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The Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday announced the results of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) of the nation's largest banks with a 100% pass rate. This is of particular note as it is the largest test (34 financial institutions vs. 14 in 2013) and the first perfect score in the CCAR's history. The positive CCAR result allows banks to return excess capital to shareholders; unsurprisingly, banks announced record buybacks and dividend hikes alongside the CCAR release. We performed a review of the last 4 years of CCAR results to gauge the 6 month performance post result. Both 2016 and 2015 delivered 93% pass rates, and bank stocks subsequently outperformed the S&P 500, stunningly so in 2016. 2014 and 2013, with pass rates of only 80% and 86%, respectively, delivered flat or negative 6 month returns relative to the S&P 500. Bottom Line: Exceptionally strong CCAR results coincide with exceptional bank stock rallies; we expect 2017 to prove no different. We reiterate our overweight banks and our high conviction overweight investment banks calls and refer readers to our S&P Financials /S&P Tech pair trade in Monday's Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT.
Special Report Feature Chart 1Global Growth Pick Up As a whole, G10 economies have been in expansion for more than seven years now. Moreover, after a near-recessionary episode in late 2015 / early 2016, the global economy is on a renewed upswing, with global trade and capex having regained vigor (Chart 1). Similar upswings in aged economic expansions have historically been the ideal breeding ground for global monetary tightening. However, the world economy is still dealing with two deflationary anchors: two decades of over-investment in emerging markets that have led to chronic overcapacity globally, and a strong preference for savings - a legacy of the great financial crisis (GFC) in the West and of financial repression in China. Thanks to this confluence of forces, global central banks have been fearful of tightening policy, hence, global policy rates continue to hover near multi-generational lows. Yet, now that the Federal Reserve has opened Pandora's box and raised rates four times, the question on every investor's mind is who is next. In this piece, we examine a few key domestic indicators for each G10 central bank (CB), and try to categorize CBs according to their likelihood of being the next one to tighten policy. We find three groups. The first one with the highest likelihood of hiking includes New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada. We place Australia, the U.K., and the Euro Area in the somewhat-likely-to-tighten camp. Finally, among the economies where we see little scope for tighter policy are Norway, Switzerland, and Japan. Using this ranking, we examine the implications for these countries' respective currencies and equity markets' relative performance. In this optic, it is important to remember that while conventional wisdom dictates that the stock market needs a depreciating currency in order to advance, empirically, countries with appreciating exchange rates have tended to outperform the global equity benchmark, reflecting the effect of international flows into these economies and markets.1 Finally, we look forward to publish in the coming months a quantitative model based on the indicators used in this report. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President Global Alpha Sector Strategy & U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 1) New Zealand Chart 2New Zealand The real Official Cash Rate has never been at such a discount to trend real GDP growth (Chart 2). As a result, nominal GDP is growing at a strong 6% a year, and core inflation is moving back toward 2%. Additionally, nominal retail sales are expanding at nearly 8% per year, the highest pace since 2007. According to the OECD, GDP is now nearly 2% above trend, which highlights the inflationary nature of New Zealand's economy. Supporting that, capacity constraints are becoming rampant, despite strong immigration into the country, unemployment is now nearly 1% below equilibrium, further confirming that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is keeping policy at too-stimulative levels. This time around, hiking rates will not be a policy mistake as it was in both 2010 and 2014. In 2010, the difference between real rates and trend real GDP growth was much narrower than today, and the output gap was still very negative. In 2014, measures of slack were also not supportive of higher rates, and a rollover in core inflation as well as muted retail sales growth created additional headwinds. Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 2) Sweden Chart 3Sweden The Riksbank's repo rate has been driven lower in response to the European Central Bank's own bias, resulting in a Swedish repo rate of -0.5%. The gap between the real policy rate in Sweden and trend GDP growth is hovering around record-low levels (Chart 3). Supported by such a stimulative policy setting, Swedish non-financial private credit has expanded massively, hitting 230% of GDP. Today, the output gap is in positive territory and the unemployment gap indicates that the labor market has tightened considerably. In fact, both measures are congruent with the levels recorded during prior rate-tightening cycles. Core inflation is still below the central bank's 2% target, but is accelerating higher. The Riksbank's resource utilization indicator is further confirming this trend and points toward much higher inflation in the second half of 2017.2 Retail sales have been soggy, but they are picking up anew, clearing the way for a rate hike. Crucially, under the tutelage of Stefan Ingves, the Riksbank has been extremely dovish, but his second term as head of the institution ends this year. For now, he does not look set to be re-appointed. His re-appointment constitutes the greatest risk to our Riksbank view. Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 3) Canada Chart 4Canada The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is still very negative, much more so in fact than was the case in 2010, the last time the Bank of Canada (BoC) tried to hike interest rates. The output gap and the unemployment gap continue to point toward a small degree of slack in the Canadian economy (Chart 4). Nonetheless, the BoC expects the output gap to close in 2018. However, the amount of slack in the economy remains very low compared to what prevailed in 2010. Like in the U.S., core inflation has recently sagged, but retail sales continue to grow at a healthy pace. Canadian policy rates have rarely diverged from those in the U.S. for long as the Canadian economy is deeply integrated in the U.S. supply chain. This means that economic impulses in the U.S. are often transferred to Canada. The Fed increasing rates in the U.S. puts pressure on the BoC. If rates diverge for too long, the Loonie will weaken considerably, exacerbating inflationary pressures in Canada. Recent communications of the BoC's most senior staff indicate a very sharp move away from dovishness. Middle Of The Pack: 1) Australia Chart 5Australia The gap between real policy rates and trend real GDP growth is in stimulative territory, but it is not at the level seen in New Zealand, Sweden or Canada. While the unemployment gap suggests the labor market is becoming increasingly tight, the OECD's measure of the output gap still stands near record lows, suggesting that in aggregate there remains substantial slack in Australia (Chart 5). This paints a mixed picture rather than an indubitably good or bad one. Core inflation remains in a downtrend and nominal retail sales are growing at very low rates, further highlighting that monetary policy is not as accommodative as in New Zealand or Canada. Improvement in global trade continues to support the Australian economy, and strong real estate activity suggests that policy is too easy for domestic asset prices. These two forces are critical in preventing Australia from falling into the bottom basket of central banks. Even if a small deceleration in global activity emerges, so long as it does not degenerate into the kind of vicious commodity selloff experienced in the second half of 2015 and early 2016, the Australian economy will be able to avoid another deceleration. Middle Of The Pack: 2) The U.K. Chart 6U.K. On many fronts, the U.K. looks ripe for an imminent rate hike. The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is as depressed as the levels recorded in the countries in the first bucket, suggesting that the Bank of England's policy stance is extremely accommodative (Chart 6). However, like in Australia, measures of economic slack paint a mixed picture. The unemployment gap points to an absence of slack, while the output gap remains negative and indicative of some slack in the U.K. Retail sales have been lifted by the recent surge in inflation, with core consumer prices now growing at a 2.6% annual rate. However, this picture is distorted. Real retail sales have massively decelerated, and the surge in inflation has had nothing to do with domestic conditions but has been entirely due to the pass-through associated with the near-20% collapse in the trade-weighted pound since November 2015. Beyond the negative output gap, the key reason why the BoE is not at the top of the list of potential hikers is because U.K. household inflation expectations remain well behaved, and the economy could continue to decelerate in the face of uncertainty associated with Brexit. This could even prompt Mark Carney to keep an even more dovish stance that we or the market currently anticipate. Middle Of The Pack: 3) The Euro Area Chart 7Euro Area The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth in the euro area is actually also at extremely stimulative levels (Chart 7), partly explaining why the European economy has been able to generate so many positive data surprises. However, the euro area economy still needs easy policy. The output gap remains very negative and unemployment is still below equilibrium. In fact, as we have argued, this latter indicator may even underestimate the amount of labor market slack in Europe, as measures of labor underutilization remain very elevated. Euro area core inflation has been moving up, but at around 1% remains well shy of the ECB's objective of close to but below 2%. True, officially the ECB targets headline inflation, but Draghi's emphasis on underlying domestic inflation trends belies a focus on core inflation. Ultimately, the combination of labor underutilization, simmering political risk in Italy and a still-negative output gap suggests the ECB in unlikely to lift interest rates until at least late 2018. The biggest risk to our view would be for the ECB to tighten policy more than we or even the market anticipate. This would put the ECB ahead of the BoE. The Laggards: 1) Norway Chart 8Norway The gap between Norway's real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is still indicative of an easy policy stance. However, the recent dip in core inflation has caused an inadvertent policy tightening, as illustrated by the gap's sharp narrowing (Chart 8). The OECD's measure of Norway's output gap is very negative, and the unemployment rate has not been this deeply above equilibrium in more than 20 years. As such, there seems to remain large amounts of slack in the Norwegian economy. Corroborating this assessment, Norwegian wages are contracting at a 4% annual pace. Norwegian retail sales have been very weak, and core inflation has collapsed from 4% to 1.5%. This easing in inflation is a blessing for the Norges Bank as this allows it to focus on the large amount of slack still present in the economy. The Laggards: 2) Switzerland Chart 9Switzerland Despite a deeply negative nominal policy rate and a continuously expanding central bank balance sheet, Switzerland monetary policy does not seem to be very easy, as the gap between the real policy rate and the trend real GDP growth rate is in neutral territory (Chart 9). The OECD's output gap and the difference between the headline unemployment rate and equilibrium unemployment rate both point toward plentiful slack in the Swiss economy. Swiss wage growth also remains quite tame, only hitting 0.1% last quarter. Core inflation remains well below target as it only modestly moved back into positive territory three months ago. The confluence of not-so-easy monetary policy and plentiful excess capacity suggests that despite the challenging conditions for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies created by deeply negative rates the Swiss economy is not yet ready to handle tighter monetary policy. The Laggards: 3) Japan Chart 10Japan Japan might be the most perplexing economy in the G10 right now, and the Bank of Japan is in the toughest position of all the major central banks in the advanced economies. Like Switzerland, despite negative nominal short-term interest rates and large asset purchases by the BoJ, the gap between Japan's real policy rates and trend real GDP growth suggests that policy is only at a neutral setting (Chart 10). This would seem appropriate given that both the output gap and the unemployment gap point to little spare capacity in Japan. However, this does not square with core inflation moving back into negative territory and barely expanding retail sales. Ultimately, Japan's problem is two-fold. First, the unemployment gap underestimates the amount of labor underutilization in Japan, as output per hour worked remains 11% and 34% behind that of the OECD and the U.S, respectively. Second, extremely depressed Japanese inflation expectations continue to result in an extraordinarily flat Philips curve. Due to these dynamics, we expect that it will take continued sustained efforts by the BoJ to overheat the economy before any signs of inflation emerge. FX Implications Based on our assessments, we would expect the RBNZ, the Riksbank and the BoC to be the first central banks to hike now that the Fed has blazed the trail. Within this group, the RBNZ is potentially the cleanest story, as all factors are aligned. We would expect the RBNZ to hike late summer / early fall 2017. Technically, the Riksbank seems in a better place to hike rates than the BoC. However, the leadership of the BoC is already preparing the market for higher rates. Canadian rates could also rise as soon as late summer / early fall 2017. Meanwhile, so long as Ingves remains head of the Riksbank, the Swedish central bank will likely stand pat. Thus, we would expect the first hike to materialize early next year, as soon as a new governor takes the helm, although, we believe markets will begin pricing in such a hike as soon as his replacement is announced. In the second group of central banks, we expect the RBA to be the first to increase rates. The BoE does face a much more inflationary environment than the RBA, but the U.K.'s economic uncertainty remains such that the BoE is likely to tread carefully and wait to see how the economy handles the new wave of political trauma unleashed by this month's election. The ECB is likely to begin tapering its own purchases at the end of 2017, but our base case anticipates that it will not touch policy rates until well into 2018. Among the laggards, the Norges Bank will most likely be the first to push up rates - something we do not anticipate until late 2018. While BCA expects oil prices to rebound, this is unlikely to boost the economy fast enough to close the output gap for at least 18 months. Switzerland and Japan need to do a lot of work before their respective economies generate any kind of inflationary pressures. We do not anticipate any tightening for Switzerland until well after the ECB has moved. The BoJ may not tighten policy for the remainder of this decade. This means that the CAD and the NZD are likely to prove to be the best-performing currencies in the dollar bloc. Investors should stay short AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. CAD/NOK also possesses more upside. The SEK could prove to be the best performing European currency. Swedish money markets are pricing in only 40 basis points of hikes over the next 12 months, something that seems too low considering the inflationary risk in that country. Stay short EUR/SEK. The EUR/USD rebounded this week on the back of seemingly hawkish comments by Draghi. Even when the ECB somewhat backtracked and communicated that the market had misinterpreted the speech, EUR/USD looked the other way. This confirms our fear that the momentum in this pair is too strong to fight. EUR/USD should retest 1.15-1.16, the upper bound of its trading range put in place since March 2015. Based on our economics work, any move above 1.15 should be used to short the euro. The pound will continue to suffer from a political discount, however, because our base case expects the BoE to tighten policy before the ECB, we continue to recommend that investors use moves above 0.88 to begin shorting EUR/GBP. The SNB is unlikely to remove its cap on the Swiss franc, which means the natural upward pull created by the large net international position of Switzerland will be of little solace for investors. Finally, the JPY should be the worst performing currency in the G10 as the BoJ will not be able to lift rates - a great handicap when, as BCA expects, global bond yields are likely to enjoy more upside than downside over the next 12 months. Equity Implications U.S. Equities Chart 11U.S. Contrary to popular belief equities and the currency are joined at the hip especially during currency bull markets. A rising currency tends to attract flows and equities outperform in common and local currency terms. Keep in mind that domestic equity exposure dominates stock market weightings, further solidifying the positive currency and equity correlation. The top panel of Chart 11 shows that this relationship is extremely tight in the U.S. with equities outperforming the MSCI ACWI when the dollar advances and suffering a setback when the greenback depreciates. The Fed has raised rates three times since December 2015 and is slated to tighten monetary policy one more time later this year. This is well telegraphed to the markets, and thus the U.S. dollar has been in sell off mode for the past 6 months, weighing on relative equity performance. The relative economic surprise indexes also have an excellent track record in forecasting relative equity momentum, and the current message is grim for relative share prices. We expect the U.S. to continue to trail other G10 bourses in the coming months and the MSCI ACWI as other CBs have more scope to tighten monetary policy, and recommend an underweight stance in global equity portfolios. Bank/financials performance is also closely linked to monetary policy. While the yield curve flattening tends to suppress net interest margins (NIM), the recovery in loan volumes and drop in NPLs owing to a pickup in economic growth more than offsets the fall in NIMs. We continue to recommend overweight exposure in U.S. banks/financials both in global and U.S. only portfolios.3 New Zealand Equities Chart 12New Zealand The positive stock and currency correlation exists in New Zealand. Currently, the Kiwi has been rising, but relative equities have not followed suit. If our analysis proves prescient and the RBNZ becomes the next G10 CB to hike, then a playable relative equity catch up phase will materialize (Chart 12). The relative surprise index is firing on all cylinders and corroborates the bullish economic message from our macro analysis and hints that New Zealand equities are a buy. We recommend an overweight stance in New Zealand stocks in global equity portfolios. While all the rest of the G10 have a domestic banking sector, New Zealand is the exception. Australian banks dominate the banking scene in New Zealand, and thus serve as a good proxy. We are comfortable to have a modest Australian banks/financials exposure in New Zealand only portfolios. However, there is one caveat: the housing market is bubbly. While excesses are well documented, we doubt that the housing markets would burst either in Australia or in New Zealand in the coming 6-12 months and bring down the Australian banking sector. In such a time frame, both CBs will still be early in their respective tightening cycles. Swedish Equities Chart 13Sweden The Swedish krona moves in lockstep with relative share prices, a relationship that has been in place for the better part of the past two decades (Chart 13). Were the Riksbank to raise the policy rate from deeply negative territory, as our macroeconomic analysis pegs it as second most likely, then equities will outperform the MSCI ACWI, and we recommend an above benchmark allocation in global equity portfolios. Economic surprises in Sweden continue to outnumber the G10, heralding additional momentum gains in relative share prices (bottom panel). The elimination of NIRP would also benefit the banking sector. NIRP serves as a noose around banks' necks, as bankers cannot pass on NIRP to retail depositors weighing on NIMs. Chart 21 in the Appendix shows that Swedish financials comprise over 30% of the overall Swedish market and drive overall market performance. Thus, we are comfortable with an overweight stance in financials in Swedish only equity portfolios given the prospects of tighter monetary policy in the coming quarters. Canadian Equities Chart 14Canada The Loonie and relative equity performance also move in tandem (Chart 14). At the current juncture the bear market in oil prices has dampened both the currency and equities, as Canada is an excellent proxy for commodity prices in general and oil prices in particular. The BoC is the third most likely CB to raise interest rates in the coming months according to our analysis, raising the odds of a reversal of fortunes for Canadian equities. The relative economic surprise index is surging, opening a wide gap with relative share price momentum. If our thesis proves accurate and the BoC pulls the trigger soon, then Canadian equities will gain some traction. Under such a backdrop we recommend an overweight stance in global equity portfolios. In terms of financials, Canadian financials' market capitalization weight is the second largest in the G10, exerting significant influence in overall equity direction. If the commodity complex is healthy enough for the BoC to tighten monetary policy, then banks will outperform on the back of firming loan growth and receding commodity related NPLs. Nevertheless, the housing market poses a clear risk. Were a housing crisis to grip the Canadian economy, bank earnings and thus performance would suffer a sizable blow. Our sense is that such an outcome is highly unlikely in the next year, making us comfortable recommending overweight financials exposure in Canadian only equity portfolios. Australian Equities Chart 15Australia The positive correlation between FX rates and relative equity performance is prevalent in Australia (Chart 15). Currently, the Aussie has stayed resilient, but equities have given way suffering alongside commodities in general and iron ore prices in particular. The RBA sits in the middle of the pack in terms of hiking interest rates next according to our thesis, but still remains the fourth most likely CB in the G10 to pull the trigger ahead of the BoE and the ECB. As such, we recommend a neutral weight in global equity portfolios. While the relative economic surprise index has vaulted higher, the positive correlation with relative share price momentum seems to have broken down in recent years. Similar to Canada, Australian financials comprise a large chunk of the broad equity market (see Chart 21 in the Appendix on page 24), setting the tone for overall equity returns. If Canada's housing market is frothy, then Australia is a definite bubble and poses a significant risk to the banking sector. The APRA is breathing down banks' necks and that is reflected in recent bank underperformance. As we mentioned earlier, we doubt the Australian housing market blows up in the next 6-12 months as the RBA will be in the early innings of a tightening cycle. As a result, only a benchmark allocation is warranted in Australian banks in Australian only portfolios. U.K. Equities Chart 16U.K. Cable and relative U.K. equity performance also follow our currency/FX positive correlation playbook (Chart 16). Relative share prices have ticked up recently taking cue from the rebound in sterling. British economic surprises have been outnumbering the G10 post Brexit, and sport a positive correlation with relative share price momentum. Our U.K. macroeconomic analysis highlights that the BoE stands right in the middle of the CB pack. Importantly, the BoE is our "surprise risk" of staying easy for longer than the economic variables would suggest as the dust clears from the Brexit aftermath. Under such a backdrop we recommend a modest underweight in U.K. equities in global equity portfolios. Similarly, U.K. banks also warrant a slight underweight stance in U.K. only equity portfolios. Eurozone Equities Chart 17Euro Area Euro area stocks and the euro have been positively correlated especially since 2003. Year-to-date EUR/USD is up roughly 10% and Eurozone equities have been stellar outperformers. The catalyst for the euro's sizable gains has been the market's realization that the ECB passed its maximum easing in Q1/2017. Receding geopolitical uncertainty has also played a key role. In addition, the economy has responded well both to the extraordinarily easy monetary policy measures and move away from austerity. The bottom panel of the Chart 17 shows that relative economic surprises are probing 5-year highs pulling relative equity momentum higher. While our macro analysis suggests that the ECB stays pat for a while longer, our "surprise risk" is that the ECB moves earlier than we expect and removes some of the extreme monetary accommodation. As a result we continue to recommend above benchmark exposure both in Eurozone equities and banks/financials. Importantly, not only will euro area banks benefit from the eventual ECB's removal of NIRP and the related boost to NIMs, but also NPLs have peaked and will continue to drift lower along with the unemployment rate. More recently, the speedy and contained resolution of two Italian bank failures along with the absorption of two Spanish banks by Santander and Bankia are a giant step in the right direction. These moves also suggest that there is political will to overcome the banking issues in the euro area. Additional bank cleanup is likely and this is a welcome development in the Eurozone that should entice healthier banks to extend credit to the economy. Norwegian Equities Chart 18Norway Over the past two decades, the Norwegian krone and relative equity performance have moved in lockstep (Chart 18). Year-to-date, relative Norwegian equities have fallen to fresh cycle lows. Similar to Canada, the country's substantial oil dependency has weighed on relative share prices and also knocked down the krone. Our macro analysis concluded that the Norges Bank will be late in lifting interest rate and sits at the bottom of the G10 CBs. As a result, we recommend underweight exposure in Norwegian stocks in global equity portfolios. Financials in Norway comprise one fifth of the stock market's capitalization (Chart 21 in the Appendix on page 24) and have been on a nearly uninterrupted run since the end of the GFC and catapulted to multi-decade highs. Given our thesis of the Norges Bank staying late in raising rates we recommend lightening up on financials equities in Norwegian only equity portfolios. Swiss Equities Chart 19Switzerland Since the late 1990s relative Swiss share prices and the CHF have been enjoying an almost perfect positive correlation (Chart 19). At the current juncture Swiss stocks have been propelling higher versus the MSCI ACWI as the franc has been appreciating. There are extremely low odds that the SNB would move the needle in terms of normalizing interest rates any time soon, according to our analysis. Keep in mind that the SNB is conducting the ultimate QE experiment by purchasing U.S. stocks, underscoring that there are a lot of layers/levers of momentary policy easing that it will have to eventually to unwind. The implication is that we would lean against recent strength in the Swiss equity market and recommend a below benchmark allocation. Switzerland financials have the third lowest market cap weight in the G10 as UBS and CS are still licking their wounds from the aftermath of the GFC. Relative financials performance has been soft and taken a turn for the worse recently in marked contrast with global financials exuberance since Brexit. Our macro analysis suggests that a below benchmark allocation is warranted in financials in Swiss only portfolios. Japanese Equities Chart 20Japan The Japanese yen and relative equity performance were joined at the hip from the mid-1990s until 2009. From the end of the GFC until 2015 this correlation broke down as Japan has been in-and-out of recession. Since then however, there is tentative evidence that Japanese equities and the yen have resumed moving in tandem (Chart 20). Our macroeconomic analysis suggests that Japan will be the last G10 CB to lift interest rates. While our study would signal that investors should avoid Japanese equities, we do not have high confidence in that view. The break and resumption in the equity/currency correlation is worrisome and suggests that other more important factors are in play dictating relative share price performance. As a result, we would modestly overweight Japanese equities in global equity portfolios in line with BCA’s Global Investment Strategy service view.4 On the financials front, relative performance in Japan has fallen into oblivion. NIRP is anchoring NIMs. But, an extremely low unemployment rate suggests that NPLs will continue to probe multi decade lows and provide an offset to bank EPS. Thus, we would stick with a neutral weighting in Japanese financials.5 Appendix Chart 21G10 Financial Market Cap Weights 1 For a more detailed discussion on the correlation between equity prices and the currency market, please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report titled, "Can The S&P 500 Rise Alongside The U.S. Dollar?", dated October 7, 206, available at gss.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Central Banks Are Sticking To Their Guns", dated June 16, 017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Girding For A Breakout?", dated May 1, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy - Strategy Outlook "Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull", June 30, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Year Of The Letter "R"", January 13, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Economic Outlook: Global growth will remain strong over the next 12 months, but will start to slow in the second half of 2018, potentially setting the stage for a recession in 2019. Overall Strategy: Investors should overweight equities and spread product for now. However, be prepared to pare back exposure next summer. Fixed Income: Maintain below benchmark duration exposure over the next 12 months. Underweight U.S. Treasurys, stay neutral Europe, and overweight Japan. Equities: Remain overweight developed market equities relative to their EM peers. Within the DM sphere, favor the euro area and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. In the EM universe, Chinese H-shares have significant upside. Currencies: The selloff in the dollar is overdone. The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate by 10% before peaking in mid-2018. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar, as does the euro. Commodities: Oil will rally over the coming months as global inventories decline. Gold will continue to struggle, before exploding higher towards the end of this decade. Feature I. Global Macro Outlook End Of The Global Manufacturing Recession Global growth estimates have been trending higher over the past 12 months, having bottomed last summer. Ironically, the collapse in oil prices in late 2014 was both the main reason for the deterioration in global growth as well as its subsequent rebound. Plunging oil prices led to a massive decline in capital spending in the energy sector and associated industries. In the U.S., energy capex dropped by 70% between Q2 of 2014 and Q3 of 2016. The economic fallout was even more severe in many other economies, especially emerging markets such as Russia and Brazil. The result was a global manufacturing recession and a pronounced slump in international trade (Chart 1). When thinking about oil and the economy, the distinction between levels and rates of change is important: While rapidly falling oil prices tend to be bad for global growth, lower oil prices are good for it. By the middle of 2016, the damage from the oil crash had largely run its course. What was left was a massive windfall for households, especially poorer ones who spend a disproportionate share of their paychecks at the pump. Industries that use oil as an input also benefited. Simply put, the oil crash went from being a bane to a boon for the global economy. A Solid 12-Month Outlook We expect global growth to remain firm over the next 12 months. Financial conditions in most countries have eased substantially since the start of the year thanks to rising equity prices, lower bond yields, and narrower credit spreads (Chart 2). Our empirical analysis suggests that easier financial conditions tend to lift growth with a lag of 6-to-9 months (Chart 3). This bodes well for activity in the remainder of this year. Chart 1The Manufacturing Recession Has Ended Chart 2Financial Conditions Have Eased Globally A number of "virtuous cycles" should amplify the effects of easier financial conditions. In the U.S., a tight labor market will lead to faster wage growth, helping to spur consumption. Rising household spending, in turn, will lead to lower unemployment and even faster wage growth. Strong consumption growth will also motivate firms to expand capacity, translating into more investment spending. Chart 4 shows that the share of U.S. firms planning to increase capital expenditures has risen to a post-recession high. Chart 3Easier Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Chart 4U.S. Firms Plan To Boost Capex The euro area economy continues to chug along. The purchasing manager indices (PMIs) dipped a bit in June, but remain at levels consistent with above-trend growth. The German Ifo business confidence index hit a record high this week. Corporate balance sheets in the euro area are improving and credit growth is accelerating. This is helping to fuel a rebound in business investment (Chart 5). The fact that the ECB has no intention of raising rates anytime soon will only help matters. As inflation expectations begin to recover, short-term real rates will fall. This will lead to a virtuous circle of stronger growth, and even higher inflation expectations. The Japanese economy managed to grow by an annualized 1% in the first quarter. This marked the fifth consecutive quarter of positive sequential growth, the longest streak in 11 years. Exports are recovering and both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs stand near record-high levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Euro Area Data Remain Upbeat Chart 6Japanese Economy Is Rebounding Chart 7China: Slight Slowdown, But No Need To Worry The Chinese economy has slowed a notch since the start of the year, but remains robust (Chart 7). Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production are rising at a healthy clip. Exports are accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global growth. Retail sales continue to expand, while the percentage of households that intend to buy a new home has surged to record-high levels. The rebound in Chinese exports and industrial output is helping to lift producer prices. Higher selling prices, in turn, are fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 8). A better profit picture should support business capital spending in the coming months. Meanwhile, the Chinese government's "regulatory windstorm" - as the local press has called it - has largely bypassed the real economy. In fact, medium and long-term lending to nonfinancial corporations, a key driver of private-sector capital spending and physical commodity demand, has actually accelerated over the past eight months (Chart 9). Chart 8China: Higher Selling Prices Fueling A Rebound In Profits Chart 9China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating All Good Things Must Come To An End We remain optimistic about global growth over the next 12 months. Unfortunately, things are likely to sour in the second half of 2018, possibly setting the stage for a recession in the U.S. and several other countries in 2019. The odds of a recession rise when economies approach full employment (Chart 10). The U.S. unemployment rate now stands at 4.3% and is on track to break below its 2000 low of 3.8% next summer. A cursory look at the data suggests that the unemployment rate is usually either rising or falling (Chart 11). And once it starts rising, it keeps rising. In fact, there has never been a case in the postwar era where the three-month average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing. Chart 10Recessions Become More Likely When The Labor Market Begins To Overheat Chart 11Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Modern economies contain numerous feedback loops. When unemployment starts increasing, this fuels a vicious cycle where rising joblessness saps confidence and incomes, leading to less spending and even higher unemployment. History suggests that it is almost impossible to break this cycle once it starts. The Fed is well aware of the risks of letting the unemployment rate fall to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Unfortunately, calibrating monetary policy in a way that achieves a soft landing is easier said than done. Changes in monetary conditions affect the economy with a lag of about 12-to-18 months. Once it has become obvious that a central bank has either loosened or tightened monetary policy too much, it is often too late to right the ship. The risks of a policy error are particularly high in today's environment where there is significant uncertainty about the level of the long-term neutral rate. Question marks about the future stance of fiscal policy will also complicate the Fed's job. We expect the Trump administration to succeed in passing legislation that cuts both personal and corporate income taxes later this year or in early 2018. The bill will be "fully funded" in the sense that there will be offsetting spending cuts, but these will be back-loaded toward the end of the 10-year budget window, whereas the tax cuts will be front-loaded. This will generate a modest amount of fiscal stimulus over the next few years. That being said, the proposed changes to health care legislation could more than neutralize the effects of lower tax rates. The Senate bill, as currently worded, would lead to substantial cuts to Medicaid relative to existing law, as well as deep cuts to insurance subsidies for many poor and middle-class families. Our base case is that Republicans in Congress fail to pass a new health care bill, thus leaving the Affordable Care Act largely unscathed. However, if they succeed, the overall stance of federal fiscal policy would likely shift from being somewhat accommodative, on net, to somewhat restrictive. This would expedite the timing of the recession. How Deep A Recession? If the U.S. does succumb to a recession in 2019, how bad will it be? Here, there is both good news and bad news. The good news is that financial and economic imbalances are not as severe today as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The Great Recession was preceded by a massive housing bubble, associated with overbuilding and a sharp deterioration in mortgage lending standards (Chart 12). Today, residential investment stands at 3.9% of GDP, compared to a peak of 6.6% of GDP Q1 of 2006. Lending standards, at least judging by FICO scores, have remained fairly high over the course of the recovery. In relation to income and rents, home prices are also much lower today than they were a decade ago. Likewise, the massive capex overhang that preceded the 2001 recession is largely absent at present. Chart 12No New Bubble In The U.S. Housing Sector Chart 13Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... The bad news is that cracks in the economy are starting to form. In contrast to mortgage debt, student debt has gone through the roof and auto loans are nearly back to pre-recession levels as a share of disposable income (Chart 13). Not surprisingly, this is starting to translate into higher default rates (Chart 14). The fact that this is happening when the unemployment rate is at the lowest level in 16 years is a cause for concern. Meanwhile, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen above 2000 levels and is closing in on its 2007 peak (Chart 15). Chart 14...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories Chart 15U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit We are particularly worried about the health of the commercial real estate (CRE) market. CRE prices currently stand 7% above pre-recession levels in real terms, having risen by a staggering 82% since the start of 2010 (Chart 16). U.S. financial institutions hold $3.8 trillion in CRE loans, $2 trillion of which are held by banks. As a share of GDP, the outstanding stock of CRE bank loans in most categories is near pre-recession levels (Chart 17). Chart 16Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 17CRE Debt Is Rising The retail sector is already under intense pressure due to the shift in buying habits towards E-commerce. Vacancy rates in the apartment sector have started to tick higher and rent growth has slowed (Chart 18 and Chart 19). The number of apartment units under construction stands at a four-decade high, despite a structurally subdued pace of household formation (Chart 20). Most of these units are likely to hit the market in 2018, which will result in a further increase in vacancy rates. Vacancies in the office sector are also likely to rise, given the recent increase in the number of new projects in the pipeline. On the flipside, demand growth for new office space is set to weaken, as a tighter labor market leads to slower payroll gains. Chart 18Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Chart 19...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam If vacancy rates across the CRE sector start rising in earnest, real estate prices will fall, leading to a decline in the value of the collateral backing CRE loans. This could prompt lenders to pull back credit, causing prices to fall further. Seasoned real estate investors are no strangers to such vicious cycles, and if the next one begins late next year when growth is slowing because the economy is running out of spare capacity and financial conditions are tightening, it would further add to the risks of a recession. Chart 20Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Gauging The Global Spillover Effects What repercussions would a U.S. recession have for the rest of the world? Simply based on trade flows, the answer is "not much." U.S. imports account for less than 5% of global ex-U.S. GDP. Thus, even a significant decline in U.S. spending abroad would not make much of a dent in overseas growth. More worrisome are potential financial spillovers. As the IMF has documented, these have been the dominant drivers of the global business cycle in the modern era.1 Chart 21Global Debt Levels Are Still High Correlations across global markets tend to increase when risk sentiment deteriorates. Thus, if U.S. stocks buckle in the face of rising recessionary risks, risk assets in other economies are sure to suffer. The fact that valuations are stretched across so many markets only makes the problem worse. A flight towards safety could trigger a pronounced decline in global equity prices, wider credit spreads, and lower property prices. This, in turn, could lead to a sharp decline in household and corporate net worth, resulting in tighter financial conditions and more stringent lending standards. Elevated debt levels represent another major source of vulnerability. Total debt as a share of GDP is greater now than it was before the Great Recession in both advanced and emerging markets (Chart 21). High debt burdens will prevent governments from loosening fiscal policy in countries that are unable to issue their own currencies. The monetary transmission mechanism also tends to be less effective in the presence of high debt. This is especially the case in today's environment where the zero lower-bound on nominal interest rates remains a formidable challenge. The presence of these fiscal and monetary constraints implies that the severity of the next recession could be somewhat greater than one might expect based solely on the underlying causes of the downturn. II. Financial Markets Overall Strategy The discussion above implies that the investment outlook over the next few years is likely to be of the "one step forward, two steps back" variety. The global economy is entering a blow-off stage where growth will get better before it gets worse. We are bullish on global equities and spread product over the next 12 months, but expect to turn bearish on risk assets next summer. Until then, investors should position for a stronger dollar and higher bond yields. We recommend a slight overweight allocation to developed market equities over their EM peers. Within the DM sphere, we favor the euro area and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. In the EM universe, Chinese H-shares stand out as offering an attractive risk-reward profile. Comparing government bonds, we are underweight U.S. Treasurys, neutral on European bonds, and overweight Japan. These recommendations are broadly in line with the output of our in-house quantitative models (Table 1 and Chart 22). Table 1BCA's Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations* Chart 22Message From Our U.S. Stock Market ##br##Timing Model Equities Earnings Are Key Earnings have been the main driver of the global equity bull market. In fact, the global forward P/E ratio has actually declined slightly since February, despite a 3.9% gain in equity prices (Chart 23). Strong global growth should continue to boost corporate earnings over the next 12 months. Consensus bottom-up estimates call for global EPS to expand by 14% in 2017 and a further 11% in 2018. The global earnings revision ratio moved into positive territory earlier this year for the first time in six years (Chart 24). Chart 23Earnings Have Been The Main Driver ##br##Of The Global Equity Bull Market Chart 24Global Earnings Picture ##br##Looks Solid Global monetary conditions generally remain favorable. Our U.S. Financial Conditions Index has loosened significantly. Historically, this has been a bullish signal for stocks.2 Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also still well above the zero line, a threshold that has warned of a downturn in stock prices in the past. Chart 25Individual Investors Are Not Overly Bullish On U.S. Equities But... Sentiment is stretched, but not excessively so. The share of bullish respondents in the AAII's weekly poll of individual investors stood at 29.7% this week (Chart 25). This marked the 18th consecutive week that optimism has been below its long-term average. Market Vane's survey of traders and Yale's Investor Confidence index paint a more complacent picture, as do other measures such as the VIX and margin debt (Chart 26). Nevertheless, as long as earnings continue to grow and monetary policy remains in expansionary territory, sentiment can remain elevated without being a significant threat to stocks. Overweight The Euro Area And Japan Over The U.S. Regionally, earnings revisions have been more positive in Europe and Japan than in the U.S. so far this year. Net profit margins are also lower in Europe and Japan, which gives these two regions more room for catch-up. Moreover, unlike the Fed, neither the ECB nor the BoJ are likely to raise rates anytime soon. As we discuss in greater detail in the currency section of this report, this should lead to a weaker euro and yen, giving European and Japanese exporters a further leg up in competitiveness. Lastly, valuations are more favorable in the euro area and Japan than in the U.S., even if one adjusts for differing sector weights across the three regions (Chart 27). Chart 26...There Are Signs Of Complacency Chart 27U.S. Valuations Seem Stretched Relative ##br##To Other Bourses Mixed Outlook For EM Earnings growth in emerging markets has accelerated sharply. Bottom-up estimates imply EPS growth of 20% in 2017 and 11% in 2018 for the EM MSCI index. Our EM strategists believe this is too optimistic, given the prospect of a stronger dollar, high debt levels across the EM space, poor corporate governance, and the lack of productivity-enhancing structural reforms. These problems warrant a slight underweight to emerging markets in global equity portfolios. Nevertheless, considering the solid backdrop for global growth, EM stocks should still be able to deliver positive real total returns over the next 12 months. Within the EM space, we favor Russia, central Europe, Korea, Taiwan, India, Thailand, and China. Chinese H-shares, in particular, remain quite attractive, trading at only 7.1-times forward earnings and 1.0-times book value. Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives ... For Now Looking at global equity sectors, upward revisions have been largest for industrials, materials, financials, and real estate. Revisions for energy, health care, and telecom have been negative. We expect cyclical stocks to outperform defensives over the next 12 months. Energy stocks will move from being laggards to leaders, as oil prices rebound. Financials should also do well, as steeper yield curves, increased M&A activity, and falling nonperforming loans bolster profits. Equity Bear Market Will Begin Late Next Year As growth begins to falter in the second half of 2018, stocks will swoon. U.S. equities are likely to fall 20% to 30% peak to trough, marking the first sustained bear market since 2008. Other stock markets will experience similar declines. Global equities will eventually recoup most of their losses at the start of the 2020s, but the recovery will be a lackluster one. As we have argued extensively in the past, global productivity growth is likely to remain weak.3 Population aging will deplete savings, leading to higher real interest rates. The next recession could also propel more populist leaders into power. None of these things would be good for stocks. Against today's backdrop of lofty valuations, global stocks will deliver a total real return in the low single-digit range over the next decade. Fixed Income Bonds Have Overreacted To The Inflation Dip We turned structurally bearish on government bonds on July 5th, 2016. As fate would have it, this was the very same day that the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield dropped to a record closing low of 1.37%. The dramatic bond selloff that followed was too much, too fast. We warned at the start of this year that bond yields were likely to climb down from their highs. At this point, however, the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of lower yields. Chart 28 shows that almost all of the decline in bond yields has been due to falling inflation expectations. Real yields have remained resilient, suggesting that investors' views of global growth have not changed much. This helps explain why stocks have been able to rally to new highs. The fall in inflation expectations has been largely driven by the decline in commodity prices. Short-term swings in oil prices should not affect long-term inflation expectations, but in practice they do (Chart 29). If oil prices recover in the second half of this year, as we expect, inflation expectations should shift higher as well. This will translate into higher bond yields. Chart 28Inflation Expectations Declined This Year, ##br##But Real Yields Remained Resilient Chart 29Low Oil Prices Drag Down##br## Inflation Expectations U.S. Treasurys Are Most Vulnerable Tightening labor markets should also boost inflation expectations. This is particularly the case in the U.S., where the economy is quickly running out of surplus labor. Some commentators have argued that the headline unemployment rate understates the true amount of economic slack. We are skeptical that this is the case. Table 2 compares a wide variety of measures of labor market slack with where they stood at the height of the business cycle in 2000 and 2007. The main message from the table is that the unemployment rate today is broadly where one would expect it to be based on these collaborating indicators. Table 2Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles 12-MONTH If the U.S. has reached full employment, does the absence of wage pressures signal that the Phillips curve is dead? We don't think so. For one thing, wage growth is not that weak. Our wage growth tracker has risen from a low of 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% at present (Chart 30). In fact, real wages have been rising more quickly than productivity for the past three years (Chart 31). Unit labor cost growth is now just shy of where it was at the peaks of the last two business cycles (Chart 32). Chart 30Stronger Labor Market ##br##Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Chart 31Real Wages Now Increasing Faster##br## Than Productivity Chart 32Unit Labor Cost Growth Close ##br##To Previous Two Peaks The evidence generally suggests that the Phillips curve becomes "kinked" when the unemployment rate falls towards 4%. In plain English, this means that a drop in the unemployment rate from 10% to 8% tends to have little effect on inflation, while a drop from 4.5% to 3.5% does. The experience of the 1960s is illustrative in that regard. Chart 33 shows that much like today, inflation in the first half of that decade was well anchored at just below 2%. However, once the unemployment rate fell below 4%, inflation took off. Core inflation rose from 1.5% in early 1966 to nearly 4% in early 1967, ultimately making its way to 6% by 1970. The Fed is keen to avoid a repeat of that episode. In a recent speech, New York Fed President and FOMC vice chairman Bill Dudley warned that "If we were not to withdraw accommodation, the risk would be that the economy would crash to a very, very low unemployment rate, and generate inflation ... Then the risk would be that we would have to slam on the brakes and the next stop would be a recession." If U.S. growth remains firm and inflation rebounds in the second half of this year, as we expect, the Fed will get the green light to keep raising rates in line with the "dots." The market is not prepared for that, as evidenced by the fact that it is pricing in only 27 basis points in rate hikes over the next 12 months. We are positioned for higher rate expectations by being short the January 2018 fed funds contract. The ECB And The BoJ Will Not Follow The Fed's Lead Could better growth prospects cause the ECB and the BoJ to follow in the Fed's footsteps and take away the punch bowl? We doubt it. Investors are reading too much into Mario Draghi's allegedly more "hawkish" tone. There is a huge difference between removing emergency measures and beginning a full-fledged tightening cycle. Labor market slack is still considerably higher in the euro area than was the case in 2008. Outside of Germany, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the euro area is about seven points higher than it was before the Great Recession (Chart 34). Chart 33Inflation In The 1960s Took Off ##br##Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Chart 34Euro Area: Labor Market Slack##br## Is Still High Outside Of Germany At this point, the market is pricing in too much tightening from the ECB. Our months-to-hike measure has plummeted from a high of 65 months in July 2016 to 25 months at present (Chart 35). Investors now expect real yields in the U.S. to be only 16 basis points higher than in the euro area in five years' time.4 This is below the 76 basis-point gap in the equilibrium rate between the two regions that Holston, Laubach, and Williams estimate (Chart 36). Chart 35ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tighteninh Chart 36The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area As for Japan, while the unemployment rate has fallen to a 22-year low of 2.8%, this understates the true amount of slack in the economy. Output-per-hour in Japan remains 35% below U.S. levels. A key reason for this is that many Japanese companies continue to pad their payrolls with excess labor. This is particularly true in the service sector, which remains largely insulated from foreign competition. In any case, with both actual inflation and inflation expectations in Japan nowhere close to the BoJ's target, this is hardly the time to be worried about an overheated economy. And even if the Japanese authorities were inclined to slow growth, it would be fiscal policy rather than monetary policy that they would tighten first. After all, they have been keen to raise the sales tax for several years now. The Bank Of England's Dilemma Gilts are a tougher call. The equilibrium rate is higher in the U.K. than in most other developed economies. Inflation has risen, although that has largely been a function of a weaker currency. Fiscal policy is turning more accommodative, which, all things equal, would warrant a more bearish view on gilts. The big wildcard is Brexit. Chart 37 shows that the U.K. is the only major country where growth has faltered this year. Worries over Britain's future relationship with the EU have likely contributed to the slowdown. Ongoing Brexit angst will keep the Bank of England on hold, justifying a neutral weighting on gilts. Stay Short Duration ... For Now In summary, investors should keep global duration risk below benchmark levels over the next 12 months. Regionally, we recommend underweighting U.S. Treasurys, overweighting Japan, and maintaining a neutral position towards euro area and U.K. government bonds. Reflecting these recommendations, we are closing our short Japanese, German and Swiss 10-year bond trade for a gain of 5.3% and replacing it with a short 30-year U.S. Treasury bond position. As global growth begins to slow in the second half of next year, global bonds will rally. However, as we discussed at length in our Q2 Strategy Outlook, the rally will simply represent a countertrend move in what will turn out to be a structural bear market.5 The 2020s, in short, could end up looking a lot like the 1970s. Spread Product: Still A Bit Of Juice Left While we prefer equities to high-yield credit on a risk-adjusted basis over the coming months, we would still overweight spread product within a global asset allocation framework. The option-adjusted spread of the U.S. high-yield index offers 200 basis points above the Treasury curve after adjusting for expected defaults, roughly in line with the mid-point of the historical data (Chart 38). Corporate defaults are likely to trend lower over the next 12 months, spurred by stronger growth and a rebound in oil prices. Chart 37U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers Chart 38Default-Adjusted Junk Spreads Are At Historical Average As with all our other views, the picture is likely to change sharply in the second half of next year. At that point, corporate spreads will widen, warranting a much more defensive stance. Currencies And Commodities The Dollar Bull: Down But Not Out Our long-standing dollar bullish view has come under fire over the past few months. The Fed's broad trade-weighted dollar index has fallen 4.6% since December. Momentum in currency markets can be a powerful force, and so we would not be surprised if the dollar remains under pressure over the coming weeks. However, over a 12-month horizon, the greenback will strengthen, as the Fed raises rates more quickly than expected while most other central banks stand pat. When all is said and done, the broad-trade weighted dollar is likely to peak next summer at a level roughly 10% higher than where it is today. That would still leave it substantially below prior peaks in 1985 and 2000 (Chart 39). The U.S. trade deficit has fallen from a peak of nearly 6% of GDP in 2005 to 3% of GDP at present (Chart 40). Rising shale production has reduced the demand for oil imports. A smaller trade deficit diminishes the need to attract foreign capital with a cheaper currency. Chart 39The Dollar Is Below Past Peaks Chart 40The U.S. Trade Deficit Has Halved Since 2005 Sentiment and speculative positioning towards the dollar have swung from extremely bullish at the start of the year to being more neutral today (Chart 41). In contrast, long euro speculative positions and bullish sentiment have reached the highest levels in three years. Our tactical short euro/long dollar trade was stopped out this week for a loss of 1.6%. However, we continue to expect EUR/USD to fall back towards parity by the end of the year. We also expect the pound to weaken against the dollar, but appreciate slightly against the euro. Now that the Bank of Japan is keeping the 10-year JGB yield pinned to zero, the outlook for the yen will be largely determined by what happens to yields abroad. If we are correct that Treasury yields - and to a lesser extent yields in Europe - rise, the yen will suffer. Commodity Currencies Should Fare Well Higher commodity prices should benefit currencies such as the Canadian and Aussie dollars and the Norwegian krone. Our energy strategists remain convinced that crude prices are heading higher. They expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. While shale output continues to rise, this is largely being offset by falling production from conventional oil fields. Consequently, oil inventories should fall in the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 42). Chart 41USD: Sentiment And Positioning ##br##Are Not Lopsided Anymore Chart 42Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead ##br##To Higher Crude Prices The outlook for industrial metals is not as upbeat as for oil, but metal prices should nevertheless rebound over the coming months. We suspect that much of the recent weakness in metal prices can be attributed to the regulatory crackdown on shadow banking activity in China. Many Chinese traders had used commodities as collateral for loans. As their loans were called in, they had no choice but to liquidate their positions. Today, speculative positioning in the commodity pits has returned to more normal levels (Chart 43). This reduces the risk of a further downdraft in commodity prices. BCA's China strategists expect the Chinese authorities to relax some of their tightening measures. This is already being seen in a decline in interbank lending rates and corporate bond yields (Chart 44). Chart 43Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning ##br##To More Normal Levels Chart 44China: Some Relief##br## After Recent Tightening Action? One key reason why the authorities have been able to let interest rates come down is because capital outflows have abated. Compared to late 2015, economic growth is stronger and deflationary pressures have receded. The trade-weighted RMB has also fallen by 7.5% since then, giving the economy a competitive boost. As such, the seeming can't-lose bet on further yuan weakness has disappeared. We still expect the RMB to depreciate against the dollar over the next 12 months, but to strengthen against most other currencies, including the euro and the yen. If the yuan remains resilient, this will limit the downside risk for other EM currencies. Nevertheless, at this point, much of the good news benefiting EM currencies has been priced in. Across the EM universe, in addition to the Chinese yuan, we like the Mexican peso, Taiwan dollar, Indian rupee, Russian ruble, Polish zloty, and Czech koruna. Lastly, a few words on the most timeless of all currencies: gold. We expect bullion to struggle over the next 12 months on the back of a stronger dollar and rising bond yields. However, once the Fed starts cutting rates in 2019 and stagflationary forces begin to gather steam in the early 2020s, gold will finally have its day in the sun. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, please see Box 4.1: Financial Linkages and Spillovers in "Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy," IMF World Economic Outlook, (April 2007). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model," dated May 5, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?" dated May 31, 2017; Global Investment Strategy - Strategy Outlook, "First Quarter 2017 From Reflation To Stagflation, (Section: Supply Matters), First Quarter 2017 From Reflation To Stagflation, (Section: Supply Matters)," dated January 6, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 U.S. minus euro area 5-year/5-year forward real bond yields. Real bonds yields are calculated as a difference between nominal yields and the CPI swap rate. Euro area yields refer to a GDP-weighted average of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Spain. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
2017 has been a tough year for movies & entertainment. The index has been in a steady downdraft and is now probing 5 year lows. Yesterday's U.S. consumer confidence number could presage an inflection point. Consumers are feeling ebullient (second panel), which typically heralds increased discretionary spending, particularly on media services. While cord cutting and concerns about TV ad spending have undermined the index of late, if cable spending continues to accelerate, then these concerns should fade. The sector enjoys high operating leverage, implying strong EPS gains from a sales lift (third panel). This rosy outlook is not yet reflected in valuations which are well below their long-term average (bottom panel). This offers investors a double feature of valuation rerating and significant earnings growth. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MOVI - DIS, TWX, FOXA, FOX, VIAB.
Highlights Trade 1: An unwinding of the Trump reflation trade... has worked exactly as expected. Take profits and switch into Trade 5. Trade 2: Short pound/euro at €1.18 and simultaneously buy call options at €1.30... is up 4%. Take profits and add to long euro/dollar. Trade 3: Underweight French OATS... has worked well both in a European bond portfolio and in a global bond portfolio. Stick with this trade. Trade 4: Long euro/yuan... is up 6%. Stick with this trade. Trade 5 (New): Underweight emerging market equities. European equity investors should underweight Poland. Feature At the mid-point of the year, we are devoting this report to appraise our top investment ideas for 2017 - as recommended in our December 22 report Five Pressing Questions (And Four Trades) For 2017. Half-time is a good moment to review the thoughts we had at the start of 2017, establish how the ideas have performed in the first half, and assess whether to stick with them or make some changes in the second half. Chart of the WeekFor EM Equities, Excessive Groupthink Is Hitting Its Natural Limit Trade 1: An Unwinding Of The Trump Reflation Trade Chart I-2The Trump Reflation Trade Has Unwound Our thoughts at the start of 2017: "Can a modern day King Canute1 single-handedly turn the tide of global deflation - the combined structural forces of over-indebtedness, demographics, technology, and globalization? This publication believes that the tide has not turned... Rationality and analysis will conclude that Trumponomics is not the structural game changer that the market seems to believe right now." How has the trade performed in the first half? Exactly as scripted, the Trump reflation trade - in its various guises - has unwound. Since our original report, the trade-weighted dollar is down 5%; the global bond yield is down 15bps (the 10-year T-bond yield is down 40bps); and banks have underperformed the market by 5% (Chart I-2). Our thoughts for the second half of 2017: Never forget that the financial markets are a complex ecosystem in which long-term investors jostle with short-term traders. The equilibrium of this ecosystem relies on rationality and analysis ultimately checking emotion and impulse. In February, our prescient warning in The Contrarian Case For Bonds was that as emotional and impulsive short-term traders had been left unchecked to drive markets, excessive groupthink was hitting its natural technical limit. The 6-month sell-off in bonds had reached a point of instability. And sure enough, the trend broke (Chart I-3). Chart I-3For Bonds, Excessive Groupthink Hit Its Natural Limit In February At such tipping points of excessive groupthink, a good benchmark is that the preceding trend will reverse by one third. On this basis, a large part of the gains in the Trump trade unwind have now been made. Take profits and switch into new trade 5. Trade 2: Short Pound/Euro At €1.18 And Simultaneously Buy Call Options At €1.30 Our thoughts at the start of 2017: "2017 will be an especially unpredictable year for U.K. politics and economics because Brexit creates a larger number of moving parts, complex interactions and feedback loops, both negative and positive... The pound is unlikely to stay near today's €1.18. Expect a sharp move one way or the other." How has the trade performed in the first half? For U.K. politics, "especially unpredictable" could be the understatement of the year! An unpredicted general election generated an even more unpredicted result. With pound/euro now below €1.13, the directional position is up 5% in gross terms, and up around 4% in net terms allowing for the cost of the call options (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Pound / Euro Has Underperformed In 2017 Our thoughts for the second half of 2017: In a hung parliament, the minority Conservative government does not have the parliamentary maths to legislate for a hard Brexit in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Significantly, the so-called 'Salisbury Convention' - in which the House of Lords does not oppose the second or third reading of any government legislation promised in its election manifesto - does not necessarily apply in a hung parliament. This is because, by definition, the minority Conservative government's manifesto did not secure a majority in the House of Commons. With the hard Brexit tail-risk diminished, our current preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third, based on the evolution of interest rate expectations explained below. Hence, take profits in short pound/euro and add to long euro/dollar. Trade 3: Underweight French OATS Our thoughts at the start of 2017: "2016 was the year when QE peaked... The credibility of the ECB to suppress long-term bond yields would then be severely damaged. And the greatest danger would be to those euro area bond yields closest to zero." How has the trade performed in the first half? French OATS have substantially underperformed both U.K. gilts (Chart I-5) and U.S. T-bonds (Chart I-6). So it has been correct to underweight French government bonds both in a European bond portfolio and in a global bond portfolio. Chart I-5French OATs Have Underperformed In##br## A European Bond Portfolio... Chart I-6...And A Global ##br##Bond Portfolio Our thoughts for the second half of 2017: Central banks' professed commitment to data-dependency means that their words - and ultimately actions - must acknowledge the hard data. No ifs, buts or maybes. Based on the latest PMIs which capture current economic sentiment, and on 6-month credit impulses, which lead activity, euro area hard data will continue to be among the best among the major economies. Combined with the supply shortages the ECB is now facing in buying German bunds, expect the ECB's words to continue becoming more hawkish. The recent relatively smooth winding down of three failing banks - Spain's Banco Popolare and Italy's Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca - will also hearten the ECB that the strategy for resolving its undercapitalised banks does not pose a systemic risk to the economy or markets. Hence, expect euro area interest rate expectations to continue converging with other developed economies. And stick with the underweight French OATS (or German Bunds) trade, especially in a global bond portfolio. Chart I-7Euro / Yuan Is Up 6% Trade 4: Long Euro/Yuan Our thoughts at the start of 2017: "The debt super cycle is over when the cost of malinvestment and misallocation of capital outweighs the benefit of good credit creation... China appears to be approaching this point. One manifestation would be continued weakness in its currency against the major developed market crosses." How has the trade performed in the first half? Euro/yuan is up 6% (Chart I-7). Our thoughts for the second half of 2017: The thoughts we expressed at the start of 2017 are still entirely valid and supported by the argument for trade 5 below. Stick with long euro/yuan. Trade 5 (New): Underweight Emerging Market Equities Just as we presciently warned of excessive negative groupthink towards bonds in February, we are now seeing similarly excessive positive groupthink towards EM equities hitting its natural technical limit. This is a strong warning that the first half 15% rally risks reversing, or fizzling, in the second half (Chart of the Week). Chart I-8If EM Underperforms DM, Poland ##br##Underperforms Europe For the detailed fundamental analysis, I refer you to the latest reports penned by my colleague, BCA's Chief Emerging Markets Strategist, Arthur Budaghyan. But in summary, Arthur says: "China's liquidity conditions have tightened, warranting a meaningful slowdown in money/credit and economic growth... the outlook for EM risk assets is extremely poor... and we continue to recommend an underweight allocation towards EM within global portfolios across stocks, credit and currencies."2 For European equity investors, this means underweighting Poland, whose relative performance tracks EM versus DM equities (Chart I-8). Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In fact, the story of King Canute has been misinterpreted. Rather than show that he could turn the tide, he wanted to show the opposite: that he was powerless against the tide. 2 Please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution" published on June 14, 2017 and available at ems.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* As shown on page 1, this week's trade is to go short emerging markets with a corresponding long in developed markets. In this case, the trade duration is up to 6 months with a profit target and stop-loss of 3%. Amongst our other open trades, long FTSE100 / short IBEX35 is approaching its 4% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. The RPI borrows from Paul Samuelson's "revealed preference" theory of consumer behavior to market behavior. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and the monetary policy backdrop. A trading rule for the stock/bond allocation based on the RPI outperforms traditional technical, monetary, and valuation indicators. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive equity market momentum lines up with positive signals from policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it is best used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. In 1938, economist Paul Samuelson published a paper entitled, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," in which he outlined an alternative to the well-known economic principle, utility theory. He dubbed his work "revealed preference theory."1 His goal was to redefine utility - a measure of consumer satisfaction with a good or service - by observing behavior. He posited that when consumers reveal their preferences by buying one item rather than another, they reveal the way in which they maximize happiness or satisfaction. For instance, one can measure preferences via experiments in which a subject is given $200 and the choice between two brands of shoes at different prices. Repeating the exercise at different levels of income and relative prices generates "preference axioms." Samuelson's theory has many more layers of complexity, but this Special Report focuses on modelling investors' preferences through observed behavior. Borrowing from Samuelson's reasoning, we developed a methodology to identify investors' axioms of preference for equities and bonds at different levels of incomes and prices. Then we compared investors' real actions with those anticipated by our methodology. This allowed us to generalize our findings and analyze the effects on a portfolio of equities and bonds. The main finding of our statistical exercise is that asset allocators can profit from understanding how short-term moves are linked to the market's revealed preferences at different times during the economic cycle. We then use the results to construct an indicator and a trading rule that not only outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy by a wide margin, it outperforms other traditional trading rules as well. Building A Revealed Preference Model Our primary objective in constructing a revealed preference indicator (RPI) is to understand: (1) how market preferences shape the behavior of investors; and (2) how they ultimately affect future returns. To do so, we broke down our analysis into three key areas: Part I identifies market preferences for different levels of income and price in the economy. Part II defines a general investment strategy that utilizes historic preferences and short-term market movements as a market timing tool. Part III optimizes the RPI and compares its historical track record with a buy-and-hold asset allocation and trading rules based on other indicators. Part I - Developing The Framework The first step in building the RPI is to establish the proper control variables. We limited our basket of investable "goods" to U.S. equities and 10-year Treasurys. We also need a variable that is analogous to the income measure that Samuelson used in his study. For the choice facing investors who are deciding between buying two financial assets, we believe that a measure of market "liquidity" is more appropriate than income. By this we do not mean the ease by which financial assets can be bought and sold. Rather, it is "funding liquidity", or how easily it is to borrow to invest. BCA often uses the four phases of the Fed cycle, as interest rates fluctuate around the equilibrium level, as a measure of funding liquidity (Chart II-1):2 Chart II-1Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Phase I = Policy is accommodative but the fed funds rate is rising. Phase II = Policy is tight and the Fed is still tightening. Phase III = Policy is tight but the Fed is cutting rates. Phase IV = Policy is easy and the Fed is cutting rates. The rationale for using the fed funds-rate cycle as a proxy for income is that, when interest rates are below equilibrium, monetary conditions are accommodative. Leverage is easy to obtain because there is plenty of liquidity (income) to fund investments. When conditions are tight, funding liquidity is relatively scarce. To measure relative prices, we first divided the S&P 500 price index by its 12-month moving average and second, we took the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield divided by 12-month moving average.3 We then used the ratio of these two deviations-from-trend to construct a relative price measure (Chart II-2). This ratio provides a single measure of how expensive stocks and bonds are, not only to each other, but to their own history as well. We then grouped the relative price data into four sets of percentiles, or buckets, shown in Table II-1. Stocks are expensive and bonds cheap at the top of the table, while the reverse is true at the bottom. Chart II-2Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Table II-1Distribution Of Relative Price Table II-2A presents the average historical monthly percent change in stock prices for each combination of the four relative price and liquidity buckets over the entire dataset. In the fourth phase of the Fed cycle (when monetary conditions are easy and the Fed is still cutting interest rates), and when relative prices are in the first bucket (i.e. stocks are expensive), the average stock price increase during the month was slightly above 1% percent. Table II-2B provides the same breakdown for the average change in bond yields (shown in basis points, not returns). Tables II-2A and II-2B are recalculated at each point in time - meaning that we used an expanding sample to calculate the price buckets, and updated the results for the ensuing price or yield movements as new data are added. That way, we completely avoid the advantage of hindsight. To simplify our methodology, we coded the results to end up with the stock and bond returns for the 16 different combinations of Fed and relative price buckets. Table II-3 uses the results from Tables II-2A and II-2B in the last period of history as an example. The "Liquidity" and "Price" columns indicate the bucket (e.g. price in bucket 1 and liquidity in bucket 1). The "Stocks" and "Bonds" columns are coded as "1" if the asset appreciated during the month given the indicated liquidity/price bucket, and a "0" if it depreciated that month. Table II-2AEquity Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Table II-2BTreasury Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Chart II-3Revealing What Investors Prefer Part II - Habits Create Expectations It is important to keep in mind that the objective of our revealed preference model is not to use the revealed market preferences as forecasts but rather to examine what happens when investors decide to follow or ignore them. Our hypothesis in building this model is that, when investors go against their historical preferences, the result should be interpreted as short-term noise. It is only when preferences and (subsequent) short-term market moves are aligned that we should heed the signal and invest accordingly. Table II-3 can be thought of as the market's revealed preference. Again, keep in mind that we allowed revealed preferences to change over time by recalculating it under our stretching-sample approach. The following steps detail how we used investor preferences to create a trading rule that verifies our hypothesis empirically: Step 1 - Expected vs. Actual: The first step is to examine how actual equity prices and bond yields behaved relative to their expected trajectory. We created two variables - one for equities and one for bonds. If revealed preference last month (t-1) suggested that the asset's return should be positive in the subsequent month (t), and it indeed turned out to be positive in period t, then we coded month t as "1." If both the revealed preference and the actual outcome were negative, we coded it as "-1." If they did not match, the code is "0" (in other words, the market did not follow the typical historical revealed preference). Thus we have two time series, one for bonds and one for stocks, which are made up of 1s, -1s and zeros. Step 2 - Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral: We combined the coded series for stocks and bonds to encompass the nine possible outcomes in our model (i.e. both bonds and stocks can have a value in any month of 1, 0 or -1, providing 9 different combinations). Table II-4 presents the nine outcomes along with the asset allocation that would have maximized investor returns based on our historical analysis. For example, investors were paid to be overweight equities when equities and bonds have a code of "1" and "-1," respectively (top row in Table II-4). In other words, stocks tended to outperform bonds when revealed preferences from the month before predicted rising stock prices and rising bond yields, and these predictions were confirmed. Table II-4Understanding The Signals From Preferences If revealed preference is not confirmed for both bonds and stocks, then it is best for investors to stand aside with a benchmark allocation. Step 3 - "If It Don't Make Dollars, It Don't Make Sense": To test whether our theory would add strategic value, we computed a trading rule to see how well it performed against a benchmark portfolio of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. The trading rule was computed as follows: when the revealed preference for equities is positive (at time t-1) and this signal is confirmed in t, then in t+1 we allocate 100% to the S&P 500 and 0% to Treasurys. When the revealed equity preference signal is correctly bearish, we removed all exposure to equities and allocated 100% to Treasurys. When the signal was neutral, we kept a benchmark allocation of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. Chart II-3 shows that this trading rule outperforms the benchmark, confirming our initial hypothesis - one should fade the short-term movements when investors go against their preferences, and only follow the signals when those movements align with historical preferences. History shows that investors tend to underperform in terms of the stock/bond allocation when they deviate from their revealed preference. Chart II-3Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Part III - Validating The Results One drawback is that this trading rule would require frequent portfolio allocation changes every month, as shown in Chart II-4. As such, we constructed a smoothed version by imposing the rule that asset allocation is unchanged unless the model provides a new signal for two months in a row (Chart II-5).4 These restrictions not only dramatically reduced the frequency of the asset allocation adjustments, but it also augmented historical cumulative excess returns (Chart II-6). Chart II-4Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Chart II-5Removing Some Of The Noise Any new indicator of course must be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy to be useful but it is also interesting to see how its performance ranks compared to a set of random portfolios. This way, we can identify if the indicator truly provides additional information. Random portfolios are generated using a monthly allocations of 100% or 0% to equities, with the remainder in Treasurys. Chart II-7 shows the performance of the smoothed indicator versus a set of 1,000 randomly generated portfolios. Chart II-6Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Chart II-7The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information We compared the indicator's trading rule to simple moving averages or BCA's other indicators. We also wanted to ensure that the RPI adds value beyond investing based strictly on the four phases of the liquidity cycle or based on relative value alone. We therefore compared the track record of the RPI trading rule to rules that are based on: (1) the deviation of the S&P 500 from its 12-month moving trend; (2) BCA's monetary conditions indicator; (3) BCA's valuation indicator; (4) BCA's technical indicator; (5) the four phases of the Fed cycle; and (6) the relative price index. Charts II-8A and II-8B highlights that RPI indeed impressively dominates the other trading rules. The one exception is that, during the Great Recession, the model's performance fell to roughly match the performance of a S&P 500 technical trading rule. Chart II-8AThe RPI Outperforms The Sum Of Its Parts... Chart II-8B...As Well As Other Indicators Part IV - Conclusions The RPI is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it will best be used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. The indicator's current reading for stocks versus bonds, at benchmark, is more conservative than our official recommendation. The benchmark reading reflects the fact that equities are overvalued and that investors have deviated from their preferences in their past two quarters. David Boucher Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist 1 For more information, please see P. A. Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica 5:17 (1938), pp. 61-71. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," dated December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 We tested a few other measures, most notably the stock-to-bond total return ratio (measured by comparing each asset's total returns), but the chosen measures provided the best and most robust results. 4 We conducted a statistical exercise to validate and optimize the allocations in Table 4 to provide a smoother performance.
Highlights A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Nonetheless, we have not changed our recommended asset allocation. Bond markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. We do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. Oil prices should rebound, based on our view that consumption will outstrip production in the second half of the year; the surprise will be how strong oil prices are in the coming months. The FOMC appears more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. We believe that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. Together with a rebound in the commodity pits, this means that the recent bond rally will reverse. Soft U.S. CPI readings are a challenge to our view. The Fed will delay the next rate hike into next year if core inflation does not move up in the next few months. The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. The profit backdrop remains constructive. Our base case is that stocks beat bonds and cash for the remainder of 2017. We expect to trim exposure to equities next year, but the evolution of a number of indicators will influence the timing. The same is true for corporate bonds. The dollar's bull phase has one more upleg left. Japanese, European and U.K. equities will outperform the U.S. in local currency terms. Feature A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Investors quickly concluded that the Fed will have to proceed even more slowly in terms of its policy normalization plan which, in turn, sent the dollar and global bond yields sharply lower. Equity indexes held up because of the dollar and bond yield "relief valves". Stocks are also benefiting from the continuing rebound in corporate earnings growth in the major economies. Nonetheless, the commodity pullback and soft U.S. inflation data are a challenge to our reflation theme, which includes a final upleg in the U.S. dollar and a negative view on bond prices. We believe that markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. We also think that the FOMC is more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. The bottom line is that we are not changing our recommended asset allocation based on June's market action. We remain overweight stocks and corporate bonds relative to government bonds and cash. We are also short duration and long the dollar. A key risk to our asset allocation relates to our contrarily bullish view on oil prices. Oil Drove The Bond Rally... The decline in long-term bond yields since March reflected in large part a drop in inflation expectations (Chart I-1). BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the slump in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Core inflation has moved lower in the U.S., Japan, Canada and (slightly) in the Eurozone, but has increased in Australia and the U.K. In terms of diffusion indexes, which often lead core inflation, they are falling in the U.S., Japan and Canada, but are rising in the U.K., the Eurozone and Australia (Chart I-2). Chart I-1 Inflation Expectations Drive Bond Rally Chart I-2Diverging Inflation Trends Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the commodity price decline as the main driver of the downshift in expectations. Short-term moves in oil prices should not affect long-term inflation expectations, but in practice the correlation has been strong since the plunge in oil prices beginning in 2014. Weaker oil and other commodity prices have also fed investor concerns that global growth is waning. We see little evidence of any slowdown in global growth, although some leading indicators have softened. Key monthly data such as industrial production, retail sales and capital goods orders reveal an acceleration in growth for the advanced economies as a group (Chart I-3). There has also been a general upgrading of the consensus growth forecast for the major countries and for the world in both 2017 and 2018 (Chart I-4). This is unlike previous years, when growth forecasts started the year high, only to be slashed as the year progressed. Chart I-3No Slowdown In Advanced Economies Chart I-4Growth Expectations Revised Up ...But Watch Out For A Reversal The implication is that we do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Nonetheless, the mini oil meltdown in June went against our medium-term bullish view. In a recent report,2 our Energy Sector Strategy team noted that investors are confused about conflicting supply signals in oil markets. Traders do not yet see the physical shortage that the IEA/EIA/OPEC and BCA's top-down supply & demand analyses argue will prevail in the coming months. Chart I-5Falling Inventories To Drive Oil Rebound The investment community is being overly pessimistic in our view. The coalition led by the Saudi Arabia and Russia will have removed 1.4 MMB/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018, versus peak production in November of last year. This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but the increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC/Russia cuts entirely. We expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, an estimate that includes rapid increases in U.S. shale output. Meanwhile, we expect consumption to grow by 1.5 MMB/d, implying that oil inventories will fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart I-5). It will be quite a shock to markets if crude reaches $60/bbl by December as we expect. As for base metals, it appears that the correction is largely related to reduced speculative demand rather than weak global and/or Chinese demand. It is true that the Chinese economy has slipped a notch according to some measures, such as housing starts and M2 growth. Nonetheless, the government remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system in June and fiscal policy has been eased. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global activity. Given that many investors remain concerned about a hard landing in China, the bar for positive surprises is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the commodity currencies and other commodity plays. A rebound in base metal and, especially, oil prices would boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although there was more to the soft May CPI report than oil prices. Is The Fed's Inflation Target Credible? Investors are questioning whether the Fed has the ability to reach its inflation goals. Is it possible that the U.S. is following Japan's roadmap where even an over-heated labor market is insufficient to generate any meaningful inflation? We argued above that the moderation in inflation expectations in the major markets was mostly related to the decline in commodity prices. However, in the U.S., it also reflected a fairly widespread pullback in CPI inflation this year. This is contrary to Fed Chair Yellen's assertion that most of it reflects special factors such as wireless telecommunications prices. The deceleration in inflation began around the start of the year. The three-month rate of change of the headline index fell by more than five percentage points between January and May, of which energy accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The deceleration in the core rate was a less severe, but still substantial at 2.8 percentage points. Table I-1 presents the components of the CPI that made the largest contribution to the deceleration in core inflation. Motor vehicles, owners' equivalent rent, apparel, recreation, wireless telecom and medical care services accounted for 1.2 percentage points as a group. However, many other sectors contributed in a small way to the overall deceleration of core inflation in the first five months of the year. Table I-1Key Drivers Of U.S. Core Inflation Deceleration In 2017 Some special factors were at play. The moderation in rent inflation likely reflects the bottoming of the vacancy rate. Discounting in the auto sector is not a surprise given weak sales. Wireless prices can be viewed as a special case as well. Nonetheless, the breadth and suddenness of the deceleration in core inflation across such diverse sectors, some unrelated to labor markets, commodity prices, the dollar or on-line shopping, is worrying. The disinflation this year in the Fed's preferred measure, the PCE price index, is not as extended but the data are published almost a month behind the CPI data. A diffusion index made up of the components of the PCE index is still in positive territory, unlike the CPI's diffusion index (Chart I-6). Nonetheless, the CPI data suggest that core PCE inflation will edge lower when the May data are released at the end of June. There has also been a moderation in some of the wage inflation data, such as average hourly earnings (Chart I-7). The slowdown has been fairly widespread across manufacturing and services. However, the soft patch already appears to be over; 3-month rates of change have firmed almost across the board (retail is a major exception). There is no slowdown evident at all in the better-constructed Employment Cost Index (ECI) as of the first quarter (Chart I-8). The ECI is adjusted to avoid compositional effects that can distort the aggregate index. The related diffusion indexes also remain constructive. Chart I-6PCE Inflation Rate To Follow CPI Lower Chart I-7AHE SoftPatch Appears Over... Chart I-8...And The ECI Marches Higher We conclude from these and other wage measures that the Phillips curve is still operating in the U.S. Admittedly, the curve appears to be quite flat, which means it is difficult to generate inflation even with a tight labor market. Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECI and various measures of labor market tightness shown in Chart I-8 does not appear to have broken down. The percentage of U.S. states with unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment jumped to 70% in May. Anything over 60% in the past has been associated with wage pressure (Chart I-9). The bottom line is that, while we are concerned about the breadth of the soft patch in the consumer price data, we are in agreement with the Fed hawks that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. We are willing at this point to chalk up the recent drop in core inflation partly to randomness in the data, and partly to lagged effects of the slowdown in real GDP growth in the first half of 2016 (Chart I-10). Admittedly, however, the U.S. inflation reports in the coming months are a key risk to our reflation-related asset allocation. Chart I-9More Than 70% Of U.S. States Have Excess Labor Demand Chart I-10Financial Conditions Point To Faster Growth And Inflation What Will The Fed Do? The CPI data have certainly rattled some members of the FOMC. Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Kaplan and Kashkari, for example, believe that the Fed needs to be patient to ensure that the inflation pullback is temporary. However, the June FOMC Statement and Yellen's press conference suggested that the consensus is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Vice President Dudley echoed this view in recent comments he made to the press. The Fed has been quick to back away from planned rate hikes at the first hint of trouble in recent years. However, it appears that the reaction function has changed, now that the labor market is at full employment. This is especially the case because financial conditions have eased further, despite the June rate hike. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. Policymakers know that the Fed has had little success in the past when it tried to nudge unemployment higher in order to relieve budding inflation pressure; these attempts almost always ended in recession. Dudley added that "...pausing policy now could raise the risk of inflation surging and hurting the economy." Other FOMC members are worried that financial stability risk will build if the low-rate environment extends much further. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed to stick with the game-plan for now. The FOMC will begin shrinking the balance sheet in September, but will wait until December for the next rate hike. That said, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the coming months would likely see the FOMC postpone the next rate increase into next year. Where Next For Bonds? We see three possible scenarios for the bond market: Reflation Returns: Weak recent inflation readings are nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. U.S. growth accelerates in the second half, unemployment falls further and both wage growth and inflation pick up. Oil inventories begin to contract and prices head higher. The FOMC is vindicated in its inflation view and proceeds with the current rate hike and balance sheet adjustment agenda. Investors receive a "wake up call" from the Fed, bond prices get hit and recent curve-flattening trend reverses. Fed Capitulates: The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, but core PCE inflation is still close to 1½% by the September FOMC meeting. We would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. Long-maturity real yields would fall in this scenario, although long-term inflation expectations could rise to the extent that the Fed's more dovish tilt will weaken the dollar and generate more inflation in the medium term. Nominal yields may not end up moving much in this scenario. A Policy Mistake: If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would begin to discount a "policy mistake" scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. In terms of probabilities, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a tail risk. We remain short-duration in anticipation of a rebound in long-term inflation expectations and higher yields. A bond selloff, however, should not present a major headwind for stocks as long as the earnings backdrop remains constructive. Will The Real Profit Margin Please Stand Up For some time we have been highlighting the importance of the mini-cycle in U.S. earnings growth; the corporate sector is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, a trend that extends beyond the energy patch. EPS growth has surged this year on the back of somewhat stronger sales and rising S&P 500 margins. The National Accounts (NIPA) data, however, paint a different picture. Earnings growth for the entire corporate sector fell sharply in the first quarter and margins continued to slide. If the NIPA data are telling the true story, then the equity market is in big trouble because it suggests that the earnings outlook is much weaker than what is discounted in stock prices. There are many definitional differences that make it difficult to reconcile the NIPA and S&P data.3 Nonetheless, we can make some general observations. Chart I-11 presents the 4-quarter growth rate of NIPA profits4 and a proxy for aggregate S&P earnings. For the latter, we multiplied earnings-per-share by the divisor to obtain an estimate of the level of aggregate earnings in dollar terms (i.e. not on a per-share basis). The bottom panel of Chart I-11 compares the level of profits, each indexed to be 100 in 2011 Q1. The charts highlight that, while there have been marked differences in annual growth rates between the two measures in some years, the levels ended up being close to the same point in the first quarter of 2017. The dip in NIPA profit growth in the first quarter was not reflected in the S&P measure. It appears that this is partly due to different profiles for profit growth in the energy and financials sectors. That said, broadly speaking, it does not appear that the difference in margins is due to a significant divergence in aggregate profits. It turns out that most of the margin divergence is related to the denominator of the calculation (Chart I-12). The NIPA denominator is corporate sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a value-added concept that is quite different from sales. It is not clear why, but GDP has grown much faster than sales since the end of 2014. It appears to us that the S&P data are telling the correct story at the moment. After all, sales are straight forward to measure, while value added is complicated to construct. The fact that sales are growing slowly is not a bullish point for stocks. Nonetheless, it does not appear that financial engineering has distorted bottom-up company data to such an extent that the S&P data are signaling strong profit growth when the reality is the opposite. We expect the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the profit backdrop remains positive for stocks for now. The same is true in the Eurozone and Japan, where margins are also rising. It is worrying that a large part of this year's U.S. equity market advance has been concentrated in a small number of stocks, but that belies the breadth of the profit recovery (Chart I-13). The proportion of S&P industry groups with rising earnings estimates is above 75%. Such widespread participation is consistent with ongoing upward revisions to 12-month forward earnings estimates. Chart I-11S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison Chart I-12Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Chart I-13Positive Earnings Revisions Are Broadly Based The solid earnings backdrop is the main reason we remain overweight stocks versus bonds and cash. Of course, given poor valuation, we must be extra vigilant in watching for warning signs of a bear market. Valuation has never been good leading indicator for bear markets, but it does provide information on the risks. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report.5 He noted that no two bear markets are the same, and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, there is not extreme overvaluation, and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart I-14: Chart I-14Equity Bear Market Indicators Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is quite flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverting. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are normally substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also still well above the zero line, a threshold that has warned of a downturn in stock prices in the past. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is because of the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is quite stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data such as the leading economic indicator and ISM have been unreliable bear market signals. That said, we do not see anything that suggests that a recession is on the horizon. Indeed, U.S. growth is likely to remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40-week moving average, and our composite technical indicator are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it has been a bad sign when EPS growth topped out. And this has often been preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect U.S. EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but are watching industrial production closely. EPS growth in Japan and the Eurozone will likely peak after the U.S., since these markets are not as advanced in the profit rebound. The bottom line is that the equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Investment Conclusions The major world bourses remain in a sweet spot because of the mini cyclical rebound in profits. One can imagine many scenarios in which equities suffer a major correction or bear phase. However, stocks would likely perform well under the two most likely scenarios for the remainder of the year. If U.S. and global growth disappoint, the combination of low bond yields and still-robust earnings growth will continue to support prices. Conversely, if world growth remains solid and the U.S. picks up, as we expect, then bond yields will rise but investors will pencil-in an even stronger profit advance over the next year. Of course, this win-win situation for stocks will not last forever. Perhaps paradoxically, the economic cycle could be shortened if the U.S. Congress gets around to passing a bill that imparts fiscal stimulus in 2018. The Fed would have to respond with a more aggressive tightening timetable, setting the stage for the next recession. In contrast, the economic cycle would be further stretched out in the absence of fiscal stimulus, keeping alive for a while longer the lackluster growth/low inflation/low bond yield backdrop that has been favorable for the equity market. We are watching the indicators discussed above to time the exit from our pro-risk asset allocation that favors stocks and corporate bonds to government bonds and cash. As for the duration call, the whiff of deflation that has depressed bond yields over the past month is overdone. Investors have also become too complacent on the Fed. We expect that the recent drop in commodity prices, especially oil, will reverse. If this view is correct, it means that the cyclical bull phase in the dollar is not over because market expectations for the pace of Fed rate hikes will rise relative to expectations in the other major economies (with the exception of Canada). We are still looking for a 10% dollar appreciation. It also means that Treasurys will underperform JGBs and Bunds within currency-hedged fixed-income portfolios. We expect the Eurostoxx 600 and the Nikkei indexes to outperform the S&P 500 this year in local currencies, despite our constructive view on U.S. growth. Stocks are cheaper in the former two markets. Moreover, both Japan and the Eurozone are earlier in the profit mini-cycle, which means that there is room for catch-up versus the U.S. over the next 6-12 months when growth in the latter tops-out. The prospect of structural reform in France is also constructive for European stocks, following the election of a reformist legislature in June. However, the upcoming Italian election warrants close scrutiny. The key risk to this base case is our view that oil prices will rebound. This is clearly a non-consensus call. If OPEC production cuts are unable to overwhelm the rise in U.S. shale output, then inventories will remain elevated and oil prices could move even lower in the near term. Our bullish equity view would be fine in this case, but the bond bear market and dollar appreciation we expect would at least be delayed. Finally, a few words on the U.K. Our geopolitical experts highlight two key points related to June's election outcome: fiscal austerity is dead and the U.K. will pursue a "softer" variety of Brexit. This combination should provide a relatively benign backdrop for U.K. stocks and the economy over the next year. Nonetheless, the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the U.K. is large enough to keep the Bank of England (BoE) on hold. Some BoE hawks are agitating for tighter policy due to the worsening inflation overshoot, but it will probably be some time before the consensus on the Monetary Policy Committee shifts in favor of rate hikes. This means that it is too early to position for gilt underperformance within fixed-income portfolios. Sterling weakness looks overdone, although we do not see much upside either. As long as Brexit talks do not become acrimonious (which is our view), the U.K. stock market should be one of the outperformers in local currency terms among the major developed markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 29, 2017 Next Report: July 27, 2017 1 For more discussion, see Alternative Facts in the Bond Market at BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, dated June 13, 2017 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Views from the Road," dated June 21, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 The first problem is that the S&P data are expressed on a per-share basis. Moreover, the NIPA data adjusts for inventory and depreciation allowance. S&P margins are calculated using sales in the denominator, while we generally use GDP as the denominator for calculating NIPA profits. 4 The NIPA data shown include financials and profits earned overseas, as is the case for the S&P. 5 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market," dated January 24, 2014, available at bcaresearch.com II. Preferences As Trading Constraints: A New Asset Allocation Indicator Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. The RPI borrows from Paul Samuelson's "revealed preference" theory of consumer behavior to market behavior. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and the monetary policy backdrop. A trading rule for the stock/bond allocation based on the RPI outperforms traditional technical, monetary, and valuation indicators. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive equity market momentum lines up with positive signals from policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it is best used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. In 1938, economist Paul Samuelson published a paper entitled, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," in which he outlined an alternative to the well-known economic principle, utility theory. He dubbed his work "revealed preference theory."1 His goal was to redefine utility - a measure of consumer satisfaction with a good or service - by observing behavior. He posited that when consumers reveal their preferences by buying one item rather than another, they reveal the way in which they maximize happiness or satisfaction. For instance, one can measure preferences via experiments in which a subject is given $200 and the choice between two brands of shoes at different prices. Repeating the exercise at different levels of income and relative prices generates "preference axioms." Samuelson's theory has many more layers of complexity, but this Special Report focuses on modelling investors' preferences through observed behavior. Borrowing from Samuelson's reasoning, we developed a methodology to identify investors' axioms of preference for equities and bonds at different levels of incomes and prices. Then we compared investors' real actions with those anticipated by our methodology. This allowed us to generalize our findings and analyze the effects on a portfolio of equities and bonds. The main finding of our statistical exercise is that asset allocators can profit from understanding how short-term moves are linked to the market's revealed preferences at different times during the economic cycle. We then use the results to construct an indicator and a trading rule that not only outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy by a wide margin, it outperforms other traditional trading rules as well. Building A Revealed Preference Model Our primary objective in constructing a revealed preference indicator (RPI) is to understand: (1) how market preferences shape the behavior of investors; and (2) how they ultimately affect future returns. To do so, we broke down our analysis into three key areas: Part I identifies market preferences for different levels of income and price in the economy. Part II defines a general investment strategy that utilizes historic preferences and short-term market movements as a market timing tool. Part III optimizes the RPI and compares its historical track record with a buy-and-hold asset allocation and trading rules based on other indicators. Part I - Developing The Framework The first step in building the RPI is to establish the proper control variables. We limited our basket of investable "goods" to U.S. equities and 10-year Treasurys. We also need a variable that is analogous to the income measure that Samuelson used in his study. For the choice facing investors who are deciding between buying two financial assets, we believe that a measure of market "liquidity" is more appropriate than income. By this we do not mean the ease by which financial assets can be bought and sold. Rather, it is "funding liquidity", or how easily it is to borrow to invest. BCA often uses the four phases of the Fed cycle, as interest rates fluctuate around the equilibrium level, as a measure of funding liquidity (Chart II-1):2 Chart II-1Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Phase I = Policy is accommodative but the fed funds rate is rising. Phase II = Policy is tight and the Fed is still tightening. Phase III = Policy is tight but the Fed is cutting rates. Phase IV = Policy is easy and the Fed is cutting rates. The rationale for using the fed funds-rate cycle as a proxy for income is that, when interest rates are below equilibrium, monetary conditions are accommodative. Leverage is easy to obtain because there is plenty of liquidity (income) to fund investments. When conditions are tight, funding liquidity is relatively scarce. To measure relative prices, we first divided the S&P 500 price index by its 12-month moving average and second, we took the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield divided by 12-month moving average.3 We then used the ratio of these two deviations-from-trend to construct a relative price measure (Chart II-2). This ratio provides a single measure of how expensive stocks and bonds are, not only to each other, but to their own history as well. We then grouped the relative price data into four sets of percentiles, or buckets, shown in Table II-1. Stocks are expensive and bonds cheap at the top of the table, while the reverse is true at the bottom. Chart II-2Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Table II-1Distribution Of Relative Price Table II-2A presents the average historical monthly percent change in stock prices for each combination of the four relative price and liquidity buckets over the entire dataset. In the fourth phase of the Fed cycle (when monetary conditions are easy and the Fed is still cutting interest rates), and when relative prices are in the first bucket (i.e. stocks are expensive), the average stock price increase during the month was slightly above 1% percent. Table II-2B provides the same breakdown for the average change in bond yields (shown in basis points, not returns). Tables II-2A and II-2B are recalculated at each point in time - meaning that we used an expanding sample to calculate the price buckets, and updated the results for the ensuing price or yield movements as new data are added. That way, we completely avoid the advantage of hindsight. To simplify our methodology, we coded the results to end up with the stock and bond returns for the 16 different combinations of Fed and relative price buckets. Table II-3 uses the results from Tables II-2A and II-2B in the last period of history as an example. The "Liquidity" and "Price" columns indicate the bucket (e.g. price in bucket 1 and liquidity in bucket 1). The "Stocks" and "Bonds" columns are coded as "1" if the asset appreciated during the month given the indicated liquidity/price bucket, and a "0" if it depreciated that month. Table II-2AEquity Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Table II-2BTreasury Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Chart II-3Revealing What Investors Prefer Part II - Habits Create Expectations It is important to keep in mind that the objective of our revealed preference model is not to use the revealed market preferences as forecasts but rather to examine what happens when investors decide to follow or ignore them. Our hypothesis in building this model is that, when investors go against their historical preferences, the result should be interpreted as short-term noise. It is only when preferences and (subsequent) short-term market moves are aligned that we should heed the signal and invest accordingly. Table II-3 can be thought of as the market's revealed preference. Again, keep in mind that we allowed revealed preferences to change over time by recalculating it under our stretching-sample approach. The following steps detail how we used investor preferences to create a trading rule that verifies our hypothesis empirically: Step 1 - Expected vs. Actual: The first step is to examine how actual equity prices and bond yields behaved relative to their expected trajectory. We created two variables - one for equities and one for bonds. If revealed preference last month (t-1) suggested that the asset's return should be positive in the subsequent month (t), and it indeed turned out to be positive in period t, then we coded month t as "1." If both the revealed preference and the actual outcome were negative, we coded it as "-1." If they did not match, the code is "0" (in other words, the market did not follow the typical historical revealed preference). Thus we have two time series, one for bonds and one for stocks, which are made up of 1s, -1s and zeros. Step 2 - Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral: We combined the coded series for stocks and bonds to encompass the nine possible outcomes in our model (i.e. both bonds and stocks can have a value in any month of 1, 0 or -1, providing 9 different combinations). Table II-4 presents the nine outcomes along with the asset allocation that would have maximized investor returns based on our historical analysis. For example, investors were paid to be overweight equities when equities and bonds have a code of "1" and "-1," respectively (top row in Table II-4). In other words, stocks tended to outperform bonds when revealed preferences from the month before predicted rising stock prices and rising bond yields, and these predictions were confirmed. Table II-4Understanding The Signals From Preferences If revealed preference is not confirmed for both bonds and stocks, then it is best for investors to stand aside with a benchmark allocation. Step 3 - "If It Don't Make Dollars, It Don't Make Sense": To test whether our theory would add strategic value, we computed a trading rule to see how well it performed against a benchmark portfolio of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. The trading rule was computed as follows: when the revealed preference for equities is positive (at time t-1) and this signal is confirmed in t, then in t+1 we allocate 100% to the S&P 500 and 0% to Treasurys. When the revealed equity preference signal is correctly bearish, we removed all exposure to equities and allocated 100% to Treasurys. When the signal was neutral, we kept a benchmark allocation of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. Chart II-3 shows that this trading rule outperforms the benchmark, confirming our initial hypothesis - one should fade the short-term movements when investors go against their preferences, and only follow the signals when those movements align with historical preferences. History shows that investors tend to underperform in terms of the stock/bond allocation when they deviate from their revealed preference. Chart II-3Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Part III - Validating The Results One drawback is that this trading rule would require frequent portfolio allocation changes every month, as shown in Chart II-4. As such, we constructed a smoothed version by imposing the rule that asset allocation is unchanged unless the model provides a new signal for two months in a row (Chart II-5).4 These restrictions not only dramatically reduced the frequency of the asset allocation adjustments, but it also augmented historical cumulative excess returns (Chart II-6). Chart II-4Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Chart II-5Removing Some Of The Noise Any new indicator of course must be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy to be useful but it is also interesting to see how its performance ranks compared to a set of random portfolios. This way, we can identify if the indicator truly provides additional information. Random portfolios are generated using a monthly allocations of 100% or 0% to equities, with the remainder in Treasurys. Chart II-7 shows the performance of the smoothed indicator versus a set of 1,000 randomly generated portfolios. Chart II-6Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Chart II-7The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information We compared the indicator's trading rule to simple moving averages or BCA's other indicators. We also wanted to ensure that the RPI adds value beyond investing based strictly on the four phases of the liquidity cycle or based on relative value alone. We therefore compared the track record of the RPI trading rule to rules that are based on: (1) the deviation of the S&P 500 from its 12-month moving trend; (2) BCA's monetary conditions indicator; (3) BCA's valuation indicator; (4) BCA's technical indicator; (5) the four phases of the Fed cycle; and (6) the relative price index. Charts II-8A and II-8B highlights that RPI indeed impressively dominates the other trading rules. The one exception is that, during the Great Recession, the model's performance fell to roughly match the performance of a S&P 500 technical trading rule. Chart II-8AThe RPI Outperforms The Sum Of Its Parts... Chart II-8B...As Well As Other Indicators Part IV - Conclusions The RPI is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it will best be used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. The indicator's current reading for stocks versus bonds, at benchmark, is more conservative than our official recommendation. The benchmark reading reflects the fact that equities are overvalued and that investors have deviated from their preferences in their past two quarters. David Boucher Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist 1 For more information, please see P. A. Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica 5:17 (1938), pp. 61-71. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," dated December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 We tested a few other measures, most notably the stock-to-bond total return ratio (measured by comparing each asset's total returns), but the chosen measures provided the best and most robust results. 4 We conducted a statistical exercise to validate and optimize the allocations in Table 4 to provide a smoother performance. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Thanks to the recent dollar and bond yield “relief valves”, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. The breakout above this level further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are at post tech-bubble highs. Stocks remain expensive based on our composite Valuation Index, although it is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that demarcates over-valuation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, once interest rate normalization is well underway, these indicator will not look as favorable. It is good news for the equity market that our Monetary Indicator did not move further into negative territory over the past month. Indeed, the indicator has hooked up slightly and is sitting close to a neutral level. Our equity Technical Indicator remains constructive. Other measures, such as our Speculation Index, composite sentiment and the VIX suggest that equity investors are overly bullish from a contrary perspective. On the other hand, the U.S. earnings surprises diffusion index highlights that upside earnings surprises are broadly based. Our elevated U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator ticked down from a high level this month, suggesting that ‘dry powder’ available to buy this market is depleted. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. The pull back in long-term bond yields since March was enough to “move the dial” in terms of the bond valuation or technical indicators. U.S. bond valuation has inched lower to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as some of the economic headwinds fade. We also think that the FOMC is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment, which support our negative view on bond prices. Now that oversold technical conditions have been unwound, it suggests that the consolidation phase for bond yields is largely complete. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, it is a bearish sign that the dollar moved lower and crossed its 200-day moving average. However, our Composite Technical Indicator highlights that overbought conditions have been worked off. We still believe the U.S. dollar’s bull phase has one more upleg left. Technical conditions are also benign in the commodity complex. Most commodities have shifted down over the last month to meet support at their 200-day moving averages. Base metals are due for a bounce, but we are most bullish on oil. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China
Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Geopolitical Calendar
Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Dear Client, We hope that you will find value in this report, a product of collaboration between BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and EM Equity Sector Strategy. My colleagues Oleg Babanov and Matt Gertken look for investment opportunities in the recent geopolitical changes on the Korean Peninsula. The election of President Moon Jae-in will be a boon for domestic consumer sentiment and relations with China. This will produce a tailwind for the consumer-oriented South Korean stocks, which have high exposure to the country’s trade with China. We deliver this report to you both for its investment value and as an example of BCA Research commitment to seek alpha in the intersection of economics, markets, and geopolitics. Kindest Regards, Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Overweight South Korea Consumer Staples We are recommending an overweight position in select South Korean consumer staples on a long-term (one year-plus) time horizon. A decline in geopolitical tensions between South Korea and China, and a potential improvement on the Korean peninsula, will provide tailwinds to the performance of Korean consumer staples, which have high exposure to China. We expect Chinese tourist numbers to Korea to recover gradually, and sales of South Korean products in mainland China to pick up over the rest of the year. Presidential elections in South Korea and a slowly improving economy are bolstering consumer sentiment and aiding a turnaround in retail sales in the country, with companies in the consumer space displaying better earnings momentum and trading at more attractive valuations than their EM peers (Table 1). Sector Backdrop We are turning cautiously positive on consumer staples in South Korea. We believe the following factors will trigger a turnaround in consumer sentiment and support share price performance of consumer-oriented South Korean stocks. Geopolitics The election of President Moon Jae-in by a wide margin, as well as a geopolitical shift toward more accommodative policy on China, will alleviate geopolitical risks and help consumer sentiment. Moon has already kicked off his administration's tenure with considerable political capital. For one, his administration represents a return to stable and legitimate government after over a year of turmoil surrounding the scandal, impeachment and removal of former President Park Geun-hye - a relief for South Korean voters. What's more, voter turnout was higher than usual, at 77%, and Moon's margin of victory over his closest contender was over 15%, the second-highest since South Korea became a full-fledged democracy in 1987 (Chart 1). There are also institutional factors playing to Moon's advantage. He was the leading contender for the presidency even without Park being removed from office - but if she had not been removed, he would have taken office in January 2018. Now, Moon has half a year longer in office than he otherwise would have had before he faces his first serious political hurdle in the April 2020 legislative elections. This half year could make a difference. Since Korean presidents serve a single, five-year term, they often become lame ducks in the second half of their term, and therefore move rapidly on policy in the first half while their political capital is high. The only significant domestic political constraint on Moon is the rival left-of-center party, the People's Party. It holds the kingmaker position in the legislature, with the ability to give a majority to either Moon's ruling Democratic Party or to the conservative opposition (Chart 2). However, the People's Party has serious weaknesses and has been compelled by its voting base to cooperate on much of Moon's platform of expanding social spending and thawing relations with North Korea and China. Moreover, the conservative opposition is discredited and fractured. Thus, Moon has limited political constraints. Given that his administration is competent - i.e. the clear populist elements are not joined with a lack of experience or pragmatism - the key question is what policies he will prioritize while his political capital is high. Chart 3THAAD Deployment Hurt ##br##Bilateral China-Korea Trade It is our view that China-exposed companies stand to benefit in the short term as China eases sanctions over the recently deployed U.S. THAAD missile defense system (Chart 3), and as better relations with China benefit the economy more broadly (Chart 4). However, if Moon prioritizes China and North Korea excessively, he risks squandering his political capital. Korea remains stuck in the middle of U.S.-China tensions that are growing on a secular basis. Tensions with the U.S. will rise as a result of Moon's orientation, and North Korean political risks will remain elevated over the medium and long term. Moon's attempts to engage with North Korea will collide with Trump's efforts to ratchet up pressure against it. Therefore, Moon is likely to find the most success in his domestic agenda of increasing government spending, hiring more public workers, raising wages and instilling worker protections, expanding the social safety net and subsidizing small- and medium-sized enterprises. These measures will boost both public and private consumption. We do not have particularly high hopes for Moon's ability to reform the so-called 'chaebol', a South Korean term denoting large, typically family-owned corporate conglomerates, but his attempt to do so will add a modicum of corporate governance and competitiveness improvements that markets will likely cheer. Macroeconomics With improvement in the geopolitical situation, stabilization in the local political system following the Park Geun-hye scandal and new elections has aided in a recovery in consumer sentiment (Chart 5). Meanwhile, a rebound in total employment numbers together with a decline in household debt is providing support to consumer spending (Charts 6A, 6B, 6C). Chart 5Consumer Confidence Is ##br##Back To A Five-Year High Chart 6ANumber Of Employed ##br##Higher Than In 2015... Chart 6B...While The Household Debt ##br##Burden Is Slowly Declining... Chart 6C...Aiding A Recovery##br## In Retail Sales Sector Specifics From a sector perspective, South Korean consumer staples remain highly competitive, outperforming their EM peers (Chart 7). At the same time, valuations are attractive for South Korean companies (Charts 8A & 8B). Chart 7South Korean Consumer Stocks Outperforming EM Consumer Staples' Aggregate... Chart 8ASouth Korean Companies Trading At Cheaper ##br##Valuations Since Mid-2016... Chart 8B...And At One Standard Deviation Below ##br##Their Seven-Year Average Furthermore, bottom-line expansion of South Korean companies remains strong, supported by solid margin trends (Charts 9A, 9B, 9C). Chart 9A...Earnings Growth In South Korea##br## Is Outperforming EM Peers Chart 9B...With Gross Margin Nearly Twice ##br## The EM Industry Average... Chart 9C...And EBTIDA Margin Is Steadily ##br## Above EM Peers We also like the fact that the net debt level for South Korean consumer staples companies is low to negative, while companies have managed to generate excess free cash flow. One undesirable implication, however, is notoriously low dividend yields, which are discouraging investors and raising corporate governance issues (Charts 10A, 10B, 10C). Taking into account the factors listed above, we have created a portfolio of six South Korean consumer staples stocks (Table 2). Chart 10ADebt Levels Have Fallen Significantly ##br## Over The Past Seven Years... Chart 10B...While Cash Generation ##br## Has Recovered... Chart 10C...But Dividend Yields ##br## Remain Disappointing Low The Overweight Basket Chart 11Performance Since June 2016: ##br## Amorepacific Corp Vs. MSCI EM Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS): A leading beauty and cosmetics producer in South Korea (Chart 11). Founded in the 1940s by Yun Dok-jeong as a company distributing camellia oil for hair treatment, the company was inherited by Yun's son and later grandson, who became the second-richest man in South Korea, controlling directly 10% of the company's free float. Today, Amorepacific is the world's 14th largest cosmetics company, with oversight of some 33 brands around the world such as Etude House, Sulwhasoo and others. In terms of revenue, the bulk is generated by beauty and cosmetic products (91%), where luxury cosmetics constitute 43%, followed by premium brands with 18%. Personal care products contribute 9% to total revenue. Geographically, 70% of revenues are generated in South Korea, and another 19% in China. Amorepacific reported weaker-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 24. Revenue increased by 5.7% year over year, with falling Chinese tourist numbers weighing on local sales, and weaker sales in mainland China. At the same time, cost of sales went up by 10.6% year over year, which resulted in gross margin compression by 100 basis points. As a result of an operating cost increase of 8.4% year over year, mainly driven by SG&A expansion (increased labor costs and one-off bonus payments), operating profit fell 6.2% year over year. Operating margin finished at 20.2% compared to 22.8% same period last year, while EBTDA margin contracted to 17.8% from 19.5% last year. Weak operating performance and disproportionate expense growth led to the bottom line falling 15% year over year. Amorepacific is currently trading at a forward P/E of 30.0x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 13% over the next three years. We believe the share price will continue to recover strongly, taking into account that easing tensions with China will restore demand and organic volume growth as well as strong momentum in overseas sales, supporting an earnings recovery. Chart 12Performance Since June 2016: ##br## E-Mart Vs. MSCI EM E-Mart (139480 KS): Number one hypermarket brand in South Korea (Chart 12). E-Mart was established in 1993 and has grown into the largest hypermarket and discount store chain in South Korea, operating over 148 branch locations locally and another 16 in China. In 2006 the company also acquired its largest competitor in the country - Wal-Mart Korea - strengthening its market share. Additionally, E-Mart runs speciality shops such as "Emart" discount stores, the "Emart Mall" online store, "Emart Traders," an everyday low-price store, as well as pet and sports/outdoor stores. In terms of revenue breakdown, the flagship E-Mart brand is responsible for 78% of total revenue, followed by the food distribution and supermarket segment with 7% each respectively. From a geographic perspective, 98% of revenue originates in South Korea and only 2% in China. E-Mart reported first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 11, missing estimates. Revenue growth was solid, up 7.4% year over year, helped by 1% same-store sales growth in the main hypermarket segment, while cost of sales increased by 6.5% year over year, which resulted in gross margin falling slightly by 20 basis points to 28.2%. Operating profit increased by 2.8% year over year, weighed on by a year-on-year jump in operating expenses of 11.1%. Operating margin stood at 4.1%, down from 4.3% in 2016, while EBITDA margin finished virtually flat at 6.7%. Thanks to better operating performance, the bottom line improved by 5% year over year. The main detraction to performance came from one-off store opening expenses and a negative calendar effect. E-Mart is currently trading at a forward P/E of 14.0x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 9% over the next three years. A store restructuring program is currently underway, and management has done well in accelerating closures of non-performing stores, which has already led to cost savings and margin turnaround. We expect this process to continue. Together with strong performance of the discount and online segments, this should warrant a further re-rating of the share price. Chart 13Performance Since June 2016: ##br## GS Retail Vs. MSCI EM GS Retail (007070 KS): Number one convenience store chain in South Korea (Chart 13). GS Retail is part of the GS Group, a former part of LG Group and the sixth-largest conglomerate in South Korea, which controls just under 66% of the company. GS Retail was incorporated back in 1971 and today operates GS25 - the largest convenience store brand in South Korea - as well as other brands such as GS Supermarkets, Watsons - a health and beauty chain, and Parnas Hotel. The largest contributor to total revenue is the convenience store segment, with 77%, followed by the supermarket business with 20% and the hotel operation with 3%. Geographically, all the revenue originates in South Korea. GS Retail reported first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 11. Revenue displayed strong growth, up 12.5% year over year, driven by solid performance in the convenience store segment (+21% year over year), while cost of sales increased by 12.3% year over year, which brought gross margin up by 20 basis points to 18.4%. A 15% year-over-year increase in operating costs due to the ongoing consolidation of the Watsons business brought operating income down slightly by 1.5% year over year, suppressing operating margin by 20 basis points to 1.4%. EBITDA margin stood at 5.9% compared to 6.2% a year ago. Despite weak operating performance, the bottom line grew by 18.8%, helped by a non-operating gain and lower interest expenses. GS Retail is currently trading at a forward P/E of 19.6x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 14% over the next three years. We expect the non-convenience store segments to contribute more to performance in the second part of the year. Furthermore, non-performing supermarket store closedowns together with seasonally strong second and third quarters, where the summer weather typically helps sales, should support stock performance. Chart 14Performance Since June 2016: ##br## H&H Vs. MSCI EM LG Household & Healthcare (051900 KS): Producer of the very first cosmetic products in Korea (Chart 14). LG H&H was incorporated in 1947 by Koo In-Hwoi, the founder of LG Corp., and had the initial name Lucky Chemical Industrial Corp. The company produced the first-ever Korean cosmetic product, "Lucky Cream," followed by "Lucky Toothpaste." From 1995 to 2001, LG H&H was part of LG Chem before being spun off. In addition to the cosmetics and household goods businesses, the company also acquired Coca Cola Beverage in 2007, turning itself into an exclusive bottler and distributor of Coca Cola products in South Korea. In terms of revenue breakdown, the cosmetics business contributes 53% to overall revenue, followed by personal products with 27% and the soft drink division with 20%. Geographically, 84% of revenue originates in South Korea, followed by China with 8% and Japan with 4%. LG H&H reported better-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 28. Revenue expanded by 5.3% year over year, driven by strong sales in the luxury cosmetics and beverage segments, while cost of sales grew by 4% year over year, bringing gross margin 50 basis points higher to 60.9%. Furthermore, operating income displayed strong growth, up 11.3%, helped by good management of operating expenses (+4.5% year over year). As a result, operating margin improved by 90 basis points to 16.2% and EBITDA margin finished at 16.9%, up from 15.7% last year. The bottom line increased by 11.9% year over year, helped by strong operating performance. LG H&H is currently trading at a forward P/E of 24.1x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 8% over the next three years. As with Amorepacific, the trigger to a re-rating in the share price of LG H&H is the improving geopolitical situation. We expect tourist numbers to South Korea to gradually increase, which will aid in both sales recovery and earnings revisions, while strong momentum in the luxury cosmetics segment will contribute to further margin expansion. Chart 15Performance Since June 2016: ##br## KT&G Vs. MSCI EM KT&G Corp (033780 KS): Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (Chart 15). Initially founded as a government monopoly with the name "Korea Tobacco & Ginseng," the company was later privatized and rebranded as the "Korea Tomorrow & Global Corporation." Today, the company is the largest tobacco company in South Korea, controlling the majority of the local market. The company also has extensive exposure to Eastern European countries. In addition to the tobacco business, KT&G also has a pharma arm, the Korea Ginseng Corp. The revenue stream is broken down into the cigarette business, which contributes 60% to overall revenue, followed by the ginseng-pharma segment, adding another 30%. KT&G reported in-line first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 27. Revenue increased by a solid 8% year over year, helped by strong ginseng sales, which expanded despite a market contraction and were also alleviated by market share gain and higher prices. Cost of sales, meantime, were up 12.7%, bringing gross margin down to 59.4% from 61.1% previously. Due to a strong increase in operating costs (+11.3% year over year), driven by higher SG&A expenses, operating income edged up only 0.6% year over year. Operating margin fell 45 basis points from last year, while EBITDA margin stood at 35.5%, or 80 basis points lower compared to the same period last year. The bottom line fell by 17.5% year over year, weighted on by higher foreign exchange losses. KT&G is currently trading at a forward P/E of 12.8x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 6.5% over the next three years. Several factors have been weighing on the company's share price recently, including the introduction of warning messages on cigarette packages and the introduction of e-cigarettes in the domestic market - making the stock one of the cheapest among its global peers (~20% discount). We believe that worries regarding e-cigarette introduction and projections of the Japanese experience are overstated due to differences in law (e.g. prohibition of smoking indoors), as well as the age composition of the market. Furthermore, we expect a strong revival in overseas sales in the second part of the year, with less headwinds from foreign exchange swings and double-digit growth due to low base effects - as well as an offset to flat local market expansion via higher selling prices. Chart 16Performance Since June 2016: ##br## Nongshim Vs. MSCI EM Nongshim (004370 KS): Farmer's Heart (Chart 16). Nongshim, or Farmer's Heart, was founded in 1965 under the name Lotte Food Industrial Company, and later changed its name. The company first focused on ramyun (instant noodle) production, later expanding into snacks - it was the first to introduce the "Shrimp Cracker" as well as beverages. Today, Nongshim is the largest ramyun and snack company in South Korea, selling to over 100 countries, with production facilities in Korea, China and the U.S. From a revenue perspective, ramyun products contribute 67% to total revenue, followed by other food products with 17.5% and snacks with 15.6%. Geographically, most sales occur in South Korea, with 80%, followed by the U.S. with 10% and China with 8%. Nongshim reported slightly better-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 15. Revenue declined slightly by 2.2% year over year due to a fall in domestic ramyun sales by 9%, while cost of sales actually declined by 5% year over year, which led to a gross margin improvement by 190 basis points to 33.7% (helped by price increases.) Operating income was virtually flat year over year, as operating costs increased by 4%. Operating margin stood at 5.85% compared to 5.70% in 2016, while EBITDA margin declined to 7.9% from 9.4% last year. Nongshim is currently trading at a forward P/E of 18.5x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 5.6% over the next three years. We expect a reversal of weak sales in China (-5% year over year) due to an easing of the geopolitical situation. Furthermore, Nongshim has already begun to claw back market share, helped by new starts and forced price hikes among its competition, which will continue to help turn around margins and improve profitability. How To Trade? The EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of listed equities consisting of six overweight recommendations. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index-hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS); E-Mart (139480 KS); GS Retail (007070 KS); LG Household & Healthcare (051900 KS); KT&G Corp (033780 KS); Nongshim (004370 KS). ETFs: At the moment, there are no ETFs with significant consumer staples sector exposure for South Korea. Funds: At the moment, there are no funds with significant consumer staples sector exposure for South Korea. Please note this trade recommendation is long term (1Y+) and based on an overweight trade. We do not see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equal-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To Our Investment Case We believe that one of the main risks is the geopolitical situation and further developments surrounding North Korea. Although the usual springtime tensions have passed, the underlying dynamic remains highly precarious. North Korea has not moderated its behavior despite President Moon's olive branch and U.S. President Trump continues to prioritize the issue and threaten bolder action. Any kind of escalation in tensions, whether they be driven by North Korea or the U.S., would negatively affect both Chinese interests and the new South Korean administration's attempts at engagement. Given that South Korea has not yet fully reversed the THAAD missile deployment, for instance, it is possible that China could maintain or intensify its informal sanctions on South Korea, such as travel and product bans, and that renewed tensions could depress overall consumer sentiment in South Korea. We are also cognizant that debt levels in the South Korean manufacturing sector as well mass layoffs in shipyards and a slowdown in exports could continue to create pressure on household disposable income levels and, in turn, spending. However, President Moon's efforts for a supplementary budget to support employment in the public sector, if approved, should alleviate some pain from layoffs. On a company level, we see increased price competition as one of the main risks to our investment case. Since many of the companies in the basket are market leaders, they will need to defend their market share aggressively in case of increased competition. Furthermore, for companies operating abroad, we see increased expansion costs as one of the risk factors for future performance. Finally, Chinese economic policy pose a risk to our view. The fiscal spending and credit impulse in China have rolled over, suggesting that demand will slow in the coming months. Moreover, the Communist Party’s ongoing “deleveraging campaign” – a crackdown on various risky financial practices and the shadow banking sector – raises the risks of a policy mistake. A slowdown in China would have negative repercussions for the South Korean companies most exposed to China and the broader Korean economy. Nevertheless, we think Chinese authorities are willing and able to meet their growth target this year. Oleg Babanov, Senior Editor obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.co.uk