pace due to low borrowing costs and residential property shortages. Core inflation will likely prove resilient in the near term and will rise over the coming 12-18 months, putting upward pressure on long-term interest rates. Finally, core inflation measures are hovering well above the 2% target and the upper band of 3% (Chart III-2 on page 13). As such, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is likely to hike interest rates sooner rather than later. Critically, inflation is acute across various parts of the economy. Specifically, service price inflation is likely to continue rising in the wake of announced price hikes in public services, such as transport. These are being devised by local authorities to counteract a loss in tax revenue. Altogether, easy fiscal policy (infrastructure spending) will support labor demand, wage growth and final domestic demand, in turn heightening inflationary pressures. Unlike its counterparts in the EU, the CNB is more sensitive to price increases due to the relatively higher starting point of inflation in the Czech economy. As such, the central bank will be the first to hike interest rates among its EU counterparts, tolerating the currency appreciation that will come with it. The basis is Czech domestic demand and income growth will be robust. Investment Recommendation Czech swap rates are currently pricing a rise of only 55 bps in interest rates over the next 10 years. As a result, we recommend investors pay 10-year swap rates (see the top panel of Chart III-1 on page 13). We also recommend going long the Czech koruna versus the US dollar. Unlike the Czech central bank, the US Federal Reserve will keep interest rates very low for too long. In short, the Fed will fall well behind the curve, while the CNB will hike earlier. Rising Czech rates versus US rates favor the koruna against the dollar. This is a structural position that will be held for the next couple of years. It is also consistent with the change in our view on the USD, which has gone from positive to negative in our report from July 9. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Regarding Pakistan’s net financial inflows this year, we estimated that net foreign investment inflows, net foreign portfolio inflows and net other financial inflows to be about US$ 1.5 billion, US$ 0.5 billion, and US$ 10.5 billion, respectively, based on past data and the six-month outlook of the country’s economy. 2 Please see the following articles: Chinese Companies to Relocate Factories to Pakistan Under CPEC Project Importers Survey Shows Production Leaving China for Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Monetary Policy: Central bankers worldwide are promising to keeping policy rates near 0% for at least the next two years, even if inflation begins to rise again. This is an obvious form of forward guidance designed to keep borrowing costs as low as possible until the COVID-19 pandemic ends. It may also be the start of a true shift in policymaker strategy, tolerating a rise in inflation just as many of the secular forces that have dampened global inflation are fading. Bond Strategy: The recent divergence of inflation expectations and real bond yields can persist if central banks commit to their dovish forward guidance. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt, particularly in the US, Canada and Italy. Feature “We’re not thinking about raising rates. We’re not even thinking about thinking about raising rates.” – Fed Chairman Jerome Powell Central bankers have emptied their bags of tricks in recent months, providing extreme monetary policy accommodation to fight the deflationary impacts of the COVID-19 recession. 0% policy interest rates, large-scale asset purchases and liquidity support programs have all been implemented in some form by the major developed market central banks. Even more extreme options like yield curve control have been contemplated in the US and implemented in Australia. Perhaps the most important tool used by policymakers, however, is the most simple of all – dovish forward guidance on future interest rate moves. The Fed, European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Japan (BoJ) and others are now committing to keep rates at current levels for at least the next two years. Additional “state-based” guidance, tying future rate hikes only to a sustainable return of inflation back to policymaker targets, is the likely next step, with the Bank of Canada already making that connection at last week’s policy meeting. Given how difficult it has been for central banks to reach those targets, policy rates can now potentially stay lower for much longer. Interest rate markets have already discounted such an outcome, with overnight index swap (OIS) curves pricing in no change in policy rates in the US, Europe, UK, Japan, Canada or Australia until at least mid-2022 and only very mild increases afterward (Chart of the Week). It remains to be seen if policymakers will actually follow through on their promises to sit on their hands and do nothing for that long, even as global growth and inflation continue what will likely be an extended and choppy recovery from the deep COVID-19 recession. Chart of the WeekAggressive Forward Guidance Is Working Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? However, if central bankers are truly serious about keeping interest rates low even if inflation picks up, in an attempt to “catch up” from previous undershoots of inflation targets, that has major implications for global bond investors – in particular, raising the value of maintaining core holdings of inflation-linked bonds in fixed-income portfolios. The First Step To Higher Inflation: Stop Talking About Rate Hikes Central bankers are increasingly using the same arguments, and even the same language, to justify their current hyper-accommodative policy stance. Here are some examples, taken from speeches and policy meetings that took place last week: ECB President Christine Lagarde: “We expect interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within our projection horizon and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics.” Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard: “Looking ahead, it likely will be appropriate to shift the focus of monetary policy from stabilization to accommodation by supporting a full recovery in employment and a sustained return of inflation to its 2 percent objective […] policy should not preemptively withdraw support based on a historically steeper Phillips curve that is not currently in evidence.” Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem: "As the economy moves from reopening to recuperation, it will continue to require extraordinary monetary policy support. The Governing Council will hold the policy interest rate at the effective lower bound until economic slack is absorbed so that the 2 percent inflation target is sustainably achieved.” Chart 2Global Growth Expectations Have Rebounded Global Growth Expectations Have Rebounded Global Growth Expectations Have Rebounded We could have switched the names on those three quotes and the message would be the same. Policy rates will stay at current levels until inflation has sustainably returned to the 2% target. Raising rates on the back of a forecast of higher inflation, driven by an expectation of lower unemployment, will not be enough this time for policymakers that have been repeatedly burned by their belief in the Phillips Curve. Bond investors have taken note of the central bankers’ message and now expect both stable policy rates and higher inflation expectations. The latest data from the ZEW survey of economic and financial market sentiment, that was published last week and covers the period to mid-July, shows this shift in expectations. On the economy, the current conditions indices for the euro area, US, UK and Japan have stopped falling, while the expectations data have all soared to the highest levels seen since 2015 (Chart 2). The ZEW also poses questions on expectations for interest rates and inflation, and there the answers are more interesting for bond investors. The net balances on expectations for long-term interest rates have bottomed out for the US, euro area and UK, as have expectations for inflation over the next twelve months (Chart 3). At the same time, expectations for short-term interest rates have lagged the moves seen in the other two series, with the net balances hovering around zero for all four countries. One possible interpretation of this data is that a greater number of the financial professionals who take part in the ZEW survey are starting to “get the hint” about central bankers’ dovish messages, expecting higher inflation and bond yields but with no change in short-term policy rates. Bond investors have taken note of the central bankers’ message and now expect both stable policy rates and higher inflation expectations. We see similar pricing in inflation-linked bond markets. While nominal bond yields have stayed stable, the mix between inflation expectations and real bond yields has shifted. Breakevens on 10-year bonds have been slowly climbing across the major developed markets since the end of March, while real yields have fallen roughly the same amount as breakevens have widened (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Inflation Expectations Are Drifting Higher Global Inflation Expectations Are Drifting Higher Global Inflation Expectations Are Drifting Higher Chart 4Inflation Breakevens & Real Yields: Mirror Images Inflation Breakevens & Real Yields: Mirror Images Inflation Breakevens & Real Yields: Mirror Images This is a relatively unusual development in the global