Financials

While the corporate sector has run up debt levels and is struggling to generate profit growth, consumers have rebuilt their savings and are enjoying the benefits of a positive wealth effect. The increase in real wage and salaries growth is supporting consumer income expectations, according to the latest consumer confidence survey (top panel). The implication is that consumption-oriented plays should be well positioned to deliver profit outperformance. Consumer finance stocks provide an attractively valued play on this theme, as does the S&P data processing index. The latter is levered to total transaction volumes, and a healthy consumer should translate into positive sales momentum. We are overweight both indexes. bca.uses_in_2016_10_27_001_c1 bca.uses_in_2016_10_27_001_c1

Highlights China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks - and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit, and they do not need deposits to lend. Banks create deposits and money by originating loans. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. What habitually drives credit booms are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. We are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed medium-size banks / long large five banks. Continue shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar. Feature For some time, the consensus view has been that rampant credit growth in China and the resulting excesses have been the natural result of the country's high savings rate, particularly among Chinese households. We have long argued differently: abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks and other creditors and borrowers. In this vein, China's credit bubble is no different than any other credit bubble in history. Although an adjustment in China might play out differently than it has in other countries where credit excesses became prevalent, China's corporate credit bubble is an imbalance that poses a non-trivial risk to both mainland and global growth (Chart I-1). Chart I-1China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP In a nutshell, Chinese banks have not channelled large amounts of household deposits into credit. Without mincing words, it is our view that banks have originated loans literally from "thin air" as banks do in any other country. In turn, credit has boosted spending, income and, consequently, savings. Do Deposits Create Loans, Or Do Loans Create Deposits? It is a widely held view among academics, investors and market commentators - including some of our colleagues here at BCA - that China's enormous credit expansion over the past several years has been a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate. The argument goes like this: China has a very high savings rate, and it is inherent that household savings flow to banks as deposits. In turn, banks have little choice but to lend out on these deposits. The upshot of this reasoning is as follows: China's abnormally strong credit growth is a consequence of the country's abundant savings rather than an unsustainable excess. This argument hails from the Intermediate Loan Funds (ILF) model, otherwise known as the Loanable Fund Theory. This model suggests that deposits create loans - i.e., banks intermediate deposits into credit. Even though the ILF model is the most widespread theory of banking within academia and in textbooks, it unfortunately has little relevance to real-life banking - i.e., banking systems around the world do not function as the model posits. An alternative but much less recognized theory, the Financing Money Creation (FMC) model, asserts that banks create deposits from "thin air" when they originate a new loan. This is the model that banking systems in almost all countries in the world subscribe to. Indeed, whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower's bank account, therefore creating new money in the process (Chart I-2). In other words, bank loans create deposits and money. Chart I-2Commercial Banks: Credit Origination Creates Deposits Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Herein we cite various papers that discuss this matter and delineate the key points: "Banks do not, as many textbooks still suggest, take deposits of existing money from savers and lend it out to borrowers: they create credit and money ex nihilo - extending a loan to the borrower and simultaneously crediting the borrower's money account" (Turner, 2013). "When banks extend loans, to their customers, they create money by crediting their customer's accounts" (King, 2012). "Based on how monetary policy has been conducted for several decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit whenever they like. They don't need a pile of "dry tinder" in the form of excess reserves to do so" (Dudley, 2009). "In a closed economy (or the world as a whole), fundamentally, deposits come from only two places: new bank lending and government deficits. Banks create deposits when they create loans." (Sheard, 2013). "Just as taking out a new loan creates money, the repayment of bank loans destroys money" (McLeay, 2014). The papers cited in the bibliography on page 18 elaborate on this topic in depth and readers are encouraged to review this literature. Bottom Line: Banks do not need deposits to lend. They create deposits and money by originating loans. Do Banks Lend Their Reserves At Central Banks? Another misconception about modern banking in general and China's banking system in particular is that banks lend out their excess reserves held at the central bank. Provided that Chinese banks have plenty of required reserves at the People's Bank of China (PBoC), some economists and analysts argue it is a matter of cutting the reserve requirement ratio to free up reserves (liquidity), which will allow banks to boost their loan origination. Again, we cite several papers as well as specific views from central bankers who reject the notion that banks lend out their reserves at the central bank: This comment by William C. Dudley (President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank) states "the Federal Reserve has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target. If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary policy. In terms of the ability to expand credit rapidly, it makes no difference whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not" (Dudley, 2009). "In fact, the level of reserves hardly figures in banks' lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks' willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion directly" (Borio et al., 2009). "While the institutional facts alone provide compelling support for our view, we also demonstrate empirically that the relationships implied by the money multiplier do not exist in the data ... Changes in reserves are unrelated to changes in lending, and open market operations do not have a direct impact on lending. We conclude that the textbook treatment of money in the transmission mechanism can be rejected..." (Carpenter et al., 2010). "...reserves are, in normal times, supplied 'on demand' by Bank of England to commercial banks in exchange for other assets on their balance sheets. In no way does the aggregate quantity of reserves directly constrains the amount of bank lending or deposit creation" (McLeay 2014). "Most importantly, banks cannot cause the amount of reserves at the central bank to fall by "lending them out" to customers. Assuming that the public does not change its demand for cash and the government does not make any net payments to the private sector (two things that are both beyond the direct control of the banks and the central bank), bank reserves have to remain "parked" at the central bank" (Sheard, 2013). More detailed analysis on this topic is available in the papers cited in the bibliography on page 18. Bottom Line: Banks do not lend out their reserves at the central bank. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination/money creation by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. Empirical Evidence: Savings Versus Credit This section presents empirical evidence that there is no correlation between national and household savings rates and loan origination. This is true for any country, including China. Credit growth and credit penetration (the credit-to-GDP ratio) have little to do with a country's or with households' savings rates. Chart I-3 illustrates that there has been no correlation between China's national or household savings rates and the credit-to-GDP ratio. China's savings rate was high and rising before 2009, yet the credit bubble formation only commenced in January 2009 when the savings rate topped out. Looking at other countries such as Korea, Taiwan and the U.S., historically we find no correlation between their savings and credit cycles1 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: Credit And Savings ##br##Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Chart I-4The U.S., Korea And Taiwan:##br## Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Importantly, a high or rising savings rate does not preclude deleveraging. There were many two- to four-year spans of deleveraging in China when the credit-to-GDP ratio was flat or falling (Chart I-5) - i.e., the growth rate of credit was at or below nominal GDP growth. This occurred despite the country's high and rising savings rate. So, not only is deleveraging not unusual for China but it has also occurred amid a high savings rate. This contradicts the commonly held view that Chinese credit has always expanded faster than nominal GDP because the nation saves a lot. Deleveraging at the current juncture will likely be very painful, because the size of credit flows is enormous and even a moderate and gradual deceleration in credit will produce a major drag on growth. Specifically, the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit that measures the impact of credit growth on GDP - will be equal to -2.2% of GDP if credit growth moderates from 11.3% now to 7.8% in the next 24 months (Chart I-6). Chart I-5There Were Periods Of ##br##Deleveraging In China Too There Were Periods Of Deleveraging In China Too There Were Periods Of Deleveraging In China Too Chart I-6China's Credit Impulse Will ##br##Likely Be Negative China's Credit Impulse Will Likely Be Negative China's Credit Impulse Will Likely Be Negative As Chart I-6 also demonstrates, China's credit impulse drives Chinese imports, the most critical variable for the rest of the world. Chart I-7China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 Further, it is possible to argue that vigorous credit growth generates robust income growth. The latter, in turn, allows a nation as a whole and households in particular to save more. If Chinese banks had not originated as many loans since early 2009 as they have, many goods and services in China would not have been produced and sold, and income growth for all companies, households and even government would be much lower. Even if the savings rate were held constant, less income would entail lower absolute amounts of both national and household savings. In short, China's exponential credit growth since 2009 has helped boost both national and household income levels, and in turn the absolute level of their savings. Chart I-7 illustrates that before 2009, mainland economic and income growth were driven by exports, but since early 2009, credit has been instrumental in generating income growth and prosperity. Finally, many analysts rationalize strong loan growth among Chinese banks by their robust deposit growth. This logic is flawed: Chinese banks have substantial deposits on hand because they originate a lot of loans. Bottom Line: China's and any other country's national or household savings rate does not explain swings in credit creation. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit. Rather, banks create deposits and money. What Drives Bank Lending? If a credit boom is not driven by abundant savings, what is the foundation for a credit boom in general, and the one currently underway in China in particular? Loan origination by a bank depends on that bank's willingness to lend, as well as general demand for loans. Also, depending on policy priorities, regulators often try to encourage or limit banks' ability to lend by imposing and adjusting various regulatory ratios. Barring any regulatory constraints, so long as there is demand for loans and a bank is willing to lend, a loan will be originated. Hence, in theory, banks can lend to eternity unless shareholders and regulators constrain them. In the immediate wake of the Lehman crisis, the Chinese authorities encouraged banks to open the credit floodgates. Thus, there was a de facto deregulation in the nation's banking system in early 2009 - policymakers encouraged strong credit origination. The experience of many countries - documented by numerous academic papers on this topic - has demonstrated that banking sector deregulation typically leads to excessive risk-taking by banks, and abnormal credit growth. These episodes have not ended well, with multi-year workouts following in their wake. By and large, a credit boom often occurs when risk-taking by banks surges and shareholders and regulators do not constrain them. This has been no different in China - the credit boom since 2009 has been powered by speculative and excessive risk-taking among banks and their management teams in particular, amid complacency of regulators and shareholders. Bottom Line: What habitually drives excessive credit creation are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. Banks' and borrowers' speculative behavior and reckless risk-taking typically degenerates into a credit boom that often ends in an economic and financial downturn. It has been no different in China. What Constrains Bank Lending? The following factors can limit bank credit origination: Monetary policy can limit credit growth via raising interest rates, which dampens loan demand. Also, banks can become more risk averse when interest rates rise as they downgrade creditworthiness of current and prospective borrowers. Government regulations can impose various restrictions on banks, restraining their risk-taking and ability to originate infinite amounts of credit. In China, to limit banks' ability to lend, regulators have imposed several mandatory ratios on commercial banks, and also practice 'Window Guidance'. First, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR=net capital / risk-weighted assets). This ratio limits banks' ability to originate infinite amounts of loans by imposing a minimum level CAR. In China, most banks comply comfortably with CAR. The CAR for the entire commercial banking system is currently 13.1%. While the minimum requirement is 8%. The caveat is that in China, banks' equity capital is nowadays considerably inflated because they have not provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). If banks were to fully provision for NPLs, their equity capital would shrink significantly, and they would probably not meet the minimum CAR. Table I-1 shows that in a scenario of 12.5% NPL ratio for banks' claims on companies and zero NPL on household loans and mortgages as well as a 20% recovery rate, a full provisioning by banks would erode 65% of their equity. In this scenario, the CAR ratio would drop a lot - probably below the required minimum of 8% and banks would be forced to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders) or shrink their balance sheets - or a combination of both. Table I-1China: NPL Scenarios And Banks' Equity Capital Impairment Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Second, the leverage ratio - computed as net Tier-1 capital divided by on- and off-balance-sheet assets. According to government regulation, this ratio should be at least 4%. As of June 30, 2016, the leverage ratio for the entire commercial banking system was 6.4%, comfortably above its floor. Nevertheless, as with CAR, the leverage ratio is overstated at the moment because the numerator - net Tier-1 equity capital - is artificially inflated, as it is not adjusted for realistic levels of NPLs, as discussed above. If 65% of equity is eroded due to sensible loan-loss provisioning and write-offs (as per Table 1), the leverage ratio would drop to about 2.3%, below the required minimum of 4%. Hence, banks would need to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders), shrink their balance sheets or do a combination of both. Equity dilution is bearish for bank stocks and, if and as banks moderate their assets/loan growth, the economy will suffer. Third, regulatory 'Window Guidance' is implemented through PBoC recommendations to banks on their annual and quarterly credit ceilings, and on their credit structures. There is no official disclosure of this measure, and it is done between the PBoC, the Chinese Banking Regulatory commission (CBRC) and banks' management. In recent years, the efficiency of 'Window Guidance' has declined dramatically. Banks have defied bank regulators' efforts to rein in credit growth by finding loopholes in regulations. What's more, they have de facto exceeded credit origination limits by moving credit risk off their balance sheets and classifying it differently than loans. The result has been mushrooming Non-Standard Credit Assets (NSCA). Table I-2 reveals that on- and off-balance-sheet NSCA stand at RMB 10 trillion and RMB 19 trillion, respectively. Furthermore, banks have lately expanded their lending to non-depositary financial organizations that include trust companies, financial leasing companies, auto financing companies and loan companies (Chart I-8). This has probably been done to circumvent government regulations. Hence, Chinese banks have taken on much more credit risk than regulators have wanted them to by reclassifying/renaming loans as NSCA, and parking these assets both on- and off-balance-sheet. Table I-2China: Five Largest Banks Hold ##br##Only 40% Of Credit Assets Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Chart I-8Non-Bank Financial Organizations##br## Are On A Borrowing Spree From Banks bca.ems_sr_2016_10_26_s1_c8 bca.ems_sr_2016_10_26_s1_c8 In short, regulatory measures in China have not been effective at restraining credit growth in recent years. Bank shareholders are the biggest losers when banks expand credit uncontrollably, and then their default rates rise. The reason being that banking is a business built on leverage. For example, if a bank's assets-to-equity ratio is 10 and 10% of assets go bad (default with no recovery), shareholders' equity will completely evaporate - i.e., they will lose their entire investment. Hence, it is in the best interests of bank shareholders to halt a credit expansion when they sense deteriorating credit quality ahead. Doing so will hurt the economy, but limit their losses. Why have shareholders of Chinese banks not stepped in to curb the credit boom and misallocation of capital? We believe they have either been satisfied with such a massive credit expansion, which has initially driven shareholder returns up, or weak institutional shareholder mechanisms have meant they have been unable to enforce credit discipline on their banks. All in all, if China's or any other credit system is driven by the principals of capitalism and markets, creditors are the ones who should curtail credit growth - regardless of what impact it will have on the economy. If a country's credit system in general and banks in particular do not operate on principals of capitalism and markets, banks can expand credit infinitely, thereby perpetuating capital misallocation and raising inefficiency, leading to stagnating productivity - in other words, a move to a more socialist bend. Only in a socialist system do banks expand their credit portfolios in perpetuity, since they are not run to maximize wealth for shareholders. On a related note, there is another misconception that all Chinese banks are state-owned and the government will be fast to bail them out by buying bad assets at par. Table I-3 illustrates the ownership structure of 16 Chinese banks listed the A-share market, including the large ones. The state (central and local governments) and SOEs have a large but not 100% ownership stake. In fact, foreign investors have considerable equity shares in many banks. Table I-3Chinese Banks: Shareholder Structure Is Diverse Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Hence, a government bail-out of these banks at no cost to shareholders would mean the Chinese government is using taxpayer money to benefit domestic private as well as foreign shareholders. Given the considerable amounts involved, this will be politically difficult to achieve unless the benefits of doing so are explicitly greater than the costs of doing nothing. Chart I-9Commercial Banks Are On ##br##Borrowing Spree From PBoC Commercial Banks Are On Borrowing Spree From PBoC Commercial Banks Are On Borrowing Spree From PBoC We are not implying that a government bailout is impossible. Our point is that it will take material pain and considerable deterioration in the economy and financial markets before the central government bails out banks at no cost to other shareholders. No wonder the authorities have not recapitalized the banks so far. In the long run, if the Chinese government is serious about improving the credit/capital allocation process, it has to allow market forces to take hold so that creditors and debtors are not bailed out but instead assume financial responsibility for their decisions. This means short-term pain but long-term gain. The lack of demand for credit is an important constraint on credit origination. If there are no borrowers, banks will have a hard time making a sizable amount of loans. Liquidity constraints also limit banks' ability to expand their assets. Let's consider an example when liquidity constraints arise. Bank A originates a loan, and Borrower A wants to transfer money to its Supplier B, which has an account at Bank B. In theory, Bank A should reduce its excess reserves at the central bank by transferring money to Bank B's reserve account at the central bank. However, if too many borrowers of Bank A try to transfer their money/deposits to other banks, Bank A will run into liquidity constraints as its excess reserves dry up. In such a case, Bank A should borrow money from the central bank or the interbank market to replenish its excess reserves. Provided many G7 central banks are nowadays committed to supplying as much liquidity (reserves) as banks require, in these countries banks do not really face liquidity constraints in lending. The focus of advanced countries' central banks is to control short-term interest rates - i.e., they manage liquidity in a way to keep policy rates at the target. In the case of China, even though the PBoC has a high required reserves ratio (RRR) for banks, it apparently supplies commercial banks with whatever amounts of liquidity they require. Chart I-9 reveals that the PBoC's claims on commercial banks have surged by fivefold in the past three years. Given the Chinese monetary authorities have in the recent years been very generous in meeting banks' demands for liquidity, the high RRR has not constrained mainland banks' ability to originate loans. This contradicts some analysts' assertions that the PBoC can boost lending by cutting the RRR. As the PBoC presently fully accommodates banks' demands for liquidity, the significance and impact of required reserves has declined. On the whole, nowadays, commercial banks in China are not facing liquidity (reserves) constraints to expand credit. High debt servicing costs could constrain bank lending. Are there limits to the credit-to-GDP ratio? It is illustrative to consider a numerical example for China. Corporate and household debt presently stands at 220% of GDP and, according to Bank of Intentional Settlement (BIS) calculations, debt servicing costs (including interest payments and amortization) account for around 20% of disposable income (Chart I-10). If credit indefinitely expands at a rate well above nominal GDP growth (Chart I-11) and interest rates do not decline, debt servicing costs will rise substantially. For example, let's assume that mainland corporate and consumer leverage reaches 400% of GDP in the next several years. If and when this happens, debt servicing costs could double, approaching 40% of income assuming constant interest rates and debt maturity. Chart I-10China's Corporate And Household##br## Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? China's Corporate And Household Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? China's Corporate And Household Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? Chart I-11Will Credit Growth Slow Toward##br## Nominal GDP Growth? Will Credit Growth Slow Toward Nominal GDP Growth? Will Credit Growth Slow Toward Nominal GDP Growth? No debtor can continue to function under such debt burden. Hence, debtors will have to cut their spending (for companies it will be a reduction in capex budgets) or these debtors will need to borrow to pay interest and retire old debt. In short, this becomes an unsustainable Ponzi scheme, where debtors borrow to service their debt obligations. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not rare in China nowadays. One way the authorities could reduce debt servicing is to cut interest rates to zero and lengthen the maturity of debt. This is what many advanced economies have done. If Chinese credit penetration does not stop rising, the PBoC will be forced to cut rates to close to zero. This in turn will lead to large capital outflows, and the RMB will depreciate versus the U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: The following factors can restrain bank credit origination: monetary policy (higher interest rates), government regulations, bank shareholders, lack of credit demand, liquidity constraints and high debt servicing costs. Investment Implications Chart I-12Short Small Banks / Long Large##br## Banks In China Short Small Banks / Long Large Banks In China Short Small Banks / Long Large Banks In China If banks' shareholders and other creditors in China act in accordance with their self-interests to preserve the value of their assets, they will have to reduce credit origination/lending. As a result, China will experience an acute economic downturn. This would constitute a capitalist-type adjustment, which in turn will lead to more efficiency, solid productivity growth, and reasonably high economic growth over the long term. However, it will also mean significant short-term pain. If the government bails out everyone, underwrites all credit risks, and gets even more involved in capital/credit allocation, the economy will not experience an acute slump for a while. However, this would represent a shift toward socialism and the potential growth rate will collapse in the next several years. With the labor force stagnating and probably contracting in the years ahead, China's potential growth will be equal to its productivity growth. In socialism, productivity growth is low, often close to zero. The growth trajectory in this scenario will follow mini-cycles around a rapidly falling potential growth rate. In brief, China's growth rate is bound to slow further, regardless of what scenario plays out over the next several years. Today, we are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed small- and medium-size banks / long large five banks in the A-share market (Chart I-12). There has been more speculative high-risk lending from the small- and medium-size banks than the large ones. As we documented in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow,2 the largest five banks have fewer non-standard credit assets than medium and small banks. If 12.5% of banks' claims on companies turn sour and the recovery rate is 20%, 100% of the equity of 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks will be wiped out. The same number for the large five banks is 42%. Hence, these 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks are more exposed to bad loans than the large five. Finally, mushrooming leverage entails that the monetary authorities should reduce interest rates drastically. However, lower interest rates will spur more capital outflows from the mainland. Hence, the RMB is set to depreciate further. We have been shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar since December 9, 2015, and this position remains intact. 1 We discussed this at length in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China: Imbalances And Policy Options", dated June 12, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominious Shadow", June 15, 2016, link available on page 22. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Bibliography Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2009), "Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Appraisal", BIS Working Papers, No. 292, November 2009. Carpenter, S. and Demiralp, S. (2010),"Money, Reserves, and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?", Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No. 2010-41, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board Dudley, W. (2009), "The Economic Outlook and the Fed's Balance Sheet: The Issue of "How" versus "When"", Remarks at the Association for a Better New York Breakfast Meeting, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090729.html Jakad, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", Bank of England, Working Paper 529, May 2015 King, M. (2012), Speech to the South Wales Chamber of Commerce at the Millenium Centre, Cardiff, October 23. Ma, G., Xiandong, Y. and Xim L. (2011), "China's evolving reserve requirements", BIS Working Papers, No. 360, November 2011. Turner, A. (2013), "Credit, Money and Leverage", September 12. Sheard, Paul (2013), "Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not 'Lent Out' Reserves", Standard & Poor's Rating Services, August 2013, New York Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. See King (2012), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 6, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Dudley (2009), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Carpenter and Demiralp (2010), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

A number of large investment banks have reported better-than-expected profit results, courtesy of a flurry of trading activity. While any profit windfall is always a plus, the nature of these gains is fleeting and unlikely to break capital markets shares out of their funk. Our focus remains on durable profit drivers, namely the outlook for capital formation. The corporate sector financing gap is slipping back toward neutral, reflecting a budding retrenchment phase in response to balance sheet stress. That will limit demand for external capital. New and secondary issuance is likely to stay muted until global economic confidence improves (second panel). Even M&A activity is cooling, despite low financing costs, representing another profit headwind. As a result, we would use any share price strength to sell, and reiterate our underweight position. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CAPM - GS, MS, BLK, BK, SCHW, CME, SPGI, ICE, STT, MCO, TROW, AMP, NTRS, IVZ, BEN, ETFC, AMG, NDAQ, LM. bca.uses_in_2016_10_20_001_c1 bca.uses_in_2016_10_20_001_c1

Highlights When interest rates are ultra-low, central banks have no margin for policy error. A small loosening or tightening has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence. The analogy is flying a plane at high altitude. Bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over German bunds (currency hedged). Currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere, once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. But a setback in the region of 5-10% could create a tactical entry point. Feature As the ECB Governing Council convenes for its October monetary policy meeting, an experience familiar to pilots1 provides a perfect analogy for central banks' very limited margin for error. Pilots call the experience "flying in coffin corner." Chart of the WeekUnusually High Turbulence For The German 30-Year Bund Unusually High Turbulence For The German 30-Year Bund Unusually High Turbulence For The German 30-Year Bund Next time you're in a plane climbing to 35,000 feet, here's something to think about; or perhaps, not to think about. As the plane gains altitude, its stall speed increases while its upper speed limit simultaneously decreases. For the pilot, this means less and less margin for error (Figure I-1). The plane's stall speed is the minimum speed to generate sufficient lift. At higher altitude, as the air gets thinner, the stall speed increases. Meanwhile, the plane's upper speed limit is set by the speed of sound. Airliners cannot fly too close to the speed of sound because the sonic shockwave produces violent and catastrophic turbulence. At higher altitude, as the air temperature drops, so does the speed of sound. Which means the plane's upper speed limit decreases. By the time the plane has reached the rarefied atmosphere of 35,000 feet, these lower and upper speed limits are barely 25 knots (30mph) apart,2 leaving almost no room for flight data misinterpretation or pilot error.3 Hence, at high altitude pilots morbidly say they are "flying in coffin corner." Analogously, in the rarefied atmosphere of zero or near-zero interest rates, central bank policy is also in coffin corner. When short-term and long-term interest rates approach the zero bound, there is no room for economic data misinterpretation or policy error. A small loosening or tightening of monetary policy has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence (Figure I-2 and Chart of the Week). Figure I-1Flying At High Altitude ##br## Has No Margin For Error Flying At The Edge Flying At The Edge Figure I-2Monetary Policy At Ultra-Low Rates ##br##Has No Margin For Error Flying At The Edge Flying At The Edge Avoiding A Stall At today's zero or near-zero interest rates in the euro area, a small loosening of monetary policy risks stalling the banking system, and thereby stalling the economy. A bank's core business is simple. Take in deposits, and lend them out at a higher interest rate than the deposit-rate - with the difference in the two defining the bank's net interest margin. A part of the net interest margin is a compensation for the risk of non-performing loans. This should be profit-neutral if correctly priced. The other large part of the net interest margin comes from the interest rate term-structure, as loans tend to be long-term while deposits are short-term. Hence, all else being equal, the bank's profitability suffers as the term-structure flattens. For a while, the bank can protect its profitability by cutting the interest rate paid on short-term deposits to well below the policy rate. However, once the policy rate hits zero, this profit-protection strategy hits a wall - because a negative deposit rate would risk an exodus of deposits into cash or cash-substitutes. Alternatively, the bank could charge a higher rate to borrowers, but this would tighten credit conditions. The third possibility is for the bank to suffer a hit to its already-thin net lending margin, but this would also tighten credit conditions. The pressure on the bank's profitability and share price would increase the cost of equity, making it harder to raise capital (Chart I-2). Given that an insufficient capital buffer is a major constraint to euro area bank lending, this would be a de facto tightening of credit conditions. The paradox is that at the zero bound, the smallest additional monetary loosening - via interest rate cuts or QE - risks stalling euro area bank credit creation (Chart I-3). Thereby it risks stalling economic growth. Chart I-2The ECB's QE Has Hurt Bank Valuations The ECB's QE Has Hurt Bank Valuations The ECB's QE Has Hurt Bank Valuations Chart I-3The Interplay Between Bank Profits And Bank Credit Creation Flying At The Edge Flying At The Edge Avoiding Violent Turbulence An extended period of ultra-low interest rates, and a commitment to keep them structurally low, has compressed the yields on government bonds pushing up their prices. As competing asset classes, the prices of corporate bonds and equities have also increased. This phenomenon is called the Portfolio Balance Effect. The big problem is that the prices of riskier assets have increased by more than is justified by the portfolio balance effect alone. This distortion is the result of a behavioural finance phenomenon called Mental Accounting Bias. Mental Accounting Bias describes the irrational distinction between the return from an investment's yield and that from its capital growth. The distinction is irrational because the money that comes from yield and the money that comes from capital growth is perfectly fungible.4 Rationally, what should matter is an investment's total return. But psychologically, the distinction between yield and capital is very stark. Fears about self-control cause people to compartmentalise yield as spending money and capital as saving money. Hence, people who want their investments to generate spending money - say, retirees - have an irrational focus on yield. Traditionally, the safe income from cash and government bonds satiates the people who irrationally focus on yield. However, in recent years, central banks' extended experiments with ZIRP, NIRP and QE have forced these yield-focussed investors out of cash and government bonds into risky investments. And just like every distortion, this phenomenon has generated memes to justify the act: 'reach for yield', 'search for yield', and 'there is no alternative' (TINA). But the irrational focus on yield instead of total return has artificially bid up the prices of risky investments. To the point that they no longer offer a sufficient risk premium5 for the very real possibility of substantial losses over a 5-10 year horizon (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The unfortunate thing is that as central bankers have little expertise in psychology or behavioural finance, they have been blind to the very dangerous behavioural distortion that their monetary policy experiments have unwittingly unleashed. Chart I-4A Positive Yield On Equities##br## Can Produce A Negative 5-Year Return... bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c4 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c4 Chart I-5...And Even A Negative ##br##10-Year Return bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c5 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c5 The risk is that the smallest monetary tightening could trigger an aggressive unwinding of this behavioural distortion. Recall the violent turbulence in global financial markets at the start of the year after just one 25bps rate hike from the Federal Reserve. Now consider what might happen if the Fed hiked again and the ECB simultaneously announced a rapid tapering of its QE program. How Must The Pilots Fly? In a rarefied atmosphere, pilots have very little margin to alter speed without inducing a stall or violent turbulence. The same applies to central banks today. The ECB has the hardest piloting task. It is becoming difficult to justify the current aggressive pace of QE given the danger of stalling the euro area banking system; and given that the euro area's nominal GDP and nominal wage bill are both growing at a very respectable 3% (Chart I-6). But an abrupt end to the ECB's QE could create violent turbulence in QE-distorted financial markets. Chart I-6What Deflation Threat? Euro Area Nominal GDP And The Wage Bill Growing At 3% bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c6 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c6 Hence, the ECB's best course of action is to hint at a very gradual deceleration of QE to start at some point in the second half of 2017. Turning to developed economy central banks in general, we remind readers of a very powerful observation. Since 2008, no major central bank has been able to hike interest rates by more than 1.75%. And every central bank that has hiked rates has had to start unwinding those hikes within a year, ultimately taking the policy rate to a new all-time low (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Since 2008, All Rate Hikes ##br##Have Been Quickly Reversed bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c7 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c7 Chart I-8Will The U.S. Be ##br##Any Different? No bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c8 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s1_c8 Given the turbulence that rate hikes will generate in the financial markets and/or the economy, we fully expect the Federal Reserve to go through exactly the same experience. The important upshot is that global central bank policy through 2017-18 will be considerably less divergent than is discounted. Bond yields could creep higher in the short term. But on a 1-year horizon, bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over euro area bonds, and especially over German bunds (currency hedged). Over the same horizon, currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. Moreover, the potential for ECB QE-tapering combined with expectations for a Fed rate hike could generate some near-term turbulence. That said, a setback in the region of 5-10% could create an excellent entry point for a 3-month trade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. Last week's long silver/short lead pair trade has bounced sharply. And the short U.K. A-rated corporate bonds trade has achieved its 4% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 Long Silver / Short Lead Long Silver / Short Lead * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. 1 Your author is a former pilot in the Royal Air Force reserve. 2 For an Airbus A330. 3 Tragically, a combination of flight data misinterpretation and pilot error at 35,000 feet was disastrous for Air France flight AF447 flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009. Going through a storm, the airspeed indicator started giving a false reading and the pilot took the wrong corrective action, resulting in a catastrophic stall. 4 Assuming no difference in tax treatment of income and capital gains. 5 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Great Distortion... And How It will End" dated September 15, 2016 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c2 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c2 Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c3 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c3 Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c4 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c4 Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c5 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c5 Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c6 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c6 Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c7 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c7 Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c8 bca.eis_wr_2016_10_20_s2_c8

Highlights EM tech stocks are overbought while banks are fundamentally vulnerable due to bad-loan overhang. EM stocks have never decoupled from the U.S. dollar and commodities prices. There has been no recovery in EM corporate profitability and EPS. We reiterate two equity trades: short EM banks / long U.S. banks, and short Chinese property developers / long U.S. homebuilders. Upgrade Thai stocks to overweight within the EM equity benchmark and go long THB versus KRW. Feature Our Reflation Confirming Indicator - an equal-weighted aggregate of platinum prices (a proxy for global reflation), industrial metals prices (a proxy for China growth) and U.S. lumber prices (a proxy for U.S. reflation) - has decisively rolled over, and is spelling trouble for emerging market (EM) equities (Chart I-1). In particular, platinum prices have relapsed after hitting a major resistance at their 800-day moving average (Chart I-2). Such a technical pattern often leads to new lows. If so, it could presage a major selloff in EM markets in the months ahead. Chart I-1A Red Flag From ##br##Reflation Confirming Indicator A Red Flag From Reflation Confirming Indicator A Red Flag From Reflation Confirming Indicator Chart I-2Platinum: A Canary##br## In A Coal Mine? bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s1_c2 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s1_c2 The rationale behind using platinum rather than gold or silver prices is because platinum is a precious metal that also has industrial uses. Besides, we have found that platinum prices correlate with EM stocks better than gold or silver. The latter two sometimes rally due to global demand for safety, even as EM markets tank. Finally, platinum seems to be the most high-beta precious metal in the sense that it "catches a cold" sooner and, thus, might be leading other reflationary plays. In short, EM share prices have been flat since August 15, and odds are that they are topping out and the next large move will be to the downside. Can EM De-Couple From The U.S. Dollar? Many investors are asking whether EM risk assets can rally if the greenback continues to rebound. Chart I-3 illustrates that since the early 1980s, there have been no periods when EM share prices rallied amid strength in the real broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar (the dollar is shown inverted on this and the proceeding charts). The same holds true if one uses the nominal narrow trade-weighted U.S. dollar1 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Real Trade-Weighted ##br##U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks Real Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks Real Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks Chart I-4Nominal Trade-Weighted ##br##U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks Nominal Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks Nominal Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And EM Stocks One could disregard these charts and argue that this time around is different. We don't quite see it that way. Chart I-5Nominal Trade-Weighted ##br##U.S. Dollar And Commodities Nominal Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And Commodities Nominal Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar And Commodities Notably, the narrative behind the EM rally since February's lows has been based on the Federal Reserve backing off from rate hikes and the U.S. dollar weakening - with the latter propelling a rally in commodities prices. These arguments appear to be reversing: the U.S. dollar is already firming up and commodities prices are at best mixed. The broad index for commodities prices always drops when the U.S. dollar rallies (Chart I-5). In recent months, the advance in commodities prices has been uneven and narrow based. While oil prices have spiked substantially, industrial metals prices have advanced very little. The current oil price rally is proving a bit more durable and lasting than we thought a few months ago. Nevertheless, China's apparent consumption of petroleum products is beginning to contract (Chart I-6). Consequently, resurfacing worries about EM/China's demand for commodities will lead to a meaningful pullback in crude prices in the months ahead, especially since the likelihood that oil producers act to restrain supply at the current prices is very low. As for commodities trading in China such as steel, iron ore, rubber, plate glass and others, they have been on a roller-coaster ride in recent months (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China's Demand For Oil Products Is Very Weak China's Demand For Oil Products Is Very Weak China's Demand For Oil Products Is Very Weak Chart I-7Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Bottom Line: There are reasonably high odds that as the U.S. dollar strengthens and commodities prices roll over, EM risk assets (stocks, currencies and credit markets) will start to relapse. EM Beyond Commodities: Still Shrinking Profits Table I-1EM Sectors Weights: In 2011 And Now The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam? The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam? Another question that many investors have been asking is as follows: Is there not a positive story in EM beyond commodities? Given that the weight of the EM equity market benchmark in commodities stocks - energy and materials - has drastically declined in recent years, from 29.2% in 2011 to 13.7% now (Table I-1), and the weight in technology stocks has risen substantially (from 12.9% in 2011 to 23.9% now), couldn't non-commodities stocks drive the index higher? In this regard, we have the following observations: Information technology stocks are overbought. The EM information technology equity index has surged to its previous highs (Chart I-8, top panel). This sector is dominated by five companies that have a very large weight also in the overall EM benchmark: Samsung (3.6% weight in the EM equity benchmark), TMSC (3.5%), Alibaba (2.9%), Hon Hai Precision (1%) and Tencent (3.8%). Their share price performance has been spectacular, and some of them have gone ballistic (Chart I-9). TMSC and to a lesser extent Samsung have benefited from the rising prices of semiconductors (Chart I-9, second panel from top). However, it is not assured that semiconductor prices will continue soaring from these levels as global aggregate demand remains very weak. In short, the outlook for semi stocks is by and large a semiconductor industry call, not a macro one. As for Alibaba and Tencent, they are bottom-up stories - not macro bets at all. At the macro level, we reassert that EM/China demand for technology goods and services as well as for health care will stay robust. Hence, from a revenue perspective, technology and health care companies will outperform other EM sectors. This still warrants an overweight allocation to technology and health care stocks, a recommendation that we have had in place since June 2010 (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Odds are that tech outperformance will persist, but we are not sure about absolute performance, given overbought conditions and not-so-cheap valuations. Excluding information technology, the EM benchmark is somewhat weaker (Chart I-10). Chart I-8EM Technology Stocks: Sky Is Limit? bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s1_c8 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s1_c8 Chart I-9Individual Tech Names Are Overbought Individual Tech Names Are Overbought Individual Tech Names Are Overbought Chart I-10EM Equities: Overall And Excluding Tech EM Equities: Overall And Excluding Tech EM Equities: Overall And Excluding Tech There is no improvement in EM corporate profitability The return on equity (RoE) for EM non-financial listed companies has stabilized at very low levels, but it has not improved at all (Chart I-11, top panel). The reason we use non-financials' RoE rather than overall RoE is because in EM the latter is artificially inflated at the moment, as banks are originating a lot of new loans but are not sufficiently provisioning for bad loans. Among the three components of non-financials RoE, net profit margins have stabilized but asset turnover is falling and leverage continues to mushroom (Chart I-11, bottom two panels). Remarkably, the relative performance between EM and U.S. stocks has historically been driven by relative RoE. When non-financial RoE in EM is above that of the U.S., EM stocks outperform U.S. ones, and vice-versa (Chart I-12). This relationships argues for EM stocks underperformance versus the S&P 500. Chart I-11EM Non-Financials: ##br##RoE And Its Components EM Non-Financials: RoE And Its Components EM Non-Financials: RoE And Its Components Chart I-12EM Versus U.S.: ##br##Relative RoE And Share Prices EM Versus U.S.: Relative RoE And Share Prices EM Versus U.S.: Relative RoE And Share Prices Overall EM EPS is still contracting in both local currency and U.S. dollar terms (Chart I-13). Even though the rate of contraction is easing for EPS in U.S. dollar terms, it is due to EM exchange rate appreciation versus the greenback this year. Furthermore, EPS in U.S. dollars is contracting in a majority of non-commodities sectors (Chart I-13A, Chart I-13B). The exceptions are utilities and industrials, which both exhibit strong EPS growth despite poor share price performance. The latter could be a sign that strong industrials and utilities EPS have been due to temporary factors and are not sustainable. Chart I-13AEM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector EM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector EM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector Chart I-13BEM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector EM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector EM EPS Growth: Overall And By Sector Banks hold the key. Apart from commodities/the U.S. dollar and tech stocks, EM banks' share prices are probably the most important precursor to the direction of the overall EM benchmark. Financials are the second-largest sector in the EM equity benchmark (26.4% weight), so if bank share prices break down, the broader EM index will likely relapse. Our analysis of bank health in various EM countries leads us to believe that banks are under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPL) (Chart I-14A, Chart I-14B). As EM growth disappointments resurface, investors will question the quality of banks' balance sheets and push down bank equity valuation. Hence, odds are bank share prices will drop sooner than later. Chart I-14AEM NPLs Are Unrecognized ##br##And Under-Provisioned EM NPLs Are Unrecognized And Under-Provisioned EM NPLs Are Unrecognized And Under-Provisioned Chart I-14BEM NPLs Are Unrecognized ##br##And Under-Provisioned EM NPLs Are Unrecognized And Under-Provisioned EM NPLs Are Unrecognized And Under-Provisioned In turn, concerns about EM banks will heighten doubts about overall EM growth and the EM equity benchmark will sell off. Bottom Line: EM tech stocks are overbought, while banks are fundamentally vulnerable due to the bad-loan overhang. As commodities prices relapse anew and worries about the EM credit cycle resurface, the EM benchmark will drop considerably. An Update On Two Relative Equity Trades We reiterate two relative equity trades: short EM banks / long U.S. banks, and short Chinese property developers / long U.S. homebuilders. For investors who do not have these positions, now is a good time to initiate them. Short EM banks / long U.S. banks (Chart I-15). The credit cycle in EM/China will undergo a further downturn: credit growth is set to decelerate as banks recognize NPLs and seek to raise capital. Even if a crisis is avoided, the need to raise substantial amounts of equity will considerably erode the value of EM bank shares. Meanwhile, risks to U.S. banks such as a flat yield curve and a possible spillover effect from European banking tremors are considerably less severe than the problems faced by EM banks. Importantly, unlike EM banks, U.S. banks' balance sheets are very healthy. Short Chinese property developers / long U.S. homebuilders (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Stay Short EM Banks##br## Versus U.S. Banks Stay Short EM Banks Versus U.S. Banks Stay Short EM Banks Versus U.S. Banks Chart I-16Stay Short Chinese Property ##br##Developers Versus U.S. Homebuilders Stay Short Chinese Property Developers Versus U.S. Homebuilders Stay Short Chinese Property Developers Versus U.S. Homebuilders Chinese property developers are on the verge of another downturn, as the authorities have tightened policy surrounding housing. Residential and non-residential property sales have boomed in the past 12 months, but starts have been less robust (Chart I-17). The upshot could still be high shadow inventories. Going forward, as speculative demand for housing cools off, property developers' chronic malaise - high leverage and lack of cash flow - will come back to play. Remarkably, property stocks trading in Hong Kong have failed to break out amid the buoyant residential market frenzy in the past 12 months, and are likely to break down as demand growth falters in the coming months (Chart I-18). Chart I-17China's Real Estate: ##br##Sales And Starts Will Contract China's Real Estate: Sales And Starts Will Contract China's Real Estate: Sales And Starts Will Contract Chart I-18Chinese Property Developers: ##br##On A Verge Of Breakdown? Chinese Property Developers: On A Verge Of Breakdown? Chinese Property Developers: On A Verge Of Breakdown? Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW The death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej marks the end of an era not only because he symbolized national unity but also because his entire generation is passing. This generational shift has far-reaching consequences for Thailand's political establishment: in the long run it could hurt the Thai military's - and its allies' - attempt to cement their dominance over parliament. However, as Box II-1 (on page 17) explains, there is a low probability of serious domestic instability over the next 12 months2 - although beyond that risks will be heating up. For now, the military junta faces no major political or economic constraints: The junta has already consolidated control over all major organs of government and has purged or intimidated political enemies. The military will have to turn power back to parliament, or make a major policy mistake, for the opposition movement to rise again. The government's fiscal deficit has been stable (around 3% of GDP) over the past few years, public debt is at 33% of GDP, government bond yields are low and debt servicing costs are at 5% of total expenditures (Chart II-1). Hence, the military government can ramp up expenditures further to appease the disaffected. Indeed, the military junta has already accelerated public capital expenditures (Chart II-2) and investments have poured into the Northeast, a populous base of opposition to the junta. Chart II-1Thailand: More Room ##br##For Fiscal Stimulus Thailand: More Room For Fiscal Stimulus Thailand: More Room For Fiscal Stimulus Chart II-2Thailand: Government ##br##Capex Has Been Booming bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c2 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c2 Likewise, fiscal expenditure has also accelerated in areas such as general public services, defense, and social protection (Chart II-3). Additionally, the Bank of Thailand (BoT) has scope to cut interest rates as the policy rate is still above a very low inflation rate (Chart II-4). This will limit the downside for credit growth and contribute to economic and political stability. Chart II-3Rising Public Spending bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c3 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c3 Chart II-4Thailand: No Inflation; Room To Cut Rates bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c4 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c4 The large current account surplus - standing at 11% of GDP - provides the authorities with plenty of fiscal and monetary maneuverability without having to worry about a major depreciation in the Thai baht (Chart II-5). Amid this sensitive political transition, the central bank will likely defend the currency if downward pressure on the baht emerges due to U.S. dollar strength. Therefore, we recommend traders to go long the Thai baht versus the Korean won (Chart II-6). Despite Korea's enormous current account, the won is at risk from depreciation in the RMB and the Japanese yen. Chart II-5Enormous Current Account ##br##Surplus Will Support The Baht Enormous Current Account Surplus Will Support The Baht Enormous Current Account Surplus Will Support The Baht Chart II-6Go Long THB Against KRW bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c6 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c6 On the whole, although the Thai economy has been stagnant (Chart II-7), fiscal spending and low interest rates will limit the downside in growth. Bottom Line: We expect relative calm on the political surface in Thailand over the next 12 months and a stable macro backdrop. Therefore, we are using the latest weakness to upgrade this bourse from neutral to overweight within an EM equity portfolio (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Thai Growth Has Been Stagnant bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c7 bca.ems_wr_2016_10_19_s2_c7 Chart II-8Upgrade Thai Stocks ##br##From Neutral To Overweight Upgrade Thai Stocks From Neutral To Overweight Upgrade Thai Stocks From Neutral To Overweight In addition, currency traders should go long THB versus KRW. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst aymank@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com BOX 1 The Military Coup In 2014 Pre-empted The King's Death... The May 2014 military coup was timed to pre-empt this event. The king's health had been declining for years and it was only a matter of time until he died. This raised the prospect of an intense political struggle that could have escalated into a full-blown succession crisis. Thus the military moved preemptively so that it would be in control of the country ahead of the king's death and could reshape the constitutional system in the military's favor before his death, as it has done. ... And This Means Stability For Now If the populist, anti-royalist faction had been in control of government at the time of the king's death, it could have attempted to manipulate the less popular new king and take advantage of the vacuum of royal authority in order to reduce the role of the military and their allies. That in turn could have sparked a wave of mass protests from royalists, pressuring the government to collapse, or a military coup that would not have carried the king's implicit approval like the 2014 coup. That would have fed the narrative that a final showdown between the factions was finally emerging, and would have been highly alarming to foreign investors. But Risks Still Linger Make no mistake: a new long-term cycle of political instability is now emerging. Potential military mistakes and the return to parliamentary rule are potential dangers. The country's deep divisions - between (1) the Bangkok-centered royalist bureaucratic and military establishment and (2) the provincial opposition -have not been healed but aggravated since the 2014 coup and the new pro-military constitution: The junta's constitutional and electoral reforms will weaken the representation of the largest opposition party, the Pheu Thai Party, and will marginalize a large share of the 65% of the country's population that lives in the opposition-sympathetic provinces. It is also conceivable that the new king could trigger conflict by lending support to the populist opposition. For instance, he could pardon the exiled leader of the rural opposition movement, or he could transform the powerful Privy Council. However, we do not expect discontent to flare up significantly until late 2017 or 2018 when the military steps back and a new election cycle begins.3 We will reassess and alert investors if we foresee a rapid deterioration in the palace-military network, or in the military's ability to prevent seething resistance in the provinces. 1 The narrow U.S. dollar is a trade-weighted exchange rate versus the euro, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, and Swedish krona. Source: The Federal Reserve. 2 The exception is that isolated acts of terrorism remain likely and could well strike key areas in Bangkok, signaling the reality that the underground opposition to military dictatorship remains alive and well. 3 The junta will use the one-year national period of mourning to its advantage and opposition forces will not want to be targeted for causing any trouble during a time of mourning. The junta could very easily delay the transition to nominal civilian rule, including the elections slated for November 2017. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

When earnings growth negatively diverges from GDP growth, the gap rarely closes <i>via</i> a rebound in profit growth. The most notable feature of prior episodes is weak corporate pricing power and the current period is no different; an ongoing profit margin squeeze means earnings in the next few months risk being a disappointment.

Deutsche Bank's woes highlight a much wider malaise within European banks: under-capitalisation and under-profitability. We explain why getting the banks right is crucial to a successful investment strategy in equity, bond and currency markets.

U.S. bank stocks have been joined at the hip with the expected 12-month change in the Fed funds rate since 2014, based on the notion that a rate hike will boost net interest margins. However, even if the Fed hikes rates, that may do little to help bank profits. The lesson from the dismal performance of Japanese bank stocks in their era of extraordinarily low interest rates is that outperformance has only occurred within the context of a steepening yield curve. We place low odds on a steepening in the U.S. yield curve if the Fed raises interest rates, given the softening in leading economic and employment indicators, not to mention the anchoring of U.S. long-term Treasurys by the shortage of global government bonds. Instead, an end to the long-term U.S. bank share underperformance phase requires broad-based economic reacceleration that drives an upturn in credit growth, stabilization in deteriorating credit quality and steeper yield curve. Until then, stay underweight and please see yesterday's Special Report on bank stocks for more details. bca.uses_in_2016_10_04_001_c1 bca.uses_in_2016_10_04_001_c1

Since 2014, market expectations of the Fed funds rate has been the primary driver of banks stock performance. Investors' heightened focus about the positive role of interest rate hikes on bank profitability has some merit because when interest rates are near the zero lower bound, net interest margins are unduly suppressed. However, a breakout in bank stocks requires much more than a hawkish Fed outlook: without a significant pick-up in top-line growth, there is no impetus for bank stocks to sustain rallies.

This week's <i>Special Report</i> looks at the three controversial predictions that I made at this year's <i>BCA New York Investment Conference</i>.