Equities

Highlights Broad Chinese equity market performance since last month's Party Congress is consistent with our view that the pace of reforms over the coming year will not cause a meaningful deceleration in China's industrial sector. Stay overweight Chinese stocks. After accounting for idiosyncrasy, divergent sector performance is largely consistent with the stated intentions of Chinese policymakers. Our new China Reform Monitor, which is based on sector performance, should help investors identify whether the pace of reforms is moving too rapidly to be consistent with a benign growth outlook. We are adding two new reform-themed trades this week, and closing one existing position (with a healthy profit). Feature BCA's China Investment Strategy service has presented a relatively benign view of the economic impact of stepped up reform efforts in China over the coming 6-12 months. As we noted in last week's report, while a "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely over the coming year, the pace of reforms will be structured at a level of intensity that will be sufficient to avoid an outsized deceleration in China's industrial sector. We also highlighted that monitoring reform progress would be an important theme to revisit, and in this week's report we review the response of investors to the Party Congress, both at the broad market and sector level, to judge whether it is consistent with our outlook and positioning. We also introduce two new reform-themed trades, and recommend booking profits on an existing position. Broad Market Performance Post-Congress Before gauging the market's view of the likely impact of refocused reform efforts on the Chinese economy over the coming year, it is worth revisiting what kind of market performance would be consistent with our view. To recap the view of our Geopolitical Strategy service,1 President Xi's reform agenda is likely to intensify over the next 12 months, suggesting that Chinese policymakers will make meaningful efforts to: Pare back heavy-polluting industry Hasten the transition of China's economy to "consumer-led" growth2 Deleverage the financial sector Continue to crack down on corruption and graft From the perspective of BCA's China Investment Strategy service, a rapid and intense pace of these reforms would likely be a net negative for Chinese equities, as well as for emerging markets (EM) and other plays on China's industrial sector. For example, in terms of the impact on Chinese stock prices, we highlighted in last week's report that MSCI China ex-tech earnings have been closely correlated with the Li Keqiang index, which would likely decline non-trivially in the face of a very pressing reform push. In addition, the potential for a policy mistake would presumably raise the risk premium on Chinese equities, which would reverse at least some of their meaningful re-rating vs the global benchmark since late-2015. As such, to be consistent with our view, broad market performance (relative to emerging market or global stocks) should have been largely unaffected in the immediate aftermath of the Party Congress, but somewhat divergent at the sector level, given the likely creation of at least some industry "winners" and "losers" from renewed reforms. For the overall market, Chart 1 shows that this is exactly what has occurred over the past month. The chart presents the relative performance of Chinese equities versus the emerging market (EM) and global benchmarks, both in US$ terms and rebased to 100 on the day of President Xi's speech at the Party Congress. The initial reaction to the speech was modestly negative, with Chinese stocks falling a little over 2% in relative terms versus their global peers. But this loss disappeared less than three weeks following the speech, underscoring that market participants agree with our assessment that a rebooted reform effort will not threaten the economy as a whole. Investors should stay overweight Chinese stocks relative to their benchmark. Chart 1No Sign That Stepped Up Reforms Will Be A Net Negative For Chinese Economic Growth The Sector Implications Of Renewed Reforms Chart 2 shows that the sector effects of President Xi's speech have indeed been more divergent, which is also in line with our perspective of view-consistent performance. The chart shows that the past month's performance of the 11 level 1 GICS sectors relative to the broad market can be grouped into three distinct categories: Chart 2China's Reforms Will Create Some Winners##br## And Losers Clear outperformers, which include health care, energy, information technology, and consumer staples, Neutral to modest underperformers, which include utilities, telecom services, and financials, and Clear underperformers, which include industrials, real estate, consumer discretionary, and materials Several of these results are not surprising, as they clearly resonate with the stated intensions of Chinese policymakers. In particular, the outperformance of health care, technology, and consumer staples stocks and the underperformance of capital-goods intensive industrials straightforwardly reflects the goal of re-orienting "old China" towards a new, consumer-focused economy. While energy stocks are viewed as a traditionally cyclically-sensitive carbon-intensive sector, oil prices have risen over the past month and China's share of global energy consumption is much smaller than that of base metals. However, the relative return profiles of a few sectors mentioned above are at least somewhat counterintuitive. On this front, several observations are noteworthy: At first blush, the significant underperformance of Chinese consumer discretionary stocks is counterintuitive if policymakers are aiming to reduce the country's reliance on investment and increase the share of private consumption. However, as Table 1 shows, Chinese consumer discretionary stocks have likely sold off due to the automobile & components industry group, which is potentially at risk of being negatively impacted by the environmental mandate of President Xi's proposed reforms. The table shows that the automobiles & components industry group accounts for a full 1/3rd of Chinese consumer discretionary market capitalization, which is non-trivially larger than in the case of the global benchmark. Table 1 also highlights that China's retailing industry group is as large as that of automobiles & components, which in theory should have provided an offset to the latter's weakness. However, in market capitalization terms, retailers in the MSCI China index are dominated by two large players, one of which is active in providing corporate travel management services. The continuation and expansion of China's anti-corruption campaign was a key message from the Party Congress, and it would appear that investors are concerned about the potential for anti-graft efforts to negatively impact the demand for goods & services that could be potentially linked to corruption or largesse. The underperformance of the materials sector is seemingly reform-consistent, although here too the details of China's investible indexes matter. Table 2 presents a sub-industry breakdown of the MSCI China materials index, as well as an indication whether rebooted reform efforts are a clear negative for the sub-industry. The table highlights that the likely impact of a renewed reform push is mixed: construction materials firms and copper producers (at least in terms of output) are like to suffer, but there are no obvious negative implications for aluminum,3 gold, and paper products producers. The impact on commodity chemicals producers is ambiguous, given that packaging for consumer goods is a significant end market for the petrochemical industry. Table 1Autos Make Up A Significant Share Of ##br##China's Consumer Discretionary Sector Table 2Impact Of Renewed Reforms ##br##On The Materials Sector Is Mixed Finally, there appears to be at least somewhat of a discrepancy between the benign performance of Chinese financials and the underperformance of the real estate sector. Attempts to curb "excessive" financial risks and debt could certainly hurt the real estate sector, but this would also negatively impact banks via a slowdown in credit growth. For now, the significant valuation gap between Chinese financials and real estate appears to be the only explanation for this divergent performance post Party Congress, but we will continue to watch these sectors for signs of a wider market implication. Sector idiosyncrasies aside, the broad conclusion from China's equity market performance over the past month is that investors acknowledge that there are likely to be winners and losers from a rebooted reform mandate, but that overall economic growth in China is not likely to significantly decelerate. This is consistent with our view that the pace of reform efforts over the coming year will not be so intense as to trigger a meaningful decline in the growth rate of China's industrial sector. But the potential for an aggressive pace of reforms is a clear risk to our view that the ongoing slowdown in China's economy is likely to be benign and controlled. Chart 3 introduces our China Reform Monitor as one way to monitor this risk, which is calculated as an equally-weighted average of the four "winner" sectors highlighted above relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors. Significant underperformance of "loser" sectors could become a headwind for broad MSCI China outperformance (especially ex-tech), and we will be watching closely for signs that our monitor is rising largely due to outright declines in the denominator. Chart 3Our China Reform Monitor Will Help Us Track The Impact Of A Renewed Reform Push Two New Reform-Themed Trade Ideas, And One Trade Closure We have new two trade ideas for investors given the performance of Chinese equities in the wake of the Party Congress: Long investable consumer staples / short investable consumer discretionary Long investable environmental, social and governance (ESG) leaders / short investable benchmark The basis for the first trade stems from our earlier discussion of the current limitations of China's investable consumer discretionary index as a clear-cut play on retail-oriented consumer spending. In addition, while consumer staples stocks are reliably low-beta, they have recently been rising vs consumer discretionary in relative terms despite a rise in the broad investable market (Chart 4). The odds favor a continuation of this trend if a renewed reform push continues to appear likely (i.e., we are banking that this trade will be driven by alpha rather than beta). Chart 4Staples Are A Better Consumer Play Chart 5ESG Leaders Should Fare Quite Well In A Reform Environment The basis for the second trade is to overweight stocks that are best positioned to deliver "sustainable" growth. Our proxy for this trade is the MSCI ESG Leaders index, which favors firms with the highest MSCI ESG ratings in each sector (using a proprietary ranking scheme). The index maintains similar sector weights as the investable benchmark, which limits the beta risk of the trade. Chart 5 highlights that MSCI's ESG Leaders index has outperformed the broad market by almost 7% per year since 2010, with current valuation levels that are broadly similar to the benchmark. To us, this trade represents an attractive risk-reward profile even if the pace of China's reforms are not aggressive over the coming year. Chart 6Close Our China / DM Materials Trade Finally, we recommend closing our long MSCI China investable materials sector / short developed markets materials trade. A scenario where China continues to shrink the domestic production capacity of metals without significantly curtailing its overall import volume may be modestly positive for global base metals prices, but it would appear that DM materials producers would benefit more from this outcome than Chinese producers (owing to the impact of production constraints on the volume of product sold). While the Chinese material sector remains grossly undervalued versus its DM peer, the bottom line is that the outlook for this trade is cloudier than before at a time when it is correcting sharply from previously overbought conditions (Chart 6). We suggest that investors close the trade for now, booking a healthy profit of 11%. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 2, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Investors should note that BCA's China Investment Strategy service has long been skeptical of calls to shift China's economy to a consumption-driven growth model, because it significantly raises the odds that the country will not be able to escape the middle-income trap. For example, please see Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 In our view, the use of aluminum in transportation is consistent with an environmental protection mandate, given that its light-weight properties allow for reduced energy consumption. For example, in the U.S. in 2014/2015, Ford Motor Company switched the production of the F150 from a steel to an aluminum frame, resulting in a significant improvement in fuel economy. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Clients frequently ask us what long-term returns they should assume when constructing strategic portfolios. In this report, we use a range of methodologies to arrive at reasonable return assumptions for bonds, equities, alternative assets, and currencies on a 10-15 year investment horizon. We conclude that global bonds are likely to return around 1.5% in nominal terms (compared to 5.3% over the past 20 years), and global equities 4.6% (compared to 6.1%). Alternative assets look rather more attractive with, for example, private equity projected to return 9% and real estate 7.1%. Nonetheless, the typical pension fund portfolio, consisting of 50% equities, 30% fixed income, and 20% alts, will be unable to achieve its return target (still typically 7% or higher). Feature Pension plan sponsors and wealth managers need realistic assumptions about the likely returns from different assets in order to construct strategic portfolios, for example when calculating the efficient frontier using a mean-variance optimizer (MVO). Using historical data is the simplest way to do this, but can be very misleading: for example, global bonds have delivered an annual nominal return of 5.3% over the past 20 years but, with bond yields currently so low, it is almost mathematically impossible for them to return anything close to that over coming years (our estimate for future returns is 1.5%). This Special Report is our attempt to produce long-run return assumptions for strategic portfolios, something that GAA clients frequently ask us for. We want to emphasize that these are reasonable assumptions, not forecasts. The value of forecasting the world economy over the next decade or more is questionable. Consider if we had carried out this exercise in 2002: how likely is it that we would have predicted the rise and fall of emerging markets, the U.S. housing crisis, and the subsequent "secular stagnation"? Our analysis, therefore, is mostly based on the philosophy that long-run historical relationships (for example, credit spreads, or the excess return of small cap stocks) are fairly constant, and that most variables (profit margins, valuation, productivity) mean revert over the long term. Our time horizon is 10-15 years. We chose this - rather than the five or seven years that is perhaps more common in such analyses - because it is closer to the investment horizon of pension funds and most individual investors. It also allows us to avoid making a call on where we are currently in the cycle, and how long the next recession and expansion will last. It is likely we are close to the peak of the current economic expansion and equity bull market (the "X" on Chart 1): choosing a shorter time horizon would mean making judgements about the timing of the cycle. Conceptually, we prefer to forecast the trend line on the chart. Chart 1Stylized Trend Versus Cyclical Movements Our assumptions are inevitably approximate. In many cases (particularly for equity returns), we use multiple methodologies and take the average result. Does it matter that the estimation error of our assumptions is likely to be large? Most academic evidence finds not.1 The reason is that, for closely correlated assets, errors in the return estimates (and therefore the optimal weights in a portfolio) will not greatly affect a portfolio's risk and return; while, for assets that are very different, errors in the estimates will not have much effect on the optimal portfolio weights. Rough estimates, therefore, are sufficient for portfolio construction purposes. In any case, using common-sense projections is better than unrealistic historical averages, and investors do need some assumptions to work with when constructing portfolios. How To Forecast Economic Growth A key input (especially when considering earnings growth, which is one factor driving equity returns) is the likely rate of economic growth in various countries and regions over our time horizon. Our simplified way of deriving this is to assume that GDP growth is a factor of (1) demographics (specifically, the growth in the population of working age), and (2) productivity growth. (We assume that capital intensity is steady.) For the demographic assumptions, we use the United Nations' median forecast of the annual growth in population aged 25-64 between 2015 and 2030 (Table 1). Productivity growth is harder to estimate. Productivity has been poor in recent years compared to history (Chart 2). There is significant uncertainty about whether this is caused by cyclical factors (the Great Recession, for example) or structural factors (the end of positive effects from the IT revolution etc.), and whether a potential new wave of technology (artificial intelligence, self-driving vehicles) will raise productivity in future. Table 1Demographic Assumptions Chart 2Productivity Growth Our approach is to assume that productivity in the U.S. will return to its 40-year average, and that productivity growth in the main European economies will be 50 bp lower than the U.S. and in Japan 80 bp lower (in line with recent averages). The estimate is harder for emerging markets, so we use two scenarios: one in which structural reforms, particularly in China, bring productivity growth back up to the average of the past 10 years, 3.5%; and a second scenario in which governments fail to reform, and therefore productivity growth continues to fall to only 1%. For inflation, we assume that central banks over the long-term largely achieve their current inflation goals. The results of our assumptions for GDP growth are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the summary of our results: the 10-15 year return assumptions for all the assets in our analysis. We also show historic returns and volatility for comparison (for the past 20 years, where data is available). Below, we describe in detail how we arrived at these numbers. Table 2GDP Growth Assumptions Table 3BCA Assumed Returns All our results are shown in nominal terms and in local currencies. While strictly speaking, it might be theoretically better to estimate real returns, in practice most investors and advisers tend to work on a nominal basis. Moreover, since we have made assumptions for inflation in each region, it is simple to translate our nominal returns into real ones. There is also a trade-off between inflation and currency movements (and interest rates). At the end of the report, we consider the impact of relative inflation rates on currency returns, allowing investors to work the returns back into their own currencies. 