inflation-linked bond universe. More often, breakevens and real yields move in the same direction. Inflation expectations tend to rise when economic growth is improving, which also puts upward pressure on real bond yields – often in tandem with markets pricing in higher policy rates at the short end of yield curves. That is not the case today. The latest fall in real bond yields may simply be markets pricing in slower potential economic growth, and lower equilibrium real interest rates, in a world where the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to leave lasting scars. That would be consistent with Bloomberg growth and inflation forecasts for the major developed economies, which expect unemployment rates to remain above pre-COVID levels in 2022, with inflation rates struggling to reach 2% (Chart 5). Chart 5The Consensus Expects A Slow Global Recovery Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? In a recent report, we presented some basic Taylor Rule estimates of the “appropriate” level of policy rates for the US, euro area, UK, Japan, Canada and Australia after the collapse in growth seen in response to the COVID-19 lockdowns. We used the most basic formulation of the Taylor Rule that put equal weight on deviations of headline inflation from central bank target levels, and deviations of unemployment from full-employment NAIRU measures. Chart 6Taylor Rules Suggest Rates Will Need To Head Higher Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Given the surge in unemployment and collapse in inflation due to the COVID-19 recession, Taylor Rule estimates were calling for negative nominal interest rates across the developed economies (Chart 6). The estimates were most severe in the US, where a fed funds rate of -3.8% is deemed “appropriate” with an unemployment rate of 11% and headline CPI inflation at 0.6%. When the Bloomberg consensus forecasts for the next two years are put into the Taylor Rule, a rising path for interest rates is projected but with rates remaining below pre-COVID levels. However, if policymakers stick to their current pledge to keep rates on hold for longer to ensure that inflation not only returns to 2%, but also stays there without the help from very easy monetary policy, then the implication is that a “below-appropriate” interest rate will be maintained for an extended period. Interest rate markets have already come to that conclusion. 5-year OIS rates, 5-years forward are trading between 0% and 1% across the developed economies – levels that are below the neutral interest rate estimates we are using in our Taylor Rule forecasts (Chart 7). Chart 7Markets Priced For An Extended Period Of Below-Neutral Rates Markets Priced For An Extended Period Of Below-Neutral Rates Markets Priced For An Extended Period Of Below-Neutral Rates With interest rates already at or near the zero bound, any rise in inflation from current levels also near 0% will result in real policy rates turning negative if central banks do nothing. This would be consistent with the messages sent by the ZEW survey, and global inflation linked bond markets where real yields are falling deeper into negative territory. That would be a major shift of global policymaker behavior, designed as a planned erosion of inflation-fighting credibility. This is especially true for the likes of the Fed, which has a well-established history of turning hawkish at the first sign of rising inflation pressures. The Fed has already hinted that it is considering shifting its policy strategy to allow overshoots of inflation after periods of undershooting the 2% target. Other central banks, like the ECB, have announced similar reviews of their inflation targets and strategy. Such a move to tolerate higher levels of inflation is a logical response to a global pandemic and deep global recession, coming on the heels of several years of low inflation. The timing may actually be ideal to run more dovish policies to boost inflation, with many of the structural factors that have helped restrain global inflation starting to turn in a more inflationary direction. That would be a major shift of global policymaker behavior, designed as a planned erosion of inflation-fighting credibility.  Bottom Line: Central bankers worldwide are promising to keep policy rates near 0% for at least the next two years, even if inflation begins to rise again. This is an obvious form of forward guidance designed to keep borrowing costs as low as possible until the COVID-19 pandemic ends. It may also be the start of a true shift in policymaker strategy, becoming more tolerant of faster inflation. Potential Reasons Why Inflation Could Return Central bankers are talking a good game right now, pledging not to turn too hawkish, too soon and allowing inflation to move back above policy targets. It remains to be seen if they would actually follow through and do nothing if realized inflation rates were to start climbing back to 2% or even higher. It is unlikely that policymakers will be facing that choice anytime soon. The COVID-19 pandemic is showing no signs of slowing in the US and large emerging market countries, global growth remains fragile and heavily reliant on monetary and fiscal policy support, and inflation rates worldwide are currently closer to 0% than 2%. Yet at the same time, there are structural disinflationary forces now changing in a way that may create a more inflationary world after the threat of the pandemic has faded. Demographics Chart 8Demographics Have Turned Less Disinflationary Demographics Have Turned Less Disinflationary Demographics Have Turned Less Disinflationary BCA Research Global Investment Strategy has noted that the global demographic trends that helped restrain inflation in recent decades are shifting.1 The ratio of the number of global workers to the number of global consumers – the global support ratio - peaked back in 2013 and is now steadily falling (Chart 8). There are structural disinflationary forces now changing in a way that may create a more inflationary world after the threat of the pandemic has faded. A rising support ratio implies there are more people producing through work than consuming which, on the margin, is disinflationary. Now, with baby boomers leaving the labor force in droves and becoming consumers in retirement (especially consuming services like health care), the support ratio is falling and becoming a potentially more inflationary force. Globalization Chart 9Globalization Has Turned Less Disinflationary Globalization Has Turned Less Disinflationary Globalization Has Turned Less Disinflationary One of the biggest disinflationary forces of the past quarter-century has been the rapid increase in global trade. As trade barriers fell and global supply chains expanded, companies were able to lower their costs of production. This allowed companies to widen profit margins without resorting to large price increases, helping to dampen overall inflation rates. Now, with global populism and protectionism on the rise, trade as a share of global GDP is declining (Chart 9). The COVID-19 pandemic will likely exacerbate this trend as more companies bring production closer to home, reversing the disinflationary impact of global supply chains, on the margin. A Strong US Dollar The relentless rise of the US dollar in recent years has exerted a major disinflationary headwind to the world economy, with a large share of global traded goods and commodities priced in dollars. Now, with the greenback finally showing signs of rolling over on a more sustainable basis (Chart 10), fueled by less favorable interest rate differentials and signs of improving global growth, the dollar is slowly becoming a more inflationary force. Chart 10USD Weakness Would Be Inflationary USD Weakness Would Be Inflationary USD Weakness Would Be Inflationary Chart 11Structural Reasons Why Policy Rates Need To Stay Low Structural Reasons Why Policy Rates Need To Stay Low Structural Reasons Why Policy Rates Need To Stay Low Of course, these factors are slow moving and will not necessarily result in an immediate increase in global inflation. Yet the trends now in place are more inflationary, on the margin, than has been the case for many years. Coming at a time when global productivity growth is anemic, the potential for an inflationary spark from overly easy monetary policies should not be ignored. Especially given the very high levels of private and public debt in the developed world, which puts more pressure on policymakers to choose inflation as a way to reduce debt burdens (Chart 11).   Investment Implication – Stay Overweight Inflation-Linked Bonds Central bankers are now signaling a desire to keep interest rates lower for longer, both to provide stimulus for virus-stricken economies and to boost weak inflation. Coming at a time when secular disinflationary forces are losing potency, this raises the risk of a protracted period of negative real policy rates as inflation rises and policymakers do little to stop it pre-emptively. Against this shifting backdrop, the value of owning global inflation-linked bonds as core holdings in fixed income portfolios is compelling. Chart 12Maintain A Core Overweight In Inflation-Linked Bonds Maintain A Core Overweight In Inflation-Linked Bonds Maintain A Core Overweight In Inflation-Linked Bonds Against this shifting backdrop, the value of owning global inflation-linked bonds as core holdings in fixed income portfolios is compelling. Inflation breakevens are more likely to creep upward than soar higher in the near term given the lingering economic threat from the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet inflation-linked bonds are likely to outperform nominal government debt over the next few years – if central bankers stay true to their word and keep rates unchanged while welcoming a pickup in inflation. The experience of the years following the 2008 financial crisis, when global policy rates were kept near 0% and central banks expanded balance sheets through quantitative easing, may be a template to follow. Global inflation linked bonds, as an asset class, steadily outperformed nominal government bonds from 2012-2016, shown in Chart 12 on a rolling 3-year annualized basis using benchmark indices from Bloomberg Barclays. A similar extended period of outperformance is not out of the question over the next few years, with central banks ramping up asset purchases once again and promising to keep policy easy until inflation returns. Bottom Line: The recent divergence of inflation expectations and real bond yields can persist if central banks commit to their dovish forward guidance. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt, particularly in the US, Canada and Italy where our models show that breakevens are most undervalued.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy "Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook, Navigating The Second Wave", dated June 30, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Can Central Bankers Credibly Be Not Credible? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights IG Energy: Investors should overweight Energy bonds within an overweight allocation to investment grade corporate bonds overall. Within IG Energy, the Independent sub-sector should perform best, and we recommend avoiding the higher-rated Integrated space. HY Energy: Investors should overweight high-yield Energy relative to the overall junk index. In particular, investors should focus their exposure on the Independent sub-sector, while avoiding the distressed Oil Field Services space. Feature This week we present part 2 of our two-part Special Report on Energy bonds. Last week’s report showed how to develop a model for Energy bond excess returns (both investment grade and high-yield) based on overall corporate bond index spreads and the oil price.1 This week, we delve deeper into the characteristics of both the investment grade and high-yield Energy indexes to better understand how both are likely to trade in the coming months. Chart 1High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed Chart 2Energy Index Sub-Sector Composition* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy In this week’s deep dive, we don’t limit ourselves to an examination of the overall Energy index. We also consider the outlooks for its five main sub-sectors: Integrated: Major oil firms that are present along the entire supply chain – from exploration and production all the way down to refined products for consumers. Independent: Exploration & production firms. Oil Field Services: Support services for the Independent sector – notably drilling. Midstream: Transportation (pipelines), storage and marketing of crude oil. Refining Chart 2 shows the share of each sub-sector in both the investment grade and high-yield Energy indexes. Midstream (46%) and Integrated (31%) are the largest sub-sectors in the investment grade index. Independent (48%) and Midstream (36%) are the heavyweights in the high-yield space. Investment Grade Energy Risk Profile Overall, investment grade Energy bonds are highly cyclical. That is, they tend to outperform the corporate benchmark during periods of spread tightening and underperform during periods of spread widening. This cyclical behavior is due to Energy’s lower credit rating compared to the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate index. Sixty five percent of Energy’s market cap carries a Baa rating compared to 59% for the overall index (Chart 3). The sector’s cyclical nature is confirmed by its duration-times-spread (DTS) ratio,2 which is well above 1.0 (Chart 4A). Interestingly, Energy has only been a highly cyclical sector since the 2014-2016 oil price crash. Prior to that, Energy mostly tracked the corporate index’s performance and only slightly underperformed the benchmark during the 2008/09 financial crisis. More recently, Energy underperformed the corporate index dramatically when spreads widened in March, but has outperformed by 936 bps since spreads peaked on March 23 (Chart 4A, panel 3). Energy has only been a highly cyclical sector since the 2014- 2016 oil price crash. Turning to the sub-sectors, the Integrated sub-sector immediately stands out as the only one with a higher average credit rating than the corporate benchmark. Ninety-two percent of Integrated issuers are rated A or Aa (Chart 3). The presence of the global oil majors (Total SA, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and BP) is what gives the sub-sector its higher average credit quality and makes it the only defensive Energy sub-sector. Notice that Integrated even proved resilient during the 2014-16 Energy bond turmoil (Chart 4B). The remaining four sub-sectors (Independent, Oil Field Services, Midstream and Refining) all have lower average credit ratings than the corporate index (Chart 3) and all trade cyclically relative to the benchmark with Independent (Chart 4C) and Oil Field Services (Chart 4D) being more cyclical than Midstream (Chart 4E) and Refining (Chart 4F). Interestingly, Independent trades more cyclically than Midstream and Refining despite having a greater concentration of high-rated issuers. This is likely due the fact that Independent (aka Exploration & Production) firms are more dependent on the level of oil prices, and typically require a certain minimum oil price to support capital spending and growth. Meanwhile, crude oil is an input for Refining firms and lower oil prices can boost margins, helping offset some of the negative impact from growth downturns. Chart 3Investment Grade Credit Rating Distributions* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Chart 4AIG Energy Risk Profile IG Energy Risk Profile IG Energy Risk Profile Chart 4BIG Integrated Risk Profile IG Integrated Risk Profile IG Integrated Risk Profile Chart 4CIG Independent Risk Profile IG Independent Risk Profile IG Independent Risk Profile Chart 4DIG Oil Field Services Risk Profile IG Oil Field Services Risk Profile IG Oil Field Services Risk Profile Chart 4EIG Midstream Risk Profile IG Midstream Risk Profile IG Midstream Risk Profile Chart 4FIG Refining Risk Profile IG Refining Risk Profile IG Refining Risk Profile   Valuation In terms of value, we find that the Energy sector offers a spread advantage relative to the corporate index and its equivalently-rated (Baa) benchmark (Table 1). This advantage holds up after we control for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread. The four cyclical sub-sectors (Independent, Oil Field Services, Midstream and Refining) all also look cheap, whether or not we control for duration differences. Integrated, the sole defensive sub-sector, is roughly fairly valued compared to the equivalently-rated (Aa) benchmark. Table 1IG Energy Valuation The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Balance Sheet Health The par value of outstanding investment grade Energy debt jumped sharply as oil prices plunged in 2014. But the sector has barely issued any debt since the 2014-16 collapse. Instead, Energy firms have relied on capital spending reductions, asset sales, equity issuance and dividend cuts to raise cash. This shift toward austerity explains why Energy’s weight in the index fell from 11% in 2015 to 8% today (Chart 5A). The median Energy firm’s net debt-to-EBITDA consequently improved between 2017 and 2019, but has once again started to rise as earnings have struggled in recent quarters (Chart 5A, bottom panel). At the issuer level, 15 out of the investment grade index’s 56 Energy issuers currently have a negative ratings outlook from Moody’s (Appendix A). Of the 23 Energy sector ratings that Moody’s has reviewed in 2020, 12 have been affirmed with a stable outlook and 11 were assigned negative outlooks. At the sub-sector level, Integrated debt growth lagged that of the corporate index during the last recovery (Chart 5B). Though the sub-sector has an average credit rating of Aa, most issuers carry negative ratings outlooks, including four of the five global oil majors (Total SA, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and BP). Interestingly, Independent trades more cyclically than Midstream and Refining, despite having a greater concentration of high-rated issuers. The outstanding par value of investment grade Independent debt had been stagnant since 2015, it then plunged this year as three sizeable issuers were downgraded from investment grade to high-yield (Chart 5C). EQT Corp, Occidental Petroleum and Apache Corp were all downgraded during the past few months. They currently account for 21% of the high-yield Energy index’s market cap. Encouragingly, only two of the 16 remaining investment grade Independent issuers currently have negative ratings outlooks. The situation is less favorable for Oil Field Services. This sub-sector’s outstanding debt has remained low since the 2014-16 collapse (Chart 5D), but four of the six investment grade Oil Field Services issuers have negative ratings outlooks. Midstream (Chart 5E) and Refining (Chart 5F) both continued to grow their outstanding debt levels throughout the entirety of the last recovery, including during the 2014-16 period. At present, only three of the 23 investment grade Midstream issuers have negative ratings outlooks, while two of the four Refining issuers have negative outlooks. Chart 5AIG Energy Debt Growth IG Energy Debt Growth IG Energy Debt Growth Chart 5BIG Integrated Debt Growth IG Integrated Debt Growth IG Integrated Debt Growth Chart 5CIG Independent Debt Growth IG Independent Debt Growth IG Independent Debt Growth Chart 5DIG Oil Field Services Debt Growth IG Oil Field Services Debt Growth IG Oil Field Services Debt Growth Chart 5EIG Midstream Debt Growth IG Midstream Debt Growth IG Midstream Debt Growth Chart 5FIG Refining Debt Growth IG Refining Debt Growth IG Refining Debt Growth   Investment Conclusions As per last week’s report, we recommend that investors overweight Energy bonds within their investment grade corporate bond allocations. This recommendation stems from our view that corporate bond spreads will tighten during the next 12 months and that the oil price will rise. As such, we want to favor cyclical investment grade bond sectors that will outperform during periods of spread tightening. With that in mind, we would advise investors to focus their investment grade Energy allocations on the most cyclical sub-sector: Independent. Not only does the Independent sub-sector have the highest DTS ratio of the five sub-sectors, but its weakest credits have already been purged from the index and further downgrades are less likely. Oil Field Services offer less spread pick-up than Independent, and also have a higher proportion of issuers with negative ratings outlooks.  By similar logic, we would avoid the Integrated sub-sector. This sub-sector trades defensively relative to the corporate benchmark and a high proportion of its issuers have negative ratings outlooks. High-Yield Energy Bonds Risk Profile On average, the High-Yield Energy index and the overall High-Yield corporate index have very similar credit ratings. However, the Energy sector has a more barbelled credit rating distribution with a greater proportion of Ba-rated securities (64% versus 55%) and a greater proportion of Ca-C rated issuers (8% versus 1%) (Chart 6). Chart 6High-Yield Credit Rating Distributions* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Chart 7AHY Energy Risk Profile HY Energy Risk Profile HY Energy Risk Profile It is likely some combination of the larger presence of very low-rated credits and increased oil price volatility that has caused the sector to trade cyclically versus the junk benchmark since 2014 (Chart 7A). Notice that Energy outperformed the junk index during the 2008 sell off, but has since turned cyclical, underperforming in both the 2015/16 and 2020 risk-off episodes. At the sub-sector level, there is currently only one high-yield rated Integrated issuer (Cenovus Energy Inc., Ba-rated, negative outlook). Based on their DTS ratios, the Independent and Oil Field Services sub-sectors are the most cyclical (Charts 7B & 7C). This is because the lower-rated (Caa & below) issuers are concentrated in the these spaces. This is particularly true for Oil Field Services where 41% of the sub-sector’s market cap is rated Caa or below. The Midstream sub-sector also trades cyclically relative to the junk benchmark, but with somewhat less volatility than Independent and Oil Field Services, as evidenced by its DTS ratio of 1.2 (Chart 7D). Refining has traded like a cyclical sector so far this year, but that may not continue now that its DTS ratio has fallen close to 1.0 (Chart 7E). Chart 7BHY Independent Risk Profile HY Independent Risk Profile HY Independent Risk Profile Chart 7CHY Oil Field Services Risk Profile HY Oil Field Services Risk Profile HY Oil Field Services Risk Profile Chart 7DHY Midstream Risk Profile HY Midstream Risk Profile HY Midstream Risk Profile Chart 7EHY Refining Risk Profile HY Refining Risk Profile HY Refining Risk Profile   Valuation The Energy sector offers a significant spread advantage over the High-Yield index and also relative to other Ba-rated issuers (Table 2). Adjusting for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread makes Energy look even more attractive. Energy spreads need to widen by 189 bps during the next 12 months to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. This compares to 93 bps for other Ba-rated issuers and 150 bps for the overall junk index. Table 2HY Energy Valuation The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Four of the five Energy sub-sectors (Integrated being the exception) also offer attractive value relative to the overall index and their equivalently-rated benchmarks. This remains true after adjusting for duration differences. Balance Sheet Health The high-yield Energy sector has added much more debt than the overall junk index since 2010 (Chart 8A). But of greater concern is that Moody’s has already changed its ratings outlook from stable to negative for 58 Energy issuers since the start of the year. Meanwhile, only 17 high-yield Energy issuers have seen their ratings outlooks confirmed as stable in 2020. Nevertheless, we take some comfort knowing that the Energy sector should benefit from having a large number of issuers able to take advantage of the Federal Reserve’s Main Street Lending facilities. As a reminder, to be eligible for the Main Street facilities issuers must have fewer than 15000 employees or less than $5 billion in 2019 revenue. They must also be able to keep their Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0, including any new debt added through the Main Street programs. The Energy sector offers a significant spread advantage over the High-Yield index and also relative to other Barated issuers. Of the 61 US high-yield Energy issuers with available data (we exclude 23 foreign issuers that won’t have access to US programs), we estimate that at least 48 are eligible to receive support from the Main Street facilities (Appendix B). This not only includes 15 out of 20 B-rated issuers, but also 12 out of 15 Caa-rated issuers and 4 out of 7 issuers rated below Caa. This broad access is the result of deleveraging that has occurred since the 2014-16 bust (Chart 8A, bottom panel) and it should go a long way toward limiting defaults in the Energy space. The Independent sub-sector’s weight in the index jumped sharply this year, the result of adding three sizeable fallen angels (Chart 8B). Importantly, 24 out of the 28 US Independent issuers appear eligible for Fed support. In contrast, the Oil Field Services sector is in distress. Its weight in the index has been declining for more than a year (Chart 8C), and a large proportion of its issuers are concentrated in lower credit tiers. However, we estimate that out of 19 issuers with available data, 13 are eligible for the Fed’s Main Street Lending facilities. Both Midstream and Refining have high concentrations of Ba-rated issuers and neither has aggressively grown its presence in the index during the past decade (Charts 8D & 8E), though Midstream’s index weight did jump this year. The high credit quality of both indexes means that most issuers will have access to the Main Street facilities, though three of the five Refining issuers are not US based. Chart 8AHY Energy Debt Growth HY Energy Debt Growth HY Energy Debt Growth Chart 8BHY Independent Debt Growth HY Independent Debt Growth HY Independent Debt Growth Chart 8CHY Oil Field Services Debt Growth HY Oil Field Services Debt Growth HY Oil Field Services Debt Growth Chart 8DHY Midstream Debt Growth HY Midstream Debt Growth HY Midstream Debt Growth Chart 8EHY Refining Debt Growth HY Refining Debt Growth HY Refining Debt Growth   Investment Conclusions The conclusion from the model we presented in last week’s report was that high-yield Energy should outperform the junk index during the next 12 months, assuming that overall junk spreads tighten and the oil price rises. However, we remain concerned that, despite the nascent economic recovery, some low-rated Energy names will go bust during the next few months, weighing on index returns. The pattern from the 2014-16 default cycle argues that our concerns may be overblown. In February 2016, high-yield Energy started to outperform the overall junk index slightly after the trough in oil prices and eleven months before the peak in the 12-month trailing default rate (Chart 1 on page 1). If oil prices are indeed already past their cyclical trough, then it may already be a good time to bottom-fish in the high-yield Energy space. The fact that the bulk of high-yield Energy issuers are eligible for support through the Main Street lending facilities tips the scales, and we recommend that investors overweight high-yield Energy relative to the overall junk index. In particular, we think investors should focus on the Independent sub-sector where value is very attractive and most issuers can tap the Fed for help if needed. We would, however, avoid the Oil Field Services sector where the bulk of Energy defaults are likely to come from. Midstream and Refining should perform well, but are less cyclical and less attractively valued than the Independent sub-sector. Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Duration-Times-Spread (DTS) is a simple measure that is highly correlated with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The DTS ratio is the ratio of a sector’s DTS to that of the benchmark index. It can be thought of like the beta of a stock. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”), a DTS ratio below 1.0 signals that the sector is defensive or (“low beta”). For more details on the DTS measure please see: Arik Ben Dor, Lev Dynkin, Jay Hyman, Patrick Houweling, Erik van Leeuwen & Olaf Penninga, “DTS (Duration-Times-Spread)”, Journal of Portfolio Management 33(2), January 2007.   Appendix A Investment Grade Energy Issuers The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Appendix B High-Yield Energy Issuers The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy