Equities

Dear Client, Next week there will be no regular strategy report. Instead, we will hold our quarterly webcast which will discuss the outlook for the European economy and assets in 2022. I look forward to this interaction. Best regards, Mathieu Savary   Highlights European and global yields have considerable upside over the coming year, even if inflation peaks in 2022. The post-World War II experience is instructive: massive war-time fiscal and monetary stimulus allowed for an upward re-estimation of the neutral rate as trend nominal growth improved. A similar development is likely to result in an improvement in nominal growth and the neutral rate compared to the post-GFC decade. China and a financial accident outside the US constitute the greatest risks this year to higher yields. European stocks and value stocks will benefit from this rise in yields. Cyclicals in general and industrials in particular are the European sectors most levered to higher yields. Overweight these assets. Defensives will underperform meaningfully if yields rise further. Long Sweden and the Netherlands / Short Switzerland is an appealing trade to bet on higher yields, especially if inflation peaks in 2022. Feature Last week, US Treasury yields finally reached levels that prevailed before the pandemic started. In Europe, German 10-year yields flirted with the symbolic 0% level, rising to their highest reading since May 2019. With the Fed preparing to increase interest rates in March, and global inflation remaining perky, do yields already reflect all the bearish bond news or will they continue to climb higher on a cyclical basis? Moreover, what would be the implications for equity prices of higher yields? BCA expects yields to rise further, for which German Bunds will not be an exception. This process will continue to generate volatility in stock prices, but ultimately, higher equities will prevail. Increasing yields will help European stocks and are strongly associated with an outperformance of cyclical equities. What’s Moving Yields Up? Not all yield increases are created equal. A breakdown of yields helps us understand what investors are pricing in for the future. In the US, the upside in 10-year yields mostly reflects the increase in 5-year yields. This maturity has moved back to levels that prevailed prior to the pandemic, while the 5-year/5-year forward yield remains below its spring 2021 peak (Chart 1, top panel). Moreover, these shifts mirror higher real interest rates, which are rising across maturities, while inflation expectations have been declining in recent weeks or have been flat since mid-2021 on a 5-year/5-year forward basis (Chart 1, middle and bottom panels). This breakdown confirms investors are driving yields higher because they expect more Fed tightening. However, this upgraded view of the Fed’s policy path is limited to the next few years, and long-term policy expectations approximated by the forward rates are not rising as much. In other words, markets do not expect that the Fed will be able to push up interest rates on a long-term basis. In Germany, the breakdown of the most recent shift in yield paints a different picture (Chart 2). As in the US, real yields, not inflation expectations, drove the latest bond selloff. This points toward pricing in an eventual policy tightening in Europe. However, unlike what is happening in the US, 5-year/5-year forward rates are the main force driving yields higher; investors are therefore expecting the ECB to have to follow the Fed later on. Chart 1Near-Term Tightening Is Driving Treasurys Chart 2longer-Term Tightening Is Driving Bunds Can the Yield Upside Continue? While BCA’s target for the 10-year Treasury yield in 2022 stands at 2.25% and the Bund yield at 0.25%, the coming two to three years should witness significantly higher yields. The period after World War II offers an interesting historical equivalent. During the War, government spending as a share of GDP exploded, lifting US gross federal debt from 52% of GDP at the dawn of the conflict to 114% at the end of 1945. However, the Fed kept a lid on interest rates during this period to help finance the war effort. T-Bill rates were pegged at 3/8th of a percent and the Fed also capped T-Bond yields at 2.5%. Chart 3The Post WWII Experience As a consequence of this policy effort, the Fed balance sheet increased significantly and continued to do so after the war (Chart 3). The stimulative fiscal and monetary policy, as well as the capacity constraints associated with shifting production from military goods to consumer and capital goods, contributed to an inflation spike to 20% in March 1947. Moreover, the Korean War boosted government spending between 1950 and 1953, resulting in another inflation spike to 9.5% in 1951. The Fed’s cap on yields ended after the March 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord. It was followed by the beginning of a multi-decade uptrend in bond yields, which culminated in 1981 with T-Bond yields above 15% following the inflationary surge of the 1970s. Nonetheless, the yield increase from 2.5% in 1951 to 4% at the end of the 1950s happened after the inflation peak of the Korean War. This original inflection reflected economic vigor and a normalization of the neutral rate after the trauma of the Great Depression. The current situation is not dissimilar. The neutral rate and the market-based estimates of the terminal rate of interest are still very low in the US and in Europe (Chart 4). However, the vast amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus injected in the economy has jolted a recovery. It has also caused a massive wealth transfer to households and the private sector in general that is likely to increase consumption permanently. As a result, growth in the coming decade will be stronger than it was in the past decade, in both the US and Europe. This process will allow the neutral rate to rise over time, which in turn will lift the terminal rate of interest and yields. In this context, even if inflation were to cool in 2022 because some of the supply constraints that marked 2021 dissipate, yields may continue to rise and do so for the remainder of the decade. This is also true in Europe where the household savings rate still towers near 19% of disposable income and may fall by 6% to reach its pre-pandemic levels, as the US experience presages (Chart 5). Chart 4Terminal Rates Proxies Are Too Low Chart 5European Savings Rate Has Downside A simple modeling exercise confirms that yields will have greater upside over the coming year. Conceptually, yields are anchored by policy rates and the terminal rate, which is somewhere above the neutral rate of interest. One of the key determinants of the nominal neutral rate is the trend growth rate of nominal GDP. While the market cannot know precisely where that growth rate stands, recent experience influences the perception of market participants. Thus, a long-term moving average of nominal GDP growth constitutes a rough proxy of this measure and will relate to investors’ assessment of the neutral rate and the terminal interest rates. Chart 6Bond Yields Are Too Low, Especially If Trend Nominal Growth Picks Up Using this approach reveals two important bearish forces for bonds. Even after accounting for the slow growth rate of both the US and Eurozone economies over the past ten years, as well as extraordinarily low policy rates, T-Notes and Bunds yields are too low (Chart 6). More importantly, if nominal GDP growth is higher this decade than next, this alone will push up the equilibrium level of yields in Advanced Economies. The upside in yields is not without risks. China is still going through a deflationary shock whereby growth is slowing. As China eases policy, Chinese yields will continue to fall, bucking the global trend (Chart 7). In recent years, Chinese yields have rarely diverged from global yields. If Chinese growth plummets from here, the divergence will not be resolved via higher Chinese yields. However, Chinese authorities do not want growth to collapse. Reports from the State Council suggest an acceleration of the implementation of major spending projects under the 14th Five-year plan and that the credit impulse is trying to bottom. Nonetheless, China remains a risk to monitor closely. The second major risk stems from the intertwined nature of the global financial system. The US economy is able to withstand higher Treasury yields, but is the rest of the world? As Chart 8 highlights, US private debt-servicing costs are low today, as a result of minimal interest rates and the decline in debt loads after the GFC. The same is not true for the G-10 outside the US, let alone EM economies. These differences suggest that the US will be much more resilient to rising yields than the rest of the world. A major financial accident outside the US would prompt a wave of risk aversion that would decrease yields around the world. Chart 7An Unusual Divergence Chart 8Will The Rest Of The World Withstand Higher US Yields? Bottom Line: Global yields have much greater upside for the years ahead, even if inflation slows in 2022. While BCA targets 2.25% and 0.25% for, respectively, Treasurys and Bund yields this year, the multi-year upside is much greater as neutral rates are re-adjusted upward. The change will not move in a straight line, but the trend will not be friendly for bondholders. In the near-term, the main culprits preventing higher yields are a further slowdown in China as well as a financial accident outside the US. Investment Implications The most obvious investment implication is that investors should use any pullback in yields to sell duration. As a corollary, investors should maintain an overweight stance on equities relative to bonds. The equity risk premium, especially in Europe, remains elevated, and European dividend yields stand near record highs compared to Bund yields (Chart 9). Moreover, when yields rise because of a higher neutral rate, this also means that the expected long-term growth rate of earnings is firming, which negates some of the adverse impacts on valuations of higher discount rates. Nonetheless, if inflation does not stabilize, the increase in yields could become much more painful for stocks, as the negative correlation between stock prices and bond yields would reassert itself—a possibility we described five weeks ago. A rising neutral rate and terminal rate are also associated with an outperformance of European stocks compared to the US and an outperformance of value stocks over growth stocks in Europe (Chart 10). These relationships reflect the greater procyclicality of European equities and value stocks. Chart 9A Valuation Cushion For Stocks Chart 10Higher Terminal Rates Favor Europe And Value Finally, we looked at the performance of European sectors based on the trend in yields. Table 1 highlights that industrials are the great winner when yields rise, which is a testament to their pro-cyclicality. They beat the market on 3-month, 6-month and 12-month horizons by 1.6%, 2.9% and 5.8%, respectively. The regularity of their benchmark-beating performance is extremely high. When yields rise, financials also see a marked improvement of their relative returns compared to their historical average returns. Surprisingly, so do European tech firms, which reflect the more hardware focus of European tech compared to the US. Table 1Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance Table 2 repeats the same exercise, but, this time, we control for the slope of the yield curve, focusing on periods when the yield curve is positively sloped. Again, industrials are the star sector, but other cyclicals such as materials and consumer discretionary also stand out. European tech remains dominated by its cyclical properties, while the outperformance of financials becomes more marked. Table 2Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Postive Yield Curve Slope As A Control Variable Table 3 looks at the behavior of sectors when yields rise and when the Euro Area PMI Manufacturing improves, which is a scenario we expect for most of 2022 once the winter passes. Industrials win more clearly than materials or consumer discretionary. The European tech sector continues to generate a very strong outperformance, while the excess return of financials firms up as well. This scenario also shows a particularly steep underperformance for all the defensive sectors. Table 3Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Improving Manufacturing PMI As A Control Variable Table 4 completes the picture, focusing on rising yields when core CPI decelerates, another development we foresee in 2022. Once again, industrials stand out as a result of the extent and regularity of their outperformance. However, under this controlling variable, the performance of materials and consumer discretionary stocks deteriorates significantly. Financials also see a large downgrade to their relative performance. Tech performs best under these circumstances. Here, staples suffer the worst fate, closely followed by utilities and healthcare. Table 4Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Falling Core CPI As A Control Variable Based on these observations, the highest likelihood scenario is that European cyclicals will outperform defensive equities significantly this year after a period of consolidation since last spring. A more targeted approach would be to overweight industrials and tech at the expense of staples and utilities. Geographically, investors should buy a basket of Swedish (overweight industrials) and Dutch stocks (overweight tech), while selling Swiss stocks (overweight healthcare).   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Highlights It’s true that rising rates often precipitate bear markets, but it takes a while, … : We subscribe to the view that expansions are more likely to be murdered by the Fed than die of old age. It’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the Fed could hike rates enough in 2022 to kill this one, though, and even the first half of 2023 would be a reach.  … because the Fed only seeks to slow the economy when it’s firing on all cylinders: Earnings are typically growing at a rapid clip and risk aversion is a distant memory when the Fed begins the process of draining the punch bowl. The fed funds rate tipping point can only be definitively identified after the fact, but our estimate has an impressive track record: No one knows for sure where the line of demarcation between easy and tight monetary policy lies, but equities have shined when the fed funds rate is below our equilibrium estimate. We do not share the view that Tech stocks are especially vulnerable to higher interest rates: Although it lacks empirical support outside of a small subset of observations, the Tech vulnerability view has spread more widely than the Omicron variant. Feature Last week’s report discussing the equity impact of impending rate hikes elicited a lot of reaction. A discussion with one investor usually has relevance for other investors, so we are sharing a composite of the questions we received, along with our responses. It gives us the chance to elaborate on some points that we did not previously address in full, but our conclusion remains unchanged. History argues that equities have little to fear from an incremental rate hike campaign, and we expect that they will generate sizable positive excess returns above Treasuries and cash over the next twelve months. The Fed, With Rate Hikes, In The Board Room Why shouldn’t investors be concerned about rate hikes when you yourself have said that the Fed precipitates recessions? As the last expansion stretched on for a record length of time, we regularly repeated the line that expansions don’t die of old age, they die because the Fed murders them. It fits well with our tipping point view of rate hikes and we wholly subscribe to it. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the Fed’s tools act much more slowly than the lethal array of objects in the game of Clue. As we highlighted last week, monetary policy acts with long and variable lags and the Fed accordingly tightens it in increments allowing for real-time feedback that might help it tailor its actions to evolving economic conditions. Ex-the pandemic, tight monetary policy has been a necessary, albeit not sufficient, recession condition for the 60 years covered by our equilibrium fed funds rate estimate. Although not every instance when the fed funds rate exceeded its equilibrium level preceded a recession, no recession occurred when the funds rate was below equilibrium (Chart 1). Owing to monetary policy’s lagged effects, however, the recessions didn’t begin until well after the Fed began to tighten policy. On average, each recession arrived 26 months after Phase I kicked off and 12 months after the policy cycle entered Phase II (Table 1). Peak growth occurs in the early stages of rate hikes, while the Fed is merely easing up on the gas; deceleration only ensues in the latter stages, when the Fed pushes down on the brake pedal. Chart 1Rate Hikes Are A Necessary, But Not Sufficient, Recession Condition ... Table 1... And It Takes A While For The Economy To Feel Their Full Effect Index P/E Multiples Don’t Collapse Overnight It’s often said that the Fed hikes rates until something breaks. If equities are ultimately going to break in the process, why wouldn’t a prudent investor read the first rate hike, or even the run-up to it, as a sign to begin reducing exposure? We showed last week that signal measures of economic activity – hiring, lending, spending and GDP – grow well above their through-the-cycle pace while the Fed is tightening policy. Corporate earnings do, too, and S&P 500 earnings expectations have risen most rapidly when the Fed is hiking rates, with Phase I growth nearly doubling aggregate growth (Chart 2, middle panel). Earnings gains are vulnerable to dilution from multiple de-rating, but Phase I multiples have been roughly flat in the aggregate (Chart 2, bottom panel). Perhaps investors recognize that equities don’t break until well after the Fed starts hiking rates, or double-digit earnings growth makes them lose sight of the likelihood that they eventually will. Chart 2Our Definitions Of The Phases Must Be Close To The Mark Based on the empirical record, investors judged by their relative performance should not reduce equity exposure until the rate hiking campaign is well advanced. Phase I has produced the best returns of any phase in the 42 years that earnings expectations have been compiled and missing out on them could be harmful to a professional investor’s career (Chart 2, top panel). Today’s Starting Point Is Unusually Demanding Have equities ever been this expensive at the start of a tightening cycle? History suggests that equities can rally in a “normal” Phase I even after some initial turbulence, but how much scope do they have to rise from current valuation levels? There is unfortunately scarcely any empirical data to address this question. The nine Phase I episodes account for just eight years of the 42-year earnings expectations era and several of them are very short (Table 2). The one instance when forward multiples were at or above today’s levels, from June through October of 1999, they were able to hold their ground, falling less than a half of a multiple point, or 1.5%. Earnings expectations grew by 6.3% over that period, allowing the S&P 500 to advance at the rate of about 1% per month, in line with its overall Phase I performance since 1979. Table 2Multiples Have Held Their Ground In Phase I Empirically, however, robust growth in earnings expectations is the basis for overweighting stocks in Phase I, not multiple expansion. We do not expect re-rating as the Fed pushes the funds rate toward its equilibrium level, and we are alert to the certainty that stocks will de-rate sometime in the future if forward multiples are still subject to mean reversion. History shows it won’t necessarily happen in Phase I, though, and TINA may stave it off while there is a dearth of non-equity options offering positive prospective real returns. Disclaimer (BCA Is Human, Too) How can you be certain that your estimate of the equilibrium rate is accurate? We are not certain at all about the level of the equilibrium rate, and nothing we’ve ever written or said should be construed as implying that we are. As we’ve said many times before, the equilibrium rate is a concept. It cannot be directly observed and our attempts to estimate it are no more than our best effort to gain a sense of where the tipping point for financial markets and the economy might be. Our current 3.25% estimate likely sounds quite high, but we take the estimates at any given point in time with a grain of salt. We are not so full of ourselves that we believe we can pin down an amorphous concept to two decimal places in real time, and we have found that thinking of the point estimate as falling within a plausible range is the best way to proceed. Right now, the US Investment Strategy team views the equilibrium rate as somewhere around 2.5% or higher. That’s all the precision we need to assert with high conviction that monetary policy is accommodative and will remain so for all of 2022 and much, if not all, of 2023. For all the inherent uncertainty of attempts to quantify the equilibrium rate, however, the sharp disparity in equity performance across easy and tight monetary policy settings suggests that we’re on the right track. We’re further encouraged by the clear distinctions in earnings and multiples growth across phases (Figure 1), which suggest that monetary policy settings exert a persistent influence on fundamentals and investor appetites. Given that equities have flourished when policy is easy, overweighting stocks in multi-asset portfolios should contribute to outperformance over the next twelve months. Monetary policy settings are not the be-all and the end-all, but we have found that they offer a very useful default guide to asset allocation. Fooled By Randomness? The results have been robust over a lengthy period, but how do you know they’re not random? Why does the relationship you’ve cited work? We are convinced that the observed strong-growth/tighter-policy, tepid-growth/easier-policy relationship has a durable structural foundation. The through line is the fact that monetary policy is a blunt instrument that works with indeterminate lags. Its limitations influence the way the Fed deploys it and impose a predictable pattern on its economic and market impacts. The Fed is not quite the meddler that its Libertarian-minded critics make it out to be, hovering over the economy in a continuous effort to fine-tune it. Instead, it acts on a limited basis to ensure that the harms embedded in cyclical extremes do not prevent the economy from reaching its long-run potential. It deploys accommodative measures during recessions to keep hysteresis from turning a cyclical soft patch into a structural albatross and restrictive measures during high-revving expansions to keep the inflation genie from getting out of the bottle. The Fed does not want to root out green shoots before they can take hold, so it does not begin Phase I, or assiduously pursue it, until it is certain that the economy can withstand higher rates, especially while (lagging) inflation readings are tame (Chart 3). It therefore launches tightening cycles with a predictable bias to err on the side of being too easy. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator, ... That bias allows the economy to gather momentum in Phase I, in line with cyclical peaks in activity and earnings growth, and outsized equity and credit returns. Left unchecked, the momentum could produce higher inflation, and the Fed is typically compelled to dial up intervention to counter it. Wielding a blunt instrument that works with a lag, however, the Fed is at risk of going too far, and Phase II hikes often induce a recession. Investors sniff out the looming downturn and de-rate equities. By the time the Fed reverses field and initiates a new easing campaign (Phase III), earnings growth has stalled out and measured inflation is peaking (Table 3). Equities mark time and credit spreads widen until, with a slowdown plainly evident and measured inflation sliding, the Fed shifts to full-on accommodation (Phase IV). It maintains market-friendly settings until the economy begins to look too strong, upon which it intervenes to hold it back, kicking off a new policy cycle. Table 3... Managed With Policy That Works With A Lag As we showed last week, the direct relationship between activity and rates is immediately apparent in the real economy. Robust activity translates to robust earnings growth, but it is possible that equity multiples will behave differently in the approaching fed funds rate cycle than they have in the past. Although we expect that TINA will protect equities from meaningful de-rating pressure this year, investors should not lose sight of the fact that the earnings estimate era began with the S&P 500’s forward P/E multiple at 7. That rock-bottom starting point paved the way for an annualized 2.6% valuation increase over the last 42 years, but it cannot continue indefinitely, if at all. We are confident that multiples will continue to fare better when the Fed is cutting rates than when it is hiking them, but the cutting tailwinds will likely weaken going forward, while the hiking headwinds will stiffen. Don’t Believe The Hype Tech stocks are especially vulnerable to higher interest rates and the fate of US indexes is intimately bound up with them. Aren’t you dismissing the threat from higher rates a little too easily? The Tech sector’s outsized presence in the S&P 500 has surely contributed to market anxieties over looming rate hikes. We are firmly of the view, however, that popular concerns over Tech stocks’ interest rate vulnerability are way overdone. The idea that their back-loaded earnings profile makes them acutely vulnerable to a higher discount rate in the manner of long duration bonds ignores the fact that their future cash flows are not fixed. Unlike bonds, their owners' claims on earnings ebb and flow as rates rise and fall in line with economic conditions. Chart 4Relative Tech Multiples Have Mostly Moved With Rates, Not Against Them We recently devoted a Special Report to pushing back against the idea that Tech stocks are hostage to interest rates. In it, we argued that a stock’s price can be viewed as the product of its earnings per share and its P/E ratio. The biggest Tech companies’ earnings have a low interest rate sensitivity because they have little debt and do not sell big-ticket items that their customers have to finance, so the purported inverse relationship between Tech stocks’ relative performance and interest rates must be a function of relative P/E multiple changes. Relative Tech multiples and interest rates consistently moved together in the ten years through 2018, however, and were only sporadically negatively correlated over the last three years (Chart 4). Duration is essential for describing the sensitivity of risk-free bond returns to changes in interest rates, but it is an uncomfortable fit with equities. Treasuries exhibit a nearly perfect inverse correlation with changes in interest rates (Chart 5, top panel), but the cash flow uncertainty introduced by even the modest credit risk associated with investment grade corporate bonds reduces the correlation considerably (Chart 5, second panel). Interest rates’ impact on equities is even more attenuated. The S&P 500 is only weakly – and positively – correlated with rates (Chart 5, third panel), just like its Tech sector constituents (Chart 5, bottom panel).                Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Chinese stocks are currently trading close to their fair value in absolute terms. When equity valuations are neutral, the direction of the next move in stocks depends on the profit outlook. Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next six months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Historically, share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months. Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in the coming months at a lower level. Relative to EM and global stocks, Chinese equities offer value. Hence, their relative performance will likely enter a rollercoaster phase. The secular outlook for corporate profitability among listed Chinese companies remains uninspiring. Hence, a structural re-rating of China stock indexes is unlikely. Feature With Chinese share prices down considerably in the past 12 months, a pertinent question is whether they offer an attractive entry point. Dissecting both valuations and the corporate earnings outlook are the key to getting the cyclical view right. This report aims to do this for both the MSCI Investable and MSCI A-share equity indexes. Our conclusion is as follows: in absolute terms, the Chinese MSCI Investable and A-share indexes have neutral valuations. Yet, the risk window for share prices remains open because corporate profits are set to contract. Also, bottoms and peaks in the money/credit cycle lead share prices by several months as illustrated in Chart 1. Hence, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Valuations Chinese equity valuations are by and large neutral. Specifically: 1. According to our aggregate composite valuation indicators, onshore A shares are fairly valued while the MSCI Investable index is slightly above its historical mean (Chart 2). This aggregate composite valuation indicator for both equity indexes is composed of three components: based on (1) median multiples; (2) 20% trimmed-mean multiples; and (3) equal-weighted multiples. The latter uses equal weights rather than market cap weights for sub-sectors in the calculation. In turn, each component is constructed using the averages of the trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-cash earnings,1 price-to-book value (PBV) and price-to-dividend ratios. The 20%-trimmed mean excludes the top 10% and the bottom 10% of sub-sectors, i.e., it removes outliers. 2. We have also calculated a cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for both A shares and MSCI Investable stocks. The CAPE ratio for A shares is slightly below its historical mean (Chart 3), and the one for the MSCI Investable index is one standard deviation below its mean (Chart 4). The idea behind the CAPE model is to remove the cyclicality of corporate profits when computing the P/E ratio. The CAPE model gauges stock valuations under the assumption that real (inflation-adjusted) EPS converges to its trend line. Importantly, the CAPE ratio is a structural valuation model, i.e., it works over the long run. Only investors with a time horizon greater than 3-5 years should use CAPE in their investment decisions. Below, we discuss the risks to Chinese corporate profits from both cyclical and structural viewpoints. We contend that a low CAPE ratio might not be unreasonable for listed Chinese companies, as their profitability has deteriorated over the past 10-12 years and their secular profit outlook is very uncertain. 3. The equity risk premium incorporates interest rates into valuations. We computed the equity risk premium by subtracting Chinese onshore government bond yields in real terms (deflated by headline CPI) from the trailing earnings yield of stocks. Chart 5 demonstrates that the equity risk premiums for A shares and investable stocks are near their historical mean, signifying neutral Chinese equity valuations at present. Relative to DM and EM equities, Chinese valuations appear to be attractive as Chinese share prices have massively underperformed their EM and DM peers in the past 12 months (Chart 6). Bottom Line: Chinese equity valuations are by and large neutral in absolute terms. When equity valuations are neutral, the next move in share prices depends on the profit outlook. If profits expand/contract, stocks will rally/sell off. Corporate Earnings: The Cyclical Outlook Chinese corporate profits are set to contract in this downturn. Chart 7 shows that Chinese aggregate industrial profits will shrink by single digits in the next nine months from a year ago. This model is based on a regression of aggregate industrial profits on China’s credit impulse. A similar model that regresses A-share non-financial companies’ net profits on narrow money (M1) growth is also pointing to a roughly 5% corporate earnings contraction in the months ahead (Chart 8). Is government stimulus sufficient to produce a recovery in the business cycle and in company earnings? So far, government stimulus has been insufficient to produce a meaningful recovery in H1 2022. In particular, the changes in the excess reserve ratio lead the credit impulse by six months, and the latter signifies only a stabilization, but not a meaningful improvement in the credit impulse prior to May 2022 (Chart 9). Given that the credit impulse leads industrial companies’ earnings by about nine months (please refer to Chart 7 above), odds are that corporate profits will not bottom until H2 2022. As for service industries, online retail sales of goods and services remain weak, reflecting sluggish household income growth (Chart 10). There has also been another factor weighing on China’s business cycle – a declining marginal propensity to spend among both households and companies (Chart 11). The marginal propensity to spend depends on sentiment and confidence among consumers and companies. A declining propensity to spend will dampen the positive effects from government stimulus. Notably, there has been a dramatic profit divergence in industrial sectors. Commodity-producing sectors – metals and mining, steel, energy and coal – have posted an earnings windfall. In contrast, industries consuming commodities – machinery, construction materials, autos, IT and food/beverages – have seen their profits plunge (Chart 12).           The reason for this industrial earnings dichotomy is that commodity prices have not fallen despite the weakness in China’s business cycle and its commodity imports (Chart 13). Critically, commodity users have not been able to pass on higher input costs to their customers due to weak demand. Consequently, commodity users have experienced a drastic profit margin squeeze and their earnings have plummeted. If commodity prices drop meaningfully, the profit divergence between these two groups of industrial enterprises will narrow. Yet, it will not improve the level of overall industrial profits in China. The rationale is that in the past six months, industrial profits of commodity users have accounted for 20% of aggregate industrial profits, while those of commodity producers have accounted for 80%. This reinforces the importance of commodity prices in driving China’s industrial profit cycles. Our view on commodity prices is as follows: Commodity prices have so far ignored China’s slowdown. However, the Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of a meaningful recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in resource prices in the coming months, as we discussed in last week’s report. Bottom Line: As policy stimulus gets more aggressive, China’s growth and corporate earnings will recover in H2. Yet, in H1 corporate profits are set to disappoint. This implies that Chinese share prices will remain in a risk window for now. Corporate Profitability: The Structural Outlook Investors reward companies with high or rising return on equity by bidding up their equity multiples, and vice versa. One of the main reasons why the structural valuation measures for Chinese equity indexes (like the CAPE ratio) have declined in the past 10 years is worsening corporate profitability. Specifically, the return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE) for non-financial companies included in the MSCI A-share and Investable indexes have been falling since 2011 (Chart 14, top and middle panels). Periodic government stimulus improved corporate profitability temporarily. Yet, as stimulus waned, corporate profitability deteriorated. Consistently, Chinese investable non-TMT stocks have produced zero price appreciation in absolute terms since 2011 (Chart 14, bottom panel). In the past 10 years, there has been a structural deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial companies. Their RoE and RoA have fallen as have turnover in account assets (sales/assets), inventory (sales/inventory) and account receivables (sales/account receivables) (Chart 15). It is unclear if this secular trend of deteriorating corporate financial performance will reverse if authorities repeatedly rescue the economy by unleashing large stimulus. As for technology/internet/platform companies, we maintain that the regulatory changes affecting Chinese internet stocks are structural rather than cyclical in nature. There could be periods when the pace of regulatory clampdown eases, but these regulations will not be rolled back in any meaningful way. Authorities will cap these companies’ profitability like regulators do with monopolies and oligopolies, which heralds a lower return on equity and low multiples. For very different reasons, US and Chinese authorities do not want Chinese companies to be listed in the US. And when Chinese and US authorities do not want to see some of these stocks listed in the US, they will not be. Odds are rising that a few of them might be delisted in the coming years. In such a scenario, many US institutional investors will likely offload their holdings of these companies. Finally, Chinese bank stocks are cheap for a reason. They have not recognized a massive amount of non-performing loans and have not provisioned for them. Going forward, another roadblock to shareholders of Chinese stocks is the common prosperity policies that the Chinese government has championed. These policies will redistribute income away from shareholders to the general population. Chart 16 illustrates the share of labor compensation has been rising since 2011 while the share of profits has been declining. Not surprisingly, Chinese investable non-TMT stocks have been doing very poorly since 2011 (Chart 14, bottom panel). The common prosperity policies will only reinforce the existing trend of a rising share of labor compensation at the expense of shareholders in the coming years. This bodes ill for structural profitability and justifies low equity multiples. In short, a low CAPE ratio for Chinese stocks might not be out of line with such a downbeat secular outlook. Bottom Line: Even if there have been – and still will be – great companies in China that deliver phenomenal performance, their shareholders might not be in a position to reap the benefits of such solid performance. In short, the structural outlook for profitability among listed companies remains uncertain. Investment Recommendations Chinese stocks, especially investable ones, are oversold and might rebound in the very near term in absolute terms. However, the three-to-six-month outlook for absolute performance remains poor. Relative to EM and global stocks, Chinese equities are very oversold and offer value. Hence, their relative performance will likely enter a rollercoaster phase. Onshore Chinese stocks will underperform onshore government bonds. Within the Chinese equity universe, we have been recommending the following strategies and they remain intact: Long A shares/short MSCI Investable index since March 4, 2021 (Chart 17, top panel). This relative ratio is overbought and will likely pull back in the near term. However, the cyclical and structural outlook continues to favor onshore stocks versus the investable universe. Short Chinese investable value stocks/long global value stocks since November 26, 2020 (Chart 17, middle panel). This strategy remains intact. Short onshore and investable property stocks versus their respective benchmarks since May 9, 2019 (Chart 17, bottom panel). The woes of property developers are not over. Please refer to our Special Report on the Chinese property market. Long large banks/short medium and small listed banks since October 2016. Small and medium banks are exposed to the continuous woes in the property market much more than the large ones. Also, their profitability will be more negatively affected by the retrenchment in shadow banking activities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    MSCI defines cash earnings as earnings per share including depreciation and amortization as reported by the company.

Highlights Chinese stocks are currently trading close to their fair value in absolute terms. When equity valuations are neutral, the direction of the next move in stocks depends on the profit outlook. Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next six months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Historically, share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months. Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in the coming months at a lower level. Relative to EM and global stocks, Chinese equities offer value. Hence, their relative performance will likely enter a rollercoaster phase. The secular outlook for corporate profitability among listed Chinese companies remains uninspiring. Hence, a structural re-rating of China stock indexes is unlikely. Feature With Chinese share prices down considerably in the past 12 months, a pertinent question is whether they offer an attractive entry point. Dissecting both valuations and the corporate earnings outlook are the key to getting the cyclical view right. This report aims to do this for both the MSCI Investable and MSCI A-share equity indexes. Our conclusion is as follows: in absolute terms, the Chinese MSCI Investable and A-share indexes have neutral valuations. Yet, the risk window for share prices remains open because corporate profits are set to contract. Also, bottoms and peaks in the money/credit cycle lead share prices by several months as illustrated in Chart 1. Hence, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 1China: Lead-Lag Relationship Between Share Prices And Money/Credit Cycles Varies Valuations Chart 2Chinese Equity Valuation in Absolute Terms Chinese equity valuations are by and large neutral. Specifically: 1. According to our aggregate composite valuation indicators, onshore A shares are fairly valued while the MSCI Investable index is slightly above its historical mean (Chart 2). This aggregate composite valuation indicator for both equity indexes is composed of three components: based on (1) median multiples; (2) 20% trimmed-mean multiples; and (3) equal-weighted multiples. The latter uses equal weights rather than market cap weights for sub-sectors in the calculation. In turn, each component is constructed using the averages of the trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-cash earnings,1 price-to-book value (PBV) and price-to-dividend ratios. The 20%-trimmed mean excludes the top 10% and the bottom 10% of sub-sectors, i.e., it removes outliers. 2. We have also calculated a cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for both A shares and MSCI Investable stocks. The CAPE ratio for A shares is slightly below its historical mean (Chart 3), and the one for the MSCI Investable index is one standard deviation below its mean (Chart 4). Chart 3China A-Shares: CAPE Ratio Chart 4Chinese MSCI Investable Stocks: CAPE Ratio The idea behind the CAPE model is to remove the cyclicality of corporate profits when computing the P/E ratio. The CAPE model gauges stock valuations under the assumption that real (inflation-adjusted) EPS converges to its trend line. Importantly, the CAPE ratio is a structural valuation model, i.e., it works over the long run. Only investors with a time horizon greater than 3-5 years should use CAPE in their investment decisions. Below, we discuss the risks to Chinese corporate profits from both cyclical and structural viewpoints. We contend that a low CAPE ratio might not be unreasonable for listed Chinese companies, as their profitability has deteriorated over the past 10-12 years and their secular profit outlook is very uncertain. 3. The equity risk premium incorporates interest rates into valuations. We computed the equity risk premium by subtracting Chinese onshore government bond yields in real terms (deflated by headline CPI) from the trailing earnings yield of stocks. Chart 5 demonstrates that the equity risk premiums for A shares and investable stocks are near their historical mean, signifying neutral Chinese equity valuations at present. Relative to DM and EM equities, Chinese valuations appear to be attractive as Chinese share prices have massively underperformed their EM and DM peers in the past 12 months (Chart 6). Chart 5Equity Risk Premium For China Chart 6Chinese Equity Valuations Relative To EM And DM Bottom Line: Chinese equity valuations are by and large neutral in absolute terms. When equity valuations are neutral, the next move in share prices depends on the profit outlook. If profits expand/contract, stocks will rally/sell off. Corporate Earnings: The Cyclical Outlook Chinese corporate profits are set to contract in this downturn. Chart 7 shows that Chinese aggregate industrial profits will shrink by single digits in the next nine months from a year ago. This model is based on a regression of aggregate industrial profits on China’s credit impulse. A similar model that regresses A-share non-financial companies’ net profits on narrow money (M1) growth is also pointing to a roughly 5% corporate earnings contraction in the months ahead (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Industrial Profits Will Post A Single Digit Contraction Chart 8Chinese A-Share Profits Will Shrink In Mid-2022 Is government stimulus sufficient to produce a recovery in the business cycle and in company earnings? So far, government stimulus has been insufficient to produce a meaningful recovery in H1 2022. In particular, the changes in the excess reserve ratio lead the credit impulse by six months, and the latter signifies only a stabilization, but not a meaningful improvement in the credit impulse prior to May 2022 (Chart 9). Given that the credit impulse leads industrial companies’ earnings by about nine months (please refer to Chart 7 above), odds are that corporate profits will not bottom until H2 2022. As for service industries, online retail sales of goods and services remain weak, reflecting sluggish household income growth (Chart 10). Chart 9Liquidity Is Pointing To Stabilization But Not A Surge in The Credit Impulse Chart 10China: Internet Sales Are Disappointing There has also been another factor weighing on China’s business cycle – a declining marginal propensity to spend among both households and companies (Chart 11). The marginal propensity to spend depends on sentiment and confidence among consumers and companies. A declining propensity to spend will dampen the positive effects from government stimulus. Notably, there has been a dramatic profit divergence in industrial sectors. Commodity-producing sectors – metals and mining, steel, energy and coal – have posted an earnings windfall. In contrast, industries consuming commodities – machinery, construction materials, autos, IT and food/beverages – have seen their profits plunge (Chart 12). Chart 12Dramatic Profit Divergence Between Commodity Producers And Users Chart 11China: The Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Declining       Chart 13Chinese Imports Of Key Commodities Have Shrunk Drastically     The reason for this industrial earnings dichotomy is that commodity prices have not fallen despite the weakness in China’s business cycle and its commodity imports (Chart 13). Critically, commodity users have not been able to pass on higher input costs to their customers due to weak demand. Consequently, commodity users have experienced a drastic profit margin squeeze and their earnings have plummeted. If commodity prices drop meaningfully, the profit divergence between these two groups of industrial enterprises will narrow. Yet, it will not improve the level of overall industrial profits in China. The rationale is that in the past six months, industrial profits of commodity users have accounted for 20% of aggregate industrial profits, while those of commodity producers have accounted for 80%. This reinforces the importance of commodity prices in driving China’s industrial profit cycles. Our view on commodity prices is as follows: Commodity prices have so far ignored China’s slowdown. However, the Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of a meaningful recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in resource prices in the coming months, as we discussed in last week’s report. Bottom Line: As policy stimulus gets more aggressive, China’s growth and corporate earnings will recover in H2. Yet, in H1 corporate profits are set to disappoint. This implies that Chinese share prices will remain in a risk window for now. Corporate Profitability: The Structural Outlook Investors reward companies with high or rising return on equity by bidding up their equity multiples, and vice versa. One of the main reasons why the structural valuation measures for Chinese equity indexes (like the CAPE ratio) have declined in the past 10 years is worsening corporate profitability. Specifically, the return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE) for non-financial companies included in the MSCI A-share and Investable indexes have been falling since 2011 (Chart 14, top and middle panels). Periodic government stimulus improved corporate profitability temporarily. Yet, as stimulus waned, corporate profitability deteriorated. Consistently, Chinese investable non-TMT stocks have produced zero price appreciation in absolute terms since 2011 (Chart 14, bottom panel). In the past 10 years, there has been a structural deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial companies. Their RoE and RoA have fallen as have turnover in account assets (sales/assets), inventory (sales/inventory) and account receivables (sales/account receivables) (Chart 15). It is unclear if this secular trend of deteriorating corporate financial performance will reverse if authorities repeatedly rescue the economy by unleashing large stimulus. Chart 14Worsening Profitability Has Been Behind Poor Equity Returns in China Chart 15Chinese Industrial Companies: Structural Deterioration in Financial Performance As for technology/internet/platform companies, we maintain that the regulatory changes affecting Chinese internet stocks are structural rather than cyclical in nature. There could be periods when the pace of regulatory clampdown eases, but these regulations will not be rolled back in any meaningful way. Authorities will cap these companies’ profitability like regulators do with monopolies and oligopolies, which heralds a lower return on equity and low multiples. For very different reasons, US and Chinese authorities do not want Chinese companies to be listed in the US. And when Chinese and US authorities do not want to see some of these stocks listed in the US, they will not be. Odds are rising that a few of them might be delisted in the coming years. In such a scenario, many US institutional investors will likely offload their holdings of these companies. Finally, Chinese bank stocks are cheap for a reason. They have not recognized a massive amount of non-performing loans and have not provisioned for them. Going forward, another roadblock to shareholders of Chinese stocks is the common prosperity policies that the Chinese government has championed. These policies will redistribute income away from shareholders to the general population. Chart 16 illustrates the share of labor compensation has been rising since 2011 while the share of profits has been declining. Not surprisingly, Chinese investable non-TMT stocks have been doing very poorly since 2011 (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 16National Income Composition: Labor’s Share Will Continue Rising The common prosperity policies will only reinforce the existing trend of a rising share of labor compensation at the expense of shareholders in the coming years. This bodes ill for structural profitability and justifies low equity multiples. In short, a low CAPE ratio for Chinese stocks might not be out of line with such a downbeat secular outlook. Bottom Line: Even if there have been – and still will be – great companies in China that deliver phenomenal performance, their shareholders might not be in a position to reap the benefits of such solid performance. In short, the structural outlook for profitability among listed companies remains uncertain. Investment Recommendations Chart 17Our Recommendations For Chinese Equity Investors Chinese stocks, especially investable ones, are oversold and might rebound in the very near term in absolute terms. However, the three-to-six-month outlook for absolute performance remains poor. Relative to EM and global stocks, Chinese equities are very oversold and offer value. Hence, their relative performance will likely enter a rollercoaster phase. Onshore Chinese stocks will underperform onshore government bonds. Within the Chinese equity universe, we have been recommending the following strategies and they remain intact: Long A shares/short MSCI Investable index since March 4, 2021 (Chart 17, top panel). This relative ratio is overbought and will likely pull back in the near term. However, the cyclical and structural outlook continues to favor onshore stocks versus the investable universe. Short Chinese investable value stocks/long global value stocks since November 26, 2020 (Chart 17, middle panel). This strategy remains intact. Short onshore and investable property stocks versus their respective benchmarks since May 9, 2019 (Chart 17, bottom panel). The woes of property developers are not over. Please refer to our Special Report on the Chinese property market. Long large banks/short medium and small listed banks since October 2016. Small and medium banks are exposed to the continuous woes in the property market much more than the large ones. Also, their profitability will be more negatively affected by the retrenchment in shadow banking activities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    MSCI defines cash earnings as earnings per share including depreciation and amortization as reported by the company.

Highlights We introduce a novel concept called the ‘wealth impulse’, which describes the counterintuitive relationship between wealth and economic growth. To the extent that GDP growth is impacted by wealth, the impact comes not from the level of wealth or from the change in wealth, but from the change in the increase in wealth – which we define as the wealth impulse. The global wealth impulse has entered a downcycle, which tends to last 1-2 years. Previous downcycles in the wealth impulse in 2010-11, 2013-14, and 2018-19 all coincided with US economic growth falling to, or remaining at, below-trend. A similar pattern could emerge through 2022-23. Previous downcycles in the wealth impulse also coincided with strong down-legs in the 30-year T-bond yield. This supports our view that while the long bond yield could rise by a further 40-50 bps, the recent spike in yields is simply a tactical countertrend move within a broader structural downtrend, which remains intact. Fractal trading watchlist: Bitcoin, the euro, EUR/CZK, semiconductors, and Polish 10-year bonds. Feature Feature ChartThe 'Wealth Impulse' Has Peaked The post-pandemic synchronized boom in global house prices and global stock markets has caused an unprecedented windfall in household wealth. Albeit, it is a windfall that is highly concentrated in the top fraction of the world’s households. Many commentators claim that this unprecedented wealth windfall will boost economic growth in 2022-23 through the so-called ‘wealth effect’. However, these claims belie a basic misunderstanding about how wealth impacts economic growth. In this short Special Report, we introduce a novel concept called the ‘wealth impulse’, which describes the true relationship between wealth and economic growth. Using this concept of the wealth impulse we explain why, somewhat counterintuitively, wealth will be a headwind rather than a tailwind to growth in 2022-23 (Chart I-1). It Is The ‘Impulse’ Of Wealth That Drives Growth, And The Impulse Has Peaked In accounting terms, wealth is a stock. By contrast, GDP is a change in a stock, or flow, meaning that GDP growth is a change in a flow. It follows that, to the extent that GDP growth is impacted by wealth, it must also come from the change in the flow of wealth: in other words, not from the level of wealth and not from the change in wealth, but from the change in the increase in wealth. We define this as the ‘wealth impulse’ (Charts 1-2-Chart 1-5) Chart I-2The Level Of Real Estate Wealth Has Surged… Chart I-3…But The Impulse Is Fading Chart I-4The Level Of Stock Market Wealth Has Surged… Chart I-5...But The Impulse Is Fading To be clear, your stock of wealth will also generate a flow through dividends, rents, and interest income. And the higher the level of your wealth, the larger this flow will be – Bill Gate’s flow is much larger than Joe Sixpack’s flow. But given that these income flows are dwarfed by the capital gains flows, they will play second fiddle for all-important spending growth. If all of this sounds somewhat convoluted, let’s illuminate the concept with a simple example. Say that your starting wealth of $1000 increased by $100 in 2020, and by another $100 in 2021. In this case, you have effectively gained a constant additional ‘capital gain’ flow to your income flow. Let’s say you spent a constant tenth of these capital gain flows. What would be the growth in your spending? The counterintuitive answer is zero. As there is no change in these capital gain flows, the wealth impulse would be zero, and there would be no growth in your spending: it would be $10 in 2020 and $10 in 2021. To get economic growth from the wealth effect, the increase in your wealth in 2021 would have to be greater than the $100 increase in 2020. Let’s say the increase was $150. In this case, the wealth impulse would be 50 percent and your spending would grow from $10 to $15.1 Now let’s say that after this $150 increase in 2021, your wealth increased by $200 in 2022. Given that the 2022 increase was greater than the 2021 increase, the wealth impulse would be positive, and your spending would grow. But what about the rate of growth? The counterintuitive answer is that economic growth would slow, because the wealth impulse has declined to 33 percent (200/150) in 2022 from 50 percent (150/100) in 2021. To the extent that GDP growth is impacted by wealth, it must come from the change in the increase in wealth, which we define as the ‘wealth impulse’. Finally, let’s say that your wealth increased by a further $150 in 2023. In this case, the wealth impulse would turn negative, to -25 percent (150/200). The counterintuitive thing is that, despite an increase in wealth, your spending would contract. In fact, this is precisely what is happening in the real world. The wealth impulse peaked in the second half of 2021, and has entered a downcycle. Significantly, downcycles in the wealth impulse tend to last 1-2 years, and end up in deeply negative territory. Hence, contrary to what the commentators are claiming, the ‘wealth effect’ tailwind to growth is already fading, and is highly likely to become a headwind through 2022-23. Creating A Composite Wealth Impulse By far the largest component of household wealth is real estate, meaning the value of our homes. Significantly, through the past decade, global real estate prices have become highly synchronized and correlated. Hence, we can derive a real estate wealth impulse from a reliable monthly US house price index, such as the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index. One rejoinder is that real estate wealth should be measured net of the mortgage debt that is owed on our homes. However, as the wealth impulse is a change of a change in wealth, and the mortgage debt changes very slowly, it does not really matter whether we calculate the impulse from gross or net real estate wealth. Either way, the impulse is fading. The wealth impulse peaked in the second half of 2021, and has entered a downcycle. The other significant component of household wealth comes from the exposure to equities. Hence, we can derive an equity wealth impulse using a broad equity index such as the MSCI All Country World. Significantly, the equity wealth impulse also peaked in 2021 and has already fallen to zero. We can then create a ‘composite’ wealth impulse which combines real estate and equities in the three to one proportion that households hold these two main assets. Unsurprisingly, this composite wealth impulse is also fading fast (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Composite Wealth Impulse Has Peaked One final issue relates to the periodicity of calculating the wealth impulse. All the analysis so far has related to the 1-year impulse: that is, the 1-year change in the 1-year increase in wealth. This periodicity should match the time that it takes for wealth changes to impact household behaviour. Based on theoretical and empirical evidence, the optimal periodicity is indeed around a year – especially as we also assess the change in our incomes and taxes over a year. But what if households react faster to the change in their wealth? We can address this by looking at the 6-month wealth impulse: that is, the 6-month change in the 6-month increase in wealth. These 6-month impulses for both real estate wealth and composite wealth are already deeply in negative territory (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The 6-Month Real Estate Wealth Impulse Has Turned Negative Chart I-8The 6-Month Composite Wealth Impulse Has Turned Negative What Does A Wealth Impulse Downcycle Mean? There are several drivers of economic growth and the wealth impulse is a marginal player amongst these drivers. Still, while the wealth impulse may not be the overarching cause of growth, it does have the potential to amplify the growth cycle in either direction.  Downcycles in the wealth impulse have coincided with strong down-legs in the 30-year T-bond yield. In this regard, it is notable that in the post-GFC era, upcycles in the wealth impulse have coincided with accelerations in US economic growth. Whereas downcycles in the wealth impulse through 2010-11, 2013-14, and 2018-19 have all coincided with growth falling to, or remaining at, below-trend. A similar pattern could emerge through 2022-23, in stark contrast to what many commentators are predicting (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Wealth Impulse Downcycles Coincide With Fading Or Sub-Par Growth Unsurprisingly, the post-GFC downcycles in the wealth impulse have also coincided with strong down-legs in the 30-year T-bond yield. This supports our view that while the long bond yield could rise by a further 40-50 bps, the recent spike in yields is simply a tactical countertrend move. The broader structural downtrend in the long bond yield remains intact (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Wealth Impulse Downcycles Coincide With Down-Legs In The 30-Year T-Bond Yield Fractal Trading Watchlist From this week, we are pleased to introduce a new section: a fractal trading ‘watchlist’, which will highlight investments that are approaching, but not yet at, points of fractal fragility that presage upcoming turning points. This will help to prepare future trades. In the starting watchlist, we highlight potential upcoming buying opportunities for bitcoin, the trade-weighted euro, and EUR/CZK, and an upcoming selling opportunity for semiconductors versus technology. Catching our eye this week though is the very aggressive sell-off in Polish government bonds relative to their peers. Inflation has surged everywhere, including in Poland, but the inflation rate in Poland remains below that in the US. This means that the massive underperformance of Polish bonds seems overdone, confirmed by an extremely fragile 260-day fractal structure (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Underperformance Of Polish Bonds Is Overdone Accordingly, the recommended trade would be to overweight Polish 10-year bonds versus US 10-year T-bond (or German 10-year bunds), setting the profit-target and symmetrical stop-loss at 8 percent. Fractal Trading Watch List   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  In practice, your income flow might also rise slightly. Assuming a yield of 2 percent on your $1000 initial wealth, and a 10 percent growth rate, your income flows would evolve from $20 to $22 (in 2020) to $24.2 (in 2021), equalling a $2.2 rise in 2021. But these would be dwarfed by the capital gain flows of $100 and $150, equalling a $50 rise in 2021. Admittedly, the propensity to spend income flows is higher than the propensity to spend capital gain flows, but assuming we spend half our income flow versus a tenth of our capital gain flow, the increase in the capital gain flow would still drive the growth in spending ($5 versus $1.1). Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - ##br##Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Dear Client,In this special issue we present the first commentary for the BCA Research US High-Quality Stock Selection strategy, which represents the next evolution of the Equity Analyzer service.The strategy, constructed exclusively using the Equity Analyzer toolset, provides reliable exposure to high-quality US securities through the BCA Score factor model, while maintaining sector neutrality relative to the US market.Most importantly, the underlying portfolio is now offered through BCA Research Investment Solutions, which provides turn-key and directing-indexing implementations of our quantitative signals.  This solution marks the most accurate and practical implementation of our equity factor model to-date.For more information about the strategy, including historical performance metrics, or, to learn how to incorporate this service into your investment process, please contact investmentsolutions@bcaresearch.com.Performance RecapThe US equity market regained its composure in month of December 2021, with investors seeing through the rapidly spreading but seemingly less pathogenic Omicron variant. The US High-Quality strategy (USHQ), which closely tracks movement in the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY, approx. 90% correlation since inception), also had a strong month, with an outperformance of 0.49% relative to SPY.1 Since last quarter, strategy performance has been mostly in line with the US market (Chart 1), with modest downside protection and lower daily return volatility (Table 1), which are typical characteristics of the strategy.Returning to the most recent month of trading (December 2021), we are reminded that tech and health care continue to have a major influence on total returns given their weight in the US market. The USHQ portfolio was able to gain ground against SPY through outperformance in 8 out of 11 GICS Level 1 sectors, namely in tech and health care (Chart 2). Within SPY, mega-cap symbols continued to provide strong contributions2 with AAPL, TSLA, FB, MA, and UNH leading the pack. Downside impact was muted, with ADBE being the top detractor. The USHQ strategy had solid breadth across constituents, with a few holdings standing out in tech and health care. The top/bottom 10 contributors for the month of December are shown in Table 2A and Table 2B. Table 12021Q4 Statistics* At the current juncture, US equities are experiencing increased volatility due in part to a hawkish tone from the Federal Reserve. The latest set of FOMC minutes point to a mid-march liftoff date. This comes amid sustained inflationary pressures and a move towards maximum employment in the US. Not surprisingly, the market has corrected slightly against this backdrop. As of end-of-day January 11, 2022, USHQ is down -0.3% MTD vs -1.7% for SPY.Factor BreakdownIn this section we examine the current factor landscape for the USHQ portfolio, SPY, and the broad US equity universe.The current factor exposure for the USHQ portfolio and SPY is shown in Chart 3. It is up to date as of the latest portfolio rebalance (Jan 3, 2021). The methodology is similar to that used by the Factor Analyzer widget on the Equity Analyzer (EA) platform. We define the composite factor exposure as the difference between the portfolio or fund-weighted average factor score and the average score of our stock universe. In this case the stock universe consists of the top 1000 US stocks according to market cap. Composite factor scores are obtained from the EA platform and range from 0% to 100%.The portfolio will tend to have a positive factor exposure on most factors as it holds the top ranking stocks in each sector according to the BCA Score.  The factor exposure of SPY will vary from month to month depending on the evolution of the market. In the ideal environment, the strategy should have positive BCA Score exposure relative to the market index. Practically speaking, this provides verification that the strategy is correctly tilted towards the factors we deem important for managing market risk.The values in Chart 4 can be interpreted as the difference between the dark green bars and light green bars in Chart 3. This month, we observe that the valuation gap between the portfolio and SPY has narrowed relative to last month. This was mainly due to a drop in the Value Score of USHQ, which can be explained by a significant price appreciation in the strategy's tech holdings. Increased exposure to Technicals for USHQ and SPY indicate that both are increasingly weighted towards firms with strong momentum over the past 12 months.When considering the broad US equity universe on an equal-weighted basis, it’s clear that the composite Value factor has experienced a resurgence over the past month (Chart 5). The BCA Score metric has remained robust over the same period, with the core model components outperforming on a long/short basis. The current factor landscape reflects a switch to an environment of rising interest rates, as seen by the movement of the 10-year Treasury yield. Based on a previous study of factor performance in different rate environments, the outlook for Quality factors remains strong, as we are currently in an environment of high3 and rising rates (Chart 6).Portfolio Constituents SummaryThis section provides information about the latest holdings in the portfolio as of last rebalance (Jan 3, 2021). The current sector composition is shown in Chart 7 with changes since last rebalance shown in parentheses. New positions in the portfolio are shown in Table 3A, and closed positions are shown in Table 3B. Movement of securities in and out of the portfolio is driven primarily by the level of the factor model ranking (BCA Score) at the time of rebalance.Specifically, positions are closed when the BCA Score drops below 70% and the Composite Macro Score is below 75%. The closed positions are replaced with high-ranking securities from the pool of top 1000 US stocks by market capitalization. Rebalancing occurs on the first trading day of each month. The number of securities in the portfolio currently sits at 55, with 5 stocks occupying each of the 11 GICS Level 1 sectors.Footnotes1   Calculated for the latest portfolio intra-rebalance period (2021-12-01 to 2022-01-03) using dividend-adjusted end-of-day pricing.2   Contribution defined as fund or portfolio-weighted return during the given month.3  As determined by our moving average (MA) cross indicators. Rates are considered “high” if the 3-month MA is above the 3-year MA.