Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Equities

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A near-term pullback in U.S. Treasury yields, still robust housing fundamentals and compelling valuations that reflect most, if not all, of the bad homebuilding news and offset thorny input cost inflation, entice us to lift the S&P homebuilding index to neutral. Troughing health care outlays versus overall PCE, minor cracks in small business hiring plans, drug pricing uncertainty and the late stages of industry M&A activity suggest that managed health care relative share prices are as good as they get. Recent Changes Book profits of 24% and augment the S&P Homebuilding Index to a benchmark allocation. Downgrade the S&P Managed Health Care Index to neutral, locking in profits of 28%. Take the S&P Telecom Services Index off the high-conviction underweight list for a gain of 10% (please see the Insight Report on May 24, 2018). Table 1 Feature Stocks held on to their early-May gains and are on track to end the month with handsome returns. While the SPX is not out of the woods yet, still shaking off the early-February tremor, our cyclically upbeat view remains intact. Recent data suggest that earnings will remain healthy, and we expect this will propel the S&P 500 to a fresh all-time high in the back half of the year. It's true that elevated corporate debt levels are a cause for concern, as we detailed in a recent Special Report titled 'Til Debt Do Us Part', and this week we highlight that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) private non-financial business sector debt-to-GDP ratio confirms the Fed data we presented in that report (Chart 1). Similarly, BIS's debt service ratio1 for non-financial corporates also confirms the Datastream Worldscope stock market data of a deteriorating interest coverage ratio (EBIT/interest expense) for non-financial equities (Chart 1). While we are closely monitoring unfolding debt dynamics, high debt levels are probably a longer-term problem (beyond the next 9-12 months) for the U.S. equity market. Higher interest rates are required in order for a debt crisis to unravel. With that in mind we were pleasantly surprised to notice that net bond ratings migration is moving in the right direction i.e. upgrades are outpacing downgrades. This is impressive as the V-shaped recovery following the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession is already reflected in the data and the most recent uptick likely represents a fresh/different mini credit cycle (downgrades minus upgrades as a percent of total shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 2). Chart 1Saddled With Debt... Chart 2...But Ratings Migration Moving In The Right Direction Either bond rating agencies are lowering their standards or euphoric rating agencies just reflect the recent fiscal policy easing, extremely low starting point of interest rates and an overall recovery in animal spirits. We side with the latter, and the implication is that SPX momentum will reaccelerate in the coming months, if history at least rhymes (bottom panel, Chart 2). Other indicators we monitor corroborate the positive equity backdrop suggested by the ratings migration data. For example, tracking tax revenue provides an excellent near real-time gauge on corporate sector cash flows. Federal income tax receipts have spiked into double-digit territory. Even state and local government tax coffers are surging, although this dataset is quarterly and trails the monthly released Federal series by four months. Government tax receipt growth has either led or coincided with previous major and sustainable overall profit recoveries (Chart 3). This suggests that S&P 500 second quarter earnings growth will surprise to the upside, despite an already high bar, in-line with our still expanding EPS growth model; the ISM, interest rates, the U.S. dollar and house prices comprise our four factor model (Chart 4). Nevertheless, the latest bout of EM currency weakness spreading beyond the 'fragile five' is a risk to our sanguine EPS growth view, especially in the back half of the year and into 2019. In other words, if this episode mostly resembles the 2013 'taper tantrum' induced devaluations then most of the damage is already done (Chart 5). However, if all of a sudden China falls off a cliff and is forced to devalue à la 2015 then all bets are off and a 'risk off' phase will ensue leading to a spike in the U.S. dollar. Chart 3Money Flowing Into Government Coffers Takes##br## A Real Time Pulse Of Corporate Profits Chart 4Q2 Profits Will Likely ##br##Surprise To The Upside... Chart 5...But A U.S. Dollar##br## Spike Is A Risk As a reminder, the greenback is a key input to our EPS growth regression model and any sustained gains will eventually weigh on SPX profits. This is clearly a risk, but our sense is that there are more parallels with 2013 than with 2015 and one big difference is the bond market's response. The third panel of Chart 5 shows that spreads have not blown out to an alarming level, at least not yet, and signal that a generalized emerging market currency crisis will be averted. Finally, another big difference with the 2015 episode is that the commodity complex is not reeling (bottom panel, Chart 5). This week we are acting on two alerts, one downgrade and one upgrade, and crystalizing outsized gains in a defensive subsector and also taking profits in a niche early cyclical sub-index. Enough Is Enough, Upgrade Homebuilders To Neutral We put the niche S&P homebuilding index on upgrade watch in late-March,2 and today we recommend pulling the trigger and monetizing our 24% relative gains since the late-November 2017 inception. Three main reasons underpin our upgrade to a benchmark allocation: 1. Bond market selloff taking a breather 2. Housing fundamentals remain robust 3. Compelling valuations reflect most, if not all, of the bad news In March we posited that "any rise above 3.05% on the 10-year Treasury yield in a short timeframe would likely prove restrictive for the U.S. economy".3 Fast forward to today and BCA's U.S. Bond Strategists believe that the likelihood of a near-term pullback in U.S. Treasury yields has increased on the back of largely discounted Fed rate hikes, extended net short positioning and the recent moderation in economic data. This backdrop should, at the margin, give some breathing room to this interest rate-sensitive index. True, refinancing mortgage application activity has nearly ground to a halt, but the MBA's mortgage purchase index continues to climb to fresh cycle highs defying rising 30-year fixed mortgage rates (top panel, Chart 6). The MBA weekly survey is nearly exhaustive as it "covers over 75 percent of all U.S. retail residential mortgage applications".4 Importantly, examining the relative volume of purchase activity is instructive. Currently, purchase applications comprise over 2/3 of total applications. There is a positive correlation between interest rates and the purchase share of overall mortgage activity as the middle panel of Chart 6 clearly depicts. This is because refinancing takes the back seat as mortgage rates rise, whereas first time home buyers are less sensitive to the level of interest rates. Wage growth and job security are most important when undertaking the first mortgage. Put differently, a pick up in economic growth that is synonymous with higher interest rates entices rather than dissuades would-be first time home buyers. The U.S. economy is currently at full employment, underscoring that the unemployment rate should move inversely with the purchase share of mortgage activity. Indeed, empirical evidence confirms this negative correlation (bottom panel, Chart 6). Similarly, the firming economic backdrop should also lead to a renormalization of the residential housing market. Household formation is still running at a higher clip than housing starts, signaling that there is little slack in the residential housing market (middle panel, Chart 7). Homebuilder confidence is as good as it gets and home prices are expanding at a healthy pace (bottom panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Housing Fundamentals... Chart 7...Remain On A Solid Footing Importantly, new home prices have exited the deflation zone versus existing home prices which is significant for the relative profitability of homebuilding stocks (third panel, Chart 8). The tightness in the new home market is also evident in the relative sales backdrop: new home sales are outshining existing home sales which is conducive to a further increase in relative top line growth and thus relative share prices (top and second panels, Chart 8). Finally, relative valuations have undershot the historical mean on a price-to-sales basis with homebuilders trading at a 50% discount to the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 8). We deem that most of the bad news is likely reflected in cheap valuations and the message is that it no longer pays to be bearish the niche S&P homebuilding index. Nevertheless, we refrain from swinging all the way to an above benchmark allocation as spiking building material costs are starting to bite, according to the latest NAHB sentiment survey (middle panel, Chart 9). Moreover, long-term EPS euphoria pushing 30%, or twice the rate of the SPX, has hit a level that typically marks relative share price tops, not troughs (bottom panel, Chart 9). Were lumber prices to give way either courtesy of a rising U.S. dollar and/or a positive resolution in the NAFTA negotiations we would not hesitate to boost this index to an overweight stance. Chart 8Firming Top And Bottom Line Growth Prospects Chart 9Surging Building Supply Costs Are A Big Risk Netting it all out, a near-term pullback in U.S. Treasury yields, still robust housing fundamentals and compelling valuations that reflect most, if not all, of the bad homebuilding news and offset thorny input cost inflation, entice us to move to a neutral stance in the S&P homebuilding index. Bottom Line: We are acting on our upgrade alert and booking gains of 24% in the S&P homebuilding index and lifting exposure to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM. Managed Health Care: Don't Overstay Your Welcome Relative share price gains for the S&P managed health care index are nearly exhausted. We are acting on our late-March downgrade alert and taking profits of 28% versus the S&P 500 since inception. At the margin, macro drivers have turned from a tailwind to a mild headwind. Long-term trends in HMOs move in distinct cycles tied with overall health care spending. When overall health care outlays begin to accelerate relative to total consumption the pressure increases on payers of medical services (i.e. health insurance) relative to the providers of those services. The opposite is also true (relative health care outlays shown inverted, Chart 10). Chart 10Rising Relative Health Care##br## Outlays Weigh On HMOs If relative health care spending has troughed for the cycle, then there are high odds that the decade long relative bull market has run its course and a major top is in place. Industry top-line growth is also fraying around the edges. The second panel of Chart 11 shows that the hiring plans subcomponent of the NFIB survey of small business owners has sunk recently. Despite an overall stable and growing employment backdrop, this letdown is disconcerting as roughly 65% of all net new job gains occur in the SME space.5 The implication is that enrollment may also be nearing a peak. Meanwhile, on the input cost front, a softer than expected blow to drug pricing practices revealed in the President's recent speech was music to the ears of Big Pharma executives, but cacophony to HMO CEOs. While no bill has been drafted yet and we are awaiting more details, at the margin, this is a net negative for managed health care profits. Historically, our medical care cost proxy has been inversely correlated with industry operating margins and the current message is that the mini margin expansion phase may be short-circuited (middle panel, Chart 12). Tack on a tick up in HMO labor costs and profits will likely underwhelm analysts' optimistic forecasts: the sell-side expects S&P managed health care index profits to outperform the SPX by 330bps in the coming twelve months (bottom panel, Chart 12). We deem it a tall order. Finally, the recent industry M&A frenzy is ebbing, signaling that the M&A premia may soon come out of this health care sub-group (top panel, Chart 13). Importantly, all this euphoria is likely reflected in relative valuations with the relative forward P/E trading one standard deviation above the historical mean (middle panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Early Signs Of... Chart 12...Margin Pressures Chart 13M&A Frenzy Fully Priced Into Expensive Valuations In sum, we do not want to overstay our welcome in the HMO space that has added considerable alpha to our portfolio since our overweight inception in April 2016. Troughing health care outlays versus overall PCE, minor cracks in the small business hiring plans, drug pricing uncertainty and the late stages of industry M&A activity suggest relative share prices are as good as they get. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P managed health care index to neutral for a gain of 28% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 "The DSR reflects the share of income used to service debt, given interest rates, principal repayments and loan maturities," https://www.bis.org/statistics/dsr.htm. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "Bumpier Ride," dated March 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Ibid. 4 https://www.mba.org/2018-press-releases/may/mortgage-rates-increase-applications-decrease-in-latest-mba-weekly-survey 5 https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2011/are-small-businesses-the-biggest-producers-of-jobs Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights The prospects for U.S. economic and earnings growth remain solid but overseas growth is rolling over. The U.S. economic surprise index is poised to turn negative but inflation surprise is headed the in the opposite direction. The Fed remains vigilant on financial stability issues. The minutes of the May FOMC meeting provided an update on the Fed's views of inflation, fiscal and trade policy. In addition, financial stability and the Fed's forward guidance were discussed. Feature Economic data released in recent weeks reinforce BCA's view that the U.S. economy is accelerating while the global economy is decelerating. Chart 1 (panel 1) shows that the index of leading economic indicators (LEI) is gaining strength in the U.S., but slowing in the rest of the developed economies (panels 2 through 6). However, the U.S. Purchasing Managers Index (PMI, solid line) is rolling over, along with the PMIs in the E.U., Japan, Canada and Australia, albeit from a high level. Still, the Treasury and currency markets are focused on the LEIs and not the PMIs, driving up both Treasury bond yields and the dollar (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Growth##BR##Stands Out Chart 2Treasury Yields And The Dollar##BR##Responding To Growth Differentials The fallout from political turmoil last week in both North Korea and Italy spilled over into U.S. financial markets, driving U.S. risk assets and Treasury yields lower. Of the two, the situation in Italy is the more significant threat to our view that the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio will continue to move higher this year. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that while investors are right to be worried about a new populist government in Italy, slowing economic growth is an even bigger immediate problem for debt sustainability concerns.1 Our Geopolitical Strategy service's baseline expectation calls for the new coalition government in Rome to back off from its most populist proposals.2 However, this will first require the pain of higher bond yields. BCA's view is that the dollar will continue to climb as the Fed boosts rates more than the market expects and as U.S. domestic growth outpaces its global counterpart.3 BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service maintains that risk/reward arguments clearly favor below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 12-month horizon. In addition, spread product returns should continue to beat Treasuries, but the window for outperformance is closing.4 Investors' positioning in Treasuries and our view that the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (CESI) may soon drop below zero,5 suggest that there is a near-term risk of a countertrend rally in Treasury prices. Assessing The Cycle BCA's view is that the next recession will be sparked by the Fed overtightening in 2019 and 2020 as it finds itself behind the curve on inflation. Chart 3 shows that the odds of a recession in the next 12 months are low. Moreover, the traditional recession signals we track are not flashing red (Chart 4). At 45 bps, the 10/2 Treasury curve remains positive (panel 2). BCA expects the 2/10 curve to remain around 50bps until the inflation breakevens are re-anchored between 2.3% and 2.5%. We anticipate that upward pressure on the short end from Fed rate hikes will be offset by the upward thrust of the breakevens on the long end.6 Panel 3 shows that the LEI crosses below zero when a recession is imminent. The April LEI rose by 6.42% year-over-year. Initial claims for unemployment insurance in the week ending May 18 were 17K below their mid-November 2017 reading. Panel 4 shows that a 6-month increase in unemployment claims of between 75,000 and 100,000 is associated with a recession. Chart 3Odds Of A Recession Remain Low Chart 4No Recession Signals Here Credit spreads also indicate that the economic expansion remains in place. Charts 5 and 6 show that the corporate bond market often warns of an approaching major top in the stock market and/or a recession. Spreads barely budged during February's spike in financial market volatility. Chart 5Credit Spreads On Both Investment Grade... Chart 6... And High Yield Debt Signal That The Expansion Has Legs Financial conditions remain supportive of above-potential growth in the final three quarters of 2018. The January peak in equity markets and troughs in investment- grade and high-yield spreads marked the recent zenith in BCA's Financial Conditions Index (FCI). Nonetheless, the FCI in the U.S. remains more expansionary than it was a year ago and our research7 shows that financial conditions lead the U.S. economy by six to nine months (Chart 7). As a result, U.S. economic growth is poised to accelerate even more in 2018. This will further push down the unemployment rate below NAIRU and ultimately force up wage and price inflation. Chart 7Lagged Effect Of Easier Monetary##BR##Conditions Will Boost Growth Bottom Line: The prospects for U.S. economic and earnings growth remain solid, aided by the lagged effect of easy financial conditions, the ongoing benefits of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act and other doses of fiscal stimulus enacted in the past six months. Moreover, several of the geopolitical risks that we flagged earlier this year have ebbed. However, as noted above, the political situation in Italy warrants investors' attention. Nonetheless, the period of synchronous global growth that lifted risk assets in 2017 and in early 2018 has ended. Chinese growth is slowing, and other emerging market economies and financial markets are under duress as U.S. rates escalate. Moreover, the U.S. economy is in the late part of the cycle. Lofty valuations implied that equity returns will be well below-average in the next five to seven years. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds for now. However, investors with longer horizons should begin to prepare for lower real returns in the 2020s after a recession early in that decade. Surprise Surprise Citi's Economic Surprise Index (CESI) is poised to turn negative (Chart 8) after hitting a four-year high, 110 days ago, in late 2017. Since then, a colder and wetter winter and early spring across the U.S., coupled with elevated expectations after the tax bill, saw most economic data fall short of expectations. Chart 8Economic Surprise Poised To Move Lower Our late March 2018 report8 noted that since 2011, there were six other episodes when the CESI behaved similarly. These phases lasted an average of 96 days; the median number of days from peak to trough was 66 days. Moreover, we stated in our March 2018 report that a trough in the Citigroup Economic Surprise reading may be a month or two away. Based on BCA's research,9 tactical investors should add to their risk positions as the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index bottoms and begins to climb. On the other hand, the inflation surprise index is about to turn positive for the first time since 2011. Chart 9 shows that the last time reports on the CPI, PPI and average hourly earnings consistently exceeded consensus forecasts was in late 2009 and early 2010. Moreover, from the last few years of the 2001-2007 economic expansion through to early 2009, the price data eclipsed forecasts more than half of the time. During this interval, economists underestimated the impact of surging energy prices on inflation readings. Typically these periods when inflation surprise is positive are associated with higher wage and compensation metrics and higher realized core inflation. Moreover, Chart 9 shows that sustained episodes where the inflation surprise index is above zero occurred when the economy was at full employment (panel 2) and when the Fed funds rate was above neutral (panel 3). The implication is that inflation indices are poised to move higher in the coming year, and prompt the Fed to continue to raise rates gradually at first, but then more aggressively starting in mid-2019. Nonetheless, inflation due to cyclical factors remains muted for now. Chart 10 shows that pro-cyclical inflation decelerated through March 2018, while acyclical inflation accelerated. Late last year we discussed this measure of inflation and its origins at the San Francisco Fed.10 Chart 9Inflation Surprise Vs.##BR##Realized Inflation And Slack Chart 10Noncyclical Sources Still##BR##Driving Inflation Lower Bottom Line: The disappointing run of economic data is not over. Treasury bond yields will likely dip as the CESI turns negative. However, the weakness in the economic data does not signal recession. We expect that the inflation surprise index will continue to grind higher, while unemployment dips further into excess demand territory and oil prices rise. After the CESI forms a bottom and starts to rise, history suggests that stocks will beat bonds, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds will outpace Treasuries, and gold and oil will climb. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, long credit and underweight duration. On The MOVE Both equity and bond market volatility (measured by the VIX and the MOVE indexes respectively) climbed in late January and early February, but have since eased (Chart 11). However, in the past 9 weeks, bond volatility surged relative to equity vol. Looking ahead, the subdued readings from the Chicago Board Options Exchange VVIX index, which measures the implied volatility of VIX options, indicate that the VIX can continue to head lower in the coming weeks. The implication is that bond-to-stock volatility ratio will move higher. Periods when bond volatility is rising faster than equity volatility are associated with turning points in the stock-to-bond ratio, and both real and nominal Treasury yields (Chart 12). That said, we are not making the case that the current upward thrust of the stock-to-bond ratio is about to change direction. Since 1990, both the stock-to-bond ratio and real bond yields rose in six of the eight periods when the MOVE/VIX rose; nominal yields climbed in all but one of these episodes. Moreover, small cap equities tend to outperform large when the MOVE index is increasing faster than the VIX. Chart 11Equity Vol Vs. Bond Market Vol Chart 12Is The MOVE/VIX Ratio On The Rise Again? Bottom Line: The increase in both equity and bond market volatility will impact the way the Fed conducts monetary policy in the coming years. Financial stability, or the lack thereof, is now top of mind among policymakers, and even more so as policy turns restrictive. The Fed's Third Mandate Revisited Chart 13FOMC Is Closely Monitoring##BR##Financial Stability BCA views financial stability as a third mandate11 for the central bank, along with low and stable inflation, and full employment. Financial stability was discussed at the May meeting by both Fed staff and voting FOMC members, but it was not on the agenda at March's meeting. Nonetheless, we expect Fed Chair Jay Powell to follow the former chair's lead on this issue. At the May meeting, Fed staff continued to characterize financial vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system as moderate on balance. This overall assessment incorporated the staff's judgment that asset valuations remain elevated. Fed staff appraised vulnerabilities as low from financial sector leverage and maturity and liquidity transformation, low-to-moderate from household leverage, and elevated from leverage in the non-financial business sector (Chart 13). In May the Fed also provided an assessment of foreign financial stability for the first time since November 2017. The central bank's economists and analysts characterized overall vulnerabilities to foreign financial stability as moderate while highlighting specific issues in some foreign economies, including elevated asset valuation pressures, high private or sovereign debt burdens and political uncertainties. Fed staff made the same assessment in November 2017. In a report last month we highlighted research from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco which found that a more restrictive monetary policy could pose risks to financial stability.12 Bottom Line: The Fed will remain vigilant about financial stability, but this means that rates will increase only gradually despite below-target inflation. The central bank must find the optimal pace to encourage employment and stable prices while guarding against financial excesses if policy stays too loose for too long. Counting The Minutes Inflation appeared to be a key topic at the May 1-2 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting.13 Moreover, at least a few members indicated that the Fed is willing to tolerate inflation above the central bank's 2% target. Trade and fiscal policy, the labor market, financial stability, the yield curve and the Fed's communication plan were also discussed. Fed economists recently updated their quantitative assessments of the FOMC's minutes.14 The note provides a guide (Table 1 in the Fed paper and Table 1) to the number of quantitative descriptors in the minutes (one, a couple, a few, etc.). We use this rubric to assess the FOMC's latest views. Table 1FOMC Minutes Rubric Tables 2 and 3 evaluate the Fed's latest thinking on inflation and its outlook. Most FOMC participants viewed the recent firming in inflation as reassurance that inflation is on track to hit the central bank's 2% target, while some thought inflation may overshoot. Several opined that the underlying inflation trend had changed little (Table 2). There was wide disagreement on the inflation outlook. Table 3 shows that many participants agreed that the Fed's goal was to return inflation to the 2% target. Many participants cited the tight labor and product markets, and stable inflation expectations, to support their views that inflation would remain near 2% this year. This approach is in line with BCA's inflation stance. A few participants worried about the impact of higher oil prices on inflation, but a similar number expressed concern that inflation would not stay at the Fed's 2% goal. Table 2FOMC Assessment Of Current Inflation Table 3FOMC Assessment Of Inflation Outlook There were extensive comments from both Fed staff and FOMC participants about the impact of fiscal policy and trade on the economy and inflation. Chart 14 presents the IMF's estimate of the impact of fiscal policy on the U.S. economy in the next few years. Fed staff continued to assume that the tax cuts would boost real GDP growth moderately in the medium term, but noted that fiscal policy may not provide a boost to growth if the economy is operating above full employment. Several FOMC participants noted the challenges in assessing the influence of fiscal policy on both the demand and supply side of the economy. We discussed the impact of fiscal policy on the supply side in last week's report.15 Chart 14U.S. Fiscal Stimulus Will##BR##Support Growth In '18 And '19 On trade, some FOMC participants noted that there was a wide range of outcomes for economic activity and inflation depending on what actions were taken by the U.S. and how U.S. trading partners responded. A few noted that the uncertainty around trade could dampen business sentiment and spending. In a recent report,16 we stated that the Fed's business and banking contacts mentioned either tariffs or trade policy 44 times in the latest Beige Book (April 18); there were only 3 mentions in the March edition. The FOMC also discussed factors contributing to the flat yield curve, citing the expected gradual rise of the federal funds rate, the downward pressure on term premiums from the Fed's still-large balance sheet as well as asset purchase programs by other central banks, and a reduction in investors' estimates of the longer-run neutral real interest rate. Notably, only a handful of participants said that the curve was not a reliable signal of future economic activity, while several endorsed the idea that an inverted curve indicated an increased risk of recession. On financial stability, a couple of participants noted that after the bout of financial market volatility in early February, the use of investment strategies predicated on a low-volatility environment may have become less prevalent, and that some investors are more cautious. However, they also noted that asset valuations across a range of markets and leverage in the nonfinancial corporate sector remained elevated relative to historical norms, leaving some borrowers vulnerable to unexpected negative shocks. Several noted that regulatory reform since the crisis had contributed to stronger capital positions, while only a few emphasized the need to build additional buffers in the financial system. The key takeaway from the FOMC's discussion on its communication policy is that the Fed may soon alter the forward guidance in its post-meeting statement to acknowledge that policy will not remain accommodative indefinitely. Bottom Line: The minutes of the May FOMC meeting indicate that the Fed is gearing up to raise rates again next month, but it is not signaling a more hawkish path than what is discounted. At the same time, the Fed is not trying to drive market expectations for the future path of short-term interest rates sharply higher. Fed officials noted that a temporary overshoot of the 2% inflation target would not be a disaster. In other words, the Fed is not willing to deviate from its path of "gradual" rate hikes. This is defined as one 25bps rate hike per quarter, which is mostly in line with current market pricing. We maintain our base case scenario: the FOMC will continue to monitor financial stability under Powell and raise rates four times in 2018. However, the FOMC will have to become more aggressive when realized inflation climbs and inflation expectations approach 2.3 to 2.5%. At that point another vol shock is likely, given that the Fed would target slower growth to curb inflation. This would be a negative signal for risk assets. Stay underweight duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Partly Sunny or Mostly Cloudy?", published May 22, 2018. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy: Growth Cures All Ills...For Now", February 21, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Swan Song", published May 18, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back And Looking Ahead", published May 22, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", published October 31, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Back To Basics", published April 17, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear", published October 4, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Waiting...", published March 26, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "Solid Start", published January 8, 2018 and "The Revenge Of Animal Spirits", published October 30, 2017. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "2018: Synchronized Global Growth: Drives U.S. Economy And Markets", published December 4, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", published July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Short-Term Caution Warranted", published April 23, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 13 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20180502.htm 14 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-fomc-meeting-minutes-an-update-of-counting-words-20170803.htm 15 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Too Soon For Stagflation?", published May 21, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stressing The Housing And Consumer Sectors", published May 7, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
As with all bull markets, the question on investors' minds has never been if it would end but when it will end as the former is a certainty and the latter is the source of alpha. We have previously noted that by almost all measures, this is the longest bull market in history and, with its age starting to show, it is time to focus on late-cycle dynamics. With that in mind, we have examined the relationships between the peak of the ISM manufacturing composite index, the peak of the S&P 500 and the beginning of the recession. Our cycle-on-cycle analysis is presented below and yields an important insight: Typically, the S&P 500 falls modestly after the ISM peaks but then delivers one last hurrah, before the end of the cycle, yielding the fattest returns of the bull market. We have overlaid this cycle-on-cycle chart with the S&P 500, indexed to 0 at the most recent ISM peak in March of this year, underlining our thesis that, despite being past the peak of the ISM, the S&P 500 has not yet seen its best days. Please see this week's Special Report for more details, including an analysis of the durations of each phase of the late cycle as well as sector winners & losers as the cycle draws to a close.
