Fiscal
At the end of 2019, Canadian growth ground to a halt. Not only are exports hurt by the recent decline in global growth, but domestic economic activity is also reeling, as capex remains soft, households are reluctant to spend, and housing activity is in poor…
Austerity fatigue has set in. Trump’s big budget deficits and his “I love debt” mantra are the waves of the future. For their part, the Democrats are shifting to the left, with the “Green New Deal” proposal being the latest manifestation. The case for fiscal…
Highlights It may seem self-evident that most governments are overly indebted, but both theory and evidence suggest otherwise. Higher debt today does not require higher taxes tomorrow if the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government bonds. Not only is that currently the case, but it has been the norm for most of history. Unlike private firms or households, governments can choose the interest rate at which they borrow, provided that they issue debt in their own currencies. Ultimately, inflation is the only constraint to how large fiscal deficits can get. Today, most governments would welcome higher inflation. There are increasing signs China is abandoning its deleveraging campaign. Fiscal policy will remain highly accommodative in the U.S. and will turn somewhat more stimulative in Europe. Remain overweight global equities/underweight bonds. We do not have a strong regional equity preference at the moment, but expect to turn more bullish on EM versus DM by the middle of this year. Feature A Fiscal Non-Problem? Debt levels in advanced economies are higher today than they were on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis. Rising private debt accounts for some of this increase, but the lion’s share has occurred in government debt (Chart 1). Chart 1Global Debt Levels Have Risen, Especially In The Public Sector Not surprisingly, rising public debt levels have elicited plenty of consternation. While there has been a lively debate about how fast governments should tighten their belts, few have disputed the seemingly self-evident opinion that some degree of “fiscal consolidation” is warranted. Given this consensus view, one would think that the economic case for public debt levels being too high is airtight. It’s not. Far from it. Debt Sustainability, Quantified Start with the classic condition for debt sustainability, which specifies the primary fiscal balance (i.e., the overall balance excluding interest payments) necessary to maintain a constant debt-to-GDP ratio (See Box 1 for a derivation of this equation). An increase in the economy’s growth rate (g), or a decrease in real interest rates (r), would allow the government to loosen the primary fiscal balance without causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase (Chart 2).1 If the government were to ease fiscal policy beyond that point, debt would rise in relation to GDP. But by how much? It is tempting to assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio would then begin to increase exponentially. However, that is only true if the interest rate is higher than the growth rate of the economy. If the opposite were true, the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise initially but then flatten out at a higher level.2 A Fiscal Free Lunch The last point is worth emphasizing. As long as the interest rate is below the economic growth rate, then any primary fiscal balance – even a permanent deficit of 20%, or even 30% of GDP – would be consistent with a stable long-term debt-to-GDP ratio. In such a setting, the government could just indefinitely rollover the existing stock of debt, while issuing enough new debt to cover interest payments. No additional taxes would be necessary. In fact, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio becomes easier the higher it rises. Chart 3 shows this point analytically. Ah, one might say: If the government issues a lot of debt, then interest rates would rise, and before we know it, we are back in a world where the borrowing rate is above the economy’s growth rate, at which point the debt dynamics go haywire. Now, that sounds like a sensible statement, but it is actually quite misleading. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. If people want to turn around and use that money to buy bonds, they are welcome to do so, but the government is under no obligation to pay them the interest rate that they want. If they do not wish to hold cash, they can always use the cash to buy goods and services or exchange it for foreign currency. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. Wouldn’t that cause inflation and currency devaluation? Yes, it might, and that’s the real constraint: What limits the ability of governments with printing presses to run large deficits is not the inability to finance them. Rather, it is the risk that their citizens will treat their currencies as hot potatoes, rushing to exchange them for goods and services out of fear that rising prices will erode the purchasing power of their cash holdings. When Is Saving Desirable? The reason governments pay interest on bonds is because they want people to save more. However, more savings is not necessarily a good thing. This is obviously the case when an economy is depressed, but it may even be true when an economy is at full employment. Just like someone can work so much that they have no time left over for leisure, or buy a house so big that they spend all their time maintaining it, it is possible for an economy to save too much, leading to an excess of capital accumulation. Under such circumstances, steady-state consumption will be permanently depressed because so much of the economy’s resources are going towards replenishing the depreciation of the economy’s capital stock. Economists have a name for this condition: “dynamic inefficiency.” What determines whether an economy is dynamically inefficient? As it turns out, the answer is the same as the one that determines whether debt ratios are on an explosive path or not: The difference between the interest rate and the economy’s growth rate. Economies where interest rates are below the growth rate will tend to suffer from excess savings. In that case, government deficits, to the extent that they soak up national savings, may increase national welfare. r < g Has Been The Norm Today, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield stands at 2.69%, compared to the OECD’s projection of nominal GDP growth of 3.8% over the next decade. The gap between projected growth and bond yields is even greater in other major economies (Chart 4). Granted, equilibrium real rates are likely to rise over the next few years as spare capacity is absorbed. Structural factors might also push up real rates over time. Most notably, the retirement of baby boomers could significantly curb income growth, leading to a decline in national savings. Chart 5 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers globally is in the process of peaking after a three-decade long ascent. Economic growth could also fall if cognitive abilities continue to deteriorate, a worrying trend we discussed in a recent Special Report.3 Chart 5The Global Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked It may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. Still, it may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. As Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF, noted in his Presidential Address to the American Economics Association earlier this year, periods in U.S. history where GDP growth exceeds interest rates have been the rule rather than the exception (Chart 6).4 The same has been true for most other economies.5 Chart 6GDP Growth Above Interest Rates: Historically, The Rule, Not The Exception What’s Next For Fiscal Policy? Austerity fatigue has set in. In the U.S., fiscally conservative Republicans, if they ever really existed, are a dying breed. Trump’s big budget deficits and his “I love debt” mantra are the waves of the future. For their part, the Democrats are shifting to the left, with the “Green New Deal” proposal being the latest manifestation. The case for fiscal stimulus is stronger in the euro area than for the United States. The European Commission expects the euro area to see a positive fiscal thrust of 0.40% of GDP this year, up from a thrust of 0.05% of GDP last year (Chart 7). This should help support growth. Chart 7The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year Additional fiscal easing would be feasible. This is clearly true in Germany, but even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio.6 Unfortunately, the situation in southern Europe is greatly complicated by the ECB’s inability to act as an unconditional lender of last resort to individual sovereign borrowers. When a government cannot print its own currency, its debt markets can be subject to multiple equilibria. Under such circumstances, a vicious spiral can develop where rising bond yields lead investors to assign a higher default risk, thus leading to even higher yields (Chart 8). Mario Draghi’s now-famous “whatever it takes” pledge has gone a long way towards reassuring bond investors. Nevertheless, given the political constraints the ECB faces, it is doubtful that Italy or other indebted economies in the euro area will be able to pursue large-scale stimulus. Instead, the ECB will keep interest rates at exceptionally low levels. A new round of TLTROs is also looking increasingly likely, which should protect against a rise in bank funding costs and a potential credit crunch. Our European team believes that a TLTRO extension would be particularly helpful to Italian banks. Even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio. Despite having one of the highest sovereign debt ratios in the world, Japan faces no pressing need to tighten fiscal policy. Instead of raising the sales tax this October, the government should be cutting it. A loosening of fiscal policy would actually improve debt sustainability if, as is likely, a larger budget deficit leads to somewhat higher inflation (and thus, lower real borrowing rates) and, at least temporarily, faster GDP growth. We expect the Abe government to counteract at least part of the sales tax increase with new fiscal measures, and ultimately to abandon plans for further fiscal tightening over the next few years. In the EM space, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa are among a handful of economies with vulnerable fiscal positions. They all have borrowing rates that exceed the growth rate of the economy, cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficits, and above-average levels of sovereign debt (Chart 9). In contrast, China stands out as having the biggest positive gap between projected GDP growth and sovereign borrowing rates of any major economy. The problem is that the main borrowers have been state-owned companies and local governments, neither of which are backstopped by the state. Not officially, anyway. Unofficially, the government has been extremely reluctant to allow large-scale defaults anywhere in the economy. Despite all the rhetoric about market-based reforms, they are unlikely to start now. Historically, the Chinese government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth. As we recently argued in a report entitled “China’s Savings Problem,” China needs more debt to sustain aggregate demand.7 Historically, the government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth (Chart 10). The stronger-than-expected jump in credit origination in January suggests that we are approaching such an inflection point. Chart 10Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Investment Conclusions The consensus economic view is that deflation is a much harder problem to overcome than inflation. When dealing with inflation, all you have to do is raise interest rates and eventually the economy will cool down. With deflation, however, a central bank could very quickly find itself up against the zero lower bound constraint on interest rates, unable to ease policy any further via conventional means. While this standard argument is correct, it takes a very monetary policy-centric view of macroeconomic policy. When interest rates are low, fiscal policy becomes very potent. Indeed, the whole notion that deflation is a bigger problem than inflation is rather peculiar. Just as it is easier to consume resources than to produce them, it should be easier to get people to spend than to save. People like to spend. And even if they didn’t, governments could go out and buy goods and services directly. Looking out, our bet is that policymakers will increasingly lean towards the ever-more fiscal stimulus. If structural trends end up causing the so-called neutral rate of interest to rise – the rate of interest that is necessary to avoid overheating – policymakers will have no choice but to eventually raise rates and tighten fiscal policy (Box 2). However, they will only do so begrudgingly. The result, at least temporarily, will be higher inflation. Fixed-income investors should maintain below benchmark duration exposure over both a cyclical and structural horizon. Reflationary policies that increase nominal GDP growth will help support equities, at least over the next 12 months. Chart 11 shows that corporate earnings tend to accelerate whenever nominal GDP growth rises. We upgraded global equities to overweight following the December FOMC meeting selloff. While our enthusiasm for stocks has waned with the year-to-date rally, we are sticking with our bullish bias. Chart 11Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step A reacceleration in Chinese credit growth will put a bottom under both Chinese and global growth by the middle of this year. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will likely come under pressure in the second half of this year. Until then, we expect the greenback to be flat-to-modestly stronger. The combination of faster global growth and a weaker dollar later this year will be manna from heaven for emerging markets. We closed our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and are now outright long EM equities. I do not have a strong view on the relative performance of EM versus DM at the moment, but expect to shift EM equities to overweight by this summer.8 Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 The Arithmetic Of Debt Sustainability Box 2 Debt Sustainability And Full Employment: The Role Of Fiscal And Monetary Policy Policymakers should strive to stabilize the ratio of debt-to-GDP over the long haul, while also ensuring that the economy stays near full employment. The accompanying chart shows the tradeoffs involved. The DD schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and the gap between the borrowing rate and GDP growth (r minus g) that is consistent with a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. In line with the debt sustainability equation derived in Box 1, the slope of the DD schedule is simply equal to the debt/GDP ratio. Any point below the DD schedule is one where the debt-to-GDP ratio is rising, while any point above is one where the ratio is falling. The EE schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and r - g that keeps the economy at full employment. The schedule is downward-sloping because an increase in the primary fiscal balance implies a tightening of fiscal policy, and hence requires an offsetting decline in interest rates. Any point above the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating at less than full employment. Any point below the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating beyond full employment and hence overheating. Suppose there is a structural shift in the economy that causes the neutral rate of interest – the rate of interest consistent with full employment and stable inflation – to increase. In that case, the EE schedule would shift to the right: For any level of the fiscal primary balance, the economy would need a higher interest rate to avoid overheating. The arrows show three possible “transition paths” to a new equilibrium. Scenario #1 is one where policymakers raise rates quickly but are slow to tighten fiscal policy. This results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #2 is one where policymakers tighten fiscal policy quickly but are slow to raise rates. This results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #3 is one where the government drags its feet in both raising rates and tightening fiscal policy. As the economy overheats, real rates actually decline, sending the arrow initially to the left. This effectively allows policymakers to inflate away the debt, leading to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Note: In Scenario #2, and especially in Scenario #3, the DD line will become flatter (not shown on the chart to avoid clutter). Consequently, the final equilibrium will be one where real rates are somewhat higher, but the primary fiscal balance is somewhat lower, than in Scenario #1. Footnotes 1 One can equally define the interest rate and GDP growth rate in nominal terms (see Box 1 for details). 2 Japan is a good example of this point. The primary budget deficit averaged 5% of GDP between 1993 and 2010, a period when government net debt rose from 20% of GDP to 142% of GDP. Since then, Japan’s primary deficit has averaged 5.1% of GDP, but net debt has risen to only 156% of GDP (and has been largely stable for the past two years). 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Most Important Trend In The World Has Reversed And Nobody Knows Why,” dated February 1, 2019. 4 Olivier Blanchard, “Public Debt And Low Interest Rates,” Peterson Institute for International Economics and MIT American Economic Association (AEA) Presidential Address, (January 2019). 5 Paolo Mauro, Rafael Romeu, Ariel Binder, and Asad Zaman, “A Modern History Of Fiscal Prudence And Profligacy,” IMF Working Paper, (January 2013). 6 The Italian 10-year bond yield is 2.83% while nominal GDP growth is 2.64%. Multiplying the difference by net debt of 118% of GDP results in a required primary surplus of .22% of GDP that is necessary to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is lower than the IMF’s 2018 estimate of cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus of 2.14%. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China’s Savings Problem,” dated January 25, 2019. 8 Please note that my colleague, Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s Chief EM strategist, remains bearish on both EM and DM equities and expects EM to underperform DM over the coming months. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
There is no doubt that Chinese policymakers are stimulating the economy, but the question is whether they are willing to pull the credit lever as aggressively as they have done in the past. So far, all of the evidence we have reviewed point to a cautious…
Highlights So What? A 70% tax on Americans with income over $10 million is not far-fetched. Why? The median U.S. voter wants higher taxes on the wealthy; Both populism and geopolitics make it impossible to cut spending; The next recession, no matter how shallow, will elicit unconventional policy. Feature The New Year has brought a chill to the investment community. No, it is not the weather, but rather a proposal by U.S. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) to create a new top-income bracket, starting at $10,000,000, that would be taxed at 70%. The reaction to the self-described Democratic Socialist has been swift. Her strategy of soaking the rich would not work, would cause an exodus of job-creators out of the U.S., and would slow down the pace of growth. A CNBC headline screamed: “The super rich at Davos are scared of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to hike taxes on the wealthy.”1 In these pages, we are not going to discuss the merits of the proposal, although it would not raise enough revenue to fund the Democrats’ other policy proposals. Instead, we are going to forecast that Representative Ocasio-Cortez will get what she wants. Within our investment horizon. Probably following the next recession, which is nigh. However, how she gets what she wants will ultimately matter more than what the tax rate is on every dollar over $10,000,000 of income. The Median American Voter Since before the 2016 U.S. election and the Brexit vote, we have argued that the Median Voter is moving to the Left, particularly in the laissez-faire economies of the U.S. and the U.K. These two Anglo-Saxon economies swerved most enthusiastically to the right of the economic spectrum during the 1980 supply-side revolutions. They embraced both neo-liberal economic policy and globalization. While these reforms allowed them to outperform their less enthusiastically capitalist peers on a number of measures of economic performance, they also produced higher income inequality and a slower pace of social mobility (Chart 1). Over time, and particularly following the 2008 Great Recession, this pernicious mix of factors produced a surge in populism. There has been plenty of evidence that our view is on track. Take for example the performance of the über-left leaning Labour Party in the U.K.’s 2017 election or the breakdown of the Washington Consensus on global trade. Still, many clients have resisted our thesis. This is because President Trump did manage to push a sweeping supply-side tax cut through Congress in 2017. Given that we forecast that Republicans would get their way on tax cuts, our clients were left wondering how our thesis of a shift to the left could coexist with a Reagan-esque lowering of tax rates? The answer is that the move of the Median Voter to the left is a structural geopolitical view. A tax cut policy in 2017 was a tactical/cyclical view that deviated from the long-term trend. Trump was a candidate who promised faster economic growth while the Republican Party was a political machine that sought a low tax regime as a matter of policy and ideology. We expected the GOP, and House leader Paul Ryan, to use the Trump presidency as a way to get one last tax cut while they had control. However, since the tax cuts were passed, much has gone awry for America’s center-right party. First, the Democrats campaigned enthusiastically against the tax cuts in the midterm elections. On the other side of the aisle, Republican members of Congress quickly found out that they got no applause from constituents for their signature piece of legislation. The tax cut therefore disappeared from GOP messaging ahead of the November 2018 election. Steve Bannon, Trump’s political strategist, had apparently predicted this outcome when he cautioned against cutting tax rates for the top income bracket. He suggested a hike on taxes for the wealthy to boost Trump’s populist credentials. (Bannon’s proposal was for a 44% rate on those who earn income over $5,000,000, mathematically on the path towards Ocasio-Cortez’s end-point!).2 Second, the Republicans went on to lose their majority in the House. Granted, presidents usually lose their first midterm. However, with unemployment at 3.7% last November and the economy clocking in at a 3% clip, the GOP had a clear upper hand on economic messaging. And yet it did not avert major losses. The commentary from the right is that the Democrats are going to dig their own grave with their increasingly “Socialist” talk. But will they? We present three reasons that suggest that Ocasio-Cortez (and, ironically, Steve Bannon) are going to get what they want. Income taxes in America will rise over the next decade. Reason #1: The Median Voter Wants Higher Taxes On The Wealthy There is nothing sacred in politics. A society’s volonté générale swings like a pendulum between thesis and antithesis. The idea that Americans embody the laissez-faire spirit, while the French are socialists, is simply a product of linear extrapolation based on the timeline of a single generation.3 Chart 2 suggests a different story. As recently as the early 1970s, the U.S. and France were like peas in a pod when it came to income distribution, while the U.K. – the epicenter of the supply-side revolution — was the most redistributive Western economy. Chart 2France Was Once Less Socialist Than America! Today, Americans are much more in line with AOC than with Paul Ryan, which is why only one of the two has a job in the U.S. Congress. Ryan knew when to take his winnings and go home. According to a poll published merely weeks after AOC’s proposal, 59% of Americans support the 70% marginal tax rate. Democrats support the idea at a 71% clip, which suggests that Ocasio-Cortez is not on the fringes of the party. Independents support it at 60% and even 45% of registered Republicans support the idea. One could argue that the much-cited poll above is merely a flash in the pan, that it signifies nothing. We disagree for two reasons. First, if 60% of Americans – including 45% of Republicans – support a 70% tax rate now, when the economy is firing on all cylinders, GDP growth is above potential, and unemployment is at 3.9%, what will they support 12-36 months from now, when the inevitable recession hits? Or when America’s indebted corporations begin to deleverage by shedding jobs because they took on massive debts in order to buy back equities and return value to shareholders (which, completely coincidentally, includes senior management)? Second, there is evidence that a majority of Americans has thought that “upper-income people” have not been paying their fair share for some time now. A Gallup poll run since the early 1990s shows that the sentiment for higher taxes on upper-income individuals is off its lows in 2010 (Chart 3). We are still far from the early 1990s highs, but the trajectory of the public opinion is clearly going in the Left’s direction and has always hovered around the 60% mark. Bottom Line: It seems like ages ago that Grover Norquist, the anti-tax advocate, dominated the hallways of Congress, prodding legislators into pledging to “oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal tax rate for individuals and businesses.” As recently as the 2012 election, 238 out of 242 House Republicans and 41 out of 47 Senate Republicans signed Norquist’s “Taxpayer Protection Pledge.” We subscribe to the theory that the median voter is the price maker in the political marketplace, the politician is the price taker. Trump and Ocasio-Cortez are merely vessels for the expression of the volonté générale, the median voter’s policy preference. And that preference runs counter to Norquist’s activism and the GOP’s tax cut policy in 2017. Reason #2: History Is On Ocasio-Cortez’s Side Chart 4 has already made the rounds, suggesting that Ocasio-Cortez is not making a ludicrous proposal given that the U.S. already had much higher marginal tax rates on top incomes in the past. Critics accuse her of simplifying history without considering context. This is an important point. First, defense spending as a percent of GDP was at 37.5% in 1945 and still at an elevated 7.4% in 1965, twenty years later. The U.S. exited World War II and then almost immediately stumbled into two major conflicts, one on the Korean Peninsula and one in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union created an existential threat that had to be resisted on land, sea, and space, justifying higher tax rates. Second, while the U.S. did indeed cut its top marginal rates throughout the second half of the century, so did everyone else! Chart 5 shows that the rest of the Western world was largely in lock-step with the U.S. In fact, it was the U.S. that came down to French levels of taxation (!!!) throughout 1960s and 1970s (again, remember Chart 2). As such, Chart 4 by itself is not a reason to excuse higher marginal rates. Of course we are completely disinterested in the merits of the policy. We are merely trying to forecast it. And Chart 4 does help us do so for two reasons. First, the key achievement of the Tax Cuts And Jobs Act of 2017 was the corporate tax cut to 21%. There is some bipartisan support for this policy, at least in the center of the Democratic Party (President Obama tried to cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 28% in 2012). The last time corporate tax rates were this low, however, the top marginal income tax rate was at 79%. As such, we think that a bipartisan consensus could emerge on keeping corporate tax cuts at or below the OECD average of 24%, but at the cost of higher marginal tax rates for high-income earners. Second, it has been a key structural view of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since inception, that the defining geopolitical feature of the twenty-first century will be the Sino-American conflict. If we are right on this issue, then perhaps an “existential conflict” to justify higher taxes on elites is already here. In other words, it is a fact that global challenges have required the U.S. to tax households and corporations at a higher rate in the past. It is also a fact that the U.S. faces greater global challenges today, specifically with China and Russia, than at anytime since the Cold War. Thus, while AOC may not be motivated by geopolitics, she may represent one aspect of a growing public policy consensus nonetheless. Simply put, with the U.S. facing both populism and geopolitical multipolarity, there is simply no political option for cutting either defense or non-defense spending. The only question is whether the U.S. will simultaneously shore up its ability to service its debts and maintain a reliable currency. AOC may find unlikely allies as geopolitical competition heats up. Reason #3: Policymakers Will Overreact To The Next Recession President Trump was elected in November 2016, with the recession having ended 88 months prior, with the unemployment rate down 5.6%, and the economy on the path to recovery. But his economic populist message resonated with a lot of voters who did not participate in that recovery. Our concern is that the next recession is close at hand. BCA’s House View is that the next recession will be relatively shallow in the U.S., in part because there aren’t any obvious bubbles. For one, cyclical spending as a percent of GDP is at mid-cycle levels (Chart 6). Corporate debt is elevated, but not by international standards (Chart 7). U.S. banks are in a much sounder position than in 2007. So, from a macroeconomic perspective, the next recession is nothing to fear. Chart 6Are We Even Mid-Cycle Yet? Chart 7Corporate Debt Load Is Not Excessive Policymakers, however, don’t care about macroeconomics. They care about the policy preferences of the Median Voter. And if that Median Voter elected an anti-establishment populist during relatively good times, who will he or she support when unemployment is high? Whoever is running the U.S. when the next recession happens, they will not wait around to find out. Unorthodox monetary, fiscal, and yes tax policy will overshoot norms and conventions regardless of how shallow the recession is. All bets are off at that point since policymakers will have a “recency bias” due to the trauma of 2008. While the recession may be shallow, the budget deficit will likely be at an elevated level. The U.S. is currently engaged in the first pro-cyclical economic stimulus since the late 1960s (Chart 8). This means that the recession will likely hit with the budget deficit already at around 5%-6% of GDP, compared to just 3%-4% when the last recession occurred. Given that the last four recessions raised the U.S. budget deficit by an average of 5% of GDP, it is safe to say that the U.S. budget deficit may rise to 2010 levels after the next downturn, regardless of how shallow the recession is. Chart 8Budget Deficits Will Be Very High In The Next Recession As with the Great Recession, the public will demand that the government deals with the deficit. Unlike in the post-2008 environment, however, we think that the Median Voter will abandon the Norquist and Tea Party thesis of cutting spending and adopt the view that higher income brackets should see their taxes increased. That said, extremely high marginal rates at $10,000,000 will impact very few individuals and thus have a negligible revenue impact. What about higher marginal rates across the board? Chart 9 illustrates the evolution of marginal tax rates, using 2012 dollars for income brackets, across decades. The 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s saw multiple tax brackets, all with progressively higher marginal tax rates. In the 1970s, the 70% tax rate started at $460,000 in 2012 dollars, but a 50% rate began at $100,000 in 2012 dollars. The question for investors is whether Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal is merely a branding exercise. A 70% tax rate that begins at $10,000,000 – Option 1 on Diagram 1 – is largely irrelevant, macroeconomically and politically. But if that is an end point of a curve, that is something that investors will want to know. This is because policymakers could draw those curves either by cutting lower-class and middle-class marginal rates – such as in Option 2 – or by simply replicating the 1970s curve, such as in Option 3. The impact of new taxes on the part of society with a higher marginal propensity to consume is an important consideration for policymakers recovering from a recession. Diagram 1Is Ocasio-Cortez’s Proposal An End Point Of A Curve Or Just A Branding Exercise? At the moment, investors are probably not overly concerned about these issues. Options 2 and 3 look unlikely in the current political environment. But, again, they have been acceptable policy options in the past and could be revived if the Democratic Party decides to make income inequality the central issue of the 2020 election. Which makes the 2020 election the most significant U.S. election in a generation. Will Trump-style populism succeed or will Democratic Socialism emerge in the United States? At the moment, most of our clients would likely guess that trade and immigration – policy issues from 2016 – will dominate the debate again in 2020. This is likely incorrect linear extrapolation. Rarely do the same issues carry over from one election to another. As such, a left-leaning presidential candidate could push the Trump administration on its tax reform package and the continued growing income inequality, despite a falling unemployment rate. Throw in a potential recession and you have a witch’s brew. Not only would the rhetoric alarm the markets, but so would the electoral math. Democrats have a solid House majority while Republicans are clinging to a small Senate majority in a year when the electoral math clearly works in Democrats’ favor (20 out of 33 Senate seats up for reelection are held by the GOP). We are not ready to give a high conviction forecast on the presidential election – other than to say that a recession will virtually ensure Trump’s loss – but we do have a high conviction that whoever wins the White House in 2020 will also carry the Senate. As such, a Democratic sweep of both the White House and Congress is a possible scenario. At that point, the Options from Diagram 1 will no longer be an academic question. Finally, even if Trump emerges victorious, he may still have to agree with a Democratic Congress to modify his tax cuts in order to pay for his border wall, immigration reform, and a national infrastructure package. In that case, the median voter would have established the long-term bottom of U.S. tax rates even without a change in political parties. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see CNBC Markets, “The super rich at Davos are scared of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to hike taxes on the wealthy,” dated January 22, 2018, available at cnbc.com. 2 Please see “Steve Bannon’s Plan to Raise Taxes on the Rich? Not Happening,” Fortune, dated July 31, 2017, available at fortune.com. 3 Also known as stereotyping.
The immediate question for investors in 2019 is whether the downside economic risk has become so pressing that President Xi will shift the policy gear from growth stabilization to total reflation. The evidence suggests that the policy stance has not changed…