1. Fixed income We start from a base that is known: the return on long-term government bonds. If an investor today buys a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, his or her annual nominal return over the next 10 years will almost certainly be 2.3% (today's yield). The only uncertainties come from (1) reinvesting coupons at the future rate of interest, but the impact of this is small, and (2) the (presumably minimal) risk of a U.S. government default. Of course, investors do not own just 10-year bonds, and indeed the average duration of U.S. Treasuries is currently 5.7 years. But changes in interest rates make relatively little difference to future returns: a rise in interest rates causes a capital loss but a higher yield on rolled-over positions after bonds mature (though, admittedly, the convexity effect is greater when rates are low, as they are now). Even if interest rates were to double over the next decade, the return from U.S. Treasuries would fall only to around 1.5% and, if interest rates fell to 0%, the return would be only about 3%. Moreover, the effect diminishes over time as more bonds are redeemed at par. Empirically, we can see that there is a strong correlation between starting yield on 10-year bonds and long-term returns from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 3). Chart 3Government Bond Returns Driven By The Starting Yield For our cash assumption, we first calculate a proxy for the current cash yield using the average spread between 10-year government bonds and three-month bills over a long-run history (using data from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton which goes back to 1900 and covers a range of countries, Table 4).2 While it is true that the yield curve steepens and flatten along with the cycle, the average yield curve shape should be a good proxy for long-term future expected returns. Of course, this assumes that the term premium comes back. It may not if bonds now are a good hedge against recession risk. However, we also need to take into account that interest rates and inflation are likely to change over the next 10-15 years. We assume that both will rise to an equilibrium level over that time. Our assumption is that central banks will get close to hitting their inflation targets (in the U.S., 2% on PCE inflation, which translates into 2.5% on CPI; in Europe, "around but below 2%"; and in Japan, 2%). For the equilibrium real rate, we take BCA's current estimate (Chart 4) and assume a small rise over the next decade as some of the after-effects of the Great Recession and secular stagnation wear off: to 0.4% in the U.S., -0.1% in the euro area, and -0.2% in Japan. Table 4Historic Spread Government Bonds To Bills (1900-2016) Chart 4Current Equilibrium Real Rates Our calculation of the return from cash over the 10-15 year horizon is based on a steady rise from the current cash return to that implied by the inflation and equilibrium real rate assumptions (Table 5). Table 5Calculation Of Assumption For Cash Return For other fixed-income instruments, we make the following assumptions: Government bonds. We assume that the spread between 10-year and 7-year bonds and 3-month bills will be similar to the historical average (Chart 5), and calculate the return from the government bond index based on this and our estimate for 10-year returns, adjusted by the duration of outstanding bonds in the index: 5.7 years for the U.S., 7.1 for Europe and 8.6 for Japan. For U.S. investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, we take the average spread, default rate, and recovery rate in history (Table 6). Obviously, spreads and default rates, especially for high-yield bonds, also jump around massively over the cycle (Chart 6), but we think it is reasonable to assume in our long-term projections that they revert to the mean. Reliable data for European and Japanese credit has a short history but, over the past 10 years, spreads and default rates have been similar to the U.S., so we use the U.S. assumptions for these markets too. Chart 5Yield Curves Table 6U.S. Corporate Credit Assumptions Chart 6Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Government-related bonds and securitized bonds (MBS, ABS etc.) are an important part of the Barclay's Aggregate Bond indexes: in the U.S., for example, securitized bonds comprise 31% of the index, and government-related ones 7%; in Europe, the weights are 8% and 17% respectively. For our projections of government-related bonds, we assume historic average spreads will continue (Table 7). For securitized bonds, we assume that the historic average spread in the U.S. will continue, and will be the same in Europe and Japan (where historic data is less readily available). Inflation-linked bonds. We assume that the average real yield of the past 10 years, 0%, will continue in future (Chart 7). Table 7Spreads Over Government Bonds Chart 7Real Yield On U.S. TIPs 2. Equities There are a number of ways to think about forward equity returns, all with a high degree of uncertainty. These could be based on starting valuations (but which valuation measure to use?); related to likely earnings growth in future years (hard to forecast); or based on a reversion to the mean of valuations and profits. We decided to take a range of different measures, and average the results. In practice, the results are similar, except for emerging markets (see below for more on EM). Table 8 summarizes the equity return calculations. Table 8Equity Return Calculations AVERAGE EQUITY The thinking behind the six measures we use is as follows. Equity risk premium (ERP). The most obvious methodology: historically, over the long run equities have returned more than government bonds. But which risk premium to use? Dimson, Marsh and Staunton's work includes the excess performance of equities over bonds since 1900 for a range of countries (Table 9). We decided not to choose a different ERP for each developed region, as the historical data would suggest, since it is difficult to argue that the U.S. is likely to be riskier in future than Europe and since, for parts of this history, Japan and the U.S. were essentially emerging markets. We, therefore, take a rounded average of world ERP over the past 116 years, 3.5%. For emerging markets, we multiply this by the average beta of EM relative to global equities over the past 30 years, 1.2, to give an ERP of 4.2%. Growth model. Think of a Gordon Growth Model, which defines the return from equities as the starting dividend yield plus future earnings growth (strictly speaking, dividend growth; we are assuming that the payout ratio will stay constant). We need to make a couple of adjustments to this. First, earnings growth has historically been correlated to nominal GDP growth but has lagged it - in the U.S. by 1.5 percentage points in the period 1918-2016 - although, since 1981, earnings have grown significantly faster than GDP (Chart 8). For the future, we assume that the long-run lag returns. Second, we need to add share buybacks to the dividend yield since, in some countries, such as the U.S., for tax reasons companies prefer to buy back shares rather than increase dividends. However, we should do this on a net basis since equity holders are penalized by companies that issue new shares. In the U.S. net equity withdrawal has been 0.3% over the past 10 years, but in both Europe and Japan, annual net new equity issuance has averaged 1.6% (Chart 9). In EM, the dilution has been even more extreme, averaging 6% over the past 10 years (and much more over the past 25 years). We subtract this dilution from future returns. Table 9Equity Excess Return Over Bonds Chart 8U.S. EPS Growth Versus Nominal GDP Growth Chart 9Net Equity Issuance Growth plus reversion to the mean. This takes the Gordon Growth Model but adds to it an assumption that PE multiples and profit margins revert to the historical mean. We again use dividend yield adjusted by net equity issuance. We assume that the current trailing PE and profit margin revert to the average since 1980 (see Table 8 above for the data) over the next 10 years. In the U.S., PE and margins are currently somewhat higher than history, but this is less the case in Europe or Japan (Charts 10 and 11). Additionally, assuming that the mean reversion happens over 10 years means that the effect on annual returns is not especially large, even for the U.S. Chart 10Net Profit Margin Chart 11Trailing PE History Earnings yield (EY). The simplest of the three valuation measures we use, the assumption is that companies reward shareholders either by paying them a dividend this year, or by reinvesting retained earnings to pay dividends in future. If you assume (admittedly a rash assumption) that the future return on investment will be similar to the current return on investment, it should be immaterial how the company pays out to shareholders. Therefore, the trailing earnings yield (1/PE ratio) should be a good proxy for future returns. Empirically, the relationship between earnings yield and 10-year future returns has been quite strong (Chart 12). However, returns have been somewhat higher on average than the EY would indicate (between 1900 and 2006, 9.7% versus an average EY of 7.5%) mainly because of rising PE multiples since 1980 (Chart 13). We think it unlikely that valuations will continue to rise, and so the EY should be a reasonable guide to future returns. Chart 12Earnings Yield And 10-Year Future Returns Chart 13Trailing Price/Earnings Multiple S&P500 Shiller PE. The cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE, or Shiller PE) - the current share price divided by the 10 year average of historic inflation-adjusted earnings - has historically had a good correlation with future long-term returns (Chart 14). A regression model of this indicates that the current Shiller PE points to long-run forward returns for the U.S. of 4.9%, for Japan 3.6%, Europe 8.5% and EM 10.8%. Valuation composite. The Shiller PE has some flaws, for example in using a fixed 10-year period for earnings when the length of cycles varies. It has not necessarily mean-reverted in history (perhaps because of long-term trends in interest rates, which it doesn't take into account). It may be more reasonable, then, to use a mixture of different valuation metrics. BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator has had a good correlation with long-run future returns (Chart 15).3 A regression model of this indicator against 15-year returns currently points to returns from the U.S. of 5.2%, Europe of 4.1%, Japan 5.1% and EM 11.0%. Small-cap stocks. We take the 2.4% excess annual return of small cap stocks over large caps in the U.S. for 1926-2016, as calculated by Dimson, Marsh & Staunton. Chart 14Shiller PE Versus ##br##15-Year Equity Return Chart 15Composite Valuation Measure Versus ##br##Long-Run Future Returns Emerging Markets The return assumption for emerging market equity returns has a much higher degree of uncertainty. On our three valuation measures, EM equities look attractive: the average return expectation of the three valuation indicators points to an annual return of 9.4%. However, the growth outlook is murky: as described above, a wave of structural reform in emerging markets, especially China, would be necessary to keep productivity - and, therefore, earnings growth - up, in order for returns to be as good as the current valuation level suggests. Another worry is the degree of equity dilution: it has averaged 6% a year over the past 10 years, and is unlikely to fall much unless corporate governance improves significantly. The range of expected returns derived from our various methodologies, therefore, varies from -1% to +11% a year. Moreover, as described in the currency section below, investors should expect a depreciation in some EM currencies over the next decade, which will also eat into returns. However, due to the influence of China, where the currency is projected to appreciate almost 2% a year against the USD, the EM equity index will see an overall boost to USD-based returns due to the currency effect. 3. Alternative Assets We consider the likely future returns for nine of the 10 alternative assets that Global Asset Allocation regularly covers (we omit wine, which is hard to value on the basis of fundamental macro factors and, anyway, is owned by few institutional investors).4 Alts are harder to forecast than public securities since data is less easily available (and may be only quarterly and based on estimated values), and since some alternative assets have not existed in their current form for very long (venture capital, for example). Moreover, alternative assets tend to have non-normal returns with skewed distributions. Table 10 shows the historical returns and volatility of the nine alternative asset classes both over the longest period for which we have data, and since 1997, when we have data for all of them. Table 10Returns And Volatility For Alternative Assets We, therefore, take a more ad hoc approach, projecting each asset class differently. Generally, we assume that future returns will look similar to historical ones. Specifically, the assumptions we use are as follows. Hedge funds. We assume a return of cash + 3.5%. Hedge fund returns have trended down over time (Chart 16), as more entrants have arbitraged away alpha. We choose to use the average return over cash of the past 10 years, 3.5% (net of fees). It is unlikely that hedge funds returns will rise back anywhere close to earlier levels, for example that of the 1990s when they returned cash +14%. Chart 16Hedge Fund Historic Returns U.S. Direct real estate. We find reasonably good results (R2 = 24%) from regressing U.S. nominal GDP growth against real estate returns. The regression equation is 1.25 x nominal GDP growth + 1.9%. Conceptually, this probably represents a cap rate plus growth of capital values slightly higher than economic growth due to supply shortages in certain key locations. We project real estate to return 7.2% annually. One risk to this assumption, however, is that commercial real estate prices are already above the previous peak from 2007; high valuations may dampen future returns. U.S. REITs. We find only weak correlations with direct real estate investment, although REITs have outperformed real estate over time (perhaps because of the inbuilt leverage of REITs). Over time, REITs have become increasingly correlated with equities. We, therefore, use a regression against U.S. equity returns (R2 = 42%), with REIT returns 0.49 x equity returns + 7.7%. This indicates 10.1% annual return from REITs in the long run. U.S. Private equity (PE). In the past, returns from private equity have been 5 or 6 percentage points higher than from public equities. This is most likely due to their higher leverage, bias towards small-cap companies, and stronger shareholder control over the companies they invest in; it can also be thought of as an illiquidity premium. However, it seems likely that excess returns will be lower in future given the bigger size of the PE industry now and relatively high valuations currently. Moreover, the PE industry currently has almost USD 1 Trn in dry power (uninvested capital), a sign that investment opportunities are limited. We assume, therefore, a slightly lower premium over public equities in future of 4 ppts. This results in a total annual return of 9.5%. U.S. Venture capital (VC). Historically (using data since 1986) VC returns have been 0.6 ppts higher than for PE (probably representing a premium for greater risk and smaller size of the companies invested in). We assume 0.5 ppt higher return in future. This leads to a return assumption of 10%. U.S. Structured products. As discussed in the fixed income section above, we use the 20-year average spread over the aggregate bond index of 0.7 ppt. Total assumed return, therefore, is 3.3%. U.S. Farmland. The value of farmland has risen by an average of 4.4% a year since 1920, a period which included five agricultural cycles. We assume that the value of land will continue to rise at the same rate. We think this is a reasonable assumption since, although nominal GDP growth in the U.S. may be lower in future than in the past, global demand for food is likely to continue to grow rapidly. The total return from investment in farm land, using a regression, produces: growth of farm land value x 1.81 + 0.64% = 8.6%. Chart 17Long-Term Commodity Prices U.S. Timberland is more defensive than farmland since trees can be stored "on the stump" and don't need to be harvested each year in the way that crops do even when prices are unattractive. Historically, timberland has returned about 1 ppt less a year than farmland, and we assume that this will continue. Commodities move in long-run cycles, with a commodity super-cycle of around 10 years, in which prices rise by 3-4x, followed by a bear market of 20 or 30 years in which they fall or stagnate (Chart 17). This is driven by a build-up of excess supply, because of the capex done during the super-cycle, and often by a structural shift on the demand side too. We see no reason why this pattern should change, with China's re-engineering of its economy away from dependence on infrastructure spending likely to be a particularly important factor over the next decade. We assume that commodity prices will, over the current bear market (now about five years old), fall by the same amount and over the same number of years as the average of previous bear markets since the 19th century. This means they have 16% further to fall over 200 months, giving a return of -1% a year. 4. Currencies Most investors are unable or unwilling to fully hedge currency exposure over very long periods. So, a consideration of how returns from different countries' assets might be affected by relative currency movements over the next 10-15 years is an important element in calculating likely returns. Fortunately, for developed market currencies at least, there is a simple, and historically fairly reliable, way to make assumptions of currency movements: reversion to purchasing power parity. As shown in Chart 18, major currencies have fairly consistently reverted to their PPP over the long run. So we can forecast likely future currency movements as a combination of 1) how far away the currency is currently from PPP against the U.S. dollar, and 2) the likely change in the PPP over the period. The latter we calculate from the IMF's forecasts of relative consumer inflation between each country and the U.S. (the IMF makes this forecast only for the next five years, but we assume that the differential continues at the same rate after 2022). Table 11 shows that most major currencies are expected to rise against the U.S. dollar over the coming decade or so. Except for Australia, they are likely to have slightly lower inflation. And - again with the exception of Australia - they all look a little undervalued currently relative to the USD. Table 11Assumed Annual Change Versus U.S. Dollar Over Next 10-15 Years Unfortunately, this approach does not work for EM currencies. They have historically traded at a level consistently well below PPP. This is mainly because, while tradable goods prices tend to be driven by international prices movements and relative unit labor costs, local services prices (which cannot be arbitraged across borders) do not. Also, inflation in emerging markets has historically been much higher than in the U.S. (Chart 19), meaning that their PPP has shifted significantly lower over time. However, China's inflation is now not dissimilar to that of the U.S. (the IMF forecasts it will be only 50 basis points a year higher over the coming five years). And China has shown some tendency for the currency to move towards PPP - 20 years ago the RMB was 190% below PPP; now it is "only" 97% below. Chart 18Reversion To PPP Chart 19U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation We, therefore, take an alternative approach to estimating currency returns for EM economies. We run a regression analysis of the annual change in each country's exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar against its CPI inflation relative to the U.S. We find mostly acceptable r-squared scores (ranging from 57% for Turkey to 1% for Taiwan). For most countries, the intercept is positive (suggesting the currency is trending over time towards PPP) and the coefficient for CPI is, as expected, negative (Table 12). Table 12Calculations For EM Currency Moves A number of EM currencies, on this analysis, would be expected to depreciate against the U.S. dollar over coming years, including Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. But, weighting the countries by their weights in the MSCI ACWI index, on average the EM universe would be expected to see a currency appreciation against the U.S. dollar of around 2% a year. This is largely due to the influence of China, which has a 29% weight in the EM index. This would be a much better result than the past 10 years when, for example, the Brazilian real has depreciated by 12% a year, the Indonesian rupiah by 16% and the Turkish lira by 37%. This could be because the IMF forecasts of future inflation (4.9% for India, 4.5% for Brazil and 4.1% for Russia), are too optimistic. They are certainly much better than these countries have achieved in the past 10 years (8.0% in India, 6.2% in Brazil, and 9.2% in Russia). Conclusion Arriving at assumptions for future returns is as much an art as a science. Our analysis is based principally on the concept that the future will be similar to long-term history (but not necessarily to the history of the past 30 years, which in many ways were abnormal for financial markets with, for example, a continuous decline in interest rates and inflation). Obviously, therefore, a very different macro environment over the next 10-15 years (for example, one in which inflation spiked, or secular stagnation deepened) would produce a very different results for economic growth and interest rates. However, it will be clear from our analysis that a great deal of the long-term return for equities and bonds is derived from the valuation at the start. Given that current valuations in almost all asset classes are expensive relative to history, this implies that future portfolio returns will be poor compared to recent, and long-term, history. Based on our return assumptions, a typical global portfolio (with 50% equities, 30% bonds, and 20% alternatives) will produce a nominal return of only 4.1% a year over the next decade or so, and a similar U.S. portfolio only 4.6%. This compares to 6.3% and 7.0% over the past 20 years. For pension funds which assume an 7.5% or 8% annual return (as many in the U.S. do), or individual investors planning their retirement on the basis of, say, a 5% annual real return, that outcome would come as a nasty shock. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For the best summary of the evidence on this, please see A Practitioner's Guide To Asset Allocation, by William Kinlaw, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington, Wiley 2017. 2 Please see Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2017 by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, February 2017 3 BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator comprises, for the U.S.: market value of equities / non-financial gross value added adjusted for foreign revenues, trailing PE, Shiller PE, and price to sales. And for other regions: divided yield, market Cap/GDP, trailing PE, price to book, forward PE, price to cash flow, price to sales, and enterprise value/total assets. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Alternative Assets: More Important Than Ever", dated 11 March 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Appendix Correlation Matrix

Special Report

Highlights Stay short the rand. The South African currency has broken down, and further downside is looming. The rand is cheap for a reason. A lack of import substitution has hampered the benefits of a depreciated currency for the economy. The trade balance will deteriorate as metals prices drop due to growth deceleration in China. Lingering political uncertainty, a poor structural backdrop and reliance on foreign portfolio flows that are at risk of reversal all argue for material downside in the rand's value from current levels. Dedicated EM equity and bond portfolios should continue to underweight South Africa. Feature The South African rand posted an impressive rally in 2016 and early 2017, despite the economy's technical recession (Chart I-1). Yet recently, the rand has started breaking down, despite domestic demand data showing modest improvement. We have argued in the past that lower commodities prices and rising U.S. interest rates along with a negative political backdrop and a weak economy would put downward pressure on the rand. However, domestic demand has recently ticked up, and according to our broad money (M3) impulse, domestic demand will likely continue to improve modestly in the next several months (Chart I-2) - barring the intensifying political headwinds hurting business and consumer sentiment. The M3 impulse is the second derivative of outstanding broad money M3. Chart I-1South Africa: ##br##Economy And Currency Chart I-2South Africa: Modest ##br##Upside In Domestic Demand Therefore, today we are posing the following question: Can South African risk assets sell off even as domestic demand continues to recover moderately? Our answer is yes. The basis is that the balance of payments (BoP) is set to deteriorate again. What Drives The Rand? The narrative that a high carry will support high-yielding EM currencies including the rand is misplaced. Chart I-3 illustrates that there has been no positive correlation between the rand's exchange rate and its short-term interest rate differential with those in the U.S. Notably, neither the level nor direction of interest rate differential correlates positively with the value of the rand. If anything, it is the exchange rate that drives interest rates in South Africa and in many high-yielding EM markets, not the other way around. The bottom panel of Chart I-3 demonstrates that the rand's appreciation typically leads to lower interest rates, and vice versa. While in the near term the rand could be under pressure from rising U.S. interest rate expectations and a U.S. dollar rebound, the currency's medium-term outlook will continue be shaped by commodities prices. Chart I-4 demonstrates that the rand's exchange rate is strongly correlated with industrial and precious metals prices. Chart I-3Rand Drives Interest ##br##Rates Not Other Way Around Chart I-4Rand Is Correlated ##br##With Metal Prices The fundamental basis for rand depreciation going forward is a worsening BoP: Industrial metals prices will drop as China's growth slows (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, a moderate pick-up in domestic demand will lead to rising imports and a deteriorating trade balance (Chart I-2, bottom panel on page 2). Precious metals prices will also be under pressure in the near term as U.S. interest rate expectations rise, supporting the U.S. dollar. In fact, the most reliable factor driving gold prices has historically been U.S. real (TIPS) yields (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China's Money/Credit Impulses ##br##Are Bearish For Industrial Metals Chart I-6Gold Is Driven By U.S. ##br##Real Rates (TIPS Yields) We expect the rand to depreciate considerably and make new lows against the euro and European currencies. This will contrast with what occurred in 2014-'15, when the rand's depreciation versus the euro and European currencies was much less pronounced than versus the dollar. Chart I-7Foreigners Are Record ##br##Long South African Bonds As the rand falls versus the majority of DM currencies, foreign investors will be prompted to reduce their holdings of South African local currency bonds and equities. Given foreigners own 42% of the country's local government bonds (Chart I-7, top panel), the bond market will sell off further, and outflows could be meaningful. Another angle to consider is whether a revival in domestic demand would be enough to offset the above negatives and attract enough foreign capital to finance the BoP. In our opinion, not this time around. First, any domestic demand recovery in South Africa will be muted. Given lingering political uncertainty, upside in business spending and job creation will remain subdued. Notably, risks are skewed to the downside for domestic demand due to lingering political uncertainty. Second, in 2016 the rand rallied considerably, even as domestic demand was falling. During 2016 and early 2017, the rand was supported by external forces such as rising metals prices and capital flows to EM. In turn, weakening domestic demand induced an imports contraction, helping the trade balance. Presently, all of these factors are reversing. Finally, portfolio flows have been much more important than FDIs for South Africa in recent years (Chart I-8). This implies that as portfolio flows dry up, FDIs will not finance the BoP. Bottom Line: South Africa's BoP dynamics are set to deteriorate markedly, leading to a major currency downleg. Is The Rand Cheap? A Look At Import Substitution Our valuation measures show that the rand is one standard deviation cheap (Chart I-9). Chart I-8South Africa: FDI Versus Portfolio Flows Chart I-9The Rand's Valuation Profile However, we believe it is "cheap for a reason." Structural forces have been and remain currency bearish. Chart I-10No Import Substitution In South Africa A cheap currency leads to import substitution - i.e., domestic producers become more competitive than foreign ones, and they replace imports with locally produced goods. This in turn improves the trade balance and boosts domestic jobs and income. Stronger output growth and higher return on capital allow the economy to withstand higher interest rates. Rising return on capital and interest rates attract foreign capital (both portfolio inflows and FDI), leading to currency appreciation. In South Africa, the inherent problem is that despite substantial weakness in the currency since 2011, there has been very little import substitution. This is true across the most basic types of goods that do not require sophisticated production methods such as footwear, plastic, rubber products and textiles (Chart I-10). Astonishingly, this has continued to hold true even after the collapse of the rand in 2015 to two-standard-deviations below its fair value. Given import substitution has not materialized, economic growth has not benefited much from a depreciated currency, and all the usual drivers that typically mark a bottom in the exchange rate and jump-start sustainable currency appreciation are thus still lacking. Hence, the rand will have to stay cheap. Interestingly, in the absence of a shift from foreign to locally produced goods, a recovery in domestic demand will boost imports, benefiting foreign producers relative to local ones - i.e., "leaking" growth to the rest of the world. Bottom Line: An ongoing lack of import substitution in South Africa has been due to lingering structural malaise. Therefore, the rand will have to stay structurally cheap. Productivity Demise It is not surprising that import substitution has been non-existent, given the demise of productivity within the South African economy. When assessing competitiveness, it is essential to analyze a country's unit labor costs in U.S. dollar terms. South African unit labor costs in U.S. dollar terms have risen by 50% in the manufacturing sector, and by 160% in the overall economy since 2000 (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Comparative Unit Labor Costs In US$: ##br##South Africa & U.S. For comparison, in the U.S., overall non-farm unit labor costs in U.S. dollars have risen by 20% since 2000, and have been more or less flat in the manufacturing sector. In brief, in the past 17 years, unit labor costs in U.S. dollar in South Africa have risen substantially more than in the U.S. There are also other ramifications of lingering productivity malaise: First, in South Africa, fiscal and monetary stimuli typically widen the current account deficit more than in countries where manufacturing is able to compete with global manufacturers. Second, inflation dynamics in South Africa are even more sensitive to exchange rate movements. A large share of imports for domestic consumption ensures that South African inflation remains correlated with the exchange rate rather than with the domestic business cycle. Third, for monetary policy, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has been forced to pursue more pro-cyclical monetary policy - raising rates when metals prices drop and the rand depreciates. Higher interest rates amid a negative terms-of-trade shock - i.e. falling metals prices - has historically reinforced boom-bust cycles in the South African economy and created less visibility for domestic investments, further hindering long-term growth. That said, there are presently low odds that the SARB will hike rates materially, even if the rand drops substantially. The monetary authorities did not significantly cut rates amid the rand's rally in 2016-'17. Hence, odds of rate hikes are low, which heralds yield curve steepening. Bottom Line: Poor productivity has been and remains a major constraint on South African growth and a major drag on the currency. An Update On Politics The December African National Congress (ANC) presidential election is around the corner, and it is worth asking if any positive outcome for the economy and markets may emerge. We do not expect so. At this point, there are two scenarios to consider. The first is that current Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa wins. Given his recent strong performance in key swing provinces and lack of competition from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Ramaphosa has decent chances of winning the ANC presidency. However, as our colleagues from the Geopolitical Strategy service argued, the structural reality is that the median voter in South Africa is not in a position to support a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms.1 In a system where policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace and not price makers, even if Ramaphosa wins, he is unlikely to address the majority of South Africa's lingering structural issues in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the rising popularity of the left-wing radical Economic Free Fighters, led by ex-Youth League Leader Julius Malema, will also be a constraint on Ramaphosa in terms of enacting supply side reforms. The second scenario is that Ramaphosa does not win, in which case he and his supporters could split from the ANC and perhaps form a new party with the Democratic Alliance (DA). It is hard to tell at the moment what this scenario would entail for the general elections in 2019. Historically, given the ANC's stronghold on the country's politics, the winner of the ANC Congress has moved on to become President of South Africa. However in the event of an ANC split, some revaluation of the political landscape would be required. Regardless of who wins the elections in 2019, a general lack of appetite for structural and painful reforms point to fiscal policy remaining lax - and being used to boost growth (Chart I-12). At 51% of GDP, the public debt burden is not yet at alarming levels. In the meantime, easy or easing fiscal stance will continue to put downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: Odds of structural reforms are low, regardless of who wins the December elections. Fiscal policy will remain easy, and public debt will continue to rise. This is a bad omen for the currency. Investment Recommendations We continue to recommend the following strategy: Continue shorting the ZAR versus the USD. The rand has broken down from a key resistance level, and has much more downside (Chart I-13). Chart I-12South Africa: Fiscal Deficit Is Wide Chart I-13The Rand: A Breakdown Underweight South African domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their EM benchmarks. Sovereign spreads have hit a strong technical resistance and are starting to bounce off (Chart I-14). Continue betting on yield-curve steepening. A lack of economic vigor will keep the SARB on hold for now, yet the country's populist fiscal stance and withdrawals by foreigners from the bond market will push up long-dated bond yields. For EM local fixed-income portfolios, we maintain the following trade: short South African and Turkish 5-year bonds / long Polish and Hungarian ones. Lastly, a few words on the stock market: Our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio for the MSCI South Africa equity index suggests that this bourse is one standard deviation expensive (Chart I-15, top panel). Chart I-14South Africa: Sovereign Spreads ##br##To Move Above EM Benchmark Chart I-15South African Equites: ##br##Valuation & Technicals Interestingly, the relative performance of this bourse versus the EM benchmark might be on a precipice of a major breakdown (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Continue underweighting South African stocks. Chart I-16Banks To Outperform As Yield Curve Steepens As to sectors, we recommend an overweight position in banks and materials. A steepening yield curve typically benefits bank stocks (Chart I-16), while materials will in turn benefit from a depreciating currency. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled, "South Africa: Crisis Of Expectations," dated June 28, 2017, link available at gps.bcaresearch.com

Highlights There are a number of cracks emerging in global risk assets. Not only have U.S. junk bond prices recently posted sharp declines, but a number of economic and financial market developments within EM also warrant investors' close attention. In particular: Feature The EM manufacturing PMI has rolled over at relatively low levels, despite continued strength in advanced economies' manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Importantly, the trend in relative manufacturing PMIs heralds EM equity underperformance against DM bourses (Chart 2). Chart 1EM Manufacturing: Rolling Over Chart 2EM Stocks To Underperform DM Stocks The Shanghai Container Freight Index has relapsed in recent months. This index has been a good indicator for EM/Asian export volumes (Chart 3, top panel). That said, DRAM semiconductor prices continue to surge (Chart 3, bottom panel). DRAM prices have jumped five-fold in less than two years, justifying the massive rally in semiconductors' stock prices. It is hard to know how long and how far the ascent in DRAM prices will continue. Nevertheless, our hunch is that non-technology exports in Asia will slow down, regardless of what happens in the global technology sector. Consistently, we expect EM non-technology stocks to relapse sooner than later, even as tech stocks remain a wild card. Global and EM tech stocks rallied exponentially and appear to be in a mania phase that could make any reasonable assessment and investment strategy off-mark. Weighing the pros and cons, we continue to recommend overweighting the tech sector within the EM universe, even as the outlook for their absolute performance remains highly uncertain. Within EM tech, we favor semi stocks (Samsung and TSMC) versus internet and social media stocks. The sheer magnitude of the EM equity rally has been driven by a few names such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, Samsung and TSMC. Their combined market cap as a share of the overall MSCI EM equity index has risen to 19%. Remarkably, the equal-weighted MSCI EM stock index has massively underperformed the market cap-weighted MSCI EM equity index (Chart 4, top panel). In contrast, the same measure for DM equities has held up much better (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asian/EM Exports At Risk Chart 4A Perspective On Internal Equity Dynamics: EM And DM EM stock prices have been firm so far despite the rebound in the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 5). As the greenback continues to advance, odds are that EM share prices will dive, as occurred in 2014 and 2015. In China, the effects of triple tightening - the liquidity squeeze by the central bank, the regulatory clampdown on banks and shadow banking by the Banking Regulatory Commission, and the anti-corruption drive that is targeting the financial industry - are gaining momentum. Onshore corporate bond yields and credit spreads over government bonds have risen further since the end of the most recent Party Congress. One of the reasons why policymakers are tightening is to rein in the enormous excesses prevalent in the credit, money and property markets that have developed in recent years. Given that advanced economies have now recovered, the Chinese authorities feel more confident to tighten domestically. Finally, while less recognized by the investment community, inflationary pressures have been rising in China. Although still at 2.25%, core consumer price inflation is clearly trending up, warranting a policy response (Chart 6, top panel). This is especially true given that real deposit rates - deflated by core consumer price inflation - have plummeted into negative territory (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5U.S. Dollar Rebound = EM Pullback Chart 6China: Beware Of Rising Inflation Consistent with tightening, China's official broad money growth has decelerated to an all-time low (Chart 7, top panel). In the meantime, narrow money (M1) growth is falling rapidly. Remarkably, M1 growth has been correlated with Chinese H-share prices (Chart 7, bottom panel). We have extensively documented in past reports1 that China's money and credit impulses are good leading indicators of the mainland's business cycle. The current readings of these indicators signal considerable growth deceleration. In addition, general (central and local) government spending growth has already slowed a lot (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Broad Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart 8China: Aggregate Fiscal Spending Growth Is Also Weak The fundamentally weakest EM currencies such as the South African rand and the Turkish lira have already broken down. Some others have so far been only marginally weak. A chain, however, typically cracks at its weakest link. Hence, it makes sense that the selloff has begun with the fundamentally weakest currencies. We expect other EM currencies to follow. Currency depreciation in EM will undermine returns for foreign investors, and the latter will become marginal sellers in both EM equity markets and local currency bonds. Meanwhile, EM currency depreciation and potentially falling commodities prices will trigger credit spread widening in EM sovereign and corporate bonds. Investment Positioning Global equity portfolios should continue underweighting EM versus DM. The risk-reward profile for EM stocks' absolute performance is extremely unfavorable. We continue to recommend underweighting EM credit markets relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. Our strongest conviction shorts are a basket of the following currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. This will erode EM returns for European investors, and temporarily halt or reverse capital inflows into EM. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, India, Argentina2 and Central Europe. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions From The Road", dated September 20, 2017. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Argentina: A Genuine Bull Market", dated October 25, 2017. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights A Quick Primer: Convertible bonds have a risk/reward profile that falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds. The key difference is that convertible bonds are less exposed to credit spreads than junk bonds and more exposed to the equity market. Performance Vs. Junk: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. The Value Proposition: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Feature From time to time we are asked whether convertible bonds have a place in U.S. fixed income portfolios, and this is the question we consider in today's Special Report. Being a hybrid credit/equity investment, it is clear that convertibles are a fairly high-risk proposition for U.S. bond funds. In fact, we find that the historical risk/reward profile of the sector falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated High-Yield corporate debt (Chart 1). So while not for every investor, we do find compelling reasons for why, in the current macro environment, U.S. bond funds should consider replacing some high-yield debt with an allocation to convertible bonds. Chart 1Fixed Income Universe - Risk Vs. Return* (1990s To Present) This report proceeds as follows. The first section provides a quick primer on convertible bonds, with a focus on the risk factors that drive the sector's performance. The second section takes a look at the historical performance of convertibles in different macro environments. The last section considers valuation in the sector. A Quick Primer Convertible bonds are much like traditional corporate bonds in that they pay periodic fixed coupons and have a maturity date. However, convertibles also give bondholders the option to convert the bond into a pre-specified number of shares of common stock. Investors obviously pay a premium for this option but have the potential to realize large gains if the firm's stock price rises. Convertibles are typically issued by smaller firms with low credit ratings. Fifty percent of the face value of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Convertibles index comes from small-cap and mid-cap firms. In addition, 58% of the Convertibles index face value comes from non-rated firms. For comparison, only 0.22% of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield bond index is un-rated. Technology firms make up 35% of the Convertibles index, which should not be surprising since the convertibles market appeals to small issuers with large financing demands who may have limited access to traditional debt and equity markets. The Convertibles index also has a large concentration in Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals (19%) and Financials (15%). In contrast, the largest sectors in the High-Yield bond index are Communications (20%), Consumer Cyclicals (15%) and Energy (14%). Chart 2Convertible Bond Value Illustrated The value of a convertible bond is illustrated in Chart 2. This chart shows how the price of a convertible bond (the line labeled "Convertible Bond Value Curve") evolves relative to the firm's stock price (shown on the x-axis). It also helps define a few key terms: Parity: Also called the "conversion value" of the security. This represents the value of the security if the conversion option is exercised. It is the 45 degree line passing through the origin of Chart 2. Conversion Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its parity value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying the firm's equity. It can be thought of as the cost of downside protection for an equity investor. Chart 2 shows that this cost is larger when the firm's equity price is low. Investment Value: Also called the "bond floor". This is the value of the security if the conversion option is never exercised. It is the thick dashed line in Chart 2. Investment Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its investment value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying a corporate bond. It can be thought of as the cost a convertible bond investor must pay to get potential equity exposure. Chart 2 shows that this cost is greater when the firm's stock price is high. We can use the concepts of conversion premium and investment premium to define three types of convertible bonds. A convertible bond is called "credit sensitive" when its underlying stock price is low. This type of convertible bond is valued very similarly to a corporate bond because there is only a low chance that the conversion option will be exercised. It therefore has a large conversion premium and a small investment premium. Conversely, an "equity sensitive" convertible bond is valued similarly to an equity. This is a convertible bond with an elevated underlying stock price, one that would make it beneficial to exercise the conversion option. These securities have high investment premiums and very low conversion premiums. "Balanced" convertible bonds fall between the other two categories. The stock price has not quite reached the value that makes the conversion option attractive, but it is close enough that the security trades at a significant investment premium. Risk Factors & Performance Drivers Based on the historical risk/reward relationship shown in Chart 1, it is clear that if convertible bonds should be included in U.S. fixed income portfolios it is in place of B-rated and Caa-rated junk bonds. We must therefore consider what factors determine the relative performance between high-yield bonds and convertibles. Chart 3Risk Decomposition, 1999-Present To do that we performed regressions of monthly total returns for both an index of convertible bonds and an index of B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds on three risk factors: Interest rate risk: proxied by the yield on the Treasury Master index Credit risk: proxied by the change in the high-yield bond spread Equity risk: proxied by monthly returns from the S&P 600 The top panel of Chart 3 shows the betas from the regressions. It shows that junk bonds have greater sensitivity to interest rate risk and credit risk, but are less sensitive to equity risk. However, to perform a complete risk attribution we need to consider both the sensitivity of returns to each risk factor and the volatilities of the risk factors themselves. The second panel of Chart 3 shows the variance of each of the three risk factors and the covariance between each pair of risk factors. With that information we are able to calculate the exposure of both junk bond and convertible bond returns to each risk factor by multiplying the squared beta by the variance of each risk factor.1 The results of this complete risk accounting are presented in the bottom panel of Chart 3. It shows that both convertible bond and junk bond total returns have small exposures to interest rate risk, with junk bonds having a somewhat larger exposure. However, the big difference between the two assets is that junk bond returns are mostly determined by credit risk while convertible bond returns are mostly determined by equity risk. This means that we can boil the decision of whether to invest in junk bonds or convertible bonds down to the question of whether junk spreads are likely to outperform equities. It is this question that we address in the next section. Convertible Bond Performance: Equities Vs. Credit Chart 4 shows that the history of relative total returns between convertible and high-yield bonds has gone through five distinct phases since the early 1990s. Chart 4Five Phases Of Convertible Bond Performance In the first phase, which culminated in the 1999/2000 tech boom, convertibles significantly outperformed junk. This is because junk spreads widened while equities performed exceptionally well. The fact that convertible bonds were a popular financing choice for small-cap tech companies also helped the sector's returns in 1999. The second phase, between 2000 and 2005, was characterized by falling Treasury yields and tighter credit spreads. Equities also performed well during this period, but not by enough to offset the impact of falling yields and tighter spreads. Junk bonds outperformed convertibles. Convertibles then outperformed junk from 2005 until the peak of the stock market in 2007. Junk spreads widened prior to the peak in the stock market, and this caused convertibles to outperform junk. Junk outperformed convertibles from 2007 until the mid-2012 trough in Treasury yields. This period was somewhat unique in that both equities and junk spreads were relatively flat. It was the greater impact of falling Treasury yields on junk bonds that drove the relative performance. Finally, convertibles have outperformed sharply since 2012, due to much higher equity prices. Junk spreads are also tighter but did experience a large widening in 2014/15. Higher Treasury yields during this time have also favored convertibles over junk. The Outlook For Convertibles The above framework gives us a way to qualitatively assess whether convertibles are likely to outperform junk going forward. First, with the Fed likely still not passed the mid-point of its rate hike cycle, Treasury yields will probably continue to rise. This will favor convertible bonds over junk bonds. Second, we have previously shown that junk bond spreads are fast approaching historically tight levels.2 In fact, we can calculate that B-rated junk spreads can only tighten another 180 bps before reaching all-time expensive valuations and Caa-rated spreads can only tighten another 375 bps. This represents only four months and five months of average monthly spread tightening, respectively. Further, junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets. The 2008 and 2002 bear markets being the most obvious examples (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). If this pattern is repeated it will help convertibles outperform junk in the late stages of the current recovery. On the equity side, although valuations are also expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low enough for the Fed to maintain an accommodative policy stance. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service also thinks that small cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months.3 As discussed above, convertible bonds are mostly issued by small cap firms. Our Cyclical Capitalization Indicator is above the zero line, indicating a favorable macro environment for small caps, and our valuation indicator shows that small caps are relatively cheap (Chart 5). However, arguably more important is that small caps remain a strong high-beta equity play (Chart 5, bottom panel). As long as the equity bull market is maintained, then small caps should outperform. One final factor that should drive the relative outperformance of small cap equities is the potential for Congress to pass tax legislation in the first half of next year. The relative small cap trade has been strongly correlated with other trades that are likely to benefit from proposed tax legislation and right now the market is probably assigning too low a probability to the chance that such legislation will pass (Chart 6). The biggest near-term risk for convertible bond returns relative to junk stems from the Technology sector. Chart 7 shows that divergences in performance between convertible bond sectors and high-yield bond sectors tend to be short lived. It also shows that Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months. It is almost certain that convertible Technology bonds are due for a period of underperformance, much like what happened to Healthcare & Pharmaceutical convertibles in 2014/15 (Chart 7, bottom panel). Given the size of the convertible Technology sector, any period of sector-specific underperformance would also exert a meaningful drag on the overall index. Chart 5Small Caps Poised For Outperformance Chart 6The Trump Trades Are Back On Chart 7Tax Cuts Will Help Small Caps In general, traditional late-cycle dynamics - rising Treasury yields and junk spreads widening before equities sell off - should favor convertible bonds over junk between now and the end of the economic recovery. We expect this will also be the case in the current cycle, although the recent outperformance in the technology sector makes us cautious in the near-term. The best strategy is probably to replace some low-rated high-yield bonds with convertibles, while avoiding the technology sector, and then subbing out even more junk for convertibles once Technology convertibles have come back down to earth. Bottom Line: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. This pattern will likely be repeated in the current cycle, although lofty valuations in the Technology sector make us cautious in the near-term. The Value Proposition The final question worth considering is whether convertible bonds appear fairly valued relative to history and investment alternatives. Specifically, we consider valuation from three different perspectives: Are equities fairly valued relative to high-yield bonds? If equities are cheap relative to high-yield bonds then it is reasonable to expect that convertible bonds are also cheap. Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to equities? Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to themselves? To answer the first question we use the BCA S&P 500 Valuation Indicator as our measure of equity valuation (Chart 8, top panel) and the 12-month high-yield breakeven spread as our measure of junk bond valuation (Chart 8, bottom panel). Both indicators are at relatively expensive levels. According to our chosen valuation metrics, equity valuation was only more expensive than it is today during the late 1990s tech boom, but in that period it reached much more expensive levels before changing course. In contrast, there have been several periods when junk breakeven spreads have been tighter, but even the all-time low is not that far below current levels. To create a true relative value indicator we standardized both our equity valuation indicator and the 12-month breakeven junk spread, and then subtracted one from the other. The result is shown in the middle panel of Chart 9 and it suggests that equities look a tad cheap compared to junk. However, relative valuation is nowhere near an extreme, and a more reasonable conclusion would be that equities and junk bonds appear fairly valued relative to each other. Chart 8Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation I Chart 9Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation II To answer the second question, whether convertible bonds look cheap relative to equities, we compare the parity (or conversion value) of the Convertible Bond index to our equity valuation indicator. The parity of the Convertible index is shown in the middle panel of Chart 8, and it shows that convertible bonds are quite expensive, but not as expensive as they were between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, our equity valuation indicator is at its most expensive levels of the current cycle. Once again, we standardize both our equity valuation indicator and the Convertible Bond index parity and take the difference. The result is shown in the bottom panel of Chart 9, and unsurprisingly, it suggests that convertible bonds appear relatively cheap compared to equities. To answer the final question, how convertibles are valued relative to themselves, we turn to Charts 10 and 11. Chart 10 shows the conversion premium of the Convertible Bond index relative to its parity. In essence, this chart shows how much extra an investor is being charged for convertible bonds relative to a similar equity portfolio. For a given parity level, a low conversion premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, and vice-versa. At the moment, Chart 10 shows that the index conversion premium is almost exactly in line with its expected value given the level of parity. Chart 10Conversion Premium Vs. Parity Chart 11Investment Premium Vs. Parity Chart 11 shows the Convertible Bond index's investment premium relative to parity. This chart shows how much extra an investor must pay for convertible bonds relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. Once again, a low investment premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, but at the moment the investment premium appears quite elevated. For the given parity level, investors are paying a bit too much for convertibles relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. In summary, while convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, on balance, there is not much of a pure valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. We do not think that valuation will be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus junk. Bottom Line: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Alex Wang, CFA, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 We also use beta weights to attribute the covariance risk to each individual risk factor and calculate the unexplained risk as the variance of the bond returns less the risk exposure from each of our three factors. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Small Cap Surge", dated October 9, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018. Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018, providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Is another "Great Moderation" at hand? Feature Uncertainty around the GOP tax plan led to a weaker dollar last week, but U.S. equities and Treasuries were little changed. The tax plan could fail if enough Republican voters turn against it. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team notes1 that as long as President Trump remains more popular with Republican voters than his Republican peers in Congress, he will be able to force the tax plan through both the Senate and the House. Moreover, we could even see some Democrats in the Senate supporting these tax changes. Ahead of the OPEC meeting on November 30, the weaker dollar along with the ongoing political turmoil boosted oil prices. Closer to home, corporate profits for Q3 2017 and guidance for Q4 2017 and beyond remains supportive for risk assets, although BCA expects S&P 500 earnings growth to peak in the next couple of quarters on a 4-quarter moving average basis. Global growth remains supportive for S&P 500, U.S. economic growth, and ultimately, higher inflation. Meanwhile, investors are still asking when price and wage inflation will turn higher toward the Fed's 2% forecast. BCA's answer: Be patient. In the final section of this week's report, we examine whether the recent period of low economic and financial market volatility will persist and herald a return to the Great Moderation. Q3 Earnings Season: Margins Still Expanding EPS and sales growth in Q3 ran well ahead of consensus expectations as forecasted in our October 2 preview. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in profit margins is still in place. Over 90% of companies have reported results so far, with 72% beating consensus EPS projections, just above the long-term average of 69%. Furthermore, 67% have posted Q3 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the long-term average of 55%. The surprise factor for year-over-year results in Q3 stands at 5% for EPS and 1% for sales. These compare favorably with the average EPS (4%) and sales (1%) in the past five years. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Margins tend to peak halfway through late-cycle periods.2 Nonetheless, the results imply that Q3 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Earnings growth (Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016) is solid at 8%, and in revenues, 5%. Strength in earnings and revenues is broad based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016 in 8 of the 11 sectors. The 7.3% year-over-year drop in the financial sector is attributed to the impact of the hurricanes on the insurance and reinsurance industries. Excluding those industries, financial EPS is up by 6% from a year ago. EPS results are particularly impressive in energy (162%), and strong in technology (24%), healthcare (8%), and materials (7%). These sectors likewise experienced significant sales gains (17%, 10%, 4%, and 9%, respectively). Corporate managements are more focused on the message in Washington than on the President (Chart 1). Trump's name was mentioned only twice in the Q3 earnings calls held through November 10, doubling the total in Q2. CEOs and CFOs have cited Trump's name at least once in each earnings season since Q2 2016. The zenith in mentions occurred immediately after Trump took office in early 2017. Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q3 2017 Results* Chart 1Managements Focused On The Message##BR##Not The Man In DC In contrast, "tax" and "reform" have appeared 13 times so far in Q3 conference calls, most often in a positive light. There were only five mentions in Q2 when investors were skeptical that a tax plan would pass this year. In the Q4 2016 reporting season following the November election, tax and reform were cited 16 times. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018.3 We are encouraged by the upward trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 2). It is odd that the recent downtick in 2017 EPS is mirrored by an uptick in the 2018 projection. The divergence can be explained by the effect of the hurricanes on the financial sector's earnings in 2017 and the probable snapback in early 2018. Analysts expect 2019 EPS growth to slow from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019.4 Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018 to a level commensurate with 3 ½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 3). Margins will crest in 2018. Accordingly, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller tailwind. This forecast excludes any encouraging effect on growth from tax cuts, which would be positive for EPS and the S&P 500 price index in the short term, but would bring forward Fed rate hikes. BCA expects growth outside the U.S. to remain robust, an additional support for EPS growth in the coming quarters. Chart 2Stability In '17 & '18 EPS Estimates, But '19 Likely To Move Lower Chart 3Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon Global Growth Update Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018,5 providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from the past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 4). Since the start of 2017, GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.6% to 3.2%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.8% to 3%. The 2019 growth projection is steady at 2.9%. This upward trajectory for 2017 and 2018 has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. The improving growth forecasts could be short-circuited by aggressive central bank actions, a worldwide trade war, or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia (or a combination of all three). Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of world growth, but BCA's stance is that oil prices will move up significantly in the coming year.6 Chart 4Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Global leading indicators are on the upswing. The most recent update of our Global Leading Indicator (excluding the U.S.) was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, the global LEI diffusion index turned positive after a worrisome dip below 50% earlier this year. It will be a warning sign for wide-reaching growth if the diffusion index moves back below 50% (Chart 5). Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding at nearly three times the U.S. rate (Chart 6). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. Additionally, G3 capital goods orders are climbing at the fastest pace since 2014. A stronger dollar may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be a modest offset, rather than something that derails the recovery in U.S. industrial production. Chart 5Global LEI's Pointing Higher Chart 6Supports For Global Growth In Place Global growth is important to large cap U.S. equities because 43% of S&P 500 sales in 2016 came from outside the U.S. (Table 2). Remarkably, this figure moved lower in the past 5 years and 10 years. In 2012, 47% of S&P 500 sales came from outside the U.S.; in 2007, it was only 1% less. The drop in overseas sales since 2012 masks shifts by region. In 2016, 8% of S&P 500 sales were to Asia, up 100 bps from 2012. Europe, excluding the U.K., accounted for 6% sales in 2016 and the U.K., a mere 1%. These numbers dropped from the 2012 figures of 10% and 2% respectively. While Standard and Poor's does not separate out sales to China, that country represents a large portion of sales to Asia, which makes China and Europe the two most important regions for overseas sales. In contrast, only 3% of S&P 500 sales are made in Canada and Mexico. Table 2Most S&P 500 Sales Go To Asia And Europe While BCA's European strategists remain upbeat about growth prospects in the Eurozone,7 our outlook on China is more sanguine. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that Chinese politics have shifted from tailwind to headwind for global growth in the wake of China's 19th National Party Congress.8 Meanwhile, BCA's China Investment Strategy states that the weak external demand environment faced by China in 2015 was a function of severe dislocations in the commodity and currency markets that probably will not recur in the coming 6-12 months. While Chinese export growth will moderate in the coming year, the absence of these shocks is an important factor supporting a gradual deceleration.9 Moreover, China's economic momentum is on the upswing. Real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic, all are expanding at double-digit rates, albeit down from recent peaks (Chart 7). Various price indexes also show a broadly based pickup in inflation to levels that will unnerve the authorities. Nonetheless, economic growth will slow in 2018 as policymakers continue to pare back stimulus. BCA does not foresee a substantial downturn in growth next year, but it could be hard on base metals prices. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both domestic economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant foreign business. Moreover, surging world growth is a precondition for higher inflation. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes10 that 68% of OECD nations have unemployment rates under the organization's assessment of "global NAIRU", which has not occurred since before the Great Recession when inflation expanded in both the goods and service sectors (Chart 8). Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and support the central bank's additional but gradual tightening stance. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. BCA's view that inflation is poised to turn higher also supports our duration call. Chart 7China: Healthy Growth Indicators Chart 8NAIRU Is Not Dead Yet Still Waiting For Wage Inflation Table 3Inflation Reacts With A Lag The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Given that inflation is a lagging indicator, investors must remain patient. Table 311 illustrates the time lag from when full employment is reached to the turning point for consumer price inflation. During long expansions, the gap is 26 months. The U.S. unemployment rate dipped below NAIRU 12 months ago in November 2016. The implication is that investors (and the Fed) are too eager as they wait for inflation's inflection point. BCA approaches wage growth - or the lack of it - in another way. Like inflation, wage growth takes time to materialize in protracted recoveries. Charts 9 and 10 provide updates on inflation and its leading indicators that we published in August 2017. These charts reiterate that price pressures take time to emerge in "slow burn" expansions. Chart 11 shows that the ECI has trended higher since 2009, matching increases in quit rates, NFIB compensation plans, and the Conference Board's measure of jobs hard to get less jobs easy to get. Moreover, the top panel of Chart 11 shows that the ECI gains are widespread and at 73%, the percentage of states reporting unemployment rates below NAIRU suggests that wage gains are imminent (Chart 12). Chart 9In the 80s And 90s Wage Growth Did Not##BR##Provide And Early Warning On Inflation Chart 10Patience Is Required On##BR##Inflation In Long Cycles Chart 11Labor Market Is Tight Enough##BR##To Push Up Inflation Chart 1270%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker,12 which is not compromised by compositional shifts in the labor market, stabilized in the past few months after rolling over in the spring and early summer. Moreover, the Tracker remains in a distinct uptrend; at 3.6% year-over-year, it is at the lower end of the 3.3% to 4.3% year-over-year range in place before the global financial crisis (Chart 13, panel 2). Chart 13Wage Pressures Mounting Bottom Line: Wage inflation is on the upswing as the output gap turns positive for the first time in a decade and the unemployment rate moves even further below NAIRU. A persistent buildup in wages will allow the Fed to bump up rates in December and three times again next year. This supports BCA's underweight stance on duration. That said, a sudden surge in consumer price or wage inflation would trigger a more aggressive response from the Fed, and a signal of "the beginning of the end" for the recent return of the Great Moderation. Great Moderation, Interrupted? The Great Recession was eight years ago, but investors are now ruminating about the return of the Great Moderation era (mid-1980s to mid-2007), when subdued macroeconomic volatility often coincided with low market volatility. Then, as now, inflation was muted and stable, but unlike today, economic growth was much faster in a long expansion phase with two mild recessions (Chart 14). There have been many studies rationalizing the Great Moderation, which was observed in most advanced economies (G7 countries and Australia) roughly at the same time though not fully synchronized (Chart 15).The phenomenon13 was initially forged in 2002 by Stock and Watson and then publicized by former Fed Chair Bernanke14 in a 2004 speech.15 Chart 14Return Of The Great Moderation? Chart 15The Great Moderation: A Global Phenomenon Too! Three main causes were identified: Structural changes in the economy: improvement in inventory management as the U.S. moved away from a manufacturing-based economy towards a service-based economy, the latter less volatile. Financial innovations, for example, increased credit availability to households through the rise of securitization, allowing consumption to be more balanced; Higher efficacy of monetary policy: increased transparency and predictability of FOMC actions, which augmented the Fed's credibility to tame inflation (price stability) and foster full employment; Good Luck (smaller shocks): post mid-1980s (and up to the global financial crisis-GFC), the economy did not experience outsized shocks such as the surge in oil prices in the 1960s and the 1970s. Most investors and/or economists agree that structural changes and better monetary policy were significant drivers of the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Good luck also seems to have been a factor and there is empirical research to support it. The persistence and length of the current expansion is an indication that good luck still plays a role, with investors taking on risk and becoming complacent. That said, there does not seem to be a consensus on the single most important driver of the "Great Moderation". Interestingly, complacency in the financial markets creates vulnerability at the late stage in this expansion. It has caught the Fed's attention as evidenced in the September 19-20 FOMC minutes: "Broad U.S. equity price indexes increased over the intermeeting period. One-month-ahead option-implied volatility of the S&P 500 index - the VIX - remained at historically low levels despite brief spikes associated with increased investor concerns about geopolitical tensions and political uncertainties." Since Chair Yellen took office in February 2014, this is the most direct reference about low volatility and therefore, complacency in the financial markets. Chart 16Back To Low Correlations Among Stocks The November 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report16 discussed complacency in the context of a return of the Great Moderation. BCA believes significant complacency is signaled by the good news already discounted in equity prices, the depressed level of the VIX and the decline this year in risk asset correlations. Moreover, large institutional investors are reportedly selling volatility and thus, dampening implied volatility across asset classes. The "Great Moderation" in macro volatility is also contributing to low correlations among stocks (Chart 16). The idea is that low perceived macroeconomic volatility during the "Great Moderation" had diminished the dispersion of growth and inflation forecasts, thereby trimming the variance of interest rate projections. This allowed equity investors to focus on alpha rather than beta, given less uncertainty about the macro outlook. The focus on alpha contributed to the decline in stock price correlation. Today, dispersion in the outlooks for growth and interest rates have returned to pre-Lehman levels, helping to explain the low levels of implied volatility and correlation in the equity market (Chart 17). Some of the reduced dispersion can be justified by the fundamentals. The onset of a broadly based global expansion has calmed lingering fears that the world economy is constantly teetering on the edge of the abyss. Investor uncertainty regarding economic policy has also moderated (bottom panel). Historically, implied volatility tended to fall when global industrial production was strong and global earnings were rising in a broad swath of countries (Chart 18). Our U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service points out that, during the later stages of the cycle, equity sector correlations tend to drop. The lower correlations occur as earnings fundamentals become more important performance drivers, and sector differentiation generates alpha.17 Similarly, the VIX can fluctuate at low levels for an extended time when global growth is broadly based. Chart 17A Less Uncertain Macro Outlook? Chart 18Broad-Based Growth Lowers Implied Volatility Still, the current readings of equity market correlation and the VIX are unnerving given a plethora of potential geopolitical crises and the pending unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Moreover, any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart. Table 4 shows the drop in the S&P 500 index during non-recessionary periods when the VIX surges by more than 10% in a 13-week period. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during those nine episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Table 4Episodes When VIX Spiked Bottom Line: Longer expansions and shorter recessions, alongside the decline in market volatility, may stay for a while, the result of the perceived return to the Great Moderation. Risk assets are thus vulnerable because a lot of good news is discounted. Nonetheless, we would view any pullback in equities as a healthy correction rather than the beginning of a bear market. If the next recession is not expected before 2019 (our base case), then it is too early for the equity market to begin to discount the next bear market because profits will continue to expand well into 2018. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds in the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here... So Much for Populism," November 8, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Synchronicity," September 25, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Some Upside In The Nickel Market," November 2, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Resynchronization," September 21, 2017. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2017. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?," November 1, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs. Today (Part I): Trade," October 26, 2017. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No," September 12, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12 https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/wage-growth-tracker.aspx?panel=1 13 Peter M. Summers, "What Caused the Great Moderation" Some Cross-Country Evidence", 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City www.kansascityfed.org/ROkYZ/OcgaZ/Publicat/econrev/PDF/3q05summ.pdf 14 James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, "Has the Business Cycle Changed? Evidence and Explanations", August 2003 https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2003/pdf/Stockwatson2003.pdf 15 Governor Ben S. Bernanke, "The Great Moderation," Washington, DC, February 20, 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/ 16 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Later Cycle Dynamics," published October 23, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, Next week on November 20th instead of our regular weekly publication you will receive our flagship publication "The Bank Credit Analyst" with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on November 27th with our high-conviction trades for 2018. Kind Regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Melting medical care input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. Stay long health care insurers. Pharma and biotech stocks suffer from declining pricing power. Continue to avoid both. As a result, the S&P health care index remains in the underweight column. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities consolidated recent gains as earnings season drew to a close last week. Recent election results coupled with the revealing of the Senate tax bill raised fresh concerns, unwarranted according to our geopolitical strategists, about the likelihood of a bill passage. While such heightened fiscal policy uncertainty is disquieting, solid EPS growth on the back of synchronized global economic and capex growth should sustain the overshoot phase in stocks. Q3 EPS vaulted to a fresh all-time high (Chart 1) and, were it not for two financials sector sub-indexes - reinsurers and multi-line insurers that were severely hit by the one off hurricane catastrophes - financials EPS growth would have been nil from -7.3%, pushing the overall SPX EPS number to 9.2% from 8.1%. Chart 2 shows that the positive EPS surprise factor remained close to the recent average. Going into earnings season, Q3 EPS growth forecasts collapsed to 4.1%, but actual results ended up 400bps higher. Chart 1Earnings-Led Advance Continues Chart 2Surprise Factor In Line With Recent Average While EPS growth cannot stay in the high teens forever, settling down close to 10%/annum EPS growth rate is possible in the near run. The softness in the U.S. dollar along with the basic resource sector commodity-related comeback, synchronized global economic and capex growth and financials contributing more than sell side analysts expect to overall EPS, suggest that such profit growth is attainable in 2018. Tack on the possibility of fiscal easing and sustained lift in animal spirits (bottom panel, Chart 1), and the odds of low double-digit EPS growth increase further. Meanwhile on the monetary policy front, news of Powell's nomination to take the helm at the Fed barely budged the equity market, but some cracks are appearing in the bond market (Chart 3). Keep in mind that going back to Volcker's late-1970s nomination, Fed Chair transitions have been volatile. In fact, the market has tested the resolve of all four previous Fed leaders (Chart 4). As soon as Volcker come into power he had to deal with the early-1980s recession (and the LatAm crisis in 1982) that saw the market fall by 17% from peak to trough. When Greenspan was confirmed Chairman in August of 1987, two months into his tenure Black Monday happened and he had to step in and reiterate the Fed's function as a lender of last resort. In 2006 Bernanke took over from the Maestro, and a recession hit by the end of 2007 that morphed into the Great Recession. Finally in early-2014, Yellen become the Fed Chairwoman and in late-2015 a global manufacturing recession had taken hold resulting in a 14% drawdown in the SPX. Chart 3Watching The Bond Market Chart 4Testing Times Inevitably, the market will test the new Fed Chairman. This expansion has been long in the tooth and given BCA's 2019 recession view, this testing time is at least a year away. This week we reiterate our underweight stance in a defensive sector and highlight its key sub-components. Stick With Managed Health Care Exposure Following a two year hiatus, managed health care stocks broke out in 2017 and the juggernaut has now resumed (Chart 5). While the recent unsuccessful intra-industry M&A attempts (breakdown of both AET/HUM and ANTM/CI deals) were a mild setback, CVS's latest announcement, to take over AET and further vertically integrate, has brought euphoria back to this health care subgroup. We have added alpha to our portfolio as relative performance is up smartly, roughly 24% since our early-April 2016 overweight recommendation, begging the question: Is the time ripe to lock in impressive profits and move to the sidelines or is there more upside left? Leading profit indicators suggest that more gains are in store for the relative share price ratio. After petering out in 2016, our managed care cost proxy (comprising physician and hospital services and medical care commodity inflation) has plummeted by over 350bps from the recent peak (shown inverted, second panel, Chart 5). Given that premiums are set on a trailing cost basis, profit margins should surprise to the upside, i.e. the industry's medical loss ratio has room to fall. Not only is our medical care input cost proxy melting, but the latest employment cost index release revealed that managed health care wage inflation is also steadily decelerating (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Taken together, these two cost categories are heralding a solid industry EPS growth backdrop in the coming months (total cost proxy shown inverted, second panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Melting Costs Are A Boon To Margins... Chart 6...And EPS Importantly, health care insurers are also set to benefit from the Trump administration's push toward lowering drug prices and the proliferation of generic drugs. While drug inflation is positive for the pharma/biotech space, it is an expense incurred by managed care providers and vice versa. The upshot is that the pharmaceutical sector's pain will be the managed health care industry's gain (bottom panel, Chart 5). On the legislative front, the failed attempts to repeal and replace the ACA is positive as the newly enrolled will likely remain insured and underpin recurring industry revenues. As long as costs stay in check, the implication is ongoing earnings improvement. Tack on any relief related to a tax bill passage (the managed care index has a 47% effective tax rate or 24% higher than the overall S&P health care sector, see Table 2) and the path of least resistance is higher for profits. Table 2Tax Relief Potential Despite all of these positives, relative valuation remains muted, hovering near the neutral zone. On a forward P/E basis the S&P managed care index is trading on a par with the S&P 500 (Chart 7). If our thesis of sustained earnings outperformance materializes in the coming quarters, then a valuation re-rating phase looms. In sum, melting input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. This is a recipe for a durable valuation expansion phase. Bottom Line: While we are underweight the broad health care index, our sole overweight remains the S&P managed health care index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC. Ailing Pharma We downgraded pharma to an underweight stance on July 31 on the back of weak pricing power fundamentals, soft spending backdrop, a depreciating U.S. dollar and deteriorating industry operating metrics. The S&P pharmaceuticals index relative performance is down 5% since then as our bearish profit thesis is validated. Our dual synchronized global economic and capex growth themes bode ill for defensive pharmaceutical stocks. Nondiscretionary health care outlays jump in times of duress and underwhelm during expansions. Currently, the soaring ISM manufacturing index is signaling that pharma profits will remain under pressure in the coming months as the most cyclical parts of the economy flex their muscles (the ISM survey is shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 8). A depreciating currency is also synonymous with pharma profit ails (bottom panel, Chart 8). Historically, a soft U.S. dollar has been closely correlated with global growth, whereas greenback strength tends to slowdown the global economy. In that context, pharma exports should at least provide some top line growth relief during depreciating U.S. dollar phases. However, pharma exports are contracting at an accelerating pace (top panel, Chart 8) despite the U.S. dollar's year-to-date softness, warning that global pharma demand is sick. Importantly, the news on the pricing power front is disconcerting. Both in absolute terms and relative to overall PPI, pharma selling prices are steadily losing steam. In the context of a bloated industry workforce, the profit margin outlook darkens significantly (Chart 9). If the Trump administration also manages to clamp down on the secular growth of pharma selling price inflation, then industry margins will remain under chronic pressure. Worrisomely, were pharma prices to continue to trail overall corporate sector price inflation, as we expect, then the de-rating phase in the S&P pharmaceuticals index has a long ways to go (bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, even on the operating metric front, the news is mostly grim. Pharma industrial production is nil and our pharma productivity proxy remains muted, warning that profits will likely underwhelm. Industry retail sales growth is also flirting with the zero line and pharma inventories have resumed growing on a short-term rate of change basis across the supply channel. Pharma shipments offer the only ray of hope. But the recent acceleration in the latter may be the result of the hurricane-related catastrophes (Chart 10). Chart 8Counter Cyclical With##br## No Export Relief Chart 9Weak Pricing Power And Bloated##br## Cost Structure Weighs On Margins Chart 10Operating Metrics ##br##Are Also Feeble Netting it out, pharma profit growth is on track to continue to disappoint as the confluence of synchronized global growth, softening U.S. dollar, pricing power losses and deteriorating operating metrics are all profit headwinds. Bottom Line: We reiterate our late-July downgrade in the S&P pharma index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, AGN, LLY, ZTS, MYL, PRGO. A Few Words On Biotech Biotech stocks are another casualty of weakening pharmaceutical wholesale price inflation, and given that the industry's profits move neck-and-neck with their pharma siblings, revenue and EPS growth are bound to continue to surprise to the downside (Chart 11). We expect such profit woes will weigh on the S&P biotech index relative performance, and re-iterate our high-conviction underweight status. Chart 11Biotech Equities Hate Higher Rates Chart 12Technicals Say Sell Not only are biotech firms modestly concealed Big Pharma, i.e. they manufacture multi-billion dollar blockbuster drugs, and the Trump administration's scrutiny of drug price inflation is a profit negative, but also a rising interest rate backdrop is working against this health care sub-index. Historically, rising interest rates have been inversely correlated with biotech stocks. High flying valuations tend to gravitate back to earth when the Fed embarks on a tightening cycle. The opposite is also true. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy view remains that in the coming 12 months interest rates will be higher, moving closer to the 3% mark on the 10-year Treasury yield front. If such a selloff materializes in the bond market, then investors will abandon biotech stocks in a heartbeat (Chart 11). Chart 13Heed The EPS Growth Model Signal Meanwhile, according to empirical evidence since the mid-1990s, relative momentum in biotech stocks is nearly perfectly inversely correlated with the global credit impulse (Chart 11). This negative correlation has become more pronounced in the past decade underscoring the non-discretionary/defensive nature of large biotech outfits. In other words biotech stocks behave like counter-cyclicals similar to their pharma brethren. Given BCA's view of a recession hitting some time in 2019, we recommend investors still avoid biotech stocks. Finally, technicals are also waving a red flag. Chart 12 shows that a head-and-shoulders formation has taken root and were the neckline to give way in the coming weeks, relative performance would suffer a substantial setback. Bottom Line: Biotech stocks remain a high-conviction underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BIOTX - ABBV, AMGN, GILD, CELG, BIIB, VRTX, REGN, ALXN, INCY. Health Care Sector Implications What does all this mean for the broad S&P health care sector? Our relative profit growth model best encapsulates these forces and is signaling that profits will remain downbeat into 2018 (Chart 13). Managed health care stocks (overweight) comprise 13% of the index, while pharma (underweight) and biotech (underweight) market capitalization weights both add up to 54% of the total. As a result of our intra-sector positioning and given our neutral weightings in the remaining health care sub-indexes, we continue to recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P health care index. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P health care sector. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights China's mini-cycle has peaked, which has raised concerns among global investors that China may return to below-trend growth over the coming year, similar to what occurred in 2015. In our view, the severe slowdown in the Chinese economy in 2015 was due to overly tight monetary policy coupled with a severely weak external demand environment. A monetary conditions approach has done an excellent job of predicting industrial activity in China over the past several years. While monetary policy has tightened somewhat since the beginning of the year, none of the monetary conditions indexes that we track have come close to returning to 2015 levels. In short, an uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the Chinese economy is not in the cards. This favors the performance of Chinese stocks, both in absolute and relative terms. Stay overweight. Feature Last week's report was replaced by a Special Report prepared by my colleague Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President of our Geopolitical Strategy team.1 The report presented a full "postmortem" on the Party Congress, and outlined how stepped up reform efforts in China are likely over the coming year, and beyond. By "reforms", our geopolitical team specifically means deleveraging in the financial sector accompanied by a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, as well as ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. The implications of the "reform reboot" scenario presented in last week's report are negative for emerging markets (EM) and other plays on China's industrial sector (such as industrial metals). We agree that a "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely given that President Xi has succeeded in amassing tremendous political capital and that he has an agenda for reform. But the intensity of reforms pursued over the coming year will have to be closely monitored by policymakers, to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. As such, the view of BCA's China Investment Strategy service is that the reform efforts over the coming year will be structured at a pace that is sufficient to avoid a meaningful deceleration in China's industrial sector, even though the momentum of China's "mini" economic cycle of the past two years has very likely peaked. However, the potential for a brisk pace of reforms to cause a more acute decline in industrial activity is a risk to our view that the slowdown in China's economy is likely to be benign and controlled. Monitoring reform progress is likely to be a key theme for this publication over the coming year. Over the nearer term, the potential impact of reform efforts is not the only risk to the economy, as many market participants appear to be worried that the peak in China's mini-cycle presages a destabilizing decline in economic activity. This week's report is the second of two parts examining the key differences facing China today from what prevailed in mid-2015,2 when the Chinese economy operated below what investors and market participants considered to be a "stable" pace of growth. In Part II we focus on monetary policy, and outline how the monetary environment remains stimulative despite a significant rise in corporate bond yields over the past year. China's Monetary Policy Stance: A Brief Review Chart 1 presents the one-year policy lending rate over the past decade, and highlights the four distinct phases that have prevailed since the global financial crisis in 2008: Chart 1A Brief Review Of China's Monetary Policy Stance A long period of significant easing that began during the Great Recession and lasted until late-2010 A material rate tightening cycle that began in late-2010 and ended in mid-2012 A half-reversal of the 2011/2012 rate cycle, which happened quickly in the summer of 2012 and was followed by a long pause until late-2014, and A significant series of rate cuts over the course of 2015, followed by a 2-year pause at current levels. We contend that policymakers were too timid in responding to economic weakness in China at the end of the third monetary policy phase highlighted in Chart 1, and that this hesitation magnified the impact of the serious deterioration in China's external demand environment that we discussed in Part I of this report. Chart 2Monetary Conditions Predict ##br##Chinese Industrial Activity Of course, in a large, trade-sensitive, economy like that of China, interest rates are not the only determinant of the degree of monetary accommodation. In order to capture the effects of the exchange rate and other factors affecting the efficacy of monetary policy, we have tended to show a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as a stand-in for the policy stance. As shown in Chart 2, the Bloomberg MCI has done an excellent job of leading industrial activity in China over the past several years, particularly during the mini-cycle of the past two years. While the MCI appears to have peaked early this year, it remains well above (i.e. more accommodative) the levels reached in mid-2015 when policymakers finally became serious about easing monetary conditions. Looking Forward Chart 3 presents a few alternative MCIs for China alongside Bloomberg's measure. Analysts tend to employ a variety of approaches when calculating monetary conditions indexes, but the real interest rate and the real effective exchange rate almost always feature prominently. Of the three alternative measures, Citigroup's MCI is the most bearish, as it includes the year-over-year growth rate of M2 which has recently languished. The remaining two measures are BCA calculations, one that deflates interest rates using producer prices, and one that uses core consumer prices. Both of our measures employ an equal split between the real interest rate and the exchange rate. Chart 3 highlights that all four MCIs have either peaked or are now falling, suggesting that a tightening in financial conditions earlier this year has somewhat reduced the degree of monetary accommodation to the economy. However, there are three key points to consider when judging the likely impact of monetary tightening on China's economy over the coming 6-12 months: None of the MCIs shown in Chart 3 have returned to their 2015 low, implying that the policy tightening that has occurred over the past year is not likely to cause Chinese industrial activity to crash in over the coming 6-12 months. Most of the appreciation in the RMB this year has occurred versus the dollar, not against the euro or in trade-weighted terms (Chart 4). In fact, in trade-weighted the RMB remains 6.5% below where it was in August 2015 prior to the currency devaluation. This highlights that the recent appreciation largely reflects dollar weakness, rather than policy-induced strength in the RMB. Chart 3Monetary Conditions Have Not Returned##br## To 2015 Levels Chart 4Recent RMB Appreciation##br## Reflects Dollar Weakness Average lending rates have only increased approximately 40 bps over the past year, in comparison to the 200 bps of easing that occurred from 2014 to 2016 (Chart 5). In real terms (when deflated by core consumer prices), average interest rate have barely risen at all this year. The still modest rise in average lending rates is an important consideration, because it contrasts with the rise in Chinese bond yields, both in the government and corporate sectors. For example, Chart 6 shows that corporate bond yields have risen by 160 bps since late-2016 and are 25 bps higher than they were in early-2015. Chart 5Average Lending Rates ##br##Have Risen Only Modestly Chart 6Corporate Bond Yields##br## Have Tightened Materially But our view is that average lending rates are a more important driver of debt service payments for China's non-financial sector. In fact, Table 1 highlights that while corporate bond financing is a growing component of Chinese private social financing, it is still quite small. The table presents a breakdown of adjusted social financing, which highlights that the sum of local currency loans, foreign currency loans in RMB, trust and entrusted loans equals roughly 85% of total social financial excluding equity issuance. Corporate bonds, by contrast, account for only about 10%, suggesting that the economic impact of the rise in bond yields this year will be relatively small. Table 1Corporate Bonds Account For A Small Percent Of China's Social Financing Investment Implications We noted in our October 12 Weekly Report that the acceleration in the Chinese economy that began in mid-2015 has likely peaked (Chart 7), ending the upswing of this "mini" economic cycle. Chart 7A Stylized View Of China's Recent The framework illustrated in Chart 7 presented three distinct scenarios for China over the coming 6-12 months: A re-acceleration of the economy and a continuation of the V-shaped rebound profile, A benign, controlled deceleration and settling of growth into the "stable" growth range, and An uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy that threatens a return to the conditions that prevailed in early-2015 (or worse). In our view, the Chinese economy in early-2015 began to operate below the "stable" growth range shown in Chart 7, owing to a "double whammy" of excessively tight monetary conditions and a synchronized global downturn. While our research suggests that China's export growth will moderate over the coming year and that monetary conditions have tightened somewhat, the magnitude of these changes are not sufficiently large to return the Chinese economy back to 2015-like conditions. To us, this is consistent with the second scenario presented above. From an absolute equity perspective, this conclusion is positive for Chinese stock prices. Chart 8 highlights that the Li Keqiang index correlates fairly well with the growth in earnings for the MSCI China index ex technology; a moderate decline in the pace of growth in China's industrial sector would blunt the earnings growth of these firms, but not enough to cause an outright contraction. The combination of positive ex-tech earnings growth and very cheap valuation (Chart 9) suggests that the absolute uptrend in Chinese ex-technology stocks that began at the beginning of 2016 is likely to continue. Chart 8Ex-Tech EPS Growth Will Moderate, ##br##But Not Contract Chart 9Excluding Technology, ##br##China Is Extraordinarily Cheap In relative terms, the picture is somewhat cloudier, although for now we would continue to favor the China MSCI index versus global and emerging market stocks. Chart 10 highlights that Chinese equities have outperformed global stocks even when excluding tech companies, although it is clear that most of the recent outperformance is due to the IT sector. On the earnings front, while we expect Chinese ex-tech earnings growth to moderate over the coming year, this is also true of overall U.S. equities (Chart 11). Finally, Chart 12 highlights that while Chinese technology firms are richly priced vs their global counterparts, the multi-year relative outperformance trend has been fundamentally-driven, a situation that does not appear to be threatened by a slowdown in China's industrial sector (given the largely domestic & consumer orientation of Chinese technology firms). Chart 10China Is Beating Global,##br## Even Excluding Technology Chart 11U.S. Earnings Growth##br## Is Set To Moderate Chart 12China's Tech Rally Is ##br##Fundamentally-Driven Bottom Line: The economic momentum of China's 2-year mini-cycle has probably peaked, but an uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy is not in the cards. This favors the performance of Chinese stocks, both in absolute and relative terms. Stay overweight. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?", dated November 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Powell's nomination will not change the Fed's gradual rate hike path, but open Board seats are a worry. Household debt growth is slower than usual, but auto debt levels are a concern. Stocks will beat bonds and oil will rise after EPS growth peaks next year. Funding liquidity should remain adequate as the Fed unwinds its balance sheet. Feature Last week was an extraordinarily busy week for U.S. financial markets, but BCA's view on the economy, the Fed and asset class returns remains the same. President Trump named Jerome Powell to replace Janet Yellen as Fed Chair and the GOP released additional details of their tax plan. The October readings on employment, manufacturing, and wage growth fell short of expectations. However, data on consumer confidence, non-manufacturing ISM and vehicle sales for October exceeded expectations. The Q3 Employment Cost Index will give Fed policymakers confidence that the Phillips curve is not dead, but the persistent weakness in unit labor costs (the Q3 data was released last week) will concern the FOMC. The Fed remains on track to raise rates by 0.25% in December and three more times in 2018, matching their dot plot. While average hourly earnings disappointed in October, the impacts of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma make the data difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, the year-over-year growth in the 3-month moving average of average hourly earnings was 2.6% in October, up from 2.5% in July, before Harvey made landfall in Texas. Moreover, real GDP is growing faster than the economy's long term potential (1.8% per the Fed), and at 4.1%, the unemployment rate is well below the Fed's measure of full employment (4.6%) (Chart 1). Jerome Powell will continue to pursue the gradual rate hikes preferred by his predecessor. However, Powell is the first Fed Chair since G. William Miller (1978-79) to not have a PhD in economics. He is not known as a policy hawk or a dove, and this lack of conviction in his own policy suggests that he will rely on more on his Board colleagues for direction than recent chairs. The potential power shift from the chair to the committee may make FOMC communications more difficult to interpret. After Yellen departs the Fed early next year, the seven-member board will be down to just four, providing Trump the opportunity to further shape monetary policy. Table 1 provides Powell's comments on key aspects of the economy, monetary and regulatory policy. Chart 1Labor Market Conditions Tightening##BR##And Support More Rate Hikes Table 1Powell On Monetary Policy, The Economy And Regulation BCA expects that Powell, a Republican, will be confirmed by the Senate and preside over the FOMC meeting in March 2018. Powell already sits on the Fed Board. In 2012 President Obama appointed Powell to the Fed to fill an unexpired term. The Senate voted 74-21 to confirm. Two years later, Powell was confirmed 67-21 for a full term (14 years) as a governor. Fifty-one votes are required for confirmation. BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, wrote about the potential for change at Federal Reserve Board earlier this year.1 The bottom line is that looming changes in the composition of the Fed's Board of Governors are important, but we doubt that the overall integrity of the Fed will be seriously compromised by bad appointments. However, at this stage, it is futile to guess who the Administration will choose. Regardless of who controls the Fed, there always will be the potential for errors because their economic models (along with everybody else's) are imprecise, data can be unreliable, and the policy tools are crude. Some uptick in inflation is likely and would even be desirable, but it will not be allowed to get out of control. The bigger uncertainty is what will happen after the next economic downturn because even the most hawkish policymakers may be forced to embrace inflationary policies that will make the past cycle's actions pale by comparison. Subprime Auto Sector Signals Household deleveraging has ended, but consumers are reticent to take on new debt despite an improving labor market and record household net worth. Household debt is growing at under 2% a year, less than half the pre-crisis pace. Moreover, household debt relative to disposable income remains well below a decade ago, but the household indebtedness profile is not uniform. While the debt-to-disposable income ratio of mortgage and revolving consumer credit has moved lower, the ratio of non-revolving credit (which includes both auto and student loan debt) has moved up since 2010 and surpassed the 15.8% pre-crisis peak in 2012 (Chart 2). Chart 2Household Debt By Sector In 2016, 34% of U.S. families had vehicle loans, up from a low of 30% in 2010. In 2004-2007, more than one-third of U.S. families carried auto debt (Chart 3). The median value of households' auto loans is $13,000 (in 2016 dollars), up from $11,000 in 2010, but still below the 2004-2007 peak of $14,000 (Chart 4). However, delinquency rates are on the rise in those areas where consumers have been adding debt (credit cards, auto loans and student loans) (Chart 5). Chart 3Rise In % Of Families With Auto Loan Debt... Chart 4...But Auto Debt Levels Are Manageable In particular, default rates in auto and student loans are above their mid-2000s readings, but are below their 2010-2012 zenith. Lending standards for vehicle loans were easy at the start of the decade, became less so recently and then turned restrictive in mid-2016. In the mid-2000s, borrowing guidelines for student loans and credit cards (data on bank lending standards for auto loans began in 2011) were easy in 2004-2007. Banks are taking a cautious approach to consumer lending in this cycle. The gradual tightening of lending criteria between 2010 and 2016 led to a drop in the average FICO score for new auto loans. However, as standards tightened in 2016 and into the first quarter of 2017, the average FICO escalated. FICO scores for new vehicle loans moved sharply lower in Q2; it may be a new trend or perhaps a blip in the data. Even with the latest dip, the FICO for new auto loans (698) is well above the 675-685 range that prevailed in 2004-2006 (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5Consumer Loan Metrics Chart 6ABS Market Overview Subprime auto loans as a percentage of all auto loans remain well below pre-crisis levels and should limit a wave of subprime auto defaults in the years ahead. Only 22% of the $148 billion in new vehicle loans recorded in Q2 2017 were issued to borrowers with FICO scores below 620. The latest reading is in the middle of the range that has been in effect since 2010 (18-25%). Between 2004 and 2007, the share of auto loans issued to subprime borrowers was as high as 32% in 2006 and averaged 28%. The FOMC has elevated financial stability in its recent deliberations2 and is watching for imbalances. The September 20-21 FOMC meeting minutes noted that "Subprime auto loan balances have declined so far this year, partly reflecting the tighter lending standards, and the average credit score of all borrowers who obtained an auto loan in the second quarter remained near the upper end of its range of the past few years." We expect the Fed to remain vigilant on this issue. Bottom Line: Household debt ratios are well below the pre-2007 peak, but consumers are piling on more auto debt. While delinquency rates for auto debt are rising, banks are tightening lending requirements and have not extended auto credit to subprime borrowers outside of historical norms. If household incomes, the stock market and housing prices rise, and banks and regulators remain vigilant, then the subprime auto sector would not pose a systemic risk to the U.S. economy or financial system.3 BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service prefers Aaa-rated credit card ABS over Aaa-rated auto loan ABS (Chart 6). Investment Direction After EPS Peak Chart 7Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should slow through 2018 toward a level commensurate with 3½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 7). Accordingly, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller force. This forecast excludes any positive effects on growth from tax cuts that would encourage EPS and the S&P 500 index in the short term, although this would also bring forward Fed rate hikes. We will provide an update on the Q3 earnings reporting season in next week's report. Investors are questioning what will happen to risk assets after earnings growth peaks, but before it slips below zero (Table 2). BCA has identified seven episodes between 1973 and 2015 when S&P 500 EPS growth reached a top and subsequently dipped below zero. Four of the seven periods (1973-75, 1976-80, 1988-1991, and 1993-2001) partially overlapped with recessions. The U.S. economy was in recession during the entire 1973-75 period but the recession occurred at or near the end in the other three occurrences. U.S. stocks, Treasuries and oil behave consistently during these periods. The performance of gold, the dollar, small caps (relative to large) and high yield (relative to Treasuries) is not consistent, and investment-grade corporate debt underperformed Treasuries in six of the seven intervals. On average, stocks beat bonds by 3,000 bps after earnings decelerate, but before they turn negative. Oil (+8,310 basis points) and gold (+6,950 bps) are the standouts; both commodities beat stocks) as earnings growth fades. Small caps barely outperform large, and the dollar, on average, is flat across all seven periods. Investment-grade corporate debt underperforms Treasuries by an average of 50 bps during these episodes. Table 2U.S. Asset Class Performance As EPS Growth Slows The three occasions when EPS growth crested and then slowed to zero, but the economy avoided a recession, were in the mid-1980s, the mid-2000s and the early part of the current decade. These mid-cycle slowdowns were triggered by Fed rate hikes in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s; in the early 2010s, there were similar fears of a rate increase, coupled with a stronger dollar and a collapse in oil prices. The performance of risk assets during these mid-cycle earnings corrections was similar to the entire sample, although the magnitude of the asset class performances shifted. Oil (+12,560 bps) and gold (+8,400 bps) were standouts; equity and Treasury prices both rose, but equities beat Treasuries by nearly 10,000 bps, easily surpassing the 3,000 bps outperformance in all periods. Small caps underperformed large caps and the dollar climbed (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. Asset Class Performance As EPS Growth Slows Bottom Line: S&P 500 earnings growth will peak in 2018. Stocks will outperform bonds as profit growth slows, which matches BCA's stance for the next 12 months. Gold and oil have both outpaced equities as earnings abate; this supports BCA's bullish position and above-consensus view of oil for 2018. BCA's modestly bullish stance on the dollar in the next 12-18 months aligns with the historical achievements of the dollar as earnings moderate, but BCA's bullish view on small caps runs counter to history after EPS growth crests. The Great Balance Sheet Unwind Given that the era of quantitative easing has been a positive one for risk assets, it is unsurprising that investors are concerned about the looming unwind of the Fed's massive balance sheet. For example, Chart 9 demonstrates the correlation between the change in G4 balances sheets and both the stock market and excess returns in the U.S. high-yield market. In an October 2017 Special Report,4 the Bank Credit Analyst outlines how the pending shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet could affect overall liquidity conditions. Liquidity falls into four categories: monetary, balance sheet, financial market transaction liquidity, and funding liquidity. Overall liquidity conditions are reasonably constructive for risk assets at the moment. Financial market and balance sheet liquidity are adequate. Monetary policy is extremely easy, although the low level of money and credit growth underscores that the credit channel of monetary policy is still somewhat impaired and/or constrained relative to the pre-Lehman years. Funding liquidity is as important as monetary liquidity for financial markets. It has recovered from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) lows, but it is far from frothy. More intense regulation means that funding liquidity will probably never again be as favorable for risk assets as it was before the crisis. But, hopefully, efforts by the authorities to reduce perceived systemic risk mean that funding liquidity may not be as quick to dry up as was the case in 2008, in the event of another negative shock. Unwinding the Fed's balance sheet represents a risk to investors because QE played such an important role in reducing risk premia in financial markets. The unwind should not affect transactions liquidity or balance sheet liquidity. It should not affect the broad monetary aggregates either. Chart 10 presents our forecast for how quickly the Fed's balance sheet will contract. Following the September 19-20 FOMC meeting we learned that balance sheet reduction will begin October 1. For the first three months the Fed will allow a maximum of $6 billion in Treasuries and $4 billion in MBS to run off each month. Those caps will increase in steps of $6 billion and $4 billion, respectively, every three months until they level off at $30 billion per month for Treasuries and $20 billion per month for MBS. Chart 9G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets Chart 10Fed Balance Sheet We have received no official guidance on the level of bank reserves the Fed will target for the end of the run-off process. However, New York Fed President William Dudley recently recommended that this level should be higher than during the pre-QE period, and should probably fall in the $400 billion to $1 trillion range.5 In our forecasts we assume that bank reserves will level-off once they reach $650 billion. In that scenario, the Fed's balance sheet will shrink by roughly $1.4 trillion by 2021. The level of excess reserves in the banking system will decline by a somewhat larger amount ($1.75 trillion). The technical impact of balance sheet unwind on the inner workings of the credit market is very complicated and difficult to forecast. Asset sales could lead to a shortage of short-term high quality assets. However, this is more a problem in terms of the Fed's ability to raise interest rates than for funding liquidity. A smaller balance sheet could, in fact, improve funding liquidity to the extent that it frees up space on banks' balance sheets. In terms of asset prices, some investors believe that when the excess reserves were created, a portion of it found its way out of the banking system and was used to buy assets directly. That is not the case. The excess reserves were left idle, sitting on deposit at the Fed. They did not "leak" out and were not used to purchase assets. Thus, fewer excess bank reserves do not imply any forced selling. Nonetheless, the QE program certainly affected asset prices indirectly via the portfolio balance effect. The risk is that the portfolio balance effect goes into reverse as the Fed unwinds the asset purchases. The negative impact on risk assets will depend importantly on the bond market's response. The bond market's reaction will be far more important than balance sheet shrinkage. Empirical estimates suggest that the Fed's shedding of Treasuries could boost the 10-year yield by about 80 basis points because the private sector will require a higher term premium to absorb the higher flow of bonds. However, the impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: Banks are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years in order to meet the new Liquidity Coverage Ratio; As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. The bottom line is that the impact on monetary liquidity of a smaller Fed balance sheet should be minimal, although long-term bond yields will be marginally higher as a result. As long as the Fed can limit the bond market damage via forward guidance, then funding liquidity should remain adequate and risk assets should take the Fed's unwind in stride. However, it will be a whole different story if inflation lurches higher. If the core PCE inflation rate were to suddenly shift up to the 2% target or above, then bond prices will be hit hard, the VIX will surge and risk assets will sustain some damage. The prospect of a more aggressive pace of monetary tightening would undermine funding liquidity, compounding the negative impact on risk assets. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Should You Fear Looming Changes At The Federal Reserve?", September 21, 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate," July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Return Of The Trump Trade," October 3, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Liquidity And The Great Balance Sheet Unwind," In the October Monthly Report. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 William C. Dudley, "The U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of New York (September 07, 2017).