Equities

Highlights 2022 has had a rough start for equity investors: the S&P 500 is now down 8% from its peak, and NASDAQ is officially in correction territory.  The question on everyone’s mind is how long this correction will last, and whether it is the right time to start buying beaten-up Tech stocks. Looking “under the hood” of the NASDAQ, we observe that with the technology space being top-heavy and dominated by the likes of Microsoft and Apple, index returns mask the heavy losses of some of the smaller, and less profitable, constituents, with many down 40-50% from their peaks.  Analysis of the market breadth shows that three-quarters of NASDAQ names are trading below their one-week highs, which, according to our analysis, indicates that Tech is (almost) ripe for a bounce back. However, the sector is currently under duress from rising rates and imminent monetary tightening.  Historically, Tech’s worst performance was two to three months prior to the first rate hike – the current pullback is a “textbook” behavior.  It will take another couple of months after the rate hike for a sustainable rebound. In addition to headwinds from rising rates, there is also an ongoing slowdown in demand for tech products and services, which translates into a deceleration of earnings and sales growth. On the valuations front, Technology is trading with a significant premium to the market, while its expected earnings growth is on par with that of the S&P 500. We recommend investors to be patient: While Tech appears oversold, and recent volatility is a function of market panic, the stars have not yet aligned for the sector.  We are tactically bearish but structurally bullish. Feature 2022 has had a rough start for equity investors: Since the beginning of January, the S&P 500 has pulled back 8%.  Market consensus is that this violent rotation is a repricing of risk, triggered by the Fed’s new hawkish stance aimed at taming the runaway inflation that has surged to a nearly 40-year high. The market expects the first rate hike as soon as March, followed by three more into the year-end. It is also grappling with the timing and degree of quantitative tightening (QT), which will follow on the heels of tapering. Energy and Financials are the only sectors in the green so far this year, with Real Estate, Healthcare, and Tech being hit the hardest (Chart 1). Internet Retail is down almost 20% from its local peak in mid-2021 and Interactive Media, home of Facebook, is down 11%. NASDAQ is officially in correction territory (Chart 2). Rising rates have hit growth and interest-rate-sensitive areas of the market the hardest. While these negative returns indicate a sharp pullback, they don’t do justice to how painful this correction has been, as much of it was happening under the radar. The S&P 500 and many of its tech-related sectors and industries are top-heavy, being home to FAANG+M, which has proven to be more immune to rising rates.  It is the smaller growth companies that have fallen much more than the top-line number indicates, with many down 40-50% from their peaks. However, now with more than 58% of stocks in the NASDAQ trading below their 30-week moving average, the natural question is: “Are we there yet?” or how much longer will this sell-off last? There are early signs of bottom-fishing among the stocks and industries hit hardest. Yet most days, both the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ start in the green, only to finish splattering to a new low (Chart 3). Chart 3Mega-cap Tech Has Fallen But Less Than Small-cap Brethren In this report, we will aim to gauge when the sell-off in tech names will have run its course by focusing on the S&P 500 Technology sector.    Also in today’s publication, we will reverse our usual course of analysis: We will start from the technicals as they are most helpful for timing entry points, and we will follow with macro and fundamentals.   Tech Sector Is Top Heavy The S&P 500 Technology sector is top-heavy, with each industry group dominated by one of the tech giants, such as Microsoft in Software and Services, Apple in Hardware and Equipment, and Nvidia in Semiconductors. We call this trio “MAN.” The MAN accounts for 50% of the S&P 500 Technology sector market capitalization (Chart 4). As a result, both sector performance and valuation are heavily affected by index composition.  To unpack what is going on within the Tech sector, we plotted the dispersion of last month’s performance within the sector through a market cap bucket, with the first bucket containing the MANs. The last couple of buckets, 10 and 11, contain some of the smallest stocks in the index. Unsurprisingly, the largest stocks in the sector have not fallen that much. The correction has most affected stocks in buckets 7 through 11, with a market cap of between $8 to $33 billion, and these are the names that may be most tempting for “bottom-fishing.” Technicals It Is A Blood Bath Out There A useful indicator of market breadth, allowing us a look under the hood”, is the percentage of stocks making new lows – which currently stands at nearly 75% (Chart 5). This is a high reading which has happened only 11% of the months since 2000.  However, once this metric rises above 85%, it indicates that the market is oversold.  When that happens, the Tech sector outperforms the S&P 500 by around 7% over the next six months, and returns are positive every month (Chart 6).  Based on this indicator, the NASDAQ in general, and Tech in particular, are close to the oversold conditions and are ready for a bounce.  Chart 5Pullback In Tech Stocks Is Broad-based However, the BCA Technical Indicator for the sector (Chart 7) is still in neutral territory. It is driven primarily by momentum components: It gauges the trend in equities and determines if the market is at an extreme in terms of momentum or investor psychology.  This indicator is highly affected by the performance of the largest index constituents. All in all, we conclude that from a technical standpoint, the Tech sector is getting closer to a rebound. Chart 7The Technical Indicator Is In The Neutral Territory Macroeconomic Backdrop New Rate Hiking Cycle Will Take Time Getting Used To Ok, Tech is oversold. Yet there is still the not-so-small matter of a new, tighter monetary regime. How does Tech fare in the environment of rising rates? Clearly, not so good so far. However, the question is, how long will it take for the higher rates to be priced in, and for Tech to rebound. To answer this question, we have run another empirical study, anchoring the performance of the Tech sector to the beginning of each hiking cycle since 1996 (Charts 8 and 9).   According to our analysis, Tech’s worst performance is two to three months prior to the first rate hike – the current pullback in Tech is a perfect illustration. While we may expect a rebound rally “when the second shoe drops” and the Fed announces the first hike, it appears that a sustainable rally may still be a couple of months away. Based on this analysis, we conclude that it will pay off to be patient and wait until the summer. It Is The Economy, Stupid! Apart from the headwind from rising rates, there is also an ongoing slowdown in demand for Tech Business Investment (Chart 10). Moreover, the Tech New Orders Index peaked at a high level at the end of 2021 and has recently turned (Chart 11). So has Private Tech Investment (Chart 12).  This indicates that demand is waning following the surge that accompanied the most recent push to digital transformation—which was accelerated by the onset of the pandemic.   Chart 10Slowdown In Tech Business Investment Chart 11Tech New Orders Have Peaked Chart 12Private Tech Investment Is Also Slowing The macroeconomic backdrop is unfavorable for the Tech Sector Fundamentals Sales And Earnings Growth Are Slowing While the Tech sector enjoyed a fantastic sales recovery in 2021, with sales growth exceeding pre-pandemic levels, this year may be different. Waning demand for tech products and services translates into a sales growth slowdown (Chart 13).   Chart 13The Tech Sector Sales Growth Is Slowing... Chart 14... So Is Earnings Growth With sales growth slowing, earnings growth is bound to follow (Chart 14), which is no different from the broad market. Technology sector earnings growth for the next 12 months is converging with that of the S&P 500: 10% vs. 9% respectively (Chart 15). Margins are expected to compress in 2022, albeit from the high levels (Chart 16). Chart 15Tech And The S&P 500 Expected Earnings Growth Has Converged Chart 16Margins Are Expected To Compress Of course, the Q4-2021 earnings results could bring a respite.  So far blended the year-on-year earnings growth rate is 15.8%: However, only 5 companies out of 71 have reported, beating expectations by 4.6%.  Will these results save the day? Possibly – expectations are a low bar to clear.  Time will tell.  But to prop up the sector, results from the MAN have got to be stellar. Valuations: Better But Not Good Enough While Tech earnings are expected to grow in line with the S&P 500, the sector is trading with a 28% premium to the market at 27x vs. 21x forward PE (Table 1). Relative PE NTM currently stands at 1.7 standard deviations above the five-year average. Although this may seem high, the froth has come off as, only two months ago, Tech was trading at 2.4 standard deviations. This is a significant change, but the sector is not yet cheap enough for bargain hunting. Adjusting for the growth rate differential between Tech and the S&P 500, we divide PE NTM over EPS Growth NTM, to arrive at PEG: Even so, Tech is still more expensive trading at 2.7 for a percentage of future growth, compared to 2.3 for the S&P 500. However, Tech is a growth sector, and perhaps by looking at only one-year-ahead earnings growth, we are being myopic. Let’s take a look at longer-term growth expectations. Curiously, over the next five years, Tech earnings are expected to grow at about an 18% annualized rate, while the S&P 500 is expected to grow at 21% (Chart 17). As a result, the PE/Long-Term Earnings Growth Rate for Tech is 1.5 vs. 1.0 for the S&P 500. Table 1Tech Valuation Premium Is Still Too High Chart 17Long-term Earnings Growth Does Not Justify Valuation Premium Either Of course, we need to keep in mind that since this sector is so top-heavy, the forward PE of the MAN affects overall sector valuations. As you can see in the table below (Table 2), MAN is trading with a premium to the sector. However, within the sector, companies with sky-high valuations are easier to find among smaller constituents (Chart 18). Valuations are elevated, while fundamentals are deteriorating  Table 2The Largest Tech Companies Are Trading With A Premium To The Sector Investment Implications While it is tempting to add to Technology on the back of this pullback, we recommend caution. Tech is oversold and recent volatility is a function of market panic, yet the stars have not yet aligned for the sector. Historically, Tech has delivered negative returns several months prior to rate hikes and underperformed the broad market. Economic normalization also brings a slowdown in demand for tech goods and services, which translates into less exciting sales and earnings growth, and margin compression. Although some froth has come off, valuations for the sector remain elevated, and the premium over the S&P 500 is not justified. The scorecard summarizes each of these points, and it is clear that, on balance, the sector has quite a few challenges ahead (Table 3). Table 3Technology Sector Scorecard On a more optimistic note, this sell-off has been fast and furious, and the worst is most likely behind. We are underweight the Technology sector. Within the sector, we are underweight Semiconductors, and Hardware and Equipment. We are still overweight Software and Services for portfolio diversification purposes. The Software sector will be one of our next “deep dives.” Stay tuned. Are we there yet?  No, we still have a few months to go. Structural Positioning While we reiterate our tactical underweighting of the Tech sector, we are bullish on it over the longer investment horizon. This sector is at the heart of US technological innovation, such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, chip design that powers EV and AV, and many others.  The sector is home to some of the best American companies, which have powered US equities throughout the past decade, and will continue to do so for decades ahead. Bottom Line Despite a sell-off of NASDAQ and the Technology sector, we are not yet recommending increasing cyclical allocation to Tech: While technicals appear attractive, tighter monetary policy, the slowdown in demand for tech goods and services, pressures on profitability, and elevated valuations remain headwinds. We reiterate our underweight to the Technology sector on a tactical basis.  We are structurally bullish.    Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Allocation

  Dear Client, The subject of cryptocurrencies elicits more emotion that any topic I can think of. As is true for the broader investment community, there is no unanimity of opinion among BCA strategists on the matter. This week, our Global Asset Allocation team is publishing a report taking a favorable view on NFTs. My report is far less sanguine on NFTs and the broader crypto landscape. I hope you enjoy the spirited debate. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The price of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has become increasingly correlated with the direction of equities. Stocks should recover over the coming months as bond markets stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand thanks to a resurgent global economy. This could give cryptos a temporary lift. The long-term outlook for cryptocurrencies remains daunting, however. In most cases, anything that cryptocurrencies can do, the existing financial system can do better. Many of the most hyped blockchain applications, from DeFi to NFTs, will turn out to be duds. Concerns that cryptocurrencies are harming the environment, contributing to crime, and enriching a small group of early investors at the expense of everyone else will lead to increased regulatory scrutiny. Our long-term target for Bitcoin is $5,000. Investors looking to hedge their risks should consider going long Cardano, Solana, and Polkadot (three up-and-coming “proof of stake” coins) versus Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Doge (three doomed “proof of work” coins). The Cost Of Crypto Who pays for cryptocurrencies? That may seem like a simple question with a simple answer: The people who buy them! Yet, as economists have long known, purchases can produce externalities – costs or benefits that are borne by someone other than the person making the purchase. Some purchases can produce positive externalities, such as when you buy nice flowers to plant in front of your house. Other purchases produce negative externalities, such as when you buy a product that harms the environment. The negative externalities arising from Bitcoin mining are well known. A single Bitcoin transaction consumes 14 times as much energy as 100,000 Visa transactions (Chart 1). Bitcoin’s annual electricity consumption exceeds that of Pakistan and its 217 million inhabitants (Chart 2). The growth in crypto mining is one reason why electricity prices are so high in many countries.    Crime is another negative externality that cryptocurrencies facilitate. Bitcoin first entered the popular lexicon in 2013 when its price briefly eclipsed $1,000 due to rising demand for the currency as a medium of exchange on Silk Road and other parts of the so-called dark web. Fast forward to today and crime continues to be a major problem for the crypto industry. According to Chainalysis, illicit addresses received $14 billion in 2021, almost double 2020 levels (Chart 3). Scamming revenue grew 82% while cryptocurrency theft rose 516%.   Don’t Feed The Whales There is another cost arising from cryptocurrencies that is rarely mentioned – a cost borne by people who have never bought cryptocurrencies and probably assume they are immune from the vagaries of crypto markets: The holders of regular fiat money. Early investors in today’s most popular cryptocurrencies are sitting on huge profits. A recent study found that 1% of Bitcoin holders control 27% of supply. Ownership is even more concentrated for most other cryptocurrencies (Chart 4). If these whales were to sell their coins, they could purchase billions of dollars of goods and services. But since there is no indication yet that the proliferation of cryptocurrencies has expanded the aggregate supply of goods and services, their purchasing power must come at someone else’s expense.1  Still Waiting Cryptocurrency proponents would counter that blockchain technologies will usher in a golden age of innovation. Based on this perspective, Bitcoin is a lot like Amazon, a company that created immense wealth for Jeff Bezos and other early shareholders, but has reshaped the global economy in a way that arguably left most people, including those who never bought Amazon stock, better off. The problem with this argument is that Bitcoin is nothing like Amazon. Chainalysis estimates that online merchants processed less than $3 billion in cryptocurrency transactions in 2020, a number that has barely grown over time (Chart 5). While updated numbers for 2021 will be released in February, our analysis of data from Coinmap suggests that the number of merchants accepting cryptocurrency increased less last year than in either 2017 or 2018 (Chart 6). This is consistent with anecdotal evidence which suggests that the vast majority of cryptocurrency transactions continue to be motivated by investment flows rather than e-commerce. A Feature Not A Bug “Just wait and see,” crypto evangelists say. “Sure, Bitcoin has been around since 2008, but new applications are just around the corner.” There are good reasons to be skeptical of such pronouncements. The Bitcoin network can barely process five transactions per second, compared to over 20,000 for the Visa network (Chart 7). The fee for a Bitcoin transaction can fluctuate significantly, and is typically much greater than for a debit card (Chart 8). Chart 7We Apologize For The Wait Chart 8It Costs A Lot To Fill Up The Crypto Tank Bitcoin’s sluggishness is inherent to how it was designed. Due to their decentralized nature, blockchains must rely on elaborate procedures to prevent bad actors from taking control. Bitcoin and other popular cryptocurrencies such as Doge use the so-called “proof of work” algorithm. To see how this algorithm works in simple terms, think of spam email. One way of eliminating spam is to require everyone to waste $10 in electricity to send a single email. That is effectively how Bitcoin functions. It is secure, but it is also very clunky. An alternative to “proof of work” is “proof of stake.” Smaller cryptocurrencies such as Cardano and Solana use this algorithm, and Ethereum is in the process of migrating to it. Continuing with the spam analogy, imagine requiring everyone to put $10 down before they send an email. If the email is opened, the $10 is returned. If the email is deleted, the $10 is forfeited. A Solution In Search Of A Problem Proof of stake systems are arguably superior to proof of work systems since the former do not require wasteful energy consumption. But are they superior to the current financial system? That is far from clear. Listening to crypto enthusiasts, one would think that everyone is still using paper money, or perhaps shells or cattle, to make transactions. In fact, the global financial system is already nearly 100% digital. Digital transfer systems such as Zelle in the US and Interac in Canada permit instantaneous transfers at very little cost. Granted, cross-border payments are far from seamless. However, this largely reflects anti-money laundering rules and other regulations that banks must follow rather than some inherent technological limitations with, say, the SWIFT system. The DeFi Delusion Decentralized Finance, or DeFi, has become a hot topic of late. Like most things involving cryptocurrencies, there is more hype than substance. The idea that there will ever be large-scale crypto-denominated lending is wishful thinking. To see why, put yourself in the position of someone contemplating lending 25 bitcoins to a borrower who is interested in buying a house for, say, $1,000,000. On the one hand, if the price of bitcoin drops, you will likely be repaid, but in depreciated coins. On the other hand, if the price of bitcoin rises, you might not be repaid at all since the value of the loan will exceed the value of the house. Any way you cut it, there is no incentive to make the loan. There are other potential DeFi applications, such as those involving smart contracts, that could potentially prove useful. The Ethereum blockchain, where many of these contracts reside, is secured by ether (ETH). The market cap of ETH is currently $370 billion. How much ether is held for investment purposes and how much is held by people looking to make transactions on the Ethereum blockchain? It is impossible to be sure, but it would not surprise us if investment demand accounts for well over 90% of ETH holdings. It would be as if the price of oil rose to $1,000 per barrel, with 90% of that value driven by investment demand. Most people would agree that this would not be a sustainable situation. NFTs: Why So Ugly? Chart 9NFTs Have Taken Off The popularity of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has soared over the past year. During the past four weeks, more than $250 million of NFTs were traded on average every day, up from almost nothing at the beginning of 2021 (Chart 9). NFTs allow artists to transform their work into verifiable assets that can be listed and sold on the blockchain. Or at least that is the claim. When they were first introduced, the expectation was that the most desirable NFTs would turn out to be unique and beautiful. Instead, as the CryptoPunks collection aptly demonstrates, many turned out to be repetitive and ugly. Why? One plausible answer is that many NFT buyers are not really looking to acquire digital art. Instead, they are looking to buy supercharged proxies for the cryptocurrency in which the NFT is denominated. As evidence, consider that 99% of the discussions in NFT forums are about how much money NFT buyers hope to make rather than about the “art” itself. Shadow Crypto Supply If this interpretation is correct, it undermines one of the main selling points of cryptocurrencies: That they are limited in supply. Just like banks can create money out of thin air whenever they make loans, the blockchain can spawn synthetic assets such as NFTs that increase the effective supply of the underlying cryptocurrency.2 And that is just for a single cryptocurrency. There is nothing that obliges someone to list a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain as opposed to any other blockchain. Indeed, there is no limit to the number of blockchains, and by extension, the number of cryptocurrencies that can be created. Chart 10 shows that there are currently more than 9,000 cryptocurrencies in circulation, up from 1,000 in 2017 and less than 100 in 2013. At least with gold, they are not adding any new elements to the periodic table. The Paradox Of Low Gas Fees Competition among blockchains will favor those that offer the lowest “gas fees,” that is, those that require only a small amount of cryptocurrency to update their ledgers. As users abandon blockchains with high gas fees, the prices of their cryptocurrencies will fall. The cryptocurrencies of the more efficient blockchains will benefit, but probably not as much as one might assume. Just as the demand for petrol would decline if automobiles became much more fuel efficient but miles driven did not rise much, falling gas fees could reduce demand for cryptocurrencies unless activity on their blockchains increased proportionately more than the decline in prices. Crypto prices may fall dramatically if governments offer blockchain networks as a public good. The rollout of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) could pave the way for this development. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment And Long-Term Outlook For Cryptos The price of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has become increasingly correlated with the direction of equities (Chart 11). As we noted in our first report of the new year, average returns for the S&P 500 in January have been negative since 2000. This year has been especially trying given the rapid ascent in bond yields. Our end-2022 target for the US 10-year Treasury yield is 2.25%. Hence, while we expect yields to rise over the remainder of the year, the process should be a lot more gradual than over the past few weeks. Equities often experience a period of indigestion when yields rise sharply. However, as we stressed last week, stocks typically rebound as long as yields do not end up rising to prohibitive levels. The bull-bear spread in this week’s AAII poll fell back to its pandemic lows, a positive contrarian indicator for stocks (Chart 12). With global growth still firmly above trend, corporate earnings should rise by enough to propel stocks into positive territory for the year. A rebound in stock prices, in turn, could give cryptocurrencies a temporary lift. Chart 11Cryptocurrency Prices Have Become Increasingly Correlated With Stocks Chart 12The Bull-Bear Ratio Is Back To Its Pandemic Lows   Nevertheless, the long-term outlook for cryptocurrencies remains daunting. In most cases, anything that cryptocurrencies can do, the existing financial system can do better. Many of the most hyped blockchain applications, from DeFi to NFTs, will turn out to be duds. Meanwhile, concerns that cryptocurrencies are harming the environment, contributing to crime, and enriching a small group of early investors at the expense of everyone else will lead to increased regulatory scrutiny. Chart 13New Money Versus Old Money The prices of the most popular cryptocurrencies do not reflect this eventuality. Even after falling 32% from its highs, the aggregate market capitalization of cryptocurrencies is still only slightly less than the value of the entire stock of US dollars in circulation (Chart 13). Our long-term target for Bitcoin is $5,000. Investors looking to hedge their risks should consider going long Cardano, Solana, and Polkadot (three up-and-coming “proof of stake” coins) versus Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Doge (three doomed “proof of work” coins).   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     One way that holders of fiat money could suffer is if the presence of cryptocurrencies reduced the demand for dollars, euros, and other central bank issued currencies. If that were to happen, inflation would rise as people sought to dispose of unwanted fiat currency by buying goods and services. Alternatively, if central banks wanted to constrain inflation, they would have to shrink the money supply by selling income-generating assets. Either way, the public would be worse off. 2     For instance, consider Alice and Bob. Both wish to have a certain amount of exposure to ETH in their investment portfolios. Suppose Bob uses some of his ETH to buy an item from the “Dopey Duck” collection that Alice has just  minted. If Bob regards his NFT as a substitute for the ETH he previously held, he will not want to buy more ETH to replace the ETH he lost. In contrast, Alice will end up with more ETH than she previously owned, and hence, will need to sell some of it. All things equal, this will lead to a lower price for ETH. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Our top five “black swan” risks for 2022: Social unrest in China; Russian invasion of all of Ukraine; unilateral Israeli strikes on Iran; a cyber attack that goes kinetic; and a failure of OPEC 2.0. Too early to buy the dip on Russian assets: President Biden says Putin will probably “move in” and re-invade Ukraine, Russian embassy staff have been evacuating Ukraine, the US and UK have been providing more arms to Ukraine, and the US is warning of a semiconductor embargo against Russia. Talks resume in Geneva on Friday. Tactically investors should take some risk off the table, especially if linked to Russia and Europe.  Stay short the Russian ruble and EM Europe; stay short the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar; stay long cyber security stocks; and be prepared for oil volatility. Convert tactical long equity trades to relative trades: long large caps versus small caps, long defensives versus cyclicals, and long Japanese industrials versus German industrials. Feature Chart 1Recession Probability And Yield Curve The 2/10-year yield curve is flattening and now stands at 79 bps, while the implied probability of a recession over the next 12 months troughed at 5.9% in April 2021, and as of December 2021 stood at 7.7% (Chart 1). Apparently stagflation and recession are too high of a probability to constitute a “black swan” risk for this year. Black swans are not only high impact but also low probability. In this year’s annual “Five Black Swan” report, the last of our 2022 outlook series, we concentrate on impactful but unlikely events. These black swans emerge directly from the existing themes and trends in our research – they are not plucked at random. The key regions are highlighted in Map 1. Black Swan #1: Major Social Unrest Erupts In China China’s financial problems are front and center risks for investors this year. They qualify as a “Gray Rhino” rather than “Black Swan” risk.1 It is entirely probable that China’s financial and property sector distress will negatively impact Chinese and global financial markets in 2022. What investors are not expecting is an eruption of social unrest in China that fouls up the twentieth national party congress this fall and calls into question the Communist Party’s official narrative that it is handling the pandemic and the underlying economic transition smoothly. Social unrest is a major risk around the world in the face of the new bout of inflation. Most of the democracies have already changed governments since the pandemic began, recapitalizing their political systems, but major emerging markets – Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil – have not done so. They have seen steep losses of popular support for both political leaders and ruling parties. There is little opinion polling from China and people who are surveyed cannot speak openly. It is possible that the government’s support has risen given its minimization of deaths from the pandemic. But it is also possible that it has not. Beijing’s policies over the past few years have had a negative impact on the country’s business elite and foreign relations. There are disgruntled factions within China, though the current administration has a tight grip over the main organs of power. Since President Xi is trying to clinch his personal rule this fall, sending China down a path of autocracy that proved disastrous under Chairman Mao Zedong, it is possible he will face surprise resistance. China’s economic growth is decelerating, clocking in at a 4.0% quarter-on-quarter growth rate at the end of last year. While authorities are easing policy to secure the recovery, there is a danger of insufficient support. Private sentiment will remain gloomy, as reflected by weak money velocity and a low propensity to spend among both businesses and households (Chart 2). The government will continue to be repressive in the lead up to the political reshuffle. At least for the first half of the year the economy will remain troubled. Structurally China is ripe for social unrest. It suffers from high income inequality and low social mobility, comparable to the US and Brazil, which are both struggling with political upheaval (Chart 3). Chart 2China's Private Sector Still Depressed​​​​​ ​​​​​​ In addition China is keeping a stranglehold over Covid-19. This “Zero Covid” policy minimizes deaths but suppresses economic activity. Strict policy has also left the population with a very low level of natural immunity and the new Omicron variant is even more contagious than other variants. Hence the regime is highly likely to double down to prevent an explosive outbreak. The service side of the economy will continue to suffer if strict lockdowns are maintained, exacerbating household and business financial difficulties (Chart 4). Yet in other countries around the world, government decisions to return to lockdowns have sparked unrest. Chart 4Zero Covid Policy: Not Sustainable Beyond 2022 China’s “Misery Index” (unemployment plus inflation) is rising sharply. While misery is ostensibly lower than that of other emerging markets, China’s unemployment data is widely known to be unreliable. If we take a worst-case scenario, looking at youth unemployment and fuel prices, misery is a lot higher (Chart 5). The youth, who are having the hardest time finding jobs, are also the most likely to protest if conditions become intolerable (Chart 6). Of course, if social unrest is limited to students, it will lack support among the wider populace. But it is inflation, not youth activism, that is the reason for China’s authorities to be concerned, as inflation is a generalized problem that affects workers as well as students. Chart 5China's Misery Index Is Higher Than It Looks​​​​​ Chart 6China's Troubled Youth Why would protesters stick their necks out knowing that the Communist Party will react ferociously to any sign of instability during President Xi Jinping’s political reshuffle? True, mainland Chinese do not have the propensity to political activism that flared up in protests in Hong Kong in recent years. Also the police state will move rapidly to repress any unrest. Yet the entire focus of Xi Jinping’s administration, since 2012, has been the restoration of political legitimacy and prevention of popular discontent. Xi has cracked down on corruption, pollution, housing prices, education prices, and has announced his “Common Prosperity” agenda to placate the low and middle classes.2 The regime has also cracked down on the media, social media, civil society, and ideological dissent to prevent political opposition from taking root. If the government were not concerned about social instability, it would not have been adopting these policies. Disease, often accompanied by famines or riots, has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties, so Beijing will not be taking risks for granted (Table 1). Table 1Disease And Downfall Of Chinese Dynasties Social instability would have a major impact as it would affect China’s stability and global investor sentiment toward China. Western democracies would penalize China for violations of human rights, leaving China even more isolated. Bottom Line: Investors should stay short the renminbi and neutral Chinese equities. Foreign investors should steer clear of Chinese bonds in the event of US sanctions. After the party congress this fall there will be an opportunity to reassess whether Xi Jinping will “let a hundred flowers bloom,” thus improving the internal and external political and investment environment, but this is not at all clear today. Black Swan #2: Russia Invades All (Not Just Part) Of Ukraine US-Russia relations are on the verge of total collapse and Russian equities have sold off, in line with our bearish recommendations in reports over the past two years. Russia’s threat of re-invading Ukraine is credible. Western nations are still wishy-washy about the counter-threat of economic sanctions, judging by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s latest comments, and none are claiming they will go to war to defend Ukraine.3 Russia is looking to remove the threat of Ukraine integrating militarily and economically with the West. The US and UK are providing Ukraine with defense weaponry even as Russia specifically demands that they cease to do so. President Putin may choose short-term economic pain for long-term security gain. The consensus view is that if Russia does invade, it will undertake a limited invasion. But what if Russia invades all of Ukraine? To be clear, a full invasion is unlikely because it would be far more difficult and costly for Russia. It would go against Putin’s strategy of calculated risk and limited conflict. Table 2 compares Russia and Ukraine in size and strength, alongside a comparison of the US and Iraq in 2002. This is not a bad comparison given that Ukraine’s and Iraq’s land area and active military personnel are comparable. Table 2Russia-Ukraine Balance Of Power 2022 Compared To US-Iraq 2002 Russia would be biting off a much bigger challenge than the US did. Ukraine’s prime age population is 2.5 times larger than Iraq’s in 2002, and its military expenditure is three times bigger. The US GDP and military spending were 150 and 250 times bigger than Iraq’s, while Russia’s GDP and military spending are about ten times bigger than Ukraine’s today. Iraq was not vital to American national security, whereas Ukraine is vital to Russia; Russia has more at stake and is willing to take greater risks. But Ukraine is in better shape to resist Russian occupation than Iraq was to resist American. The point is that the US invasion went smoothly at first, then got bogged down in insurgency, and ultimately backfired both in political and geopolitical terms. Russia would be undertaking a massive expense of blood and treasure that seems out of proportion with its goal, which is to neutralize Ukraine’s potential to become a western defense ally and host of “military infrastructure.” However, there are drawbacks to partial invasion. The remainder of the Ukrainian state would be unified and mobilized, capable of integrating with the western world, and willing to support a permanent insurgency against Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Russia has forces in Belarus, Crimea, and the Black Sea, as well as on Ukraine’s eastern border, giving rise to fears that Russia could attempt a three-pronged invasion of the whole country. In short, it is conceivable that Russian leaders could make the Soviet mistake of overreaching in the military aims, or that a war in eastern Ukraine could inadvertently expand into the west. If Russia tries to conquer all of Ukraine, the global impact will be massive. A war of this size on the European continent for the first time since World War II would shake governments and populations to their bones. The borders with Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland and the Black Sea area would become militarized (Map 2). NATO actions to secure its members and fortify their borders would exacerbate tensions with Russia and fan fears of a wider war. Trade flows would become subject to commerce destruction, affecting even neutral nations, including in the Black Sea. Energy supplies would tighten further, sending Russia and probably Europe into recession. The disruption to business and travel across eastern Europe would be deep and lasting, not only due to sanctions but also due to a deep risk-aversion that would affect foreign investors in the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact. Germany would be forced to quit sitting on the fence, as it would be pressured by the US and the rest of Europe to stand shoulder to shoulder in the face of such aggression. Finland and Sweden would be much more likely to join NATO, exacerbating Russia’s security fears. Russia would suffer a drastic loss of trade, resulting in recession, and its currency collapse would feed inflation (Chart 7). Chart 7Inflation Poses Long-Term Threat To Putin Regime Ultimately the consequences would be negative for the Putin regime and Russia as a result of recession and international isolation. But in the short run the Russian people would rally around the flag and support a war designed to prevent NATO from stationing missiles on their doorstep. And their isolation would not be total, as they would strengthen ties with China and conduct trade via proxy states in the former Soviet Union. Bottom Line: A full-scale invasion of all of Ukraine is highly unlikely because it would be so costly for Russia in military, economic, and political terms. But the probability is not zero, especially because a partial re-invasion could lead to a larger war. While global investors would react in a moderate risk-off matter to a limited war in eastern Ukraine, a full-scale war would trigger a massive global flight to safety as it would call into question the entire post-WWII peace regime in Europe. Black Swan #3: Israel Attacks Iran The “bull market in Iran tensions” continues as there is not yet a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal that the US abrogated. Our 2022 forecast that the UAE would get caught in the crossfire was confirmed on January 17 when Iran-backed Houthi rebels expanded their range of operations and struck Abu Dhabi (Map 3). The secret war is escalating and US-led diplomacy is faltering. Iran is not going to give up its nuclear program. North Korea achieved nuclear arms and greater military security and is now developing first and second strike capabilities. Meanwhile Ukraine, which faces another Russian invasion, exemplifies what happens to regimes that give up nuclear arms (as do Libya and Iraq). Iran appears to be choosing the North Korean route. While we cannot rule out a minor agreement between President Biden and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, we can rule out a substantial deal that halts Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Here’s why: Any day now Iran could reach nuclear “breakout capacity,” with enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Table 3).4 Table 3Iran’s Violations Of 2015 Nuclear Deal Since US Exit Within Iran’s government, the foreign policy doves have been humiliated and kicked out of office while the hawks are fully in control. No meaningful agreement can be reached before 2024 because of the risk that the US will change ruling parties again and renege on any promises. Iran is highly incentivized to make rapid progress on its nuclear program now. The US will not be able to lead the P5+1 coalition to force Iran to halt its program because of its ongoing struggles with Russia and China. China is striking long-term cooperation deals with Iran. Israel has a well-established record of taking unilateral action, specifically against regional nuclear programs, known as the “Begin Doctrine.”5 Israel’s threats are credible on this front, although Iran is a much greater operational challenge than Iraq or Syria. Iran’s timeline from nuclear breakout to deliverable nuclear weapon is 12-24 months.6 Iran’s missile program is advanced. Missile programs cannot be monitored as easily as nuclear activity, so foreign powers base the threshold on nuclear capability rather than missile capability. Iran had a strong incentive to move slowly on its nuclear and missile programs in earlier years, to prevent US and Israeli military interference. But as it approaches breakout capacity it has an incentive to accelerate its tempo to a mad dash to achieve nuclear weaponization before the US or Israel can stop it. Now that time may have come. The Biden administration is afraid of higher oil prices and Israeli domestic politics are more divided and risk-averse than before. And yet Iran’s window might close in 2025, as the US could turn aggressive again depending on the outcome of the 2024 election. Hence Iran has an incentive to make its dash now. The US and Israel will restate their red lines against Iranian nuclear weaponization and brandish their military options this year. But the Biden administration will be risk-averse since it does not want to instigate an oil shock in an election year. Israel is more likely than the US to react quickly and forcefully since it is in greatest danger if Iran surprises the world with rapid weaponization. Here are the known constraints on unilateral Israeli military action: Limited Israeli military capability: Israel would have to commit a large number of aircraft, leaving its home front exposed, and even with US “bunker buster” bombs it may not penetrate the underground Fordow nuclear facility.7 Limited Israeli domestic support: The Israeli public is divided on whether to attack Iran. The post-Netanyahu government recently came around to endorsing the US’s attempt to renegotiate the nuclear deal. Limited US support: Washington opposes Israeli unilateralism that could entangle the US into a war. Israel cannot afford to alienate the US, which is its primary security guarantor. Iranian instability: The Iranian regime is under economic distress due to “maximum pressure” sanctions. It is vulnerable to social unrest, not least because of its large youth population. These constraints have been vitiated in various ways, which is why we raise this Israeli unilateralism as a black swan risk: Where there’s a will, there’s a way: If Israel believes its existence will be threatened, it will be willing to take much greater operational risks. It has already shown some ability to set back Iran's centrifuge program beyond the expected.8 Israeli opinion will harden if Iran breaks out: If Iran reaches nuclear breakout or tests a nuclear device, Israeli opinion will harden in favor of military strikes. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has an incentive to take hawkish actions before he hands the reins of government over to a partner in his ruling coalition as part of a power-sharing agreement. The ruling coalition is so weak that a collapse cannot be ruled out. US opposition could weaken: Biden will have to explore military options if talks fail and Iran reaches nuclear breakout capacity. Once the midterms are over, Israel may have even more freedom to act, while a gridlocked Biden may be looking to shift his focus to foreign policy. Iranian stability: Iran’s social instability has not resulted in massive unrest or regime fracture despite years of western sanctions and a global recession/pandemic. Yet now energy prices are rising and Iran has less reason to believe sanction regimes will be watertight. From Israeli’s point of view, even regime change in Iran would not remove the nuclear threat once nuclear weapons are obtained. Finally, while Israel cannot guarantee that military strikes would successfully cripple Iran’s nuclear program and prevent weaponization, Israel cannot afford not to try. It would be a worse outcome to stand idly by while Iran gets a nuclear weapon than to attack and fail to set that program back. Hence the likeliest outcome over the long run is that Iran pursues a nuclear weapon and Israel attacks to try to stop it, even if that attack is likely to fail (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Game Theory: Will Israel Attack Iran? Bottom Line: A unilateral Israeli strike is unlikely but would have a massive impact, as 21% of global oil and 26% of natural gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and conflict could disrupt regional energy production and/or block passage through the strait itself. Black Swan #4: Cyber Attacks Spill Into Real World Investors are very aware of cyber security risks – it holds a respectable though not commanding position in the ranks of likely crisis events (Table 4). Our concern is that a cyber attack could spill over into the real world, impairing critical infrastructure, supply chains, and/or prompting military retaliation. Table 4Cyber Events Underrated In Consensus View Of Global Risks Russian attacks on US critical infrastructure by means of ransomware gangs disrupted a US fuel pipeline, meat-packing plant, and other critical infrastructure in 2021. Since then the two countries have engaged in negotiations over cyber security. The Russian Federal Security Bureau has cracked down on one of the most prominent gangs, REvil, in a sign that the US and Russia are still negotiating despite the showdown over Ukraine.9 Yet a re-invasion of Ukraine would shatter any hope of cooperation in the cyber realm or elsewhere. Russia is already using cyberattacks against Ukraine and these activities could expand to Ukraine’s partners if the military conflict expands. Should the US and EU impose sweeping sanctions that damage Russia’s economy, Russia could retaliate, not only by tightening energy supply but also by cyber attacks. Any NATO partners or allies would be vulnerable, though some states will be more reactive than others. Interference in the French election, for example, would be incendiary. The key question is: if Russia strikes NATO states with damaging cyber attacks, at what point would it trigger Article V, the mutual defense clause? There are no established codes of conduct or red lines in cyber space, so the world will have to learn each nation’s limits via confrontation and retaliation. Similar cyber risks could emerge from other conflicts. China is probably not ready to invade Taiwan but it has an interest in imposing economic costs on the island ahead of this fall’s midterm elections. Taiwan’s critical role in the semiconductor supply chain means that disruptions to production would have a global impact. Israel and the US have already used cyber capabilities to attack Iran and set back its nuclear program. These capabilities will be necessary as Iran approaches breakout capacity. Yet Iran could retaliate in a way that disrupts oil supplies. North Korea began a new cycle of provocations last September, accelerated missile tests over the past four months, and is dissatisfied with the unfinished diplomatic business of the Trump administration. In the wake of the last global crisis, 2010, it staged multiple military attacks against South Korea. South Korea may be vulnerable due to its presidential elections in May. The semiconductor or electronics supply chain could be interrupted here as well as in Taiwan. Bottom Line: There is no code of conduct in cyber space. As geopolitical tensions rise, and nations test the limits of their cyber capabilities, there is potential for critical infrastructure to be impaired. This could exacerbate supply chain kinks or provoke kinetic responses from victim nations. Black Swan #5: OPEC 2.0 Falls Apart The basis of the OPEC 2.0 cartel is Russian cooperation with Saudi Arabia to control oil supply and manage the forward price curve. Backwardation, when short-term prices are higher than long-term, is ideal for these countries since they fear that long-term prices will fall. In a world where Moscow and Riyadh both face competition from US shale producers as well as the green energy revolution, cooperation makes sense. Yet the two sides do not trust each other. Cooperation broke down both in 2014 and 2020, sending oil prices plunging. Falling global demand ignited a scramble for market share. Interestingly, Russian military invasions have signaled peak oil price in 1979, 2008, and 2014. Russia, like other petro-states, has greater room for maneuver when oil revenues are pouring in. But high prices also incentivize production, disincentivize cartel discipline, and trigger reductions in global demand (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Invasions And Oil Price Crashes Broadly speaking, Saudi oil production rose modestly during times of Russian military adventures, while overall OPEC production was flat or down, and Russian/Soviet production went up (Chart 9). Chart 9Saudi And OPEC Oil Production During Russian Military Adventures Since 2020, we have held that OPEC 2.0 would continue operating but that the biggest risk would come in the form of a renewed US-Iran nuclear deal that freed up Iranian oil exports. In 2014, the Saudis increased production in the face of the US shale threat as well as the Iranian threat. This scenario is still possible in 2022 but it has become a low-probability outcome. Even aside from the Iran dynamic, there is some probability that Russo-Saudi cooperation breaks down as global growth decelerates and new oil supply comes online. Bottom Line: The world’s inflation expectations are elevated and closely linked to oil prices. Yet oil prices hinge on an uneasy political agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia that has fallen apart twice before. If Russia invades Ukraine, or if US withdraws sanctions on Iran, for example, then Saudi Arabia could make a bid to expand its market share and trigger price declines in the process. Two Bonus Black Swans: Turkey And Venezuela Turkey lashes out: Our Turkish Political Capital Index shows deterioration for President Recep Erdogan’s political capital across a range of variables (Table 5). With geopolitical pressures increasing, and domestic politics heating up ahead of the 2023 elections, Erdogan’s behavior will become even more erratic. His foreign policy could become aggressive, keeping the lira under pressure and/or weighing on European assets. Table 5Turkey: Erdogan’s Political Capital Wearing Thin Venezuela’s Maduro falls from power: Venezuelan regime changes often follow from military coups. These coups do not only happen when oil prices collapse – sometimes the army officers wait to be sure prices have recovered. Coup-throwers want strong oil revenues to support their new rule. An unexpected change of regimes would affect the oil market due to this country’s giant reserves. Bottom Line: Turkey’s political instability could result in foreign aggression, while Venezuela’s regime could collapse despite the oil price recovery. Investment Takeaways We are booking profits on our tactical long trades on large caps and defensive sectors. We will convert these to relative trades: long large caps over small caps, and long defensives over cyclicals. We also recommend converting our tactical long Japan trade into long Japanese industrials / short German industrials equities. If US-Russia diplomacy averts a war we will reconsider.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      “Gray Rhino” is a term coined by author Michele Wucker to describe large and probable risks that people neglect or avoid. For more, see thegrayrhino.com. 2     Xi Jinping recently characterized the “common prosperity” agenda as follows: “China has made it clear that we strive for more visible and substantive progress in the well-rounded development of individuals and the common prosperity of the entire population. We are working hard on all fronts to deliver this goal. The common prosperity we desire is not egalitarianism. To use an analogy, we will first make the pie bigger, and then divide it properly through reasonable institutional arrangements. As a rising tide lifts all boats, everyone will get a fair share from development, and development gains will benefit all our people in a more substantial and equitable way.” See World Economic Forum, “President Xi Jinping’s message to The Davos Agenda in full,” January 17, 2022, weforum.org. 3     Chancellor Scholz, when asked whether Germany would avoid using the Nord Stream II pipeline if Russia re-invaded Ukraine, said, "it is clear that there will be a high cost and that all this will have to be discussed if there is a military intervention against Ukraine.” He was speaking with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. See Hans Von Der Burchard, “Scholz: Germany will discuss Nord Stream 2 penalties if Russia attacks Ukraine,” Politico, January 18, 2022, politico.eu. 4     For the Begin Doctrine, see Meir Y. Soloveichik, “The Miracle of Osirak,” Commentary, April 2021, commentary.org. 5     The estimate of 12-24 months to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile has been cited by various credible sources, including David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “Highlights of Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 24, 2021, isis-online.org, and Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller, “A Redline for Iran?” Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 6     See Edieal J. Pinker, Joseph Szmerekovsky, and Vera Tilson, “Technical Note – Managing a Secret Project,” Operations Research, February 5, 2013, pubsonline.informs.org, as well as “What Can Game Theory Tell Us About Iran’s Nuclear Intentions?” Yale Insights, March 17, 2015, insights.som.yale.edu.  7     See Josef Joffe, “Increasingly Isolated, Israel Must Rely On Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategika 35 (September 2016), Hoover Institution, hoover.org. 8     The sabotage of the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center at the Natanz nuclear facility in July 2020 “set back Iran’s centrifuge program significantly and continues to do so,” according to David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and John Hannah, “Iran’s Natanz Tunnel Complex: Deeper, Larger Than Expected,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 13, 2022, isis-online.org. For a recent positive case regarding Israel’s capabilities, see Mitchell Bard, “Military Options Against Iran,” Jewish Virtual Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, January 2022, jewishvirtuallibrary.org.  9     For the FSB and REvil, see Chris Galford, “Russian FSB arrests members of REvil ransomware gang following attacks on U.S. infrastructure,” Homeland Preparedness News, January 18, 2022, homelandprepnews.com. For the Colonial Pipeline and JBS attacks, and other ransomware attacks, see Jonathan W. Welburn and Quentin E. Hodgson, “How the United States Can Deter Ransomware Attacks,” RAND Blog, August 9, 2021, rand.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights On US inflation and the Fed: If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2% (from its current level above 4%). Yet, share prices will sell off before inflation converges toward the Fed’s target. On US TIPS yields: Rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US, support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. On China: Despite stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. Besides, a bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. On financial market divergences: Major selloffs evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. Hence, the nature of current market dynamics is more consistent with a major selloff than a short-term correction. On regional allocation within a global equity portfolio: Overweight the euro area and Japan, underweight the US and EM. Feature Ms. Mea is a long-time BCA client and an avid follower of the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) service. Since 2017, I have been meeting with her twice a year to exchange thoughts on the global macro environment, to discuss the nuances of our views and to elaborate on investment strategy. We always publish our conversations for the benefit of all EMS clients. This virtual meeting took place earlier this week. Chart 1A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields Ms. Mea: It has been two years since we last met in person. I did not imagine that world travel would stay so depressed for so long when the pandemic began two years ago. I have also been surprised by the recent behavior of financial markets. There have been divergences that I cannot reconcile, such as the woes in China’s real estate sector and resilient commodity prices, the diverging performance of the S&P 500, US small caps and a significant portion of NASDAQ-listed stocks. I will ask you about these later. But let’s start with your main macro themes. Since early last year, you have been advocating two macro themes: (1) China’s slowdown; and (2) rising and non-transitory US inflation. They were controversial a year ago but have now become widely accepted in the investment community. Financial markets have moved a great deal to reflect these macro themes. Don’t you think financial markets have already fully priced in these macro trends? Answer: You are right that these narratives have become well known and financial markets have been moving to price in these developments. However, our bias is that these themes are not yet fully priced in and these macro forces will continue to impact financial markets over the near term. Let’s first discuss US inflation and interest rate moves. Chart 1 illustrates that US government bond yields have broken above major resistance levels. Such a breakout technically entails higher yields. Odds are that US long-term bond yields will move up by another 50 basis points in the months ahead before they pause or reverse. The fundamental justification for higher US bond yields is as follows: The inflation genie is out of the bottle in the US. If the Fed adheres to its inflation mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2%. In December, trimmed-mean CPI and median CPI printed 4.8% and 3.8% respectively, well above the Fed’s preferred range of 2-2.25% for core inflation (Chart 2). Critically, these inflation measures are not impacted by volatile components. These measures strip out outliers like used and new car prices, auto parts, as well as energy and food. The core CPI and PCE inflation measures will drop this year but super core inflation will remain north of 3%, well above the Fed’s preferred range. Importantly, a wage inflation spiral is already underway in the US. Employees have experienced substantial negative wage growth in real terms in the past 12 months. Labor shortages are prevalent, and the employee quit rate is very high. Employees are demanding very high wage growth and employers will have little choice but to meet these demands (Chart 3). Chart 2US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad-Based Inflationary Pressures Chart 3US Wages Will Be Accelerating Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison As a result, the only way to bring down core inflation toward its preferred target range is for the Fed to slow the economy down and curb employment and wage gains. Yet before core inflation converges to the Fed’s target, risk assets will sell off first. Practically, the Fed will talk hawkish and hike until something breaks. The breaking point will be a major selloff in US share prices. US equities have been priced to perfection on the assumption that US interest rates will remain low for many years. As interest rate expectations rise further, US equity multiples are under pressure (Chart 4). Ms. Mea: The recent rise in US bond yields has been largely driven by the real component (TIPS yields), not inflation breakevens. That would usually imply improving US growth prospects. Yet US stocks have corrected as TIPS yields rose. How do you explain this and what should investors expect going forward? Answer: Indeed, the latest rise in US bonds yields is primarily driven by increasing TIPS yields, not inflation breakevens (Chart 5) TIPS yields have not been driven by economic growth expectations in the past couple of years. TIPS yields are breaking out and more upside is likely for reasons unrelated to US economic growth: The Fed’s rhetoric and guidance. TIPS yields typically move with 5-year/5-year forward yields, i.e., expectations for US interest rates in the long run (Chart 6). One of reasons why forward interest rates and TIPS yields have been low is the Fed’s commitment to keep interest rates extremely depressed for so long. As the Fed’s rhetoric has recently changed, so are interest rate expectations and TIPS yields. Given that core inflation will not drop to the Fed’s target range any time soon, the Fed will likely escalate its hawkish rhetoric. Hence, TIPS yields will keep rising, until something breaks. Chart 5US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation Chart 6US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations TIPS demand/supply and momentum. The TIPS market is relatively small, and it has been rigged by the Fed in the past two years or so. As a part of its QE program, the Fed has been buying a large share of TIPS, and it now owns 22% of this market. As a result, TIPS yields have fallen irrespective of economic growth dynamics. As the QE program ends, the Fed will stop purchasing TIPS. There has also been a rush into TIPS by institutional investors. In a quest for inflation protection when the Fed was complacent about inflation, investors have been opting for TIPS. This has also depressed TIPS yields. As the US central bank sounds more hawkish, investors’ demand for inflation protection will likely diminish. In addition, TIPS prices have recently plunged dramatically. Large losses could prompt further liquidation by investors pushing TIPS yields much higher. All of the above and the fact that TIPS yields remain negative suggest that they will continue rising in the coming months. Chart 7Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Ms. Mea: Your point that TIPS yields will continue rising in the months ahead irrespective of US inflation and growth dynamics is interesting. So, what are the implications of rising US bond yields, especially TIPS yields, on various financial markets? Answer: Falling/low TIPS yields have benefited long duration plays like US stocks, and especially US growth stocks. Declining TIPS yields were a drag on the US dollar (Chart 7). Finally, they also prompted portfolio capital flows to EM. Consistently, rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US (Chart 4, above) support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. Ms. Mea: But aren’t US share prices positively correlated with US interest rates? Answer: Not always. Chart 8 illustrates that the correlation between the S&P 500 and US Treasury yields varied over time. Prior to the mid-1960s, it was positive. From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields. Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? We believe US markets are now undergoing a major paradigm shift in the stock prices-bond yields correlation. The latter is about to turn negative like it did in the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the reason why the stock-to-bond yields correlation turned negative was because US core inflation surged well above 2% in 1966 (Chart 8, bottom panel). This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. The same is happening now. As we wrote a year ago in our Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship, the proper roadmap for the US stock-to-bond correlation is not the last 10 or 20 years, but the second half of the 1960s. After US core CPI surged substantially above 2%, the S&P 500 became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9). Ms. Mea: Let’s now turn to emerging markets. How will EM financial markets perform amid rising US bonds yields? Also, which US yields matter most for EM financial markets, US Treasury yields or TIPS? Answer: Neither US Treasury yields nor TIPS yields have a stable correlation with EM stock prices. Correlations between US nominal bond yields, EM currencies and EM domestic bond yields vary over time. However, US TIPS yields exhibit a reasonably strong positive correlation with mainstream EM local bond yields and the US dollar's exchange rate versus EM currencies (Chart 10). Mainstream EM includes 16 markets but excludes China, Korea and Taiwan. Hence, as US TIPS yields move up, it is reasonable to expect the US dollar to strengthen against mainstream EM currencies and their local bond yields to rise (Chart 10). Currency depreciation and rising domestic bond yields will prove to be toxic for the share prices of these mainstream emerging markets. To sum up, rising US TIPS yields will jeopardize the performance of EM equities, currencies, local rates and credit markets. Ms. Mea: Aren’t many EMs better prepared for rising US nominal/real yields than they were in 2013? Answer: Yes, they are: many EM countries that were running large current account deficits in 2013 now have current account surpluses or small deficits (Chart 11, top panel). Besides, mainstream EMs ramped up their foreign currency debt in the years preceding 2013 while their foreign debt has changed little in the past 6-7 years (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Chart 11Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Table 1Current Account Balances In Individual EM Countries Table 1 illustrates the current account balance in individual developing countries. Further, the share of foreign investor holdings in EM local currency bonds has declined a great deal in the past 2 years (Table 2). Finally, many mainstream EM central banks have hiked rates aggressively and their local bond yields have already risen considerably in the past 12 months. These also provide some protection against fixed-income portfolio capital outflows. All in all, vulnerability from foreign portfolio capital outflows in EM is much lower than it was in 2013. Nevertheless, EM financial markets will not remain unscathed if US rates march higher, the US dollar rallies and US stocks wobble. Based on the parameters displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the most vulnerable countries among mainstream EMs are Peru, Colombia, Chile and Egypt. Table 2Foreign Ownership Of Domestic Bonds: January 2022 Versus October 2019 Chart 12China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective Ms. Mea: Let’s now move to your second theme - China’s slowdown. This is well known and arguably priced in financial markets. Importantly, policymakers have been ratcheting up stimulus. Don’t you think now is the time to upgrade the stance on Chinese stocks and China-related plays? Answer: Despite the new round of stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. As we wrote in last week’s report titled Chinese Equities: Valuations and Profits, Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next 6 months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Importantly, even though property market woes are well known and housing sales and starts have collapsed, housing construction activity has remained resilient (Chart 12). The bottom panel of Chart 12 demonstrates rising completions, which is one of reasons why raw materials prices have been resilient. However, new funding for property developers has dried up and they will be forced to scale back completions/construction activity. Historically, EM non-TMT share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months (Chart 13). Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in a few months. In brief, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 13China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks Ms. Mea: Another topic I wanted to discuss today is divergences in global financial markets. Some equity markets have already fallen significantly, while the S&P 500 index as well as a couple of individual EM equity bourses (India, Taiwan and Mexico) have been firm. There have been massive divergences within the US equity market in general and the NASDAQ index in particular. Besides, EM high-yield corporate spreads have widened but EM investment grade corporate spreads remain tight. Finally, commodity prices have remained firm despite both China’s slowdown and US dollar strength. How should investors interpret these divergences? Answer: Such divergences in financial markets often occur during major selloffs. Notable financial market downturns evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Chart 14Domino Effect In 2007-08 Similarly, the US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 14). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 14, bottom panel). There was a domino effect in financial markets in both the 2015 and 2018 turbulences. Initially, the selloffs started in the weakest links while other parts were holding up. Then, the selloff spread to all without exception. For example, in 2018, US share prices and high-yield credit spreads were doing quite well until October 2018. Then, a broad-based selloff transpired in the fourth quarter of 2018.  Just as chains break at their weakest links, financial market selloffs begin in the most susceptible sectors. Overpriced US stocks with little or no profits and currencies with zero or negative interest rates have been most vulnerable to rising US interest rates. That is why these segments have sold off first in response to rising US nominal and real rates. Our hunch is that the selloff in global markets due to rising US interest rates will broaden in the coming months. This does not mean that global stocks on the verge of a major bear market, but a double-digit drop in global share prices is likely. The last asset class standing will be commodity prices. These will likely be the last affected by rising US interest rates because many investors buy commodities as an inflation hedge. Besides, oil prices have also been supported by the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine and Iran. It might take investor concerns about the US economy and a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Chart 15Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Ms. Mea: What investment strategy do you recommend in the coming months? Answer: As US interest rates continue rising and China’s recovery fails to transpire immediately, EM financial markets remain at risk. Therefore, we recommend a defensive stance for absolute return investors in EM equity and fixed income. We are also continuing to short a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. As for global equity regional allocation, the outlook for EM performance is less certain than it was in the past 12 months. Clearly, rising US/DM interest rates herald US equity underperformance versus other DM markets, like the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). The basis is that non-US equities are not as expensive as US ones and, hence, are less vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 16EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields Whether EM outperforms or not is mainly contingent on the US dollar, rather than US bond yields. The top panel of Chart 16 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance against DM has a low correlation with US bond yields. Yet, EM equities will underperform their DM peers if the USD strengthens (the greenback is shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 16). However, if the greenback depreciates, EM will certainly outperform the US in both equity and the fixed income space. Putting it all together, asset allocators should overweight the euro area and Japan, and underweight the US and EM in a global equity portfolio. Ms. Mea: What about EM local bonds and EM credit markets? Answer: EM credit spreads will widen, and EM local yields will not drop as US bond yields head higher and EM exchange rates depreciate. We continue to recommend investors underweight EM credit versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As for local rates, we largely remain on the sidelines of this asset class. Our current recommendations are as follows: receiving 10-year rates in China and Malaysia, paying Czech 10-year rates and betting on 10/1-year yield curve inversions in Mexico and Russia. For a detailed list of our country recommendations for equities, credit, domestic bonds and currencies, please refer to Open Position Tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com

Highlights We reformatted and added three sections to our existing trade tables: strategic themes, cyclical asset allocations and tactical investment recommendations. An extensive audit of our current trade book shows that our country and sector allocation recommendations have been successful. Of the eight open trades in our book, six have so far generated positive returns. We now recommend closing three out of the eight positions, based on a review of the original basis and subsequent performance of our trades. We have also added one cyclical and two tactical trades. We will look for opportunities to propose new trades to our book in the coming months. Feature In this week's report, we introduce our newly formatted trade tables (on Page 15), which include the following: Strategic themes (structural views beyond 18 months) Cyclical asset allocations within Chinese financial markets (in the next 6 to 18 months) Tactical trades (investment recommendations for the next 0 to 6 months) We revisited the original basis and subsequent performance of our open trades as part of an audit of our trade book. We maintain five of the eight trades and will add one cyclical and two tactical trades. Our new features and the rationale for retaining or closing each trade are presented below. Strategic Themes The new Strategic Themes section now includes the following market relevant structural forces: President Xi Jinping’s “common prosperity” policy initiative, which is intended to narrow the nation’s wealth gap; a demographic shift of a shrinking population by 2025; and secular disputes between the US and China (Table 1). Table 1 These structural aspects will have a macro impact on China’s policy landscape, economy and financial markets. Investors should consider whether the themes point toward a reflationary policy bias; whether they will have a medium- to long-term effect on corporate earnings; and whether these themes will, on a structural basis, warrant higher/lower risk premiums for owning Chinese stocks. Cyclical Equity Index Allocation Recommendations (Relative To MSCI All Country World) Table 2 is a summary of our cyclical recommendations for Greater China equity indexes. We recommend the following equity index allocations within a global equity portfolio, for the next 6 to 18 months: Table 2 Underweight MSCI China (Chinese investable stocks). Underweight MSCI China A Onshore (Chinese onshore or A-share stocks). Neutral stance on MSCI Hong Kong Index. Overweight MSCI Taiwan Index. Chart 1Chinese Stocks Substantially Underperformed Global Equities Our recommendation to underweight MSCI China Index and MSCI China A Onshore Index were extremely successful in 2021 (Chart 1). We will continue to maintain an underweight stance for the time being, based on our concern that the current policy easing measures will be insufficient to revive China’s slowing economy. We expect policy stimulus to step up in the coming months and economic growth to start improving by mid-2022. However, corporate profits are set to disappoint in the first half of the year. This implies that Chinese share prices will remain volatile with substantial downside risks. Chinese investable stocks are in oversold territory and will likely rebound in the near term in both absolute and relative terms (discussed in the Tactical Recommendations section on Page 14) (Chart 2). Nonetheless, on a cyclical basis, they face challenges both from the impact of a slowing economy on earnings growth and ongoing regulatory and geopolitical risks. Our model suggests high odds (70%) of a considerable earnings contraction in Chinese investable stocks in the next 6 to 12 months. We recommend investors upgrade their allocation to the MSCI Hong Kong Index from underweight to neutral within a global equity portfolio. The MSCI Hong Kong equity index appears to be very cheap compared with global equities (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Investable Stocks Are Oversold Chart 3MSCI HK Equities Are Cheap The MSCI Hong Kong equity index includes Hong Kong-domiciled companies and not mainland issuers listed in Hong Kong. Rising US Treasury yields will be a headwind to Hong Kong-domiciled company stock performance because the HKD is pegged to the USD and therefore Hong Kong bond yields tend to follow the direction of bond yields in the US. Chart 4MSCI HK Index Is Defensive In Nature However, an offsetting factor is that due to composition changes over time, the MSCI Hong Kong equity index has become much more defensive and tends to perform better than the emerging Asian and EM equity benchmarks during turbulent times (Chart 4). The weight of insurance companies and diversified financials account for over 40% of the MSCI Hong Kong Index, compared with property stocks, which take up 20% of the equity market cap. The insurance and diversified financials subsectors are less vulnerable to escalating short-term interest rates compared with property stocks. During risk-off phases, the defensive nature in the MSCI Hong Kong Index will support its performance relative to the some of the more industrial- and tech-heavy EM and global equity indexes. We maintain an overweight stance on the MSCI Taiwan Index relative to global equities. The trade (see discussion in the Cyclical Equity And Sector Trades section) has brought an impressive 40% rate of return since its inception in 2019. Cyclical Recommended Asset Allocation (Within Chinese Onshore Assets) We recommend an underweight position in equities in China’s onshore multi-asset portfolios (Table 3). Chinese onshore stocks are not cheap and will likely underperform onshore government bonds as the economy struggles to regain its footing. Chart 5Total Returns In Chinese Onshore Stocks Have Barely Kept Up With Onshore GB Chart 5 shows that in the past decade total returns in Chinese onshore stocks have barely kept up with that in onshore long-duration government bonds. During policy easing cycles Chinese onshore stocks generated positive excess returns over government bonds, however, the outperformance has been extremely volatile and very brief. Given that we do not expect Beijing to allow a significant overshoot in stimulus this year, there is a good chance that the returns in Chinese onshore stocks will underperform onshore government bonds. Cyclical Equity And Sector Trades Our rationale for retaining or closing each trade is described below. Chart 6Chinese Onshore Stocks Outperformance Has Been Passive Long China A-Shares/Short Chinese Investable Stocks (Maintain) We initiated this trade in March 2021. The recommendation has been our most successful trade, generating a 40+% return since then (Chart 6). China’s internet platform giants have a large weight in the MSCI Investable index and they remain vulnerable (Chart 7). Although China’s antitrust regulations may have passed the peak of intensity, they will not be rolled back and multiple compression in these stocks will likely continue in 2022. In contrast, the A-share index is heavily weighted in value stocks. The trade is in line with our view that the global investment backdrop has shifted in favor of global value versus growth stocks due to an above-trend US expansion and climbing US bond yields in the next 6 to 12 months. The relative ratio between China A-shares and investable stocks is overbought and will likely pull back in the near term (Chart 8). However, the cyclical and structural outlook continues to favor onshore stocks versus the investable universe. Chart 7Sizable Underperformance In Investable Consumer Discretionary Stocks Chart 8A Near-Term Pullback In Relative Ratio Is Likely Long CSI500/Short Broad A-Share Market (Maintain) The CSI500 index, which comprises 500 SMID-cap companies, has outperformed the broad A-share market by 32% since mid-February (Chart 9). We think the outperformance in SMID stocks has not fully run its course. Historically, SMID-caps tend to outperform large caps in the late phase of an economic recovery and the valuation premia in small cap stocks remains near decade lows (Chart 10). In addition, the government’s increasing efforts to support small- and medium-sized corporates will help to shore up confidence in those companies. Therefore, SMID will probably continue to outperform large cap stocks this year. Chart 9A Low Valuation Premia And More Policy Support Will Help Lift Prices Of SMID-Caps Chart 10SMID-Caps Tend To Outperform Large-Caps In Late Business Cycle Long MSCI Taiwan Index/Short MSCI All Country World (Maintain) The MSCI Taiwan equity index has consistently outperformed global equities since mid-2019, mostly driven by the rally in Taiwanese semiconductor stocks. Global chip supply shortages since the COVID pandemic have further boosted the sector’s outperformance (Chart 11). Furthermore, Chart 12 highlights improvements in the cyclical case for Taiwanese stocks as an aggregate. Panels 1 & 2 show an uptick in the new export orders component of Taiwanese manufacturing PMI. The new export orders component has historically coincided with both Taiwanese exports to China and the relative Taiwanese manufacturing PMI on a cyclical basis. As such, the economic fundamentals also support a continued outperformance in Taiwanese stocks. Chart 11A Great Run In MSCI Taiwan Equity Index And Semis Chart 12Exports To China, 12-Month Forward EPS, And Relative Stock Prices: All Likely To Improve Long Chinese Onshore Industrial Stocks/Short MSCI China A Index (Maintain) This trade, initiated in September last year, has brought a slightly positive return as of today. Our view was based on improving manufacturing investment and policy support for the sector, even though China’s business cycle had already peaked. Chart 13China Onshore Industrials Closely Track Economic Fundamentals While we maintain the trade for now, we will monitor credit growth in Q1 to assess whether to close the trade. The sector’s performance is highly correlated with our BCA China Activity Index and the Li Keqiang Leading Indicator (Chart 13). A bottoming in both indicators in mid-2022 would suggest that investors should maintain the trade. The caveat, however, is that the sector’s valuations have already become extreme, indicating that the bar may be higher for the sector to outperform even when economic fundamentals improve in 2H22. We will watch for signs of an overshoot in stimulus in the coming three to six months. Conversely, credit growth in Q1 that is at or below expectations will warrant closing this trade. Long Domestic Semiconductor Sector/Short Global Semiconductor Benchmark (Close) Replace with: Long Domestic Semiconductor Sector/Short MSCI China A Onshore The trade has been our biggest loser since its inception in August 2020. Although Chinese onshore semiconductor stocks outperformed the broad A-share market by a large margin, they have underperformed their global peers (Chart 14). Thus, we are closing the trade and replacing it with long Chinese onshore semis relative to the broad A-share market. We remain bullish on Chinese semi stocks, on both a structural and cyclical basis. Secular pressures from the US and the West to curb the advancement of Chinese technology will encourage China’s authorities to double down on supporting state-led technology programs. Moreover, prices of Chinese onshore semis have plummeted since November last year, bringing their lofty valuations closer to long-term trend and providing a better cyclical risk-reward profiles for these stocks (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Onshore Semis Underperformed Global... Chart 15...But Outperformed Domestic Broad Market Long Domestic Consumer Discretionary/Short Broad A-Share Market (Close) Chart 16A Trend Reversal In Chinese Onshore Consumer Discretionary Stocks Performance We placed the trade in May 2020 when China’s economy and household discretionary consumption showed a strong rebound from the deep slump in Q1 2020. As strength waned in the country’s domestic demand for housing, housing-related durable goods and automobiles, the sector’s relative performance also started to dwindle from its peak in the fall of last year (Chart 16). Going forward, even though China’s economy will start to improve on a cyclical basis, domestic consumer discretionary sector will face non-trivial headwinds. The performance of its subsectors, such as hotels, restaurants, and services, will remain subdued due to China’s zero tolerance COVID policy that leads to frequent lockdowns and travel restrictions (Chart 17). Moreover, the internet and direct-marketing retail subsectors are facing tighter regulations, which lowers the sector’s profitability and valuations (Chart 18). Chart 17Domestic COVID Flareups Pose Significant Threat To Chinese Consumer Services Sector Performance Chart 18Online Retailing Also Faces Regylatory Pressures Short Hong Kong 10-Year Government Bond/Long US 10-Year Treasury (Maintain) In the past decade, Hong Kong's 10-year government bond yield has been consistently below that of the US, even though Hong Kong has an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar and its monetary policy is directly tied to that of the US. Chart 19The US-HK Yield Gap Should Widen In The Coming Months The US-Hong Kong 10-year yield spread has substantially narrowed since early 2020 when the US Fed aggressively cut its policy rate. In the coming 6-12 months, however, the spread will likely widen given that the Fed will start to normalize rates (Chart 19, top panel). Chart 19 (bottom panel) highlights that the relative total return profile of the trade (in unhedged terms) trends higher over time due to the carry advantage. Although cyclically the relative total return will likely reverse to its trend line and argues for a short stance on US Treasury, we think it is too early to close the trade. The USD will likely remain strong in the near term, and we have yet to turn positive on Chinese and Hong Kong assets over a 6 to 18-mont time horizon. Therefore, we maintain this trade until the USD starts to weaken, and foreign investment flows into China and Hong Kong shows sustainable momentum. Long USD-CNH (Close) We are closing this trade, which we initiated in May 2020 when tensions between the US and China were rising. The trade has lost more than 10% since its inception because the RMB exchange rate was boosted in 2021 by China’s record current account surplus, wide interest rate differentials and speculation that tension between the US and China would abate. Chart 20A Weaker USD Will Prevent Sizable RMB Depreciation We expect all three favorable conditions supporting the RMB to start reversing in 1H22, suggesting downward pressure on the RMB. However, over a longer period of 6 to 18 months the US dollar also has the potential to trend lower, preventing the RMB from any sizable depreciation (Chart 20). The dollar strength in the past year has been the result of both speculative flows into the US dollar based on rising interest rate expectations and portfolio inflows into the US equity markets.  In the next 6 to 18 months, however, our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor predicts that the dollar could begin a paradigm shift, whereby any actions by the Fed could eventually lead to a weakening of the US dollar. Higher rates than the market expects will initially boost the US dollar, but will also undermine the US equity market leadership, reversing the substantial portfolio inflows from recent years. On the flip side, fewer rate hikes will severely unwind higher rate expectations in the US relative to other developed markets. Chester further predicts that the DXY could touch 98 in the near term but will break below 90 in the next 12-18 months. Tactical Recommendations (0-6 months) We are initiating two tactical trades to go long on the MSCI China Index and MSCI Hong Kong Index relative to global equities. Relative to global stocks, Chinese investable equities are very oversold and offer value. In addition, while US tech stocks are entering a rollercoaster phase due to higher bond yields in the US, Chinese tech stocks will also fall but by a lesser degree because China’s monetary policy cycle is less affected by the Fed’s policy decisions. In other words, Chinese investable stocks may passively outperform global equities. Nonetheless, as noted in our previous reports, Chinese investable stocks face both cyclical and structural challenges. Hence the overweight stance on these stocks is strictly a tactical play rather than a cyclical one. We favor the MSCI Hong Kong Index versus global equities for similar reasons as Chinese investable stocks. The Hong Kong equity index is also technically oversold. Since the composition of the index has become more defensive, it will likely outperform in risk-off phases. In addition, if the US dollar rallies in the near term, share prices of Hong Kong-domiciled companies will materially outperform.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations