Fixed Income

Highlights Negative Rates: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. UK vs. New Zealand: Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. Go long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts (currency-hedged into GBP) on tactical (0-6 months) basis. Feature Policymakers around the world are, once again, under increasing pressure to contemplate new responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to rage through much of the US and emerging world and is flaring up again across Europe. Additional fiscal policy measures will likely be necessary, but it is increasingly politically difficult in many countries to ramp up government support measures – or even extend existing programs - after the massive increase in deficits and debt undertaken this past spring. Chart of the WeekA Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt An inadequate fiscal response will put even more pressure on monetary policy to give a boost to virus-stricken economies. Yet fresh options there are even more limited. Policy rates are already near 0% in all developed nations, with central banks promising to keep them there for at least the next couple of years. Central banks are also rapidly expanding their balance sheets to buy up assets via quantitative easing programs. A move to sub-0% policy rates may be the next option for central banks not already there like the ECB and the Bank of Japan. Although it remains questionable how much more stimulus monetary policy could hope to deliver. Government bond yields are at or near historic lows in most countries, while equity and credit markets continue to enjoy a spectacular recovery from the rout in February and March. The stock of global negative-yielding debt has risen to $16 trillion, according to Bloomberg, which remains close to the highs seen over the past few years (Chart of the Week). So who will be the next central bank to cross that bridge into negative rate territory? US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem and Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe have all publicly dismissed the need for negative rates in their economies. Recent comments from Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Governor Adrian Orr, however, have suggested that negative rates could be a future policy choice, if needed. New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. Markets are increasingly discounting those outcomes. The UK Gilt yield curve is trading below 0% out to the 6-year maturity, while New Zealand nominal government bond yields are trading at or below a mere 0.3% out to 7-years (and where real yields on inflation-linked bonds have recently turned negative). Of the two, New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. A Negative Rates Checklist For The UK & New Zealand In a Special Report we published back in May, we looked back at the decisions that drove the move to negative policy rates by the ECB, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Riksbank, with a goal of determining if such an outcome could happen elsewhere.1 We were motivated by the growing market chatter suggesting that the Fed would eventually be forced to cut the fed funds rate to sub-0% territory to fight the deep COVID-19 recession. Chart 2The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates We concluded in that report that such a move was unlikely, but could occur if there was a contraction in US credit growth and/or a spike in the US dollar to new cyclical highs, both outcomes that would result in a major drop in US inflation expectations. Such moves preceded the shift to negative rates in those other countries during 2014-16, as a way to lower borrowing costs and weaken currencies. Since that May report, the US dollar has depreciated and US credit growth has continued to expand amid very stimulative financial conditions, thus the odds of the Fed having to cut the funds rate below 0% are very low. The Fed is far more likely to dovishly alter its forward guidance, or even institute yield curve control to cap US Treasury yields, to deliver additional monetary easing, if necessary. (NOTE: next week, we will be discussing the Fed’s next possible policy moves, and the potential impact on financial markets, in a Special Report jointly published with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy). The pressure to consider negative interest rates in the non-negative rate developed market countries remains strong, however, after the major increase in unemployment rates and sharp falls in inflation seen earlier this year (Chart 2). Putting current levels of both into a simple Taylor Rule formula suggests that the “appropriate” level of nominal policy rates is currently negative in the US and Canada, mainly because of the double-digit unemployment rates in those countries. Taylor Rules for the UK and New Zealand remain slightly positive, however, at 0.2% and 0.9%, respectively. Yet the forecasts for inflation and unemployment from the BoE and RBNZ suggest a diverging dynamic between the two over the next couple of years. The BoE is forecasting a very sharp recovery from the 2020 recession, with the UK unemployment rate projected to fall back to 4.7% by 2022 from the surge to 7.5% this year. At the same time, the RBNZ’s forecasts are more cautious, with the New Zealand unemployment rate expected to fall to only 6.1% in 2022 from the projected 8.1% peak at the end of this year. Thus, the implied Taylor Rules using those forecasts suggest a need for negative rates in New Zealand, but a rising path for UK policy rates over the next two years (Chart 3). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Despite the diverging trajectory in policy rates implied by the two central banks’ forecasts, markets are pricing in a more similar path for rates. Forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates are discounting slightly negative rates in the UK and New Zealand to the end of 2022 (Chart 4). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Chart 3Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Chart 4Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ The individual cases of the UK and New Zealand as current candidates for negative interest rates can help derive a list of factors to monitor to determine if negative rates would be a more likely policy outcome for any central bank. Based on our read of recent comments from BoE and RBNZ officials, combined with our assessment of what took place in other countries that moved to negative rates in the past, we would include the following in any Negative Rates Checklist: Policymaker perceptions on the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates For central bankers, the ELB (or “reversal rate”) is defined as the policy rate below which additional rate cuts are deemed counterproductive to stimulating the economy. For example, cutting rates too low could limit the ability of the banking system to earn interest income, thus hindering banks’ appetite to make new loans. Chart 5Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? For most central banks, the belief is that the ELB is at or just above 0%. It is possible that because of a structural shift, a central bank could deem the ELB to be negative in that particular economy. That could be because of a sharp deterioration in trend economic growth or a rapid rise in debt or a belief that the banking system was strong enough to handle the income shock of negative rates. Currently, potential GDP growth rate estimates have been marked down in both the UK and New Zealand because of the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 5). In New Zealand, taking the average of the RBNZ’s real GDP growth forecasts for the next three years as a proxy for trend growth suggests that trend growth is now around 1.2%, similar to the reduced estimates of UK potential GDP growth. In terms of debt levels, the ratio of total public and private non-financial debt to GDP is close to 400% in the UK, which is far greater than the 126% level of that same ratio in New Zealand. In terms of banking system health, banks in both countries are well capitalized. The Tier 1 capital ratio of the major UK banks is 14.5%, while the similar figure in New Zealand is 13.5%; both figures are provided by the BoE and RBNZ, respectively. Stress tests run by the central banks in recent months indicate that capital levels will remain adequate even after the likely hit from loan losses due to the severity of the 2020 economic downturn. Our assessment is that both the BoE and RBNZ can claim that the ELB is in fact below zero, based on the slow pace of trend economic growth in both. In the case of the UK, high debt levels also suggest that policy rates may have to go below 0% to generate any stimulus to growth via new borrowing activity. In both countries, the central banks can claim that the banking system can handle a period of negative rates, if policymakers go down that road to boost economic growth. Economic confidence is depressed An extended period of weak economic activity and depressed confidence can trigger a need to move to negative policy rates if rates were already at 0%. Currently, UK economic confidence is in tatters after the -20% decline in real GDP seen in the second quarter of 2020. The GfK consumer confidence index remains at recessionary low levels, while the BoE Agents’ survey of UK firms shows a collapse in plans for investment and hiring over the next year (Chart 6). Chart 6A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence New Zealand, the economy contracted -1.6% in the first quarter of the year with consensus forecasts calling for a -20% collapse in the second quarter. Yet economic confidence is surprisingly resilient. The Westpac survey of consumer confidence is falling, but the July reading was still above typical recessionary lows (Chart 7). The ANZ survey of business investing and hiring intentions has been surprisingly upbeat of late, rebounding from the April trough but still below pre-virus levels. Our assessment here is that the BoE has a stronger case for moving to negative rates, based on the deeper collapse in confidence in the UK compared to New Zealand. Inflation expectations are too low If inflation expectations remain too low once rates have hit 0%, then inflation-targeting central banks must consider more extraordinary options to revive inflation expectations. That could take the form of extended forward guidance on future interest rate moves, expanding the size and scope of quantitative easing programs, or cutting policy rates into negative territory. Currently, inflation expectations remain elevated in the UK. 5-year CPI swaps, 5-years forward, are now at 3.6%, while the Citigroup/YouGov survey of household inflation expectations 5-10 years out sits at 3.3% (Chart 8). In New Zealand, the RBNZ inflation survey shows inflation expectations have fallen into the bottom half of the central bank’s 1-3% target band. Chart 7Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Chart 8Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Financial conditions turning more restrictive Chart 9The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions Another reason why a central bank could try negative rates is if asset prices were trading at depressed levels even after policy rates were at 0%. The current signals on financial conditions in the UK and New Zealand are generally stimulative, but more so in the latter. Currently, the MSCI equity index for New Zealand is nearing the all-time high reached in 1987, while the equivalent UK equity index is languishing near the lows of the past decade (Chart 9). The New Zealand dollar and British pound have both bounced off the cyclical lows seen earlier this year (more on that later). The annual growth rates of nominal house prices have started to pick up in both countries, but with a faster pace in New Zealand. Finally, corporate credit spreads have narrowed sharply since the end of the first quarter in both countries, with New Zealand spreads actually falling below the pre-virus levels seen this year. Our assessment here is that financial conditions in both countries remain generally stimulative, but more so in New Zealand. Neither central bank can point to restrictive financial conditions as a reason to move to negative rates. Signs of impairment of the transmission of policy interest rates to actual borrowing costs If bank lending growth was weakening and/or borrowing rates remained high relative to policy rates, this could be a sign that negative policy rates are necessary to induce greater loan demand by lowering borrowing costs. Chart 10NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts Currently, the annual growth rate of bank lending is slowing in New Zealand, but remains positive at 4.5% (Chart 10). Loan growth in the UK is now a much more robust 7.4%, but some of that growth is due to UK companies drawing down lines of credit with their banks to survive during the COVID-19 lockdowns. A bigger issue is the lack of the full pass-through of the RBNZ’s recent cuts into borrowing rates, especially for home loans. The spread between 5-year fixed mortgage rates and the RBNZ cash rate is now an elevated 387bps, while the equivalent spread in the UK is much lower at 160bps. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue that an impaired transmission of policy rate cuts to actual borrowing rates could justify a move to negative rates. Scope For Currency Depreciation For any central bank, a benefit of a negative interest rate policy is that it can trigger more stimulus via a weaker currency. This can help boost economic growth by making exports more competitive, while also helping lift inflation by raising the cost of imports. On the growth side, a weaker currency would be somewhat more helpful for New Zealand where exports are 19% of GDP, compared to 16% in the UK. (Chart 11). That is an important distinction, as there is greater scope for the New Zealand dollar (NZD) to depreciate if the RBNZ went to negative rates than for the British pound (GBP) to weaken if the BoE did the same. Chart 11A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit Chart 12BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound Perhaps the most interesting feature of this entire negative rates discussion is that, for the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. For the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. The UK and New Zealand both have similarly sized current account deficits, equal to -3.3% and -2.7% of GDP, respectively (middle panel). At the same time, both countries have net foreign direct investment surpluses roughly equal to those current account deficits, leaving their basic balances around 0 (bottom panel). In other words, both countries currently attract enough long-term foreign direct investment inflows to “fund” their current account deficits. Foreign investors may be less willing to continue buying as many New Zealand or UK financial assets if either country went to a negative interest rate to intentionally weaken the currency, as the RBNZ has publicly stated would be a desired outcome of such a move. Chart 13RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi Our colleagues at BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy estimate that, on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the GBP/USD exchange rate is now -20% below its long-run fair value (Chart 12). The level of the currency is also broadly in line with the current level of interest rate differentials between the UK and the US (bottom panel). In other words, the GBP is already cheap and additional rate cuts would have limited impact in driving the currency lower. It is a different story for NZD/USD, which is fairly valued on a PPP basis but remains elevated relative to New Zealand-US interest rate differentials (Chart 13). Therefore, our assessment is that only the RBNZ can credibly generate meaningful currency weakness from a move to negative rates. Summing it all up Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. In the UK, there is less evidence pointing to a significantly impaired credit channel that could be remedied by negative rates, inflation expectations are elevated, and the pound is already at undervalued levels. In New Zealand, previous RBNZ rate cuts have not fully flowed through into bank lending rates, inflation expectations are low, and the New Zealand dollar is at fair value (and, therefore, has room to become cheaper via negative rates). Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. Bottom Line: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. A Negative Rates Trade Idea: Go Long New Zealand Government Bonds Vs. UK Gilts Chart 14Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Based on our analysis above, we are adding a new cross-country spread trade to our Tactical Overlay Trades list on page 18: going long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts on a currency-hedged basis (i.e. hedging the NZD exposure into GBP). The trade is to be implemented using on-the-run cash bonds. The current unhedged NZ-UK 10-year yield spread is +36bps, but even on a hedged basis (using 3-month currency forwards) the yield differential is still positive at +23bps (Chart 14). We are targeting zero for the unhedged spread, to be realized sometime within the six months. We like this trade because it can win not only from a decline in New Zealand bond yields if the RBNZ goes to negative rates (as we think is increasingly likely), but also from a potential rise in Gilt yields if the BoE defies market pricing and does not go to negative rates. If both countries keep rates on hold, then the trade will earn a small positive spread over the current meagre level of Gilt yields.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You?", dated May 20, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights ESG-related equities have outperformed global benchmarks over the past two years, as well as during the recent equity selloff. Investor demand and institutional pressure will drive the financial industry to analyze nonfinancial disclosures more closely and take them more into account. The pathway to achieving that is not simple: Unification of reporting standards and improvement in the quality of disclosure are required. Governments can play a role by enforcing climate and sustainability disclosure for firms wanting bailout support. Key stakeholders in the financial system – especially asset managers and other providers of capital – will look to incorporate more sophisticated ESG analysis into their traditional frameworks. Introduction This report is an update to our Special Report published in late 2018 on the benefits of ESG investing. In that report we concluded that ESG indices have performed at least in line with, and may even have slightly outperformed, broad-market indices, while providing societal and environmental benefits.1 We can now also answer one of the questions we raised in that report: Whether ESG investing provides protection during recessions and bear markets. Since we published that report, the ESG space has continued to grow, with the number of new US “sustainable” fund launches, as tracked by Morningstar, increasing – albeit at a lower rate than in the previous two years (Chart 1).2  This can be attributed to an ever-increasing investor demand, predominantly from Europe, but growing rapidly in both the US and Asia, too. The Global Sustainable Investment Review estimates that ESG assets under management (using a relatively broad definition of ESG) totaled $30 trillion as of 2018.3 Chart 1The Industry Is Catering To Increasing Investor Demand ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff Our earlier report highlighted the increasing demand from investors to allocate capital based on environmental, social, and governance standards, or ESG. Simply put, we defined ESG investing as any investment activity that recognizes a certain set of principles, and screens securities based on those factors. While the term itself might be new, the core concept behind it is not. It encompasses a philosophy dating back hundreds of years, beginning with faith-based investing, to the more recent increased awareness of climate and governance issues. The COVID-19 pandemic – also considered an ESG risk – illustrated how quickly a health and environmental threat can turn into a social issue, as unemployment rates surged to new highs and economic activity came to a halt. In this report, we analyze how the performance of ESG indices has evolved since our last report, and in particular, during the recent February-March equity selloff. Additionally, we discuss the opportunities that governments, investors, and corporations can seize in the future. We also assess the various risks facing ESG investing, given that it is no longer a niche space. Performance Update Since we published our report in late 2018, ESG indices in most countries (with the exception of the US and Canada) have outperformed the broad market benchmarks.4  The global ESG index has outperformed the All-Country World (ACW) broad market index by 1% since (Chart 2). While this might not count as a remarkable outperformance, it answers some of the doubts cast on the merits of ESG investing. However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. Importantly, ESG indices either performed in line with or better than broad market indices during the equity selloff between February-March 2020. ESG indices in all major countries and regions, with the exception of the US, outperformed the benchmark during this period (Chart 2). Research by MSCI breaks down the active returns of various ESG country and region indices versus their corresponding broad market indices in Q1 2020. This analysis showed that the outperformance predominantly came from equity style tilts, followed by ESG-related factors and sector/industry tilts (Chart 3). Chart 2ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG indices tilt towards higher-quality, low-beta, and high-yielding stocks relative to their benchmarks. As part of the index construction, some ESG indices exclude stocks not meeting the indices’ ESG eligibility criteria.  This would include various names in the oil & gas industry, for example (for environmental criteria), as well as some tech giants (for social and governance reasons). The exclusion of some tech names partly explains the US index’s underperformance. Chart 3 shows that stock selection for the US MSCI ESG Leaders index – the one shown in Chart 2 – had a negative contribution to active returns over the first quarter. Chart 3Breaking Down ESG Performance ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Index methodology plays a big role in determining expected performance. The methodology of the MSCI ESG index suite generally aims to reduce sector differences relative to the broad indices, thereby limiting systematic risk. However, even within the MSCI ESG suite, methodologies differ between indices (Tables 1 & 2).5 Table 1Index Methodology Determines Sector Tilts ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Table 2Methodology Differences Matter ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. It is also important for investors to understand that sustainability is a long-term issue. For example, as economies shut down when COVID-19 infections and deaths rose, investors rushed to sell their risky exposures: The five largest “traditional” US equity ETFs saw cumulative net equity outflows of as high as $22 billion during the three-week period between February 19 and March 13. By contrast, the five largest ESG equity funds experienced small, yet positive, inflows over the same period (Chart 4). This was also true globally, where sustainable funds tracked by Morningstar recorded inflows close to $45 billion dollars during this period, whereas equity funds overall recorded over $380 billion of outflows.6 The most likely reason for this is that investors see ESG investing as a defensive play, given its sector and factor tilts. Chart 4Small, Yet Steady Inflows During The Equity Selloff ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Institutional Pressure Chart 5Analyzing Nonfinancial Disclosures Is A Must... ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Investors – particularly those with longer investment horizons, such as pension funds and endowments – are becoming more committed to evaluating their investments more rigorously from an ESG standpoint. This means putting pressure on asset managers to screen and assess company performance using ESG factors. A survey by EY in June 2020 shows that only 2% of respondents conduct little-to-no review of nonfinancial disclosures relating to a company’s environmental and social performance, down from 36% in 2013 (Chart 5). However, absent a formal governing body, standardized reporting, and proper regulation regarding what should be labeled ESG, as well as how metrics are evaluated, asset managers struggle to comply. One of the key points we highlighted in our previous report is that consideration of ESG factors in investment decisions must go beyond simple reliance on ESG scores. The various ESG rating agencies rely on different metrics, factors, and datasets to rank companies and therefore produce very different benchmarks and funds, even though they may have the same objectives. This means that different investors using different ESG indices could end up with different allocations to the same universe of stocks. Therefore, analysis and inclusion based on ESG scores may be misleading and yield dissimilar results. A research paper by the MIT Sloan School of Management showed that the sources of differentiation of ESG rankings by ratings agencies stem from: 1) Scope Divergence: Ratings rely on different attributes to capture ESG performance; 2) Measurement Divergence: Relying on different indicators to measure the same attribute; and 3) Weight Divergence: Ranking the attributes differently in terms of importance. Of these, the paper found that the measurement divergence was the most important.7  Chart 6...With More Companies Now Reporting ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Asset managers are not necessarily to blame. They simply lack adequate tools. The problem is not the dearth of disclosure, but rather its quality and comparability. In fact, over the past few years, more companies have begun reporting on their sustainability and social performance (Chart 6). However, the fact that reporting is voluntary, and companies rely on different reporting frameworks and standards, makes cross-country and inter-firm comparisons difficult. On the bright side however, there is a growing pressure for collaboration between the various reporting frameworks in order to bring about a single reporting standard. For example, a recently announced partnership between the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) – two of the many organizations responsible for creating sustainability reports and reporting on governance data – is an important step in bringing the various standard-setters together. This should promote greater reporting consistency, and highlight the importance of key non financial disclosures. Improved reporting will affect not only investors, but also providers of capital, including banks. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Providers of capital will have to assess not only borrowers’ fundamentals and growth prospects, but also understand their governance policies and environmental footprint. A recently published report by the Bank of England (BoE) highlighted the potential impact of climate change – both through transition8 and physical risks9 – on UK banks, insurers, and the entire financial system. To highlight the extent of “climate-related exposure,” the analysis found that almost 10% of England’s mortgage value is on properties in flood-risk zones, and that loan exposures to high emission-intensive sectors represent almost 70% of the common equity Tier 1 capital of the UK’s largest banks.10 If a climate event occurs, or new regulations are implemented, the impact will be severe. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Governments can play a role. As COVID-19 stimulus plans are rolled out – mainly in developed economies – governments are requiring companies in need of support or bailouts to improve their environmental and climate disclosures. This will make it easier for private-sector investors to incorporate ESG analysis. Large Canadian firms, for example, that apply for government loans, must now publish annual climate disclosure reports as well as other releases relating to environmental and sustainability goals. Additionally, further rounds of stimulus could be given to those investing in ESG-related areas – known as “green stimulus.” Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, G20 countries have committed over $300 billion to support various energy initiatives, of which approximately $150 billion was aimed at clean energy policies and renewable energy programs.11 This could set a precedent for future government support to aid the transition to a greener economy. It can perhaps also serve as an indicator of which areas can present opportunities for investment. Monetary policy is set to remain accommodative for the next few years. It is not unimaginable, then, that central banks’ unconventional monetary easing methods could involve purchasing green bonds,12 issued by both corporations and governments. This is something ECB president Christine Lagarde has hinted at, to aid in the world’s fight against climate change.13 Chart 7The Green Bond Market Is Growing ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream The green bond market continues to grow, with bond issuance in 2019 up over 55% year-on-year. This growth, however, has fallen somewhat in 2020 due to the economic slowdown (Chart 7), despite overall bond issuance increasing in the second quarter of the year, as companies rushed to raise cash and refinance at lower rates.14 The fact that proceeds issued by green bonds must explicitly be used for environmental projects is the most likely reason for the decline. Green bond issuance, in 2020, has totaled $112 billion as of July, with the US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands being the top four issuers. China, the top issuer in 2018 and 2019, slipped to sixth place in 2020, with its green bond issuance shrinking from $27 billion in 2019 to $6 billion year-to-date. Risks & Headwinds Investors should be wary of various short-to-medium term risks to ESG investment. In the short-term, a delay of climate-change targets is possible. A second wave of COVID-19 infections that would trigger further lockdowns might lead to a rollback in environmental regulation and a refocus of stimulus packages on all-out growth rather than on ESG and climate initiatives. Over the coming years, as ESG investing becomes more mainstream, investors will need to take greater care to spot “greenwashing.”15 For example, this includes funds labeled as “sustainable”, but which hold securities that do not fit under that umbrella. It would also include companies taking advantage of the absence of reporting regulations to report misleading or incomplete information. Such care will be crucial until a unified reporting framework is established. According to calculations by Morningstar, over 500 funds expanded their prospectuses to include ESG factors in their investment analysis in 2019, up from the roughly 50 funds which did so in 2018.16,17 Indeed, this is a sign that funds are responding to investor demand and adding appropriate ESG analysis. However, whether these funds use sustainability as a core factor in their investing is unclear. Therefore, investors should continue to undertake their own proper due diligence. Conclusions The path to fully incorporating ESG analyses into a traditional investing framework is heading in the right direction, but is not yet clear-cut. A unified framework that allows for consistent and comparable disclosures would fix one of the biggest hurdles that investors face. ESG-related equity indices have outperformed in most countries and regions since late 2018, as well as during the recent equity selloff. The full advantage to be derived from incorporating ESG factors should be unlocked as more accurate and comprehensive data becomes available. Investor demand for ESG-related investments will remain the dominant force in driving the shift to integrating ESG disclosures into traditional financial analysis. Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “ESG Investing: No Harm, Some Benefit,” dated November 21, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/989209/esg-funds-setting-a-record-pace-for-launches-in-2020 3 "Global Sustainable Investment Review 2018," Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, gsi-alliance.org. 4 For the purpose of this analysis, we use the MSCI ESG Leaders index suite. 5 "MSCI ESG Indexes," MSCI, msci.com. 6 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/984776/theres-ample-room-for-sustainable-investing-to-grow-in-the-us 7 Florian Bergand, Julian F Kölbel, and Roberto Rigobon, "Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings," May 17, 2020. 8 Transition risks can be defined as the risks of economic dislocation and financial losses associated with the transition to a lower-carbon economy. 9 Physicals risks can be defined as those arising from the interaction between climate-related events and human and natural systems. 10"The Bank of England’s climate-related financial disclosure 2020," Bank Of England. 11 "G20," energypolicytracker.org. 12 Green bonds are fixed income securities in which the proceeds are exclusively and explicitly assigned to projects or activities to finance and combat environmental issues – such as those relating to climate change and depletion of biodiversity and natural resources. 13 "Lagarde Puts Green Policy Top Of Agenda in ECB Bond Buying," Financial Times, July 8, 2020. 14 "Credit Trends: Global Financing Conditions: Bond Issuance Is Expected To Finish 2020 Up 6% After A Strong Second Quarter," S&P Global Ratings, July 27, 2020. 15Greenwashing is the process of relying on false claims and impressions to provide misleading information about how certain activities, investments, services, products, etc., are environmentally sound and friendly. 16 https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973432/the-number-of-funds-considering-esg-explodes-in-2019 17 As of March 2020, data by Morningstar show that 3,297 global sustainable funds exist.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. A firming macro backdrop, the USD’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight, today. This move also pushes our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Table 1 Lessons From The 1940s Lessons From The 1940s Feature In our March 23 Weekly Report, when we identified 20 reasons to start buying equities, we published a cycle-on-cycle profile (Chart 1, top panel) of how the SPX performs following a greater than 20% drawdown. History suggested that, on average, new all-time highs would emerge sometime in early 2022! Unfortunately, this assessment proved offside as the S&P 500 made fresh all-time closing highs last week, less than five months from the March 23 trough. Chart 1Overstretched Overstretched Overstretched Nevertheless, comparing the current unprecedented SPX rebound with the historical recessionary profile remains instructive as it highlights how excessively stretched equities currently appear. The bottom panel of Chart 1 warns that the SPX is vulnerable to a snapback, were the SPX to return to the historical mean or median recovery profile. Likely rising (geo)political risks could serve as a near-term catalyst for a healthy pullback. Importantly, all of the SPX’s return since the March lows is due to the multiple expansion and then some, as forward EPS have taken a beating (not shown). Equities are long duration assets and given the drubbing in the discount rate, the forward P/E multiple has done all the heavy lifting. Chart 2 puts some historical context to the S&P 500 forward P/E going back to 1979 using I/B/E/S data. Empirical data supports finance theory and shows that the 40-year bull market in bond prices has caused a structural upshift to the SPX forward P/E. Chart 2Moving In Opposite Directions Moving In Opposite Directions Moving In Opposite Directions While low rates explain the near all-time highs in the SPX forward P/E, looking ahead we doubt that the SPX multiple can expand much further if we assume that the easy assist from ZIRP is behind us and will not repeat; i.e. the Fed will refrain from wrecking the US banking system by exploring NIRP. In contrast, our analysis suggests that a selloff in the bond market is the missing ingredient that will ignite a massive rotation out of growth stocks and into value and propel deep cyclicals versus defensives to uncharted territory. More specifically, the rallies in copper prices, crude oil and the CRB Raw Industrials index need confirmation from the bond market that they are demand, rather than supply driven. This backdrop will also shift equity returns within deep cyclicals away from a handful of tech stocks and toward other beaten down high operating leverage sectors (i.e. energy, industrials and materials) as we posited in our recent August 3 Special Report “Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives”. Zooming out and observing how investors have moved capital from one asset class to the next in the aftermath of QE5 is in order (Chart 3). First, the SPX enjoyed a V-shaped recovery from the March 23 lows. Then in early-May, as we first posited in our May 11 Weekly Report, the big EURUSD up-move was set in motion and investors started piling into short USD positions taking cue from the Fed’s QE5 that was directly targeting the US dollar with liquidity swaps. The debasing of the dollar served as a global reflator. Now the final piece of the QE5 puzzle is the bond market. Chart 3 highlights that in order for QE to work, counterintuitively a selloff in the bond market would confirm that the economy is healing and is ready to start standing on its own two feet. The jury is still out. With regard to the Fed’s remaining bullets, yield curve control (YCC) is one unorthodox tool that the FOMC could choose to deploy in the coming years. On that front, turning back in time and drawing parallels with the 1940s is instructive. In 1942 the Fed, at the behest of the Treasury, pegged long-term interest rates at 2.5% and ballooned its balance sheet in order to finance the government’s expenditures during WWII. The Fed surrendered its independence, and this YCC unwarrantedly stayed in place until 1951 when in the midst of the Korean War, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord finally ended the peg of government long-dated bond interest rates.1 Chart 3Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Chart 4WWII-Like Starting Point WWII-Like Starting Point WWII-Like Starting Point Chart 4 shows the ebbs and flows of the US government’s total debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit as a percentage of output since 1940. While the debt-to-GDP profile fell from 1945 onward owing partially to a tight fiscal ship that the US subsequently ran, it troughed when the US floated the greenback. Since then, the US has been fiscally irresponsible running large budget deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio has never looked back and very recently went parabolic (top panel, Chart 4). Charts 5 & 6 take a closer look at some macro variables in the 1940s and Charts 7 &  8 compare them to today. Chart 5The… The… The… Chart 6…1940s… …1940s… …1940s… First, YCC did not prevent the late-1948 recession (Chart 5, shaded areas). Crudely put, monetary stimulus is not a panacea for boom/bust cycles. Second, M2 growth was climbing at a 30%/annum rate, the money multiplier was on a secular advance and money velocity was surging especially in the first half of the 1940s (Chart 6). As a result and as expected, YCC caused three significant inflationary jumps (bottom panel, Chart 6) that aided the US government in bringing down the massive debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. inflating its way out of a debt trap) that it had accumulated via large deficits in the front half of the 1940s (top panel, Chart 5). Third, interest rates were a coiled spring and once the Treasury-Fed Accord was signed, they exploded higher (fourth panel, Chart 5). Finally, equities fared well during the first three years of YCC until the end of WWII, but then suffered an outsized setback until mid-1949, before recovering and taking out the 1945 highs in 1951 (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 7...Compared With… ...Compared With… ...Compared With… Chart 8…Today …Today …Today Were the Fed to embark on YCC in the near-future in order to monetize the US government’s deficits, there are a few parallels to draw with the 1940s especially given that the starting point of debt-to-GDP is similar to the WWII figure (top panel, Chart 4). The Fed would likely lose its independence. This would be a paradigm shift. The Fed would crowd out fixed income investors, and flood the market with US dollars. M2 money stock would continue to surge. Few investors will be chasing US dollar assets including equities. The path of least resistance would be significantly lower for the US dollar as foreign investors would flee. This debt monetization along with a depreciating currency and swelling money supply would result in inflation rearing its ugly head, especially given that import prices would soar. What is difficult to envision is how the economy would perform during an inflationary impulse. Our sense is that the risk of stagflation would rise significantly, especially given the current inverse correlation between M2 growth and the velocity of money.2 In the stagflationary 1970s, any liquidity injections via higher M2 growth failed to translate into rising money velocity. Importantly, the “Nixon shock” effectively ended the Bretton Woods system and floated the US dollar causing a 40% devaluation from peak-to-trough (Chart 9). Tack on the oil related supply shock and stagflation reigned supreme in the 1970s, owing to cost-push inflation. Chart 9Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator In contrast during the 1940s, demand-pull inflation hit the economy rather hard, as the US was retooling its industrial base to win WWII alongside its allies. Also the US dollar was linked to gold since the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and ten years later the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement ushered in the era of fixed exchange rates, which is a big difference from the 1970s.3 As a reminder, from a political perspective venturing down the inflation avenue is the least painful way of dealing with a debt burden, rather than pursuing tight fiscal policy which is synonymous with political suicide. From an equity perspective, owning commodity-levered sectors and other hard asset-linked equities including REITs would make sense as we highlighted in our recent inflation Special Report. Health care stocks would also shine in case of an inflationary spurt according to empirical evidence that we highlighted in the same Special Report. On the flip side, our inflation Special Report also revealed that shedding telecom services and utilities would be wise and most importantly avoiding technology stocks. Tech stocks are disinflationary beneficiaries as they are mired in constant deflation and have built business models not only to withstand, but also to thrive in deflation. Inflation is a tech killer as these growth stocks suffer when the discount rate spikes and causes valuations to move from a premium to a discount. Nevertheless, deflation/disinflation is more likely in the coming 12-to-18 months, whereas inflation is at least two-to-three years away as we mentioned in our recent inflation Special Report. This week we continue to augment our cyclicals versus defensives portfolio bent and take our defensive exposure down a notch by downgrading consumer staples to a modest below benchmark allocation via a downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index. Downgrade Hypermarkets To Underweight… Last summer we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight as we were preparing the portfolio to withstand a recessionary shock given that the yield curve had inverted. Fast forward to the March carnage in the equity markets and this defensive move served our portfolio well. However, we did not want to overstay our welcome and set a stop in order to exit this position that was triggered in late-March netting our portfolio 26% in relative gains. More recently, we have been adding cyclical exposure to the portfolio and lightening up on defensives and as a continuation of this shift we are now compelled to downgrade the S&P hypermarkets to underweight. The economy is reopening and thus it no longer pays to seek refuge in safe haven hypermarket equities. In fact most of the macro indicators we track suggest the recession is over that will sustain severe downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 10 shows that the ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent has slingshot from below 30 to north of 60, junk spreads are probing all-time lows, consumer confidence has troughed and small and medium enterprises hiring intentions are on the mend. Moreover, the extraordinary fiscal expansion has brought spending forward and PCE is all but certain to skyrocket when the Q3 GDP figures get released in late-October, signaling that the easy money has been made in Big Box retailers (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly, discretionary spending should pick up the slack from staple-related purchases, further dampening the need to own hypermarket shares (middle & bottom panels, Chart 11). Chart 10Rebounding Macro Rebounding Macro Rebounding Macro Chart 11Returning to Normality Returning to Normality Returning to Normality On the operating front, while WMT is making strides in its online presence and offering mix, non-store retail sales are on a tear dominated by King AMZN (as a reminder we are overweight the S&P internet retail index). This is a secular trend and should continue unabated and in a relative sense continue to weigh on hypermarket profitability (bottom panel, Chart 12). Finally, a significant tailwind is turning into a severe headwind for this industry: import price inflation. The US dollar has reversed course and it is in a freefall. Historically, the greenback has been an excellent leading indicator of import price inflation and the current message is grim for hypermarket razor thin profit margins (import prices shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 12Amazonification Is On Track Amazonification Is On Track Amazonification Is On Track Chart 13Currency Headwinds Currency Headwinds Currency Headwinds Adding it all up, softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HYPC – WMT, COST. …Which Pushes Consumer Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation The downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index tilts our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Countercyclical consumer staples stocks served their purpose and provided the support to our portfolio in the front half of the year when we needed them most. Now that the economic reopening is gaining steam and the government, the health care system and society are all ready to effectively deal with a flare up in the pandemic, the allure of defensive positioning has diminished. In other words, COVID-19 is currently a known known risk versus an unknown unknown risk early in the year, and defending against it now is more successful. Moreover, according to our mid-April research on what sectors investors should avoid during recessionary recoveries, consumer staples stocks trail the SPX on average by 660bps one year following the SPX trough. The current macro backdrop corroborates this analysis and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share prices. Not only is the ISM manufacturing survey on fire, but also consumer confidence is making an effort to trough (ISM manufacturing and consumer confidence shown inverted, Chart 14). Meanwhile, financial market variables emit a similarly bearish signal for safe haven staples stocks. Following a brief spike in the bond-to-stock ratio (BSR), the BSR has recently resumed its downdraft (top panel, Chart 15). Volatility has all but collapsed since soaring to over 80 in March, as the Fed has orchestrated a quashing of all asset class volatilities (middle panel, Chart 15). Lastly, the pairwise correlation between stocks in the S&P 500 has also nosedived bringing some semblance of normality back into equity markets (bottom panel, Chart 15). All three of these financial market variables will continue to exert downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 14V-shaped Recovery… V-shaped Recovery… V-shaped Recovery… Chart 15...Across The Board ...Across The Board ...Across The Board On the US dollar front, while consumer goods manufacturers get a P&L translation gain from a depreciating currency, their export exposure is on par with the SPX and does not provide a relative advantage. In marked contrast, empirical evidence shows that relative profitability moves in tandem with the greenback and the USD recent weakness will undercut consumer staples profitability (bottom panel, Chart 16), especially via climbing input cost inflation. In sum, a firming macro backdrop, the US dollar’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P consumer staples index to underweight. Chart 16Mind the Gap Mind the Gap Mind the Gap Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/special_reports/treasury_fed_accord/background 2     The velocity of money “is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. If the velocity of money is increasing, then more transactions are occurring between individuals in an economy.” Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 3    Our colleagues from The Bank Credit Analyst recently illustrated how a strong dollar is good for the US economy on a medium term basis. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings ​​​​​​​ Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 ​​​​​​​Favor value over growth

Highlights Global Credit Spreads: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the rout in February and March has driven corporate spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the coronavirus and US politics. Credit Strategy: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Feature Chart of the WeekA Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned A Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned A Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned Global credit markets have enjoyed a spectacular recovery from the carnage seen just five months ago when investors realized the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Investment Grade Corporate index has tightened from the 2020 high of 326bps to 130bps, while the OAS on the Global High-Yield index has narrowed from the 2020 high of 1192bps to 556bps. Unsurprisingly, those spread peaks both occurred on the same day: March 23, the day the US Federal Reserve announced their corporate bond buying programs. We have described the Fed’s actions as effectively removing the “left tail risk” of investing in credit, and not just in the US, by introducing a central bank liquidity backstop to the US corporate bond market. The backdrop for global credit markets, on the surface, seems typical for sustained spread compression (Chart of the Week). Economic optimism is buoyant, with the global ZEW expectations index now at the highest level since 2014. Monetary conditions are highly supportive, with near-0% policy rates across all developed economies and the balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England growing at a combined year-over-year pace of 46%. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US.  The next moves in credit will be more challenging and less rewarding than the past five months. Investment grade corporate credit spreads no longer offer compelling value in most developed economies, while high-yield spreads are tightening in the face of rising default rates in the US and Europe. While additional spread tightening is not out of the question in these markets, investors should consider rotating into credit sectors that still offer some relative value – like emerging market (EM) hard currency corporates. A World Tour Of Our Spread Valuation Indicators The sharp fall in global bond yields over the past several months has not just been confined to government debt. Yields have fallen toward, and even below, pre-virus lows for a variety of sectors ranging from US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to EM USD-denominated sovereign debt (Chart 2). Investors are clearly reaching for yield in the current environment of tiny risk-free government bond yields, with no greater sign of this than the recent new issue by a US sub-investment grade borrower of a 10-year bond with a coupon below 3%.1 The drop in credit yields has also occurred alongside tightening credit risk premiums, although spreads remain above the pre-virus lows for most sectors in the US, Europe and EM (Chart 3). The degree of correlation across global credit markets has been intense, with very little differentiation between countries. Investment grade corporate spreads in the US, UK and euro area are all closing in on 100bps; high-yield spreads in those same regions are all around 500bps. Chart 2Global Credit Yields Are Low Global Credit Yields Are Low Global Credit Yields Are Low Chart 3Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Last week, we introduced the concept of “yield chasing” to describe how the ranking of returns in developed market government bonds was becoming increasingly correlated to the ranking of outright yield levels.2 We have seen a similar dynamic unfold in global credit markets, especially since that peak in spreads in late March. In Chart 4 and Chart 5, we present the relationship between starting benchmark index yields, and the subsequent excess returns over risk-free government bonds, for a variety of developed market and EM credit products. The first chart covers the time from start of 2020 to the March 23 peak in spreads, while the second chart shows the relationship since then. The two charts are mirror images of each other. Chart 4Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (January 1 To March 20) What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? Chart 5Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (Since March 23) What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? The worst performing markets in the first three months of the year were those with the highest yield to begin 2020: high-yield corporates in the US and Europe along with EM credit, which have been the best performing markets since late March. The opposite is true for lower yielders like investment grade credit in Japan, the euro area and Australia, which were among the top performers before March 23 and have lagged sharply since then. While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Chart 6Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Measures of bond volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury options prices have declined to pre-pandemic lows, while the VIX index of US equity volatility is now down to 22 from the 2020 peak around 80 (Chart 6). The excess return volatility of US corporate bond markets has followed suit, thus allowing for lower US credit spreads. Even allowing for the lower levels of overall market volatility, corporate credit spreads do look relatively tight in the US and Europe. The ratio of the US investment grade index OAS to the VIX is now one standard deviation below the median since 2000 (Chart 7). A similar reading exists for the ratio of the US high-yield index OAS to the VIX, which is also one standard deviation below the long-run average (bottom panel). In the euro area, the ratios of investment grade and high-yield OAS to European equity volatility, the VStoxx index, are not as stretched as in the US, but remain below long-run median levels (Chart 8). Chart 7Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Chart 8Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol While these simple comparisons of spread to market volatility suggest that corporate credit spreads are tight in most major markets, other indicators paint a more nuanced picture of cross-market valuations. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads is the 12-month breakeven spread. That measures the amount of spread widening that must occur over a one-year horizon for a credit product to have the same return as government bonds. In other words, how much must spreads increase to eliminate the carry advantage of a credit product over a risk-free bond, after accounting for the volatility of that product. We compare those 12-month breakeven spreads with their own history in a percentile ranking, which determines the attractiveness of spreads. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. A look at breakeven spread percentile rankings for the major credit groupings in the US (Chart 9), euro area (Chart 10) and EM (Chart 11) shows more diverging spread valuations. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 10Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 11EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings The US investment grade breakeven spread is just below the 25th percentile of their long-run history, although the high-yield breakeven spread remains in the top quartile of its history. Euro area breakeven spreads are “fairly” valued, both sitting around the 50th percentile. The EM USD-denominated sovereign breakeven spread is in the third quartile below the 50th percentile, while the EM USD-denominated corporate breakeven spread looks better, sitting just at the 75th percentile. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. We would not be surprised to see US investment grade spreads tighten back to the previous cyclical low at some point in the next 6-12 months. There are more compelling opportunities in other global credit markets, however, especially on a risk-adjusted basis. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. Bottom Line: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the out in February and March has driven credit spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the virus and US politics. Spread valuations are looking more stretched, but “yield chasing” and “spread chasing” behavior will remain dominant with central banks encouraging risk-seeking behavior with easy money policies. Putting It All Together: Recommended Allocations One way to look at the relative attractiveness of global spread product sectors is to compare them all by 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. We show that in Chart 12, not just for the overall credit indices by country but also among credit tiers within each country. Sectors rated below investment grade are in red to differentiate from higher-quality markets. Chart 12Global Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads, Ordered By Percentile Ranks What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? The main conclusion form the chart is that there is a lot of red on the left side and none on the right side. That means junk bonds in the US and Europe have relatively high breakeven spreads, while investment grade credit in most countries have relatively lower breakeven spreads. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. To further refine the cross-country comparisons, we must look at those breakeven spreads relative to the riskiness of each sector. In Chart 13, we present a scatter graph plotting the 12-month breakeven spreads versus our preferred measure of credit risk, duration-times-spread (DTS), for all developed market corporate credit tiers, as well as EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The shaded region represents all values within +/- one standard error of the fitted regression line. Thus, sectors below that shaded region have breakeven spreads that are low relative to its DTS, suggesting a poor valuation/risk tradeoff. The opposite is true for sectors above the shaded region. Chart 13Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? The sectors that stand out as most attractive in this framework are B-rated and Caa-rated US high-yield, and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The least attractive sectors are US investment grade corporates, for both the overall index and the Baa-rated credit tier. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. Looking beyond the spread and volatility measures presented in this report, we must consider the default risk of high-yield bonds. Our preferred measure of valuation that incorporates default risk is the default-adjusted spread, which measures the current high-yield index spread net of default losses. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. The current US high-yield default-adjusted spread is now well below its long-run average (Chart 14). We expect a peak US default rate over the next year between 10-12% (levels seen after past US recessions) and a recovery rate given default between 20-25% (slightly below previous post-recession levels). That combination would mean that expected default loses from the COVID-19 recession could exceed the current level of the US high-yield index spread by as much as 400bps (see the bottom right of the chart). Given that risk of default losses overwhelming the attractiveness of US high-yield as measured by the 12-month breakeven spread, we prefer to stay up in quality by focusing on Ba-rated names within an overall neutral allocation to US junk bonds. For euro area high-yield, where default-adjusted spreads are also projected to be negative next year but with less attractive 12-month breakeven spreads, we recommend a cautious up-in-quality allocation to Ba-rated names only but within an overall underweight allocation. After ruling out increasing allocations to US B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield, that leaves the two remaining valuation outliers from Chart 13 - US investment grade and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The gap between the index OAS of the two has narrowed from the March peak of 446bps to the latest reading of 259bps (Chart 15). We believe that gap can narrow further towards 200bps, especially given the supportive EM backdrop of USD weakness and China policy stimulus – both factors that were in place during the last sustained period of EM corporate bond outperformance in 2016-17. Chart 14No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY Chart 15EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG We upgraded our recommended allocation to EM USD-denominated credit out of US investment grade back in mid-July, and we continue to view that as the most attractive relative value opportunity in global spread product on a risk/reward basis. Bottom Line: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-10/u-s-junk-bond-market-sets-record-low-coupon-in-relentless-rally 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? What Next For Global Corporate Credit Spreads? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The strong rally in certain mega-cap stocks has masked the muted revival in the broad equity universe. Limited fiscal stimulus and a broken monetary transmission mechanism herald lackluster economic and profit recoveries. While dedicated EM equity investors should for now maintain an underweight position in India within an EM equity portfolio, they should consider upgrading this bourse on potential near-term underperformance. Absolute-return investors should consider buying this bourse on a setback in the coming months. Fixed-income investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates but use any rupee selloff to rotate into cash bonds. Feature Indian share prices have staged a remarkable comeback following the financial carnage in March. However, the outlook for the economy and for corporate profits does not justify the current level of share prices. While this thesis is applicable to most markets around the world, the gap between share prices and economic activity is even larger in India. Chart I-1Loans To Companies Are Muted In India Loans To Companies Are Muted In India Loans To Companies Are Muted In India In particular: The credit and liquidity crunch has been more acute in India than in many other EM and DM economies. Bank loan growth has surged in many countries as companies have borrowed to avoid a liquidity crunch due to a plunge in sales. However, in India bank loans to companies been shown little improvement (Chart I-1). This means that enterprises in India have not been able to draw on bank loans – to the same extent as they have done elsewhere – to attenuate a liquidity crunch stemming from revenue contraction. As a result, Indian enterprises have retrenched more in terms of both employment and capital spending, and their rebound has been more muted. As an example, the global manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs have risen above the 50 line but the same measures in India remain below the 50 line (Chart I-2). India’s employment index from the Manpower group has fallen to a record low as of early July (Chart I-3). As a result, household nominal income growth – which was slumping before the pandemic – has fallen much further. Chart I-2India Is Lagging In Global Recovery India Is Lagging In Global Recovery India Is Lagging In Global Recovery Chart I-3India: Employment Conditions Are Very Poor India: Employment Conditions Are Very Poor India: Employment Conditions Are Very Poor   Passenger car and commercial vehicle sales have plummeted (Chart I-4). Corporate investment expenditure and production have crashed. Manufacturing output, capital goods production and imports all plummeted in March and April and rebounded only mildly in June (Chart I-5). Chart I-4India: Discretionary Spending Is Slow To Recover... India: Discretionary Spending Is Slow To Recover... India: Discretionary Spending Is Slow To Recover... Chart I-5...As Are Production And Investment ...As Are Production And Investment ...As Are Production And Investment Table I-1India: Share Of Each Equity Sector In Profits & Market Cap Strategy For Indian Equities And Fixed-Income Strategy For Indian Equities And Fixed-Income Economic activity will improve gradually but the level of activity will remain below the pandemic level for some time. As a result, corporate profits will be slow to revive. Odds are that it will take more than one and half years before the EPS of listed companies reach their 2019 level. This is especially true for severely hit sectors – financials, industrials, materials, and consumer discretionary stocks – which together account for 44% of listed companies’ profits. The sectors less affected by the pandemic recession – namely, consumer staples, information technology and health care – together account for 30% of corporate profits (Table I-1). A Breakdown In The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Impediments to rapid economic recovery are the modest fiscal stimulus and a breakdown in the monetary transmission mechanism. While India announced a large fiscal stimulus, much of this is made up of loan guarantees. Some measures like central bank purchases of government bonds also do not represent actual fiscal spending. Chart I-6 illustrates that government spending has risen only moderately and it has been offset by the drop in the credit impulse. Provided that the credit impulse will remain weak due to reasons we discuss below, the aggregate stimulus will not be sufficient to produce a robust and rapid recovery. The outlook for the economy and for corporate profits does not justify the current level of share prices. Critically, the monetary policy transmission mechanism was impaired even before the pandemic broke out in India, and the situation has gotten worse since March. Even though the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been reducing its policy rate, the prime lending rate has dropped very modestly (Chart I-7). Indian commercial banks which are saddled with non-performing loans (NPLs) have been reluctant to reduce their lending rates. Chart I-6Drag From Credit Impulse Has Offset Fiscal Stimulus Drag From Credit Impulse Has Offset Fiscal Stimulus Drag From Credit Impulse Has Offset Fiscal Stimulus Chart I-7India: Very Little Decline In Prime Lending Rate India: Very Little Decline In Prime Lending Rate India: Very Little Decline In Prime Lending Rate   Even though AAA local currency corporate bond yields have dropped, BBB corporate bond yields remain above 10% (Chart I-8). This compares with 5-year government bond yields of 5%. Critically, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, borrowing costs remain elevated (Chart I-9). Such elevated real borrowing costs will continue to hinder credit demand. Chart I-8Corporate Bond Yields Remain Elevated Corporate Bond Yields Remain Elevated Corporate Bond Yields Remain Elevated Chart I-9Borrowing Costs In Real Terms Are Restrictive Borrowing Costs In Real Terms Are Restrictive Borrowing Costs In Real Terms Are Restrictive   Finally, banks might be reluctant to originate much credit because of the rise in NPLs and the uncertainty over the extension of government guarantees on pandemic-induced NPLs and their own recapitalization programs. Bottom Line: Limited fiscal stimulus and a broken monetary transmission mechanism herald lackluster economic and profit recoveries. Beyond Mega Caps The strong rally in certain mega-cap stocks has masked the muted revival in the broad equity universe. The MSCI equity index has rallied by 50% since its late March lows and stands only 7% below its pre-pandemic highs in local currency terms. Yet, the MSCI equal-weighted index and small caps are, in local currency terms, still 15% and 16% below their pre-pandemic highs, respectively (Chart I-10). The performance of the overall equity index has been exaggerated by the rally in Reliance Industries’ share price as well as information technology stocks, consumer staples and health care. The 150% surge in Reliance Industries stock price since late March lows is due to company-specific rather than macro factors. This company presently accounts for 15% of the MSCI India index. The monetary policy transmission mechanism was impaired even before the pandemic broke out in India. In addition, info technology, consumer staples and health care (including sales of personal care products and medicine) have benefited due to the pandemic. By contrast, equity sectors leveraged to the business cycle in general and discretionary spending in particular have all underperformed. Importantly, bank share prices have been devasted due to poor economic growth and rising NPLs. India’s mega-cap stocks that have led the rally since March lows are expensive, as anywhere else. Finally, India’s equal-weighted equity index has failed to meaningfully outperform the EM equal-weighted index after underperforming severely in late 2019 and Q1 2020 (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Muted Revival In Broader Equity Universe Muted Revival In Broader Equity Universe Muted Revival In Broader Equity Universe Chart I-11India Relative To EM: Little Outperformance India Relative To EM: Little Outperformance India Relative To EM: Little Outperformance   Bottom Line: The advance in Indian share prices has been amplified by the rally in large-cap stocks. Meanwhile, the equal-weighted and small-cap indexes have done considerably worse reflecting the downbeat economic conditions. Equity Valuations And Strategy Chart I-12Indian Equity Valuations Are Elevated On A Market-Cap Basis... Indian Equity Valuations Are Elevated On A Market-Cap Basis... Indian Equity Valuations Are Elevated On A Market-Cap Basis... As discussed earlier, India’s equity market leaders like information technology, consumer staples and health care are already expensive, trading at a trailing P/E ratio of 23, 47 and 33, respectively. The rest of the equity market is not expensive, but its profit outlook is mediocre. As to other valuation metrices, the market seems to be moderately expensive both on an absolute basis and versus the EM equity benchmark: The 12-month forward P/E ratio is 22.5, the highest in the decade (Chart I-12, top panel). Relative to the EM benchmark, on the same measure is trading at 50% premium (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Based on the equal-weighted equity index – i.e. stripping out the effect of large-cap stocks on the index, Indian equities are overvalued in absolute terms (Chart I-13, top panel). On this equal-weighted measure, Indian stocks are currently trading at a 35% premium versus their EM peers (Chart I-13, bottom panel). The cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio is close to the historical mean (Chart I-14, top panel). Chart I-13...And On An Equal-Weighted Basis ...And On An Equal-Weighted Basis ...And On An Equal-Weighted Basis Chart I-14Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio   However, the CAPE ratio is agnostic to corporate earnings on a cyclical horizon. It assumes corporate profits will revert to their long-term rising trend (Chart I-14, bottom panel). This is not assured in the next six months in our opinion. Hence, a lackluster profits recovery – profits disappointments – is a risk to the performance of India’s bourse in the coming months. Equity Strategy: Weighing pros and cons, we recommend that dedicated EM equity investors maintain an underweight position in India within an EM equity portfolio. However, they should consider upgrading this bourse on potential near-term underperformance. The strong rally in certain mega-cap stocks has masked the muted revival in the broad equity universe. Absolute-return investors should consider buying this bourse on a setback in the coming months. Odds are that the index could drop up to 15% in US dollar terms triggered by a potential global risk-off phase and domestic profit disappointments. Currency And Fixed-Income Chart I-15Consumer Inflation Is Not A Problem In India Consumer Inflation Is Not A Problem In India Consumer Inflation Is Not A Problem In India We have been recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in India since April 23 and this recommendation remains intact. As argued above, the economic recovery will be gradual, and the output gap will remain negative for some time. Consequently, wages and inflation will likely surprise on the downside. Even though headline and core inflation rates have recently picked up, this has been due to a rise in food prices, transportation and personal care products (Chart I-15). Hence, there are not genuine inflationary pressures in India and the RBI will be making a mistake if it stops easing due to rises in headline or core CPI readings. Food prices have been rising for a while due to supply shocks. Importantly, the rise in food prices should not be interpreted as genuine inflation. Meanwhile, personal care products include gold jewelry and this CPI sub-component has therefore been rising due to the surge in gold prices (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Finally, transport costs have been on the rise due to supply chain bottlenecks in India as a result of COVID-19 and due to the rise in global oil prices. The broken monetary transmission mechanism means that the RBI will have to cut rates by much more. The fixed-income market is not discounting rate cuts.  There is value in long-term rates in India. The yield curve is very steep – the spread between 10-year and 1-year swap rates is 92 basis points. In addition, 10-year government bond yields are currently yielding 522 basis points above 10-year US Treasurys. We are not particularly concerned about public debt. Central government debt was at 52% of GDP before the recession and total public debt (including both central and state governments) was 80% of GDP. The same ratios are much higher in many other EM and DM economies. Chart I-16India's Stock-To-Bond Ratio Is At A Critical Resistance India's Stock-To-Bond Ratio Is At A Critical Resistance India's Stock-To-Bond Ratio Is At A Critical Resistance Finally, the rupee could correct as the US dollar rebounds from oversold levels, but foreign investors should use that setback in India’s exchange rate to rotate from receiving rates to buying 10-year government bonds outright, i.e., taking on currency risk. The RBI has been accumulating foreign exchange reserves, meaning it has been preventing the currency from appreciating. The current account is balanced and the financial/capital account has passed its worse phase. India will continue to attract foreign capital due to its long-term appeal and higher-than-elsewhere interest rates.  Domestic investors should favor bonds over stocks in the near term (Chart I-16). Bottom Line: Continue betting on lower interest rates in India. Fixed income investors should switch from receiving rates to buying 10-year government bonds on a correction in the rupee in the coming months. Dedicated EM local currency bond portfolios should continue overweighting India.     Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations