Europe

What's The Message From USTs Relative To Bunds? What's The Message From USTs Relative To Bunds? The drubbing in the US/EMU sovereign bond spread is cause for concern for the SPX’s slingshot recovery off the March 23 lows, especially given the tight positive correlation of these two series over the past three decades (top panel). Typically, higher relative yields attract capital to US shores and vice versa, and some of that capital inevitably leaks into US stocks. Moreover, theory would suggest that relative yields move with the ebb and flow of relative return on capital. Indeed, the bottom panel of the chart highlights such an empirical relationship. Currently, euro area return on assets is narrowing the gap with the US which usually happens in recessions. The persistent unresponsiveness in the 10-year UST yield near the zero line which stands closer to the ECB’s NIRP, likely spells short-term trouble for the SPX. Bottom Line: We remain cautious on the near-term prospects of the S&P 500 until the election uncertainty lifts in November.   

Highlights In this report, we initiate coverage of the EU Emission Trading System’s (ETS) CO2 allowances. We expect this policy-driven cap-and-trade market to become central to the market-driven pricing mechanism for CO2 fundamentals. Futures on EU CO2 emissions allowances will resume their rally – and surpass the €30 level seen in July 2019 – as ETS allowances supplies tighten in September. Global CO2 emissions are projected to fall 8% this year – 2.6 billion MT (2.6 gigatonnes, or Gt) – as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, based on IEA modeling. If realized, this would be up to six times the decline in CO2 emissions following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The speed at which actual CO2 emissions return to pre-COVID-19 levels will be a function of how quickly global growth recovers, and the intensity of “green” investments. Post-COVID-19, the rebound in emissions could be sharply higher, as has been the case with previous global downturns. Following the GFC, CO2 emissions recovered all of the year-on-year (y/y) decline in 2009 by 2010 (Chart of the Week). As with any COVID-19-related projection, uncertainty – to the upside and downside – dominates our outlook. Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Crushes Global CO2 Emissions COVID-19 Crushes Global CO2 Emissions COVID-19 Crushes Global CO2 Emissions Feature The EU’s CO2 emissions market is designed to achieve policy goals – i.e., reducing the carbon footprint of utilities and manufacturers in Europe. As tempting as it may be to view the surge in EU CO2 emission allowances futures as a harbinger of a powerful recovery in European economic growth, such hopes would be misplaced (Chart 2).1 The sharp rally in part reflects the expected decrease in the volume of CO2 emission allowances that will be available for trading over the September 2020 – August 2021 period. In line with its policy mandates, the ETS reduced this volume by 0.33 Gt following a May 2020 meeting, bringing the total volume available for trade in the year beginning in September to ~ 1.32 Gt.2 The EU’s CO2 emissions market is designed to achieve policy goals – i.e., reducing the carbon footprint of utilities and manufacturers in Europe – vs. pricing those emissions purely as a function of supply-demand fundamentals. Chart 2CO2 Allowances Rally Reflects Anticipated Supply Squeeze CO2 Allowances Rally Reflects Anticipated Supply Squeeze CO2 Allowances Rally Reflects Anticipated Supply Squeeze CO2 Emissions As is the case with industrial commodities – particularly oil, base metals, iron ore and steel – non-OECD markets dominate CO2 emissions. CO2 is the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitted into the atmosphere, and the largest share – almost two-thirds – of it is accounted for by fossil fuel use in industrial and transportation processes (Chart 3). CO2 emissions are closely tied to oil consumption. In non-OECD economies, this means they are closely tied to GDP, as the income elasticity of oil consumption for EM economies is ~ 0.65, meaning a 1% increase in income translates to a 0.65% increase in oil demand. In DM, transportation and electric generation drive hydrocarbon usage. In non-OECD and OECD markets, we model emissions as a function of oil consumption and financial variables (Chart 4). Chart 3Fossil-Fuel CO2 Dominates GHG Emissions EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply It comes as no surprise that commodity prices generally are highly correlated with CO2 emissions, given the markets in which they trade are continually responding to supply-demand shifts in industrial and consumer markets. This can be seen in our Global Commodity Factor, which extracts the common factor across 28 real commodity prices (Chart 5). Chart 4CO2 Emissions Trend With GDP, Oil Consumption CO2 Emissions Trend With GDP, Oil Consumption CO2 Emissions Trend With GDP, Oil Consumption As is the case with industrial commodities – particularly oil, base metals, iron ore and steel – non-OECD markets dominate CO2 emissions (Chart 6). Chart 5CO2, Commodity Prices Closely Aligned CO2, Commodity Prices Closely Aligned CO2, Commodity Prices Closely Aligned Chart 6Non-OECD Economies Dominate CO2 Emissions EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply Within this category, China accounts for ~ 45% of non-OECD CO2 emissions post-GFC, and close to 28% of global emissions, according to BP’s 2020 Statistical Review.3 China’s heavy reliance on coal-fired power generation and heating drive its CO2 emissions (Chart 7, top panel). Asia as a whole accounts for ~ 19 Gt of CO2 emissions, or 53% of the global total, while the US and Europe account for 18% and 17%, respectively.4 US CO2 emissions are driven by electric generation and transport, as the bottom panel of Chart 7 shows. Chart 7Electric Generation And Heating Drive China’s CO2 Emissions EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Emission Allowances The ETS also will force the overall number of emission allowances to contract at a 2.2% rate p.a. beginning next year. In the 21st century, ICE EUA futures prices have not followed actual EU CO2 emissions (Chart 8). This is not unexpected, given this market largely is a policy-driven market, not a fundamentally driven market. The ETS runs a cap-and-trade system covering ~ 45% of the EU’s GHG emissions, which limits emissions by more than 11,000 power stations, industrial plants and other heavy energy-use applications. Until 2019, the ETS adjusted supplies of emissions allowances by literally removing surpluses from the market resulting from overallocations of supplies via its free allocations and auctions. Thereafter, the ETS Market Stability Reserve (MSR), began absorbing unallocated emissions allowances to keep prices from falling to the point that investment in CO2 abatement would be disincentivized.5 Chart 8Two Ships In The Night: EU CO2 Emissions and EUA Futures Two Ships In The Night: EU CO2 Emissions and EUA Futures Two Ships In The Night: EU CO2 Emissions and EUA Futures As ETS system surplus allocations are reduced, we expect this market will more closely reflect the actual supply and demand for CO2 allowances. The ETS also will force the overall number of emission allowances to contract at a 2.2% rate p.a. beginning next year, versus the 1.74% p.a. contraction observed over the 2013-2020 period, in order, it says, to keep the GHG emissions falling to policy levels set for 2030. Even with its flaws vis-à-vis a true commodity market driven by supply-demand fundamentals, the ETS’s CO2 emissions allowances market is extremely important as a source of information regarding the state of the world. Last year, Reuters’s Refinitiv service estimated that of the $164 billion worth of CO2 emissions traded globally 90% was accounted for by the European market.6 As ETS system surplus allocations are reduced, we expect this market will more closely reflect the actual supply and demand for CO2 allowances. This will allow it to generate a market-clearing price for emissions allowances, which will be a valuable data point for global markets, especially when it comes to allocating capital to reducing GHG emissions. The ETS is retaining the right to issue free allocations, so that participants in the system are not disadvantaged by other jurisdictions not subject to the stringent requirements imposed by the ETS. Bottom Line: The ETS’s CO2 emission allowances will resume the rally launched in March 2020, as the supply of allowances contracts beginning in September. We are not ready to recommend any positions in this market, but will continue to follow and write about it going forward, expecting it will become not only a viable market but an important source of information of the market-clearing price of CO2 emissions.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent and WTI prices have been moving side-ways since June at ~ $41/bbl and $39/bbl, respectively. Fundamentals are tightening but fear of a second wave of COVID-19 infections weighs on prices. Bakken shale-oil producers could struggle to restart drilling and production activities after a court ordered the closure of the basin’s crucial Dakota Access pipeline – responsible for moving ~ 600k b/d – due to insufficient environmental checks. As previously shut-in production comes back on line, regional prices could remain under pressure to incentivize additional crude-by-rail volumes – at close to double the transportation costs – out of the basin, keeping prices below producers’ breakevens (Chart 9). Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices continue moving up as economic activity in China recovers (Chart 10). Prices are now 32% higher vs. March lows. Large metal-producing countries in Latin America have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. This puts supply at risk and could have lasting impacts as needed investment in new mines is delayed. In fact, Codelco announced it is suspending construction at its El Teniente mine in Chile due to rising COVID-19 cases in the region. Copper could enter a persistent supply-deficit period if demand remains in its upward trend. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices crossed $1,800/oz on Tuesday, reaching their highest level since 2011. The yellow metal’s rally continues to be fueled by record Western investment demand. ETFs inflows in June reached 104 tons, pushing gold-backed ETF volumes and AUM to new highs. Globally, ETF holdings’ tonnage increased by 25% ytd. This more than offsets the collapse in physical demand from China and India. Going forward, we expect a lower US dollar will support income growth in EM countries, providing additional demand for gold. Ags/Softs:  Underweight The latest USDA Acreage report surprised the market, with corn producers planting 5 million less acres than their intentions in March. This large decline caused corn futures to rally to 3-month highs. Since then, the market has focused on adverse weather, hoping dryness in major corn producing areas would reduce corn yields. However, that didn’t materialize. Forecasts are showing less intense heat in the Midwest crop belt and futures are losing some ground compared to recent highs. The market is now awaiting Friday’s USDA Supply and Demand report. With exports on pace to come in slightly below the USDA estimate for the year and a much-reduced planting area, we expect corn ending stocks to be well below the June estimate of 3.32 Bn bushels. Chart 9Bakken Crude Prices Are Falling Vs WTI Bakken Crude Prices Are Falling Vs WTI Bakken Crude Prices Are Falling Vs WTI Chart 10China's Economic Growth Supports Copper Prices China's Economic Growth Supports Copper Prices China's Economic Growth Supports Copper Prices     Footnotes 1    These futures are the EUA contracts for delivery of Carbon Emission Allowances at the Union Registry, which was set up to account “for all allowances issued under the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS).”  Contracts for delivery of these allowances are traded on ICE Futures Europe’s platform. 2    Please see ETS Market Stability Reserve to reduce auction volume by over 330 million allowances between September 2020 and August 2021 published by the European Commission May 8, 2020. 3    Please see bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2020: a pivotal moment published June 17, 2020. 4    Please see CO2 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions published by Our World in Data, a collaboration between researchers at the University of Oxford, and the non-profit organization Global Change Data Lab, in December 2019. 5    Surpluses have been a feature of the market since 2009.  Please see Market Stability Reserve published by the European Commission. 6    Please see Value of global CO2 markets hit record 144 billion euros in 2018: report published January 16, 2019 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2020 Summary of Closed Trades EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply EU CO2 Markets Rally On Lower Allowances Supply

Please note that I will be hosting a webcast on Friday July 17 and that the webcast will replace next week’s report. Highlights Go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if stock versus bond outperformance continues for another 10 percent. There is now a strong incentive for short-term investing and a strong disincentive for long-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. Covid-19 is unlikely to kill you, but it can make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Feature Chart of the WeekA Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Financial markets have reached an absurdity. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for just three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. And just to be clear, we are comparing cumulative returns over the entire holding period of three months versus one that is forty times longer at ten years. The case for buying and holding most mainstream investments has collapsed. Investors seeking attractive long-term returns can no longer rely on mainstream bond and stock markets. Nowadays, the long-term investment story is about sectors and themes, and we will continue to tell this story in our regular reports. However, this week we will focus on the implications of short-termism in the mainstream markets. Short-Term Returns Now Beat Long-Term Returns Through the past year, anybody who has bought the German 10-year bund, with the intention of holding it until it redeems in 2029 is guaranteed a deeply negative return. Yet there have been many three-month periods in which the bund has generated a high single-digit return (Chart I-2). Chart I-23-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! 3-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! 3-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! Likewise, anybody who owns the US 10-year T-bond has made almost as much money in the first three months of this year as they mathematically can by holding it for ten years! By extension, the same principle also applies to mainstream stock markets which are priced for feeble long-term returns – yet can rally by 20-30 percent in the space of a few weeks. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. Admittedly, these are nominal returns, and the long-term real returns could be boosted by deflation. Nevertheless, the economy would have to experience Great Depression levels of deflation to make the long-term real returns genuinely attractive. Yet it wasn’t always like this. Until recent years, the cumulative returns available from long-term investing were many multiples of those available from short-term investing – as they should be (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). But today, the incentive structure is back-to-front. There is a strong disincentive for long-term investing and a strong incentive for short-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Albeit traders that must get their timing right. Chart I-3Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Chart I-4...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing ...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing ...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing Unfortunately, when everybody behaves like traders there are worrying implications for financial market liquidity and stability. Short-Termism Destroys Market Liquidity We have been brought up to believe that agreement and consensus create peace and harmony, whereas disagreement and opposition create conflict and discord. Hence, it is natural to think that agreement and consensus also create calm and stability in the financial markets. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. A calm and stable market requires disagreement. Disagreement is the source of market liquidity and stability. Meaning, the ability to convert stocks into cash, or cash into stocks, quickly and in volume without destabilising the stock price. For an investor to convert a large amount of stocks into cash without destabilising the price, a mirror-image investor must be willing to take the opposite position. It follows that market liquidity comes from a disagreement about the attractiveness of the investment at a given price. As an aside, we often read comments such as ‘investors are moving out of stocks into cash’, or vice-versa. Such comments are nonsensical. If one investor is selling stocks, then a mirror-image investor must be buying stocks. The stocks cannot just vanish into thin air! A market which loses its variation of investment horizons loses its liquidity and stability. If institutional investors are selling, then a mirror-image investor must be buying. The mirror-image buyer could be less savvy retail investors, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a sell signal. Or the mirror-image buyer could be ‘smart money’ hedge funds, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a buy signal. It follows that unless we know the identity of both the seller and the buyer, the ‘flows’ information is useless. The much more useful information is the variation of investment horizons in the market. This is because a market which possesses a variation of investment horizons also possesses the disagreement required for liquidity and stability. Conversely, a market which lacks this variation of investment horizons could soon run out of liquidity and undergo a change in trend. Investors with different time horizons disagree about the attractiveness of an investment at a given price because they interpret the same facts and information differently. For example, a day-trader will interpret an outsized rally as a ‘momentum’ buy signal, whereas a value investor will interpret the same information as a ‘loss of value’ sell signal. Therefore, the market possesses liquidity and stability when its participants possess a variation of investment horizons. For example, both a 1-day horizon and a 3-month (65 business days) horizon. The corollary is that the market’s liquidity and stability disappear when its participants no longer possess this healthy variation in horizons. In technical terms, this occurs when the market’s fractal structure collapses. In the above example, it would be signalled by the 65-day fractal dimension collapsing to its lower limit (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed All of which brings us to our tactical stock-to-bond sell signal. A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Since 2015, a collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend, implying either a sell or buy signal based on the direction of the preceding trend. The two most recent occurrences happened this year on January 2, a sell signal, and March 9, a buy signal (Chart of the Week). A collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend. The 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has collapsed once again, reinforced by a similar observation in the US stock-to-bond ratio. This suggests that the recent 40 percent rally in stocks versus bonds is approaching exhaustion and is susceptible to a tactical reversal (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion Hence, go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if the outperformance continues for another 10 percent. One caveat is that bullish fundamentals can swamp fragile fractal structures. Hence, the strong outperformance of stocks versus bonds would persist if, for example, a breakthrough treatment or vaccine suddenly emerged for Covid-19. On the other hand, it is worth noting that US hospitalizations for the disease are rising once again, even if deaths, so far, are not (Chart I-7). Nevertheless, we reiterate that the Covid-19 morbidity (severe illness) rate is much more important than the mortality rate, for two reasons. Chart I-7US Hospitalizations For Covid-19 Are Rising Again A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds First, it is morbidity rather than mortality that swamps the finite and limited intensive care unit (ICU) capacity in healthcare systems. Second, the evidence now suggests that many recovered Covid-19 victims suffer long-term damage to their lungs and/or other vital organs such as kidneys, the liver, and the brain. This is the case even for apparently mild cases of the disease that do not require hospitalization. Therefore, don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. The threat from Covid-19 is not that it will kill you. It almost certainly won’t. The threat is that it will make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Fractal Trading System* As discussed, this weeks recommended trade is short DAX versus 10-year T-bond, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent. Chart I-8GBP/RUB GBP/RUB GBP/RUB In other trades, long GBP/RUB is within a whisker of its 3 percent profit target. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 59 percent When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Butterflies & Yield Curve Models: With bond market volatility now back to the subdued levels seen prior to the COVID-19 market turbulence earlier in 2020, it is a good time to update our global yield curve valuation models to look for attractive butterfly trade ideas. Valuations: The models generally indicate that flattener trades offer better value across all countries. Our medium-term strategic bias, however, is towards steeper yield curves with policy rates on hold and depressed global inflation expectations likely to continue drifting higher over the latter half of the year. Yield Curve Trades: We are initiating the first set of yield curve trades within our rebooted Tactical Trade Overlay: going long a 7-year bullet vs. a 5-year/10-year barbell in the US; long a 2-year/30-year barbell vs. a 5-year bullet in France; long a 5-year/30-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in Italy; and long a 3-year/20-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in the UK. Feature In a Special Report published back in February of this year, we dusted off our model-based framework to find value in trades focused on the shape of government bond yield curves.1 By comparing the market-implied short-term interest rate expectations extracted from our curve models to our own macro views, we are able to come up with actionable buy or sell signals across the yield curve in nine developed markets: the US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Table 1Most Attractive Butterfly Trades Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Given the extreme market turbulence around the time we published that report, as the full scope of the COVID-19 pandemic was becoming evident, we chose not to recommend any curve trades from our models until global volatility subsided to acceptable levels. The vigorous action from central banks to manipulate bond yields since then - quantitative easing, aggressive forward guidance, outright yield curve control in Japan and Australia, and other unconventional monetary policy measures - introduced another layer of difficulty in implementing successful curve trades using models estimated in more normal times. With global bond market volatility now back down to pre-COVID levels, we feel that the time is right to use our curve models to help identify opportunities. Specifically, we are implementing new recommended yield curve trades in the US, France, Italy, and the UK. Table 1 shows the most attractive butterfly trades across all the markets covered in this analysis. Note that three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade, the reasoning for which we outline later in this report. Three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade. Before delving into our analysis proper, a quick note: in the interest of brevity, we will limit ourselves to a simple explanation of butterfly strategies and our yield curve models in this report. For those interested in a deeper explanation of the curve modeling framework, please refer to our February 25, 2020 Special Report. A Recap On Butterflies And An Update On Our Yield Curve Models A butterfly fixed income strategy involves two main components: a barbell (a weighted combination of long-term and short-term bonds) and a bullet (a medium-term bond that sits within the yield curve segment selected in the barbell). To implement a butterfly strategy, a bond investor would go long (short) the barbell while simultaneously going short (long) the bullet. By weighting the combination of the long- and short-term bonds in the butterfly such that the weighted sum of their duration equals the duration of the medium-term bond in the bullet, we achieve immunization to parallel shifts in the yield curve. At the same time, due to the relatively higher duration of the longer-term component of the butterfly, we get exposure to specific changes in the slope of the yield curve. In general, the barbell will outperform the bullet in a flattening yield curve environment, and vice-versa. Chart of the WeekButterfly Spreads & Yield Curves Butterfly Spreads & Yield Curves Butterfly Spreads & Yield Curves To actually decide how, and on which parts of the yield curve, to implement our butterfly strategies, we make use of our yield curve models. These models rely on the positive relationship typically observed between the butterfly spread and the slope of the yield curve. When the curve steepens, the butterfly spread widens, and vice-versa (Chart of the Week). This has to do with mean reversion: as the curve steepens, it increases the odds that the curve will flatten in the future since it cannot steepen indefinitely. Consequently, investors will ask for greater compensation to enter a curve steepener trade when the curve is already steepening. As a result, we can create simplified models of the yield curve by regressing any butterfly spread on its corresponding curve slope. Deviations from these fair value models indicate which butterfly strategies are cheap or expensive. However, the model output does not by itself constitute a buy or sell signal and must be integrated with our macro view on the slope of the curve. For example, a butterfly strategy with an expensive bullet implies that there is already a certain amount of steepening discounted in the yield curve. If the yield curve flattens, or even steepens by an amount smaller than what is discounted in the yield curve over the investment horizon, the barbell will outperform, as expected. However, if we see more steepening than is discounted in the yield curve, the bullet will outperform, even though it was already at relatively expensive levels. Therefore, it is crucial to integrate our macro view on how much the curve will steepen or flatten over the investment horizon into our curve trade selection framework. In recent reports, we have emphasized our high-conviction view that global inflation expectations will drift higher in the coming months, driven by reflationary fiscal and monetary policy and a continued rebound in global commodity prices (most notably, oil).2 However, a rise in inflation expectations does not necessarily translate to a “one-to-one” rise in nominal yields if it is offset by a compression in real bond yields. To disentangle this, we look at the 3-year rolling betas of nominal 10-year government bond yields to the corresponding 10-year breakeven inflation rates using inflation-linked bonds (Chart 2). The data suggest a currently weaker relationship between inflation expectations and nominal yields, with all betas well below their post-crisis maxima. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia where it is more likely that a rise in inflation expectations will translate to higher nominal yields. Conversely, we are less hesitant to enter flatteners in the lower-beta regions such as the UK, France, Italy, and Japan. Chart 2The Link Between Nominal Yields And Inflation Expectations Has Weakened Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies When we said earlier this year that we were “dusting off” our yield curve models, that was not just a figure of speech. The models date back originally to 2002, meaning that they are old enough to vote—perhaps even for a popular rapper. Even though we have been refining and updating it along the way, one of our concerns was that this model was estimated for a pre-crisis sample period before near-zero rates became ubiquitous in developed markets. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia. To test that the curve relationships within our models are maintained when global central banks are pinning policy rates near 0%, we have re-estimated all the regressions for the post-financial crisis period from 2009 to 2017 when most central banks kept rates near the zero bound. Chart 3 shows the results for the representative 2-year, 5-year and 10-year portions of the yield curve. On the whole, the coefficients are weaker but still positive with the exception of Japan, where many years of zero rates and quantitative easing have caused the 2-year/5-year/10-year butterfly spread to become largely unmoored from the 2-year/10-year slope. Chart 3Looking For Structural Shifts In Our Yield Curve Models Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Therefore, we still see value in our curve modeling approach, even in the current environment where central banks are likely to be on hold for a period measured in years, not months. Bottom Line: Butterfly strategies are an effective way to position for changes in the slope of the yield curve without exposure to shifts in the curve. Our current strategic bias is to expect steepening of developed market yield curves through rising longer-term inflation expectations, but our global yield curve models indicate better value in most flattening trades. Thus, we need to be extremely selective in recommending trades based on the results of our yield curve models. Yield Curve Models And Trades By Region In the remaining pages of this report, we present the current read-outs from of our yield curve models for each of the major developed markets. More specifically, we provide the deviations from fair value for different combinations of bullets and barbells and highlight the most attractive butterfly strategy. The deviations from fair value shown in Tables 2-10 are standardized to facilitate comparisons between the different butterfly combinations. In addition, for each country we provide a quick assessment of the performance of these butterfly strategies over time by applying a simple mechanical trading rule. Every month, we enter the most attractive butterfly strategy, i.e. the one with the highest absolute standardized deviation from its model fair value. The overall message from the models is that barbells appear attractive relative to bullets across all the countries shown. However, we will only initiate trades in cases where the model output and our macro outlook complement each other. US Looking solely at our model output, US Treasury curve flatteners appear most attractive, with the long 3-year/30-year barbell vs. 5-year bullet trade displaying the greatest deviation from fair value with a residual of -1.55 (Table 2). However, we are inclined to agree with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy on how to interpret Treasury curve valuation in the current environment. They argue that even though steepeners in the US are currently expensive, valuations can become even more overstretched with the Fed signaling no rate increases for at least the next two years and the market priced for an extended period of near-zero rates.3 Table 2US: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Our fundamental bias is towards US Treasury curve steepening, with the Fed locking down the front end of the curve and rising inflation expectations putting upward pressure on longer-term yields. Thus, we are entering into the long 7-year bullet vs. 5/10 barbell trade which has a small but positive model residual of +0.17. That represents a better valuation starting point than the other US butterfly spreads, and is therefore a more efficient and profitable way to position for steepeners becoming even more expensive going forward. As highlighted earlier, nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener.  The 7-year bullet appears just 1bp cheap according to our model and would only underperform its counterpart given a flattening in the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope greater than 22bps, which we believe is unlikely given the reasons outlined above (Chart 4A). Chart 4AUS 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model US 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model US 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 4BUS Butterfly Strategy Performance US Butterfly Strategy Performance US Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has delivered steady returns with only a few periods of negative year-over-year returns (Chart 4B). Germany The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the German yield curve is going long the 1-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet, which is almost one standard deviation above its model-implied fair value, with a standardized residual of -0.97 (Table 3). Table 3Germany: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 5-year bullet appears 29bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 1-year/30-year German curve slope greater than 50bps (Chart 5A). Chart 5AGermany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Germany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Germany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 5BGermany Butterfly Strategy Performance Germany Butterfly Strategy Performance Germany Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has been quite profitable, delivering consistently positive year-over-year returns for all but the initial period of our sample (Chart 5B). France The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the French OAT yield curve is going long the 2-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet (Table 4). This combination is a little less than one standard deviation over its model-implied fair value with a standardized residual of -0.84. Nominal yields in France are also relatively less correlated with inflation expectations, which makes this a prime candidate for a flattener trade. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 4France: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 5-year bullet appears 21bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/30-year French curve slope greater than 48bps (Chart 6A). Chart 6AFrance 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model France 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model France 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 6BFrance Butterfly Strategy Performance France Butterfly Strategy Performance France Butterfly Strategy Performance As with Germany, following the mechanical trading rule in the French OAT market has also been profitable, with only three periods of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 6B). Italy And Spain In Italy, the most attractively valued butterfly combination is going long the 5-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 10-year bullet – a combination with a standardized residual of -0.79 (Table 5). In Spain, going long the 3-year/30-year barbell and short the 5-year bullet seems most attractive with a standardized residual of -0.83 (Table 6). Of the two peripheral euro area countries, we are choosing to put on a trade in the relatively larger and more liquid Italian government bond market. As with France, Italian nominal yields also display a relatively low beta to inflation breakevens. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 5Italy: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Table 6Spain: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies In Italy, the 10-year bullet appears 22bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Italian curve slope greater than 153bps (Chart 7A). Following the mechanical trading rule in Italy has yielded strong excess returns, with only one very short period of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 7B).  As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis. Chart 7AItaly 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Italy 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Italy 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 7BItaly Butterfly Strategy Performance Italy Butterfly Strategy Performance Italy Butterfly Strategy Performance In Spain, the 5-year bullet appears 14bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/30-year Spanish curve slope greater than 47bps (Chart 8A). As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis (Chart 8B). Chart 8ASpain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Spain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Spain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 8BSpain Butterfly Strategy Performance Spain Butterfly Strategy Performance Spain Butterfly Strategy Performance UK On the UK Gilt yield curve, the most attractive butterfly combination is holding a 3-year/20-year barbell versus a 10-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.08 (Table 7). As with France and Italy, not only is this flattener trade attractively valued, the UK is also one of the countries where inflation breakevens are relatively less correlated with nominal yields, making this another excellent candidate for our Tactical Trade Overlay. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27. Table 7UK: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 10-year bullet appears 13bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/20-year Gilt curve slope greater than 52bps (Chart 9A). Chart 9AUK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model UK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model UK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 9BUK Butterfly Strategy Performance UK Butterfly Strategy Performance UK Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in the UK has produced consistent returns on a year-over-year basis (Chart 9B). Canada The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Canadian yield curve is favoring the 5-year/30-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.41 (Table 8). Table 8Canada: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 7bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Canadian curve slope greater than 42bps (Chart 10A). Chart 10ACanada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Canada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Canada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 10BCanada Butterfly Strategy Performance Canada Butterfly Strategy Performance Canada Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in Canada has historically been a good strategy, but we do note two periods of minor losses in 2013 and 2019 (Chart 10B). Japan The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the JGB yield curve is the 5-year/20-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently has a standardized residual of -1.03 (Table 9). As we noted earlier, however, valuations in the JGB market are likely distorted due to the Bank of Japan’s long-running programs of quantitative easing, zero policy rates and Yield Curve Control that aims to keep the 10-year JGB yield around 0%. Table 9Japan: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 6bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/20-year Japan curve slope greater than 23bps (Chart 11A). Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns. Chart 11AJapan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Japan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Japan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 11BJapan Butterfly Strategy Performance Japan Butterfly Strategy Performance Japan Butterfly Strategy Performance Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns (Chart 11B). Australia The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Australian yield curve is going long the 2-year/10-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, displaying a standardized residual of -1.73 (Table 10). Table 10Australia: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 15bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/10-year Australian curve slope greater than 101bps (Chart 12A). Chart 12AAustralia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Australia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Australia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 12BAustralia Butterfly Strategy Performance Australia Butterfly Strategy Performance Australia Butterfly Strategy Performance Compared to the other markets in our analysis, following the mechanical trading rule in Australia has not produced stellar returns (Chart 12B). However, excess returns on a year-over-year basis have been positive barring two periods.   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Global Yield Curve Trades: Follow The Butterflies", dated February 25, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds", dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.