Special Report Feature Chart I-1Recent Defaults Have Focused Attention ##br##On Corporate Health The recent spike in defaults on bonds and loans in China, including missed debt repayments by local government financing vehicles (LGFV) and some listed companies, has unsettled investors over the past few weeks.1 The yield spread between 5-year government bonds and 5-year corporate bonds AA minus in China's domestic bond market, has recently hit their widest level in nearly two years (Chart I-1). As a result, some investors are concerned about the possibility of widespread defaults as the Chinese government's deleveraging campaign continues to roll out, and sweeping new rules on shadow banking take effect. Given the report focus on corporate health, this week we are updating our China Industry Watch thematic chartpack to present a visual presentation of the changing situation in China's corporate sector, and its relevance to the broader stock market performance. Overall, the Chinese corporate sector has continued to deleverage and its financial situation has improved modestly. Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM),2 which is an equally weighted average of net income margin, return on capital, EBIT-to-debt ratio, debt-to-asset ratio and interest coverage ratio, shows that the health of most sectors are improving. Specifically, for steel, construction materials, automobile, food& beverage and tech, our CHMs are in healthy territory. For oil & gas, coal, non-ferrous metals and machinery, CHMs are still below zero but are recovering. In terms of profit growth, it has remained robust for most of the sectors shown in the report. In particular, profit growth has accelerated substantially in the coal and steel sectors, as higher selling prices helped offset the impact of production constraints on revenue and aggressive cost cutting increased gross margins. Firms in the energy sector have also enjoyed higher profit growth as oil prices rebounded. In terms of the leverage picture, the liabilities-to-assets ratio has continued to decline broadly across sectors (Chart I-2). However, in regards of debt sustainability, the interest-to-sales ratio has increased substantially in coal, steel, and non-ferrous sectors, due to dramatic decline in sales resulting from production constraints. The interest coverage ratio in these sector is less problematic because of improving gross margins. For the tech sector, however, there has been a spike in the interest-to-sales ratio and a sharp decline in interest coverage. Looking beyond the fairly broad-based improvement in our overall non-financial CHM, we doubt that a broad-based default wave will occur in response to the crackdown on shadow banking. First, by our estimation, the recent defaults cited above account for only 0.09% of outstanding corporate bonds. Second, the latest PBOC monetary report changed the tone from emphasizing "deleveraging" to "stabilizing leverage and restructuring", which shows that regulators are as concerned about the stability of the economy as they are about reducing excessive debts. One problem that is worth monitoring is the negative trend in overall industrial enterprises sales, which had a negative growth rate in Q1 relative to the same quarter last year. Part of this negative growth rate is likely due to base effects, given that Q1 2017 itself was abnormally strong. Nevertheless, comparing first three month of the sales this year to that of previous years, it is clear that 2018's value did not reflect an uptrend in the data (Chart I-3). This weak top line performance is somewhat worrisome and we will continue to watch for signs of a further slowdown. Chart I-2A Continued Decline In Debt-To-Assets Chart I-3Tepid Topline Growth Is Worrisome Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com BCA China Industry Watch includes four categories of financial ratios to monitor a sector's leverage, profitability, growth and efficiency, respectively. Some of these ratios, as shown in Table 1, are slightly tweaked from conventional definitions due to data availability. The financial data in our exercise are from the official statistics on overall industrial firms, of which the listed companies are a subset, but most financial ratios based on the two sets of data are very similar, especially for the heavy industries that dominate the Chinese stock markets - both onshore and offshore. The financial ratios on leverage, growth and profitability are almost identical for some sectors, while some other sectors that are not well represented in the stock market, such as technology, healthcare and consumer sectors, show notable divergences. As the Chinese equity universe continues to expand, we expect that the two sets of data will increasingly converge. Table 1The China Industry Watch 1 More than 10 companies, several of them listed, from a variety of industries have defaulted on 17 bonds worth more than 16.5 billion yuan (US$2.6 billion), according to figures from Choice. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Introducing The BCA China Industry Watch,” dated February 10, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: China Industry Watch All Firms Chart II-1Non-Financial Firms: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-2Non-Financial Firms: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-3Non-Financial Firms: Leverage Indicators Chart II-4Non-Financial Firms: Growth Indicators Chart II-5Non-Financial Firms: Profitability Indicators Chart II-6Non-Financial Firms: Efficiency Indicators Oil & Gas Sector Chart II-7Oil&Gas Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-8Oil&Gas Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-9Oil&Gas Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-10Oil&Gas Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-11Oil&Gas Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-12Oil&Gas Sector: Efficiency Indicators Coal Sector Chart II-13Coal Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-14Coal Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-15Coal Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-16Coal Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-17Coal Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-18Coal Sector: Efficiency Indicators Steel Sector Chart II-19Steel Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-20Steel Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-21Steel Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-22Steel Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-23Steel Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-24Steel Sector: Efficiency Indicators Non Ferrous Metals Sector Chart II-25Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-26Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-27Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-28Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-29Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-30Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Efficiency Indicators Construction Material Sector Chart II-31Construction Material Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-32Construction Material Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-33Construction Material Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-34Construction Material Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-35Construction Material Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-36Construction Material Sector: Efficiency Indicators Machinery Sector Chart III-37Machinery Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-38Machinery Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-39Machinery Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-40Machinery Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-41Machinery Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-42Machinery Sector: Efficiency Indicators Automobile Sector Chart III-43Automobile Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-44Automobile Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-45Automobile Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-46Automobile Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-47Automobile Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-48Automobile Sector: Efficiency Indicators Food & Beverage Sector Chart III-49Food&Beverage Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-50Food&Beverage Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-51Food&Beverage Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-52Food&Beverage Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-53Food&Beverage Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-54Food&Beverage Sector: Efficiency Indicators Information Technology Sector Chart III-55Information Technology Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-56Information Technology Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-57Information Technology Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-58Information Technology Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-59Information Technology Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-60Information Technology Sector: Efficiency Indicators Utilities Sector Chart III-61Utilities Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-62Utilities Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-63Utilities Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-64Utilities Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-65Utilities Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-66Utilities Sector: Efficiency Indicators Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Special Report As with all bull markets, the question on investors' minds has never been if it would end but when it will end as the former is a certainty and the latter is the source of alpha. We have previously noted that by almost all measures, this is the longest bull market in history1 and, with its age starting to show, it is time to focus on late-cycle dynamics. Our preferred leading indicator for declines in U.S. equity markets has been the ISM manufacturing composite index. The ISM has, despite a few false positives, led both recessions and S&P 500 troughs with remarkable accuracy (Chart 1). Chart 1Our Preferred Leading Indicator When gains in the S&P 500 are broken into their respective components, it becomes apparent that the ISM is a strong predictor of both sentiment, as measured by changes in the valuation multiple (Chart 2), as well as profit prospects, as measured by earnings growth (Chart 3). Chart 2ISM Leads Valuation... Chart 3...And Earnings Still, valuations and earnings eventually, and invariably, converge, usually explosively so in a recession. Accordingly, measuring the ISM's lead time should provide some insight into the duration of the economic expansion as well as appropriate sector allocation. In our last Weekly Report,2 we examined how in the late/later stages of economic expansion, banks, representing a prototypical early-cyclical sector, underperformed the broad market. In this report, we are broadening the analysis to all of the GICS1 sectors of the S&P 500. Timing Is Everything We begin our analysis by examining the duration of leads between the cyclical peak of the ISM and the end of economic expansion (i.e. the start of recession as defined by the NBER) going back to the 1960s with our results summarized in Table 1. These results are somewhat unhelpful as the durations range from as short as 8 months at the beginning of the 1980s to more than 3 years, as in the period preceding the Great Recession. With the hypothesis in mind that the market would have sniffed out a recession before economic activity actually began to contract, we split the duration into two periods: the time between the peak of the ISM and the peak of the S&P 500 and the time between the peak of the S&P 500 and the beginning of the recession (Table 2). While the duration inconsistency between iterations argues against using this data to forecast the longevity of an equity bull market, a closer examination of the periods yields a key insight: The duration of the blow off phase of the bull market is on average more than three times longer than the fall before the recession. Table 1ISM Peak To Recession Table 2Late Cycle Can Be Split in Two Phases Still, the purpose of this report is not to estimate the length of time between the most recent ISM peak (March, 2018) and recession; as shown above, such an exercise would be meaningless as history has never rhymed in this regard. Rather, this Special Report should offer a portfolio allocation roadmap if, as we believe, the ISM has peaked but the S&P 500 has yet to see its cyclical highs.3 Riding The Wave Chart 4S&P 500 Cycle-On-Cycle Returns Chart 4 shows a cycle-on-cycle analysis of S&P 500 returns in the periods between the peak of the ISM and the beginning of the recession, across the seven iterations since the 1960's. This chart requires some explanation; because the time frames between ISM peak and recession vary so substantially per iteration, we have segmented each period into eight parts. Each part can represent a time frame as short as one or as long as eight months; what matters is the direction of the market, not the time frame. We have overlaid this cycle-on-cycle chart with the S&P 500, indexed to 0 at the most recent ISM peak in March of this year. It is worth qualifying that the S&P 500 peaked before the ISM in two of the seven iterations we have examined and, by overlaying the year-to-date S&P 500 over this curve, we are explicitly stating that we expect the S&P 500 peak in the current cycle to follow the peak in the ISM, as happened in five iterations, including the most recent three (please refer to our recent publication where we lifted our SPX peak target to 32004). Despite the machinations in creating Chart 4, the pattern is remarkably consistent; the S&P 500 falls modestly after the ISM peaks but then delivers one last hurrah, before the end of the cycle. Once again, however, the trick to securing the excess returns earned in the fat times is timing, as the fall after the S&P 500 peak is precipitous. Further, given the much shorter time frame on the back end of the curve, haste is of the essence. Sector Winners & Losers As shown in Table 3, the average return of the S&P 500 from the peak of the ISM to the beginning of the recession is a fairly modest 6.7% (non-compounded). That return appears even more modest in the context of an average 25 month duration. When the returns are split into the periods before and after the peak of the S&P 500, the 25% gain before the peak and the 12% decline after (Tables 4 and 5) are more significant and underscore the role of timing for capital preservation in the late cycle. Table 3Health Care Outperforms In The Late Cycle Table 4High Beta Stocks Outperform Early... Table 5...Defensive Stocks Beat Late The top performers in the first phase of the late cycle equity market surge are some of the highest beta sectors, including energy and technology. Also, unsurprisingly, these sectors have performed poorly in the latter phase we examined when the market slides toward recession. Still, we would highlight the S&P energy index as a portfolio overweight in the late cycle. Energy has historically been the top performer from the peak of the ISM to the peak of the S&P 500 and, while it is a sub-par performer in the latter stages, it continues to outperform the falling broad market. Further, energy registered relative performance gains in every iteration we examined and was the only sector to consistently repeat its performance, positive or negative. The current iteration of the late cycle should probably see stellar returns in this sector as crude oil prices have only recently broken out, a pattern that has repeated following other ISM peaks (Chart 5); BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy expects this trend to continue in 2018. As such, the nascent turnaround in sector performance (Chart 6) should have long legs; we reiterate our high-conviction overweight in this deep cyclical sector. Chart 5Oil And ISM Move In Sync... Chart 6...And So Do Energy Equities Another interesting insight from this research is the strong performance of the S&P health care sector in both phases we examined (Chart 7). This is largely due to the high-beta biotech sub-sector outperforming early (Chart 8) with the more defensive managed health care and pharma sub-indexes sustaining the outperformance following the SPX peak (Chart 9). Chart 7Health Care Is A Resilient Late Cycle Performer Chart 8Biotech Leads Early In light of this research and given recent pricing power developments, we are adding an upgrade alert to the pharma and biotech groups and thus to the broad S&P health care index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG: S5BIOT - ABBV, AMGN, GILD,CELG, BIIB, VRTX, ALXN, REGN, INCY and BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, LLY, AGN, ZTS, MYL, NKTR, PRGO. Chart 9...While Pharma Outperforms Late Stay Cyclical (For Now) The current backdrop of a Fed that seems likely to be permissive of an inflation overshoot (or at least not too hawkish), combined with a strong domestic fiscal thrust in the form of tax cuts and a potential infrastructure bill, supports our thesis that, despite being past the peak of the ISM, the S&P 500 has not yet seen its best days. Accordingly, the upshot of our analysis is that it pays to maintain a cyclical portfolio bent to capture the most lucrative phase of the bull market. This is reflected in our overall portfolio allocation; we note that the top and bottom performers in this analysis (S&P energy and S&P telecom services, Table 3) are overweight and underweight, respectively, on our high conviction list. Still, our upgrade alerts in the health care sector should stand as a caution to readers that we are prepared to reduce beta in our portfolio allocation should our other leading indicators flash yellow. For now, however, we continue to believe the odds of recession are close to nil on a 9-12 month horizon and, accordingly, remain positive on the broad market's prospects with a cyclical portfolio allocation over defensive. Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Sector Winners & Losers When Fiscal Easing Offsets Monetary Tightening," dated April 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Resilient," dated May 14, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Lifting SPX Target," dated April 30, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Ibid.
Highlights So long as EM corporate and sovereign bond yields continue to rise, EM share prices will remain in a downtrend. EM corporate earnings growth has peaked while EM corporate profitability remains structurally weak. We recommend re-establishing a short Brazilian bank stocks position, and to continue shorting the BRL versus the U.S. dollar. Put Malaysian stocks on an upgrade watch list as the elections outcome is a long-term positive. However, its financial markets will likely face meaningful headwinds in the months ahead. Stay short MYR versus the U.S. dollar. Feature Monitoring Market Signals Rising U.S. bond yields are wreaking havoc on EM risk assets. Not only are EM currencies plunging, but sovereign and corporate bond yields are also spiking. In fact, EM share prices always decline when EM corporate and sovereign bond yields rise (Chart I-1). There is less correlation between EM equity and U.S. bond yields. Chart I-1EM Share Prices Always Decline When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise The basis: So long as the rise in U.S. bond yields is offset by compressing EM credit spreads, EM corporate bond yields decline and EM share prices rally. But when EM corporate (or sovereign) yields rise, irrespective of whether this is due to rising U.S. Treasury yields or widening EM credit spreads, EM equity prices come under considerable selling pressure. Lately, both EM credit spreads have been widening and U.S. bond yields have been mounting. That said, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads still remain tight by historical standards, suggesting this asset class is still pricing in little risk. Hence, as EM currencies continue to sell off, EM credit spreads will widen further (Chart I-2). Meanwhile, U.S. government bond yields in our view have more upside: U.S. growth is robust (nominal GDP growth is 5%) and inflationary pressures are heightening. Long-term Treasury yields have risen much less than 2- and 5-year bond yields. Therefore, it is not surprising that a bit of catch-up is now underway. Rising U.S. bond yields will inevitably inflict more damage on EM risk assets. EM share prices are sitting on their 200-day moving average (Chart I-3, top panel). Relative to DM, EM share prices have decisively broken below their 200-day moving average (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-2Weaker EM Currencies = Wider Credit Spreads Chart I-3A Breakdown In The Making? In addition to widening EM corporate and sovereign bond yields, there are some other market-based indicators that investors should monitor: The ratio of total return (including carry) of commodities currencies relative to safe-haven currencies1 is hovering around 200-day moving average (Chart I-4). A breakdown in this ratio will herald that the rally in EM risk assets is over and a bear market is underway. Chinese offshore and onshore corporate spreads are widening (Chart I-5). This could be the canary in the proverbial coal mine predicting a nascent downturn in Chinese share prices and China-related plays globally. Chart I-4Watch This Market Indicator Chart I-5China' On- And Off-Shore Credit Spreads Finally, investor sentiment on EM equities remains bullish. For example, net long positions of asset managers and leveraged funds in EM stock index futures was still extremely elevated as of May 11th (Chart I-6). Bottom Line: We continue to recommend a bearish stance on EM risk assets in absolute terms and underweighting EM stocks, currencies and credit markets versus their DM counterparts. The list of our recommended fixed-income and currency positions is available on page 19. EM Corporate Profits And Profitability It appears that EM profit growth has topped out, regardless of whether we consider net profits (Chart I-7, top panel), EBITDA or cash earnings2 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). These data are for EM non-financial companies included in the MSCI EM overall equity index. The blue lines are from Datastream's World Scope database, and the dotted lines are from MSCI. Chart I-6Investors Remain Positive On EM Equities Chart I-7EM Corporate Earnings Have Topped Out The last data points for World Scope's net income and EBITDA are as of the end of March 2018, before EM currencies began to plunge. It seems that net income and EBITDA data from World Scope slightly leads the comparable series from MSCI at turning points. This is due to statistical data compilation processes these sources employ. We examine non-financials' corporate profits because EM financials/banks' earnings are often distorted by provisions and other adjustments.3 As a result, they are a poor timing tool for profit cycle turning points. Our negative viewpoint on EM equities is contingent on a significant slowdown, and probably an outright contraction in EM corporate profits in the next 12 months. We have several observations on the EM profit cycle: China's credit plus fiscal spending as well as broad money impulses nicely lead EM corporate profit cycles, and they presently point to an impending cyclical downturn (Chart I-8). As a top-line slowdown transpires, consistent with our expectations, EM profit margins will shrink. If this indeed occurs, EM non-financial profit margins will roll over at levels on par with previous bottoms (Chart I-9). This holds when using both net income and EBITDA. Chart I-8China's Credit Cycle And ##br##EM Non-Financial Profits Chart I-9EM Non-Financials: ##br##Profit Margins Are Still Low The same point is pertinent for return on assets (RoA) of listed EM non-financial companies. Chart I-10 portends two versions of RoA measures using net income and EBITDA. If RoA were to peak now in this cycle - which is our baseline scenario - it would roll over at levels on par with previous bottoms reached in 2002 and 2008. Chart I-10EM Non-Financials: Return On Assets Bottom Line: If our outlook for a considerable slowdown in EM revenue growth this year materializes, EM non-financials' profit margins and RoA will relapse at very low levels - the levels that prevailed at previous cycle lows. Hence, EM corporate profitability remains structurally weak, consistent with our view that there has been little corporate restructuring in recent years. Among EM bourses, we are overweighting Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, India, central Europe, Mexico and Chile. Our underweights are Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Peru, Malaysia and Indonesia. Brazil: Reinstate Short Bank Stocks Position Brazilian markets have sold off sharply of late. The currency has been the main culprit of the selloff. As we have repeatedly argued in the past, the exchange rate holds the key in Brazil. The country's stocks and local bonds as well as sovereign and corporate credit do well when the currency is strong or stable, and sell off during periods of real depreciation. We expect more downside in the currency, which will lead to escalating selling pressure in equity, credit and probably fixed-income markets. We are therefore reiterating our negative stance on Brazilian financial markets: The pace of real economic activity might be rolling over (Chart I-11A). This is occurring at a time when levels of economic activity are still severely depressed, well below their 2012 peak (Chart I-11B). Chart I-11ABrazil: Signs Of Growth Rollover... Chart I-11B...At Low Levels Business confidence also remains weak amid uncertainty ahead of this fall's presidential elections, which will continue to inhibit hiring and investment. In the meantime, the export sector, which has led growth since 2015, is facing headwinds. Exports in terms of volumes as well as value (U.S. dollars) have decelerated considerably (Chart I-12). As China's growth slows and commodities prices dwindle in the second half of this year, Brazil exports will contract. Nominal GDP growth has relapsed to its 2015 lows - a period when the country's financial markets were rioting (Chart I-13, top panel). Even though economic activity in real terms has rebounded, inflation has plunged resulting in extremely weak nominal income growth. Chart I-12Brazil: Exports Are Slowing Chart I-13Brazil Suffers From Low Inflation The GDP deflator and core consumer price inflation have plummeted to 20-year lows (Chart I-13, bottom panel). As a result, interest rates deflated by inflation - i.e., real interest rates - remain extremely high. Fiscal policy is restrained by a rule that limits current year spending growth to last year's inflation rate. This year's fiscal expenditure growth is going to be 3% in nominal terms. Given that inflation is still very depressed, this means that fiscal spending growth will be extremely low next year too. Furthermore, the central bank is unlikely to cut interest rates amid the turmoil in the currency market. The central bank also typically shrinks the banking system's reserves - tightens liquidity - during periods of exchange rate depreciation, as illustrated in Chart I-14. Therefore, the combination of weak nominal growth and high real interest rates will slip Brazil into a debt deflation dynamic - where indebtedness rises as nominal income/revenue growth remains below borrowing costs (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Falling BRL = Tighter Liquidity Chart I-15Brazil: An Unsustainable Gap This is especially true for government debt in Brazil. We maintain that the nation's public debt dynamics will remain on an unsustainable trajectory as long as government revenue growth does not exceed the level of nominal interest rates. In turn what Brazil needs are much lower real interest rates and a weaker currency to boost nominal GDP/income growth. This would ultimately stabilize public and private debt dynamics and improve debtors' ability to service debt. However, a sizable exchange rate depreciation, which is all but required to boost nominal growth, will in the interim be bad for financial markets, especially foreign investors. Chart I-16Brazil: Markets Have Hit Critical Levels Finally, there are a number of technical patterns that suggest a major top has been reached in Brazilian financial markets, and that downside from current levels will likely be significant. In particular, Brazil share prices in U.S. dollar terms have failed to break above their multi-year moving average, which has served as both a support and resistance in the past (Chart I-16, top panel). Likewise the real's total return including carry versus the dollar has been unable to break above its previous high. This, combined with the head-and-shoulder pattern of BRL (Chart I-16, bottom panel), suggests the real might be entering a bear market. Bank stocks are a large part of the equity index, and they have lately been under severe selling pressure. We are reinstating our short position in Brazilian banks. We closed this position last week when we removed our short Brazilian banks / long Argentine banks equity recommendation due to the selloff in Argentine banks.4 The currency depreciation is forcing local interest rates to rise, which is causing liquidity to tighten in Brazil. High borrowing costs in real terms are inhibiting credit demand. In particular, banks' aggregate loans to companies and households in both nominal and real terms are still shrinking. Although consumer loans are rising, the contraction in corporate lending has more than offset the recovery in household credit. Further, Chart I-17 demonstrates that the relapse in nominal GDP growth (shown inverted in the chart) heralds a rise in the rate of change of non-performing loans (NPL) as well as their provisions. As provisions begin to rise, banks' earnings will take a hit. Chart I-18 illustrates that banks have been reducing NPL provisions to boost profits and a rate of change in provisions has been a decisive factor driving bank equity prices in recent years. Chart I-17Slower Nominal Growth = Higher Provisions & NPLs Chart I-18NPL Provisions And Bank Stocks Bottom Line: Re-establish a short bank stocks position, and continue to short the BRL versus the U.S. dollar and MXN. Remain underweight Brazilian stocks as well as sovereign and corporate credit within respective EM portfolios. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Malaysia: Short-Term Challenges, Long-Term Opportunities Chart II-1Malaysia: Banks Have Been ##br##'Cooking Their Books' The election victory by the Malaysian opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan, offers a major opportunity to reverse the significant deterioration in Malaysia's governance and, hence, poor productivity growth that has occurred under the former Prime Minister Najib Razak. The political change is therefore a bullish development for Malaysia in the long-run. As such, we are placing the Malaysian bourse on an upgrade watch list. Yet the performance of Malaysia's financial markets in the coming months will remain challenged by vulnerabilities emanating from the country's weak banking system and potential negative forces that will subdue its external sector. These factors will slow growth in the months ahead, hurt the ringgit and exert downward pressures on Malaysian share prices: The health of Malaysian commercial banks is questionable. Since the economic downturn started in 2014, banks have grossly underreported their non-performing loans (NPLs) (Chart II-1). Additionally, they have been lowering NPL provisions to artificially boost their earnings in the past year or so (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Hence, banks' reported earnings are inflated. The former government tolerated these actions to ensure "economic and financial stability". Yet this sense of false "stability" will reverse under the new government. The latter headed by incoming Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad will likely attempt to change leadership of state institutions and SOEs and also clean the financial system in order to improve its transparency and soundness. We suspect as a part of this restructuring, the authorities and the central bank will begin exerting pressure on commercial banks to recognize and provision for NPLs. It is always new leadership within financial regulatory institutions or banks that opt to open the books and recognize NPLs. Higher provisioning will cause bank earnings to slump considerably, jeopardizing their share prices (Chart II-2). Malaysian banks account for 34% of the MSCI Malaysia index and 40% of its total earnings. Finally, bank stocks are not cheap with a price-to-book value ratio of 1.6 and a trailing P/E ratio at 15. On the external front, rising U.S. bond yields will cause the U.S. dollar to strengthen versus the ringgit, which will not bode well for Malaysian financial assets. Chart II-3 shows that spreads of Malaysian local government bond yields over U.S. Treasurys have reached new cyclical lows. As such, local yields offer little caution for foreign bond investors. Given that around 29% of domestic currency bonds are owned by foreigners, the ringgit depreciation will likely generate selling pressure in the local bond market. Chart II-2Malaysia: Bank Stocks Are At Risk Chart II-3Malaysia: Local Bond Yields ##br##Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys Further, the outlook for Malaysia's trade balance is negative due to potential cracks in the semiconductors industry and in commodities. Semiconductors account for 15% of Malaysia's exports while commodities account for around a quarter of its exports; with energy making up 14% exports and palm oil accounting for 8%. Malaysian exports of semiconductors are likely peaking. Chart II-4 shows that the average of Taiwan's and Korea's semiconductors shipment-to-inventory ratios is pointing to a deceleration in Malaysia's semiconductor exports. Taiwan and Korea are major semiconductor manufacturing hubs that ship some of their chips to Malaysia for testing and assembly. On this note, Chart II-5 shows that Taiwanese semiconductor exports to Malaysia are decelerating. This is confirming a forthcoming slump in Malaysia's semiconductor exports. And finally, various semiconductor prices are beginning to decline. Chart II-4Malaysia's Semiconductor Industry At Risk Chart II-5Malaysia's Semi Exports To Slow As for commodities, palm oil prices have been weak (Chart II-6). The industry is facing significant headwinds due to import restrictions from India and the EU. Besides, Malaysia is probably bound to lose palm oil market share to Indonesia. China and Indonesia signed an agreement last week with the former agreeing to purchase more of this commodity from Indonesia. Chart II-6Unusual Divergence Between ##br##Oil And Palm Oil Prices Meanwhile, as our colleagues from the Geopolitical Strategy service argued this week, the incoming Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad plans to review some Chinese investments in Malaysia that were undertaken by his predecessor.5 Doing so could induce China to retaliate by limiting Malaysian palm oil imports and reducing imports of other Malaysian products as well. Around 13% of Malaysian exports are shipped to China. A final word on oil is warranted. The surge in oil prices is unambiguously bullish for this economy. However, it is important to realize that this price surge is driven by escalating geopolitical risks and mushrooming traders' net long positions in crude rather than global demand. The former might persist for some time as U.S.-Iran hostilities linger. Continued strength in the dollar, however, could trigger a considerable decline in oil prices as traders head for the exits. On the whole, Malaysia's current account balance will deteriorate which will weigh on the Malaysian currency and hurt U.S. dollar returns of Malaysian financial assets. Faced with currency depreciation, the Malaysian central bank is unlikely to defend the currency by hiking interest rates or selling its foreign exchange reserves (doing so would also tighten banking system liquidity). The Malaysian economy cannot bear much higher interest rates as private-sector debt-to-GDP stands at a whopping 134%. In the meantime, currency depreciation will inflict pain on debtors with foreign currency liabilities. Malaysian companies are amongst the largest foreign currency borrowers in the developing economies univers. In short, the ringgit will come under material selling pressure like many other EM currencies and this will hurt the economy. This will also weigh on the equity index - which is dominated by banks. Bottom Line: While we recommend investors to maintain an underweight position in Malaysian equities for now, we are placing this bourse on upgrade watch list given the positive election results. We are waiting for the following to occur before upgrading Malaysia's stock market: (1) Commodities prices to fall and the semiconductor cycle to slow and (2) Malaysian commercial banks to recognize more NPLs and increase provisioning for bad loans. Meanwhile, currency traders should stay short MYR versus the U.S. dollar and equity investors should remain short banks. Finally, for fixed-income traders we continue to recommend long Thai / short Malaysia local bonds. Credit portfolios should underweight this sovereign credit for now. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 This index is constructed using an equal-weighted index of six total return commodities currencies such as BRL, CLP, ZAR, AUD, NZD and CAD divided by the total returns of the safe-haven currencies: JPY and CHF. 2 Cash earnings are defined and calculated by MSCI as earnings per share including depreciation and amortization as reported by the company - i.e. depreciation and amortization expenses are added to earnings in order to calculate cash earnings. 3 For example, please refer to discussion on Brazilian and Malaysian banks on pages 7 and 13, respectively. 4 Please refer to Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: A Correction Or Bear Market?" dated May 10, 2018, link is available on page 20. 5 Pleas see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Are You Ready For "Maximum Pressure?" dated May 16, 2018, available on gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Divergence between U.S. and global economic outcomes is bullish for the U.S. dollar and bad for EM assets; Maximum Pressure worked with North Korea, but it may not with Iran, putting upside pressure on oil; An election is the only way to resolve split over Brexit and the new anti-establishment coalition in Italy is not market positive; Historic election outcome in Malaysia and the prospect of a weakened Erdogan favors Malaysian over Turkish assets; Reinitiate long Russian vs EM equities in light of higher oil price and reopen French versus German industrials as reforms continue unimpeded in France. Feature "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." - Theodore Roosevelt, in a letter to Henry L. Sprague, January 26, 1900. May started with a geopolitical bang. On May 4, a high-profile U.S. trade delegation to Beijing returned home after two days of failed negotiations. Instead of bridging the gap between the two superpowers, the delegation doubled it.1 On May 8, President Trump put his Maximum Pressure doctrine - honed against Pyongyang - into action against Iran, announcing that the U.S. would withdraw from the Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal - also referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These geopolitical headlines were good for the U.S. dollar, bad for Treasuries, and generally miserable for emerging market (EM) assets (Chart 1).2 We have expected these very market moves since the beginning of the year, recommending that clients go long the DXY on January 31 and go short EM equities vs. DM on March 6.3 Chart 1EM Breakdown? Chart 2U.S. Dollar Rallies When Global Trade Slows Geopolitical risks, however, are merely the accelerant of an ongoing process of global growth redistribution. A key theme for BCA's Geopolitical Strategy this year has been the divergent ramifications of populist stimulus in the U.S. and structural reforms in China. This political divergence in economic outcomes has reduced growth in the latter and accelerated it in the former, a bullish environment for the U.S. dollar (Chart 2).4 Data is starting to support this narrative: Chart 3Global Growth On A Knife Edge Chart 4German Data... The BCA OECD LEI has stalled, but the diffusion index shows a clear deterioration (Chart 3); German trade is showing signs of weakness, as is industrial production and IFO business confidence (Chart 4); Another bellwether of global trade, South Korea, is showing a rapid deterioration in exports (Chart 5); Global economic surprise index is now in negative territory (Chart 6). Chart 5...And South Korean, Foreshadows Risks Chart 6Unexpected Slowdown In Global Growth Meanwhile, on the U.S. side of the ledger, wage pressures are rising as the number of unemployed workers and job openings converge (Chart 7). Given the additional tailwinds of fiscal stimulus, which we see no real chance of being reversed either before or after the midterm election, the U.S. economy is likely to continue to surprise to the upside relative to the rest of the world, a bullish outcome for the U.S. dollar (Chart 8). In this environment of U.S. outperformance and global growth underperformance, EM assets are likely to suffer. Chart 7U.S. Labor Market Is Tightening Chart 8U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD Additionally, it does not help that geopolitical risks will weigh on confidence and will buoy demand for safe haven assets, such as the U.S. dollar. First, U.S.-China trade relations will continue to dominate the news flow this summer. President Trump's positive tweets on the smartphone giant ZTE aside, the U.S. and China have not reached a substantive agreement and upcoming deadlines on trade-related matters remain a risk (Table 1). Table 1Protectionism: Upcoming Dates To Watch Second, President Trump's application of Maximum Pressure on Iran will cause further volatility and upside pressure on the oil markets. The media was caught by surprise by the president's announcement that he is withdrawing the U.S. from the JCPOA, which is puzzling given that the May 12 expiration of the sanctions waiver was well-telegraphed (Chart 9). It is also surprising given that President Trump signaled his pivot towards an aggressive foreign policy by appointing John Bolton and Mike Pompeo - two adherents of a hawkish foreign policy - to replace more middle-of-the-road policymakers. It was these personnel changes, combined with the U.S. president's lack of constraints on foreign policy, that inspired us to include Iran as the premier geopolitical risk for 2018.5 Chart 9Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Iran-U.S. Tensions: Maximum Pressure Is Real Last year, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy correctly forecast that President Trump's Maximum Pressure doctrine would work against North Korea. First, we noted that President Trump reestablished America's "credible threat," a crucial factor in any negotiation.6 Without credible threats, it is impossible to cajole one's rival into shifting away from the status quo. The trick with North Korea, for each administration that preceded President Trump, was that it was difficult to establish such a credible threat given Pyongyang's ability to retaliate through conventional artillery against South Korean population centers. President Trump swept this concern aside by appearing unconcerned with what were to befall South Korean civilians or the Korean-U.S. alliance. Second, we noted in a detailed military analysis that North Korean retaliation - apart from the aforementioned conventional capacity - was paltry.7 President Trump called Kim Jong-un's bluff about targeting Guam with ballistic missiles and kept up Maximum Pressure throughout a summer full of rhetorical bluster. As tensions rose, China blinked first, enforcing President Trump's demand for tighter sanctions. China did not want the U.S. to attack North Korea or to use the North Korean threat as a reason to build up its military assets in the region. The collapse of North Korean exports to China ultimately starved the regime of hard cash and, in conjunction with U.S. military and rhetorical pressure, forced Kim Jong-un to back off (Chart 10). In essence, President Trump's doctrine is a modification of President Theodore Roosevelt's maxim. Instead of "talking softly," President Trump recommends "tweeting aggressively".8 It is important to recount the North Korean experience for several reasons: Maximum Pressure worked with North Korea: It is an objective fact that President Trump was correct in using Maximum Pressure on North Korea. Our analysis last year carefully detailed why it would be a success. However, we also specifically outlined why it would work with North Korea. Particularly relevant was Pyongyang's inability to counter American economic pressure and rhetoric with material leverage. Kim Jong-un's only objective capability is to launch a massive artillery attack against civilians in Seoul. Given his preference not to engage in a full-out war against South Korea and the U.S., he balked and folded. Trump is tripling-down on what works: President Trump, as all presidents before him, is learning on the job. The North Korean experience has convinced him that his Maximum Pressure tactic works. In particular, it works because it forces third parties to enforce economic sanctions on the target nation. If China were to abandon its traditional ally North Korea and enforced painful sanctions, the logic goes, then Europeans would ditch Iran much faster. Iran is not North Korea: The danger with applying a Maximum Pressure tactic against Iran is that Tehran has multiple levers around the Middle East that it could deploy to counter U.S. pressure. President Obama did not sign the JCPOA merely because he was a dove.9 He did so because the deal resolved several regional security challenges and allowed the U.S. to pivot to Asia (Chart 11). Chart 10Maximum Pressure Worked On Pyongyang Chart 11Iran Nuclear Deal Had A Strategic Imperative To understand why Iran is not North Korea, and how the application of Maximum Pressure could induce greater uncertainty in this case, investors first have to comprehend why the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal was concluded in the first place. Maximum Pressure Applied To Iran The 2015 U.S.-Iran deal resolved a crucial security dilemma in the Middle East: what to do about Iran's growing power in the region. Ever since the U.S. toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the fulcrum of the region's disequilibrium has been the status of Iraq. Iraq is a natural geographic buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional rivals. Hussein, a Sunni, ruled Iraq - 65% of which is Shia - either as an overt client of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (1980-1988), or as a free agent largely opposed to everyone in the region (from 1990s onwards). Both options were largely acceptable to Saudi Arabia, although the former was preferable. Iran quickly seized the initiative in Iraq following the U.S. overthrow of Hussein, which created a vast vacuum of power in the country. Elite members of the country's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the so-called Quds Force, infiltrated Iraq and supplied various Shia militias with weapons and training that fueled the anti-U.S. insurgency. An overt Iranian ally, Nouri al-Maliki, assumed power in 2006. Soon the anti-U.S. insurgency evolved into sectarian violence as the Sunni population revolted and various Sunni militias, supported by Saudi Arabia, rose up against Shia-dominated Baghdad. The U.S. troops stationed in Iraq quickly became either incapable of controlling the sectarian violence or direct targets of the violence themselves. This rebellion eventually mutated into the Islamic State, which spread from Iraq to Syria in 2012 and then back to Iraq two years later. The Obama administration quickly realized that a U.S. military presence in Iraq would have to be permanent if Iranian influence in the country was to be curbed in the long term. This position was untenable, however, given U.S. military casualties in Iraq, American public opinion about the war, and lack of clarity on U.S. long-term interests in Iraq in the first place. President Obama therefore simultaneously withdrew American troops from Iraq in 2011 and began pressuring Iran on its nuclear program between 2011 and 2015.10 In addition, the U.S. demanded that Iran curb its influence in Iraq, that its anti-American/Israel rhetoric cease, and that it help defend Iraq against the attacks by the Islamic State in 2014. Tehran obliged on all three fronts, joining forces with the U.S. Air Force and Special Forces in the defense of Baghdad in the fall 2014.11 In 2014, Iran acquiesced in seeing its ally al-Maliki replaced by the far less sectarian Haider al-Abadi. These moves helped ease tensions between the U.S. and Iran and led to the signing of the JCPOA in 2015. From Tehran's perspective, it has abided by all the demands made by Washington during the 2012-2015 negotiations, both those covered by the JCPOA overtly and those never explicitly put down on paper. Yes, Iran's influence in the Middle East has expanded well beyond Iraq and into Syria, where Iranian troops are overtly supporting President Bashar al-Assad. But from Iran's perspective, the U.S. abandoned Syria in 2012 - when President Obama failed to enforce his "red line" on chemical weapons use. In fact, without Iranian and Russian intervention, it is likely that the Islamic State would have gained a greater foothold in Syria. The point that its critics miss is that the 2015 nuclear deal always envisioned giving Iran a sphere of influence in the Middle East. Otherwise, Tehran would not have agreed to curb its nuclear program! To force Iran to negotiate, President Obama did threaten Tehran with military force. As we have detailed in the past, President Obama established a credible threat by outsourcing it to Israel in 2011. It was this threat of a unilateral Israeli attack, which Obama did little to limit or prevent, that ultimately forced Europeans to accept the hawkish American position and impose crippling economic sanctions against Iran in early 2012. As such, it is highly unlikely that a rerun of the same strategy by the U.S., this time with Trump in charge and with potentially less global cooperation on sanctions, will produce a different, or better, deal. The recent history is important to recount because the Trump administration is convinced that it can get a better deal from Iran than the Obama administration did. This may be true, but it will require considerable amounts of pressure on Iran to achieve it. At some point, we expect that this pressure will look very much like a preparation for war against Iran, either by U.S. allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, or by the U.S. itself. First, President Trump will have to create a credible threat of force, as President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did in 2011-2012. Second, President Trump will have to be willing to sanction companies in Europe and Asia for doing business with Iran in order to curb Iran's oil exports. According to National Security Advisor John Bolton, European companies will have by the end of 2018 to curb their activities with Iran or face sanctions. The one difference this time around is Iraqi politics. Elections held on May 13 appear to have resulted in a surge of support for anti-Iranian Shia candidates, starting with the ardently anti-American and anti-Iranian Shia Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr is a Shia, but also an Iraqi nationalist who campaigned on an anti-Tehran, anti-poverty, anti-corruption line. If the election signals a clear shift in Baghdad against Iran, then Iran may have one less important lever to play against the U.S. and its allies. However, we are only cautiously optimistic about Iraq. Pro-Iranian Shia forces, while in a clear minority, still maintain the support of roughly half of Iraqi Shias. And al-Sadr may not be able to govern effectively, given that his track record thus far mainly consists of waging insurgent warfare (against Americans) and whipping up populist fervor (against Iran). Any move in Baghdad, with U.S. and Saudi backing, to limit Iranian-allied Shia groups from government could lead to renewed sectarian conflict. Therein lies the key difference between North Korea and Iran. Iran has military, intelligence, and operational capabilities that North Korea does not. This is precisely why the U.S. concluded the 2015 deal in the first place, so that Iran would curb those capabilities regionally and limit its operations to the Iranian "sphere of influence." In addition, Iran is constrained against reopening negotiations with the U.S. domestically by the ongoing political contest between the moderates - such as President Hassan Rouhani - and the hawks - represented by the military and intelligence nexus. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits somewhere in the middle, but will side with the hawks if it looks like Rouhani's promise of economic benefits from the détente with the West will fall short of reality. The combination of domestic pressure and capabilities therefore makes it likely that Iran retaliates against American pressure at some point. While such retaliation could be largely investment-irrelevant - say by supporting Hezbollah rocket attacks into Israel or ramping up military operations in Syria - it could also affect oil prices if it includes activities in and around the Persian Gulf. Bottom Line: We caution clients not to believe the narrative that "Trump is all talk." As the example in North Korea suggests, Trump's rhetoric drove China to enforce sanctions in order to avert war on the Korean Peninsula. We therefore expect the U.S. administration to continue to threaten European and Asian partners and allies with sanctions, causing an eventual drop in Iranian oil exports. In addition, we expect Iran to play hardball, using its various proxies in the region to remind the Trump administration why Obama signed the 2015 deal in the first place. Could Trump ultimately be right on Iran as he was on North Korea? Absolutely. It is simply naïve to assume that Iran will negotiate without Maximum Pressure, which by definition will be market-relevant. Impact On Energy Markets BCA Energy Sector Strategy believes that the re-imposition of sanctions could result in a loss of 300,000-500,000 b/d of production by early 2019.12 This would take 2019 production back down to 3.3-3.5 MMB/d instead of growing to nearly 4.0 MMb/d as our commodity strategists have modeled in their supply-demand forecasts. In total, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for 2019 oil markets by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing the production that Iran has brought online since 2016 (Chart 12). Is the global energy market able to withstand this type of loss of production? First, Chart 13 shows that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been cut from 450 million barrels at its peak to less than 100 million barrels today. Surplus inventories are destined to shrink to nothing by the end of the year even without geopolitical risks. In short, there is no excess inventory cushion. Chart 12Current And Future Iran Production Is At Risk Chart 13Excess Petroleum Inventories Are All But Gone Second, spare capacity within the OPEC 2.0 alliance - Saudi Arabia and Russia - is controversial. Many clients believe that OPEC 2.0 could easily restore the 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. However, our commodity team has always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually has achieved (Chart 14). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 15). Chart 14Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are ##br##Producing 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 15Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors"##br## Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Third, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.23 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 16). Venezuelan production declined by 450,000 b/d over the course of 21 months (December 2015 to September 2017), followed by another 450,000 b/d plunge over the past six months (September 2017 to March 2018), as the country's failing economy goes through the death spiral of its 20-year socialist experiment. The oil production supply chain is now suffering from shortages of everything, including capital. It is difficult to predict what broken link in the supply chain is most likely to impact production next, when it will happen, and what the size of the production impact will be. The combination of President Trump's Maximum Pressure doctrine applied to Iran, continued deterioration in Venezuelan production, and the inability of OPEC 2.0 to surge production as fast as the market thinks is unambiguously bullish for oil prices. Oil markets are currently pricing in a just under 35% probability that oil prices will exceed $80/bbl by year-end (Chart 17).13 We believe these odds are too low and will take the other side of that bet. Indeed, we think that the odds of Brent prices ending above $90/bbl this year are much higher than the 16% chance being priced in the markets presently, even though this is up from just under 4% at the beginning of the year. Chart 16Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Chart 17Market Continues To Underestimate High Oil Prices Bottom Line: Our colleague Bob Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist, also expects higher volatility, as news flows become noisier. The recommendation by BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy is to go long Feb/19 $80/bbl Brent calls expiring in Dec/18 vs. short Feb/19 $85/bbl calls, given our assessment that the odds of ending the year above $90/bbl are higher than the market's expectations. A key variable to watch in the ongoing saga will be President Trump's willingness to impose secondary sanctions against European and Asian companies doing business with Iran. We do not think that the White House is bluffing. The mounting probability of sanctions will create "stroke of pen" risk and raise compliance costs to doing business with Iran, leading to lower Iranian exports by the end of the year. Europe Update: Political Risks Returning Risks in Europe are rising on multiple fronts. First, we continue to believe that the domestic political situation in the U.K. regarding Brexit is untenable. Second, the coalition of populists in Italy - combining the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Euroskeptic Lega - appears poised to become a reality. Brexit: Start Pricing In Prime Minister Corbyn Since our Brexit update in February, the pound has taken a wild ride, but our view has remained the same.14 PM May has an untenable negotiating position. The soft-Brexit majority in Westminster is growing confident while the hard-Brexit majority in her own Tory party is growing louder. We do not know who will win, but odds of an unclear outcome are growing. The first problem is the status of Northern Ireland. The 1998 Good Friday agreement, which ended decades of paramilitary conflict on the island, established an invisible border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Membership in the EU by both made the removal of a physical border a simple affair. But if the U.K. exits the bloc, and takes Northern Ireland with it, presumably a physical barrier would have to be reestablished, either in Ireland or between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K. The former would jeopardize the Good Friday agreement, the latter would jeopardize the U.K.'s integrity as a state. The EU, led on by Dublin's interests, has proposed that Northern Ireland maintain some elements of the EU acquis communautaire - the accumulated body of EU's laws and obligations - in order to facilitate the effectiveness of the 1998 Good Friday agreement. For many Tories in the U.K., particularly those who consider themselves "Unionists," the arrangement smacks of a Trojan Horse by the EU to slowly but surely untie the strings that bind the U.K. together. If Northern Ireland gets an exception, then pro-EU Scotland is sure to ask for one too. The second problem is that the Tories are divided on whether to remain part of the EU customs union. PM May is in favor of a "customs partnership" with the EU, which would see unified tariffs and duties on goods and services across the EU bloc and the U.K. However, her own cabinet voted against her on the issue, mainly because a customs union with the EU would eliminate the main supposed benefit of Brexit: negotiating free trade deals independent of the EU. It is unclear how PM May intends to resolve the multiple disagreements on these issues within her party. Thus far, her strategy was to simply put the eventual deal with the EU up for a vote in Westminster. She agreed to hold such a vote, but with the caveat that a vote against the deal would break off negotiations with the EU and lead to a total Brexit. The threat of such a hard Brexit would force soft Brexiters among the Tories to accept whatever compromise she got from Brussels. Unfortunately for May's tactic, the House of Lords voted on April 30 to amend the flagship EU Withdrawal Bill to empower Westminster to send the government back to the negotiating table in case of a rejection of the final deal with the EU. The amendment will be accepted if the House of Commons agrees to it, which it may, given that a number of soft Brexit Tories are receptive. A defeat of the final negotiated settlement could prolong negotiations with the EU. Brussels is on record stating that it would prolong the transition period and give the U.K. a different Brexit date, moving the current date of March 2019. However, it is unclear why May would continue negotiating at that point, given that her own parliament would send her back to Brussels, hat in hand. The fundamental problem for May is the same that has plagued the last three Tory Prime Ministers: the U.K. Conservative Party is intractably split with itself on Brexit. The only way to resolve the split may be for PM May to call an election and give herself a mandate to negotiate with the EU once she is politically recapitalized. This realization, that the probability of a new election is non-negligible, will likely weigh on the pound going forward. Investors would likely balk at the possibility that Jeremy Corbyn will become the prime minister, although polling data suggests that his surge in popularity is over (Chart 18). Local elections in early May also ended inconclusively for Labour's chances, with no big outpouring for left-leaning candidates. Even if Labour is forced to form a coalition with the Scottish National Party (SNP), it is unlikely that the left-leaning SNP would be much of a check on Corbyn's Labour. Chart 18Corbyn's Popularity Is In Decline Bottom Line: Theresa May will either have to call a new election between now and March of next year or she will use the threat of a new election to get hard-Brexit Tories in line. Either way, markets will have to reprice the probability of a Labour-led government between now and a resolution to the Brexit crisis. Italy: Start Pricing In A Populist Government Leaders of Italy's populist parties - M5S and Lega - have come to an agreement on a coalition that will put the two anti-establishment parties in charge of the EU's third-largest economy. Markets are taking the news in stride because M5S has taken a 180-degree turn on Euroskepticism. Although Lega remains overtly Euroskeptic, its leader Matteo Salvini has said that he does not want a chaotic exit from the currency bloc. Is the market right to ignore the risks? On one hand, it is a positive development that the anti-establishment forces take over the reins in Italy. Establishment parties have failed to reform the country, while time spent in government will de-radicalize both anti-establishment parties. Furthermore, the one item on the political agenda that both parties agree on is to radically curb illegal migration into Italy, a process that is already underway (Chart 19). On the other hand, the economic pact signed by both parties is completely and utterly incompatible with reality. It combines a flat tax and a guaranteed basic income with a lowering of the retirement age. This would blow a hole in Italy's budget, barring a miraculous positive impact on GDP growth. The market is likely ignoring the coalition's economic policies as it assumes they cannot be put into action. This is not because Rome is afraid to flout Brussels' rules, but because the bond market is not going to finance Italian expenditures. Long-dated Italian bonds are already cheap relative to the country's credit rating (Chart 20), evidence that the market is asking for a premium to finance Italian expenditures. This is despite the ongoing ECB bond buying efforts. Once the ECB ends the program later this year, or in early 2019, the pressure on Rome from the bond market will grow. Chart 19European Migration Crisis Is Over Chart 20Italian Bonds Still Require A Risk Premium We suspect that both M5S and Lega are aware of their constraints. After all, neither M5S leader Luigi Di Maio nor Lega's Salvini are going to take the prime minister spot. This is extraordinary! We cannot remember the last time a leader of the winning party refused to take the top political spot following an election. Both Di Maio and Salvini are trying to pass the buck for the failure of the coalition. In one way, this is market-positive, as it suggests that the anti-establishment coalition will do nothing of note during its mandate. But it also suggests that markets will have to deal with a new Italian election relatively quickly. As such, we would warn investors to steer clear of Italian assets. Their performance in 2017, and early 2018, suggests that the market has already priced in the most market-positive outcome. Yes, Italy will not leave the Euro Area. But no, there is no "Macron of Italy" to resolve its long-term growth problems. Bottom Line: The Italian government formation is not market-positive. Italian bonds are cheap for a reason. While it is unlikely that the populist coalition will have the room to maneuver its profligate coalition deal into action, the bond market may have to discipline Italian policymakers from time to time. In the long term, none of the structural problems that Italy faces - many of which we have identified in a number of reports - will be tackled by the incoming coalition.15 This will expose Italy to an eventual resurgence in Euroskepticism at the first sight of the next recession. Emerging Markets: Elections In Malaysia And Turkey Offer Divergent Outcomes As we pointed out at the beginning of this report, an environment of rising U.S. yields, a surging dollar, and moderating global growth is negative for emerging markets. In this context, politics is unlikely to make much of a difference. The recently announced early election in Turkey is a case in point. Markets briefly cheered the announced election (Chart 21), before investors realized that there is unlikely to be a consolidation of power behind President Erdogan (Chart 22). Even if Erdogan were to somehow massively outperform expectations and consolidate political capital, it is not clear why investors would cheer such an outcome given his track record, particularly on the economy, over the past decade. Chart 21Investors Briefly Cheered Ankara's Snap Election Chart 22Is Erdogan In Trouble? Malaysia, on the other hand, could be the one EM economy that defies the negative macro context due to political events. Our most bullish long-term scenario for Malaysia - a historic victory for the opposition Pakatan Harapan coalition - came to pass with the election on May 9 (Chart 23).16 Significantly, outgoing Prime Minister Najib Razak accepted the election results as the will of the people. He did not incite violence or refuse to cede power. Rather, he congratulated incoming Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and promised to help ensure a smooth transition. This marks the first transfer of power since Malaysian independence in 1957. It was democratic and peaceful, which establishes a hugely consequential and market-friendly precedent. How did the opposition pull off this historic upset? Ethnic-majority Malays swung to the opposition; Mahathir's "charismatic authority" had an outsized effect; Barisan Nasional "safety deposits" in Sabah and Sarawak failed; Voters rejected fundamentalist Islamism. What are the implications? Better Governance - Governance has been deteriorating, especially under Najib's rule, but now voters have demanded improvements that could include term-limits for prime ministers and legislative protections for officials investigating wrongdoing by top leaders (Chart 24). Economic Stimulus - Pakatan Harapan campaigned against some of the painful pro-market structural reforms that Najib put in place. They have promised to repeal the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) and reinstate fuel subsidies. They have also proposed raising the minimum wage and harmonizing it across the country. While these pledges will be watered down,17 they are positive for nominal growth in the short term but negative for fiscal sustainability in the long term. Chart 23Comfortable Majority For Pakatan Harapan Coalition Chart 24Voters Want Governance Improvements The one understated risk comes from China. Najib's weakness had led him to court China and rely increasingly on Chinese investment as an economic strategy. Mahathir and Pakatan Harapan will seek to revise all Chinese investment (including under the Belt and Road Initiative). This review is not necessarily to cancel projects but to haggle about prices and ensure that domestic labor is employed. Mahathir will also try to assert Malaysian rights in the South China Sea. None of this means that a crisis is impending, but China has increasingly used economic sanctions to punish and reward its neighbors according to whether their electoral outcomes are favorable to China,18 and we expect tensions to increase. Investment Conclusion On the one hand, in the short run, the picture for Malaysia is mixed. Pakatan Harapan will likely pursue some stimulative economic policies, but these come amidst fundamental macro weaknesses that we have highlighted in the past - and may even exacerbate them. On the other hand, a key external factor is working in the new government's favor: oil. With oil prices likely to move higher, the Malaysian ringgit is likely to benefit (Chart 25), helping Malaysian companies make payments on their large pile of dollar-denominated debt and improving household purchasing power, a key election grievance. Higher oil prices are also correlated with higher equity prices. Over the long run, we have a high-conviction view that this election is bullish for Malaysia. It sends a historic signal that the populace wants better governance. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has found that improvements in governance are crucial for long-term productivity, growth, and asset performance.19 Hence, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy recommends clients go long Malaysian equities relative to EM. Now is a good entry point despite short-term volatility (Chart 26). We also think that going long MYR/TRY will articulate both our bullish oil story as well as our divergent views on political risks in Malaysia and Turkey (Chart 27). Chart 25Oil Outlook Favors Malaysian Assets Chart 26Long Malaysian Equities Versus EM Chart 27Higher Oil Prices Favor MYR Than TRY We are re-initiating two trades this week. First, the recently stopped out long Russian / short EM equities recommendation. We still believe that the view is on strong fundamentals, at least in the tactical and cyclical sense.20 Russian President Vladimir Putin has won another mandate and appears to be focusing on domestic economy and the constraints to Russian geopolitical adventurism have grown. The Trump administration has apparently also grown wary of further sanctions against Russia. However, our initial timing was massively off, as tensions between Russia and West did not peak in early March as we thought. We are giving this high-risk, high-reward trade another go, particularly in light of our oil price outlook. Second, we booked 10.26% gains on our recommendation to go long French industrials versus their German counterparts. We are reopening this view again as structural reforms continue in France unimpeded. Meanwhile, risk of global trade wars and a global growth slowdown should impact the high-beta German industrials more than the French. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Senior Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Washington's demand that China cut its annual trade surplus has grown from $100 billion, announced previously by President Trump, to at least $200 billion. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: A Correction Or Bear Market?" dated May 10, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "'America Is Roaring Back!' (But Why Is King Dollar Whispering?),"dated January 31, 2018, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War," dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, and "Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Instead of a "big stick," President Trump would likely also recommend a "big nuclear button." 9 This is an important though obvious point. We find that many liberally-oriented clients are unwilling to give President Trump credit for correctly handling the North Korean negotiations. Similarly, conservative-oriented clients refuse to accept that President Obama's dealings with Iran had a strategic logic, even though they clearly did. President Obama would not have been able to conclude the JCPOA without the full support of U.S. intelligence and military establishment. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Out Of The Vault: Explaining The U.S.-Iran Détente," dated July 15, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 While there was no confirmed collaboration between Iranian ground forces in Iraq and the U.S. Air Force, we assume that it happened in 2014 in the defense of Baghdad. The U.S. A-10 Warthog was extensively used against Islamic State ground forces in that battle. The plane is most effective when it has communication from ground forces engaging enemy units. Given that Iranian troops and Iranian backed Shia militias did the majority of the fighting in the defense of Baghdad, we assume that there was tactical communication between U.S. and the Iranian military in 2014, a whole year before the U.S.-Iran nuclear détente was concluded. 12 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Geopolitical Certainty: OPEC Production Risks Are Playing To Shale Producers' Advantage," dated May 9, 2018, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Feedback Loop: Spec Positioning & Oil Price Volatility," dated May 10, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Bear Hunting And A Brexit Update," dated February 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, and "Europe's Divine Comedy Party II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "How To Play Malaysia's Elections (And Thailand's Lack Thereof)," dated March 21, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 For instance, the proposed Sales and Services Tax (SST) is more like a rebranding of the GST than a true abolition. And while fuel subsidies will be reinstated - weighing on the fiscal deficit - they will have a quota and only certain vehicles will be eligible. It will not be a return to the old pricing regime where subsidies were unlimited and were for everyone. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Does It Pay To Pivot To China?" dated July 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Ranking EM Countries Based on Structural Variables," dated August 2, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Vladimir Putin, Act IV," dated March 7, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights An examination of the three pillars of China's economy provides an unambiguous signal that a slowdown is underway. This would normally warrant, at most, a neutral allocation to Chinese stocks, but several factors argue against cutting exposure for now. Stay overweight, but with a short leash. Recent changes in the BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio's recommended allocation have validated two of our recent investment recommendations. In addition, the model is providing a curiously bullish signal about the relative performance of Chinese vs global stocks that heightens our reluctance to reduce Chinese equity exposure. Our China Reform Monitor signals that investors do not view the current pace of structural reforms as being overly burdensome for the economy. In addition, while Chinese policymakers have made some significant gains in improving China's air quality over the past 18 months, these changes have mostly occurred from a near-hazardous starting point (suggesting that more progress will be needed). As such, we recommend that investors stick with our long ESG leaders / short investable benchmark trade over the coming year. Feature Global investor sentiment improved modestly on Monday, in response to statements from President Trump indicating a possible détente between the U.S. and China on the issue of trade. In particular, Mr. Trump signaled a willingness to assist ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications equipment maker, whose operations would have been enormously impacted by the U.S. Commerce Department's decision last month to ban American companies from selling to the firm. In the view of our Geopolitical Strategy Service, announcements like these should be viewed as marginally positive developments within the context of a serious downtrend in U.S./China relations. Investors appear to be eager to respond to positive news about waning U.S. protectionism, but the reality is that several important decisions related to the U.S.' section 301 probe have yet to be announced.1 As we noted in last week's Special Report,2 this underscores that the near-term risks to China from the external sector are clearly to the downside. Abstracting from the day-to-day assessment of the trade picture, we have emphasized that other core elements of the China outlook have deteriorated. As we present below, an aggregate view of the three pillars of China's economy continues to argue for a (contained) slowdown, with protectionism acting as a downside risk to an already sober economic outlook. Extremely cheap valuation and the high-beta nature of Chinese ex-tech stocks continue to justify an overweight stance versus global equities, but we recommend that investors keep Chinese stocks on downgrade watch for the remainder of Q2 as the risks to the Chinese economy warrant an ongoing assessment of what is currently a finely balanced equity allocation decision. Assessing The Three Pillars Chart 1 presents our stylized framework for analyzing China's economy. It highlights that China's business cycle is largely driven by three "pillars": industrial activity, the housing market, and trade. While the services sector, the Chinese consumer, and/or the technology sector are of interesting secular relevance, generally-speaking China's business cycle continues to be subject to its "old" growth model centered on investment and exports. Chart 1The Three Pillars Of China's Business Cycle Industrial Activity: We took an empirical approach to predicting China's industrial sector activity in our November 30 Special Report,3 and tested the ability of 40 different macro data series to lead the Li Keqiang index (LKI). While the LKI is closely followed and somewhat cliché, we have focused on it because of its strong correlation with ex-tech earnings and import growth. The results of our November report pointed to the success of monetary condition indexes, money supply, and credit measures to reliably predict the LKI since China's real GDP growth peaked in 2010. We constructed our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator based on these measures, and we have frequently highlighted over the past few months that the indicator is pointing to a continued deceleration in China's industrial activity (Chart 2). Housing: We noted in our November report that housing market data also correlates with the LKI, albeit less well than the components of our Leading Indicator. One important observation about China's housing market that we highlighted in our February 8 Weekly Report is that residential floor space sold appears to have reliably led floor space started (a proxy for real residential investment) since 2010 (Chart 3). Over the past 6-8 months, however, floor space started appears to have diverged from the trend in floor space sold, which may have been caused by a non-trivial reduction in housing inventories over the past few years.4 Nonetheless, we also noted that the level of inventories remains quite elevated, suggesting that the uptrend in floor space started is unlikely to continue without a renewed uptrend in sales volume. In our view, this conclusion implies that the housing outlook over the coming 6-12 months is neutral, at best. Chart 2China's Industrial Sector ##br##Will Continue To Slow Chart 3Resi Sales Volume Does Not Point To ##br##A Sustained Pickup In Construction Trade: The third pillar of China's economy is the external sector, which remains important even though net exports have fallen quite significantly in terms of contribution to China's growth. We noted in our April 18 Weekly Report that there is a strongly positive relationship between the annual change in contribution to growth from China's net exports and subsequent gross capital formation, highlighting that external demand provides an important multiplier effect for Chinese activity. For now, nominal export growth (in CNY terms) remains at the high end of its 5-year range, reflecting the strength of the global economy. But three significant risks remain to the export outlook: 1) the clear and present danger of U.S. import tariffs, 2) the possibility that Chinese policymakers may accelerate their reform efforts to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" provided by robust global demand,4 and 3) the very substantial rise in the export-weighted RMB (Chart 4), which is fast approaching its 2015 high. As a final point on trade, Chart 5 highlights that the recent divergence between the LKI and nominal import growth is resolved when examining the latter in CNY terms. The chart suggests that while export growth has been buoyed by a strong global economy, China's contribution to the global growth impulse is diminishing. The very tight link demonstrated in Chart 5 also suggests that industrial activity is the most important pillar to watch among the three noted above, which means that Chart 2 argues for a negative export outlook for China's major trading partners. Chart 4A Non-Trivial Deterioration ##br##In Competitiveness Chart 5The Rise In CNYUSD Is Flattering ##br##Imports Measured In Dollars Our assessment of the three pillars of China's economy points to a conclusion that we have highlighted frequently in our recent reports: China's industrial sector is slowing, and there are downside risks to the export outlook. The character of the slowdown does not suggest that a major shock to the global economy is likely to emanate from China over the coming 6-12 months, but the outlook is more consistent with a reduction than an expansion in China's contribution to global growth. Under normal circumstances, at best this would warrant a neutral asset allocation outlook to China-related financial assets. Chart 6The Uptrend In Relative Chinese ##br##Ex-Tech Performance Is Intact However, we have also argued that the relatively attractive valuation and the technical profile of Chinese equities suggests that investors should have a high threshold for reducing their exposure to China within a global equity portfolio. Chart 6 highlights that Chinese ex-tech share prices continue to demonstrate resilient performance versus their global peers, despite the ongoing slowdown in China's economy. In addition, as we will note below, our BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio is providing a curiously bullish signal about the relative performance of Chinese stocks, which heightens our reluctance to cut exposure. Bottom Line: An examination of the three pillars of China's economy provides an unambiguous signal that a slowdown is underway. This would normally warrant, at most, a neutral allocation to Chinese stocks, but several factors argue against cutting exposure for now. Stay overweight, but with a short leash. Reading The Tea Leaves From Our Sector Alpha Portfolio We introduced our BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio in a January Special Report, in part to demonstrate that the concept of alpha persistence (i.e. alpha that is persistently positive or negative) has material implications for portfolio returns. In particular, we noted that the portfolio's strategy of allocating to China's investable equity sectors based on the significance of alpha has resulted in over 200bps of long-term outperformance versus the investable benchmark, without taking on any additional risk (Table 1). Table 1An Alpha-Based Sector Model Has Historically Outperformed China's Investable Stock Market Table 2 presents the portfolio's current allocation, relative to the current benchmark weights for each sector as well as the portfolio's sectoral allocation when we published our January report. Two observations are noteworthy: The model recommends an overweight allocation to resources; consumer staples; health care; utilities; and real estate, at the expense of industrials; consumer discretionary; financials; technology; and telecom services. These positions are largely in-line with the model's recommendations in January, except for a non-trivial increase in exposure to energy and financials, and a significant reduction in technology and consumer discretionary. The portfolio's reduced exposure to technology and consumer discretionary stocks validate two recent investment recommendations from BCA's China Investment Strategy team: we recommended a long consumer staples / short consumer discretionary trade on November 16,5 and we recommend that investors retain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks while neutralizing exposure to the tech sector on February 15.6 Table 2Our Sector Alpha Portfolio Has Validated Two Of Our Recent Recommendations Chart 7 highlights another interesting insight from the model, by presenting the beta of the portfolio relative to the investable benchmark alongside the benchmark's performance versus global stocks. First, the chart underscores the limited systemic risk of the portfolio, as the portfolio's beta rarely deviates materially from 1. But more importantly, it appears that the portfolio's beta versus the investable benchmark is somewhat correlated with (and leads) China's performance versus global stocks: Chart 7A Curiously Bullish Signal From ##br##Our Sector Alpha Portfolio Prior to the global financial crisis, the portfolio's beta was above 1 and rising, until early-2007 (preceding the peak in relative performance by about a year). Following the crisis, the portfolio beta steadily declined until late-2014/early-2015, interrupted only by a brief rise back above 1 from 2009-2010. Chinese stock prices steadily underperformed global equities during this period. The portfolio beta rose back to 1 in mid-2015, and stayed flat until early last year. Chinese stocks technically underperformed global stocks during this period, but by a much more modest amount than what occurred on average from 2009 to 2014. In this case, the rise in the portfolio beta in 2015 appeared to correctly signal that a sharply underweight stance towards Chinese stocks was no longer warranted. Finally, the portfolio beta surged rapidly higher last year, in line with a material rise in the relative performance of Chinese stocks. It has fallen modestly since January, but remains at one of the highest levels seen over the past 15 years. Drawing pro-cyclical inferences from the beta characteristics of risk-adjusted performers is a novel approach for BCA's China Investment Strategy service, and for now we regard the results of Chart 7 as a curious signal that warrants further examination. Still, this bullish sign is consistent with the general resilience of Chinese stocks that we have observed over the past several months, which continues to argue in favor of a high threshold to cut exposure to China within a global equity portfolio. Bottom Line: Recent changes in the BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio's recommended allocation have validated two of our recent investment recommendations. In addition, the model is providing a curiously bullish signal about the relative performance of Chinese vs global stocks that heightens our reluctance to reduce Chinese equity exposure. An Update On The "Reform Trade" We noted in the aftermath of last November's Communist Party Congress that China was likely to step up its reform efforts in 2018, and make meaningful efforts to: Pare back heavy-polluting industry Hasten the transition of China's economy to "consumer-led" growth7 Halt leveraging in the corporate/financial sector Eliminate corruption and graft As a result of this outlook, we highlighted that the pace of renewed structural reforms would be a key theme to watch this year, in order to ensure that the pursuit of these policies would not unintentionally cause a repeat of the significant slowdown in the economy that occurred in 2014/2015. We presented our framework for monitoring this risk in our November 16 Weekly Report, which was to track an index that we called the BCA China Reform Monitor. The monitor is calculated as an equally-weighted average of four "winner" sectors that outperformed the investable benchmark in the month following the Party Congress relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors. We argued that significant underperformance of "loser" sectors could be a sign that reform intensity has become too burdensome for the economy (and thus a material headwind ex-tech equity performance), and highlighted that we would be watching for signs that our monitor was rising largely due to outright declines in the denominator. Using this framework, Chart 8 suggests that structural reform efforts are ongoing but that investors do not view the current pace of these reforms as overly burdensome for the economy. In particular, panel 2 highlights that recent movements in our Reform Monitor have been driven by fairly steady outperformance of the "winner" sectors, with "loser" sectors simply trending sideways. While it is possible that Chinese policymakers will intensify their efforts to reform the economy over the coming 6-12 months,4 for now our China Reform Monitor continues to support an overweight stance towards Chinese ex-tech stocks vs their global peers. However, given the message of our Reform Monitor, it is somewhat surprising that another of our reform-themed trades has fared so poorly over the past three months. Chart 9 presents the performance of our long investable environmental, social and governance (ESG) leaders / short investable benchmark trade, which was up approximately 4% since inception in late-January but is now down 1.4%. The basis of this trade was to overweight stocks that are best positioned to deliver "sustainable" growth, which we argued would fare well in a reform environment. Does the underperformance of this trade suggest that the reform theme is unlikely to be investment-relevant over the coming year? Chart 8Structural Reforms Not Viewed As ##br##Economically Restrictive By Investors Chart 9ESG Leaders Should Fare Quite ##br##Well In A Reform Environment In our view, the answer is no. First, while the MSCI ESG leaders index maintains roughly similar sector weights as the investable benchmark (which limits the beta risk of the trade), Table 3 highlights that differences do exist. These modest differences in sector allocation do appear to be impacting performance (Chart 10), in particular the underweight allocation to energy stocks (which are outperforming) and the overweight allocation to technology (which has sold off since mid-March). Table 3Sector Allocation Has Impacted The Recent Performance Of China's ESG Leaders Chart 10Sector Allocation Impacting Recent ##br##Performance Of ESG Leaders Second, while China made significant gains last year in improving air quality in several major population centers (such as Beijing and Shanghai), these improvements have mostly occurred from a near-hazardous starting point and have simply rendered China's air to be less unhealthy. Even in Beijing, Chart 11 highlights that PM2.5 readings have started to increase again, from a level that only briefly reached "good" quality. In addition, Chart 12 highlights that some of the improvement in air quality last year occurred, at least in part, because China shifted polluting activity from one province to another. This implies that Chinese policymakers will continue to wrestle with improving the country's air quality for some time to come, which in our view continues to favor ESG leaders over the coming year and beyond. Chart 11Some Significant Recent Gains In Air ##br##Quality, But Part Of An Ongoing Battle Chart 12Air Quality Gains In Some Provinces, At The Expense Of Others Bottom Line: Our China Reform Monitor signals that investors do not view the current pace of structural reforms as being overly burdensome for the economy. In addition, while Chinese policymakers have made some significant gains in improving China's air quality over the past 18 months, these changes have mostly occurred from a near-hazardous starting point (suggesting that more progress will be needed). As such, we recommend that investors stick with our long ESG leaders / short investable benchmark trade over the coming year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Inside The Beltway," dated May 2, 2018, available on gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report "China's "Red Line" In The Trade Talks," dated May 9, 2018, available on cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," dated November 30, 2017, available on cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China: A Low-Conviction Overweight," dated May 2, 2018, available on cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress," dated November 16, 2017, available on cis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "After The Selloff: A View From China," dated February 15, 2018, available on cis.bcaresearch.com 7 Investors should note that BCA's China Investment Strategy service has long been skeptical of calls to shift China's economy to a consumption-driven growth model, because it significantly raises the odds that the country will not be able to escape the middle income trap. For example, please see Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Overweight Despite a blockbuster earnings season, banks have come under pressure recently. Worrisomely, they have not followed the 10-year Treasury yield higher and that is cause for concern, particularly since they have re-established a correlation with the yield curve. This positive correlation shift from interest rates to the yield curve slope is important as it will likely squeeze banks' net interest margins, a key profit driver (second panel). The third and bottom panels show that there is increasing empirical evidence that banks have already started making this transition away from the 10-year UST yield and toward the 10/2 yield curve, and we are thus compelled to book profits and remove this early cyclical index from the high-conviction overweight call list. The S&P banks index is now also on downgrade alert. Bottom Line: Stay overweight banks for now, but lock in gains of 6% and remove the S&P banks index from the high-conviction overweight call list, as our confidence is not as high as in late-November. Further, we are putting this key financials sub index on downgrade alert reflecting the negative implication from our later stages of the business cycle analysis (please see our Weekly Report for our analysis of the business cycle). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Firming industry demand at a time when global energy capital spending budgets are renormalizing, along with rising crude oil prices, signal that high-beta energy services equities have more running room. Our confidence in additional significant bank relative price gains has decreased. There is budding evidence that the bank/yield curve correlation is getting re-established, as we had posited last autumn, and coupled with later cycle dynamics signal that the bank outperformance is getting long in the tooth. Recent Changes Crystalize gains of 6% in the S&P banks index and remove from the high-conviction overweight call list. Put the S&P banks index on downgrade alert. Prefer large caps to small caps (please refer to the May 10th Sector Insight). Table 1 Feature Equities staged a breakout attempt last week and the SPX reclaimed the 50-day moving average, with the energy sector leading the pack. However, the lateral move in place over the past quarter is not over yet as the market is still digesting the February 5th drawdown. Importantly, EPS euphoria cannot last forever and the inevitable profit growth deceleration post the calendar 2018 onetime tax reform fillip is weighing on the market. The 12-month forward EPS growth rate has come down to 15%, and as we move into the back half of 2018 it will continue to glide toward a still impressive 10% (or two times nominal GDP growth), which is where the calendar 2019 estimate currently stands (Chart 1). Following up from last week's 'Til Debt Do Us Part' Special Report, the overall market's (ex-financials and ex-real estate) 'Altman Z-score' is waving a mini yellow flag. Cyclical momentum in this indicator is giving way and the broad market's deteriorating creditworthiness is also, at the margin, anchoring profit growth (Chart 2). Chart 1Unsustainable EPS Euphoria Chart 2Watching Balance Sheets... Nevertheless, we remain constructive on the broad market from a cyclical 9-12 month horizon as the odds of recession are close to nil, and interpret recent market action as a sign of resiliency. The SPX refuses to give way to the bearish narrative plagued by geopolitical uncertainty/fears and slowing global growth. Chart 3 shows an extremely economically sensitive indicator, lumber, alongside the ISM manufacturing survey. Since 1969 when lumber futures first commenced trading, these two series have been tightly positively correlated. Recently, a rare and steep divergence is visible and our inclination is to expect all-time high lumber prices to arrest the ISM's fall in the coming months. True, lumber prices reflect a NAFTA-related premium and at the current juncture cannot be fully trusted that they are emitting an accurate economic signal. We, thus, resort to another - daily reported - global growth barometer, the Baltic Dry Index (BDI). The third panel of Chart 3 shows that a wide gap has opened between the ISM manufacturing index and the BDI. If our assessment is correct and this global growth soft patch is transitory, then the ISM will remain squarely clear of the 50 boom/bust line. Taken together, these two economically sensitive high frequency series comprise our Global Trade Indicator which is underscoring that global export growth will pick up in the back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 3). Finally, on the domestic freight front,1 the composite freight index is also reaccelerating, signaling that domestic demand conditions are firing on all cylinders (fourth panel, Chart 3). Circling back to profit growth, long-term S&P 500 EPS growth expectations have vaulted to the highest level since the dotcom bubble (bottom panel, Chart 4). While in isolation, this measure signals we are in overshoot territory and such breakneck EPS growth is clearly unsustainable, the SPX PEG ratio tells a different story (we divide the 12-month forward price to earnings ratio by the long-term EPS growth rate to arrive at the current reading near 1 on the S&P 500 PEG ratio, Chart 4). Chart 3...But Economy Is Humming Chart 4Market Is Cheap According To PEG Ratio On this valuation measure the SPX appears cheap. Historically, every time the PEG ratio has sunk to one standard deviation below the mean, at least a reflex rebound ensued. Table 2 summarizes the five most recent iterations we included in the analysis since 1985. While we cannot rule out a steep undershoot, if history at least rhymes, the S&P should be higher in the subsequent 12 months (Chart 5). Chart 5SPX Cycle-On-Cycle Return Profile When The PEG Ratio Gets Depressed Table 2S&P 500 Yearly Returns* This week we are removing an early cyclical index from our high-conviction call list, locking in handsome profits, and updating a high-beta energy sub-index. Put Banks On Downgrade Watch Despite a blockbuster earnings season, banks have come under pressure recently. Worrisomely, they have not followed the 10-year Treasury yield higher and that is cause for concern. We first cautioned last October that banks would shatter their near one-to-one relationship with the 10-year UST yield and re-establish it with the yield curve likely in the back half of 2018 as the Fed would further lift the fed funds rate away from the zero lower bound.2 This positive correlation shift from interest rates to the yield curve slope is important as it will likely squeeze banks' net interest margins, a key profit driver (Chart 6). Charts 7 & 8 show that there is increasing empirical evidence that banks have already started making this transition away from the 10-year UST yield and toward the 10/2 yield curve, and we are thus compelled to book profits of 6% and remove this early cyclical index from the high-conviction overweight call list. The S&P banks index is now also on downgrade alert. Chart 6NIM Trouble? Chart 7Monitoring Shifting... Chart 8...Correlations What would cause us to change our yearlong cyclical constructive view and move to a benchmark allocation, is a lack of relative price outperformance in the next 10-year Treasury yield jump. Crudely put, if banks fail to best the market when the bond market further sells off roughly to 3.25%, as BCA's fixed income strategists expect, we will pull the trigger and downgrade to a neutral stance. Another reason we are likely to become more wary of bank relative performance in the coming quarters is the stage of the business cycle. Importantly, we wanted to test our hypothesis that in the late/later stages of the expansion early cyclicals, banks included, fare poorly. Therefore, at some point we should move away from our sanguine view on this index and not overstay our welcome as the current expansion has become the second longest on record according to the NBER designated recessions. In more detail, what we did to test this hypothesis was to document relative bank performance from when the ISM manufacturing peaked for the cycle until the recession commenced going back to the 1960s (Chart 9). Table 3 aggregates the results using monthly data. What is clear is that if the recession is a financial crisis related recession, then shy away from banks. But, in 4 out of the 7 last cycles dating back to the 1960s, banks outperformed the broad market in the later stages of the business cycle. Chart 9Banks Tend To Slump In Later Stages Of The Cycle Table 3Late Cycle Analysis Nevertheless, breaking down the results in two periods is instructive. One period recalibrates the bank relative returns from the ISM peak until the SPX peak, and the second one from the SPX peak until the recession commences (Table 3). Banks clearly underwhelm 4 out of the 7 iterations as the SPX crests, confirming our negative return hypothesis. Subsequently, as the SPX deflates when the economy heads into recession, relative bank performance significantly improves with the caveat that during financial crises, banks continue to bleed (in an upcoming Special Report we will be performing the same analysis on the GICS1 U.S. equity sectors, stay tuned). Two weeks ago we lifted our peak SPX target to 3200,3 and the implication is that banks' best days have likely passed, if history at least rhymes. Bottom Line: Stay overweight banks for now, but lock in gains of 6% and remove the S&P banks index from the high-conviction overweight call list, as our confidence is not as high as in late-November.4 Further, we are putting this key financials sub index on downgrade alert reflecting the negative implication from our later stages of the business cycle analysis. We are closely monitoring the yield curve slope and interest rate correlation with bank performance, and if banks refrain from participating in the next leg up in interest rates it will serve as a catalyst to prune exposure to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB. Energy Servicers: The Phoenix Is Rising Quarter-to-date the S&P energy services index is up 12% compared with the 2% rise in the broad market. Even year-to-date, oil servicing companies have bested the market by 600bps. The steep rebound in oil prices primarily lies behind such stellar outperformance, and BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy still-upbeat crude oil view is a harbinger of even brighter days ahead for this high-beta energy sub sector (Chart 10). While we are exploring our capex upcycle theme via a high-conviction overweight in the broad S&P energy index, oil services companies are also a prime beneficiary of our synchronized global capital outlays upcycle theme. In fact, relative share price momentum does not yet fully reflect the rebound in industry investment (using national accounts) that remains in a V-shaped recovery since the Q1/2016 oil market trough (second panel, Chart 11). Importantly, OPEC 2.0 and $70/bbl oil prices have resulted in a semblance of normality in the E&P space (a key industry client) that has lifted spending budgets (bottom panel, Chart 11). The upshot is that energy services revenues will continue to expand (Chart 11). Energy related capital spending budgets are not only rising in the U.S. (primarily in shale oil), but also globally. The global rig count is breaking out, and declining OECD oil stocks suggest that drilling activity will remain robust (top and second panel, Chart 12). Chart 10Catch up Phase Chart 11Capex Upcycle... Chart 12...Beneficiary Taking the pulse of oil services industry slack is extremely important for profitability. Our global idle rig proxy is also making a breakout attempt following a massive two year plus retrenchment phase (top panel, Chart 13). Keep in mind that energy servicers have only recently exited deflation, that wreaked havoc in the sector's financial metrics. Now as a renormalization period is unfolding with higher underlying commodity prices breathing life into industry new order growth, even a modest pricing power rebound will go a long way in lifting depressed profits. In fact, new orders-to-inventories are in a reflex rebound. While such an exponential rise is unsustainable, firming oil services demand should continue to remove excess slack, a boon for industry selling prices and profits (middle and bottom panels, Chart 13). Sentiment toward this energy sub-index remains bombed out and there is widespread disbelief that this rebound is sustainable. Rather, the risk of a deflationary relapse has kept investors at bay pushing relative valuations deep into undervalued territory. Both our composite relative Valuation Indicator (VI) and relative price-to-book are hovering near all-time lows (bottom panel, Chart 12). Technicals are not as depressed as the VI reading, with the recent relative share price bounce lifting our relative Technical Indicator to the neutral zone (Chart 14). Chart 13Deflation Is Over Chart 14Unloved And Underowned In sum, there are more gains in store for the S&P energy services index. Firming industry demand at a time when global energy capital spending budgets are renormalizing, along with rising crude oil prices, signal that high-beta energy services equities have more running room. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P energy service index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE -NOV, SLB, FTI, BHGE, HAL, HP. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 The freight transportation services index consists of: For-hire trucking (parcel services are not included); Freight railroad services (including rail-based intermodal shipments such as containers on flat cars); Inland waterway traffic; Pipeline movements (including principally petroleum and petroleum products and natural gas); and Air freight. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Later Cycle Dynamics," dated October 23, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Lifting SPX Target," dated April 30, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps