Fixed Income

HighlightsUpgrade odds of Russia invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. The US and allies are transferring arms to Ukraine while seeking alternate energy supply for Europe.Of the 75% war risk, we give 10% odds to Russia conquering all of Ukraine, as discussed in our “Five Black Swans For 2022.” Russia’s limited war aims worked in 2014 and President Putin tends to take calculated military risks. Full-scale invasion would force the West to unify.The remaining 25% goes to diplomatic resolution. It appears that the US is not offering Russia sufficient security guarantees. Ukrainian leaders do not have a domestic mandate to surrender and have not done so for eight years. Russia cannot accept the  status quo now that it has made armed demands for big change.Our third key view for 2022 – that oil producing states have geopolitical leverage – is vividly on display.Tactically stay defensive. But cyclically stay invested. Book 10% gain on long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Book a 8.6% gain on long CAD-RUB.FeatureUkraine’s economy is small but investors rightly worry that an expansion of the still simmering 2014 war there will cause Europe’s energy supply to tighten, pushing up prices and dragging on European demand. Russia would cut off natural gas to Ukraine, which would cut off 6.6% of Europe’s natural gas imports, 18% of Germany’s, 77% of Hungary’s, and 38% of Italy’s (Chart 1). Chart 1Ukraine Hinges On Germany All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update)  If Europe retaliates against Russia with crippling sanctions, Russia and Belarus could conceivably cut off another 20% of Europe’s imports and 60% of Germany’s imports. The Czech Republic, Finland, and Hungary get almost 100% of their natural gas from Ukraine and Russia, while Finland, Poland, and Hungary get more than half of their oil from Russia. In other words, Europe will try to avoid war and try to limit sanctions so that Russia does not further reduce supply.Yet Russia, if waging war, will prefer to receive revenues from Europe, as long as Europe is still buying. Thus Russia will keep its military aims limited so that Germany and other countries have a basis for watering down sanctions to keep the energy flowing and avoid a recession. The US has already committed to sweeping sanctions against Russia and is much more likely to follow through (though President Biden also wants to avoid an energy shock ahead of midterm elections).Energy consumption amounts to only 2% of European GDP, though it could rise to 5% in the event of a shock, as our European Investment Strategist Mathieu Savary has shown. This number would not be far from the 7% reached in 2008, which coincided with financial crisis and recession. All of Europe will suffer from high prices, not only those that import via Ukraine, and Europe’s supply squeeze would push up global prices as well. So the risk of a recession in Europe will rise if the energy squeeze worsens, even if a recession is ultimately avoided.Whatever Russia ends up doing with its military, it may start off with shock and awe. Europe might see its first major war since World War II. Global investors will react very negatively, at least until they can be assured that the conflict will remain contained in Ukraine. According to our market-based quantitative indicators of Russian geopolitical risk, there is still complacency – the ruble has not fallen as far as one would expect based on key macro variables (Chart 2). Chart 2Russia Geopolitical Risk: Two Quantitative Indicators Russia Geopolitical Risk: Two Quantitative Indicators Russia Geopolitical Risk: Two Quantitative Indicators   Chart 3Russian Market Reaction Amid Ukraine Crisis Russian Market Reaction Amid Ukraine Crisis Russian Market Reaction Amid Ukraine Crisis  Investors will sell European – especially eastern European – equities and currencies even more rapidly if a war breaks out (Chart 3). It is too soon to buy the dip. What is needed is a Russian decision and then clarity on the scope of the western reaction. Even then, developed Europe and non-European emerging markets will be more attractive.Looking at global equities: How did the market respond to previous Russian invasions?Few conclusions can be drawn from Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, given Georgia’s lack of systemic importance and the simultaneous global financial crisis (Chart 4). Stocks underperformed bonds and cyclicals underperformed defensives, but value caught a bid relative to growth.Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 occurred in a different macroeconomic context but saw stocks flat relative to bonds, cyclicals fall relative to defensives (except energy stocks), and small caps roll over relative to large caps (Chart 5). Value stocks, however, outperformed growth stocks. Chart 4Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Georgia Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Georgia Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Georgia ​​​​​  Chart 5Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Crimea Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Crimea Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Crimea ​​​​​  Chart 6Ukraine Crisis And Energy: 2022 Versus 2014 Ukraine Crisis And Energy: 2022 Versus 2014 Ukraine Crisis And Energy: 2022 Versus 2014  However, in today’s context, these cyclical trends are looking stretched, so a temporary pullback from these trends should be expected. Value stocks, especially energy stocks, have skyrocketed relative to growth and defensives and are likely to pull back in a global risk-off move (Chart 6). Tactically we recommend American over European assets, defensives over cyclicals, large caps over small caps, and safe-haven assets like gold and the Japanese yen.Washington Offers “No Change” To MoscowWhy is a diplomatic solution less likely than before?The US offered no concessions to Russia in its formal written response to Russia’s demands on January 26. “No change, and there will be no change” in longstanding policies, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.1 The relevant policies are not about NATO membership – Ukraine is never going to join NATO – but rather about the US and NATO making Ukraine a de facto member by providing arms and defense cooperation. Russia obviously sees a US-armed Ukraine as a threat to its national security.One of the few realistic demands of Russia’s – that the US and NATO stop providing arms – has been flung back in Russia’s face. Blinken pointed out in his press conference that the US has given more defense aid to Ukraine in the past year than in any previous year. He said the US will continue to provide arms while pursuing diplomacy, including five MI-17 helicopters on the way. He also noted that the US has authorized allies to transfer American-origin arms to Ukraine.2The importance of the defense cooperation is not the quality of the arms being transferred (so far) but the long-term potential for the US to turn Ukraine into Russia’s Taiwan, i.e. a foreign-backed military enemy on its doorstep. The costs of inaction today could be checkmate from Russia’s long-term strategic point of view. Russia has warned for 14 years that it saw Ukraine as a red line and yet the US and NATO have increased defense cooperation. It is a moot point whether the US provides arms because it does not empathize with Russia’s security interests or because it believes Russia will attack Ukraine regardless.A diplomatic solution could still come from the US, if more information comes to light, or from Ukraine itself, under French and German pressure. Ukraine could make promises to respect Russia’s national security interests and implement the Minsk Protocols it was forced into after Russia seized Crimea in 2014.3If Ukraine surrenders, Russia can claim victory and reduce the threat of war, at least temporarily. But it would not eliminate the long-term risk of war since Ukraine’s government may not be willing or able to implement any such agreement. Ukraine views the Minsk agreement as a Russian imposition and it has rejected key parts of it (such as federalization and granting rights and privileges to Russian separatists in Donbass) for eight years already.4The joint statement from Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany on January 26 reaffirms the ceasefire in the Donbass.5 It is unlikely that Russia can walk away with this ceasefire alone, having made fundamental demands regarding Russia’s long-term security and the European order. It is more likely that any Ukrainian violation of the ceasefire will now offer a pretext for Russia to respond with military force.Russia’s military advantage is immediate whereas diplomatic attempts by Ukraine to buy time could help it stage a more formidable defense against Russia in future, given ongoing US and NATO defense cooperation. This is why the continuation of arms transfers is the signal. Russia is incentivized to take action sooner rather than later now that the western willingness and urgency to provide arms has increased.Putin has succeeded with his “small war” and “hybrid war” strategy thus far. Russian forex and gold reserves at $630 billion (38% of GDP), gradual diversification away from the dollar (16% of forex reserves), low short-term external debt (5% of GDP), an alternative bank communication system, a special economic relationship with China, a Eurasian Economic Union that can help circumvent sanctions, all provide Russia with some buffer against US sanctions.GeoRisk Indicators: Europe Chart 7European GeoRisk Indicator Amid Ukraine Crisis European GeoRisk Indicator Amid Ukraine Crisis European GeoRisk Indicator Amid Ukraine Crisis  In our Q3 2021 outlook, we argued that European political risk had bottomed due to Russia. Our geopolitical risk indicators show that financial markets tend to price European political risks in line with the USD-EUR exchange rate. The dollar rallied in 2021 and has since fallen back but a war and energy squeeze in Europe should help the dollar stay resilient, as should Federal Reserve rate hikes (Chart 7).If Russia attacks, the Ukrainians will fall back and then mount an insurgency. This will make the war more difficult than its planners initially believe. It will also raise the risk that war will spill over. Neighbors that provide economic aid – not to mention military aid – will eventually make themselves vulnerable to Russian attack, either to destroy commerce or cut insurgency supply lines.NATO will fortify its borders with troops but then tensions will grow on those borders, reducing security and raising uncertainty in the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Ukraine could become a war zone like Libya or Syria except that this time the US and Russia would truly be fighting a proxy war against each other.Other European Risks Pale In ComparisonWe will monitor the French election in case the Ukraine conflict causes dynamics to shift against President Emmanuel Macron. Most likely Macron’s diplomatic flourishes, combined with France’s insulation from Russia and Ukraine, will benefit him at the ballot box.In the UK, Prime Minister Boris Johnson faces a leadership challenge. He will probably survive but the Conservative Party faces a serious challenge over the coming years. Labour’s comeback will build ahead of the next election, given that the pandemic has dealt a powerful blow against the Tories, who have been in power since 2010 and are therefore becoming stale. Labour has gotten over the Jeremy Corbyn problem.What matters is whether the UK rejoins the EU, whether Scotland leaves the UK, and whether the next government has a strong majority with which to lead. So far there have not been major changes on these issues:The Tories still have a 75-seat majority through 2024.Support for Scottish independence is stuck at 45% where it has been since 2014.Polling is still evenly divided on Brexit. Labour taking power is a prerequisite to any reunion with the EU, Labour does not want to campaign on re-opening the Brexit issue. While Labour will want to run against inflation, and win back the middle class, rather than for the EU.Thus political risk will be flat, not returning to Brexit highs anytime soon, which is marginally good news for pound sterling over a cyclical horizon (Chart 8). Chart 8UK GeoRisk Indicator And Boris Johnson's Troubles UK GeoRisk Indicator And Boris Johnson's Troubles UK GeoRisk Indicator And Boris Johnson's Troubles  India Enters Populist Phase Of Election Cycle2022 will mark the beginning of India’s election season in full earnest, even though general elections are not due until 2024. This is because within the five-year election cycle spanning from 2019-2024, this year will see elections in some of India’s largest states (Chart 9).More importantly 2022 will see elections take place in most of India’s northern region (Chart 10), which is a key constituency for the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Chart 9India: Major State Elections This Year All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) ​​​​​  Chart 10North India In Focus With State Elections All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) ​​​​​ Of all the state elections due this year, the most critical will be those in Uttar Pradesh, where voting will begin on February 10, 2022. Final results will be declared a month later on March 10, 2022.Uttar Pradesh Will Disappoint BJPAt the last state elections held in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, BJP stormed into power with one of the strongest mandates ever seen in this sprawling and heterogenous state. The BJP boosted its seat share to an extraordinary 77%, leaving competitors far behind (Chart 11). Chart 11Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) Stormed Into Power In Uttar Pradesh (UP) In 2017 All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update)  Cut to 2022, the BJP appears likely to cross the 50% majority threshold but will cede seat share to a regional party called the Samajwadi Party (SP).What will drive this reduction in seats? The reduction will be driven by a degree of anti-incumbency sentiment and some adverse socio-political arithmetic. In a state where voting is still driven to a large extent by identity politics, it is worth recalling that the BJP was able to win the 2017 elections by pulling votes from three distinct communities:BJP’s core constituency of upper caste Hindus.A subset of Other Backward Classes (OBCs).A subset of a community belonging historically to one of the lowest social levels in India called Dalits.This winning formula of 2017 may not work in 2022 as the BJP faces resentment from parts of each of these three communities as well as from farmers (who were against farm law reforms that the BJP tried to pass).There is a chance that these groups may flock to the regional Samajwadi Party in 2022. The latter is in a position of strength as it is expected to retain support from its core constituency of Muslims and upper-caste OBCs too.Yet the risk is to the downside for the ruling party. Modi and the BJP have suffered a hit to their popular support from the global pandemic and recession, like other world leaders.Reading The Tea Leaves For 2024The pro-Modi wave that began in 2014, and gained steam in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, became a tsunami by 2019, causing the BJP to win a decisive 56% of seats in the national assembly. So, if the BJP loses seats in Uttar Pradesh this year, what will be the implications for the general elections of 2024?In a base case scenario, the Modi-led BJP appears set to emerge as the single largest party in the 2024 elections (albeit with a lower seat share than the 62 of 80 seats that the BJP managed in 2019). As the BJP administration ages, it is expected to lose a degree of seat share in its core constituency of north India. But these losses should be partially offset by gains in regions like east India where the BJP continues to make inroads. Also, national parties tend to attract higher vote share at general elections as compared to state elections, and this is true for the BJP. Most likely the pandemic will have fallen away by 2024 and the economy will be expanding.However, a lot can change in two years, and a major disappointment at Uttar Pradesh would sound alarm bells. By 2024, the BJP will have been in power for ten years. So it is not a foregone conclusion that the BJP will win a single-party majority for a third time, even if it does remain the biggest party.Regional parties like the Samajwadi Party (from Uttar Pradesh), Trinamool Congress (from West Bengal), Shiv Sena (from Maharashtra) and Aam Aadmi Party (from New Delhi) are small but rising and may incrementally eat into the BJP’s national seat share.Policy Implications For 2022 Chart 12India’s Fiscal Report Card May Worsen With Populism All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update) All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update)  India’s central government will unveil its budget for FY23 on Feb 1, 2022 in the Indian parliament. We expect the government to announce a fiscal deficit of 6.6% of GDP which will be marginally lower than the FY22 target of 6.8% of GDP. However, with key elections around the corner, we allocate a high probability to the government announcing a big-bang pro-farmer or pro-poor scheme from this pulpit. This high focus on populism and inadequate focus on capital expenditure could lead markets to question India’s fiscal well-being at a time when its debt levels are high (Chart 12).Distinct from policy risks in the short run, geopolitical risks confronting India are elevated too. India’s relationship with China continues to fester. Sino-Indian frictions could easily take a turn for the worst in 2022 as India enters the business end of its five-year election cycle on one hand and China’s all-important 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP) is due in the fall of 2022. China could take advantage of US distraction in Ukraine to flex its muscles in Asia. A geopolitical showdown with China would likely only cause a temporary drop in Indian equities, but taken with other factors, now is not the time to buy.Bottom Line: We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India.GeoRisk Indicators: Rest Of WorldNeutral China: China’s performance relative to emerging markets may be starting to bottom but we do not recommend buying it. Domestic political risk is still rising according to our indicator and we expect it to keep rising (Chart 13). Negative political surprises will occur in the lead up to the twentieth national party congress and the March 2023 implementation of the “Common Prosperity” plan. Any Russian conflict will distract the US and enable General Secretary Xi Jinping to cement his second ten-year term in office – and China’s reversion to autocracy – with minimal foreign opposition. The US’s conflict with China is one reason Russia believes it has a window of opportunity. Chart 13CHINA GEORISK INDICATOR CHINA GEORISK INDICATOR CHINA GEORISK INDICATOR  Short Taiwan: Taiwan’s geopolitical risk has paused far short of previous peaks as the country’s currency and stock market benefit from the ongoing semiconductor shortage. But a peak may be starting to form in relative equity performance (Chart 14). We doubt that China will see any Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 as an opportunity to invade Taiwan, although economic sanctions and cyber-attacks are an option that we fully anticipate. Invading Taiwan is far more difficult militarily than invading Ukraine and China is less ready than Russia for such an operation. However, China might be able to exploit a Russian attack as soon as 2024. Chart 14TAIWAN TERRITORY GEORISK INDICATOR TAIWAN TERRITORY GEORISK INDICATOR TAIWAN TERRITORY GEORISK INDICATOR  Long South Korea: South Korea’s presidential election is approaching on March 9 and this event combined with North Korea’s new cycle of missile provocations will keep political risk elevated (Chart 15). The conservative People Power party has pulled ahead in opinion polling and the incumbent Democratic Party has been weakened by the pandemic. But the race is still fairly tight and a viable third party candidate could make a comeback. China’s policy easing should eventually benefit South Korea. Chart 15SOUTH KOREA GEORISK INDICATOR SOUTH KOREA GEORISK INDICATOR SOUTH KOREA GEORISK INDICATOR  Long Australia: Australia’s federal election must be held by May 21 and anti-incumbency feeling has taken hold, with the Liberal-National coalition collapsing in opinion polls relative to the Australian Labor Party. Australia still faces shockwaves from the pandemic and China’s secular slowdown, reversion to autocracy, and conflict with the US, especially if the US gets distracted in Europe. Political risk is high and rising (Chart 16). However, Australia benefits from rising commodity prices and we favor developed markets outside the United States. Chart 16AUSTRALIA GEORISK INDICATOR AUSTRALIA GEORISK INDICATOR AUSTRALIA GEORISK INDICATOR  Long Canada: Canada’s recapitalized its political system with last year’s general election and political risk is subsiding (Chart 17). Canada benefits from rising oil and commodity prices and close proximity to the hyper-stimulated US economy. Chart 17CANADA GEORISK INDICATOR CANADA GEORISK INDICATOR CANADA GEORISK INDICATOR  Neutral Turkey: Turkey is one of our perennial candidates for a “black swan” event as the country’s political stability continues to suffer under strongman rule, unorthodox monetary and fiscal policy, military adventures in North Africa and Syria, and now a Russian bid to dominate the Black Sea. Elections looming in 2023 will provoke turmoil as the Erdogan administration is extremely vulnerable and yet has many ways to try to cling to power (Chart 18). Chart 18TURKEY GEORISK INDICATOR TURKEY GEORISK INDICATOR TURKEY GEORISK INDICATOR  Neutral Brazil: Brazilian political risk is subsiding as the market expects former President Lula da Silva to return to power in this October’s presidential election and replace current populist President Jair Bolsonaro. Relative equity performance always appears as if it has bottomed only to inch lower in the next selloff. China’s policy easing is a boon for Brazil but China is not providing massive stimulus, the election will be tumultuous, and even a Lula victory will need to see a market riot to ensure that structural reforms are pursued (Chart 19). Chart 19BRAZIL GEORISK INDICATOR BRAZIL GEORISK INDICATOR BRAZIL GEORISK INDICATOR  Long South Africa: South Africa still faces elevated political risk despite the conclusion of the 2021 municipal elections. However, the ruling African National Congress, which is pursuing an anti-corruption drive, is likely to stay in power, lending policy continuity. Equities have bottomed and are rebounding relative to emerging markets (Chart 20). The danger is that structural reforms will slip ahead of the spring 2024 election. Chart 20SOUTH AFRICA GEORISK INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA GEORISK INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA GEORISK INDICATOR  Investment TakeawaysTactically stay long gold, defensives over cyclicals, large caps over small caps, Japanese industrials versus German, GBP-CZK, and JPY-KRW.Book a 10% gain on long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Book a 8.6% gain on long CAD-RUB.   Matt Gertken Vice PresidentGeopolitical Strategymattg@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFAEditor/Strategistritika.mankar@bcaresearch.comFootnotes1      For Blinken’s press conference on the US formal response to Russia, see US Department of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability," January 26, 2022, state.gov.2     For Ukraine’s criticism that Germany should offer pillows in addition to helmets, see Humeyra Pamuk and Dmitry Antonov, "U.S. responds to Russia security demands as Ukraine tensions mount," Reuters, January 26, 2022, reuters.com. For the US’s $2.5 billion in defense aid to Ukraine since 2014, see Elias Yousif, "U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine," January 26, 2022, stimson.org. For purpose and significance, see Samuel Charap and Scott Boston, "U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?" Rand Blog, rand.org.3     Michael Kofman, "Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West," War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022, warontherocks.com.4     In 2021 the US apparently moved to embrace the Minsk Protocols for the first time, but since then it has not joined the talks. See National Security Adviser Jack Sullivan, "White House Daily Briefing," December 7, 2021, c-span.org. 5             Élysée, "Declaration of the advisors to the N4 Heads of States and Governments," January 26, 2022, elysee.fr. See also "Russia, Ukraine agree to uphold cease-fire in Normandy talks," DW, January 26, 2022, dw.com.Geopolitical CalendarStrategic ThemesOpen Tactical Positions (0-6 Months)Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights In the short term, the US stock market price will track the 30-year T-bond price, with every 10 bps move in the yield moving the stock market and bond price by 2.5 percent. We think that the bond market will not allow the stock market to suffer a peak-to-trough decline of more than 15-20 percent. Given that the drawdown is already 10 percent, it equates to no more than 20-40 bps of upside for the 30-year T-bond yield, to a level of 2.3-2.5 percent. Hence, we are quite close to an entry-point for both stocks and long-duration bonds. In the next few years, the structural bull market will continue, ending only at the ultimate low in the 30-year bond yield. But on a 5-year horizon, the blockchain will be the undoing of the US stock market – by undermining the vast profits that the US tech behemoths make from owning, controlling, and manipulating our data and the digital content that we create. In that sense, the blockchain will ultimately reveal – and pop – a ‘super bubble’. Fractal trading watchlist: We add Korea and CAD/SEK, and update bitcoin, biotech, and nickel versus silver. Feature Chart of the WeekIf The Market Is Not Far From Its Fundamentals, Can This Really Be A 'Super Bubble'? If The Market Is Not Far From Its Fundamentals, Can This Really Be A 'Super Bubble'? If The Market Is Not Far From Its Fundamentals, Can This Really Be A 'Super Bubble'? Why has the stock market started 2022 on such a poor footing? Chart I-2 and Chart I-3 identify the main culprit. Through the past year, the tech-heavy Nasdaq index has been tracking the 30-year T-bond price on a one-for-one basis, while the broader S&P 500 shows a connection that is almost as good. Chart I-2The Nasdaq Has Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One... The Nasdaq Has Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One... The Nasdaq Has Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One... Chart I-3…The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price ...The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price ...The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price Therefore, as the 30-year T-bond price has taken a tumble, so have growth-heavy stock markets. Put simply, the ‘bond component’ of these stock markets has been dominating recent performance, overwhelming the ‘profits component’ which tends to move more glacially. It follows that the short-term direction of the stock market has been set – and will continue to be set – by the direction of the 30-year T-bond price. Stocks And Bonds Are Nearing A ‘Pinch Point’ The next few paragraphs are necessarily technical, but worth absorbing – as they are fundamental to understanding the stock market’s recent sell-off, as well as its future evolution. The duration of any investment quantifies how far into the future its cashflows lie, by averaging those cashflows into one theoretical future ‘lump sum’. For a bond, the duration also equals the percentage change in the bond price for every 1 percent change in its yield.1 Crucially, the duration of the US stock market is the same as that of the 30-year T-bond, at around 25 years. Therefore, if all else were equal, the US stock market price should track the 30-year T-bond price, with every 10 bps move in the yield moving the stock market and bond prices by 2.5 percent. In the long run of course, all else is not equal. The 30-year T-bond generates a fixed income stream, whereas the stock market generates income that tracks profits. Allowing for this difference, the US stock market should track: (The 30-year T-bond price) multiplied by (profits expected in the year ahead) multiplied by (a constant) In which the constant expresses the theoretical lump-sum payment 25 years ahead as a multiple of the profits in the year ahead – and thereby quantifies the expected structural growth in profits. We can ignore this constant if the structural growth in profits does not change. Nevertheless, remember this constant, as we will come back to it later when we discuss a putative ‘super bubble’. The ‘bond component’ of the stock market has been dominating recent performance. This model for the stock market seems simplistic. Yet it provides an excellent explanation for the market’s evolution through the past 40 years (Chart I-4), as well as through the past year in which, to repeat, the bond component has been the dominant driver. Chart I-4The US Stock Market = The 30-Year T-Bond Price Multiplied By Profits The US Stock Market = The 30-Year T-Bond Price Multiplied By Profits The US Stock Market = The 30-Year T-Bond Price Multiplied By Profits In the short term then, given the 25 year duration of the US stock market, every 10 bps rise in the 30-year T-bond yield will drag down the stock market by 2.5 percent. We can also deduce that the sell-off will be self-limiting and self-correcting, because at some ‘pinch point’ the bond market will assess that the deflationary impulse from financial instability will snuff out the recent inflationary impulse in the economy. Where is that pinch point? Our sense is that the bond market will not allow the stock market to suffer a peak-to-trough decline of more than 15-20 percent. Given that the drawdown is already 10 percent, it equates to no more than 20-40 bps of upside for the 30-year T-bond yield, to a level of 2.3-2.5 percent. Hence, we are quite close to an entry-point for both stocks and long-duration bonds. The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) As is typical, the recent market setback has unleashed narratives of an almighty bubble starting to pop. Stealing the headlines is value investor Jeremy Grantham of GMO, who claims that “today in the US we are in the fourth super bubble of the last hundred years.” Is there any merit to Mr. Grantham’s claim? An investment is in a bubble if its price has completely broken free from its fundamentals. For example, in the dot com boom, the stock market did become a super bubble. But as we have just shown, the US stock market today is not that far removed from its fundamental components of the 30-year T-bond price multiplied by profits. At first glance then, Mr. Grantham appears to be wrong (Chart of the Week). Still, if the underlying components – the 30-year T-bond and/or profits – were in a bubble, then the stock market would also be in a bubble. In this regard, isn’t the deeply negative real yield on long-dated bonds a sure sign of a bubble? The answer is, not necessarily. As we explained last week in Time To Get Real About Real Interest Rates, the deeply negative real yield on Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) is premised on an expected rate of inflation that we should take with a huge dose of salt. Putting in a more realistic forward inflation rate, the real yield on long-dated bonds is positive, albeit just. What about profits – are they in a bubble? The US (and world) profit margin stands at an all-time high, around 20 percent greater than its post-GFC average (Chart I-5). But a 20 percent excess is not quite what we mean by a bubble. Chart I-5Profit Margins Are At An All-Time High Profit Margins Are At An All-Time High Profit Margins Are At An All-Time High There is one final way that Mr. Grantham could be right, and for this we must come back to the previously mentioned constant which quantifies the expected long-term growth in profits. If this expected structural growth were to collapse, then the stock market would also collapse. This is precisely what happened to the non-US stock market after the dot com bust, when the expected structural growth – and therefore the structural valuation – phase-shifted sharply lower (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). As a result, the non-US stock market also phase-shifted sharply lower from the previous relationship with its fundamentals (Chart I-8). Could the same ultimately happen to the US stock market? Chart I-6The Structural Growth And Valuation Of Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Down... The Structural Growth And Valuation Of Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Down... The Structural Growth And Valuation Of Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Down... Chart I-7...Could The Same Happen To ##br##US Stocks? ...Could The Same Happen To US Stocks? ...Could The Same Happen To US Stocks? Chart I-8Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Lower From Their Previous Relationship With Fundamentals Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Lower From Their Previous Relationship With Fundamentals Non-US Stocks Phase-Shifted Lower From Their Previous Relationship With Fundamentals The answer is yes – and the main risk comes from the blockchain and its threat to the pseudo-monopoly status that the US tech behemoths have in owning, controlling, manipulating, and monetising our data and the digital content that we create. If the blockchain returned that ownership and control back to us, it would devastate the profits of Facebook, Google, and the other behemoths that dominate the US stock market. If the expected structural growth were to collapse, then the stock market would also collapse. That said, the blockchain is a long-term risk to the stock market, likely to manifest itself on a 5-year horizon. Before we get there, in the next deflationary shock, the 30-year T-bond yield has the scope to decline by at least 150 bps, equating to a 40 percent increase in the ‘bond component’ of the US stock market. To conclude, the structural bull market will end only at the ultimate low in the 30-year bond yield. And then, the blockchain will reveal – and pop – a ‘super bubble’. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week we add Korea and CAD/SEK, and update bitcoin, biotech, and nickel versus silver. Of note, the near 30 percent underperformance of Korea through the past year has reached the point of fractal fragility that has signalled previous major reversals in 2015, 2017 and 2019 (Chart I-9). Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go long Korea versus the world (MSCI indexes), setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 8 percent.  Chart I-9Korea Is Approaching A Turning Point Versus The World Korea Is Approaching A Turning Point Versus The World Korea Is Approaching A Turning Point Versus The World Korea Approaching A Turning Point Versus EM Korea Approaching A Turning Point Versus EM Korea Approaching A Turning Point Versus EM CAD/SEK Could Reverse CAD/SEK Could Reverse CAD/SEK Could Reverse Bitcoin Near A First Support Level Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Nickel Approaching A Sell Versus Silver Nickel Approaching A Sell Versus Silver Nickel Approaching A Sell Versus Silver Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Defined fully, the duration of an investment is the weighted average of the times of its cashflows, in which the weights are the present values of the cashflows. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Federal Reserve: Market turbulence will not dissuade the Fed from starting to hike rates in March, with longer-term consumer inflation expectations climbing steadily higher. Given the choice of fighting high inflation or supporting asset prices, the Fed will choose the former as tightening financial conditions are not yet an impediment to above-trend US economic growth. Canada: Canadian growth is set to recover as the intense Omicron wave has peaked, further intensifying inflationary pressures. The Bank of Canada has all the information from its consumer and business surveys to justify hiking rates immediately, particularly with inflation expectations above the central bank’s 1-3% target range. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios, as markets have not yet discounted the likely cyclical peak in policy interest rates. Feature Chart of the WeekA Less Friendly Policy Backdrop For Risk Assets A Less Friendly Policy Backdrop For Risk Assets A Less Friendly Policy Backdrop For Risk Assets Risk assets have taken a beating over the past week, with major equity indices in the US and Europe suffering the sharpest selloffs seen since the early days of the pandemic. There are many sources of investor angst fueling the risk aversion wave - a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine, some mixed results on Q4/2021 corporate earnings reports, the lingering Omicron wave and most importantly, fears of tighter global monetary policy. The latter is most evident in the US, with a few prominent Wall Street investment banks now calling for the Fed to deliver much more than the 3-4 rate hikes currently discounted for 2022. The Fed is now in a difficult spot. Realized US inflation remains very high, supply chain disruptions are not going away, and wage growth is accelerating amid tight US labor market conditions. Survey-based consumer inflation expectations show little sign of peaking, with longer-term expectations now climbing steadily higher. As a result, the Fed has been forced to rapidly shift its policy guidance in a more hawkish direction. These trends are not unique to the US, however, as similar inflation dynamics are playing out in places like the UK and Canada where central banks are also expected to deliver a lot of monetary tightening this year (Chart of the Week). For inflation targeting central banks, a surge in inflation that becomes increasingly embedded in longer-term inflation expectations is a direct challenge to their credibility. The policy prescription must involve monetary tightening to raise real interest rates in a bid to stabilize inflation expectations. At the same time, given the starting point of near-0% nominal policy rates and high inflation, deeply negative real interest rates have a lot of room to rise before becoming a serious restraint on economic growth. This limits how far bond yields can decline in response to a generalized risk-off move like the one seen over the past week. For financial markets hooked on easy monetary policies, an inflation-induced monetary tightening cycle will lead to even higher bond yields – especially real yields - and more frequent bouts of market volatility this year. The events of the past week will likely not be a one-off. The Fed Cares About Inflation, Not Your Equity Portfolio US equity markets have had a rough start to 2022. The S&P 500 is down -9% so far in January, with the tech-heavy NASDAQ index down a whopping -13% (Chart 2). The VIX index now sits at 31, nearly double the level seen at the end of 2021. The selloff in risk assets has occurred alongside an increase in real US bond yields. TIPS yields for the 2yr, 5yr and 10yr maturities are up +20bps, +36bps and +43bps, respectively since the start of the year - a reflection of increasing Fed rate hike expectations. Yet other financial markets have seen more limited swings so far in 2022. Non-US equities are sharply outperforming the US; the EuroStoxx index of European equities is down -6%, while the MSCI emerging market (EM) equity index is down just -2%. US investment grade and high-yield spreads, using the Bloomberg benchmark indices, are up a relatively modest +9bps and +36bps, respectively, while the DXY US dollar index is up only +0.4%. The risk asset selloff seen year-to-date has been sharp, but has likely not been enough for the Fed to postpone the expected March liftoff of the fed funds rate. US financial conditions have tightened, but not nearly by enough to make the Fed to more concerned about the US economic growth outlook (Chart 3). Also, financial markets appear to be functioning normally, suggesting what is happening is a repricing of risk assets rather than a selloff driven by poor market liquidity conditions. Chart 2A 'Real' Equity Market Correction A 'Real' Equity Market Correction A 'Real' Equity Market Correction ​​​​​​ Chart 3High Inflation, Not High Asset Values, is The Fed's Biggest Concern High Inflation, Not High Asset Values, is The Fed's Biggest Concern High Inflation, Not High Asset Values, is The Fed's Biggest Concern ​​​​​​ The bigger risk to US growth may actually come from high inflation, rather than falling asset values. Real US household income growth, derived from responses in the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations to individual questions on incomes and inflation, is expected to contract -3% over the next year (bottom panel). Given that decline in perceived spending power, with inflation far exceeding wage growth, it is no surprise that the University of Michigan consumer confidence index is near an 8-year low. US business confidence has also been hit by high inflation. The NFIB survey of small business sentiment and the Conference Board survey of corporate CEO confidence declined in the latter half of 2021, largely in response to inflationary supply chain disruptions and labor shortages. Nearly one-quarter of NFIB survey respondents cite “inflation” as the single most important problem in operating their businesses. Economic sentiment has clearly taken a hit because of elevated US inflation, even with the US unemployment rate at 3.9% and overall real GDP growth remaining solidly above trend. This suggests that slowing inflation could actually provide a more sustainable boost to the US growth through improved confidence – if the Fed can first successfully engineer a “soft landing” for the economy once it begins hiking rates. The problem the Fed now faces is that the high inflation of the past year is starting to leak into longer-term survey-based measures of inflation expectations. 5-10 year ahead consumer inflation expectations from the University of Michigan survey are now at a 10-year high of 3.1%, while the 10-year-ahead inflation forecast from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters is at a 23-year high of 2.6% (Chart 4). Market-based inflation expectations like TIPS breakevens have stopped rising, as a more hawkish Fed has boosted real TIPS yields, but remain elevated at levels consistent with the Fed achieving, but not exceeding, it's 2% medium-term inflation target (bottom panel). The combination of a tight US labor market and consumers expecting more inflation raises the risk that the US could enter a wage-price spiral, where workers demand wage increases in response to higher inflation and companies are therefore forced to raise prices to maintain profitability. The conditions for a wage-price spiral seem to now be in place in the US (Chart 5): unemployment is low, wages are accelerating and a growing number of US workers are quitting jobs to find better work. Perhaps most importantly, US consumers are more uncertain about where inflation will be in the future. Chart 4US Inflation Expectations Becoming More Entrenched US Inflation Expectations Becoming More Entrenched US Inflation Expectations Becoming More Entrenched ​​​​​ Chart 5The Start Of A US Wage/Price Spiral? The Start Of A US Wage/Price Spiral? The Start Of A US Wage/Price Spiral? ​​​​​​ The New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations asks respondents to place probabilities on certain ranges for future US inflation rates one and three years ahead. The probability-weighted average of those inflation rates is dubbed “inflation uncertainty”, and those have doubled over the past year from 2% to 4% (bottom panel). This means that the survey respondents now see higher inflation outcomes as more probable, which will likely result in increased wage demands to “keep up” with the cost of living. With the US labor market looking tight as a drum, amid extensive shortages of quality workers as reported in business confidence surveys, the odds of wage increases because of higher inflation instead of higher productivity – a.k.a. a wage-price spiral – have shot up significantly. Already, the 5-year-annualized growth rate of US unit labor costs has doubled since the start of the pandemic (Chart 6), evidence that wage increases are not being matched by faster productivity. Given the strong historical correlation between unit labor cost growth and core inflation in the US, the rise in the latter will be more persistent if US workers ask for bigger cost-of-living driven wage increases. Chart 6Rising US Labor Costs Provide A Lasting Boost To US Inflation Rising US Labor Costs Provide A Lasting Boost To US Inflation Rising US Labor Costs Provide A Lasting Boost To US Inflation ​​​​​​ Chart 7 ​​​​​ Former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan famously described “price stability” – the Fed’s stated medium-term goal - as a situation where “… households and businesses need not factor expectations of changes in the average level of prices into their decisions.” This is clearly not the situation in the US today, which is why the Fed has no choice but to move ahead with interest rate increases to begin the road back to price stability. Financial market selloffs may actually assist the Fed in achieving that goal through tighter financial conditions, thereby limiting how much interest rates must increase to cool off above-trend US economic growth. Interest rates must still go up first, though – especially in real terms. Already, investors have adjusted to that reality by lifting their medium-term “real rate expectations”. We proxy the latter by taking the difference between the forward path for nominal US interest rates discounted in the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve and the forward path of US inflation discounted in the US CPI swap curve. Over just the past month, that market-implied forward path for the real fed funds rate has shifted from discounting an average level of around -1% over the next decade to something closer to -0.25% (Chart 7). We anticipate that those real rate expectations will move even higher as the Fed begins to hike rates in March and continues its tightening cycle over the next 1-2 years. This will underpin the move higher in US bond yields that we expect this year, for both government and corporate debt, with the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield reaching a high of 2.25% by year-end. Bottom Line: Market turbulence will not dissuade the Fed from starting to hike rates in March. Longer-term consumer inflation expectations are climbing steadily higher, which is starting to feed into higher wage demands in a very tight labor market. Given the choice of fighting high inflation or supporting asset prices, the Fed will choose the former as tightening financial conditions are not yet an impediment to above-trend US economic growth. Stay below-benchmark on US interest rate exposure, both in terms of duration and country allocation, in global bond portfolios. Canada Update: The BoC Has A Lot Of Work To Do The Bank of Canada (BoC) meets this week and we anticipate that the first rate hike of this tightening cycle will be announced. This will just be the beginning of what will likely be an extended cycle. Canadian monetary conditions are far too accommodative given above-trend growth and accelerating inflation. The BoC places a lot of analytical weight on its Business Outlook Survey when assessing the state of the Canadian economy. The Q4/2021 survey signaled very strong business confidence and robust demand (both domestic and foreign), with a growing majority of firms surveyed planning to increase investment and hiring over the next year (Chart 8). Survey respondents also reported significant capacity constraints, especially in industries that have experienced strong demand during the pandemic, like retail, manufacturing and housing. This is related to global supply chain disruptions, but also to intensifying labor shortages. Chart 8A Bright Outlook For The Canadian Economy A Bright Outlook For The Canadian Economy A Bright Outlook For The Canadian Economy The survey was conducted before the Omicron variant began to spread through Canada, which lead to the reimposition of severe economic restrictions. The number of Canadian COVID cases has peaked, however, and some restrictions have already begun to be lifted in Ontario, Canada’s largest province by population. The economic impact of Omicron will therefore be concentrated in the first couple of months of 2022 and should not derail the hiring and investment plans indicated in the Business Outlook Survey. A reacceleration of Canadian economic growth post-Omicron would magnify high Canadian inflation at a time of intense capacity constraints and tight labor markets. The Canadian unemployment rate fell to 5.9% in December, just 0.2 percentage points above the pre-COVID low seen in February 2020. Headline CPI inflation reached a 31-year high of 4.8% in December 2021, with trimmed CPI inflation (which omits the most volatile components) reaching an 30-year high of 3.7% (Chart 9). The rise in inflation has been broad-based, with large increases seen for both goods inflation (6.8%) and services inflation (3.7%). Like the US, high inflation is becoming more embedded in survey-based inflation expectations. Canadian businesses expect inflation to be 3.2% over the next two years, according to the Business Outlook Survey.1 Canadian consumers expect inflation to be 4.9% over the next year and 3.5% over the next five years, according to the BoC’s Canadian Survey Of Consumer Expectations (Chart 10). The latter had been very stable around 3% since the survey began back in 2014, thus the 0.5 percentage point jump seen in the latest quarterly survey is a highly significant move that suggests the 2021 inflation surge is become more embedded in Canadian consumer psychology. Chart 9The BoC Has An Inflation Problem On Its Hands The BoC Has An Inflation Problem On Its Hands The BoC Has An Inflation Problem On Its Hands ​​​​​​ Chart 10Canadian Consumer Inflation Expectations Are Rising Canadian Consumer Inflation Expectations Are Rising Canadian Consumer Inflation Expectations Are Rising ​​​​​​ The Canadian inflation backdrop has similarities to the US situation described earlier in this report. Like the US, one-year-ahead Canadian consumer inflation expectations are far above wage expectations (only +2%), which suggests that Canadian consumers expect real wages to contract -2.9%. Also like the US, falling real wage expectations are acting as a drag on Canadian consumer confidence (bottom panel). And also like the US, we expect Canadian workers to increase their wage demands to restore real purchasing power, potentially starting a wage-price spiral. Given widespread Canadian labor market shortages, this process has likely already started. According to the BoC Business Outlook Survey, 43% of firms had to boost wages in Q4/2021 because of “cost of living adjustments”, compared to 29% in Q3/2021 (Chart 11). An even larger share of respondents in the Q4 survey (54%) reported having to raise wages to attract and retain workers, up significantly from Q3 and an indication of how Canadian firms are seeing their wage bill go up trying to find quality labor in a tight job market. Chart 11 Given the messages on growth and inflation from its surveys, the BoC has all the evidence it needs to begin the rate hiking process as soon as possible. The bigger question is how high will rates have to go to cool off Canadian economic growth and bring inflation back into the BoC’s 1-3% target range. The BoC’s own internal models estimate that the neutral level of the policy interest rate is between 1.75% and 2.75%. Those estimates were last produced back in April 2021, however, and the range may need to be revised higher to reflect the changes seen in the Canadian economy since then – most notably the greater supply constraints and higher inflation. At a minimum, the BoC will likely have to raise the policy rate to the higher end of its last estimated range for the neutral rate. Current market pricing in the Canadian OIS curve discounts the BoC hiking the policy rate from 0.25% today to 1.6% by the end of 2022 (Chart 12). With eight scheduled BoC policy meetings this year, including this week, the 2022 pricing is realistically achievable. However, only another 50bps of hikes are priced for 2023 and no additional hikes after that. Chart 12Markets Are Underestimating The Likely Cyclical Peak In Canadian Rates Markets Are Underestimating The Likely Cyclical Peak In Canadian Rates Markets Are Underestimating The Likely Cyclical Peak In Canadian Rates Chart 13Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds A peak policy rate around 2% would only be in the lower half of the BoC’s range of neutral rate estimates. It would also represent a very low peak real rate of 0% assuming inflation returns to the midpoint of the BoC target range. It is possible that markets are underestimating how high the BoC will have to lift rates, both in nominal and real terms, because of a fear that rate increases will hurt highly indebted Canadian homeowners and trigger a sharp pullback in house prices. This is a legitimate concern given the stretched housing valuations across most major Canadian cities. However, the BoC is facing the same credibility issue that the Fed and other inflation-targeting central banks are facing in the pandemic era. Canadian inflation is too high and becoming more embedded in inflation expectations. Also like the Fed, the BoC will have to fight the inflation battle now and deal with the collateral damage on financial conditions (and the housing market) later. Importantly, with the Fed also likely to deliver several rate hike in 2022. Thus, the BoC has less need to fear a surge in the Canadian dollar, driven by widening interest rate differentials, that could aggressively tighten financial conditions beyond the impact on asset markets and house prices from higher interest rates (Chart 13). Summing it all up, we maintain our negative strategic outlook on Canadian government bonds as markets are underestimating the tightening that will be required from the BoC over the next 1-2 years. Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada has all the information from its consumer and business surveys to justify hiking rates immediately, particularly with medium-term consumer inflation expectations now above the central bank’s 1-3% target range. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios, as markets have not yet discounted the likely cyclical peak in policy interest rates.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Business inflation expectations calculated as the share of respondents reporting expected inflation within a certain range multiplied by the midpoint of the range. We assume a value of 0.5 for “less than 1” and a value of 3.5 for “greater than 3”. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Overlay Trades

Highlights Corporate Bond Returns & Fed Tightening: Corporate bond performance varied considerably during the past four Fed tightening cycles. Our analysis of these periods suggests that valuations and the slope of the yield curve are the two most important factors to monitor. Investment Grade Strategy: Given tight valuations, our analysis of past Fed tightening cycles suggests that it will make sense to downgrade our allocation to investment grade corporates from neutral (3 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5) once we are confident that the yield curve has shifted into a flatter regime. High-Yield Strategy: De-risking will also be warranted in the high-yield space as the yield curve flattens, but relative valuations dictate that investors should retain a preference for high-yield over investment grade corporates. Feature It is now apparent that the Federal Reserve intends to kick off the next rate hike cycle at the March FOMC meeting. This move has been strongly hinted at in recent Fed speeches and it will be telegraphed more officially when Jay Powell addresses the media tomorrow. In preparation for upcoming rate increases, last week’s report looked at Treasury returns during prior periods of Fed tightening.1 This week, we extend that analysis to the corporate bond market. Specifically, we consider the excess returns that were earned by both investment grade and high-yield corporates during the four most recent rate hike cycles.2 We conclude that a defensive posture toward credit risk will be warranted as Fed tightening gets underway. While we aren’t quite ready to downgrade our recommended allocation to corporate bonds today, we expect to do so within the next couple of months. Corporate Bond Returns During Rate Hike Cycles Table 1 presents excess returns for both the Bloomberg Barclays Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index and the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield Corporate Bond Index in each of the past four Fed tightening cycles. As was the case last week, we define each tightening cycle as spanning from the first rate hike until the last rate hike. We also exclude periods such as 1997 when the Fed only lifted rates once before reversing course. Table 1Corporate Bond Returns During Fed Rate Hike Cycles Positioning For Rate Hikes In The Corporate Bond Market Positioning For Rate Hikes In The Corporate Bond Market Our first preliminary conclusion is that (unlike with Treasury returns) there is not much commonality between the different cycles. For example, corporate excess returns were quite strong during the 2015-18 cycle and very weak during the 1999-2000 cycle. In other words, it’s even more important to examine each cycle individually to get a sense of how we should position in the corporate bond market today. The 2015-2018 Cycle The most recent Fed tightening cycle started with a 25 basis point rate hike in December 2015. The Fed then went on hold for 12 months before delivering a string of 8 hikes between December 2016 and December 2018. All in all, the tightening cycle lasted 36 months and the Fed raised the target rate by 225 bps. Investment grade corporate bond returns were quite strong during this period (Chart 1A), and there is one major reason why. The start of the tightening cycle happened to coincide with the peak of a default cycle. As a result, corporate spreads were elevated when hiking began and they tightened rapidly throughout 2016 and 2017 (Chart 1A, panel 3). Spread tightening in 2016 and 2017 was helped along by an accommodative policy environment, as evidenced by the fact that the yield curve remained steep (3/10 slope > 50 bps) during those years (Chart 1A, panel 4). It’s notable that returns turned negative in 2018, only after the average index spread moved below 100 bps and the Treasury slope moved below 50 bps. In other words, corporate bond returns were strong early in the cycle but turned negative once value evaporated and the monetary backdrop became less accommodative. High-Yield returns show a similar pattern to investment grade (Chart 1B). Spreads started out very wide in early-2016 and tightened rapidly until monetary conditions turned more restrictive in 2018. Our Default-Adjusted Spread is an additional valuation tool for high-yield bonds (Chart 1B, panel 4). This is calculated as the average index spread less the actual default losses that were experienced during the subsequent 12 months. Our research has shown that high-yield bonds usually outperform Treasuries during 12 month periods in which the Default-Adjusted Spread is above 100 bps (see the Appendix of this report for more details). In this case, the Default-Adjusted Spread was an extremely high 258 bps at the beginning of the tightening cycle and it didn’t dip below 100 bps until after rate hikes ended. Chart 1A2015-2018 Cycle: Investment Grade 2015-2018 Cycle: Investment Grade 2015-2018 Cycle: Investment Grade Chart 1B2015-2018 Cycle: High-Yield 2015-2018 Cycle: High-Yield 2015-2018 Cycle: High-Yield   The 2004-2006 Cycle During this cycle, which spanned from June 2004 to June 2006, the Fed lifted rates by 400 bps (sixteen 25 basis point rate hikes). The fed funds rate rose from 1% to 5.25% during the two-year span. Excess investment grade corporate bond returns were close to zero during this cycle (Chart 2A). Unlike in 2015, corporate spreads started out at tight levels (below 100 bps), though the accommodative monetary environment – as evidenced by the steep yield curve – allowed them to tighten somewhat during the first year of Fed hiking. However, spreads then reverted closer to 100 bps in 2005 as the yield curve flattened to below 50 bps (Chart 2A, panel 4) and the policy backdrop turned more restrictive. Junk bonds performed extremely well during the 2004-06 cycle (Chart 2B), and once again this is due to very attractive starting valuations. The average High-Yield Index spread was 384 bps on the day of the first hike in 2004, compensation that turned out to be astoundingly high when you consider that monthly default events were in the low single digits throughout the entire period (Chart 2B, bottom panel). As was the case in the 2015-18 cycle, our Default-Adjusted Spread measure never dipped below 100 bps. In fact, it troughed at 145 bps in early 2005 (Chart 2B, panel 4). Chart 2A2004-2006 Cycle: Investment Grade 2004-2006 Cycle: Investment Grade 2004-2006 Cycle: Investment Grade Chart 2B2004-2006 Cycle: High-Yield 2004-2006 Cycle: High-Yield 2004-2006 Cycle: High-Yield The 1999-2000 Cycle In this cycle, the Fed lifted rates by 175 bps between June 1999 and May 2000, driving the fed funds rate from 4.75% to 6.5%. Excess investment grade corporate bond returns were poor during this period (Chart 3A), the combination of relatively low starting spreads and a very flat yield curve that even inverted in early 2000 (Chart 3A, panels 3 & 4). High-yield excess returns were even worse than for investment grade (Chart 3B). While, at the onset of Fed tightening, junk spreads were quite elevated in absolute terms (Chart 3B, panel 3), they turned out to be too low compared to the magnitude of default losses that occurred throughout 1999 and 2000 (Chart 3B, bottom panel). Our Default-Adjusted Spread measure started the cycle below 100 bps and then dipped into negative territory in early 2000 (Chart 3B, panel 4). Chart 3A1999-2000 Cycle: Investment Grade 1999-2000 Cycle: Investment Grade 1999-2000 Cycle: Investment Grade Chart 3B1999-2000 Cycle: High-Yield 1999-2000 Cycle: High-Yield 1999-2000 Cycle: High-Yield The 1994-1995 Cycle The Fed surprised markets by lifting rates extremely quickly during this cycle. The Fed moved rates from 3% to 6% in the span of only 12 months between February 1994 and February 1995. This cycle coincided with modestly positive excess returns for investment grade corporates (Chart 4A). The average index spread began the cycle at the extraordinarily tight level of 67 bps (Chart 4A, panel 3). However, unappealing valuations were counteracted by the accommodative monetary environment, as evidenced by a yield curve slope that didn’t dip below 50 bps until the Fed was almost done hiking (Chart 4A, panel 4).    Junk returns were also modestly positive during this period (Chart 4B). Spreads started the cycle at attractive levels (Chart 4B, panel 3) and the default rate was on the downswing (Chart 4B, bottom panel). Junk spreads, however, were mostly rangebound during the period of Fed tightening. Chart 4A1994-1995 Cycle: Investment Grade 1994-1995 Cycle: Investment Grade 1994-1995 Cycle: Investment Grade Chart 4B1994-1995 Cycle: High-Yield 1994-1995 Cycle: High-Yield 1994-1995 Cycle: High-Yield Investment Implications Investment Grade Our analysis of past cycles reveals that valuation and the slope of the yield curve are the two most important factors to consider when assessing the potential for investment grade corporate bond excess returns during a Fed tightening cycle. The 2015-18 period of strong investment grade returns coincided with elevated spreads and a yield curve slope that stayed above 50 bps for the first two years of tightening. In contrast, the 1999-2000 period of negative corporate returns was driven by expensive starting valuations and a very flat curve. Today, investment grade corporate bond valuations are about as expensive as they’ve ever been. The average index option-adjusted spread (OAS) is currently 100 bps, the index OAS has been tighter than this level 40% of the time since 1995 (Chart 5). This does not appear terrible at first blush, but we must also consider that the risk characteristics of the index have changed during the past few decades. Specifically, the index’s average credit rating is lower, and its average duration is higher. If we adjust the index to maintain a constant credit rating through time, we see that the spread falls from its 40th percentile to its 28th percentile (Chart 5, panel 2). If we then adjust for the changing duration of the index by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread instead of the OAS, we see the spread fall to its 7th percentile since 1995 (Chart 5, bottom panel).3 As for the yield curve, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is currently very close to 50 bps – the threshold that roughly represents the transition from an accommodative monetary environment to a more neutral one (Chart 6). Given expensive starting valuations, our inclination is to reduce our investment grade corporate bond exposure once we are confident that the 3/10 slope will remain below 50 bps for the remainder of the cycle. We think we are close to reaching that point, but we aren’t quite there yet. Our estimates based on a range of plausible scenarios for Fed tightening suggest that the 3/10 slope will permanently move below 50 bps in the coming months, by July at the very latest. When that occurs, we will reduce our recommended corporate bond exposure from neutral (3 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). Chart 6Watch The Treasury Slope Watch The Treasury Slope Watch The Treasury Slope Chart 5IG Valuation IG Valuation IG Valuation High-Yield The valuation picture for high-yield is somewhat more pleasant than for investment grade. The OAS differential between the high-yield and investment grade indexes is fairly tight, at its 15th percentile since 1995 (Chart 7). However, this differential rises to the 36th percentile when we adjust for the duration differences of the indexes by using the 12-month breakeven spread. Chart 7HY Valuation HY Valuation HY Valuation Applying our Default-Adjusted Spread methodology to today’s junk market, we estimate that the Default-Adjusted Spread will come in above the crucial 100 bps threshold as long as the default rate is 3.5% or lower during the next 12 months (Chart 7, bottom panel). This seems quite likely given the current strong state of corporate balance sheets.4 All that said, the evidence from past cycles suggests that a more defensive posture toward high-yield corporates will also be warranted once we are confident that the 3/10 slope has permanently moved below 50 bps. However, relative valuation dictates that we should still retain a preference for high-yield over investment grade even as we get more defensive overall. Our next move will likely be to downgrade high-yield from overweight (4 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). Some Thoughts On Credit Investment Strategy The above analysis of corporate bond performance shows that it is generally weaker once the yield curve has flattened into a range of 0 – 50 bps. However, that move alone doesn’t guarantee negative excess corporate bond returns. In fact, it is quite plausible that the slope could remain within a 0 – 50 bps range for a long time even as the Fed tightens, and that corporate bonds could still deliver small positive excess returns versus Treasuries. However, we must acknowledge that the risks of Fed overtightening, curve inversion and economic recession increase as the yield curve flattens. We must also acknowledge that current valuations suggest that future excess returns will be small, even if they are positive. For example, if we assume that the average investment grade OAS can’t tighten very much from current levels, then the best we can expect is 100 bps per year of excess return. Meanwhile, 100 bps of spread widening – much less than you would expect in a default cycle – would lead to losses of roughly 850 bps. In other words, it will be profitable to exit investment grade corporate bond positions today as long as the next bout of 100 bps of spread widening occurs within the next 8.5 years (Table 2). The risk/reward trade-off clearly favors a more defensive credit allocation. Table 2The Risk/Reward Trade-off In Corporate Bonds Positioning For Rate Hikes In The Corporate Bond Market Positioning For Rate Hikes In The Corporate Bond Market Interestingly, Table 2 shows that the risk/reward math is more favorable for junk bonds. Depending on our default loss assumptions, the 8.5 years we calculated for investment grade falls to a range of 1.8 to 3 years for high-yield. Bottom Line: Tight valuations and low expected returns suggest that investors should be more cautious on credit risk this cycle. In our view, it is advisable to reduce credit risk allocation earlier than usual this cycle in order to ensure that you aren’t invested during the next big selloff. Appendix Image Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Rate Hikes In The Treasury Market”, dated January 18, 2022. 2 We define excess returns as the excess returns earned by the corporate bond index relative to a duration-matched position in US Treasuries. 3 The 12-month breakeven spread can be thought of as the spread widening required for the index to break even with duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month investment horizon. It can be approximated as OAS divided by duration. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed’s Inflation Problem”, dated November 23, 2021. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights The bond market assumes that when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. High inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than the negative ex-ante real yield that 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) are now offering. Long-term investors should overweight 10-year T-bonds versus 10-year TIPS. Underweight (or outright short) US TIPS. Underweight commodities, and especially underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal trading watchlist: the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Real Yield Turns Out To Be Higher Than Expected The Real Yield Turns Out To Be Higher Than Expected The Real Yield Turns Out To Be Higher Than Expected Real interest rates are negative. Or are they? Given that real interest rates form the foundation of most asset prices, getting this question right is of paramount importance. Over the short term, yes, real interest rates are negative. Policy interest rates in the major developed economies are unlikely to rise quickly from their current near-zero levels. So, they will remain below the rate of inflation. But what about over the longer term, say ten years – are long-term real interest rates truly negative? The Real Bond Yield Is The Mirror Image Of Backward-Looking Inflation The negative US real 10-year bond yield of -0.7 percent comprises the nominal yield of 1.8 percent minus an expected inflation rate of 2.5 percent. This means that the negativity of the real bond yield hinges on the expectation for inflation over the next ten years. Therein lies the big problem. Many people believe that the bond market’s expected 10-year inflation rate is an independent and forward-looking assessment of how inflation will evolve. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. And at that, an extremely short period of historic inflation, just six months.1  The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. Specifically, in the pandemic era, the bond market has derived its expected 10-year inflation rate from the historic six month (annualized) inflation rate, which it assumes will gradually converge to a long-term rate of just below 2 percent during the first four years, then stay there for the remaining six years2 (Figure I-1). We recommend that readers replicate this simple calculation for themselves to shatter any illusion that there is anything forward-looking about the bond market’s inflation expectation! (Chart I-2). Chart I- Chart I-2Expected 10-Year Inflation Is Just Based On The Last 6 Months Of Inflation! Expected 10-Year Inflation Is Just Based On The Last 6 Months Of Inflation! Expected 10-Year Inflation Is Just Based On The Last 6 Months Of Inflation! The upshot is that when the backward-looking six month inflation rate is low, like it was in the depths of the global financial crisis in late 2008 or the pandemic recession in early 2020, the market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be low. And when the backward-looking six-month inflation rate is high, like now or in early-2008, the bond market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be high. In other words, the bond market extrapolates the last six months of inflation into the next ten years. This observation leads to an immediate investment conclusion. The US six-month inflation rate has already peaked. As it cools, it will also cool the expected 10-year inflation rate, thereby putting upward pressure on the mirror image Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) real yield. It follows that investors should underweight (or outright short) US 10-year TIPS (Chart I-3). Chart I-3As Inflation Cools, TIPS Will Underperform As Inflation Cools, TIPS Will Underperform As Inflation Cools, TIPS Will Underperform The Real Bond Yield Is Based On A False Expectation There is a more fundamental issue at stake. The market assumes that when recent inflation has been low, it will be lower than average for the next ten years. And when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. The price level is lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! Another way of putting this is that the market assumes that any breakout of the consumer price index (CPI) will be amplified over the following ten years (Chart I-4). Yet the reality is that any breakout of the price level tends to trend-revert over the following ten years. This means that after the CPI’s decline in late 2008, the market massively underestimated where the price level would be ten years later. But earlier in 2008, when the CPI had surged, the market massively overestimated where the price level would be ten years later. Chart I-4The Market Exaggerates Any Deviations In The CPI Into The Distant Future The Market Exaggerates Any Deviations In The CPI Into The Distant Future The Market Exaggerates Any Deviations In The CPI Into The Distant Future Today in 2022, the price level seems to be uncomfortably high. But the remarkable thing is that it is still lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Market Overestimates Where The Price Level Will Stand 10 Years Ahead The Market Overestimates Where The Price Level Will Stand 10 Years Ahead The Market Overestimates Where The Price Level Will Stand 10 Years Ahead The crucial point is that after surges in the price level, realised 10-year inflation turns out to be at least 1 percent lower than the bond market’s expectation (Chart I-6). This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds turns out to be at least 1 percent higher than the ex-ante real yield that 10-year TIPS offered at the start of the ten year period (Chart of the Week). Chart I-6Actual Inflation Turns Out To Be Lower Than Expected Actual Inflation Turns Out To Be Lower Than Expected Actual Inflation Turns Out To Be Lower Than Expected It follows that after the current surge in the price level, the (actual) real yield that will be delivered by 10-year T-bonds over the next ten years will not be the -0.7 percent indicated by the TIPS 10-year real yield. Instead, if history is any guide, it will be at least +0.3 percent. Therefore, in answer to our original question, the real long-term interest rate is almost certainly not negative. Of course, the obvious comeback is that ‘this time is different’. But we really wouldn’t bet the farm on it. Many people thought this time is different during the price level surge in early 2008 as well as the lows in late 2008 and early 2020. But those times were not different. And our bet is that this time isn’t any different either. This means that the real yield on T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than that on TIPS. Long-term investors should overweight T-bonds versus TIPS. Commodities Are Vulnerable A final important observation relates to commodities. Commodity prices have been tightly tracking the 6-month inflation rate, but which way does the causality run in this tight relationship? At first glance, it might seem that the causality runs from commodity prices to the inflation rate. Yet on further consideration, this cannot be right. It is not the commodity price level that drives the overall inflation rate, it is the commodity inflation rate that drives the overall inflation rate. And in the past year, overall inflation has decoupled (upwards) from commodity inflation (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Inflation Is Tracking ##br##Commodity Prices... Inflation Is Tracking Commodity Prices... Inflation Is Tracking Commodity Prices... Chart I-8...But Inflation Should Be Tracking Commodity Inflation ...But Inflation Should Be Tracking Commodity Inflation ...But Inflation Should Be Tracking Commodity Inflation Therefore, the causality in the tight relationship between the 6-month inflation rate and commodity prices must run from backward-looking inflation to commodity prices. And the likely explanation is that investors are bidding up commodity prices as a hedge against the backward-looking inflation which they are incorrectly extrapolating into the future. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. It follows that as 6-month inflation cools, so will commodity prices. The investment conclusion is to underweight commodities, and especially to underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s observations relate to the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. The US dollar reached a point of fragility in early December, from which it experienced a classic short-term countertrend sell-off. As such, the countertrend sell-off is mostly done. Alternative energy versus old energy is approaching a major buying point. Biotech versus the market is very close to a major buying point. Nickel versus silver is very close to a major selling point. Semiconductors versus technology was on our sell watchlist last week, and has now hit its point of maximum fragility (Chart I-9). Therefore, the recommended trade is to short semiconductors versus broad technology, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 6 percent. Chart 9Semiconductors Are Due A Reversal Semiconductors Are Due A Reversal Semiconductors Are Due A Reversal Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Fractal Trading Watchlist Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The expected 10-year inflation rate = (deviation of 6-month annualized inflation from 1.6)*0.2 + 1.6. 2 Inflation is based on the PCE deflator. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Image 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights On US inflation and the Fed: If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2% (from its current level above 4%). Yet, share prices will sell off before inflation converges toward the Fed’s target. On US TIPS yields: Rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US, support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. On China: Despite stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. Besides, a bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. On financial market divergences: Major selloffs evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. Hence, the nature of current market dynamics is more consistent with a major selloff than a short-term correction. On regional allocation within a global equity portfolio: Overweight the euro area and Japan, underweight the US and EM. Feature Ms. Mea is a long-time BCA client and an avid follower of the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) service. Since 2017, I have been meeting with her twice a year to exchange thoughts on the global macro environment, to discuss the nuances of our views and to elaborate on investment strategy. We always publish our conversations for the benefit of all EMS clients. This virtual meeting took place earlier this week. Chart 1A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields Ms. Mea: It has been two years since we last met in person. I did not imagine that world travel would stay so depressed for so long when the pandemic began two years ago. I have also been surprised by the recent behavior of financial markets. There have been divergences that I cannot reconcile, such as the woes in China’s real estate sector and resilient commodity prices, the diverging performance of the S&P 500, US small caps and a significant portion of NASDAQ-listed stocks. I will ask you about these later. But let’s start with your main macro themes. Since early last year, you have been advocating two macro themes: (1) China’s slowdown; and (2) rising and non-transitory US inflation. They were controversial a year ago but have now become widely accepted in the investment community. Financial markets have moved a great deal to reflect these macro themes. Don’t you think financial markets have already fully priced in these macro trends? Answer: You are right that these narratives have become well known and financial markets have been moving to price in these developments. However, our bias is that these themes are not yet fully priced in and these macro forces will continue to impact financial markets over the near term. Let’s first discuss US inflation and interest rate moves. Chart 1 illustrates that US government bond yields have broken above major resistance levels. Such a breakout technically entails higher yields. Odds are that US long-term bond yields will move up by another 50 basis points in the months ahead before they pause or reverse. The fundamental justification for higher US bond yields is as follows: The inflation genie is out of the bottle in the US. If the Fed adheres to its inflation mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2%. In December, trimmed-mean CPI and median CPI printed 4.8% and 3.8% respectively, well above the Fed’s preferred range of 2-2.25% for core inflation (Chart 2). Critically, these inflation measures are not impacted by volatile components. These measures strip out outliers like used and new car prices, auto parts, as well as energy and food. The core CPI and PCE inflation measures will drop this year but super core inflation will remain north of 3%, well above the Fed’s preferred range. Importantly, a wage inflation spiral is already underway in the US. Employees have experienced substantial negative wage growth in real terms in the past 12 months. Labor shortages are prevalent, and the employee quit rate is very high. Employees are demanding very high wage growth and employers will have little choice but to meet these demands (Chart 3). Chart 2US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad-Based Inflationary Pressures US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad=Based Inflationary Pressures US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad=Based Inflationary Pressures Chart 3US Wages Will Be Accelerating US Wages Will Be Accelerating US Wages Will Be Accelerating Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison As a result, the only way to bring down core inflation toward its preferred target range is for the Fed to slow the economy down and curb employment and wage gains. Yet before core inflation converges to the Fed’s target, risk assets will sell off first. Practically, the Fed will talk hawkish and hike until something breaks. The breaking point will be a major selloff in US share prices. US equities have been priced to perfection on the assumption that US interest rates will remain low for many years. As interest rate expectations rise further, US equity multiples are under pressure (Chart 4). Ms. Mea: The recent rise in US bond yields has been largely driven by the real component (TIPS yields), not inflation breakevens. That would usually imply improving US growth prospects. Yet US stocks have corrected as TIPS yields rose. How do you explain this and what should investors expect going forward? Answer: Indeed, the latest rise in US bonds yields is primarily driven by increasing TIPS yields, not inflation breakevens (Chart 5) TIPS yields have not been driven by economic growth expectations in the past couple of years. TIPS yields are breaking out and more upside is likely for reasons unrelated to US economic growth: The Fed’s rhetoric and guidance. TIPS yields typically move with 5-year/5-year forward yields, i.e., expectations for US interest rates in the long run (Chart 6). One of reasons why forward interest rates and TIPS yields have been low is the Fed’s commitment to keep interest rates extremely depressed for so long. As the Fed’s rhetoric has recently changed, so are interest rate expectations and TIPS yields. Given that core inflation will not drop to the Fed’s target range any time soon, the Fed will likely escalate its hawkish rhetoric. Hence, TIPS yields will keep rising, until something breaks. Chart 5US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation Chart 6US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations TIPS demand/supply and momentum. The TIPS market is relatively small, and it has been rigged by the Fed in the past two years or so. As a part of its QE program, the Fed has been buying a large share of TIPS, and it now owns 22% of this market. As a result, TIPS yields have fallen irrespective of economic growth dynamics. As the QE program ends, the Fed will stop purchasing TIPS. There has also been a rush into TIPS by institutional investors. In a quest for inflation protection when the Fed was complacent about inflation, investors have been opting for TIPS. This has also depressed TIPS yields. As the US central bank sounds more hawkish, investors’ demand for inflation protection will likely diminish. In addition, TIPS prices have recently plunged dramatically. Large losses could prompt further liquidation by investors pushing TIPS yields much higher. All of the above and the fact that TIPS yields remain negative suggest that they will continue rising in the coming months. Chart 7Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Ms. Mea: Your point that TIPS yields will continue rising in the months ahead irrespective of US inflation and growth dynamics is interesting. So, what are the implications of rising US bond yields, especially TIPS yields, on various financial markets? Answer: Falling/low TIPS yields have benefited long duration plays like US stocks, and especially US growth stocks. Declining TIPS yields were a drag on the US dollar (Chart 7). Finally, they also prompted portfolio capital flows to EM. Consistently, rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US (Chart 4, above) support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. Ms. Mea: But aren’t US share prices positively correlated with US interest rates? Answer: Not always. Chart 8 illustrates that the correlation between the S&P 500 and US Treasury yields varied over time. Prior to the mid-1960s, it was positive. From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields. Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? Early 2020s = Late 1960s? Early 2020s = Late 1960s? We believe US markets are now undergoing a major paradigm shift in the stock prices-bond yields correlation. The latter is about to turn negative like it did in the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the reason why the stock-to-bond yields correlation turned negative was because US core inflation surged well above 2% in 1966 (Chart 8, bottom panel). This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. The same is happening now. As we wrote a year ago in our Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship, the proper roadmap for the US stock-to-bond correlation is not the last 10 or 20 years, but the second half of the 1960s. After US core CPI surged substantially above 2%, the S&P 500 became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9). Ms. Mea: Let’s now turn to emerging markets. How will EM financial markets perform amid rising US bonds yields? Also, which US yields matter most for EM financial markets, US Treasury yields or TIPS? Answer: Neither US Treasury yields nor TIPS yields have a stable correlation with EM stock prices. Correlations between US nominal bond yields, EM currencies and EM domestic bond yields vary over time. However, US TIPS yields exhibit a reasonably strong positive correlation with mainstream EM local bond yields and the US dollar's exchange rate versus EM currencies (Chart 10). Mainstream EM includes 16 markets but excludes China, Korea and Taiwan. Hence, as US TIPS yields move up, it is reasonable to expect the US dollar to strengthen against mainstream EM currencies and their local bond yields to rise (Chart 10). Currency depreciation and rising domestic bond yields will prove to be toxic for the share prices of these mainstream emerging markets. To sum up, rising US TIPS yields will jeopardize the performance of EM equities, currencies, local rates and credit markets. Ms. Mea: Aren’t many EMs better prepared for rising US nominal/real yields than they were in 2013? Answer: Yes, they are: many EM countries that were running large current account deficits in 2013 now have current account surpluses or small deficits (Chart 11, top panel). Besides, mainstream EMs ramped up their foreign currency debt in the years preceding 2013 while their foreign debt has changed little in the past 6-7 years (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Chart 11Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Table 1Current Account Balances In Individual EM Countries Conversation With Ms. Mea: US Inflation Redux, TIPS And Implications For EM Conversation With Ms. Mea: US Inflation Redux, TIPS And Implications For EM Table 1 illustrates the current account balance in individual developing countries. Further, the share of foreign investor holdings in EM local currency bonds has declined a great deal in the past 2 years (Table 2). Finally, many mainstream EM central banks have hiked rates aggressively and their local bond yields have already risen considerably in the past 12 months. These also provide some protection against fixed-income portfolio capital outflows. All in all, vulnerability from foreign portfolio capital outflows in EM is much lower than it was in 2013. Nevertheless, EM financial markets will not remain unscathed if US rates march higher, the US dollar rallies and US stocks wobble. Based on the parameters displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the most vulnerable countries among mainstream EMs are Peru, Colombia, Chile and Egypt. Table 2Foreign Ownership Of Domestic Bonds: January 2022 Versus October 2019 Conversation With Ms. Mea: US Inflation Redux, TIPS And Implications For EM Conversation With Ms. Mea: US Inflation Redux, TIPS And Implications For EM Chart 12China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective Ms. Mea: Let’s now move to your second theme - China’s slowdown. This is well known and arguably priced in financial markets. Importantly, policymakers have been ratcheting up stimulus. Don’t you think now is the time to upgrade the stance on Chinese stocks and China-related plays? Answer: Despite the new round of stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. As we wrote in last week’s report titled Chinese Equities: Valuations and Profits, Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next 6 months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Importantly, even though property market woes are well known and housing sales and starts have collapsed, housing construction activity has remained resilient (Chart 12). The bottom panel of Chart 12 demonstrates rising completions, which is one of reasons why raw materials prices have been resilient. However, new funding for property developers has dried up and they will be forced to scale back completions/construction activity. Historically, EM non-TMT share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months (Chart 13). Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in a few months. In brief, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 13China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks Ms. Mea: Another topic I wanted to discuss today is divergences in global financial markets. Some equity markets have already fallen significantly, while the S&P 500 index as well as a couple of individual EM equity bourses (India, Taiwan and Mexico) have been firm. There have been massive divergences within the US equity market in general and the NASDAQ index in particular. Besides, EM high-yield corporate spreads have widened but EM investment grade corporate spreads remain tight. Finally, commodity prices have remained firm despite both China’s slowdown and US dollar strength. How should investors interpret these divergences? Answer: Such divergences in financial markets often occur during major selloffs. Notable financial market downturns evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Chart 14Domino Effect In 2007-08 Domino Effect In 2007-08 Domino Effect In 2007-08 Similarly, the US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 14). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 14, bottom panel). There was a domino effect in financial markets in both the 2015 and 2018 turbulences. Initially, the selloffs started in the weakest links while other parts were holding up. Then, the selloff spread to all without exception. For example, in 2018, US share prices and high-yield credit spreads were doing quite well until October 2018. Then, a broad-based selloff transpired in the fourth quarter of 2018.  Just as chains break at their weakest links, financial market selloffs begin in the most susceptible sectors. Overpriced US stocks with little or no profits and currencies with zero or negative interest rates have been most vulnerable to rising US interest rates. That is why these segments have sold off first in response to rising US nominal and real rates. Our hunch is that the selloff in global markets due to rising US interest rates will broaden in the coming months. This does not mean that global stocks on the verge of a major bear market, but a double-digit drop in global share prices is likely. The last asset class standing will be commodity prices. These will likely be the last affected by rising US interest rates because many investors buy commodities as an inflation hedge. Besides, oil prices have also been supported by the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine and Iran. It might take investor concerns about the US economy and a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Chart 15Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Ms. Mea: What investment strategy do you recommend in the coming months? Answer: As US interest rates continue rising and China’s recovery fails to transpire immediately, EM financial markets remain at risk. Therefore, we recommend a defensive stance for absolute return investors in EM equity and fixed income. We are also continuing to short a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. As for global equity regional allocation, the outlook for EM performance is less certain than it was in the past 12 months. Clearly, rising US/DM interest rates herald US equity underperformance versus other DM markets, like the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). The basis is that non-US equities are not as expensive as US ones and, hence, are less vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 16EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields Whether EM outperforms or not is mainly contingent on the US dollar, rather than US bond yields. The top panel of Chart 16 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance against DM has a low correlation with US bond yields. Yet, EM equities will underperform their DM peers if the USD strengthens (the greenback is shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 16). However, if the greenback depreciates, EM will certainly outperform the US in both equity and the fixed income space. Putting it all together, asset allocators should overweight the euro area and Japan, and underweight the US and EM in a global equity portfolio. Ms. Mea: What about EM local bonds and EM credit markets? Answer: EM credit spreads will widen, and EM local yields will not drop as US bond yields head higher and EM exchange rates depreciate. We continue to recommend investors underweight EM credit versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As for local rates, we largely remain on the sidelines of this asset class. Our current recommendations are as follows: receiving 10-year rates in China and Malaysia, paying Czech 10-year rates and betting on 10/1-year yield curve inversions in Mexico and Russia. For a detailed list of our country recommendations for equities, credit, domestic bonds and currencies, please refer to Open Position Tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Image Image

Highlights US Vs. Europe: Growth and inflation momentum remains stronger in the US versus Europe. The latter is taking the bigger economic hit from more severe Omicron economic restrictions and a greater exposure to slowing Chinese demand. European inflation has accelerated, but remains slower and less broad-based than elevated US inflation. The backdrop remains more negative for US fixed income compared to Europe. UST-Bund Spread: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures). Feature Chart of the WeekUS Bond Yields & Bond Volatility Are Both Rising US Bond Yields & Bond Volatility Are Both Rising US Bond Yields & Bond Volatility Are Both Rising Global fixed income markets are off to a volatile start in 2022, on the back of significant repricing of US interest rate expectations. The 10-year US Treasury yield now sits at 1.85%, up +34bps so far in January and is up +72bps from the August 4/2021 intraday low of 1.13%. The 2-year US yield, which is even more sensitive to changes in Fed expectations, is 1.04%, up +31bps so far this month and up +87bps since early August 2021. Yields are rising in other countries as well, with the 10-year benchmark government bond yield up year-to-date in the UK (+24bps), Canada (+45bps) and even Germany (+18bps) where the Bund yield is threatening to return to positive territory. US Treasuries are selling off as markets have heeded the hawkish shift in the Fed’s interest rate guidance. The US overnight index swap (OIS) curve now discounting 89bps of Fed rate hikes in 2022. Bond volatility further out the Treasury curve has increased as yields have moved higher, with the realized volatility of the Bloomberg 7-10 US Treasury index now at an 19-month high (Chart of the Week). We continue to recommend a defensive strategic posture towards direct US Treasuries with below-benchmark exposure on both duration and country allocations in global bond portfolios. However, we prefer a more efficient way to position for the same theme of rising US yields – betting on a wider 10-year US Treasury-German Bund spread. US Growth & Inflation Fundamentals Support A More Hawkish Fed The rise in global bond yields seen in recent weeks has inflicted damage on risk assets, but not in a consistent fashion. Equity markets have taken the brunt of the hit, with the S&P 500 down around -3% so far in January with the tech-heavy NASDAQ down -6%. Yet the MSCI emerging market equity index is up around +1%, European equities are flat and global high-yield corporate bond spreads are essentially unchanged so far this month. While higher bond yields are reflecting expectations of more global monetary tightening over the next year, medium-term interest rate expectations remain subdued. Our proxy for the market pricing of terminal interest rate expectations – 5-year OIS rates, 5-years forward – remains at or below pre-pandemic levels in the US, the UK, Canada and the euro area (Chart 2). Risk assets are performing relatively well in the face of higher bond yields because markets still do not believe that a major increase in interest rates will be needed in the current global tightening cycle. We see this – the likelihood that interest rates will have to rise much more than markets expect - as the biggest vulnerability for global bond markets over the next couple of years. The US remains the “poster child” for this view. In the US, core CPI inflation accelerated to an 31-year high of 5.5% in December. The pickup in US inflation continues to be broad-based, with the Cleveland Fed median CPI and trimmed mean CPI inflation measures reaching 3.8% and 4.8%, respectively (Chart 3). This massive run-up in US inflation has filtered through to medium-term household inflation expectations; the preliminary University of Michigan consumer survey for January showed that inflation 5-10 years out is expected to be 3.1% - the highest level in 13 years. Chart 2Rising Yields Are Not A Threat To Risk Assets ... Yet Rising Yields Are Not A Threat To Risk Assets ... Yet Rising Yields Are Not A Threat To Risk Assets ... Yet ​​​​​ Chart 3The Fed Cannot Ignore Elevated Inflation Expectations The Fed Cannot Ignore Elevated Inflation Expectations The Fed Cannot Ignore Elevated Inflation Expectations ​​​​​​ Chart 4US Demand Steadily Normalizing From The Pandemic Shock US Demand Steadily Normalizing From The Pandemic Shock US Demand Steadily Normalizing From The Pandemic Shock While much of the run-up in US inflation over the past year has been fueled by supply chain disruption and high energy prices, there is still a robust demand component to the high inflation. Consumer spending on goods remains elevated versus its pre-pandemic trend, while services spending is steadily returning back to the pre-pandemic pace (Chart 4). The overall US unemployment rate is now down to 3.9%, the lowest level since February 2020, with broad-based strength in the US labor market across most industries (bottom panel). The rise in consumer inflation expectations has to be most worrisome to Fed officials. Yes, market-based inflation expectations have already seen a significant run-up since the mid-2020 lows, and have even drifted down a bit of late on the back of the more hawkish rhetoric from the Fed. However, survey-based measures of inflation expectations tend to be less volatile than market-based measures, and typically follow trends in realized inflation, which is not slowing down in the US. In other words, rising household inflation expectations are a more reliable indication that an inflationary mindset is becoming entrenched in consumer behavior. US inflation dynamics are transitioning away from supply-driven goods inflation toward more lasting domestically driven forces like tight labor markets, faster wage growth and rising housing costs (Chart 5). Measures of supply chain disruption like global shipping costs are showing signs of peaking (top panel), while commodity price momentum has clearly rolled over – both should eventually feed into slower goods inflation this year. At the same time, tight labor markets will continue to boost US employment costs, which historically have been strongly correlated to US services inflation (middle panel). Chart 5US Inflation Pressures Remain Intense US Inflation Pressures Remain Intense US Inflation Pressures Remain Intense Meanwhile, shelter costs, which represents 32% of the US CPI index, were up 4.2% on a year-over-year basis in December and are likely to continue accelerating given a dearth of housing supply versus demand that is pushing up both house prices and rents (bottom panel). Tying it all together, there are good reasons why the Fed has ramped up the hawkish rhetoric over the past couple of months. However, with the US OIS curve now discounting between 3-4 rate hikes in 2022, it will be harder to generate a second consecutive year of negative returns in the US Treasury market this year. Dating back to the early 1970s, there have only been five calendar years where the Bloomberg US Treasury index delivered an outright negative total return: 1994, 1999, 2009, 2013 and 2021 (Chart 6). None of the four cases prior to last year saw negative returns in the following year, as Treasury yields fell in 1995, 2000, 2010, 2014. Yet even the episodes that saw consecutive years of US yield increases – 1974-75, 1977-81, 1987-88, 2005-06 and 2015-16 – did not see outright negative returns from the Bloomberg US Treasury index. Chart 6Negative Return Years For US Treasuries Are Rare Negative Return Years For US Treasuries Are Rare Negative Return Years For US Treasuries Are Rare Given the starting point of deeply negative real US bond yields, and interest rate expectations that remain too low beyond 2022, we still see value in staying below-benchmark on US duration exposure on a medium-term basis. However, we see a more efficient way to play for higher Treasury yields this year by positioning US Treasury underweights/shorts versus overweights/longs in government bonds in a region where discounted rate hikes will not happen – Europe. The ECB Is In No Hurry To Hike Rates The same supply driven factors that have pushed up US inflation over the past year have also lifted inflation in the euro area. Headline HICP inflation reached an 30-year high of 5.0% in December, while core HICP inflation hit an all-time high of 2.6%. The European Central Bank (ECB), however, is unlikely to deliver any rate hikes in 2022 even with the high inflation, for several reasons (Chart 7): Growth momentum entering 2022 was soft, thanks to Omicron related economic restrictions at the end of 2021 and also weak demand for European exports from China. It will take time for both of those factors to reverse, thus reducing any growth related pressure to tighten monetary policy. Inflation expectations are not exceeding the ECB 2% inflation target, with the 5-year/5-year forward EUR CPI swap now at 1.9% even with headline inflation of 5.0%. The surge in European energy prices will eventually subside in the first half of 2022, which will reduce inflationary pressure on the ECB to tighten. The ECB is ending its pandemic emergency bond buying program (PEPP) in March, and is only partially replacing that buying activity by upsizing its existing pre-pandemic asset purchase program (APP). The ECB will not want to compound the effect of this “tapering” of bond buying by also hiking interest rates, which would surely tighten financial conditions further through higher Italian government bond yields, rising corporate bond yields and a firmer euro. There is little evidence to date showing any pass-through of higher energy-fueled inflation into more domestically-driven inflation. Euro area wage growth was only 1.3% as of the latest available data in Q3/2021 (which is still well after realized inflation had started to accelerate), highlighting the lack of visible “second round” effects on euro area inflation from high energy prices that would prompt the ECB to consider rate hikes (Chart 8). Chart 7An ECB Rate Hike In 2022 Is Unlikely An ECB Rate Hike In 2022 Is Unlikely An ECB Rate Hike In 2022 Is Unlikely ​​​​​​ Chart 8Limited 'Second Round' Effects From Energy-Driven European Inflation Limited 'Second Round' Effects From Energy-Driven European Inflation Limited 'Second Round' Effects From Energy-Driven European Inflation ​​​​​​ The EUR OIS curve is discounting 7bps of rate hikes by year-end. Even that modest amount will not be delivered, which will limit how much further European government bond yields will rise this year. A Better Mousetrap: Playing UST Bearishness Through UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades Combining our view of an increasingly hawkish Fed and a still-dovish ECB produces our highest conviction investment recommendation for 2022: positioning for a wider 10-year US Treasury/Germany Bund spread. This can be done by underweighting the US versus core Europe in global bond portfolios, or shorting US Treasury futures versus German Bund futures as we are already recommending in our Tactical Trade Overlay (see page 15). A Treasury-Bund spread widening view is a more efficient way to play for a more hawkish Fed and higher US Treasury yields, for several reasons: There are many examples over past 30 years where the Treasury-Bund spread widened in consecutive years (Chart 9). This is in contrast to the fewer occurrences of consecutive years of rising Treasury yields shown earlier in this report. Thus, there are better odds that last year’s Treasury-Bund spread widening can be repeated in 2022. Chart 9Consecutive Years Of A Rising UST-Bund Spread Happen Often Consecutive Years Of A Rising UST-Bund Spread Happen Often Consecutive Years Of A Rising UST-Bund Spread Happen Often The realized volatility of Treasury-Bund spread trades is almost always lower than that of an outright short position in US Treasuries, but the direction of returns of the two trades is similar (Chart 10). This shows that there is directionality in the Treasury-Bund spread (i.e. it is driven far more by the movements of US yields), but that is a welcome feature given our more bearish view on US Treasuries. The Treasury-Bund spread remains well below fair value on our fundamental valuation model, with fair value increasing due to widening US-European inflation differentials (Chart 11). Tighter relative monetary policies this year (more tapering and rate hikes from the Fed compared to the ECB) also favor a wider fair value spread on our model. Chart 10UST-Bund Wideners Have Lower Volatility Than Outright UST Shorts UST-Bund Wideners Have Lower Volatility Than Outright UST Shorts UST-Bund Wideners Have Lower Volatility Than Outright UST Shorts ​​​​​ Chart 11The UST-Bund Spread Looks Very Cheap On Our Model The UST-Bund Spread Looks Very Cheap On Our Model The UST-Bund Spread Looks Very Cheap On Our Model ​​​​​​ The gap between our 24-month discounters, which measure the change in policy interest rates over the next two years discounted in OIS curves, for the US and euro area is a reliable leading indicator of the 10-year Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 12, bottom panel). The “discounter spread” is currently calling for the Treasury-Bund spread to widen by more than the current path discounted in US Treasury and German Bund forward rates. Chart 12Position For More UST-Bund Spread Widening In 2022 Position For More UST-Bund Spread Widening In 2022 Position For More UST-Bund Spread Widening In 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Not Technically Stretched UST-Bund Spread Is Not Technically Stretched UST-Bund Spread Is Not Technically Stretched ​​​​​ The Treasury-Bund spread is not stretched from a technical perspective (Chart 13). The spread is sitting right at its 200-day moving average and the 26-week change in the spread (a measure of price momentum) is rising but remains well below previous peak levels that have capped past spread increases. Summing it all up, the case is strong for including US-Germany spread widening positions as core holdings in investor portfolios in 2022. The current spread is 185bps and we have a year-end target of 225bps. Bottom Line: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures).   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index