Equities

Highlights In the Philippines, inflation is breaking out while the central bank is well behind the curve. Financials markets remain at risk. As a play on surging interest rates: Go short Philippine property stocks. We appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular - where a monetary policy shift is in the making. A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area. Feature The Philippines: Short Real Estate Stocks Philippine stocks are on the verge of a major breakdown (Chart I-1, top panel). Meanwhile, local currency bond yields are surging (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown The Philippine economy continues to overheat, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has fallen well behind the curve. The top panel of Chart I-2 shows that both headline and core inflation measures are rising precipitously and have breached the central bank's upper target of 4% by a wide margin. Chart I-2The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve Odds are that inflation will continue to climb higher. Overall domestic demand remains reasonably strong. Noticeably, both the current and fiscal accounts are in deficit and widening (Chart I-3). A current account deficit is a form of hidden inflation. The basis is that it gauges the degree of excess domestic demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Chart I-3The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The roots of these macro problems stem from ultra-easy monetary and fiscal policies pursued by Filipino authorities. The BSP has kept borrowing costs low and for much longer than was warranted, and has been slow to hike rates. As a result, credit has been booming relentlessly (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Bank Loans Have Boomed... The fiscal authorities, on the other hand, have vigorously pursued growth-at-all-costs programs. Government spending is now growing at an annual rate of 22% (Chart I-5). Chart I-5...So Have Government Expenditures Consequently, these populist policies have created excessive domestic demand that has stoked an inflation breakout. Given Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's reluctance to cut back on fiscal expenditures, it will be up to the monetary authorities to tighten sufficiently enough to curb inflation.1 The currency was depreciating against the U.S. dollar in 2017, even as its EM peers rallied. A falling currency amid strong economic growth is generally a symptom of an overheating economy; it signals that real interest rates are low and the central bank is behind the curve. Today, the monetary authorities need to hike borrowing rates aggressively, otherwise the currency will plunge much further. The country's financial markets are quickly approaching a riot point, and local currency bond yields are already selling off as creditors are rebelling (see bottom panel of Chart I-1 on page 1). Another option the BSP could take to defend the peso without hiking rates much is to sell foreign exchange reserves. Doing so, nevertheless, will still lead to higher domestic interest rates - especially at the short end of the curve. When a central bank sells its dollar reserves, it absorbs local currency liquidity - i.e. commercial banks' excess reserves at the central bank decline. Interbank rates then rise, which pushes up short-term rates and potentially long-term ones too. This is how financial markets naturally force macro adjustments on an overheating economy when policymakers are reluctant to act. As such, Filipino share prices are now facing a major risk. Higher domestic rates amid strong loan growth will cause the economy to decelerate significantly. Certain interest rate-sensitive sectors such as vehicle sales are already shrinking. The property sector - the segment of the economy that has benefited the most from the credit binge - will be the next shoe to drop: The supply of residential real estate buildings has been booming - floor space built has risen 2.4-fold since 2003. As interest rates continue to rise, real estate and construction loans - which are still growing at a 19% annual rate - will slump. Higher borrowing costs will hurt real estate prices. Meanwhile, rent growth will decline as the economy decelerates. The slowdown in the property sector will take a heavy toll on real estate development and management companies: First, these firms' revenues and income - property sales, rental and other types of income - will decelerate significantly (Chart I-6, top panel). Chart I-6Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Second, higher interest rates will raise their interest expenses (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Remarkably, Philippine real estate stocks have remained quite resilient, despite the broad selloff in financial markets. While the former are down by 18% in dollar terms from their early 2018 peak, Chart I-7 suggests rising interest rates herald a much more pronounced drop in their prices. Chart I-7Filipino Property Stocks Are On A Cliff Besides, these property companies are also still expensive. Their price-to-book value (PBV) currently stands at 2.9. Between the years 2000 and 2005, their PBV averaged 1.6. We are therefore initiating a new trade: Short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Crucially, the real estate sector makes up 27% of the Philippines MSCI index, and will therefore have a significant impact on the Philippine stock market. As to bank stocks - the other large segment of the equity market - a couple of points are in order. Commercial banks in the Philippines are exposed to the real estate sector. Hence, a slowdown in the property sector will culminate in the form of higher NPLs and provisions for bad loans on banks' balance sheets. Real estate and construction loans account for 25% of total bank loans. Crucially, NPLs and provision levels - at 1.3% and 1.9%, respectively - are very low, and have so far not risen. This is unsustainable given the magnitude of the ongoing credit boom and rising interest rates. Higher provisions will cause banks' profits and share prices to suffer materially. This will come on top of plunging net interest margins (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed As to equity valuations, this bourse is not cheap, neither in absolute terms nor relative to the EM equity benchmark - both valuation measures are neutral (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Overall, the outlook for Philippine equities as a whole remains unattractive both in absolute terms, as well as relative to the EM benchmark. Bottom Line: EM equity portfolios should continue underweighting this bourse. We are also initiating a new trade: Going short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Central European Markets Our presiding macroeconomic theme for central Europe - which we first elaborated on in a Special Report titled, Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak2 - has been as follows: An accommodative policy stance in the context of strong growth and tight labor markets warrants higher inflation. Our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - is continuing to surge across all central European countries as well as in Germany. This foreshadows higher wage growth ahead (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Furthermore, monetary policy in central European countries remains accommodative - policy rates are negative in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Consistently, private credit (bank loan) growth and domestic demand remain robust. Today, we appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular, where a policy shift is in the making. Hungary: Moving Away From Ultra-Accommodative Monetary Policy? Last month, the NBH (National Bank of Hungary) modified its monetary policy statement to include a new paragraph explaining that the council is prepared for the gradual normalization of monetary policy, depending on the outlook for inflation.3 Given our view that inflation in Hungary will continue to rise, the NBH is likely to move away from ultra-accommodative monetary policy sooner rather than later. Besides mounting inflationary pressures, several factors lead us to believe that the NBH is more comfortable normalizing policy today than in the past: First, after seven years of deleveraging, private credit is finally on the rise, and money supply growth is booming (Chart II-2, top and middle panel). Chart II-2Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Second, capital expenditures are recovering and business confidence is making new highs (Chart II-3, top and middle panel). Furthermore, construction is firing on all cylinders (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Chart II-3Hungary: Capex Is Robust Lastly, core consumer inflation is rising and the real deposit rates is at -2%, the lowest in 20 years (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Given the genuine need for rate normalization in Hungary and the central bank's readiness to do so, we are adjusting our strategy: We are taking profits of 72 basis points on our Hungarian yield curve steepening trade that we initiated on June 21, 2017. Hungary's yield curve is already the steepest yield curve in Europe. The slope of the 10/1-year yield curve is 320 basis points in Hungary, versus 200 in Poland, 100 in the Czech Republic and 105 in Germany. We are closing our long PLN / short HUF trade with a 7.7% gain since its initiation on September 28, 2016 (Chart II-4). The cross rate is close to an all-time high and will likely reverse. Chart II-4Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area (Chart II-5). Chart II-5A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates First, not only is final domestic demand in Hungary much more robust than in the euro area, but Hungary's output gap is positive while the euro area's is still negative (Chart II-6,top and middle panel). This foreshadows a widening gap in inflation between Hungary and the euro area (Chart II-6, bottom panel). As this transpires, policy rate expectations will rise faster and by more in Hungary than in the euro area. Chart II-6Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Second, ultra-accommodative monetary policy in Hungary has served its purpose and has generated an overflow of liquidity. In effect, with broad money supply in Hungary now growing considerably faster than in the euro area, the NBH will likely tighten its policy at a faster pace and by more than the ECB (Chart II-7). This warrants a widening 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Chart II-7Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Third, as global trade continues to slump, affecting German manufacturing, the European Central Bank will be fast to reiterate its readiness to keep policy accommodative longer than expected. This could push back expectations of the first ECB rate hike. Finally, Italy remains a risk and European banks are exposed to weakening developing countries. With euro area bank share prices plunging close to their 2008 and 2012 lows, the ECB will be both slow and cautious in signaling rate normalization in the immediate future. While Hungary is a very open economy and will feel the pinch from a slowdown in European manufacturing, its currency may depreciate further against the euro as it typically does amid global risk-off periods. A cheap currency will reduce the NBH's worries about the pass-through of a global slowdown and disinflation into its domestic economy. In short, given that both economies have different inflationary backdrops, Hungarian interest rate expectations will increasingly diverge from those of the euro area. As such, fixed-income investors should bet on a rising 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Our Other Positions In Central European Markets Within the fixed income and currency space: Stay overweight CE3 within EM dedicated fixed-income portfolios. Predicated on our view that the epicenter of the ongoing global growth slowdown is China, emerging Asian and commodity leveraged markets are at much bigger risk than their Central European counterparts. Consistent with this theme, stay short IDR versus PLN. Book profits of 109 basis points on the following trade initiated on July 26, 2017: Pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates (Chart II-8). In line with our expectations,4 the Czech National Bank has been responding to rising domestic inflationary pressures and has been tightening monetary policy faster than the National Bank of Poland. There now remains little upside in Czech rates relative to Polish ones, so we are booking profits. Chart II-8Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Stay long CZK against the EUR. Widening growth and inflation gaps between the Czech Republic and the euro area justify higher rates and a stronger currency in the former relative to the latter. Regarding the equity space: Stay long CE3 banks / short euro area banks. CE3 banks are less leveraged and have a higher return on assets than euro area banks. Continue overweighting CE3 within EM dedicated equity portfolios. CE3 stocks have staged a double bottom relative to their emerging market peers, both in common and local currency terms (Chart II-9). Given emerging markets are saddled with credit excesses, unresolved economic imbalances and looming currency weakness, central Europe is likely to continue outperforming. Chart II-9CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM A summary of all our trades and asset allocations can be found on page 14 and 15. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Philippines: Duterte's Money Illusion," dated April 25, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak," dated June 21, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 http://www.mnb.hu/en/monetary-policy/the-monetary-council/press-releases/2018/press-release-on-the-monetary-council-meeting-of-18-september-2018 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Economic data and policy announcements over the past month reflect the view that policymakers are serious about restraining credit growth, and that they will attempt to combat any weakness in external demand by boosting domestic consumption. A review of historical episodes of "outsized" investment intensity shows that policymakers have good reason to try and shift the composition of China's economy towards consumption, as it suggests that China's current experience probably cannot be sustained. A shift even somewhat away from heavy investment-led growth means that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen relative to past economic slowdowns, implying that it will take more pain before investors can cash in. It is too soon to move towards an outright long position favoring domestic stocks, even though considerable bad news has been priced in. CNY-USD likely has further downside, and investors allocating among Chinese stocks should only favor domestic over investable equities in currency-hedged terms. Feature September's total social financing data, released earlier this month, provided important evidence supporting our view that Chinese policymakers are not aiming for a significant acceleration in private sector credit growth. Chart 1 highlights that the year-over-year growth rate of adjusted total social financing (TSF) actually ticked modestly lower in September, in clear contrast to the bet of many investors that China is following its "old stimulus rulebook". Chart 1Chinese Policymakers Are Not Pumping The Credit Taps Some market participants have pointed to the fact that adjusted TSF is rising sharply on a 3-month annualized basis after adjusting for seasonality (Chart 2), and have concluded from this fact that a sustained expansion in credit growth is forthcoming. However, Chart 3 illustrates that the pickup shown in Chart 2 is due to a surge in special local government bond issuance, which reflects front-loading of fiscal spending. Financial news outlets have reported that "provincial authorities had by the end of September already raised 92 percent of the 1.35 trillion yuan ($195 billion) worth of special infrastructure bonds that the central government has targeted for the entire year",1 implying that local government bond issuance in Q4 will drop off significantly relative to the past three months. Chart 2A Near-Term Pickup... Chart 3...Caused By Front-Loaded Fiscal Spending The September credit data aside, we acknowledge that there have been several small-scale stimulus announcements from the Chinese government over the past month. But the bottom line for now is that developments over this period reflect the view that policymakers are serious about restraining credit growth, and that they will attempt to combat any weakness in external demand by boosting domestic consumption.2 Restraining Credit Growth: Wisdom Or Folly? China's unwillingness to resort to a significant acceleration in credit growth to help stabilize its economy has surprised some investors, and raised criticism in some corners that the country is making a policy mistake. A recurring argument in this vein, particularly among perennial China bulls, is that policymakers should not be concerned about China's elevated levels of private sector debt because it is the natural and inevitable result of a high savings rate. According to this view, restraining credit growth and attempting to boost consumption merely dooms China's ability to escape the middle-income trap, because higher per capita income can only be achieved by further growth in the stock of capital. BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not dispute the notion that a high savings rate can lead to a high leverage ratio, particularly among small, fast-growing economies. But in the case of China, the sharp rise in private sector debt that has occurred since 2010 was not natural, and certainly was not inevitable. Instead, our view is that it was the result of an explicit "least-bad" choice made by policymakers to weather the reality of poor external demand following the global financial crisis. Chart 4 presents, in a nutshell, the theoretical support for the "keep investing" view. The chart depicts real per capita GDP for 80 countries in 2014 as a function of the average share of gross capital formation to GDP from 1960 to 2014. The chart clearly shows that richer countries today have tended to invest more on average in the past, which is entirely consistent with textbook economic theory. Chart 4Higher Investment Has Led To Higher Per Capita GDP Growth... However, there are two reasons why the simple inference from Chart 4 that China should just "keep investing" is deeply flawed. First, while investment as a share of GDP in China has recently declined from its 2011-2014 peak, it remains close to 45%. This is a massive rate of investment, and a historical review points to the conclusion that it probably cannot be sustained: 45% is nearly off the x-axis scale shown in Chart 4, suggesting that China's current rate of investment is not achievable over extended periods of time. In fact, the chart suggests that 30% is the highest realistic rate of investment as a share of GDP that a country can maintain over an extended period. In 2014, based on the definition of the data from the Penn World Table (GDP share of gross capital formation at current purchasing power parity), China had maintained its investment share above 30% for 12 years. At first blush, there appears to be some precedent suggesting that China's outsized investment run can go on for longer: among the 80 countries included in Chart 4, 14 of them have experienced a longer continuous run of investment as a share of GDP. However, Chart 5 shows that most of these experiences occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when global exports as a share of GDP were rising from a very low base. This implies that historical examples of outsized investment runs have largely reflected export-driven catch-up stories, which bodes poorly for China's ability to continue to invest at its recent massive scale given that global exports to GDP appear to have peaked. Chart 5...But Very High Rates Of Investment Have Driven By Exports Second, the relationship shown in Chart 4 captures the potential gains of profitable and rational investment, or in other words the accumulation of a "useful" stock of capital. But an unfortunate reality facing savers is that while one can choose to save or invest, one cannot necessarily choose the accompanying rate of return. If China invests heavily at very low or negative rates of return, the idea that investment will lead China out of the middle-income trap is very likely wrong. As we have discussed in previous reports, there is good evidence to suggest that the marginal gains from investment in China have been falling. The private sector debt-to-GDP ratio features prominently in the case against profitable investment in China: despite a massive rise in investment and debt from 2002-2007, the private sector debt-to-GDP ratio barely rose, because this debt was used to accumulate capital that verifiably delivered nominal GDP growth. Yet following 2010 the ratio rose sharply, implying that the returns from the investment that has taken place over the past decade have been (at least so far) considerably lower than those of the prior decade. Also, we noted in our August 29 Special Report that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have accounted for a sizeable portion of the private sector leveraging that occurred after 2010,3 and that the marginal operating gain from debt for SOEs has become negative (Chart 6). A gap between the cost/return on borrowed funds strongly implies that the investment channeled through SOEs over the past several years does not represent, on balance, the accumulation of useful capital. Chart 6Strong Evidence Against Productive SOE Investment In our view, a cohesive story emerges from the above analysis, one that counters the view that China is making a policy mistake by trying to avoid another significant episode of private sector leveraging. China's enormous catchup in per capita GDP over the past 20 years was initially export-led, but was sustained after 2010 by quasi-fiscal spending in the form of a material leveraging of state-owned enterprises. This shadow government spending was aimed at preventing large-scale job losses, but proved to be considerably less productive than the private, export-driven investment-boom that preceded it. This suggests that China is simply investing too much for an economy that needs to accumulate capital for the purposes of domestic production, and that any further, aggressive leveraging of the private sector will simply raise the odds or the cost of the eventual bailout. While investors who are hoping to profit from China's credit excesses may wish for a different outcome, the bottom line is that Chinese policymakers will act in the best interests of their country, and they have good reason to try and shift China's economy away from extremely high rates of investment towards more consumption. Implications For Investment Strategy As would be the case in any other major country, we have no doubt that Chinese policymakers will eventually move to a maximum reflationary stance (which would imply a significant reacceleration in credit growth) if they feel that the existing slowdown will lead to deep, threatening economic instability. The key point for investors is that a desire of policymakers to shift even somewhat away from heavy investment-led growth means that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen relative to past economic slowdowns, implying that it will take more pain before investors can cash in. Within the universe of Chinese financial assets, there are three pertinent investment strategy questions that arise from this reality: Even if there is more pain to come, Chinese domestic stocks have fallen 30% in local currency terms, and close to 40% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 7). Is it time to go outright long? Should investors allocating among Chinese stocks favor domestic or investable equities? What is the outlook for CNY-USD? For now, our answers are as follows: 1) not yet, 2) domestic over investable in currency-hedged terms, and 3) weaker (possibly significantly so). Chart 7The Bear Market In A-Shares Is Advanced... We agree that 30% is a reasonable estimate of the likely decline in domestic earnings over the coming year, which normally would suggest that A-shares have fully priced the bad news and that investors should consider buying. However, there are two key reasons why we think this conclusion is premature: We noted in our September 19 Weekly Report that the lesson of 2014/2015 was Chinese stocks needed both policy stimulus and earnings clarity before bottoming.4 For now, China's stimulative response has been measured, and we have yet to see any decline in domestic 12-month forward earnings (Chart 8). While it is not the only factor contributing to the decline, the escalation in the trade war with the U.S. acted as a clear negative catalyst for the Chinese stock market. We have argued that the evolution of the trade positions of both sides suggests that the imposition of a third and final round of import tariffs covering all Chinese exports to the U.S. is likely, which would further reduce Chinese earnings visibility for investors. News reports this week suggested that an announcement to this effect could occur in early-December, if a meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi is called off or fails (as we expect). Chart 8...But Forward EPS Have Yet To Start Falling Chart 9 presents our framework for forecasting CNY-USD as a function of various U.S. import tariff scenarios, which we used to argue that a break above the psychologically-important level of 7 for USD-CNY appeared likely barring strong action from the PBOC4. The RMB has weakened in line with our view over the past month, and Chart 9 shows that it stands to weaken further, potentially significantly, if the U.S. does move ahead with a 25% import tariff on all imports from China. Chart 9Further Downside In CNY-USD Is Likely Finally, our negative outlook for the currency informs our view that a relative position favoring domestic over investable stocks should be currency-hedged. Chart 10 shows that an uptrend in relative performance does appear to be forming in local currency terms, but not in U.S. dollar terms (due to the recent renewed weakness in CNY-USD). Chart 10Relative To Investable Stocks, Only Favor A-Shares In Hedged Terms We opened a shadow trade in our July 5 Weekly Report of being long the MSCI China A Onshore index / short MSCI China index,5 which we said we would consider implementing in response to a 5% rally in relative performance. Our intention was to structure this trade in unhedged terms (consistent with most of the trades in our trade book), and our judgement is that it is simply too early to do so despite the fact that a 5% relative rise in U.S. dollar terms has indeed occurred. Signs of a durable bottom in CNY-USD, or an assessment of minimal further downside coupled with strong outperformance of domestic stocks in local currency terms, are likely catalysts for a green light. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "China Is Struggling To Find Projects To Spend Bond Splurge On", Bloomberg News, October 22, 2018. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?", dated August 8, 2018, and "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two", dated August 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging", dated August 29, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War", dated September 19, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Standing On One Leg", dated July 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights So What? The bull market in defense stocks is global and only beginning. We construct a BCA Global Defense Index to give investors exposure to this theme. Why? Multipolarity will drive uncertainty and conflict, spurring arms demand to Cold War heights. Contemporary geopolitical hotspots require expensive and modern technology. Cold War-era weapon systems are long in the tooth and in need of replacement. Also... We close our long Energy / short S&P 500 portfolio hedge for a gain. Feature It is somewhat of a cliché to tell clients that one of our highest conviction calls is to be overweight defense stocks. We are, after all, geopolitical investment strategists! Our decision to go long S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks / short MSCI ACW is up 14% since initiation in December 2016. In this report, we build on previous work focusing on U.S. defense stocks and expand our analysis to global plays. GPS' Mega-Theme: Multipolarity Is Good For War International affairs are characterized by an anarchic governance structure. In the absence of a global government, the vacuum of power is filled by powerful states. These states behave like bullies in the schoolyard. When a single, powerful bully dominates the lunch break, all other kids fall in line or suffer the bully's wrath. When two bullies split the yard into warring camps, proxy fights may emerge on the sidelines, but generally an equilibrium is preserved. Formal political science theory and history teach us that the further we are from a hegemonic global structure where one country (the hegemon) dominates and bullies all others, the closer we are to anarchy. The "offensive realism" school of International Relations theory further splits multipolarity into two types: Balanced multipolarity is characterized by a number of roughly equally powerful states, similar to the distribution of power of continental Europe during the "Concert of Europe" era in the nineteenth century. Unbalanced multipolarity is closest to contemporary geopolitics. In The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer reviewed 200 years of European history and concluded that unbalanced multipolarity is by far the most volatile geopolitical system (Table 1).1 Table 1Global System Structure And War A multipolar ordering of global power, therefore, produces the highest level of disorder (Chart 1). This finding is theoretically elegant, but normatively disturbing. Every country gets a voice and an opportunity to defend its sovereignty. But the international order is normatively ignorant and desires a bully or hegemon. Chart 1Multipolarity Produces Disorder Over the past fifty years, there have been three identifiable periods in the global arms market (Chart 2): Chart 2Further Upside In The 'War Bull Market' Cold War Arms Race - 1961-1982: The arms trade grew by a whopping 177% during this period, with an average annual growth rate of 5.5%; Disarmament - 1982-2002: Arms trade shrunk by 61% and average annual growth rate was -3.9%; Multipolarity - 2002-present: What started with the U.S. defense buildup following 9/11 has evolved into a truly global response to emerging multipolarity. The arms trade grew by 73% from 2002 to 2017, with an average annual growth rate of 3.4%. Bottom Line: In 2017, the total arms trade was 68% of its peak in 1982, signifying that we have more room to go in this recent "War Bull Market." Given that unbalanced multipolarity produces a higher volume of conflict than a bipolar system, we would expect the current phase to be more fruitful for the global arms race than even the Cold War era. The Pillars Of An Arms Bull Market Chart 3Global Defense Spending... In this report, we focus on the global arms trade, which is different from global defense spending (Chart 3). This is because global defense spending includes non-investible transactions, such as spending on salaries, buildings, health care, and pensions. The global arms trade was once 20% of global defense spending, but is now only 1.9% (Chart 4). Chart 4...Is Different From The Global Arms Trade The reason is that salaries and pensions now dominate defense budgets. In the U.S., they make up 42% of all expenditure. They are higher in much of the developed world (66% in Italy, for example). Moreover, many countries that in 1960 did not have an armaments industry have become quite adept at satisfying demand via domestic production. We nonetheless would expect the global arms trade to bounce off of its lows today. There are three main reasons. Evolving Conflict Zones: Asia And Europe The primary reason to expect a brisk pickup in the global arms race is that the global conflict zones are evolving. Multipolarity is causing shifting geopolitical equilibriums. We expect both East Asia and Europe - largely dormant as hotspots since the end of the Cold War - to catch up with the Middle East as zones of tensions. Periods of rising conflict tend to coincide with the rise in the global arms trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Rising Conflict Coincides With Escalating Arms Trade East Asia is our primary concern. Sino-American tensions have been brewing for decades, well before the trade war initiated by the Trump administration. Recently, the trade war has begun to spill into strategic areas (Table 2), creating a vicious feedback loop that could spark an accident or outright military conflict. Table 2Trade War Spills Into Strategic Areas The South China Sea is the premier geographic location of U.S.-China strategic friction. It is a hub for international trade, a vital supply route for all major Asian economies, and the premier focus of China's attempt to rewrite global rules (Diagram 1). We update our list of clashes in this area in Appendix A. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout China has used its growing economic heft in the region to bully its neighbors into acquiescing to its geopolitical posture (Chart 6). It has used economic sanctions, trade boycotts, and tourism bans to get its way with the neighborhood. China's East Asia neighbors - including Japan - will look to balance their growing dependence on the Chinese economy with a desire to maintain sovereignty. One way to do so will be to rearm and present a formidable challenge to Beijing's regional hegemony. This means that not only the South China Sea but also China's entire periphery is at risk of friction, and this is true regardless of any U.S. interest in Asia. Chart 6China Uses Its Economic Might To Bully Europe is also growing as a potential source of global arms demand. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has seen a decline in defense spending. One reason is the NATO alliance, which has allowed Europeans to pass the buck to the U.S. This has not only been the case with the safely cocooned Western European states. Poland, intimately familiar with the built-in geopolitical risks of its neighborhood, reduced its defense spending once it joined NATO. President Trump has made awakening Europe from its stupor a key pillar of his trans-Atlantic policy. A combination of Trump's pestering and concerns that the U.S. is trending towards isolationism with an evolving threat matrix that now includes terrorism, migration, and Russia should be enough to spur Europeans to meet their commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense (Chart 7). Chart 7Europeans Will Be Swayed To Meet Defense Commitments... If NATO member states and Japan were to respond to their evolving threats and commit to spending 2% of GDP on defense, the impact on global arms demand would be significant. The extra spending would be roughly $145 billion, a 14% increase from current levels (Chart 8). Chart 8...Raising Global Arms Demand What about the Middle East? In the short term, we are concerned that President Trump's "maximum pressure" policy could lead to kinetic action against Iran. In the medium and long term, we expect some form of an equilibrium to emerge in the Middle East that would keep regional demand for weapons stable at current elevated levels. Saudi Arabia has been the primary importer of weapons, with 13% of total demand since 2002. Saudi purchases have accelerated as the U.S. has geopolitically deleveraged out of the region (Chart 9 and Chart 10). Chart 9As The U.S. Military Deleverages... Chart 10...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Evolving Technological Demands The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of this century was probably the last large-scale mechanized conflict involving large formations of main battle tanks (MBT). The evolving threat matrixes in East Asia and Europe are likely to create a growing demand for naval, air superiority, and drone/autonomous technology. In East Asia, the two main risk theaters are the South and East China Seas. In Europe, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Black Seas are increasingly becoming a risk vector due to the instability of North African and Middle East countries, as well as Russian assertiveness. This is good news for the arms industry as aircraft and ships are some of the most lucrative exports given the high level of technological sophistication that goes into developing them (Chart 11). A war fought in the trenches and jungles by soldiers and insurgents is unlikely to be very profitable, other than for small arms manufacturers. But tensions between sovereign nations across large distances and bodies of water will be highly lucrative for major defense manufacturers that specialize in anti-access/area-denial systems.2 Chart 11Aircraft And Ships Are Most Lucrative Furthermore, capital depreciation is advanced for the most sophisticated (and thus expensive) military technology that was introduced at the tail-end of the Cold War expansionary phase. The U.S. aircraft carrier fleet, for example, is mostly made up of Nimitz-class carriers, which have served for the past 43 years on average (Chart 12). Chart 12Capital Depreciation Is Advanced Our back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the cyclicality in U.S. aircraft carriers is apparent across the major defense systems. Looking at 40 countries and their respective aircraft and MBTs, the bulk of these weapons is beyond the average age of the previous generation when it was retired (Chart 13). Part of the reason for the extended life cycle is better technology, but we suspect the main reason is that these major weapon systems were developed at the height of the Cold War and have not been updated since then. Chart 13Weapons Are Beyond Retirement Age, Need Updating Population Aging The demographic trends of population aging and low birth rates have wide-ranging macroeconomic implications. But they will also impact the defense industry by encouraging automation. There are benefits to automation in the military sphere beyond simply replacing a shrinking pool of able-bodied youth. First, the likely geopolitical hotspots of this century - East Asian seas, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean - are conducive to high-tech warfare. These bodies of water will be patrolled by drones and plied by autonomous surface vessels while hypersonic missiles deny access to the enemy. Second, by shifting the burden of fighting wars from humans to robots, policymakers will face lower constraints to conflict. This development will not only encourage policymakers to develop autonomous weapon systems, but might also increase the frequency with which they are used, destroyed, and thus re-ordered, shortening the hardware life-cycle and thus increasing the sales volume. Bottom Line: Global multipolarity has seen the U.S. geopolitically deleverage from the Middle East, threaten Europe with abandonment, and put pressure on China in East Asia. These are trends that we believe are here to stay irrespective of President Trump's success or failure in the 2020 election. They are all bullish for defense spending and arms trade. In addition, evolving technological demands and global demographic trends will buoy the arms trade. We expect this era of unbalanced multipolarity to be even more lucrative for global defense contractors. The U.S.: Remain Overweight Anastasios Avgeriou, BCA's chief U.S. equity strategist, recommends that investors remain overweight the pure-play BCA defense index and add exposure to it on any meaningful pullbacks while keeping it as a structural overweight within the GICS1 S&P industrials index. In the U.S., defense spending and investment have bottomed and will continue to accelerate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) continues to project that defense outlays will jump further next year (middle panel, Chart 14). We expect that this breakneck pace is actually sustainable, mainly because any fiscal compromise with Democrats on discretionary, non-defense spending would require acquiescence on GOP spending priorities, such as defense. Defense outlays will therefore continue to expand into the 2020s. Chart 14Upbeat Defense Outlays... Such a buoyant demand backdrop is music to the ears of defense contractor CEOs and represents a boost to defense equity revenue growth prospects. Defense contractors enjoy high operating leverage. No wonder M&A activity is robust: at least four large deals have been announced in the past year that are underpinning both takeout premia and relative share prices (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 15...And A Flurry Of M&A Is A Boon For Defense A closer look at operating metrics corroborates the view that defense goods manufacturers are firing on all cylinders. New orders recently jumped to fresh all-time highs and the industry's shipments-to-inventories ratio is rising, on track to surpass the 2008 peak. Unfilled orders are also running at a high rate, signaling that factories will keep on humming at least for the next few quarters (Chart 16). Chart 16Firming Operating Metrics Importantly, the industry is not standing still and is making significant investments. U.S. defense capex as reported in the financial statements of constituent firms is growing at roughly 20% annually, or twice as fast as overall capex (Chart 17). Defense ROE is running near 30%, again roughly double the rate of the broad market (Chart 18). Chart 17Industry Is Not Standing Still Chart 18Healthy Balance Sheet With High ROE... Valuations are on the expensive side and in overshoot territory (Chart 19). This is clearly a risk to the overall view. However, if our structural thesis pans out, then defense stocks in the U.S. will grow into their pricey valuations as happened in the back half of the 1960s. Chart 19...But Valuations Are Expensive Bottom Line: The secular advance in pure-play defense stocks remains in place. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy recommends an above-benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA defense index are: LMT, LLC, NOC, GD, and RTN. Global Stocks: Be Discerning Beyond the U.S., which global defense stocks are appealing? We believe that there are several market and structural factors to consider. We have ranked national defense sectors by market and structural factors in Tables 3 and 4. Further, Appendix B lists all the non-U.S. weapon manufacturers that we examined, as well as market performance by country. Table 3Russian Defense Sector Attractive On Market Factors Table 4European Companies Rank Highly On Structural Factors Momentum - We like stocks from equity markets that have momentum behind them, i.e. whose stock are above their 200-day moving average. Relative valuation - We like defense sectors that are at a discount relative to the U.S. plays. Performance since Trump - For any country that has outperformed the U.S. aerospace and defense sector since the inauguration of President Trump on January 20, the market believes in its competitiveness vis-à-vis the largest exporter. Geographical diversity - We have ranked country defense sectors by how diverse their sources of revenue are. The higher the figure, the more geographically diverse the revenue pool. Russian and Indian defense plays score very low on this variable as they depend solely on one source: themselves. Exposure to arms trade - We have ranked country defense sectors by how exposed their contractors are to defense as opposed to civilian production. Most companies have major civilian outlays. To fully capture our multipolarity theme, we have ranked companies based on how fully focused they are on producing and selling weapons. Share of global arms market - We recommend that clients buy defense companies in countries that already have a high share of the global arms market. Decisions on purchasing weapons often involve path dependency due to the need to acquire compatible systems. Defense spending - We penalize countries that are already spending 2% of GDP on defense. Their companies will see little boost to domestic demand. It is the other, under-spending countries that will significantly increase their outlays over the next decade. Russian companies score high on market factors. They have good momentum, are attractively valued relative to the U.S. aerospace and defense sector, and are structurally supported. Israel, Canada, Australia, and Brazil are also attractive. All of these are made up of only one stock. On structural factors alone, we like German, British, Italian, and Swedish defense companies. They are geographically diversified, have a respectable share of the global arms trade, and have both reason and room to increase domestic spending. French companies are also structurally attractive, although France may have less need to increase defense outlays. Putting it all together, we are creating a BCA Global Defense Basket. We would include the following global tickers in that basket: A:ASBX, F:AIRS, F:CSF, F:SGM, F:AM@F, C:CAE, D:RHM, D:TKA, I:LDO, I:FCTI, ULE, COB and W:SAAB. Clients may want to include in the basket the five U.S. tickers recommended by BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy: LMT, LLL, NOC, GD, and RTN. We recommend that investors buy this basket, in absolute terms, as a structural investment. Housekeeping We are closing two of our hedges today. First, we are closing long Brent / Short S&P 500 for a gain of 6% and our long U.S. energy / short U.S. information technology for a loss of 1.63%. We initiated the two tactical trades on October 3, which means we timed the market correction perfectly. However, concerns over a supply glut in the oil market meant that the "long" part of our trade did not work out. Furthermore, there have been leaks from the White House to the media that the U.S. may award exceptions to the oil embargo to several critical importers. This would suggest that the Trump administration is beginning to see the risks of its aggressive maximum pressure strategy toward Iran and therefore may be trying to backtrack from it. We still think that the odds of an oil spike due to geopolitics in 2019 are high, but they do appear to be declining, at least for the time being. As such, we are closing the two trades for a net gain. We will continue to monitor the Iran embargo carefully as we expect that geopolitical risks will again be understated in the future, offering investors another opportunity to be long energy. Jesse Anak Kuri, Consulting Editor jesse.anakkuri@mail.mcgill.ca 1 Please see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 2 Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) is a strategy of preventing an adversary from occupying or transiting a geographic area. Defense systems that perform A2/AD functions in the modern era tend to be expensive and technologically sophisticated. They include anti-ship missiles, sophisticated radars, attack submarines, and air-superiority fighter jets. Appendix A Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Appendix B Appendix B Chart 20British Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 21French Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 22German Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 23Italian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 24Swedish Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 25Norwegian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 26Canadian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 27Australian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 28Korean Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 29Japanese Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 30Singaporean Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 31Israeli Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 32Russian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 33Brazilian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 34Indian Defense Stocks Appendix B Chart 35Turkish Defense Stocks Appendix B Table 1Key Aerospace And Defense Companies Appendix B Table 1Key Aerospace And Defense Companies, Continued

Highlights Growth Scare: Despite the recent pickup in global equity market volatility, bond volatility remains subdued. Until there is more decisive evidence of a deeper pullback in global growth that is impacting the mighty U.S. economy, yields on government bonds - which remain overvalued in all major developed economies - will have difficulty falling much more even if equity markets continue to correct. Stay below benchmark on global duration exposure, while maintaining only a neutral allocation to global credit. Canada: The Bank of Canada remains on a hawkish path to a more neutral policy rate, even with the lingering concerns over household debt and global trade tensions. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in hedged global bond portfolios. Feature Just like that other great October tradition, Halloween, market volatility has returned to spook investors. Both the MSCI All-Country World Index and S&P 500 index are officially in correction territory, down -10% from the highs reached in September. The causes for the pullback range from high-profile third quarter U.S. earnings disappointments to increased evidence that the U.S.-China tariff war is negatively impacting U.S. investment spending. Yet the reaction from global bond markets has been relatively muted for such a large pullback in stocks. Benchmark 10-year government bond yields for the major developed markets are down from their peaks, but the declines have been smaller in countries where central banks are in a rate hiking cycle (U.S. -14bps, Canada -19bps) relative to countries where central banks are on hold (Germany -20bps, U.K. -31bps). One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the downtrend in data surprises appears to have stabilized in the U.S. and, even more importantly, China, while European data continues to disappoint relative to expectations (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekNoisy Equities, Calm Bonds We still do not believe that global bond yields have peaked for the cycle. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark strategic bias on overall duration exposure, but with only a neutral allocation to global corporate bonds that favors U.S. credit. On a more shorter-term tactical basis, there is a risk that yields could decline further, with more credit spread widening than seen during the current risk-off episode, if economic data starts to disappoint in the U.S. where growth has so far been resilient. Staying up in credit quality within an allocation to U.S. corporates is one way to hedge against such an outcome. Bond Yields Are Normalizing, Bond Volatility Is Not The selloff in risk assets has resulted in a pickup in widely-followed market volatility measures like the U.S. VIX index. Yet when looking at the level of realized total return volatility across all major asset classes, the current bout of turbulence has been unimpressive outside of global equities. In Chart 2, we present an update of a chart from our 2018 global bond outlook report, showing the current levels of realized volatility across different asset class benchmarks compared to their historical ranges. The vertical lines in each chart represent the range between 1999 and 2017 of annualized monthly volatilities for global government bonds, credit, equities, currencies and commodities. The red triangles represent the most recent 13-week annualized volatilities for those same asset classes. What stands out in the chart is that volatilities are off the historical lows for global equities, Italian government bonds and industrial commodities, yet volatilities remain subdued for developed market government bonds, global corporate debt and currencies. Chart 2Bond Volatility Remains Subdued, Despite More Volatile Equities We have long argued that the shift to a structurally higher level of volatility across all asset classes will show up first with a rise in bond volatility. In the U.S., in particular, sustained periods of elevated volatility for both Treasuries (as measured by the MOVE index) and stocks (as measured by the VIX index) have occurred alongside episodes of greater variance in nominal GDP growth (Chart 3). When the latter rises, that also triggers more uncertainty about the future path of monetary policy which feeds into a rise in expected bond volatility. That, in turn, impacts volatility in growth sensitive assets like equities, credit and commodities. Chart 3Equity Vol Responding To Growth Uncertainty Right now, nominal GDP volatility has picked up in the U.S. but still remains low by historical standards (middle panel). Some of that increased growth volatility can be attributed to the Trump fiscal stimulus coming at a time of full employment, which has helped boost both real GDP growth and U.S. inflation. Interest rate markets have moved to discount more Fed hikes in response, but the Fed's steady pace of well-telegraphed, 25bps-per-quarter rate increases is likely acting to dampen Treasury market volatility. As we have written about extensively throughout the course of 2018, the hurdle for central banks (not just the Fed) to shift to a less hawkish or more dovish policy stance is much higher when unemployment is low and inflation is closer to central bank targets. In such an environment, the correlation between equity and bond returns should be weaker than during periods of excess capacity and low inflation when central banks can stay dovish. That can be seen in Chart 4, which plots the trailing 52-week correlation of total returns for equities and government bonds for the major developed markets (top panel), along with the 10-year market-based inflation expectations for each country (bottom panel). For almost all countries shown, the stock/bond correlation has risen to zero away from the negative correlations that dominated the post-crisis years. That move in correlations has occurred alongside a more stable backdrop for inflation expectations, which are much closer to central bank targets. The lone exception is, of course, Japan, where inflation remains disappointingly low and the Bank of Japan continues to keep a tight lid on interest rates. Chart 4More Stable Inflation Means Less Correlated Stock & Bond Returns Besides more stable inflation, another factor preventing yields from falling as much as implied by the declines in equity markets is that global bond yields remain overvalued relative to trend economic growth. One way to assess this is to look at the level of real bond yields relative to a moving average of actual GDP growth. We show this for the major developed economies in Charts 5 & 6, which plot rolling 3-year moving averages of real GDP growth (a proxy for "trend" or potential growth) versus real 5-year government bond yields, 5-years forward. For the latter, we take the nominal 5-year/5-year forward yield and subtract a five-year moving average of realized headline inflation for each country, rather than market-based inflation-linked instruments like CPI swaps or TIPS, to allow for a longer history of real yields in the charts. Chart 5Real Bond Yields Are Still Too Low ... Chart 6... Compared To Real Economic Growth For all countries show, real bond yields remain below the level of real growth. The gap between the two is smallest in the U.S. and Canada - unsurprising, as central bankers have been tightening monetary policy, and helping push up real interest rates, in both countries. Bonds look most overvalued in core Europe, Japan and Sweden where policymakers have been using negative interest rates and quantitative easing (QE) to hold down bond yields. Real yields in those countries are between 200-300bps below our proxy for trend real growth. With such a large gap between actual growth and interest rates, it becomes harder for policymakers to consider easing monetary policy, or at least slow the pace of policy normalization, in response to more volatile financial markets. It should not be a surprise that last week, during a period of global market turmoil, the European Central Bank and Sweden's Riksbank both signaled that they remain on pace to end QE and begin hiking interest rates within the next 6-12 months, while the Bank of Canada delivered another 25bp rate hike. In the absence of a VERY large global growth shock, global real yields should be expected to increase over at least the next year, and a defensive posture on global duration exposure should be maintained. One such shock could come from a deeper downturn in China than has already occurred in 2018, which would feed into a bigger slowdown in non-U.S. growth. Another shock could come from the U.S. if the recent pullback in core durable goods orders (Chart 7) is a sign that a) U.S. companies are becoming more worried about the impact of U.S.-China trade tariffs on global growth; and/or b) the impact of the Trump fiscal stimulus is already starting to fade. Such a move could be exacerbated by a larger downturn in housing activity than seen already in response to rising mortgage rates. Chart 7Treasuries Are Exposed To A U.S. Growth Scare These shocks, if large enough, could trigger a short-covering rally in U.S. Treasuries, where sentiment remains very depressed (bottom panel). However, with leading economic indicators still pointing to above trend U.S. growth, and with U.S. consumer spending holding firm alongside a tight labor market and faster wage growth, such a pullback in yields would likely be short-lived and difficult for investors to time successfully. Bottom Line: Despite the recent pickup in global equity market volatility, bond volatility remains subdued. Until there is more decisive evidence of a deeper pullback in global growth that is impacting the mighty U.S. economy, yields on government bonds - which remain overvalued in all major developed economies - will have difficulty falling much more even if equity markets continue to correct. Stay below benchmark on global duration exposure, while maintaining only a neutral allocation to global credit. Canada Update: The BoC Stays Hawkish The Bank of Canada (BoC) delivered another rate hike last week, lifting the policy rate by 25bps to 1.75%. The language used to explain the hike was surprisingly hawkish. In the press conference following the BoC meeting, Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins noted that the policy rate remains negative in real terms and is still below the central bank's estimate of neutral (between 2.5% and 3.5%). She also noted that the term "gradual" was no longer used to describe the pace of monetary tightening, so as not to give the impression that policy was following a steady predetermined path similar to the Fed's tightening cycle - potentially, a sign that more hawkish surprises could be in the offing. The BoC also sounded more optimistic on the outlook for the Canadian economy, while sounding less concerned about the two factors that should cause the most worry - high consumer debt levels and uncertainty over global trade. The more upbeat tone is at odds with the current pace of economic growth in Canada, which has slowed. GDP growth has decelerated to 1.9% from 3.0% at the end of 2017, while the OECD's leading economic indicator for Canada is also in a downtrend (Chart 8). In the Monetary Policy Report (MPR) that was also released last week, the latest BoC forecasts for Canadian real GDP growth for 2019 and 2020 were essentially left unchanged. Chart 8Is The BoC's Growth Optimism Justified? The BoC noted that the composition of demand within the Canadian economy was shifting away from consumption and housing towards business investment and exports. That can be seen in the most recent data that shows sluggish consumer spending (middle panel) and rebounding export growth (bottom panel). The central bank attributes the softer path for consumption to its own interest rate increases and changes to housing market policies, both of which have forced households to adjust their spending patterns. That is evident in the sharp decline in house price growth, deceleration of household credit growth and the softening trends in housing starts and residential investment spending (Chart 9) Chart 9Canadian Housing Has Cooled Off The BoC is of the view, however, that consumer spending will rebound (but not overheat) on the back of strong household income growth and a pickup in net immigration inflows that is boosting population growth. The other area of diminished concern for the central bank is investment spending, which has been negatively impacted by the uncertainty over the renegotiation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). That smooth acronym is now gone, to be replaced by the more awkward "USMCA", or United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. That new trade deal has reduced the immediate uncertainty over the impact of U.S. trade policy on Canada, although the BoC did note in the MPR that there was still the potential for lingering uncertainty based on previous U.S. trade actions (i.e. on steel and aluminum imports to the U.S.) and because the USMCA has not yet been ratified. The BoC did make an upward adjustment to its assumptions regarding the hit to Canadian growth from U.S. trade policy compared to the July MPR. The level of exports is now only expected to fall by -0.3% over the next two years (vs -0.7% in the July MPR) and business investment is expected to decline by -0.7% over the same period (vs -1.4% in the July MPR). The reduction in trade uncertainty should be expected to free up demand for capex in Canada. The Q3/2018 BoC Senior Loan Officers' Survey reported a further easing of lending standards from the Q2 survey (Chart 10). The central bank's Q3 Business Outlook Survey also noted that firms' investment intentions continued to strengthen to the highest level in eight years (middle panel). This was primarily due to increased expectations for future sales growth, coming at a time of high reported capacity pressures (bottom panel). Importantly, the Business Outlook Survey took place before the USMCA deal was reached, suggesting that the data may actually understate sales expectations. This bodes well for future gains to overall GDP growth from business investment spending. Chart 10Canadian Companies Need To Invest & Hire That same Business Outlook Survey also reported that firms are continuing to experience labor shortages, most notably in sectors such as construction, transportation and information technology. This is a sign that employment growth should remain firm in Canada. Coming at a time when the unemployment rate at 5.9% remains well below estimates of full employment, this suggests that there could be some upward pressure on inflation. Canadian headline CPI inflation currently sits at 2.2%, while core CPI inflation is at 1.8% (Chart 11). That is a sharp decline from the 3% inflation seen in July, which was the result of an unexpected surge in airline fares. Yet at current levels, Canadian inflation sits right at the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target range. Furthermore, the BoC's own assessment is that the output gap is in a range of -0.5% to +0.5%, in line with the estimates from the IMF and OECD (middle panel). Although headline wage growth has cooled in recent months, the BoC's preferred measure that incorporates several wage measures ("Wage-Common"), has been stable near the same 2% levels as seen for CPI inflation. Chart 11Canadian Inflation At BoC Target Expect More BoC Hikes With the Canadian economy operating at full employment and with inflation at target, the BoC seems determined to push the policy rate back up towards their estimated 2.5%-3.5% range for the neutral rate. This means another 75-175bps of additional rate increases. At the moment, there are only 49bps of hikes over the next year discounted in the Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve (Chart 12). This leaves Canadian bond yields exposed to additional rate increases. This is especially true given our forecast of continued Fed interest rate increases in 2019, as the BoC has been playing a game of "Follow the Leader" with the Fed during the current tightening cycle (top panel). Chart 12Stay Underweight Canadian Government Bonds In terms of our recommended fixed income investment strategy, we continue to favor: an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds for global bond investors a below-benchmark duration stance within dedicated Canadian bond portfolios long positions in Canadian inflation protection (CPI swaps or inflation-linked bonds) While we expect the Canadian yield curve to flatten as the BoC delivers more rate hikes than currently discounted over the next year, we do not see the 2-year/10-year curve flattening by more than is currently priced in the forwards. This is not the case for an outright duration bet, where the forwards are currently priced for very little upward movement in Canadian bond yields over the next year. Therefore, we prefer to stick with directional bets on Canadian yields (higher) and Canadian relative bond performance versus global peers (worse). Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada remains on a hawkish path to a more neutral policy rate, even with the lingering concerns over household debt and global trade tensions. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in hedged global bond portfolios. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The latter stages of expansions and bull markets ought to be jittery, ... : Equities tend to get jumpier in the final stages of equity bull markets, but performance typically improves enough to generate attractive risk-adjusted returns. ... and tariff fights, a potential trade war, and other daunting headlines only make things worse: Tariff worries are starting to pile up in earnings calls, threatening financial markets and the real economy. When it comes to the economy, U.S. investors have to ask how much good news is too much good news: The trouble with an extended stretch of good news is that it conditions investors to keep setting the bar higher. After all, bear markets don't begin when things are bad, they begin when things can't get better. We remain constructive on risk assets, but we recognize the need for vigilance: The indicators we're watching are not signaling a turn right now, but we are keeping our eyes peeled. Feature So much for the boring bull market. After a somnolent 2017, when single-day moves of at least 1% were a rarity, and there were no 2% moves at all, volatility is back (Chart 1). The S&P 500 shed 9% in the three weeks ended Wednesday; the major small-cap indexes and the NASDAQ have fared a good bit worse; and with the vast majority of S&P 500 constituents having made corrections (peak-to-trough declines of at least 10%), breadth is crumbling. The key question for asset allocators and equity investors of all stripes is whether or not the recent moves mark the beginning of a bear market. Chart 1What A Difference A Year Makes We do not think they do; volatility is supposed to reawaken in the latter stages of bull markets, and we are not deterred by October's admittedly lousy action. Our work on the key cycles does not point to an imminent inflection point, and we still think the bull market has another year to go. We are conscious of the dangers of being lulled to sleep by a strong U.S. economy, but we take some comfort from a review of the way bull markets have played out over the last 50 years. A preponderance of evidence suggests that the expansion, the credit cycle, and the equity bull market are not over yet, and we recommend staying invested. The Evolution Of Bull Markets The bull market that began in March 2009 is the ninth bull market of the last 52 years.1 Bull markets have been the rule, with the S&P 500 spending less than 20% of that stretch in a bear market (Chart 2). We have previously noted that large-cap U.S. bull markets have a tendency to sprint to the finish line; the pace of appreciation tends to quicken noticeably over a bull's final stages. Chart 2Bull Markets May Be Stocks' Natural Condition ... Charts 3 and 4 present the course of bull-market gains from 1966 through 2007. Details of the bull markets, which span nearly 8,400 sessions, are listed in Table 1. Each quintile in Chart 3 reflects the aggregate performance over the eight complete bull markets between 1966 and 2007; the first quintile's performance is calculated by linking the advance in the first 104 days of Bull #1, with the advance over the first 133 days of Bull #2, the advance over the first 311 days of Bull #3, and so on through the first 252 days of Bull #8, summing to eight advances across 1,679 trading days. Decile calculations follow the same protocol, aggregating 839 or 840 days of performance. Chart 3... But Performance Within A Bull ... Chart 4... Is Quite Variable Table 1S&P 500 Bull Markets Since 1966 The return distributions are quite uneven, with only the first and last deciles clearly topping the aggregate bull-market return. Investors who underweight equities before the bull market is complete are at risk of underperforming their benchmarks. Investors who are underweight equities when the bull market commences are almost certain to underperform. Bull markets may quicken in their final stages, but they begin by being shot out of a cannon. The cannon shot may offer an important takeaway about equity positioning in bear markets, but we will take the inflections one at a time. The key U.S. equity decision currently confronting an investor is whether or not attempting to capture the final gains in this bull market is worth his/her while. Per historical annualized mean returns and standard deviations in each bull-market decile, the risk/reward profile favors remaining fully invested (Chart 5, top panel). The first and last deciles lead the way on a return-per-unit-of-risk basis just as surely as they do on an absolute-return basis (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5Bulls Also Sprint To The Finish Line On A Risk-Adjusted Basis Bottom Line: The lion's share of bull-market gains are earned in their first and last deciles, on both an absolute and a risk-adjusted basis. If the bull market has another year to run, history favors maintaining at least an equal weighting in equities in spite of the recent upheaval. What Might Be Different This Time There is no shortage of factors to worry about right now. The tit-for-tat imposition of new tariff barriers is likely to exert at least some downward margin pressure for all companies that export goods to China, and/or consume resources/sell imported goods subject to tariffs. Tariffs are beginning to be cited regularly as a burden on quarterly earnings calls. Our geopolitical strategists don't expect the issue to go away any time soon; they view the trade contretemps as just one element of a struggle for preeminence between the U.S. and China. Pressure from a stronger dollar is also being blamed for lowered earnings forecasts. Comments from reliably dovish Atlanta Fed President Bostic confirmed that the FOMC is viewing developments through a more hawkish lens. Price stability is the focus at the Fed, as one should expect with the unemployment rate at a 50-year low and headed lower.2 There is more to exchange rates than policy-rate differentials, but the rising fed funds rate will keep at least some wind at the dollar's back. We do not expect that the president's ongoing attempts to discourage the Fed from continuing to hike will amount to anything. White House pressure on the Fed is nothing new, from LBJ's inimitable face-to-face negotiating style, to Nixon's (successful) campaign to influence Arthur Burns, to George H.W. Bush's testy public inveighing against rate hikes early in his term. Just last week, Paul Volcker divulged a remarkable joint effort by President Reagan and Treasury Secretary Baker to get the Fed to stay its hand ahead of the 1984 election. As Reagan looked on silently, according to Volcker, Baker told him, "The president is ordering you not to raise interest rates before the election."3 The news that devices resembling functional pipe bombs had been mailed to several Democratic officials, including former president Obama and the Clintons, helped to unsettle markets last Wednesday. Trade matters more to financial markets, however. For all the dispiriting headlines, it remains our view that the expansion remains healthy and is likely to continue for another year, backed by double-barreled fiscal and monetary accommodation. We are monitoring trade tensions and the dollar, but we don't yet see a catalyst to precipitate an inflection point in the key cycles. How To Fool A Macro Investor Even if the domestic economy is hale and hearty, however, investors can't blithely ignore the risks. The latter stages of expansions and bull markets can be treacherous. We know of no one who has articulated the market perils of good times as well as Oaktree Capital co-founder Howard Marks. Inspired by a client, we read all of Marks' client memos from 20074 at the beginning of the year, and we have been mulling over his concerns about the current cycle as he's raised them. Although we are not concerned about current valuation levels, the S&P 500 isn't cheap. We are encouraged that the forward earnings multiple is nearly three points off of its year-to-date high (Chart 6), but other metrics are at least somewhat elevated relative to history (Chart 7). We only get exercised about valuation at extremes, and we long ago internalized the law of mutual exclusivity: investors can have cheap stocks or good news, but they can't have both. Given the relentless drumbeat of good economic and corporate earnings news, stocks shouldn't be cheap. Chart 6Valuations Have Cooled Considerably Since January ... Chart 7... Across The Board There is a fine line between good and too good, however, because growth in mature companies and economies ultimately reverts to the mean. When expectations get too high, investors run the risk of finding themselves offside, as Marks has written: No matter how favorable and steady fundamentals may be, the markets will always be subject to substantial cyclical fluctuation. The reason is simple: even ideal conditions can become overrated and therefore overpriced. And having reached too-high levels, prices will correct, bringing capital losses despite the idealness of the environment [.] So don't fall into the trap of thinking that good fundamentals = positive market outlook [.] ... [P]rofit potential is all a matter of the relationship between intrinsic value and price. There is no level of fundamentals that can't become overpriced.5 Investment Implications We remain constructive on the economy and markets, because we do not see a near-term catalyst to cut off the expansion, the credit cycle and/or the equity bull market. Significant equity market downturns typically require outright contractions in corporate earnings (contractions, not decelerating growth, which has historically been just fine for stocks), and they rarely occur outside of recessions. Our simple recession indicator, which looks at the slope of the yield curve, the year-over-year change in leading economic indicators, and the state of Fed policy, is nowhere near danger territory.6 There is no doubt that complacent investors could get too bulled up on already-discounted good news, but fiscal stimulus would seem to ensure that a recession is out of the question in 2019. The fraught environment pushed us to cut our house view on global equities from overweight to equal weight at our June View Meeting, redirecting the proceeds to establish a cash overweight. U.S. Investment Strategy followed suit, pulling in its horns on U.S. equities. The downgrade has paid off; as of Thursday's close, the MSCI All-Country World Index had fallen 7% since June 15th, while the S&P 500 was down 2.7%. As we mentioned last week, the 2,600-2,640 range, spanning correction territory to the year-to-date lows (Chart 8), looks pretty good to us and we will look to increase our recommended equity exposure if the S&P approaches its lower bound. Chart 8The Sell-Off May Nearly Be Spent Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 We adhere to the classic definition of bull (and bear) markets, a trough-to-peak closing-price gain (peak-to-trough decline) of at least 20%. 2 According to the Atlanta Fed's online calculator (https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/calculator.aspx?panel=1), it takes less than 110,000 monthly payroll gains to keep the unemployment rate at a steady state. 3 "Paul Volcker, at 91, 'Sees a Hell of a Mess in Every Direction,' New York Times. Accessed October 23, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/business/dealbook/paul-volcker-federal-reserve.html 4 Marks' memos are available to the public at https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/howard-marks-memos. 5 Marks, Howard, "It's All Good," July 16, 2007 Memo to Oaktree Clients, p.5. Accessed from online archive February 18, 2018. 6 Please see the August 13, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "How Much Longer Can The Bull Market Last?" available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Overbought technicals, pricey valuations, decelerating global growth, declining capex, rising indebtedness and softening operating metrics argue for hopping off the S&P railroads index. Rising refined product stocks, ebbing gasoline demand, and excessive analyst profit optimism underscore that more pain lies ahead for refiners. Recent Changes Book profits of 15% in the S&P railroads index and downgrade to neutral today. TABLE 1 FEATURE Equities continue to digest the recent healthy pullback, and should remain range-bound before building a base in order to resume their bull market run. As we highlighted in our October 9thWeekly Report, "stock market crash-prone October is upon us, and thus a pick-up in volatility would not come as a surprise".1 Simply put, the difference between perception and reality propagates as volatility. Volatility has indeed come roaring back. There are high odds that vol will settle at a higher level, and bouts of volatility will be more frequent. The most important determinant of vol is interest rates, as we first highlighted on March 5th this year.2 For almost a decade, the Fed kept the fed funds rate close to zero in order to suppress volatility. QE and excess liquidity injections into the financial system and in the economy also aided in bringing down volatility across assets classes. Now this process is working in reverse. Not only is the Fed tightening monetary policy by increasing the fed funds rate, but it is also allowing maturing bonds to fall off its balance sheet (what some market participants have defined as quantitative tightening). In other words, as the Fed is mopping up excess liquidity, volatility is making a comeback (Chart 1). Chart 1VIX The Comeback Kid A relatively flat yield curve also points to higher volatility in the months ahead. This relationship is intuitive, given that a flat curve signals that the cycle is long in the tooth and a recession may be approaching. While both of these interest rate relationships with vol have a long lead time, the message is clear: investors should get accustomed to higher volatility at this stage of the cycle (yield curve shown on inverted scale, Chart 2). Chart 2Yield Curve And Vol Joined At The Hip Following up from last week, our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) caught the attention of a number of our clients, igniting a healthy exchange. One criticism is that this Indicator has had some big misses in the past. This is true, but the recent history (since mid-1990s) has enjoyed an extremely high correlation. Importantly, if we show SPX profits as an impulse, the fit with the EII increases considerably (bottom panel, Chart 3). In addition, the EII moves in lockstep with the impulse of S&P 500 momentum (second panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Nevertheless, our worry remains intact and the risk of modest economic disappointment sometime early next year is rising (Chart 4). On that front, another indicator that continues to show signs of stress is the credit card chargeoff rate of U.S. commercial banks, excluding the 100 largest outfits. According to the Fed, both delinquencies and chargeoffs are near recessionary levels, a message large banks do not corroborate, at least not yet (Chart 5). Chart 4Economic Growth Trouble Chart 5Watch Credit Quality True, we do not think the consumer is at the cusp of retrenching as a tight labor market and rising wage inflation should boost disposable income, but rising interest rates are a clear headwind. Importantly, the fact that regional banks are sniffing out some credit quality trouble is disconcerting especially given the recent anecdote of commercial real estate (CRE) chargeoffs at Bank OZK, a regional bank that epitomizes the CRE excesses of the current cycle. We will continue to monitor our Indicators for further evidence of deteriorating credit quality. While all these risks are worrisome, and a surge in the U.S. dollar is a key EPS risk for 2019, last Friday we triggered our "buy the dip" strategy for long-term oriented capital that we have been touting recently - as the SPX hit the 10% drawdown mark since the late-September peak - predicated on BCA's view of no recession in the coming 12 months.3 In fact, none of the boxes in the three signposts we track to call the end of the cycle have been checked yet (please refer to last week's report for a recap).4 In addition, the multiple has reset significantly lower (down 20% from the cyclical peak set in January) flirting with the late-2015/early-2016 lows (Chart 6), leaving the onus on EPS to do the heavy lifting. Chart 6Wholesale Liquidation Should Bring Out Bargain Hunters On that front, Q3 earnings season has been solid, despite the input cost inflation worries that MMM and CAT rekindled recently (please look forward to reading next week's pricing power update where we gauge if the U.S. corporate sector will be in a position to pass on input cost inflation down the supply chain or to the consumer). This week we downgrade a transportation sub-group that has been on fire, and update our view on an energy index we continue to dislike. Time To Get Off The Rails We have been riding the rails juggernaut for roughly 16 months, but the time has come to get off board. Chart 7 shows that technical conditions are overbought and relative valuations are pricey, hovering near previous extremes as investors are extrapolating good times far into the future. Such euphoric readings have historically been synonymous with a high relative performance mark for this key transportation sub-index and are a cause for concern. Chart 7Overvalued And Overbought We do not want to overstay our welcome on the S&P rails index for a number of reasons. First, its is quite perplexing why this capital intensive industry has been cutting capex as the rest of the non-financial corporate sector has been growing gross fixed capital formation at near double-digit rates (second panel, Chart 8). Chart 8Capex Blues Adding insult to injury, railroad CEOs have been changing the capital structure of their respective firms by borrowing extensively in order to retire equity (in order to satisfy shareholders) and thus artificially massaging EPS higher. Going through the recent history of the constituents' financial statements is worrying. Net debt-to-EBITDA is up 75% since early-2015 near 2.2x and higher than the overall market, largely driven by rising indebtedness (Chart 8). Taken together, lack of investment and a higher debt burden are painting a grim backdrop, especially if cash flow growth suffers a mishap. Second, the global manufacturing outlook has downshifted on the back of Trump's trade rhetoric and China's larger than anticipated slowdown. Tack on our souring margin proxy and relative EPS euphoria resting mostly on equity retirement is under attack (second panel, Chart 9). Chart 9Warning Signals... Third, two of our key industry Indicators have suddenly turned south. Our Railroad Indicator has dropped into the contraction zone and our Rail Shipment Diffusion Indicator has fallen off a cliff lately (Chart 10). The implication is that rail freight demand is likely on the verge of cresting. Chart 10...Abound... Fourth, industry operating metrics are deteriorating, at the margin. Intermodal rail shipments have rolled over. In fact, toppy consumer confidence alongside decreasing traffic at the Port of Los Angeles signal that the path of least resistance is lower for this key rail freight category, comprising 50% of total carloads (Chart 11). In addition, coal shipments are moribund, despite the recent slingshot recovery in natural gas prices that should have enticed utilities to switch out of nat gas and into coal for electricity generation (not shown). Chart 11...Even In Intermodel... However, there are some positive offsets that prevent us from turning outright bearish on the S&P rails index. This transportation sub group is an oligopoly and is in the driver's seat with regard to pricing power (middle panel, Chart 12). In other words, it has the ability to pass rising diesel costs through to its clients as a fuel surcharge. Alternative modes of transportation like air freight and trucking are available, at least for some rail categories, but the switching costs are typically prohibitive and the relative price advantages few and far between. Chart 12...But There Are Offsets Further, rail pricing power is a key input to our railroad EPS model and the message from our model is that EPS have more upside, at least until Q1/2019. Thus, we refrain from swinging all the way to a below benchmark allocation. Adding it up, overbought technicals, pricey valuations, declining capex rising indebtedness and softening operating metrics argue for hopping off the rails. Bottom Line: Lock in gains of 15% since inception in the S&P rails index and downgrade to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Refiners Crack Under Pressure Pure-play refiners remain our sole underweight within the energy space, and despite recent M&A activity, they have trailed the broad market by 9% since the early-July inception. More downside looms, and we continue to recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index. We remain puzzled with sell-side analysts' extreme long-term EPS euphoria in this niche energy space. Historically, when an index catapults to a 25%/annum 5-year forward EPS growth rate, it is time to run for cover: the tech sector in the late 1990s, biotech stocks in the early-2000s and in 2014 and, most recently, semi equipment stocks in late-2017 all painfully demonstrate that stocks hit a wall when profit euphoria is so elevated (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Too Good To Be True Refiners are currently trading at a 45%/annum long-term EPS growth rate. While at first we thought base effects were the culprit, a closer inspection reveals that those effects were filtered out late last year and the recent increase in expected growth rate from 20% to north of 45% defies logic (middle panel, Chart 13). We expect a sharp revision to a rate below the broad market in the coming months, as refining stocks also continue to correct lower. There are a few reasons why we anticipate such a gravitational pull back down to earth. Refined product consumption is falling and that exerts a downward pull on refining profitability. This letdown in demand is materializing at a time when gasoline inventories are rising at a high mid-single digit rate (gasoline inventories shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 14). Chart 14Bearish Supply Demand Backdrop Not only have light vehicle sales crested, but also vehicle miles driven are flirting with the contraction zone, weighing heavily on gasoline demand prospects (second panel, Chart 15). Chart 15No Valuation Cushion Ultimately, pricing discovery resolves any supply/demand imbalances and most evidence currently points to at least an easing in crack spreads. Chart 16 highlights that crude oil inventories are trailing the buildup in refined products stocks and that is pressuring refining margins. Chart 16Mixed Signals... The implication is that refining industry profits will underwhelm, which will catch investors and analysts by surprise given their near and long-term optimistic EPS assessment. If our weak profit backdrop pans out, then a lack of a valuation cushion suggests that relative share prices will likely suffer a significant drawdown (bottom panel, Chart 15). Nevertheless, there are two related positive offsets. And, if they were to persist then our bearish view on refiners would be offside. The widening Brent-WTI crude oil spread suggests that crack spreads could reverse course if it stays stubbornly elevated. This wide oil price differential has pushed refining net exports close to all-time highs and represents a profit relief valve as the energy space has, up to now, escaped the trade wars unscathed (Chart 17). Chart 17...On Crack Spreads Netting it out, rising refined product stocks, softening gasoline demand, and excessive analyst profit optimism underscore that more pain lies ahead for refiners. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5OILR - PSX, VLO, MPC and HFC. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "The "FIT" Market" dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 10 Reasons We Still Like Banks" dated March 5, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight, "Time To Bargain Hunt" dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "Icarus Moment?" dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

We have been advocates of a "buy the dip" strategy and now that the 10% drawdown is here we are ready to put to work longer-term oriented capital, with a time horizon of at least 9-months. The primary reason for this is BCA's view of no recession in the coming 9-12 months. Also none of the boxes have been ticked on the three indicators we monitor to call the end of the cycle (please refer to this week's report for a recap). With regard to the ferocity of the drawdown, not only is there a wholesale liquidation on the forward P/E multiple, but this is also occurring in tandem with a 12-month forward EPS deceleration down from 20% to 10%. Finally, stocks are weaker than they appear as large cap indexes tend to mask the breadth of the declines we have seen. According to the Value Line Arithmetic and Geometric indexes the average and median stock is down roughly 13% from the recent peak and according to Standard & Poor's small cap stocks are down 16% from the recent top, whereas the SPX is near the -10% mark from the 2940 peak hit in late-September. Bottom Line: We would be deploying longer-term oriented capital as a U.S. recession remains a low probability event in the coming 12-months.

Highlights The correction in global equities is not yet over, but we would turn more constructive if stocks retreated about 6% from current levels. Among the many things bothering investors, the fate of the Chinese economy remains high on the list. Chinese growth continues to slow, with the impact of the trade war yet to be fully felt. Investors are likely to end up being disappointed by both the size and the composition of Chinese stimulus. High debt levels and excess capacity limit the prospective benefits of traditional fiscal/credit easing. Stimulus measures aimed at boosting consumption, which is what the authorities are increasingly focusing on, would help the Chinese economy. However, they would generate only small gains for the rest of the world. A weaker yuan would be outright negative for other economies. Cyclically and structurally, we expect the bond bear market to continue, but slower Chinese growth and a stronger dollar could temporarily cap Treasury yields over the coming months. Feature Correction Slightly More Than Halfway Through We argued in our October 5th report that "prudent investors should consider scaling back risk if they are currently overweight risk assets" because the market was at an elevated risk of a "phase transition" from unbridled optimism to a more sober appreciation of the risks presently facing the global economy.1 The good news is that the ongoing correction will be just that, a correction. Both monetary and fiscal policy in the U.S. remain highly accommodative. The next recession will not occur until late-2020 at the earliest. U.S. equities, which account for over half of global stock market capitalization, rarely enter sustained bear markets outside of recessions (Chart 1). Chart 1Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap The bad news is that we have yet to reach a capitulation point. As we noted last week, corrections usually end when investors stop believing that they are witnessing a correction and start thinking that a bear market is afoot.2 Normally, stocks need to break through prior support levels several times before "buy the dip" investors throw in the towel. This week saw the S&P 500 fall below its October 11th lows. A few more iterations of this pattern may be necessary. To repeat what we wrote before, barring any major new developments, we would turn bullish on global equities again if the MSCI All-Country World Index were to fall by 12% 10% 8% 6% from current levels. With that in mind, we are putting in a limit order to buy the ACWI ETF at $64.3 Emerging Markets: Time To Pay The Piper Even if we were to turn more positive on global equities, we would maintain our preference for developed market stocks over emerging markets, despite the latter's higher beta nature. The wave of liquidity created by the Fed and other major central banks over the past decade ended up flowing into places where it was not needed. Emerging markets were a prime destination: Dollar-denominated debt in emerging markets now stands at levels reached just before the late-1990s Asian Crisis (Chart 2). Chart 2EM Dollar Debt At Late-1990s Levels While EM valuations have cheapened considerably, they are not yet at washed out levels. The latest BofA Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey showed that managers were slightly net overweight emerging market equities in October. This is a far cry from 2015, when a net 30% of managers were underweight EM stocks. Chinese Stimulus To The Rescue? China figures heavily into the equation. If the Chinese government were to deliver a massive dose of traditional fiscal/credit easing, this would boost fixed-asset investment and thus commodity prices, helping emerging markets in the process. Such a dollop of stimulus would also lift global growth. As a countercyclical currency, the U.S. dollar tends to weaken when global growth accelerates (Chart 3). The reflationary impulse from higher commodity prices and a softer dollar would be manna from heaven for emerging markets. Chart 3Decelerating Global Growth Tends To Be Bullish For The Dollar If we had strong confidence that such a burst of stimulus were forthcoming, we would be comfortable in calling the end of the global stock market correction now and going overweight EM assets. Unfortunately, the evidence so far suggests that while the Chinese authorities are stimulating the economy, they are not doing so by enough to reignite growth (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Growth Remains Soft Real GDP increased at a weaker-than-expected pace in the third quarter. Industrial production surprised on the downside in September, echoing declines in the manufacturing PMI. Home sales are running well below housing starts, suggesting downside risk for the latter in the months ahead. Goldman's China Current Activity Indicator has continued to grind lower, while the economic surprise index remains mired in negative territory. Our conversations with clients suggest that most are expecting the recently announced stimulus measures to arrest and then reverse the downward trend in growth. We are not so sure. As our geopolitical team has stressed, the Chinese government has expended a lot of political capital on its reform agenda.4 Abandoning it now would not only cause the government to lose credibility, but it would undermine the very reasons it was implemented in the first place. Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to 260% of GDP at present (Chart 5). Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, China has ended up with a severe overcapacity problem. The rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart 6). Our China team estimates that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant.5 Chart 5China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Chart 6Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For Chinese SOEs Today, Chinese banks are being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not sour. This has become an impossible feat. As such, we are skeptical that the recent acceleration in credit growth will have long legs (Chart 7). Anecdotal evidence suggests that some companies which are receiving credit are simply holding on to the cash, rather than running the risk of being accused of investing in money-losing projects. Monetary policy in China is increasingly pushing on a string. Chart 7China: Only A Modest Acceleration In Credit Growth Rebalancing: Be Careful What You Wish For This does not mean that China will not try to prop up its economy. It will. But the form of stimulus the government pursues may not be to foreign investors' liking. For example, consider the recently announced income tax reforms, which raise the threshold at which households need to start paying taxes while increasing deductions for education, health, housing, and eldercare. In and of themselves, these measures are admirable and long overdue. The Chinese income tax system is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 8).6 A more progressive tax system would boost consumption among poorer households. Chart 8High Tax Burden For Low-Income Households In China The snag is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As Arthur Budaghyan, BCA's Chief EM strategist, has long noted, policies that boost Chinese consumption are simply less beneficial to the rest of the world than policies that boost investment.7 Pundits who talk about the virtue of "rebalancing" the Chinese economy away from fixed-asset investment and towards consumer spending should be careful what they wish for! The Trade War Will Heat Up One of the more notable aspects of China's recent slowdown is that it has been concentrated in domestic demand rather than in net exports. Remarkably, Chinese exports to the U.S. actually increased by 12% in dollar terms in the first nine months of the year, compared to the same period in 2017. However, judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, the export sector is likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 9). Chart 9China: An Ominous Sign For Exports Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires on November 29 are likely to be disappointed. As we have stressed in the past, Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It will also force the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a "big, beautiful" trade agreement with them (incidentally, the new USCAM USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to the "horrible" one that it replaced with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China). This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit. Reaching a deal with China would actually be a strategic mistake for Trump's political career. A Weaker RMB Ahead A weaker Chinese currency would blunt some of the pain inflicted on China's export sector from Trump's tariffs. There is obviously a limit to how far China can let its currency slide, but last week's decision by the U.S. Treasury to refrain from labeling China a currency manipulator will probably embolden the Chinese to allow the currency to depreciate some more from current levels.8 A weaker Chinese currency would be a cold shower for the rest of the world. Not only will it make other economies less competitive in global markets; it will also reduce Chinese imports. Concluding Thoughts Investors spend a lot of time debating the magnitude of China's stimulus plans and not enough time thinking about the composition of that stimulus. Credit/fiscal easing of the sort China has historically engaged in is good for other emerging markets because it sucks in raw materials and capital goods. In contrast, consumption-based stimulus is only modestly beneficial to the rest of the world, while a weaker Chinese currency is an outright negative for other economies. If China focuses more on the latter two types of stimulus and less on the former, global investors are likely to be disappointed. Emerging market assets have cheapened considerably over the past few months and will likely find a bottom in the first half of next year. For now, however, investors should overweight developed market stocks relative to their EM peers. Consistent with our July 5, 2016 call declaring "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," both the cyclical and structural trend in bond yields is firmly to the upside. Tactically, however, bonds are deeply oversold (Chart 10). The combination of slower EM growth, disappointments over the magnitude and composition of Chinese stimulus, and a stronger dollar will put a lid on yields over the next few months. Chart 10Treasurys Are Oversold Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next U.S. Recession: Waiting For Godot?" dated October 5, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Phase Transitions In Financial Markets: Lessons For Today," dated October 19, 2018. 3 Valid during extended trading hours. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two," dated August 15, 2018. 5 Please see Emerging Market Strategy Special Report, "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?" dated April 6, 2018. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment?" dated April 13, 2018. 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar Rally And China's Imports," dated May 24, 2018. 8 Ironically, while China may not be manipulating its currency based on the Treasury's legal definition, economic logic suggests it is. True, China is no longer buying dollars in a bid to weaken the yuan. In fact, its reserves have actually declined significantly since 2015. However, the value of the yuan is determined not just by current dollar purchases; it is also determined by those that have taken place in the past. If a central bank buys dollars, this bids up the value of those dollars relative to its own currency. If it then stops buying dollars, its currency does not instantly fall back to its original level. All things equal, it just stays where it is. The best parallel is with quantitative easing. Both theory and evidence suggest that it is the stock of bonds that a central bank owns, rather than the flow of bonds in and out of its balance sheet, that determines the level of yields. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades