Energy

Highlights Oil markets are on tenterhooks, as unplanned outages; continued losses in Venezuela's output; pipeline bottlenecks in the U.S. shales; and a higher likelihood of sharper losses of Iranian exports are priced into global benchmarks. In our updated base-case balances model, we expect core OPEC 2.0 to front-load their just-agreed production increase, with ~ 800k b/d added to the market in 2H18, and just over 210k b/d in 1H19.1 This will lift the core's total output ~ 1.1mm b/d by the end of 1H19 vs. 1H18. This is offset by losses in the rest of OPEC 2.0 of ~ 530k b/d in 2H18, and just under 640k b/d in 1H19. This leaves OPEC 2.0's net output up ~ 275k b/d in 2H18, and down ~ 430k b/d in 1H19 vs. 1H18 levels (Chart of the Week). We keep demand growth at 1.7mm b/d in 2018 and 2019. Our base case is augmented with three scenarios: i) Venezuela production collapses; ii) a reduction in our forecasted U.S. shale production increase arising from pipeline bottlenecks; and iii) both of these occurring simultaneously in the Oct/18 - Sep/19 interval. Our revised Brent ensemble forecast for 2H18 now stands at $70/bbl, versus $76/bbl last month, reflecting the front-loaded OPEC 2.0 production increase. We expect the global benchmark to average $77/bbl next year, against our previous expectation of $73/bbl. We continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl under Brent during the next 18 months (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0's Core's Production Increase##BR##Offset By Non-Core Losses OPEC 2.0's Core's Production Increase Offset By Non-Core Losses OPEC 2.0's Core's Production Increase Offset By Non-Core Losses Chart 2Updated Ensemble Forecast Reflects Venezuela Deterioration, Shale Bottlenecks Updated Ensemble Forecast Reflects Venezuela Deterioration, Shale Bottlenecks Updated Ensemble Forecast Reflects Venezuela Deterioration, Shale Bottlenecks Highlights Energy: Overweight. We remain long call spreads along the Brent forward curve, given our belief upside risks will dominate oil markets. These positions are up 34.1% on average over the past four months they've been open. We expect backwardation to increase as OECD storage falls, supporting our long S&P GSCI trade, which is up 13.8%. Base Metals: Neutral. In a tit-for-tat response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, the EU imposed import duties on U.S. products this past Friday. Canada plans to impose tariffs beginning July 1, while Mexico has already implemented duties on U.S. exports. Risks that ongoing trade disputes could escalate into a trade war are weighing on the metals complex. Copper retraced its early June jump, despite ongoing contract renegotiations at Chile's Escondida mine. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold traded down to the low $1,250/oz level as a stronger broad trade-weighted USD and rising real rates pressure the market. Ags/Softs: Underweight. In effort to diversify its source of imports amid the ongoing trade row with the U.S., China announced the removal of import tariffs on animal feed from five Asian countries earlier this week.2 Ag prices have fallen since the beginning of June amid fears escalating trade fights will bear down on U.S. farmers. Nevertheless, May trade data show China's ag imports have remained robust. Feature In recent weeks, markets have been buffeted by reports of a 350k b/d unplanned outage in Canada; 400k b/d of losses in Libya; continued force majeures in Nigeria's Bonny system; and indications Venezuela's production decline is accelerating: The country's U.S. refiner Citgo was left to fend for itself on the open market, in the wake of the failure of state-run supplier PDVSA to deliver crude. On top of that, markets appear to be pricing in as much as 1mm b/d of lost Iranian exports, on the back of increased pressure from the Trump Administration in the U.S., which is leaning on American allies to take Iranian imports to zero. In our modeling, we continue to expect 500k b/d will be lost to export markets, as a result of the re-imposition of sanctions by the U.S., but are watching the situation closely. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is attempting to get out ahead of an almost-certain tightening of the global market. In what appears to be hastily arranged leaks, the Kingdom signaled it already has undertaken a two-month production ramp - lifting its output to record levels this month and next: 10.8mm b/d in June, 11mm b/d in July. This is up from ~ 10mm b/d earlier this year, per over-compliance by KSA on its OPEC 2.0 quota of 10.54mm b/d. Russia, the other putative leader of OPEC 2.0, is signaling it will be able to contribute ~ 200k b/d over 2H18, vs production of ~ 11.2mm b/d at present.3 OPEC 2.0 Front-Loads Output Hike Lacking detail from OPEC 2.0, we are front-loading the coalition's just-agreed production increase in our updated base-case balances model, with ~ 800k b/d added to the market in 2H18, and just over 210k b/d in 1H19. This lifts core OPEC 2.0's output ~ 1.1mm b/d compared to 1H18 levels. Core OPEC 2.0's increased production will be offset by continued losses in the rest of the coalition amounting to ~ 530k b/d in 2H18, and ~ 640k b/d in 1H19. This leaves OPEC 2.0's net output up ~ 275k b/d in 2H18, and down ~ 430k b/d in 1H19 vs. 1H18 levels. Globally, we expect global supply to rise ~ 2mm b/d this year and next, averaging 99.9mm b/d and 101.7mm b/d, respectively. Our base case is augmented with three scenarios: i) Venezuela production collapses to 250k b/d from current levels of ~ 1.3mm b/d, which allows it to support domestic refined product demand and nothing more; ii) a reduction in our forecasted U.S. shale production increase arising from pipeline bottlenecks; and iii) both of these occurring simultaneously in the Oct/18 - Sep/19 interval. In our simulations, a Venezuela collapse would be met by OPEC 2.0's core producers lifting production another 200k b/d, which takes its total output hike to 1.2mm b/d in 2019. OPEC 2.0 does not respond to the temporary lower-than-expected U.S. shale growth contingency we're modeling, which is brought on by pipeline bottlenecks in the Permian Basin. On the demand side, we are keeping annual growth at ~ 1.7mm b/d in 2018 and 2019. For all the agita in the market at present - largely a function of increasingly acrimonious trade frictions between the U.S. and its allies and China - fundamentals remain well supported. Indeed, one of our key gauges, EM trade import volumes, remains well supported (Chart 3). EM import volumes are closely aligned with income levels - as income grows, import volumes grow. Likewise, as EM incomes grow, demand for commodities - particularly oil and copper - grows. Chart 3Growing EM Incomes Support Import Volumes,##BR##And Oil Demand Growing EM Incomes Support Import Volumes, And Oil Demand Growing EM Incomes Support Import Volumes, And Oil Demand Chart 4Balances Remain##BR##In Deficit Balances Remain In Deficit Balances Remain In Deficit As always, EM demand growth paces global growth, rising at a rate of ~ 1.3mm b/d over the 2018 - 19 interval. In 2018, we expect consumption to average just over 100mm b/d globally, while next year we're expecting demand to come in at 102mm b/d. Even with OPEC 2.0's production hike, the contingencies we're modeling - in Venezuela and the U.S. shales - along with weak net growth in overall production volumes for the better part of the next 18 months, leaves global balances in deficit (Chart 4 and Table 1). This continues to force OECD inventories lower over the next 18 months (Chart 5). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets Chart 5Physical Deficits Draw Inventories Lower Physical Deficits Draw Inventories Lower Physical Deficits Draw Inventories Lower Our revised Brent ensemble forecast for 2H18 now stands at $70/bbl, versus $76/bbl last month, reflecting the front-loaded OPEC 2.0 production increase. We expect the global benchmark to return to $77/bbl next year, against our previous expectation of $73/bbl. We continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl under Brent during the next 18 months (Chart 2). OPEC 2.0 Likely Taps Spare Capacity At this point it appears OPEC 2.0 could be forced to revisit its just-concluded deal to lift production, particularly if, as appears increasingly likely, Venezuela's production collapses, and the market loses its 1mm b/d or so of exports. The country reportedly is falling behind in meeting commitments to its customers, which deprives it of the cash to pay for additives needed to run its heavy oil as a charging stock in refineries. Venezuela's state-owned Citgo refinery operating in the U.S. reportedly is being forced to source crude away from Venezuela, as the barrels it relied on in the past no longer are shipping on schedule. Chart 6Unplanned Outages Are Back OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets Unplanned outages are once again picking up, following a relatively tranquil period (Chart 6). We expect continued volatility in crude oil markets over the next 18 months, particularly if unplanned outages continue to rise, and OPEC 2.0 is forced to cover another event(s) similar to the most recent loss of production in Libya, where civil unrest took ~ 400k b/d off the market, and Canada (~ 350k b/d), where a power failure at Syncrude Canada's oil sands facility in Alberta shut down production. Chart 7Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin On this score, the market is extremely vulnerable - the U.S. EIA estimates OPEC's spare capacity presently is ~ 1.8mm b/d, most of which is found in KSA. By next year, the EIA expects spare capacity to be slightly over 1mm b/d (Chart 7). Estimated 2018 spare capacity translates into 1.8% of global consumption this year, and a little over 1.0% next year, given our demand estimates of 100mm and 102mm b/d this year and next. By way of comparison, in 2007, spare capacity stood at 2.4% of global demand - 2.1mm b/d vs. 86.4mm b/d. This was the period when WTI prices were headed to $150/bbl, and OPEC was meeting demand out of spare capacity. EM Consumers Exposed China and India pressed OPEC 2.0 leadership to raise production, because, along with other large EM economies, they implemented fuel-subsidy reforms, which expose their consumers to higher fuels costs. This is a key difference in the current cycle vs history: Many more consumers are directly exposed to higher prices. Recent academic research suggests higher prices resulting from strong demand are not destabilizing to economic growth if they reflect rising consumer incomes. However, rising prices due to supply shocks are destabilizing to economic growth, and typically are followed by recession. Higher oil prices resulting from a supply shock - e.g., if Venezuela were to go off line for a long enough period of time - would force OPEC 2.0 and the U.S. shales to replace more than 3mm b/d of lost production. At this point, it is not clear they can do this in short order. Indeed, given the inelasticity of oil demand, it is likely demand destruction - via higher prices - would be required to balance supply and demand globally. Higher prices required to equilibrate markets almost surely would reduce EM oil demand - the dominant source of growth in our models - and derail the global economic recovery, if households' budgets are hit too hard by higher oil prices. Bottom Line: In our revised ensemble forecast for 2H18, we expect Brent crude prices to average $70/bbl, reflecting the front-loaded OPEC 2.0 production increase. We expect the global benchmark to average $77/bbl next year. We continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl under Brent during the next 18 months. Higher volatility is expected. We remain long call spreads along the forward curve, and expect backwardation to steepen, which will support our long S&P GSCI recommendation. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. This past week it agreed to raise production 1mm b/d beginning in July. The core consists of KSA, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. 2 Please see "China drops tariffs on animal feed from Asian countries as U.S. dispute escalates," dated June 26, 2018, available at reuters.com. 3 Please see "Oil rises on supply losses, U.S. push to isolate Iran," published by reuters.com June 27, 2018, for reporting on KSA's intention to go to 11mm b/d. The number reported by Reuters for KSA's June production is slightly less than 800k b/d over the 10.03mm b/d production level for May KSA self-reported in this month's OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report. See also "OPEC, Russia Agree to Raise Production," published June 24, 2018, by egyptoil-gas.com. 11mm b/d would be record production for KSA. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets

Highlights China's crude oil inventories - both strategic and commercial - have skyrocketed in recent years. This has entirely offset the decline in OECD commercial crude oil inventories. China's crude oil import growth is likely to average mid-single digit territory over the coming 18-24 months with risks of falling toward zero for several months. This is in sharp contrast to the average double-digit growth rate that prevailed during 2015-2017. Chinese crude oil inventories will rise much more slowly and a period of modest de-stocking in commercial crude inventories in China cannot be ruled out. Chinese crude oil final consumption growth is tempering alongside slowing growth in almost all major petroleum products demand. Both transportation and industrial consumption growth of petroleum products is showing considerable weakness. The investment implication is that Chinese oil demand and especially imports of crude oil will likely be much less supportive of oil prices in the coming two years than they have been in recent years.1 Feature The common narrative in the global investment community of late attributes the oil price rally since 2016 to the decline in OECD crude oil inventories. Yet, the OECD countries do not include China and many other developing nations. This report looks to shed light on China's impact on the oil market with respect to demand, output and inventories. The most revealing part of our assessment is that China's crude oil inventories have skyrocketed in recent years, which in turn have offset the decline in OECD commercial crude oil inventories. The top panel of Chart I-1 illustrates that when China's crude oil inventories are added to the OECD measure, the aggregate of global crude inventories is currently still near a record high. Chinese crude oil inventories have surged from 470 million barrels in 2014 to more than 1 billion barrels presently (Chart I-1, bottom panel). In brief, China has been importing much more oil than it has been consuming since the middle of 2014, when crude prices began to collapse (Chart I-2). In other words, the massive inventory accumulation has been a major force behind the double-digit growth in China's crude imports. Chart I-1Be Aware Of High Chinese Crude Oil Inventories Be Aware Of High Chinese Crude Oil Inventories Be Aware Of High Chinese Crude Oil Inventories Chart I-2China: Importing More Oil Than Consuming China: Importing More Oil Than Consuming China: Importing More Oil Than Consuming The key question for investors is: Will China maintain strong crude oil imports growth going forward? Having examined China's demand, output, and inventory dynamics, we conclude that the recent deceleration in Chinese crude oil import growth (to 5-6%) has been driven by legitimate fundamentals. Crude import growth is likely to average mid-single digit territory over the coming 18-24 months with risks of falling toward zero for several months. This is in sharp contrast to the average double-digit growth rate that prevailed during 2015-2017 (Chart I-3).2 Chart I-3Chinese Oil Imports Growth: ##br##No More Double Digits Chinese Oil Imports Growth: No More Double Digits Chinese Oil Imports Growth: No More Double Digits This suggests that China will be much less supportive of global oil prices in the coming year or two than it has been in recent years, a fact that may also weigh more generally on global investor sentiment towards China. A Clearer Picture Of Global Oil Inventories In Chart I-1, our calculation showed a massive buildup of China's crude oil inventories over the past three years, reaching a record high of 1,030 million barrels as of May 2018. Below we answer four questions about China's inventories: Why are China's oil inventories significant for investors? How did we calculate a timely monthly oil inventory estimate for China? How can investors judge the validity of our approach? What is the outlook for strategic and commercial inventory accumulation over the coming year? Why are China's oil inventories significant for investors? The following suggest that without China's oil inventory build-up, oil prices would not have rallied as much as they have over the past two years. In other words, China has been a major force pushing oil prices higher: Mainly due to the significant inventory buildup, the increase in Chinese oil imports has been bigger than the increase in global oil production in both 2016 and 2017, which are clearly different from previous years (Chart I-4, top panel). The 490 million-barrel increase in Chinese crude oil inventories over 2015-2017 alone mopped up 35% global oil production increase. While OECD commercial crude oil reserves have declined 275 million barrels from their July 2016 peak to May 2018, Chinese crude inventories have actually risen by 380 million barrels over the same period. As of May 2018, Chinese crude oil inventory levels had already risen to 36% of OECD total commercial crude oil inventories (Chart I-4, bottom panel). How did we calculate a timely monthly oil inventory estimate for China? Our Chinese crude oil inventory proxy was constructed based on the crude oil flow diagram shown in Chart I-5. Chart I-4China Has Been A Major Force For Oil Price Rally China Has Been A Major Force For Oil Price Rally China Has Been A Major Force For Oil Price Rally Chart I-5How We Derived Our Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Proxy? China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope Total crude oil supply in China equals to the sum of crude oil net imports and domestic crude oil production. The crude oil available for demand is either for final consumption without any transformation, which in general only accounts for about 1-2% of total supply, or used in refineries to be transformed into petroleum products. The latter typically accounts for over 90% of total supply. The remaining unused crude oil is stored as either Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) or Commercial Petroleum Reserves (CPR). Therefore, by deducting the crude oil consumed in the refining process from the total supply of crude oil, we derived the flow of inventory - the level of changes of inventory.3 By using the cumulative value of the flow inventory data, we were able to derive the stock of inventory. Here we assume the initial inventory in 2006 was zero. This assumption is reasonable as the first fill of the SPR was in 2007 and the stock of CPR was extremely low compared to current levels. Hence, any error in this calculation is reasonably minute. Chart I-2 on page 2 clearly shows that crude oil supply growth is much faster than the growth of domestic crude oil consumption, resulting in rising domestic crude oil inventories. In the meantime, Chart I-6 illustrates that most of the increase in China's crude oil imports have indeed been due to the massive build-up in domestic crude oil inventories - not growth in final demand. Chart I-6Significant Inventory Buildup Has Driven Up ##br##Chinese Crude Oil Imports Significant Inventory Buildup Has Driven Up Chinese Crude Oil Imports Significant Inventory Buildup Has Driven Up Chinese Crude Oil Imports Regarding the data, there is a technical question to clarify: Does the NBS data of crude oil consumed in the refining process cover all Chinese refineries? We believe so. The data always cover both state-owned refineries and large and medium non-state-owned refineries. The only question is whether the crude oil used in small refineries - which have capacity of 2 million tons per year or lower - are accounted for in the NBS data on the amount crude oil refined. According to NBS, the data is collected from refineries with annual main business income of RMB20 million and above. In China, all refineries have much higher revenue than RMB20 million. Even for a small refinery with capacity of 2 million tons per year, its annual main business income is considerably above this threshold. For example, at the end of 2013, there were 49 local refining enterprises in Shandong province, with total main business income of RMB 336 billion. This means on average one refining company in Shandong can generate about RMB 7 billion - significantly higher than the RMB20 million threshold. Investors should note that Shandong province has the most local refineries and owns the largest local refining capacity in China among all provinces. Since 2015 the government has also implemented supply reforms in the oil refinery sector, having shut down or upgraded outdated refining facilities with capacity of 2 million tons per year or lower. Therefore, the amount of crude oil used in the small refineries that is not captured by NBS statistics, if any, is insignificant. In addition, increasingly stringent environmental policies, intensifying domestic competition and rising requirements for higher-quality petroleum products have all forced many small refineries out of business. In brief, our level of conviction in our crude oil inventory estimate for China is high. How can investors judge the validity of our approach? Official Chinese oil inventory data does exist: the NBS publishes a yearly series of annual changes in domestic crude oil inventories. But the significance of our inventory estimate is that it is available with far greater frequency and timeliness than the official data, and a simple comparison of our proxy with the official data for crude oil inventories shows similar size and variations (Chart I-7). Hence, our inventory calculation provides investors with a timely monthly estimate of Chinese oil inventories that is consistent with official data. Chart I-7Validity Check: Our Inventory ##br##Proxy Vs. NBS Data Validity Check: Our Inventory Proxy Vs. NBS Data Validity Check: Our Inventory Proxy Vs. NBS Data What is the outlook for strategic and commercial inventory accumulation over the coming year? As of this past May, China had 290 million barrels of SPR and 740 million barrels of CPR. Looking forward, the pace of SPR accumulation will be significantly slower than the previous several years. Back in 2004, the government planned three phases of SPR construction. The first phase has long been completed, and was filled in before 2010. The completion of construction of the second phase of SPR was delayed from 2015 to last year. So far, the government has released little information about the third phase of SPR construction. Total capacity from the first two phases is 40 million tons: 12 million tons from the first phase and 28 million tons from the second phase. The NBS last December released Chinese crude oil SPR inventory data, which was at 37.73 million tons (277 million barrels) as of June 2017. We believe the second phase of the SPR was completed in the past 10 months, and that there is not much free SPR space left at the moment. The third phase has the same capacity (28 million tons, or about 200 million barrels) as the second phase. Given that in both first and second phases it has taken more than two years to select and construct the SPR sites, the fill of the third phase of the SPR will unlikely occur within the next two years. The CPR has been rising much faster than the SPR due to low oil prices and the government's policy of allowing local refineries to import crude oil starting in 2015. In the past three years, CPR accumulation accounted for about 80% of China's total crude oil inventory increase. This makes sense, as commercial crude oil users have much larger physical reserve space than the SPR. Also, both commercial users and the government would have taken advantage of previously low oil prices to import as much as they could during the past several years. This is in line with China's strategy of building commodities inventories when prices drop. Back in 2009-2010, when oil prices were low, China also significantly boosted its purchases of crude oil overseas to build up domestic crude oil inventories. As China will continue with its domestic refinery capacity expansion, we still expect further accumulation in the country's CPR, albeit at a much slower pace. That said, a brief period of modest de-stocking in commercial inventories of crude oil cannot be ruled out either. Current Chinese crude oil inventories (CPR and SPR combined) are no longer low (Chart I-8). They are equivalent to 123 days of crude oil net imports - much higher than the 90 days the IEA requires OECD countries to hold. Chart I-8Chinese Crude Oil Inventories: No Longer Low Chinese Crude Oil Inventories: No Longer Low Chinese Crude Oil Inventories: No Longer Low With Brent oil prices rising above $75 per barrel and elevated domestic crude oil inventories, both government and commercial users will likely slow their purchases of overseas oil for inventory accumulation. Tightening credit supply also will hinder companies' ability and willingness to finance more inventory accumulation. This might cause even a brief period of de-stocking in commercial inventories of crude oil. Bottom Line: After a massive buildup over the past three years, further inventory accumulation for both the SPR and CPR will slow considerably and in fact a period of modest de-stocking in commercial crude inventories in China cannot be ruled out. As a result, Chinese oil imports will converge to the pace of final demand growth. Tempering Final Oil Demand Growth In addition to our view that Chinese oil inventory accumulation will slow significantly and even could halt for several months, China's final oil demand growth is also trending lower (Chart I-9). As China's economic structure has been shifting from exports and investments to consumer spending, its energy intensity has declined. Petroleum products consumption within industry (mining, manufacturing and electricity generation) posted the biggest decline on record in the past decade, while consumption in transport service and residential posted the largest gains (Chart I-10, top panel). In 2016, the transport service and residential sectors (car driving and cooking and heating) together accounted for 83% of the increase in Chinese total petroleum products consumption (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Chart I-9Slowing China's Oil Consumption Growth Slowing China's Oil Consumption Growth Slowing China's Oil Consumption Growth Chart I-10Drivers Of Chinese Oil Consumption Growth China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope In terms of types of petroleum products, this economic shift has translated into higher growth in gasoline, kerosene and LPG consumption, and lower growth in diesel fuel and fuel oil consumption. Gasoline and kerosene are mainly consumed as fuel for passenger cars and airplanes, respectively. LPG is also widely used for residential heating and cooking fuel. By comparison, diesel fuel and fuel oil are more used in the industrial process, even though diesel is also a major fuel for commercial trucks and special vehicles. As a result, gasoline, kerosene and LPG have experienced a rising share of total Chinese petroleum consumption, while diesel and fuel oil and other products have drifted lower (Chart I-11). Looking forward, we still expect positive growth in Chinese petroleum products consumption, but expect it to fall from 4-5% to 3-4% over the next two years. Chinese car sales growth will remain weak at 1-2% in the coming years as rising car ownership, advanced public transportation and high frequency of traffic jams temper car sales growth (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Chinese Oil Products As Share Of Total ##br##Oil Consumption: Gains And Losses China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope Chart I-12Weak Car Sales Growth Weak Car Sales Growth Weak Car Sales Growth Some government policies are discouraging residents from owning a car. For example, Beijing car buyers are required to obtain a license plate through a random draw before they can actually drive their car. The odds of obtaining a plate in Beijing as of this past February stood at an astonishingly low 1 in 1,907 - twice as low as the end of last year (1 in 800) and the lowest since the license plate lottery was introduced in January 2011. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, it costs more than $14,000 to get a new car license plate, and the success rate of bidding keeps declining. Meanwhile, the authorities' priority is to move to ecologically friendly vehicles. The government has been using sale tax discounts to promote sales of small-engine cars with engines up to 1.6L from 2008 to 2017. As a result, among existing cars and new car sales, passenger cars with capacity under 1.6L account for over 55% of total cars (Chart I-13). The government also encourages new energy vehicle (NEV) sales through direct cash subsidies, tax subsidies and easier access to a new car plate. With the government's support, we expect NEV sales growth to remain high (Chart I-14). NEV sales reached 770 thousand units last year, and accumulated sales will rise to 5 million units by 2020. Chart I-13Government Promotes ##br##Ecologically Friendly Vehicles Government Promotes Ecologically Friendly Vehicles Government Promotes Ecologically Friendly Vehicles Chart I-14Strong Growth of New Energy ##br##Vehicle Sales Will Continue Strong Growth Of New Energy Vehicle Sales Will Continue Strong Growth Of New Energy Vehicle Sales Will Continue In addition, the government is aiming to improve the average passenger car's fuel efficiency from 6.7L/100KM to 5L/100KM in 2020 and further to 4L/100KM in 2025. This means a 25% reduction in fuel consumption for driving 100KM over the next two years, and another 20% reduction from 2020 to 2025. Fuel efficiency improvement has been limited in the past several years as gas-guzzling SUVs have dominated sales. The government could increase its policy enforcement to facilitate the improvement in fuel efficiency over the next 12-18 months as we move closer to 2020. China has also started promoting ethanol consumption in transportation fuel to substitute gasoline to some extent. The industrial sector will continue to slow, which will lead to lower diesel and fuel oil demand. Bottom Line: Chinese organic oil demand growth is on a weakening path. Improving Chinese Crude Oil Production After accounting for inventory accumulation and underlying demand growth, production is the final aspect to consider when analyzing China's impact on the market for oil. The big contraction in Chinese crude oil production - a 6.9% drop in 2016 and a 4.1% decline last year - has contributed to 33% and 22% of Chinese net imports growth in 2016 and 2017, respectively (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Chinese Crude Oil Production ##br##Will Likely Improve Chinese Crude Oil Production Will Likely Improve Chinese Crude Oil Production Will Likely Improve Aging fields and oil prices below break-even production costs are the main culprits behind shrinking output. We expect Chinese crude oil output to recover over the next 12-18 months. As China has a crude oil production target of a minimum of 200 million tons in 2020, the country has to boost its output by 4.4% over the next two years. Odds are high that Chinese crude oil output may at least stop falling this year. Petro China has produced 1.38 million tons of crude oil in Xinjiang in the past two years and plans to raise its output from the region to 6 million tons, in accordance with the country's 13th five-year development plan (2016-2020). Rising oil prices may help recover some production losses. In 2016, some high-cost and low-efficiency production in the Shengli oilfield was shut down. In that year, the Xinjiang oilfield also cut 700 thousand tons of production. Oil majors such as PetroChina and CNOOC are ramping up their upstream exploration efforts. Bottom Line: Chinese crude oil output is likely to recover over the next 12-18 months. Investment Conclusions The major investment implication from the above analysis is that Chinese oil demand and imports will be much less supportive for global oil prices in the coming two years than they have been in recent years. Chart I-16Crude Oil: Still Near-Record ##br##High Speculative Positions Crude Oil: Still Near-Record High Speculative Positions Crude Oil: Still Near-Record High Speculative Positions From the perspective of BCA's China Investment Strategy service, this reality may weigh on global investor sentiment towards China given the prominence that many market participants place on China's commodity demand when judging its contribution to global economic activity. BCA's China team downgraded Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers to neutral from overweight in yesterday's Special Alert,4 and our conclusions in this report support that recommendation. From the perspective of BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service, the "China factor" has probably not been well discounted in the current price of oil, as both net speculative positions and open interest in crude oil recently rose to their highest levels since at least 2000 (Chart I-16). Hence, the Emerging Markets Strategy team believes the risk-reward for oil prices is poor. In comparison, a lot of positive news that has already occurred and is widely known by investors - i.e. OPEC production rationing, U.S. newly re-imposed sanctions on Iran and a further decline in Venezuelan crude oil output - has likely already been fully discounted in current oil prices. In addition, emerging market (EM) ex-China crude oil demand is facing strong headwinds, given that oil prices in many emerging countries in local currency terms have risen substantially and in some cases to new highs (Chart I-17A and Chart I-17B ). Besides, as many of these countries have removed fuel subsidies, local prices will continue to move in tandem with world oil prices. Chart I-17AOil Demand Growth In EM Ex-China: ##br##Facing Strong Headwinds Oil Demand Growth in EM ex-China: Facing Strong Headwinds Oil Demand Growth in EM ex-China: Facing Strong Headwinds Chart I-17BOil Demand Growth In EM Ex-China: ##br##Facing Strong Headwinds Oil Demand Growth in EM ex-China: Facing Strong Headwinds Oil Demand Growth in EM ex-China: Facing Strong Headwinds The combination of both high local currency oil prices and fuel subsidies removals entails that consumers in many developing countries are already feeling the pain from higher oil prices, and their demand will slow. EM ex-China accounts for 45.3% of global oil consumption. Hence, weakness in EM demand from EM ex-China will not be inconsequential for oil prices. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Frontier Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com 1 This view differs from BCA's Commodities and Energy Strategy team's view on oil that is bullish. 2 Our research suggests that China's net exports of petroleum products will likely continue to rise strongly and require even more crude oil imports. However, the increase of Chinese crude oil imports for rising net petroleum products will not affect total global crude oil demand as its final oil products will just be consumed outside of China. Hence, it is about shifts in market share of refineries not oil final demand. 3 This is also adjusted for final consumption of crude oil without refining. This use of crude oil account for only 1-2% of total crude oil supply (output plus net imports). 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Alert "Downgrade Chinese Stocks To Neutral," dated June 20, 2018, available on cis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Short oil and gas versus financials. Stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors. Downgrade the FTSE100 to neutral. Overweight France, Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark. Underweight Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. European equities will struggle to make much headway versus the technology-dominated S&P500 and MSCI Emerging Markets. Overall market direction will be range-bound through the summer. Feature Two market oddities stood out in the first half of the year. The first oddity was the abrupt decoupling of bank equity performance from bond yields (Chart I-2). For many years, bank equity performance and bond yields have been joined at the hip (Chart I-3). The faithful relationship exists because higher bond yields tend to signal stronger economic growth, either real or nominal. Stronger growth should be good for banks as it is associated with both accelerating credit growth and lower provisions for non-performing loans. Chart of the WeekWhen Technology Outperforms, European Equities Struggle Versus Emerging Market Equities When Technology Outperforms, European Equities Struggle Versus Emerging Market Equities When Technology Outperforms, European Equities Struggle Versus Emerging Market Equities Chart I-2Oddity 1: Banks Abruptly Decoupled##br## From Bond Yields Oddity 1: Banks Abruptly Decoupled From Bond Yields Oddity 1: Banks Abruptly Decoupled From Bond Yields Chart I-3Banks And Bond Yields Have Been ##br##Joined At The Hip For Years Banks And Bond Yields Have Been Joined At The Hip For Years Banks And Bond Yields Have Been Joined At The Hip For Years The second oddity was the abrupt decoupling of crude oil from industrial metal prices (Chart I-4). It is rare for crude oil to outperform copper by 30% in the space of just six months (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Oddity 2: The Crude Oil Price Abruptly ##br##Decoupled From Metal Prices It Is Rare For Crude Oil To Outperform Copper By 30% In Six Months It Is Rare For Crude Oil To Outperform Copper By 30% In Six Months Chart I-5It Is Rare For Crude Oil To Outperform ##br##Copper By 30% In Six Months It Is Rare For Crude Oil To Outperform Copper By 30% In Six Months It Is Rare For Crude Oil To Outperform Copper By 30% In Six Months Explaining The Oddities In The 1st Half The underperformance of banks is consistent with similar underperformances in the other classically growth-sensitive sectors - industrials, and basic materials (Chart I-6). Furthermore, the underperformances of these cyclicals is closely tracking the downswing in the global 6-month credit impulse (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The Odd Man Out: ##br##Oil And Gas The Odd Man Out: Oil And Gas The Odd Man Out: Oil And Gas Chart I-7The Underperformance Of Cyclicals Is Closely ##br##Tracking The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse The Underperformance Of Cyclicals Is Closely Tracking The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse The Underperformance Of Cyclicals Is Closely Tracking The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Note also that these underperformances started well before any inkling of a trade spat. Hence, the recent escalation in the trade skirmishes is reinforcing a change of trend that was already in place. Taken together, this evidence would strongly suggest that global growth is not accelerating; it is decelerating. Oil is the odd man out because its supply dynamics, rather than demand dynamics, have been dominating its price action, lifting its year-on-year inflation rate to 60%. However, a large part of this surge in year-on-year inflation is also to do with the 'base effect', the dip in the oil price to $45 a year ago. The base effect is a statistical quirk, and shouldn't really bother markets. After all, most people do not consciously compare today's price with that exactly a year ago. Unfortunately, central banks' inflation targets are based on year-on-year comparisons, and this could explain why bond yields have decoupled from growth. If oil price inflation is running at 60% it will underpin headline CPI inflation, central bank reaction functions, and thereby bond yields. So here's the explanation for the oddities in the first half. Banks, industrials, and the other classically cyclical sectors are taking their cue from global growth and industrial activity, which does appear to be losing momentum. In contrast, bond yields are taking their cue from the oil price, given its major impact on headline inflation and on central bank reaction functions. Spotting An Opportunity In The 2nd Half Chart I-8Crude Oil's 12-Month Inflation Rate Is 60% Crude Oil's 12-Month Inflation Rate Is 60% Crude Oil's 12-Month Inflation Rate Is 60% Ultimately, an oil price spike based on supply dynamics without support from stronger demand is unsustainable - because the higher price eventually leads to demand destruction (Chart I-8). On the other hand, if global demand growth does reaccelerate, it is the beaten-down bank equity prices that have the recovery potential. Either way, this leads us to a compelling intra-cyclical trade: short oil and gas versus financials. In aggregate though, we expect cyclical sectors to continue underperforming defensives through the summer. Based on previous credit impulse mini-cycles, we can confidently say that mini-deceleration phases last at least six to eight months and that the typical release valve is a decline in bond yields. In this regard, the apparent disconnect between decelerating growth and slow-to-budge bond yields risks protracting this mini-deceleration phase. Therefore, through the summer, it is appropriate to stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors. The strategy has worked well since we initiated it at the start of the year, and it is too early to take profits. Likewise, the portfolio of high-quality government 30-year bonds which we bought in early May is performing well, and we expect it to continue doing so for the time being. Don't Over-Complicate The Investment Process! To reiterate, stick with an underweight to the classical cyclicals versus defensives; and within the cyclicals, short oil and gas versus financials. These sector stances then have a very strong bearing on regional and country equity allocation. This is because up to a quarter of the market capitalisation of each major stock market is in one dominant sector, and this dominant sector gives each equity index its defining fingerprint (Table I-1): for the FTSE100, it is oil and gas; for the Eurostoxx50 it is financials; for the Nikkei225 it is industrials. So all three of these regional indexes are dominated by classical cyclicals. Table I-1Each Major Stock Market Has A Defining Sector Fingerprint Oddities In The 1st Half, Opportunities In The 2nd Half Oddities In The 1st Half, Opportunities In The 2nd Half For the S&P500 and MSCI Emerging Markets indexes, the dominant sector is technology. Although the technology sector is not strictly speaking defensive, it is much less sensitive to growth accelerations and decelerations than the classical cyclicals. There is another important factor to consider: the currency. The FTSE100 oil and gas stock, BP, receives its revenue and incurs its costs in multiple major currencies, such as euros and dollars. In this sense, BP's global business is currency neutral. But BP's stock price is quoted in London in pounds. This means that if the pound strengthens, the company's multi-currency profits will decline relative to the stock price and weigh it down. Conversely, if the pound weakens, it will lift the BP stock price. So the currency is the channel through which the domestic economy can impact its stock market, albeit it is an inverse relationship: a strong currency hinders the stock market; a weak currency helps it. The upshot is that the defining sector fingerprints for the major indexes turn out to be: FTSE100 = global oil and gas shares expressed in pounds. Eurostoxx50 = global banks expressed in euros. Nikkei225 = global industrials expressed in yen. S&P500 = global technology expressed in dollars. MSCI Emerging Markets = global technology expressed in emerging market currencies. Professional investors might argue that this trivializes an investment process on which they spend a lot of time, resource, research, and ultimately money. But we would flip this argument around. To justify the large amounts of time and resource spent on the investment process, professional investors are often guilty of over-complicating it! We fully admit that many factors influence the financial markets, but these factors follow the Pareto Principle, also known as the 80:20 rule. A small number of causes explain the majority of effects. And the 20% that explains 80% of a stock market's relative performance is its defining sector fingerprint. The Chart of the Week and Chart I-9-Chart I-12 should dispel any lingering doubts that readers might have. Chart I-9FTSE 100 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Oil And Gas##br## In Pounds Vs. Global Tech In Dollars FTSE 100 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Tech In Dollars FTSE 100 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Tech In Dollars Chart I-10FTSE 100 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Oil And Gas ##br##In Pounds Vs. Global Industrials In Yen FTSE 100 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Industrials In Yen FTSE 100 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Industrials In Yen Chart I-11FTSE 100 Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 = Global Oil And Gas ##br##In Pounds Vs. Global Banks In Euros FTSE 100 Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Banks In Euros FTSE 100 Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 = Global Oil And Gas In Pounds Vs. Global Banks In Euros Chart I-12Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Banks ##br##In Euros Vs. Global Tech In Dollars Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Tech In Dollars Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Tech In Dollars So what does all of this mean for investors right now? A stance that is short oil and gas versus financials necessarily implies that the FTSE100 will struggle versus the Eurostoxx50, given the FTSE100's oil and gas fingerprint and the Eurostoxx50's banks fingerprint. Hence, today we are taking profits in our overweight to the FTSE100, and downgrading this position to neutral. This leaves us with overweight positions to France, Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark, and underweight positions to Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. Meanwhile, a stance that is underweight the classical cyclicals necessarily implies that European equities will struggle to make much headway versus the technology-dominated S&P500 and MSCI Emerging Markets. Finally, in terms of overall market direction, we expect the range-bound pattern established in the first half of the year to hold through the summer. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. However, we reiterate that the outperformance of oil and gas versus financials is technically very stretched, which reinforces the fundamental arguments in the main body of this report to go short oil and gas versus financials. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-13 Short oil and gas versus financials Short oil and gas versus financials The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights In line with our House view, we expect the broad USD trade-weighted index (TWIB) to continue to appreciate over the next six to 12 months, as U.S. growth outpaces that of other DMs, and the Fed's pace of rate hikes outpaces that of other systemically important central banks. Ordinarily, this would be bad news for the overall commodities complex. However, most commodity prices disconnected from the U.S. dollar in 2015 - 16. This disconnect produced a not-often-seen positive correlation between commodities and the USD, which remained in place into 2017. Fundamentals are keeping oil and base metals correlations weaker vs. the USD. Precious metals and ags are most vulnerable to a stronger USD. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Cracks in Nigeria's Bonny pipeline system will further delay loadings already curtailed by a force majeure declaration, according to local sources. Elsewhere, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) apparently boosted production ahead of the regularly scheduled OPEC meeting in Vienna on June 22, as mounting losses in Venezuela and U.S. sanctions against Iran loom.1 KSA and Russia are pushing for higher production from OPEC 2.0 ahead of the Vienna meeting. Base Metals: Neutral. Although union negotiators took a conciliatory tone in discussions, contract terms between it and BHP Billiton in Chile's Escondida mine still have not been resolved. Among other things, the union proposed a salary increase of 5% and a $34,000 one-off bonus for workers.2 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices held close to $1,300/oz going into this week FOMC meeting. Ags/Softs: Underweight: The USDA revised down its ending-stocks estimates for corn and soybeans for the 2017/18 and the 2018/19 crop years in its latest WASDE, which was released earlier this week. Feature Chart of the WeekUSD TWIB Vs. Chief Commodity Indices USD TWIB Vs. Chief Commodity Indices USD TWIB Vs. Chief Commodity Indices Broadly speaking, commodity prices are negatively correlated with the USD TWIB. The principal indices we follow - the CRB, Bloomberg and S&P GSCI index - all are cointegrated with the USD, i.e., they share a long-term trend, wherein commodity prices rise as the USD falls, and vice versa (Chart of the Week). Ordinarily, we would expect the near-term appreciation of the U.S. dollar to weigh on broad commodity indices' performance. These are not ordinary times. Surprisingly, what holds for these aggregate indices does not hold for individual commodity groups within the indices. We've ranked each commodity by industry group, and found that over the long term - and this is critical - oil and base metals are most sensitive to changes in the USD TWIB, while precious metals and ags are less sensitive. A 1% change in the U.S. dollar index leads to a change in the energy sub-index of the CRB of almost 5%, while a 1% change in the TWIB leads to a change of just under 4% for the base metals sub-index of the CRB. For the precious metals sub-index of the CRB, we would expect to see prices change by just under 3% for every 1% change in the dollar index, while for the ags sub-index of the CRB, broadly speaking, we could expect a change of just under 2.5%.3 USD's Complicated Relationship With Commodities To understand what's driving the broad indices and their component sub-indexes, we ran Granger-causality tests to get a better picture of what's driving what.4 On average, the U.S. dollar drives the broad indices, from a Granger-causality perspective. However, it does not drive the individual commodity sub-indexes in the same manner (Table 1). Table 1USD Vs. Commodities: What's Driving What? Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken We found an interesting relationship between copper and oil: Copper's relationship with oil is stronger than its relationship with the USD - likely because both commodities respond to the same demand factors (e.g., global industrial growth), and that mining and refining copper are energy-intensive processes. We still see a long-term underlying common relationship with the U.S. dollar, but copper is more strongly tied to oil. Bottom Line: We ranked the four main commodity groups with respect to their historical sensitivity to the USD using two distinct metrics. Over the long haul, we found the order from most to least sensitive is (1) Energy, (2) Base Metals, (3) Precious Metals, (4) Ags. USD And Commodities Out Of Whack While most commodity indices exhibit strong and stable negative correlations with the U.S. dollar, many of these relationships were pushed out of their long-term equilibria in 2016, and, importantly, have remained out of whack for an unusually long period (Chart 2).5 In fact, we found most individual commodities and commodity groups haven't converged back to their long-term equilibrium correlation levels with the USD TWIB, and their respective divergences are once again moving higher (Chart 3). Chart 2CRB Sub-Indices Out Of Whack With USD Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Chart 3Short-Term Correlations Remain In Disequilibrium Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken As we've shown in previous research, commodity prices can remain in disequilibrium with the dollar when important fundamental (supply - demand) shocks dominate price formation.6 Table 2 shows which commodity groups are most out-of-equilibrium since 2016 relative to their long-term historical correlation. Energy, especially oil, and base metals groups are at the top of this list. Despite the fact that both of these groups are the most sensitive to the USD, based on our long-term analysis discussed above, the fact that they remain in disequilibria with the USD suggests the increase in the U.S. dollar we expect over the next 6 months will have a limited impact on these commodities. This leaves ags and, notably, precious metals, most vulnerable to the USD appreciation foreseen in our House view. Table 3 shows how the sensitivities of the different commodity groups vs. the USD TWIB have changed from 2015 to now versus the 2000 to 2015 period preceding it.7 Moreover, we see that in the shorter period between 2015 and now, the base metals and oil sensitivities (in red) are not significant. Economically, this means prices have disconnected from the USD during this period, owing to the overwhelming influence of supply-demand fundamentals on the price-formation process. Table 2Rank Of Rolling Correlation Divergences##BR##In 6-Month Vs. 5-Year Rolling Correlations Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Table 3Fundamentals Overwhelm##BR##USD's Influence Since 2015 Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken The most plausible explanation for this is base metals and oil markets experienced fundamental shocks over the period - especially since 2016, e.g. OPEC launching a market-share war in 2014 and surging production, followed by the OPEC 2.0 production cuts still in force in the market. In theory, and absent important fundamental (supply-demand) shocks in base metals and energy markets (e.g., a strike at major copper mines or an unexpected outcome at the OPEC 2.0 meeting next week), these correlations should converge back to the long-term equilibrium. However, the speed of convergence is unknown. As long as we observe a disequilibrium in the short-term correlations, we can assume that the disequilibrium will be maintained over the short term. The short-term correlation movements show most of the commodity groups were converging toward equilibrium in recent months, but have since reversed course, particularly oil (Chart 4 and Table 2). Chart 4Short- Vs. Long-Term Correlations Divergence Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken We believe the historic correlation levels between base metals and oil prices and the USD TWIB gradually will be restored. However, a number of factors will have to be monitored in order to determine the timing and the level around which the correlations will stabilize - i.e., close to the 2008 - 2013 levels or to those of the 2000 - 2007 period (Chart 5). We found that the EM/DM business cycle - i.e., the relative performance of EM to DM economies - as well as the shape of the oil forward curve generally can act as mediating factors in restoring the correlations of the USD TWIB and commodity prices.8 The stronger EM economies are relative to DM economies, or the more in contango the oil forward curve is, the more negative the correlations between commodities, especially oil and base metals, and the USD TWIB. Obviously, should the opposite occur, we would expect the weaker correlations to persist, although this might not constitute a complete disequilibrium. The mediating factors we mentioned can diminish or enhance the USD - Commodity correlations, but that does not mean they completely break them down. Chart 5Oil Vs. USD TWIB Correlation Remains Out Of Whack Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Bottom Line: Commodity prices disconnected from the U.S. dollar in 2015 - 16, which led to a rare environment in which the correlations between the USD TWIB and commodities became positive. Surprisingly, this disconnect remained in place for an extended period, which led us to revise our USD-elasticity ranking of commodity groups. As long as the fundamental shocks in the energy and base metals groups continue to dominate price formation in these markets, precious metals and ags will remain the most vulnerable groups to U.S. dollar appreciation. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "More delays to Nigerian Bonny Light as crude pipeline closes," published by Naija247 in Nigeria on June 11, 2018, and "Saudis Start to Ramp Up Oil Output, Ahead of OPEC Meeting," published by The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2018. See also BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding to Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," published on March 31, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the oil-producer coalition led by The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. 2 Please see "Escondida Union to Copper Investors: Bet on Quick Wage Deal," published by bloomberg.com, June 7, 2018, and "BHP responds to contract proposal from union at Chile's Escondida mine," published by uk.reuters.com on 11 June 2018. 3 These elasticities are the average coefficients for each commodity group we calculated using two different cointegrating regressions - Dynamic Ordinary Least Square and Panel - covering Jan 2000 to now. 4 Granger-causality measures the extent to which changes in one variable cause (or allow one to predict) changes in another variable. This is based on the work of the 2003 Nobel laureate, Clive Granger, who began publishing on this in 1969. Please see "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral Methods," Econometrica, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 1969), pp. 424-438. 5 We make sure the correlations we estimate use cointegrated random variables, which means the empirical results we get provide consistent estimates of actual population correlations. Please see Johansen, Soren (2007), "Correlation, regression, and cointegration of nonstationary economic time series," published by the Center for Research in Econometric Analysis of Time Series at the Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus. 6 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "OPEC 2.0 Vs. The Fed," dated February 08, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 These sensitivities are coefficients in cointegrating regressions, which, given the construction of the regressions, are elasticities. 8 Using threshold regressions, we found the USD impact on BM and energy prices is, on average, weaker when DM stock prices outperform that of EM and when the oil forward curve is backwardated. These two variables act as mediators to the USD-Commodity relationship, and can be used to project the strength of the relationship. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Correlations Vs. USD Weaken Correlations Vs. USD Weaken

Highlights Neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. Feature U.S. risk assets are rebounding amid solid economic news and rising hopes that another Eurozone financial crisis has been averted. Still, investors remain concerned about rising rates, protectionist trade policies, and the health of emerging market economies. In addition, market participants continue to scan the U.S. economic data in both the manufacturing and service sectors looking for signs that the late-cycle phase of the expansion is ending and that a recession is nigh. The NASDAQ and small cap U.S. stocks rallied past their February peaks last week, but the S&P 500 remains 3.7% below its early 2018 heights. Moreover, BCA's stock-to-bond ratio continues in an uptrend and we expect stocks to beat bonds in the next year. However, neither U.S. high-yield spreads nor the VIX have returned to their January lows. 10-year Treasury yields are 53 bps higher and the dollar is up by 5%. West Texas Intermediate oil prices peaked at $72.26/bbl on May 21. We discuss BCA's latest view on oil later in this report. U.S. economic growth remains solid. May's reading (58.6) on the ISM non-manufacturing index released last week is consistent with 3.5% real GDP growth. Moreover, the May sounding (58.7) on manufacturing indicates that the U.S. economy is growing near 5%. We discuss the signal from both the ISM's manufacturing and non-manufacturing indicators in the next section. In any case, U.S. economic activity in 1H 2018 will easily surpass the FOMC's view of both potential GDP growth (1.8%) and its estimate for actual growth in 2018 (2.7%) (Chart 1). The Fed will provide a new set of dot plots and economic forecasts this week. BCA expects the Fed to bump up rates this week and then gradually during the next year. The Fed and the market's view of the path of rates in the next 12 months is aligned (Chart 2). However, BCA's stance is that inflation will accelerate in 2019, which would elicit a more aggressive response from the central bank starting in the second half of 2019. Our view is that the Fed will stick to its gradual path unless economic growth is much weaker than expected or inflation spikes higher. Moreover, because inflation is at the Fed's 2% target and the economy is at full employment, the price at which the Fed's "policy put" gets exercised is much lower than earlier in the cycle. The implication is that neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Still, a wider trade war is a risk to U.S. and global growth, and we address this issue in the service sector below. Chart 11H GDP Tracking Well Above##BR##Potential & Fed's Forecast 1H GDP Tracking Well Above Potential & Fed's Forecast 1H GDP Tracking Well Above Potential & Fed's Forecast Chart 2Fed And Market Aligned##BR##On Rate Path In Next 12 Months Fed And Market Aligned On Rate Path In Next 12 Months Fed And Market Aligned On Rate Path In Next 12 Months On The Same Page The ISM surveys - manufacturing and non-manufacturing - are aligned. The top panel of Chart 3 shows that both metrics have climbed since their troughs in late 2015 (manufacturing) and early 2016 (non-manufacturing). These lows occurred amid EM-related economic and market turbulence. The 2015 nadir in the manufacturing series was more pronounced, thus the rise outpaced the non-manufacturing indicator (panel 2). U.S. financial markets, and the stock market more specifically, are sensitive to the performance of the manufacturing sector. The service sector accounts for 62% of U.S. economic activity and 86% of private-sector employment (Chart 4). Charts 5 and 6 show the relationship between the year-over-year change in BCA's stock-to-bond ratio and the level of manufacturing (Chart 5) versus non-manufacturing (Chart 6) composites. The relationship (r-squared 0.56) between our stock-to-bond ratio and the manufacturing sector is more robust that the r-squared (0.43) between the stock-to-bond ratio and the non-manufacturing sector. Chart 3Manufacturing And Non-Manufacturing ISM Are Aligned, But That's Not Always The Case Manufacturing And Non-Manufacturing ISM Are Aligned, But That's Not Always The Case Manufacturing And Non-Manufacturing ISM Are Aligned, But That's Not Always The Case Chart 4U.S. Economy Is 60% Services... U.S. Economy Is 60% Services... U.S. Economy Is 60% Services... Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, Charts 7 and 8 show that the financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. Between 1958 and 1988, the r-squared between our stock-to-bond ratio and manufacturing data was 0.19 (Chart 7). That increased to 0.34 from 1988 to 2018 (Chart 8). Chart 5Tighter Relationship Between##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio And Manufacturing ISM... At Your Service At Your Service Chart 6... Than With##BR##Non Manufacturing ISM At Your Service At Your Service Chart 7ISM Manufacturing Vs.##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio 1958-1988... At Your Service At Your Service Chart 8... And##BR##1988-2018 At Your Service At Your Service Chart 9 shows that there have been six other periods when the manufacturing index recovered more quickly than non-manufacturing. Five of the intervals were associated with EM stress.1 Moreover, as is currently the case, the economy was at or below full employment in four of the six occasions when manufacturing outpaced the service sector. Furthermore, the Fed initiated rate hikes in four of the seven episodes, including the current one (Appendix Chart 1). EM stocks tend to outpace U.S. equities as the non-manufacturing index rises faster than the manufacturing index. In addition, when the U.S. manufacturing sector is accelerating relative to the service sector, China's growth prospects (as measured by the LI Keqiang Index) improve. Chart 9Performance Of EM Assets When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM Performance Of EM Assets When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM Performance Of EM Assets When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM The peak in our Relative ISM composite index is consistent with BCA's view that the economic expansion that began in 2009 is nearing an end. Our Relative ISM Composite dipped prior to the 2001 recession, but began to rise as the 2007-2009 downturn commenced. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indices collapsed at the same pace prior to the 2007-2009 recession, because the breakdown of the banking system related to the housing crisis weighed on the non-manufacturing data. Unfortunately, the ISM non-manufacturing data only begins in 1997. However, using the goods and service-sector GDP as proxies for the ISM metrics, we find that the manufacturing sector tends to underperform the service sector in the late stages of an expansion (Chart 10). Our earlier work2 details the performance of U.S. financial assets in a late-cycle environment. Chart 10Manufacturing Sector Tends To Underperform The Service Sector In Late Cycle Environments Manufacturing Sector Tends To Underperform The Service Sector In Late Cycle Environments Manufacturing Sector Tends To Underperform The Service Sector In Late Cycle Environments Bottom Line: Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. While the U.S. economy will enjoy a strong rebound in the second quarter, leading economic indicators in most of the other major countries have rolled over. The advanced stage of the U.S. business cycle, heightened geopolitical risks and our bias for capital preservation keep us tactically cautious on risk assets again this month. Service Sector: An Update Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector (Chart 4 again), the majority of high frequency economic data measures activity in the manufacturing sector. However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS) initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the service sector which includes small- and medium-sized companies3 and produces timely revenue figures on a quarterly basis. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to paint a more accurate picture of national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private-fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers because it is very useful to track economic performance. Moreover, the QSS is an important source of revisions to real GDP because over 40% of the quarterly estimates of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) for services is based on the QSS. The "key services statistics" include information services, health care services, professional, scientific and technical services, administrative and support, and waste management and remediation services. The QSS for Q1 2018 found that total revenues for selected services fell by 1.2% over the previous quarter but rose 5.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and only non-seasonally adjusted data available). Nominal GDP climbed 4.7% year-over-year in Q1 (Chart 11). Several areas of the service economy saw sales growth in Q1 outpace nominal GDP. Sales were strongest in finance and insurance (+7.8%) followed by information (+7%). Real estate and rental leasing sales increased by 4.7% in the past year while revenue in health care & social assistance rose +3.4%. Together, sales in finance & insurance and health care & social assistance make up about 50% of total revenues. Chart 11Many Areas Of Service Sector##BR##Advancing Faster Than Nominal GDP Many Areas Of Service Sector Advancing Faster Than Nominal GDP Many Areas Of Service Sector Advancing Faster Than Nominal GDP Chart 12Sales Growth In The Service Sector##BR##Is Broad Based Sales Growth In The Service Sector Is Broad Based Sales Growth In The Service Sector Is Broad Based However, revenue growth in several categories decelerated in Q1 and grew more slowly than nominal GDP. Arts, entertainment and recreation, administration support and waste management, and other services are in this category. Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see a similar revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of Q1 real GDP in late June (Chart 12). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2018. This above-trend growth will continue to put downward pressure on the unemployment rate and push inflation higher, setting the stage for a more aggressive Fed next year and a recession in 2020. The Wrong Trade War? The large trade surplus in the U.S. service sector is a hidden source of strength for the economy and labor market (Chart 13). President Trump campaigned on his ability to create high-paying manufacturing jobs and he has focused his attention on the goods side of the U.S. trade deficit. Nonetheless, his America First rhetoric threatens jobs in the high-paying service sector. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has imported more than it has exported, acting as a drag on GDP growth. The trade gap reflects a large and persistent goods deficit, which more than offsets a growing trade surplus on the service side (Chart 14). U.S. imported goods exceeded exports by $807 billion in 2017. Service exports reached an all-time high of $798 billion in 2017 - $255 billion more than imports - up from $249 billion in 2016. It is too soon to tell if the smaller surplus in services is related to Trump's protectionist trade rhetoric. Exports of services have increased by 6% a year on average since 2000, which is nearly twice as fast as nominal GDP. Service exports expanded by just 4% in 2017 versus 2016, which is below the pace of nominal GDP (4.7%) The trade surplus in services subtracted 0.08% from real GDP in Q1 2018, but added 0.05% in 2017. Moreover, the trade surplus in services has consistently added to GDP growth over the past few decades, although the trade surplus in services is swamped by the large drag on GDP due to the trade deficit on goods. Industries where the U.S. enjoys a trade surplus have experienced job growth that is faster than in industries where the U.S. runs a deficit. In addition, median wages ($30.07 as of April 2018) among surplus-producing industries are more than 20% higher than in industries in the goods sector ($24.94) where there is a trade deficit. Moreover, wages in the trade-oriented service sector have escalated quicker than in the goods-producing sector in the past year (Chart 15). Chart 13The U.S. Runs Trade##BR##Surplus In Services... The U.S. Runs Trade Surplus In Services... The U.S. Runs Trade Surplus In Services... Chart 14...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset##BR##The Big Trade Deficit In Goods ...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset The Big Trade Deficit In Goods ...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset The Big Trade Deficit In Goods Chart 15Wages In Export-Led Service Industries##BR##21% Higher Than In Goods Sector Wages In Export-Led Service Industries 21% Higher Than In Goods Sector Wages In Export-Led Service Industries 21% Higher Than In Goods Sector Furthermore, exports in the U.S. service sector tend to compete on quality (not on price) and, therefore, will not be as affected as U.S. goods exports if the dollar meets BCA's forecast for a modest increase this year (Chart 16). That said, the Trump administration's trade policies threaten to reduce the U.S.'s global dominance in services. Chart 16Services Exports Compete On Quality, Not Price Services Exports Compete On Quality, Not Price Services Exports Compete On Quality, Not Price Table 1 shows that the U.S. has the largest trade surplus in travel ($82 billion surplus in 2016), intellectual property ($80 billion), financial services ($73 billion) and other business services ($43 billion), which includes legal, accounting, consulting and architectural services. The U.S. also runs a surplus in maintenance and repair services. Table 1Key Components Of U.S. Trade Surplus In Services At Your Service At Your Service Trump's trade and immigration policies put this trade surplus at risk. In 2016, foreigners spent $82 billion more to vacation in, travel to, and be educated in the U.S. than what U.S. citizens spent on those services overseas. Moreover, a recent U.N. report4 noted that "Global flows of foreign direct investment fell by 23 per cent in 2017. Cross-border investment in developed and transition economies dropped sharply, while growth was near zero in developing economies." If foreign governments continue to react to Trump's directives on trade and immigration, then the U.S. trade advantage in financial services ($73 billion), software services ($29 billion), TV and film rights ($12 billion), architectural services ($5 billion) and advertising ($10 billion) will also be at risk. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions on trade and globalism potentially risks America's dominance in the service sector. In theory, U.S. trade restrictions could add to U.S. GDP growth via increased manufacturing output and a smaller goods trade deficit. However, many U.S. trading partners have already announced tariffs on U.S. goods which will put the brakes on growth. Even so, any gains on the manufacturing trade front could be largely offset by damage to the U.S. surplus in services trade. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects that trade-related uncertainty will persist at least until the midterm elections in November.5 On a related note, an increase in onshore oil production in the past 10 years reduced the U.S's large trade deficit in petroleum and petroleum products. BCA's energy strategists recently updated their oil price and production forecasts for this year and next. Still Bullish On Oil BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service remains bullish on oil, although two key elements of the outlook makes forecasting particularly difficult.6 Our base case forecast has been bullish for some time, based on our assumption that OPEC 2.0 would retain its previous output cuts, at least through the end of 2018. Venezuela's production has contracted sharply and we penciled in a further modest decline. Iranian exports will also shrink due to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. The only substantial growth on the production side is expected to come from U.S. shale producers. The supply/demand backdrop pointed toward higher prices with world demand projected to remain robust. We estimated that Brent could reach $90/bbl early next year. Chart 17Ensemble Forecast Accounts For##BR##Collapse In Venezuela's Exports Ensemble Forecast Accounts For Collapse In Venezuela's Exports Ensemble Forecast Accounts For Collapse In Venezuela's Exports However, some major oil consumers, including the U.S., are starting to complain. The U.S. has asked the OPEC 2.0 countries to increase output, which may remove further upward pressure on prices. OPEC 2.0's leadership has signaled that it will consider reversing the production cuts during the second half of this year. This could add an extra 870 b/d of production. The other major unknown is how much further Venezuelan production will slide. Our oil strategists have run alternative scenarios to gauge the risks to the base case. The optimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 retaining production cuts and Venezuelan production dipping by another 1m b/d. The pessimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 reversing the production cuts, while Venezuelan production erodes modestly compared with the base and optimistic cases. Chart 17 shows that Brent hits $100/bbl in 2019 in the optimistic case, but drops to $60 in the pessimistic scenario. The ensemble forecast, shown in red in Chart 17, is a weighted average of the three scenarios. It shows that the price of oil will be roughly flat over the next 18 months. Bottom Line: Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix Chart 1Fed Policy And Labor Market Slack When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM Fed Policy And Labor Market Slack When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM Fed Policy And Labor Market Slack When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Cleanup On Aisle Two", published June 4, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," published October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.census.gov/services/qss/about_the_survey.html 4 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_overview_en.pdf 5 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again", published May 31,2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Investors are underestimating the risks of U.S.-Iran tensions; The Obama administration's 2015 deal resulted in Iran curbing aggressive regional behavior that threatened global oil supply; The U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran has not improved; Unlike North Korea, Iran can retaliate against the Trump administration's "Maximum Pressure" doctrine - particularly in Iraq; U.S.-Iran conflicts will negatively affect global oil supply, critical geographies, and sectarian tensions - hence a geopolitical risk premium is warranted. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy (CES) desk is using a new ensemble forecast, which takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl, and WTI to $70/bbl from $72/bbl. For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and WTI goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well. Feature Following the roll-out of our oil-price ensemble model last week, we are publishing a Special Report written by our colleague Marko Papic, who runs BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. This report explores the more nuanced aspects of the U.S. - Iran sanctions conflict, and why the contest for Iraq is important for investors. We also summarize our latest forecast. We trust you will find this analysis informative, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Tensions between the U.S. and Iran snuck up on the markets (Chart 1), even though President Trump's policy agenda was well telegraphed via rhetoric, action, and White House personnel moves.1 Still, investors doubt the market relevance of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement between Iran and the P5+1.2 Chart 1Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Several reasons to fade the risks - and hence to fade any implications for global oil supply - have become conventional wisdom. These include the alleged ability of OPEC and Russia to boost production and Washington's supposed ineffectiveness without an internationally binding sanction regime. Chart 2BCA's Updated Ensemble Forecast:##BR##Brent Averages /bbl in 2H18 BCA's Updated Ensemble Forecast: Brent Averages $76/bbl in 2H18 BCA's Updated Ensemble Forecast: Brent Averages $76/bbl in 2H18 Our view is that investors and markets are underestimating the geopolitical, economic, and financial relevance of the U.S.-Iran tensions. First, the ideological rhetoric surrounding the original U.S.-Iran détente tends to be devoid of strategic analysis. Second, Iran's hard power capabilities are underestimated. Third, OPEC 2.0's ability to tap into its spare capacity is overestimated.3 CES's updated ensemble forecast takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl previously, and its WTI forecast to $70/bbl from $72/bbl (Chart 2). For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and its WTI expectation goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well, as markets continue to process sometimes-conflicting news flows. This means spike to and through $80/bbl for Brent are more likely than markets currently anticipate. Why Did The U.S.-Iran Détente Emerge In 2015? Both detractors and defenders of the 2015 nuclear deal often misunderstand the logic of the deal. First, the defenders are wrong when they claim that the deal creates a robust mechanism that ensures that Iran will never produce a nuclear device. Given that the most critical components of the deal expire in 10 or 15 years, it is simply false to assert that the deal is a permanent solution. More importantly, Iran already reached "breakout capacity" in mid-2013, which means that it had already achieved the necessary know-how to become a nuclear power.4 We know because we wrote about it at the time, using the data of Iran's cumulative production of enriched uranium provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).5 In August 2013, Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, produced at the impregnable Fordow facility, reached 200kg (Chart 3). Chart 3Iran's Negotiating Leverage Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict At that point, Israeli threats of attacking Iran became vacuous, as the Israeli air force lacked the necessary bunker-busting technology to penetrate Fordow.6 As we wrote in 2013, this critical moment gave Tehran the confidence to give up "some material/physical components of its nuclear program as it has developed the human capital necessary to achieve nuclear status."7 The JCPOA forced Iran to stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility altogether and to give up its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20%. However, Iran only agreed to the deal because it had reached a level of technological know-how that has not been eliminated by mothballing centrifuges and "converting" facilities to civilian nuclear research. Iran is a nuclear power in all but name. Second, the detractors of the JCPOA are incorrect when they claim that Iran did not give up any regional hegemony when it signed the deal. This criticism focuses on Iran's expanded role in the Syrian Civil War since 2011, as well as its traditional patronage networks with the Lebanese Shia militants Hezbollah and with Yemen's Houthis. However, critics ignore several other, far more critical, fronts of Iranian influence: Strait of Hormuz: In 2012, Iran's nearly daily threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were very much a clear and present danger for global investors (Map 1). Although we argued in 2012 that Iran's capability was limited to a 10-day closure, followed by another month during which they could threaten the safe passage of vessels through the Strait, even such a short crisis would add a considerable risk premium to oil markets given that it would remove about 17-18 million bbl/day from global oil supply (Chart 4).8 Since 2012, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities have largely stayed the same.9 Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Chart 4Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq: The key geographic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran is Iraq (Map 2). Iran filled the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. It deployed members of the infamous Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Iraq to support the initial anti-American insurgency. Iran's support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was critical following the American withdrawal in 2011, particularly as his government became increasingly focused on anti-Sunni insurgency. Map 2Iraq: A Buffer Between Saudi Arabia And Iran Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Bahrain: Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Bahrain experienced social unrest in 2011. The majority of Bahrain's population are Shia, while the country is ruled by the Saudi-aligned, Sunni, Al Khalifa monarchy. The majority of Shia protests were at least rhetorically, and some reports suggest materially, supported by Iran. To quell the protests, and preempt any potential Iranian interference, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force. Eastern Province: Similar to the unrest in Bahrain, Shia protests engulfed Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011. The province is highly strategic, as it is where nearly all of Saudi oil production, processing, and transportation facilities are located (Map 1). Like Bahrain, it has a large Shia population. Saudi security forces cracked down on the uprising and have continued to do so, with paramilitary operations lasting into 2017. While Iranian involvement in the protests is unproven, it has been suspected. Anti-Israel Rhetoric: Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran threatened Israel with destruction on a regular basis. While these were mostly rhetorical attacks, the implication of the threat was that any attack against Iran and its nuclear facilities would result in retaliation against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq and direct military action against Israel. Both defenders and detractors of the JCPOA are therefore mistaken. The JCPOA does not impact Iran's ability to achieve "breakout capacity" given that it already reached it in mid-2013. And Iran's regional influence has not expanded since the deal was signed in 2015. In fact, since the détente in 2015, and in some cases since negotiations between the Obama administration and Tehran began in 2013, Iran has been a factor of stability in the Middle East. Specifically, Iran has willingly: Stopped threatening the Strait of Hormuz (the last overt threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were made in 2012); Acquiesced to Nouri al-Maliki's ousting as Prime Minister of Iraq in 2014 and his replacement by the far more moderate and less sectarian Haider al-Abadi; Stopped meddling in Bahraini and Saudi internal affairs; Stopped threatening Israel's existence (although its material support for Hezbollah clearly continues and presents a threat to Israel's security); Participated in joint military operations with the U.S. military against the Islamic State, cooperation without which Baghdad would have most likely fallen to the Sunni radicals in late 2014. The final point is worth expanding on. After the fall of Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - to the Islamic State in May 2014, Iranian troops and military advisors on the ground in Iraq cooperated with the U.S. air force to arrest and ultimately reverse the gains by the radical Sunni terrorist group. Without direct Iranian military cooperation - and without Tehran's material and logistical support for the Iraqi Shia militias - the Islamic State could not have been eradicated from Iraq (Map 3). Map 3The Collapse Of A Would-Be Caliphate Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict How did such a dramatic change in Tehran's foreign policy emerge between 2012 and 2015? Iranian leadership realized in 2012 that the U.S. military and economic threats against it were real. Internationally coordinated sanctions had a damaging effect on the economy, threatening to destabilize a regime that had experienced social upheaval in the 2009 Green Revolution (Chart 5). It therefore began negotiations almost immediately after the imposition of stringent economic sanctions in early and mid-2012.10 Chart 5Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite To facilitate the negotiations, the Guardian Council of Iran disqualified President Ahmadinejad's preferred candidate for the 2013 Iranian presidential elections, while allowing Hassan Rouhani's candidacy.11 Rouhani, a moderate, won the June 2013 election in a landslide win, giving him a strong political mandate to continue the negotiations and, relatedly, to pursue economic development. Many commentators forget, however, that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run in the first place, knowing full well that he would likely win. In other words, Rouhani's victory revealed the preferences of the Iranian regime to negotiate and adjust its foreign policy. Bottom Line: The 2015 U.S.-Iran détente traded American acquiescence in Iranian nuclear development - frozen at the point of "breakout capacity" - in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. As such, focusing on just the JCPOA, without considering the totality of Iranian behavior before and since the deal, is a mistake. Iran curbed its influence in several regional hot spots - almost all of which are critical to global oil supply. The Obama administration essentially agreed to Iran becoming a de facto nuclear power in exchange for Iran backing away from aggressive regional behavior. This included Iran's jeopardizing the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz either by directly threatening to close the channel or through covert actions in Bahrain and the Eastern Province. The U.S. also drove Iran to accept a far less sectarian Iraq, by forcing out the ardently pro-Tehran al-Maliki and replacing him with a prime minister far more acceptable to Saudi Arabia and Iraqi Sunnis. Why Did The U.S. Chose Diplomacy In 2011? The alternative to the above deal was some sort of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. contemplated such action in late 2011. Two options existed, either striking Iran's facilities with its own military or allowing Israel to do it themselves. One reason to choose diplomacy and economic sanctions over war was the limited capability of Israel to attack Iran alone.13 Israel does not possess strategic bombing capability. As such, it would have required a massive air flotilla of bomber-fighters to get to the Iranian nuclear facilities. While the Israeli air force has the capability to reach Iranian facilities and bomb them, their effectiveness is dubious and the ability to counter Iranian retaliatory capacity with follow-up strikes is non-existent. Chart 6Great Power Competition Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict The second was the fact that a U.S. strike against Iran would be exceedingly complex. Compared to previous Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq (Operation Opera 1981) and Syria (Operation Outside The Box 2007), Iran presented a much more challenging target. Its superior surface-to-air missile capability would necessitate a prolonged, and dangerous, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission. In parallel, the U.S. would have to preemptively strike Iran's ballistic missile launching pads as well as its entire navy, so as to obviate Iran's ability to retaliate against international shipping or the U.S. and its allies in the region. The U.S. also had a strategic reason to avoid entangling itself in yet another military campaign in the Middle East. The public was war-weary and the Obama administration gauged that in a world where global adversaries like China and Russia were growing in geopolitical power, avoiding another major military confrontation in a region of decreasing value to U.S. interests (thanks partly to growing U.S. shale oil production) was of paramount importance (Chart 6). Notable in 2011 was growing Chinese assertiveness throughout East Asia (please see the Appendix on page 24). Particularly alarming was the willingness of Beijing to assert dubious claims to atolls and isles in the South China Sea, a globally vital piece of real estate (Diagram 1). There was a belief - which has at best only partially materialized - that if the United States divested itself of the Middle East, then it could focus more intently on countering China's challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in East Asia and the Pacific. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Bottom Line: The Obama administration therefore chose a policy of military posturing toward Iran to establish a credible threat. The military option was signaled in order to get the international community - both allies and adversaries - on board with tough economic sanctions. The ultimate deal, the JCPOA, did not give the U.S. and its allies everything they wanted precisely because they did not enter the negotiations from a position of preponderance of power. Critics of the JCPOA ignore this reality and assume that going back to the status quo ante bellum will somehow improve the U.S. negotiating position. It won't. What Happens If The U.S.-Iran Détente Ends? The Trump administration is serious about applying its Maximum Pressure tactics on Iran. Buoyed by the successful application of this strategy in North Korea, the White House believes that it can get a better deal with Tehran. We do not necessarily disagree. It is indeed true that the U.S. is a far more powerful country than Iran, with a far more powerful military. On a long enough timeline, with enough pressure, it ought to be able to force Tehran to concede, assuming that credible threats are used.14 Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration will presumably rely on Israel far less, and on its own military capability a lot more, to deliver those threats, which should be more effective. The problem is that the timeline on which such a strategy would work is likely to be a lot longer with Iran than with North Korea. This is because Iran's retaliatory capabilities are far greater than the one-trick-pony Pyongyang, which could effectively only launch ballistic missiles and threaten all-out war with U.S. and its regional allies.15 While those threats are indeed worrisome, they are also vacuous as they would lead to a total war in which the North Korean regime would meet its demise. Iran has a far more effective array of potential retaliation that can serve a strategic purpose without leading to total war. As we listed above, it could rhetorically threaten the Strait of Hormuz or attempt to incite further unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The key retaliation could be to take the war to Iraq. The just-concluded election in Iraq appears to have favored Shia political forces not allied to Iran, including the Alliance Towards Reform (Saairun) led by the infamous cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr (Chart 7). Surrounding this election, various Iranian policymakers and military leaders have said that they would not allow Iraq to drift outside of Iran's sphere of influence, a warning to the nationalist Sadr who has fought against both the American and Iranian military presence in his country. Iraq is not only a strategic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional rivals, but also a critical source of global oil supply, having brought online about half as much new supply as U.S. shale since 2011 (Chart 8). If Iranian-allied Shia factions engage in an armed confrontation with nationalist Shias allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, such a conflict will not play out in irrelevant desert governorates, as the fight against the Islamic State did. Chart 7Iraqi Elections Favored Shiites But Not Iran Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Chart 8Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Instead, a Shia-on-Shia conflict would play out precisely in regions with oil production and transportation facilities. In 2008, for example, Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fought a brief civil war against Sadr's Mahdi Army in what came to be known as the "Battle of Basra." While Iran had originally supported Sadr in his insurgency against the U.S., it came to Maliki's support in that brief but deadly six-day conflict. Basra is Iraq's chief port through which much of the country's oil exports flow. Iraq may therefore become a critical battleground as Iran retaliates against U.S. Maximum Pressure. From Iran's perspective, holding onto influence in Iraq is critical. It is the transit route through which Iran has established an over-land connection with its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Map 4). Threatening Iraqi oil exports, or even causing some of the supply to come off-line, would also be a convenient way to reduce the financial costs of the sanctions. A 500,000 b/d loss of exports - at an average price of $70 per barrel (as Brent has averaged in 2018) - could roughly be compensated by an increase in oil prices by $10 per barrel, given Iran's total exports. As such, Iran, faced with lost supply due to sanctions, will have an incentive to make sure that prices go up (i.e., that rivals do not simply replace Iranian supply, keeping prices more or less level). The easiest way to accomplish this, to add a geopolitical risk premium to oil prices, is through the meddling in Iraqi affairs. Map 4Iran Needs Iraq To Project Power Through The Levant Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict It is too early to forecast with a high degree of confidence precisely how the U.S.-Iran confrontation will develop. However, Diagram 2 offers our take on the path towards retaliation. Diagram 2Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict The critical U.S. sanctions against Iran will become effective on November 4 (Box 1). We believe that the Trump administration is serious and that it will force European allies, as well as South Korea and Japan, to cease imports of oil from Iran. China will be much harder to cajole. Box 1: Iranian Sanction Timeline President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum to re-impose all U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA. The Office of Foreign Assets Control expects all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA to be re-imposed and in full effect after November 4, 2018. However, there are two schedules by which sanctions will be re-imposed, a 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods.1 Sanctions Re-Imposed After August 6, 2018 The first batch of sanctions that will be re-imposed will come into effect 90 days after the announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. These include: Sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of several commodities (including gold), semi-finished metals, and industrial process software; Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran; Sanctions on trade in Iranian currency and facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector; Sanctions on export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Sanctions Re-Imposed After November 4, 2018 The second batch of sanctions will come into effect 180 days after the announced Trump administration JCPOA withdrawal decision. These include: Sanctions on Iranian port operators, shipping, and shipbuilding activities; Sanctions against petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); Sanctions against the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; Sanctions on transactions and provision of financial messaging services by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran; Sanctions on Iran's energy sector; Sanctions on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services. 1a Please see the U.S. Treasury Department, "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," dated May 8, 2018, available at www.treasury.gov. By Q1 2019, the impact on Iranian oil exports will be clear. We suspect that Iran will, at that point, have the choice of either relenting to Trump's Maximum Pressure, or escalating tensions through retaliation. We give the latter a much higher degree of confidence and suspect that a cycle of retaliation and Maximum Pressure would lead to a conditional probability of war between Iran and the U.S. of around 20%. This is a significant number, and it is critical if President Trump wants to apply credible threats of war to Iran. Bottom Line: Unlike North Korea, Iran has several levers it can use to retaliate against U.S. Maximum Pressure. Iran agreed to set these levers aside as negotiations with the Obama administration progressed, and it has kept them aside since the conclusion of the JCPOA. It is therefore easy for Tehran to resurrect them against the Trump administration. Critical among these levers is meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. Not only is Iraq critical to Iran's regional influence; it is also key to global oil supply. We suspect that a cycle of Iranian retaliation and American Maximum Pressure raises the probability of U.S.-Iran military confrontation to 20%. We will be looking at several key factors in assessing whether the U.S. and Iran are heading towards a confrontation. To that end, we have compiled a U.S.-Iran confrontation checklist (Table 1). Table 1Will The U.S. Attack Iran? Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Investment Implications Over the past several years, there have been many geopolitical crises in the Middle East. We have tended to fade most of them, from a perspective of a geopolitical risk premium applied to oil prices. This is because we always seek the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying, market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. In 2015, we identified three factors that we believe are critical for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications.16 These are: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Renewed sanctions against Iran do so directly. So would Iranian retaliation in Iraq or the Persian Gulf. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Re-imposed sanctions obviously directly impact Iran as they could increase domestic political crisis. A potential Iranian proxy-war in Iraq would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni vs. Shia - which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. A renewed U.S.-Iran tensions check all of our factors. The risk is therefore real and should be priced by the market through a geopolitical risk premium. In addition, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for oil markets in 2019 by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing most of the production gains that Iran has made since 2016 (Chart 9). This is a problem given that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been significantly cut. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Energy Sector Strategy teams believe that global petroleum inventories will be further reduced in 2019 (Chart 10). Chart 9Current And Future Iran##BR##Production Is At Risk Current And Future Iran Production Is At Risk Current And Future Iran Production Is At Risk Chart 10Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories,##BR##Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated What about the hints from the OPEC 2.0 alliance that they would surge production in light of supply loss from Iran? Oil prices fell on the belief OPEC 2.0 could easily restore 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. Our commodity strategists have always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually achieved (Chart 11). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 12). Furthermore, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.2 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 13). Chart 11Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing##BR##1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 12Secondary##BR##OPEC 2.0 Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Chart 13Venezuela Is##BR##A Bigger Risk Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk 2H18, 2019 Oil Forecasts BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy updated its forecast last week, after the leaders of OPEC 2.0 indicated member states would be considering putting as much as 1mm b/d back on the market, following the price run-up accurately called from the beginning of this year. KSA and Russian are not being explicit about what they intend to do. In the background are the U.S.'s renewed Iran sanctions discussed above, which could remove ~ 500k b/d from the export markets by the end of 1H19, and the increasingly likely collapse of Venezuela's exports, which could remove ~ 1mm b/d. Against this, we have production in the U.S. shales increasing this year and next by ~ 1.3 - 1.4mm b/d to offset these potential losses, but even there we're seeing problems getting the shale oil out of the U.S.17 That's why CES went to an ensemble forecast, and will keep it in place as the market continues to process these conflicting signals (Chart 14). While some production will be restored to the market this year, it will be a drawn-out process, given CES's view OPEC 2.0 does not want to undo the hard work it took to drain OECD oil inventories (Chart 15). CES's Brent forecast was lowered $2/bbl in 2H18 and $7/bbl in 2019 to $76/bbl and to $73/bbl, respectively. CES's WTI forecast for 2H18 also was lowered $2/bbl to $70/bbl, while our 2019 forecast is now at $67/bbl, down $5/bbl vs. our previous forecast. Chart 14Factors In BCA's Ensemble Forecast Factors In BCA's Ensemble Forecast Factors In BCA's Ensemble Forecast Chart 15Balances Will Loosen If Supply Increases Balances Will Loosen If Supply Increases Balances Will Loosen If Supply Increases CES continues to expect continued strength on the demand side, with global oil consumption growing 1.7mm b/d. This will be driven by steady income growth in EM economies. One of the principal gauges CES uses to assess EM demand - import volumes - continues to move higher on a year-on-year basis, signaling incomes continue to expand (Chart 16). EM growth accounts for 1.3 of the 1.7mm b/d of growth we're expecting in 2018 and 2019. In forthcoming research, CES will be looking more deeply into the evolution of demand and the threat - if any - higher prices pose for EM growth. As was noted in last week's CES publication,17 consumers in many states no longer are shielded from high oil prices, as they were in the past: Governments around the world used the collapse in prices beginning in 2014 to remove/reduce fuel subsidies. This changes the dynamics of EM oil demand considerably, even if governments feel compelled to step into markets and order suppliers to not pass through the entire price increase. OPEC 2.0's leaders - KSA and Russia - appear united in their view of what is required to keep oil markets balanced over the long haul, so as not to disincentivize consumers from purchasing cars and trucks and the motor fuel required to run them. But over the short term, their goals differ. KSA is looking to IPO Saudi Aramco - next year, according to the latest reports - and this sale would most definitely benefit from higher prices. Indeed, KSA's oil minister Khalid al-Falih appeared to be comfortable with prices pushing toward $80/bbl recently. Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, has said in the past he favors an oil price somewhere between $50 and $60/bbl. CES continues to believe the dominant price risks remain on the upside - at 28.31% and 12.12%, markets continue to underestimate the probability Brent prices will trade above $80 and $90/bbl this year and next (Chart 17). Chart 16Strong EM Commodity Demand Expected,##BR##As Incomes And Imports Continue To Grow Strong EM Commodity Demand Expected, As Incomes And Imports Continue To Grow Strong EM Commodity Demand Expected, As Incomes And Imports Continue To Grow Chart 17Oil Markets Continue To Underestimate##BR##Upside Price Risks In 2H18 And 2019 Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Bottom Line: A renewal of U.S. - Iran tensions throws up real risks that are not being fully priced by the oil markets at present. They raise the probability global oil supplies out of the Middle East will be directly threatened, and that tensions in Iran and Iraq will flare into proxy wars. Such an outcome would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Lastly, rising tensions could exacerbate sectarian conflict in the Middle East as a whole, particularly along the Sunni - Shia divide, which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The JCPOA was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany (the "+1" of the P5+1). 3 BCA's Senior Commodity & Energy Strategist Robert P. Ryan has given the name "OPEC 2.0" to the Saudi-Russian alliance that is focused on regaining a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," dated March 30, 2017; and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" dated April 6, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Breakout" nuclear capacity is defined here as having enough uranium enriched at lower levels, such as at 20%, to produce sufficient quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear device. The often-reported amount of 20% enriched uranium required for breakout capacity is 200kg. However, the actual amount of uranium required depends on the number of centrifuges being employed and their efficiency. In our 2013 report, we gauged that Iran could produce enough HEU within 4-5 weeks at the Fordow facility to develop a weapon, which means that it had effectively reached "breakout capacity." 5 Please see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions Of Security Council Resolutions In The Islamic Republic Of Iran," IAEA Board Report, dated August 28, 2013, available at www.iaea.org. 6 Although, in a move designed to increase pressure on Iran and its main trade partners, the Obama administration sold Israel the GBU-28 bunker-busting ordinance. That specific ordinance is very powerful, but still not capable enough to penetrate Fordow. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Special Report, "Crisis In The Persian Gulf: Investment Implications," dated March 1, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 There are four U.S. Navy Avenger-class minesweepers based in Bahrain as part of the joint U.S.-U.K. TF-52. This number has been the same since 2012, when they were deployed to the region. 10 Particularly crippling for Iran's economy was the EU oil embargo imposed in January 2012, effective from July of that year, and the banning of Iranian financial institutions from participating in the SWIFT system in March 2012. 11 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is a 12-member, unelected body wielding considerable power in Iran. It has consistently disqualified reformist candidates from running in elections, which makes its approval of Rouhani's candidacy all the more significant. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reality Check: Israel Will Not Bomb Iran (Ever)," dated August 14, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 The NATO war with Yugoslavia in 1999 reveals how challenging SEAD missions can be if the adversary refuses to engage its air defense systems. The U.S. and its NATO allies bombed Serbia and its forces for nearly three months with limited effectiveness against the country's surface-to-air capabilities. The Serbian military simply refused to turn on its radar installations, making U.S. AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, designed to home in on electronic transmissions coming from radar systems, ineffective. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threats,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: A Tale Of Red Herrings And Black Swans," dated October 14, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," published May 31, 2018.It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict

Highlights Chart of the WeekBCA's Ensemble Forecast Vs. Base Case BCA's Ensemble Forecast Vs. Base Case BCA's Ensemble Forecast Vs. Base Case With OPEC 2.0 signaling it will consider raising production in 2H18 to cover unexpected losses from Venezuela, and rising odds that state's output will cease, we've adopted an ensemble approach to forecast benchmark crude oil prices. This ensemble includes: i) our existing base case - steady demand and a loss of 500k b/d from Iran; ii) OPEC 2.0 restoring production cuts in 2H18; and, iii) explicit odds Venezuela's ~ 1mm b/d of exports collapse (Chart of the Week).1 We expect definitive output guidance following OPEC 2.0's June 22 meeting. For now, our base case dominates our 2H18 forecast, given our expectation any increase in production will be slowly restored to the market. Next year we see a higher probability most of OPEC 2.0's cuts will be restored. The odds that Venezuela's exports collapse goes from 20% in 2H18 to 30% in 2019. This ensemble forecast takes our 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl, and our WTI forecast to $70/bbl from $72/bbl. For next year, our Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and our WTI expectation goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. We expect higher volatility, as well. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Spot Brent and WTI prices fell ~ 6% in the past week, as OPEC 2.0 signaled member states were considering restoring production. We remain long call spreads and the energy-heavy S&P GSCI, believing markets over-reacted to the news. Base Metals: Neutral. India's Tamil Nadu state government ordered the country's largest copper smelter shut, following rioting over alleged pollution from the plant, according to Bloomberg. This removes 400k MT of capacity from the market.2 Precious Metals: Neutral. Rising geopolitical risks in Italy are supporting gold prices, despite a stronger USD. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The re-emergence of U.S.-Sino trade tensions weighed on corn and soybean futures this week. This comes despite an ongoing truckers' strike in Brazil, which has been supporting soybean prices.3 Feature Just when it looked like OPEC 2.0 would keep its production cuts in place for the rest of the year, the coalition's leadership is signaling it will consider reversing production cuts during 2H18. Needless to say, this makes the task of forecasting prices more difficult. Guidance coming from the St. Petersburg Economic Forum at the end of last week was not definitive - it resembled more of a trial balloon. Press reports suggest as much as 1mm b/d of product cuts could gradually be restored to the market over 2H18, which would loosen global balances relative to our previous expectation (Chart 2). Still, Russia's energy minister Alexander Novak declined to confirm these cuts would be made.4 By our reckoning, some 1.2mm b/d of production actually has been cut by OPEC 2.0 since January 2017, mostly from KSA and Russia, which together account for close to 1mm b/d of the total. The big surprise on the production side has been the collapse of Venezuela, which went from just under 2.1mm b/d of crude output in Nov/16 - the month against which production targets were set under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement - to ~ 1.4mm b/d at present. We have Venezuela's production falling to 1.2mm b/d by the end of this year, and 1.0mm b/d by the end of 2019. We expect Iranian exports to fall ~ 200k b/d at the end of 2018, and another 300k b/d by the end of 1H19 in our base case model, as a result of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against it. This takes total Iranian export losses to 500k b/d by 2H19 in our base case. The only substantial growth on the production side is coming from U.S. shales in our base case, with production expected to be up 1.28mm b/d this year to 6.52mm, and 7.98mm b/d in 2019. Even this growth, however, could be constricted/delayed due to pipeline bottlenecks in the Permian. With demand expected to remain strong - growing at 1.7mm b/d this year and next in our models - market balances were tightening, and OECD inventories were falling appreciably (Chart 3). Chart 2Restoring OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts##BR##Would Loosen Global Balances Restoring OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Would Loosen Global Balances Restoring OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Would Loosen Global Balances Chart 3Inventories Would Draw Less If##BR##OPEC 2.0 Production Is Restored In 2018 Inventories Would Draw Less If OPEC 2.0 Production Is Restored In 2018 Inventories Would Draw Less If OPEC 2.0 Production Is Restored In 2018 The collapse of Venezuela's output did appreciably accelerate the tightening of the market, and lifted prices beyond the level that would have prevailed had this production not been lost to the market. This contraction, combined with the threatened re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, prompted leaders in important consumer markets to warn growth could be at risk with the oil-price rise potentially fueling inflation and inflation expectations - leading central banks, particularly the Fed, to continue tightening monetary policy. As gasoline, jet fuel and diesel prices rise, a greater share of household budgets goes toward purchasing hydrocarbons, which, all else equal, stifles growth if rising incomes cannot absorb the higher prices.5 Consumer Protests Registered With OPEC 2.0 Leaders in large oil-consuming states - particularly India, China and the U.S. - registered their dissatisfaction with high energy prices over the past month with OPEC 2.0, most notably when U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted his displeasure in April. OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo recalled the tweet at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum last week, saying, "I think I was prodded by his excellency Khalid Al-Falih that probably there was a need for us to respond. We in OPEC always pride ourselves as friends of the United States."6 Consumers in many states no longer are shielded from high oil prices, as governments around the world used the collapse in prices beginning in 2014 to remove/reduce fuel subsidies.7 This changes the dynamics of EM oil demand considerably, even if governments feel compelled to step into markets and order suppliers to not pass through the entire price increase. KSA and Russia appear largely united in their view of what is required to keep oil markets balanced over the long haul, so as not to disincentivize consumers from purchasing motor fuels. But over the short term, their goals differ. KSA is looking to IPO Saudi Aramco - next year, according to the latest reports - and this sale would most definitely benefit from higher prices. Indeed, KSA's oil minister Khalid al-Falih appeared to be comfortable with prices pushing toward $80/bbl recently. Russia's Novak has said in the past he favors an oil price somewhere between $50 and $60/bbl.8 Moving To Ensemble Forecasts Reconciling OPEC 2.0's short- and long-term goals, particularly the coalition's apparent new-found desire to be responsive to consumer interests; rising geopolitical tensions involving significant exporting states; and rising odds Venezuela implodes, and its exports are lost to the market, complicates the price-forecasting process considerably. In order to give full account to the different paths these uncertain influences will have on prices, we've adopted an ensemble model, in which we forecast three separate price paths: A base case, using our existing fundamental inputs and econometric modeling, which we published last week; A production-restoration case, where 870k b/d of production is restored to markets by OPEC 2.0 over 2H18 to compensate for the unexpected loss of Venezuela's output; The complete collapse of Venezuela's oil exports - amounting to ~ 1mm b/d - which we also published last week.9 In our base case, we use our standard fundamental model inputs - global production, consumption and OECD inventories - to forecast prices for this year and next (Table 1). The production-restoration and the Venezuela-export collapse models are boundary cases for our ensemble forecast, which is particularly important in 2019. The production restoration case leads to 870k b/d of OPEC 2.0 production coming back on line over the course of 2H18, with Venezuelan production deteriorating slowly, which is bearish for prices. The Venezuela-export collapse case results in a significant loss in production - 1mm b/d of Venezuela exports beginning in Jun/18 - which is bullish for prices, even with 1.2mm b/d of output being restored by OPEC 2.0 over the course of 2H18. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again To generate the ensemble forecast, we weight the three cases above, with our base case dominating the model in 2H18, and falling off in 2019, while the production-restoration case dominates our outlook in 2019 (Chart 4). We also increase the probability of Venezuela's 1mm b/d collapsing over this interval - going from a 20% chance in Jun/18 to 30% in Dec/19. We will be continually updating these estimated probabilities (Table 2). Table 2BCA Ensemble Forecast Components OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again As we approach OPEC 2.0's June 22 meeting in Vienna, we expect more definitive guidance from KSA and Russia, which will allow us to refine these probabilities. In addition, we expect volatility to increase, as changes in forward guidance and uncertainty in physical markets increases the rate at which speculators react to the arrival of new information (Chart 5).10 Chart 4Ensemble Forecast Accounts For##BR##Collapse In Venezuela's Exports Ensemble Forecast Accounts For Collapse In Venezuela's Exports Ensemble Forecast Accounts For Collapse In Venezuela's Exports Chart 5Spec Positioning Will##BR##Push Volatility Higher Spec Positioning Will Push Volatility Higher Spec Positioning Will Push Volatility Higher Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 injected a new element of uncertainty into the markets this past week by signaling it would consider restoring oil-production cuts over 2H18, which could be as high as 1mm b/d, in response to consumer complaints at the highest levels. The guidance from the coalition's leadership in these early days does not allow us to definitely adjust our oil supply estimates, so we're simulating what we consider to be a highly likely schedule of production restoration. In addition, we are assigning explicit odds to the collapse of Venezuela's exports, which would remove ~ 1mm b/d of exports from the market. We combine these separate assessments with our existing forecasting model to create an ensemble forecast for prices in 2H18 and 2019. In this approach, our existing base-case model, which assumes OPEC 2.0's production cuts will be maintained this year and slowly restored over 1H19 is maintained; a production-restoration case is introduced, which assumes 870k b/d of production is brought back on line over the course of 2H18. Lastly, we assume Venezuela's production is lost to the market in Jun/18, and that OPEC 2.0 restores the 1.2mm b/d of actual production cuts it made beginning in Jan/17 over 2H18. We weight these different cases to produce our ensemble forecast. Using this approach, we are revising our 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl, and our WTI forecast to $70/bbl from $72/bbl. For next year, we are lowering our Brent forecast to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and our WTI expectation to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. We expect higher volatility, as well. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which agreed to cut 1.8mm b/d of production. By our reckoning, some 1.2mm b/d have been cut voluntarily - mostly by KSA and Russia. Alexander Novak, Russia's oil minister, stated actual cuts are closer to 2.7mm b/d, mostly because of the freefall in Venezuela's production. Non-Gulf states also have seen significant production losses. 2 See "Copper Supply Shock Hits India As Top Plant Ordered To Close," published by Bloomberg.com, May 29, 2018. 3 See "GRAINS-Corn, Soybeans Sag On Renewed U.S.-China Trade Jitters," published by Reuters.com, May 29, 2018. 4 Please see "OPEC, Russia Prepared To Raise Oil Output Amid U.S. Pressure," published by uk.reuters.com on May 25, 2018. 5 The OECD makes this point explicitly in its just-released report "OECD sees stronger world economy, but risks loom large," published May 30, 2018. 6 Please see fn. 3 above. 7 Please see "With the Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014 - 16 Oil Price Collapse," published by the World Bank in January 2018. See fn. 11 for a list of EM countries that reformed their oil subsidies, which includes oil exporters in OPEC like KSA, Kuwait and Nigeria. 8 We discuss this at length in "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices," published February 22, 2018, by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bacresearch.com. 9 We presented the Venezuela-production collapse simulation in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy. Please see "Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 We explore the relationship between price volatility and spec positioning in "Feedback Loop: Spec Positioning & Oil Price Volatility," published May 10, 2018, by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again

Highlights The risk/reward balance for risk assets remains unappealing this month, even though our base-case outlook sees them outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. The number of items that could take equity markets to new highs appears to fall well short of the number of potential landmines that could take markets down. Tensions vis-à-vis North Korea have eased, but the U.S./China trade war is heating up. Trump's voter base and many in Congress want the President to push China harder. Eurozone "breakup risk" has reared its ugly head once again. The Italian President is trying to install a technocratic government, but the interim between now and a likely summer election will extend the campaign period during which the two contending parties have an incentive to continue with hyperbolic fiscal proposals. The next Italian election is not a referendum on exiting the EU or Euro Area. Nonetheless, the risks posed by the Italian political situation may not have peaked, especially since Italy's economic growth appears set to slow. We are underweight both Italian government bonds and equities within global portfolios. It is also disconcerting that we have passed the point of maximum global growth momentum. We expect growth to remain above-trend in the advanced economies, but the economic data will be less supportive of global risk assets than was the case last year. One reason for the economic "soft patch" is that the Chinese economy continues to decelerate. Our indicators suggest that growth will moderate further, with negative implications for the broader emerging market complex. Dearer oil may also be starting to bite, although prices have not increased enough to derail the expansion in the developed economies. This is especially the case in the U.S., where the shale industry is gearing up. Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. While the U.S. economy will enjoy a strong rebound in the second quarter, leading economic indicators in most of the other major countries have rolled over. Similar divergences are occurring in the inflation data. The international growth and inflation decoupling is probably not over, which means that long-dollar positions should continue to pay off in the coming months. U.S. inflation is almost back to target and the FOMC signaled that an overshoot will be tolerated. Policymakers will likely transition from "normalizing" policy to targeting slower economic growth once long-term inflation expectations return to the 2.3%-2.5% range. The advanced stage of the U.S. business cycle, heightened geopolitical risks and our bias for capital preservation keep us tactically cautious on risk assets again this month. Feature The major stock indexes are struggling, even though 12-month forward earnings estimates continue to march higher (Chart I-1). One problem is that a lot of good earnings news was discounted early in the year. The number of items that could take markets to new highs appear to fall well short of the number of potential landmines that could take markets down. Not the least of which is ongoing pain in emerging markets and the return of financial stress in Eurozone debt markets. Last month's Overview highlighted the unappealing risk/reward balance for risk assets, even though our base-case outlook sees them outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. The advanced stage of the business cycle and our bias for capital preservation motivated us to heed the recent warnings from our growth indicators and 'exit' timing checklist. We also were concerned about a raft of geopolitical tensions. Fast forward one month and the backdrop has not improved. Our Equity Scorecard Indicator edged up, but is still at a level that historically was consistent with poor returns to stocks and corporate bonds (see Chart I-1 in last month's Overview). Our 'exit' checklist is also signaling that caution is warranted (Table I-1). Meanwhile, the "global synchronized expansion" theme that helped to drive risk asset prices higher last year is beginning to unravel and trade tensions are escalating. Chart I-1Struggling To Make Headway Struggling To Make Headway Struggling To Make Headway Table I-1Exit Checklist For Risk Assets June 2018 June 2018 U.S./Sino Trade War Is Back? The "on again/off again" trade war between the U.S. and China is on again as we go to press. Investors breathed a sigh of relief in mid-May when the Trump Administration signaled that China's minor concessions were sufficient to avoid the imposition of onerous new tariffs. However, the proposed deal did not go down well with many in the U.S., including some in the Republican Party. The President was criticized for giving up too much in order to retain China's help in dealing with North Korea. Trump might have initially cancelled the summit with Kim in order to send a message to China that he is still prepared to play hard ball on trade, despite the North Korean situation. We expect that U.S./North Korean negotiations will soon begin, and that Pyongyang will not be a major threat to global financial markets for at least the near term. It is a different story for U.S./China relations. Trump's voter base and many in Congress on both sides of the isle want the President to push China harder. This is likely to be a headwind for risk assets at least until the U.S. mid-term elections. The Return Of Eurozone Breakup Risk Turning to the Eurozone, "breakup risk" has reared its ugly head once again. Italian President Sergio Mattarella's decision to reject a proposed cabinet minister has led to the collapse of the populist coalition between the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and the euroskeptic League. President Mattarella's choice for interim-prime minister, Carlo Cottarelli, is unlikely to last long. It is highly unlikely that he will be able to receive parliamentary support for a technocratic mandate, given the fact that he cut government spending during a brief stint in government from 2013-14. As such, elections are likely this summer. Chart I-2Italy: No Euro Support Rebound Italy: No Euro Support Rebound Italy: No Euro Support Rebound Investors continue to fret for two reasons. First, the interim period will extend the campaign period during which both M5S and the League have an incentive to continue with hyperbolic fiscal proposals. Second, M5S has suggested that it will try to impeach Mattarella, a long and complicated process that would heighten political risk, though it will likely fail in our view. As our geopolitical strategists have emphasized throughout 2017, Italy will eventually be the source of a major global risk-off event because it is the one outstanding major European country capable of reigniting the Euro Area break-up crisis.1 While a majority of Italians support the euro, they are less supportive than any other major European country, including Greece (Chart I-2). Meanwhile a plurality of Italians is confident that the future would be brighter if Italy were an independent country outside of the EU. That said, the next election is not a referendum on exiting the EU or Euro Area. The current conflict arises from the coalition wanting to run large budget deficits in violation of Europe's Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules. Given that the costs of attempting to exit the Euro Area are extremely severe for Italy's households and savers, and that even the Five Star Movement has moderated its previous skepticism about the euro for the time being, it is likely going to require a recession or another crisis to cause Italy seriously contemplate an exit. We are still several steps away from such a move. Nonetheless, the risks posed by the Italian political situation may not have peaked. Italy's leading economic indicator points to slowing growth, which will intensify the populist push for aggressive fiscal stimulus. We are underweight both Italian government bonds and equities within global portfolios. Global Growth Has Peaked Chart I-3Past The Point Of Max Growth Momentum Past The Point Of Max Growth Momentum Past The Point Of Max Growth Momentum It is also disconcerting that we have passed the point of maximum global growth momentum, as highlighted by the indicators shown in Chart I-3. We expect growth to remain above-trend in the advanced economies, but the economic data will be less supportive of global risk assets than was the case last year. What is behind this year's loss of momentum? First, growth in 2017 was flattered by a rebound from the oil-related manufacturing recession of 2015/16. That rebound is now topping out, while worries regarding a trade war are undoubtedly weighing on animal spirits and industrial activity. Second, the Eurozone economy was lifted last year by the previous recapitalization of parts of the banking system, which allowed some pent-up credit demand to be satiated. This growth impulse also appears to have peaked, which helps to explain the sharp drop in some of the Eurozone's key economic indicators. Still, we do not expect European growth to slip back below a trend pace on a sustained basis unless the Italian situation degenerates so much that contagion causes significantly tighter financial conditions for the entire Eurozone economy. The third factor contributing to the global growth moderation is China. The Chinese economy surged in 2017 in a lagged response to fiscal and monetary stimulus in 2016, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI) and import growth (Chart I-4). Both are now headed south as the policy backdrop turned less supportive. Downturns in China's credit and fiscal impulses herald a deceleration in capital spending and construction activity (Chart I-4, bottom panel). The LKI has a strong correlation with ex-tech earnings and import growth. In turn, the latter is important for the broader EM complex that trade heavily with China. Weaker Chinese import growth has also had a modest negative impact on the developed world (Chart I-5). We estimate that, for the major economies, the contribution to GDP growth of exports to China has fallen from 0.3 percentage points last year to 0.1 percentage points now.2 Japan and Australia have been hit the hardest, but the Eurozone has also been affected. Interestingly, U.S. exports to China have bucked the trend so far. Chart I-4China Growth Slowdown... China Growth Slowdown... China Growth Slowdown... Chart I-5...Is Weighing On Global Activity ...Is Weighing On Global Activity ...Is Weighing On Global Activity China is not the only story because the slowdown in global trade activity in the first quarter was broadly based (Chart I-5). Nonetheless, softer aggregate demand growth out of China helps to explain why manufacturing PMIs and industrial production growth in most of the major developed economies have cooled. Our model for the LKI is still moderating. We do not see a hard economic landing, but our analysis points to further weakening in Chinese imports and thus softness in global exports and manufacturing activity in the coming months. Oil's Impact On The Economy... Finally, oil prices are no doubt taking a bite out of consumer spending power as Brent fluctuates just below $80/bbl. Our energy experts expect the global crude market to continue tightening due to robust growth and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Chief among these are the continuing loss of Venezuelan crude production and the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran. At the same time, we expect OPEC 2.0 to keep its production cuts in place in the second half of the year. Increasing shale output will not be enough to prevent world oil prices from rising in this environment, and we expect oil prices to continue to trend higher through 2018 and into early 2019 (Chart I-6). Brent could touch $90/bbl next year. There are a few ways to gauge the size of the oil shock on the economy. Chart I-7 shows the U.S. and global 'oil bill' as a share of GDP. We believe that both the level and the rate of change are important. Price spikes, even from low levels, do not allow energy users the time to soften the blow by shifting to alternative energy sources. Chart I-6Oil: Stay Bullish Oil: Stay Bullish Oil: Stay Bullish Chart I-7The Oil Bill The Oil Bill The Oil Bill The level of the oil bill is not high by historical standards. The increase in the bill over the past year has been meaningful, both for the U.S. and at the global level, but is still a long way from the oil shocks of the 1970s. U.S. consumer spending on energy as a share of disposable income, at about 4%, is also near the lowest level observed over the past 4-5 decades (Chart I-8). The 2-year swing in this series shows that rapid increases in energy-related spending has preceded slowdowns in economic growth, even from low starting points. The swing is currently back above the zero line but, again, it is not at a level that historically was associated with a significant economic slowdown. Chart I-8Oil's Impact On U.S. Consumer Spending Oil's Impact On U.S. Consumer Spending Oil's Impact On U.S. Consumer Spending Moreover, the mushrooming shale oil and gas industry has altered the calculus of oil shocks for the U.S. The plunge in oil prices in 2014-16 was accompanied by a manufacturing and profit mini recession in the developed countries, providing a drag on overall GDP growth. Chart I-9 provides an estimate of the contribution to U.S. growth from the oil and gas industry. We have included capital spending and wages & salaries in the calculation, and scaled it up to include spillover effects on other industries. Chart I-9Oil's Impact On Consumer Spending And Shale Oil's Impact On Consumer Spending And Shale Oil's Impact On Consumer Spending And Shale The oil and gas contribution swung from +0.5 percentage points in 2012 to -0.4 percentage points in 2016. The contribution has since become only slightly positive again, but it is likely to rise further unless oil prices decline in the coming months. We have included the annual swing in consumer spending on energy as a percent of GDP in Chart I-9 (inverted) for comparison purposes. At the moment, the impact on growth from the shale industry is roughly offsetting the negative impact on consumer spending. The bottom line is that the rise in oil prices so far is enough to take the edge off of global growth, but it is not large enough to derail the expansion in the developed countries. This is especially the case in the U.S., where the shale industry is gearing up. ...And Asset Prices As for the impact on asset prices, it is important to ascertain whether rising oil prices represent more restrictive supply or expanding demand. A mild rise in oil prices might simply be a symptom of increased demand caused by accelerating global growth. Higher oil prices are thus reflective of robust demand, and thus should not be seen as a threat. In contrast, the 1970s experience shows that supply restrictions can send the economy into a tailspin. In order to separate the two drivers of prices, we regressed WTI oil prices on global oil demand, inventories and the U.S. dollar. By excluding supply-related factors such as production restrictions, the residual of the regression model gives an approximate gauge of supply shocks (panel 2, Chart I-10). This model clearly has limitations, but it also has one key benefit: it estimates not just actual disruptions in supply, but also the premium built into prices due to perceived or expected future supply disruptions. For example, the 1990 price spike appears as quite a substantial deviation from what could be explained by changes in demand alone. Similar negative supply shocks are evident in 2000 and 2008. Chart I-10Identifying Supply Shocks In The Oil Market Identifying Supply Shocks In The Oil Market Identifying Supply Shocks In The Oil Market We then examined the impact that supply shocks have on subsequent period returns for both Treasury and risk assets. We divided the Supply Shock Proxy into four quartiles corresponding to the four zones shown in Chart I-10: strong positive shock, mild positive shock, mild negative shock and strong negative shock; the last of these corresponds to the region above the upper dashed line, which we have shaded in the chart. The performance of risk assets does not vary significantly across the bottom three quartiles of the supply shock indicator (Chart I-11). However, performance drops off precipitously in the presence of a strong negative supply shock. This is consistent with the "choke point" argument: investors are initially unconcerned with a modest appreciation in oil prices. It is only when prices are driven sharply above the level consistent with the current demand backdrop that risk assets begin to discount a more pessimistic future. The total returns to the Treasury index behave in the opposite manner (Chart I-12). Treasury returns are below average when the oil shock indicator is below one (i.e. positive supply shock) and above average when oil prices rise into negative supply shock territory. In other words, an excess of oil supply is Treasury bearish, as it would tend to fuel more robust economic growth. Conversely, a supply shock that drives oil prices higher tends to be Treasury bullish. This may seem counterintuitive because higher oil prices can be inflationary and thus should be bond bearish in theory. However, large negative oil supply shocks have usually preceded recessions, which caused Treasurys to rally. Chart I-11Effect On Risk Assets June 2018 June 2018 Chart I-12Effect On Treasurys June 2018 June 2018 The model clearly shows that the drop in oil prices in 2014/15 was a positive supply shock, consistent with the oil consumption data that show demand growth was fairly stable through that period. The model indicator has moved up toward the neutral line in recent months, suggesting that the supply side of the market is tightening up, but it is still in "mild positive supply shock" territory. The latest data point available is April, which means that it does not capture the surge in oil prices over the past month. Some of the recent jump in prices is clearly related to the cancelled Iran deal and other supply-related factors, although demand continues to be supportive of prices. The implication of this model is that it will probably require a significant further surge in prices, without a corresponding ramp up in oil demand, for the model to signal that supply constraints are becoming a significant threat for risk assets. A rise in Brent above US$85 would signal trouble according to this model. As for government bonds, rising oil prices are bearish in the near term, irrespective of whether it reflects demand or supply factors. This is because of the positive correlation between oil prices and long-term inflation expectations. The oil bull phase will turn bond-bullish once it becomes clear that energy prices have hit an economic choke point. Desynchronization Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. First quarter U.S. GDP growth was underwhelming, but the long string of first-quarter disappointment points to seasonal adjustment problems. Higher frequency data are consistent with a robust rebound in the second quarter. Forward looking indicators, such as the OECD and Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicators, continue to climb. This is in contrast with some of the other major economies, such as the Eurozone, U.K., Australia and Japan (Chart I-13). First quarter real GDP growth was particularly soft in Japan and the Eurozone, and one cannot blame seasonal adjustment in these cases. Chart I-13Growth & Inflation Divergences Growth & Inflation Divergences Growth & Inflation Divergences The divergence in economic performance likely reflects Washington's fiscal stimulus that is shielding the U.S. from the global economic soft patch. Moreover, the U.S. is less exposed to the oil shock and the China slowdown than are the other major economies. Similar divergences are occurring in the inflation data. While U.S. inflation continues to drift higher, it has lost momentum in the euro area, Japan and the U.K. (Chart I-13). Renewed stresses in the Italian and Spanish bond markets have sparked a flight-to-quality in recent trading days, depressing yields in safe havens such as U.S. Treasurys and German bunds. Nonetheless, prior to that, the divergence in growth and inflation was reflected in widening bond yield spreads as U.S. Treasurys led the global yields higher. Long-term inflation expectations have risen everywhere, but real yields have increased the most in the U.S. (prior to the flight-to-quality bond rally at the end of May). This is consistent with the growth divergence story and with our country bond allocation: overweight the U.K., Australia and Japan, and underweight U.S. Treasurys within hedged global portfolios. The dollar lagged earlier this year, but is finally catching up to the widening in interest rate spreads. The international growth and inflation decoupling is probably not over, which means that long-dollar positions should continue to pay off in the coming months. Expect More Pain In EM Dollar strength and rising U.S. bond yields are a classic late-cycle combination that often spells trouble for emerging market assets. We do not see the recent selloff across EM asset classes as a buying opportunity since markets have only entered the first stage of the classic final chapter; EM assets underperform as U.S. bond yields and the dollar rise, but commodity prices are resilient. In the second phase, U.S. bond yields top out, but the U.S. dollar continues to firm and commodity prices begin their descent. If the current slowdown in Chinese growth continues, as we expect, it will begin to weigh on non-oil commodity prices. Thus, emerging economies may have to deal with a deadly combination of rising U.S. interest rates, a stronger greenback, falling commodity prices and slowing exports to China (Chart I-14). Which countries are most exposed to lower foreign funding? BCA's Emerging Market Strategy services has ranked EM countries based on foreign funding requirements (Chart I-15). The latter is calculated as the current account balance plus foreign debt that is due in the coming months. Chart I-14EM Currencies Exposed To China Slowdown EM Currencies Exposed To China Slowdown EM Currencies Exposed To China Slowdown Chart I-15Vulnerability Ranking: Dependence On Foreign Funding June 2018 June 2018 Turkey, Malaysia, Peru and Chile have the heaviest foreign funding requirements in the next six months. These mostly stem from foreign debt obligations by their banks and companies. Even though most companies and banks with foreign debt will not default, their credit spreads will likely widen as it becomes more difficult to service the foreign debt.3 It is too early to build positions even in Turkish assets. Our EM strategists believe that it will require an additional 15% depreciation in the lira versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and euro, in combination with 200-250 basis points hike in the policy rate, and a 20% drop in share prices in local currency terms, to create a buying opportunity in Turkish financial instruments. FOMC Expects Inflation Overshoot Escalating turmoil in EM financial markets could potentially lead the Federal Reserve to put the rate hike campaign on hold. However, that would require some signs of either domestic financial stress or slowing growth. The FOMC is monitoring stress in emerging markets and in the Eurozone, but is sticking with its "gradual" tightening pace for now (i.e. 25 basis points per quarter). May's FOMC minutes signaled a rate hike in June. However, the minutes did not suggest that the Fed is getting more hawkish, despite the Staff's forecast that growth will remain above trend and that the labor market will continue to tighten at a time when core inflation is already pretty much back to target. Some inflation indicators, such as the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, suggest that core inflation will overshoot. The minutes signaled that policymakers are generally comfortable with a modest overshoot of the 2% inflation target because many see it as necessary in order to shift long-term inflation expectations higher, into a range that is consistent with meeting the 2% inflation target on a "sustained" basis (we estimate this range to be 2.3-2.5% for the 10-year inflation breakeven rate). The fact that the FOMC took a fairly dovish tone and did not try to guide rate expectations higher contributed to some retracement of the Treasury selloff in recent weeks. Nonetheless, an inflation overshoot and rising inflation expectations will ultimately be bond-bearish, especially when the FOMC is forced to clamp down on growth as long-term inflation expectations reach the target range. As discussed in BCA's Outlook 2018, one of our key themes for the year is that risk assets are on a collision course with monetary policy because the FOMC will eventually have to transition from simply removing accommodation to targeting slower growth. Timing that transition will be difficult, and depends importantly on how much of an inflation overshoot the FOMC is prepared to tolerate. Is 2½% reasonable? Or could inflation go to 3%? The makeup of the FOMC has changed, but we expect Janet L. Yellen4 to shed light on this question when she speaks at the BCA Annual Investment Conference in September. Investment Conclusions The risks facing investors have shifted, but we do not feel any less cautious than we did last month. Geopolitical tensions vis-à-vis North Korea have perhaps eased. But trade tensions are escalating and investors are suddenly faced with another chapter in the Eurozone financial crisis. The major fear in the first and second chapters was that bond investors would attack Italy, given the sheer size of that economy and the size of Italian government debt. That dreadful day has arrived. The profit backdrop in the major economies remains constructive for equity markets. However, even there, the bloom is coming off the rose. Global growth is no longer synchronized and the advanced economies have hit a soft patch with the possible exception of the U.S. While far from disastrous, our short-term profit models appear to be peaking across the major countries (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Profit Growth: Solid, But Peaking Profit Growth: Solid, But Peaking Profit Growth: Solid, But Peaking The typical U.S. late cycle dynamics are also threatening emerging markets, at a time when investors are generally overweight and many EM countries have accumulated a pile of debt. U.S. inflation is set to overshoot the target, the FOMC is tightening and the dollar is rising. Throw in slowing Chinese demand and the EM space looks highly vulnerable. If the global economic slowdown is pronounced and drags the U.S. down with it, then bonds will rally and risk assets will take a hit. If, instead, the soft patch is short-lived and growth re-accelerates, then the U.S. Treasury bear market will resume. Stock indexes and corporate bond excess returns would enjoy one last upleg in this scenario, but downside risks would escalate once the Fed begins to target slower economic growth. Either way, EM assets would be hit. Our base case remains that stocks will beat government bonds and cash on a 6-12 month horizon. However, the risk/reward balance is unattractive given the geopolitical backdrop. Thus, we remain tactically cautious on risk assets for the near term. We still expect that the 10-year Treasury yield will peak at close to 3½% before this economic expansion is over. Nonetheless, this would require a calming of geopolitical tensions and an upturn in the growth indicators in the developed world. The risk/reward tradeoff for corporate bonds is no better than for equities and we urge caution in the near term. On a 6-12 month cyclical horizon, we still expect corporate bonds to outperform government bonds, at least in the U.S. European corporates are subject to the ebb and flow of the Italian bond crisis, and face the added risk that the ECB will likely end its QE program later this year. Looking further ahead, this month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, analyzes the Eurozone corporate sector's vulnerability to the end of the cycle that includes rising interest rates and, ultimately, a recession. We find that domestic issuers into the Eurozone market are far less exposed than are foreign issuers. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2018 Next Report: June 28, 2018 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016, available on gps.bcaresearch.com 2 This underestimates the impact on the major countries because it does not account for third country effects (i.e. trade with other countries that trade with China). 3 For more information, please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar Rally And China's Imports," dated May 24, 2018, available on ems.bcaresearch.com 4 Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (2014-2018). II. Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The Eurozone Corporate Sector As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. We previously identified the U.S. corporate bond market as a definite candidate. This month we look at European corporates. European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. Foreign issuers are much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond relative returns this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program. We recommend an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Risk assets remain on a collision course with monetary policy, which is the main reason why the "return of vol" is a key theme in the BCA 2018 Outlook. In the U.S., rising inflation is expected to limit the FOMC's ability to cushion soft patches in the economic data or negative shocks from abroad. We expect that ECB tapering will add to market stress, especially now that Eurozone breakup risks are again a concern. We also believe that geopolitics will remain a major source of uncertainty and volatility. All this comes at a time when corporate bond spreads offer only a thin buffer against bad news. On a positive note, we remain upbeat on the earnings outlook in the major countries. The U.S. recession that we foresaw in 2019 has been delayed into 2020 by fiscal stimulus. The longer runway for earnings to grow keeps us nervously overweight corporate bonds, at least in the U.S. That said, corporates are no more than a carry trade now that the lows in spreads are in place for the cycle. We are keeping a close eye on a number of indicators that will help us to time the next downgrade to our global corporate bond allocation. Profitability is just one, albeit important, aspect of the financial backdrop. What about the broader trend in financial health? Does the trend justify wider spreads even if the economy and profits hold up over the next year? We reviewed U.S. corporate financial health in the March 2018 monthly Bank Credit Analyst, using our bottom-up sample of companies. We also stress-tested these companies for higher interest rates and a medium-sized recession. We concluded that the U.S. corporate sector's heavy accumulation of debt in this expansion will result in rampant downgrade activity during the next economic downturn. As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. The U.S. corporate bond market is a definite candidate. This month we extend the analysis to the European corporate sector. The European Corporate Health Monitor The bottom-up version of the Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a complement to our top-down CHM, which uses macro data from the ECB to construct an index of six financial ratios for the non-financial corporate sector. While useful as an indicator of the overall trend in corporate financial health, it does not shed light on underlying trends across credit quality, countries and sectors. It also fails to distinguish between domestic versus foreign issuers in the Eurozone market. A number of features of the European market limit the bottom-up analysis to some extent relative to what we are able to do for the U.S.: the Eurozone market is significantly smaller and company data typically do not have as much history; foreign issuers comprise almost 50% of the market, a much higher percentage than in the U.S.; and the Financial sector features more prominently in the Eurozone index, but we exclude it because our CHM methodology does not lend itself well to this sector. We analyzed only domestic issuers in our study of U.S. corporate health. However, we decided to include foreign issuers in our Eurozone analysis in order to maximize the sample size. Moreover, it is appropriate for some bond investors to consider the whole picture, given that important benchmarks such as Barclay's corporate indexes include both foreign and domestic issuers. The relative composition of domestic versus foreign, investment-grade versus high-yield, and industrial sectors in our sample are comparable with the weights used in the Barclay's index. The CHM is calculated using the median value for each of six financial ratios (Table II-1). We then standardize1 the median values for the six ratios and aggregate them into a composite index using a simple average. The result is an index that fluctuates between +/- 2 standard deviations. A rising index indicates deteriorating health, while a downtrend signals improving health. We defined it this way in order to facilitate comparison with trends in corporate spreads. Table II-1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs June 2018 June 2018 One has to be careful in interpreting our Eurozone Monitor. The bottom-up version only dates back to 2005. Thus, while both the level and change in the U.S. CHM provide important information regarding balance sheet health, for the Eurozone Monitor we focus more on the change. Whether it is a little above or below the zero line is less important than the trend. Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Chart II-1 compares the top-down and bottom-up Eurozone CHMs for the entire non-financial corporate sector.2 The levels are different, although the broad trends are similar. Key differences that help to explain the divergence include the following: the top-down CHM defines leverage to be total debt as a percent of the market value of equity, while our bottom-up CHM defines it to be total debt as a percent of the book value of the company. The second panel of Chart II-1 highlights that the two measures of leverage have diverged significantly since 2012; the top-down CHM defines profit margins as total cash flow as a percent of sales. For data-availability reasons, our bottom-up version uses operating income/total sales; and most importantly, the top-down CHM uses ECB data, which includes only companies that are domiciled in the Eurozone. Thus, it excludes foreign issuers that make up a large part of our company sample and the Barclay's index. When we recalculate the bottom-up CHM using only domestic investment-grade issuers, the result is much closer to the top-down version (Chart II-2). Both CHMs have been in 'improving health' territory since the end of the Great Financial Crisis. The erosion in the profitability components during this period was offset by declining leverage, rising liquidity and improving interest coverage for domestic issuers. Chart II-1Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Chart II-2Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up It has been a different story for foreign IG issuers (Chart II-3). These firms have historically enjoyed a higher return on capital, operating margins, interest coverage, debt coverage and liquidity. Nonetheless, heavy debt accumulation has undermined their interest- and debt-coverage ratios in absolute terms and relative to their domestic peers until very recently. In other words, while domestic issuers have made an effort to clean up their balance sheets since the Great Recession, financial trends among foreign issuers look more like the trends observed in the U.S. No doubt, this is in part due to U.S. companies issuing Euro-denominated debt, but there are many other foreign issuers in our sample as well. Some analysts prefer total debt/total assets to the leverage measure we use in constructing our CHMs. However, the picture is much the same; leverage among IG domestic and foreign firms has diverged dramatically since 2010 (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Chart II-4Diverging Leverage Trends Diverging Leverage Trends Diverging Leverage Trends Over the past year or so there has been some reversal in the post-Lehman trends; domestic health has stabilized, while that of foreign issuers has improved. Leverage among foreign companies has leveled off, while margins and the liquidity ratio have bounced. The results for high-yield (HY) issuers must be taken with a grain of salt because of the small sample size. Chart II-5 highlights that the HY CHM is improving for both domestic and foreign issuers. Impressively, leverage is declining for both the domestic and foreign components. The return on capital, interest coverage, and debt coverage have also improved, although only for foreign issuers. Chart II-5Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Corporate Sensitivity The bottom line is that, while there have been some relative shifts below the surface, the European corporate sector's finances are generally in good shape in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. This is particularly the case for domestic issuers that have yet to catch the equity buyback bug. However, less accommodative monetary policy and rising borrowing rates have focused investor attention on corporate sector vulnerability. Downgrade risk will mushroom if corporate borrowing rates continue rising and, especially, if the economy contracts. If there is a recession in Europe in the next few years it will likely be as a result of a downturn in the U.S. We expect a traditional end to the U.S. business cycle; the Fed overdoes the rate hike cycle, sending the economy into a tailspin. The U.S. downturn would spill over to the rest of the world and could drag the Eurozone into a mild contraction. We estimated the change in the interest coverage ratio for the companies in our bottom-up European sample for a 100 basis-point rise in interest rates across the corporate curve, taking into consideration the maturity distribution of the debt (i.e. the coupons reset only for the bonds, notes and loans that mature in the next three years). We make the simplifying assumptions that all debt and loans maturing in the next three years are rolled over, but that companies do not take on net new obligations. We also assume that EBIT is unchanged in order to isolate the impact of higher interest rates. The 'x' in Chart II-6 denotes the result of the interest rate shock only. The 'o' combines the interest rate shock with a recession scenario, in which EBIT contracts by 15%. The interest coverage ratio declines sharply when rates rise by 100 basis points, but the ratio moves to a new post-2000 low only for foreign issuers. The ratio for domestic issuers falls back to the range that existed between 2009 and 2013. The median interest coverage ratio drops further when we combine this with a 15% earnings contraction in the recession scenario. Again, the outcome is far worse for foreign than it is for domestic issuers. Chart II-7 presents a shock to the median debt coverage ratio. Since debt coverage (cash flow divided by total debt) does not include interest payments, we show only the recession scenario result that reflects the decline in profits. Once again, foreign issuers appear to be far more exposed to an economic downturn than their domestic brethren. Chart II-6Interest Coverage Shocks Interest Coverage Shocks Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-7Debt Coverage Shock Debt Coverage Shock Debt Coverage Shock Indeed, the results for foreign issuers are qualitatively similar to the shocks we previous published for our bottom-up sample of IG corporates in the U.S. (Chart II-8 and Chart II-9). In both cases, higher interest rates and contracting earnings will take the interest coverage and debt coverage ratios into uncharted territory. Chart II-8U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-9U.S. Debt Coverage Shock U.S. Debt Coverage Shock U.S. Debt Coverage Shock Conclusions European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers, where balance sheet activity has focused on lifting shareholder value since the last recession. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. There has been a small convergence of financial health between Eurozone domestic and foreign issuers over the past year or so, but the latter are still much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond returns relative to European government bonds or to U.S. corporates this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program later in 2018. We expect spreads to widen as this important liquidity tailwind fades. For the moment, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service recommends an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Standardizing involves taking the deviation of the series from the 18 quarter moving average and dividing by the standard deviation of the series. 2 Note that a rising CHM indicates deteriorating health to facilitate comparison with quality spreads. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The divergence between the U.S. corporate earnings data and our equity-related indicators continued in May. We remain cautious, despite the supportive profit backdrop. The U.S. net earnings revisions ratio fell a bit in May, but it remains well in positive territory. Forward earnings continued their ascent, and the net earnings surprise index rose further to within striking distance of the highest levels in the history of the series. Normally, an earnings backdrop this strong would justify an overweight equity allocation within a balanced portfolio. Unfortunately, a lot of good earnings news is discounted based on our Composite Valuation Indicator and extremely elevated 5-year bottom-up earnings growth expectations (see the Bank Credit Analyst Overview, May 2018). Moreover, our equity indicators are sending a cautious signal. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay indicator continued to decline in May. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. U.S. flows have clearly turned negative for equities, although flows into European and Japanese markets are holding up for now. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks remained on its 'sell' signal in May, for the second month in a row. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. These indicators are not aligned at the moment, further supporting the view that caution is warranted. Moreover, our composite equity Technical Indicator is on the verge of breaking down and our Monetary Indicator moved further into negative territory in May. Meanwhile, market froth has not been completely extinguished according to our Speculation Indicator (which is a negative sign for stocks from a contrary perspective). As for bonds, the powerful rally at the end of May has undermined valuation, but the 10-year Treasury is not yet in expensive territory. Our technical indicator suggests that previously oversold conditions are easing, but bonds are a long way from overbought. This means that yields have room to fall further in the event of more bad news on Italy or on the broader geopolitical scene. The dollar has not yet reached overbought territory according to our technical indicator. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Investors are underestimating the risks of U.S.-Iran tensions; The Obama administration's 2015 deal resulted in Iran curbing aggressive regional behavior that threatened global oil supply; The U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran has not improved; Unlike North Korea, Iran can retaliate against the Trump administration's "Maximum Pressure" doctrine - particularly in Iraq; U.S.-Iran conflicts will negatively affect global oil supply, critical geographies, and sectarian tensions - hence a geopolitical risk premium is warranted. Average Brent and WTI oil prices should rise to $80/bbl and $72/bbl in 2019 even without adding the full range of events that will drive up the geopolitical risk premium. Risks lie to the upside. Feature Tensions between the U.S. and Iran snuck up on the markets (Chart 1), even though President Trump's policy agenda was well telegraphed via rhetoric, action, and White House personnel moves.1 Still, investors doubt the market relevance of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement between Iran and the P5+1.2 Chart 1Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Several reasons to fade the risks - and hence to fade any implications for global oil supply - have become conventional wisdom. These include the alleged ability of OPEC and Russia to boost production and Washington's supposed ineffectiveness without an internationally binding sanction regime. Our view is that investors and markets are underestimating the geopolitical, economic, and financial relevance of the U.S.-Iran tensions. First, the ideological rhetoric surrounding the original U.S.-Iran détente tends to be devoid of strategic analysis. Second, Iran's hard power capabilities are underestimated. Third, OPEC 2.0's ability to tap into its spare capacity is overestimated.3 To put some numbers on the difference between our view and the market's view, we rely on the implied option volatilities for crude oil futures.4 As Chart 2 illustrates, the oil markets are currently pricing in just under 30% probability that oil prices will exceed $80/bbl by year-end, and merely 14% that they will touch $90/bbl in the same timeframe. We believe these odds are too low and will take the other side of that bet. Chart 2The Market Continues To Underestimate High Oil Prices Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Did The U.S.-Iran Détente Emerge In 2015? Both detractors and defenders of the 2015 nuclear deal often misunderstand the logic of the deal. First, the defenders are wrong when they claim that the deal creates a robust mechanism that ensures that Iran will never produce a nuclear device. Given that the most critical components of the deal expire in 10 or 15 years, it is simply false to assert that the deal is a permanent solution. More importantly, Iran already reached "breakout capacity" in mid-2013, which means that it had already achieved the necessary know-how to become a nuclear power.5 We know because we wrote about it at the time, using the data of Iran's cumulative production of enriched uranium provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).6 In August 2013, Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, produced at the impregnable Fordow facility, reached 200kg (Chart 3). Chart 3Iran's Negotiating Leverage Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize At that point, Israeli threats of attacking Iran became vacuous, as the Israeli air force lacked the necessary bunker-busting technology to penetrate Fordow.7 As we wrote in 2013, this critical moment gave Tehran the confidence to give up "some material/physical components of its nuclear program as it has developed the human capital necessary to achieve nuclear status."8 The JCPOA forced Iran to stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility altogether and to give up its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20%. However, Iran only agreed to the deal because it had reached a level of technological know-how that has not been eliminated by mothballing centrifuges and "converting" facilities to civilian nuclear research. Iran is a nuclear power in all but name. Second, the detractors of the JCPOA are incorrect when they claim that Iran did not give up any regional hegemony when it signed the deal. This criticism focuses on Iran's expanded role in the Syrian Civil War since 2011, as well as its traditional patronage networks with the Lebanese Shia militants Hezbollah and with Yemen's Houthis. However, critics ignore several other, far more critical, fronts of Iranian influence: Strait of Hormuz: In 2012, Iran's nearly daily threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were very much a clear and present danger for global investors (Map 1). Although we argued in 2012 that Iran's capability was limited to a 10-day closure, followed by another month during which they could threaten the safe passage of vessels through the Strait, even such a short crisis would add a considerable risk premium to oil markets given that it would remove about 17-18 million bbl/day from global oil supply (Chart 4).9 Since 2012, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities have largely stayed the same.10 Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Chart 4Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Iraq: The key geographic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran is Iraq (Map 2). Iran filled the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. It deployed members of the infamous Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Iraq to support the initial anti-American insurgency. Iran's support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was critical following the American withdrawal in 2011, particularly as his government became increasingly focused on anti-Sunni insurgency. Map 2Iraq: A Buffer Between Saudi Arabia And Iran Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Bahrain: Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Bahrain experienced social unrest in 2011. The majority of Bahrain's population are Shia, while the country is ruled by the Saudi-aligned, Sunni, Al Khalifa monarchy. The majority of Shia protests were at least rhetorically, and some reports suggest materially, supported by Iran. To quell the protests, and preempt any potential Iranian interference, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force. Eastern Province: Similar to the unrest in Bahrain, Shia protests engulfed Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011. The province is highly strategic, as it is where nearly all of Saudi oil production, processing, and transportation facilities are located (Map 1). Like Bahrain, it has a large Shia population. Saudi security forces cracked down on the uprising and have continued to do so, with paramilitary operations lasting into 2017. While Iranian involvement in the protests is unproven, it has been suspected. Anti-Israel Rhetoric: Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran threatened Israel with destruction on a regular basis. While these were mostly rhetorical attacks, the implication of the threat was that any attack against Iran and its nuclear facilities would result in retaliation against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq and direct military action against Israel. Both defenders and detractors of the JCPOA are therefore mistaken. The JCPOA does not impact Iran's ability to achieve "breakout capacity" given that it already reached it in mid-2013. And Iran's regional influence has not expanded since the deal was signed in 2015. In fact, since the détente in 2015, and in some cases since negotiations between the Obama administration and Tehran began in 2013, Iran has been a factor of stability in the Middle East. Specifically, Iran has willingly: Stopped threatening the Strait of Hormuz (the last overt threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were made in 2012); Acquiesced to Nouri al-Maliki's ousting as Prime Minister of Iraq in 2014 and his replacement by the far more moderate and less sectarian Haider al-Abadi; Stopped meddling in Bahraini and Saudi internal affairs; Stopped threatening Israel's existence (although its material support for Hezbollah clearly continues and presents a threat to Israel's security); Participated in joint military operations with the U.S. military against the Islamic State, cooperation without which Baghdad would have most likely fallen to the Sunni radicals in late 2014. The final point is worth expanding on. After the fall of Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - to the Islamic State in May 2014, Iranian troops and military advisors on the ground in Iraq cooperated with the U.S. air force to arrest and ultimately reverse the gains by the radical Sunni terrorist group. Without direct Iranian military cooperation - and without Tehran's material and logistical support for the Iraqi Shia militias - the Islamic State could not have been eradicated from Iraq (Map 3). How did such a dramatic change in Tehran's foreign policy emerge between 2012 and 2015? Iranian leadership realized in 2012 that the U.S. military and economic threats against it were real. Internationally coordinated sanctions had a damaging effect on the economy, threatening to destabilize a regime that had experienced social upheaval in the 2009 Green Revolution (Chart 5). It therefore began negotiations almost immediately after the imposition of stringent economic sanctions in early and mid-2012.11 Map 3The Collapse Of A Would-Be Caliphate Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Chart 5Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite To facilitate the negotiations, the Guardian Council of Iran disqualified President Ahmadinejad's preferred candidate for the 2013 Iranian presidential elections, while allowing Hassan Rouhani's candidacy.12 Rouhani, a moderate, won the June 2013 election in a landslide win, giving him a strong political mandate to continue the negotiations and, relatedly, to pursue economic development. Many commentators forget, however, that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run in the first place, knowing full well that he would likely win. In other words, Rouhani's victory revealed the preferences of the Iranian regime to negotiate and adjust its foreign policy. Bottom Line: The 2015 U.S.-Iran détente traded American acquiescence in Iranian nuclear development - frozen at the point of "breakout capacity" - in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. As such, focusing on just the JCPOA, without considering the totality of Iranian behavior before and since the deal, is a mistake. Iran curbed its influence in several regional hot spots - almost all of which are critical to global oil supply. The Obama administration essentially agreed to Iran becoming a de facto nuclear power in exchange for Iran backing away from aggressive regional behavior. This included Iran's jeopardizing the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz either by directly threatening to close the channel or through covert actions in Bahrain and the Eastern Province. The U.S. also drove Iran to accept a far less sectarian Iraq, by forcing out the ardently pro-Tehran al-Maliki and replacing him with a prime minister far more acceptable to Saudi Arabia and Iraqi Sunnis. Why Did The U.S. Chose Diplomacy In 2011? The alternative to the above deal was some sort of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. contemplated such action in late 2011. Two options existed, either striking Iran's facilities with its own military or allowing Israel to do it themselves. One reason to choose diplomacy and economic sanctions over war was the limited capability of Israel to attack Iran alone.13 Israel does not possess strategic bombing capability. As such, it would have required a massive air flotilla of bomber-fighters to get to the Iranian nuclear facilities. While the Israeli air force has the capability to reach Iranian facilities and bomb them, their effectiveness is dubious and the ability to counter Iranian retaliatory capacity with follow-up strikes is non-existent. The second was the fact that a U.S. strike against Iran would be exceedingly complex. Compared to previous Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq (Operation Opera 1981) and Syria (Operation Outside The Box 2007), Iran presented a much more challenging target. Its superior surface-to-air missile capability would necessitate a prolonged, and dangerous, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission.14 In parallel, the U.S. would have to preemptively strike Iran's ballistic missile launching pads as well as its entire navy, so as to obviate Iran's ability to retaliate against international shipping or the U.S. and its allies in the region. The U.S. also had a strategic reason to avoid entangling itself in yet another military campaign in the Middle East. The public was war-weary and the Obama administration gauged that in a world where global adversaries like China and Russia were growing in geopolitical power, avoiding another major military confrontation in a region of decreasing value to U.S. interests (thanks partly to growing U.S. shale oil production) was of paramount importance (Chart 6). Notable in 2011 was growing Chinese assertiveness throughout East Asia (please see the Appendix). Particularly alarming was the willingness of Beijing to assert dubious claims to atolls and isles in the South China Sea, a globally vital piece of real estate (Diagram 1). There was a belief - which has at best only partially materialized - that if the United States divested itself of the Middle East, then it could focus more intently on countering China's challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in East Asia and the Pacific. Chart 6Great Power Competition Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Bottom Line: The Obama administration therefore chose a policy of military posturing toward Iran to establish a credible threat. The military option was signaled in order to get the international community - both allies and adversaries - on board with tough economic sanctions. The ultimate deal, the JCPOA, did not give the U.S. and its allies everything they wanted precisely because they did not enter the negotiations from a position of preponderance of power. Critics of the JCPOA ignore this reality and assume that going back to the status quo ante bellum will somehow improve the U.S. negotiating position. It won't. What Happens If The U.S.-Iran Détente Ends? The Trump administration is serious about applying its Maximum Pressure tactics on Iran. Buoyed by the successful application of this strategy in North Korea, the White House believes that it can get a better deal with Tehran. We do not necessarily disagree. It is indeed true that the U.S. is a far more powerful country than Iran, with a far more powerful military. On a long enough timeline, with enough pressure, it ought to be able to force Tehran to concede, assuming that credible threats are used.15 Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration will presumably rely on Israel far less, and on its own military capability a lot more, to deliver those threats, which should be more effective. The problem is that the timeline on which such a strategy would work is likely to be a lot longer with Iran than with North Korea. This is because Iran's retaliatory capabilities are far greater than the one-trick-pony Pyongyang, which could effectively only launch ballistic missiles and threaten all-out war with U.S. and its regional allies.16 While those threats are indeed worrisome, they are also vacuous as they would lead to a total war in which the North Korean regime would meet its demise. Iran has a far more effective array of potential retaliation that can serve a strategic purpose without leading to total war. As we listed above, it could rhetorically threaten the Strait of Hormuz or attempt to incite further unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The key retaliation could be to take the war to Iraq. The just-concluded election in Iraq appears to have favored Shia political forces not allied to Iran, including the Alliance Towards Reform (Saairun) led by the infamous cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr (Chart 7). Surrounding this election, various Iranian policymakers and military leaders have said that they would not allow Iraq to drift outside of Iran's sphere of influence, a warning to the nationalist Sadr who has fought against both the American and Iranian military presence in his country. Iraq is not only a strategic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional rivals, but also a critical source of global oil supply, having brought online about half as much new supply as U.S. shale since 2011 (Chart 8). If Iranian-allied Shia factions engage in an armed confrontation with nationalist Shias allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, such a conflict will not play out in irrelevant desert governorates, as the fight against the Islamic State did. Chart 7Iraqi Elections Favored Shiites But Not Iran Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Chart 8Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Instead, a Shia-on-Shia conflict would play out precisely in regions with oil production and transportation facilities. In 2008, for example, Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fought a brief civil war against Sadr's Mahdi Army in what came to be known as the "Battle of Basra." While Iran had originally supported Sadr in his insurgency against the U.S., it came to Maliki's support in that brief but deadly six-day conflict. Basra is Iraq's chief port through which much of the country's oil exports flow. Iraq may therefore become a critical battleground as Iran retaliates against U.S. Maximum Pressure. From Iran's perspective, holding onto influence in Iraq is critical. It is the transit route through which Iran has established an over-land connection with its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Map 4). Threatening Iraqi oil exports, or even causing some of the supply to come off-line, would also be a convenient way to reduce the financial costs of the sanctions. A 500,000 b/d loss of exports - at an average price of $70 per barrel (as Brent has averaged in 2018) - could roughly be compensated by an increase in oil prices by $10 per barrel, given Iran's total exports. As such, Iran, faced with lost supply due to sanctions, will have an incentive to make sure that prices go up (i.e., that rivals do not simply replace Iranian supply, keeping prices more or less level). The easiest way to accomplish this, to add a geopolitical risk premium to oil prices, is through the meddling in Iraqi affairs. Map 4Iran Needs Iraq To Project Power Through The Levant Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize It is too early to forecast with a high degree of confidence precisely how the U.S.-Iran confrontation will develop. However, Diagram 2 offers our take on the path towards retaliation. Diagram 2Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize The critical U.S. sanctions against Iran will become effective on November 4 (Box 1). We believe that the Trump administration is serious and that it will force European allies, as well as South Korea and Japan, to cease imports of oil from Iran. China will be much harder to cajole. BOX 1 Iranian Sanction Timeline President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum to re-impose all U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA. The Office of Foreign Assets Control expects all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA to be re-imposed and in full effect after November 4, 2018. However, there are two schedules by which sanctions will be re-imposed, a 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods.1 Sanctions Re-Imposed After August 6, 2018 The first batch of sanctions that will be re-imposed will come into effect 90 days after the announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. These include: Sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of several commodities (including gold), semi-finished metals, and industrial process software; Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran; Sanctions on trade in Iranian currency and facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector; Sanctions on export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Sanctions Re-Imposed After November 4, 2018 The second batch of sanctions will come into effect 180 days after the announced Trump administration JCPOA withdrawal decision. These include: Sanctions on Iranian port operators, shipping, and shipbuilding activities; Sanctions against petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); Sanctions against the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; Sanctions on transactions and provision of financial messaging services by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran; Sanctions on Iran's energy sector; Sanctions on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services. 1 Please see the U.S. Treasury Department, "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," dated May 8, 2018, available at www.treasury.gov. By Q1 2019, the impact on Iranian oil exports will be clear. We suspect that Iran will, at that point, have the choice of either relenting to Trump's Maximum Pressure, or escalating tensions through retaliation. We give the latter a much higher degree of confidence and suspect that a cycle of retaliation and Maximum Pressure would lead to a conditional probability of war between Iran and the U.S. of around 20%. This is a significant number, and it is critical if President Trump wants to apply credible threats of war to Iran. Bottom Line: Unlike North Korea, Iran has several levers it can use to retaliate against U.S. Maximum Pressure. Iran agreed to set these levers aside as negotiations with the Obama administration progressed, and it has kept them aside since the conclusion of the JCPOA. It is therefore easy for Tehran to resurrect them against the Trump administration. Critical among these levers is meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. Not only is Iraq critical to Iran's regional influence; it is also key to global oil supply. We suspect that a cycle of Iranian retaliation and American Maximum Pressure raises the probability of U.S.-Iran military confrontation to 20%. We will be looking at several key factors in assessing whether the U.S. and Iran are heading towards a confrontation. To that end, we have compiled a U.S.-Iran confrontation checklist (Table 1). Table 1Will The U.S. Attack Iran? Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Investment Implications Over the past several years, there have been many geopolitical crises in the Middle East. We have tended to fade most of them, from a perspective of a geopolitical risk premium applied to oil prices. This is because we always seek the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying, market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. In 2015, we identified three factors that we believe are critical for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications.17 These are: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Renewed sanctions against Iran do so directly. So would Iranian retaliation in Iraq or the Persian Gulf. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Re-imposed sanctions obviously directly impact Iran as they could increase domestic political crisis. A potential Iranian proxy-war in Iraq would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni vs. Shia - which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. A renewed U.S.-Iran tensions check all of our factors. The risk is therefore real and should be priced by the market through a geopolitical risk premium. In addition, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for oil markets in 2019 by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing most of the production gains that Iran has made since 2016 (Chart 9). This is a problem given that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been significantly cut. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Energy Sector Strategy teams believe that global petroleum inventories will be further reduced in 2019 (Chart 10). Chart 9Current And Future Iran##br## Production Is At Risk Current And Future Iran Production Is At Risk Current And Future Iran Production Is At Risk Chart 10Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories,##br## Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated What about the hints from the OPEC 2.0 alliance that they would surge production in light of supply loss from Iran? Oil prices fell on the belief OPEC 2.0 could easily restore 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. Our commodity strategists have always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually achieved (Chart 11). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 12). Chart 11Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing##br## 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 12Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" ##br##Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Furthermore, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.2 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 13). BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy therefore projects that the combination of stable global demand, steady declines in Venezuela's crude oil output, and the loss of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions in 2019 will lift the average Brent and WTI prices to $80 and $72/bbl respectively (Chart 14).18 This forecast, however, represents our baseline based on fundamentals of global oil supply and demand (Chart 15) and does not include our potential scenarios outlined in Diagram 2, which would obviously add additional geopolitical risk premium. Chart 13Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Chart 14Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Chart 15Balances Tighter As Supply Falls Balances Tighter As Supply Falls Balances Tighter As Supply Falls For investors looking for equity-market exposure in this scenario, BCA's Energy Sector Strategy recommends overweighing U.S. shale producers and shale-focused service companies for investors looking for equity-market exposure to oil prices. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has broken down this recommendation into specific equity calls, which we encourage our clients to peruse.19 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The JCPOA was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany (the "+1" of the P5+1). 3 BCA's Senior Commodity & Energy Strategist Robert P. Ryan has given the name "OPEC 2.0" to the Saudi-Russian alliance that is focused on regaining a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," dated March 30, 2017; and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" dated April 6, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 We use Brent implied volatility - of at-the-money options of the selected futures contract - as an input to construct the cumulative normal density of future prices. Thus, the probability obtained is one where the terminal futures price, at the selected months, exceeds the strike price quoted. In order to derive this probability, we need the current market price of the selected future contract, the number of days to expiration, the strike price, and a measure of the volatility of this contract. 5 "Breakout" nuclear capacity is defined here as having enough uranium enriched at lower levels, such as at 20%, to produce sufficient quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear device. The often-reported amount of 20% enriched uranium required for breakout capacity is 200kg. However, the actual amount of uranium required depends on the number of centrifuges being employed and their efficiency. In our 2013 report, we gauged that Iran could produce enough HEU within 4-5 weeks at the Fordow facility to develop a weapon, which means that it had effectively reached "breakout capacity." 6 Please see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions Of Security Council Resolutions In The Islamic Republic Of Iran," IAEA Board Report, dated August 28, 2013, available at www.iaea.org. 7 Although, in a move designed to increase pressure on Iran and its main trade partners, the Obama administration sold Israel the GBU-28 bunker-busting ordinance. That specific ordinance is very powerful, but still not capable enough to penetrate Fordow. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Special Report, "Crisis In The Persian Gulf: Investment Implications," dated March 1, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 There are four U.S. Navy Avenger-class minesweepers based in Bahrain as part of the joint U.S.-U.K. TF-52. This number has been the same since 2012, when they were deployed to the region. 11 Particularly crippling for Iran's economy was the EU oil embargo imposed in January 2012, effective from July of that year, and the banning of Iranian financial institutions from participating in the SWIFT system in March 2012. 12 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is a 12-member, unelected body wielding considerable power in Iran. It has consistently disqualified reformist candidates from running in elections, which makes its approval of Rouhani's candidacy all the more significant. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reality Check: Israel Will Not Bomb Iran (Ever)," dated August 14, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 The NATO war with Yugoslavia in 1999 reveals how challenging SEAD missions can be if the adversary refuses to engage its air defense systems. The U.S. and its NATO allies bombed Serbia and its forces for nearly three months with limited effectiveness against the country's surface-to-air capabilities. The Serbian military simply refused to turn on its radar installations, making U.S. AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, designed to home in on electronic transmissions coming from radar systems, ineffective. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threats,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: A Tale Of Red Herrings And Black Swans," dated October 14, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019," dated May 24, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Geopolitical Certainty: OPEC Production Risks Are Playing To Shale Producers' Advantage," dated May 9, 2018, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize

Highlights Stable global demand; steady declines in Venezuela's crude oil output; and the cumulative loss of 500k b/d of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions by 2H19 will lift average Brent and WTI prices to $80 and $72/bbl in 2019, respectively (Chart of the Week). Brent prices will average $78/bbl in 2H18, while WTI goes to $72/bbl, as these supply-side effects are not material to prices this year. We lowered our estimate of Venezuela output to 1.2mm b/d by end-2018 (vs. 1.3mm b/d previously), and to 1.0mm b/d by end-2019 (vs. 1.2mm b/d). Offsetting these losses and continued deterioration in non-Gulf OPEC supply in 2019, we assume OPEC 2.0 slowly restores 1.2mm b/d in 1H19, and U.S. shale oil grows 1.4mm b/d. Even so, balances tighten significantly (Chart 2).1 Chart of the WeekBrent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Chart 2Balances Tighter As Supply Falls Balances Tighter As Supply Falls Balances Tighter As Supply Falls If Venezuela collapses, and its ~ 1mm b/d of crude exports are lost, Brent crude oil could go to $100/bbl by end 2019, in the simulation we ran assuming exports collapse in 2H18. Uncertainty over supply and demand responses to higher prices makes this difficult to model. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Our options recommendations - long Brent call spreads spanning Dec/18 to Aug/19 delivery - are up an average 50.5%. Our long S&P GSCI position, recommended Dec 7/17 to take advantage of increasing backwardation, is up 18.9%.2 Base Metals: Neutral. Copper rallied earlier this week on an apparent easing of trade tensions between the U.S. and China. However, a statement by U.S. President Trump suggesting uncertain progress in talks led to a reversal in most of these gains by mid-day Wednesday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge and tactical long silver position were relatively flat over the past week, as the broad trade-weighted USD moved higher. Ags/Softs: Underweight. China's Sinograin, the state grain buyer, reportedly was in the market this week showing interest in purchasing U.S. soybeans, according to agriculture.com's Successful Farming website. Feature Barring the immediate collapse of Venezuela's oil industry and the loss of its ~ 1mm b/d of oil exports, which we discuss below beginning on page 7, the global crude market will continue to tighten from the supply side, on the back of ratcheting geopolitical pressures. Chief among these are the continuing loss of Venezuelan crude oil production, which, even without a total collapse that wipes out its ~ 1mm b/d of exports, will see production fall to 1.2mm b/d by the end of this year from ~ 1.44mm b/d at present. This represents a decline in our previous estimate of 100k b/d. By the end of 2019, we expect Venezuela production to fall to 1.0mm b/d, 200k b/d below our previous estimate. One year ago, Venezuela was producing just under 2.0mm b/d of crude. The other supply source affected by geopolitics is Iran, where we expect export volumes to fall later this year, due to the re-imposition of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions (Chart 3). We are modeling a loss of 200k b/d by year-end 2018, and a cumulative loss of 500k b/d by the end of 1H19.3 Lastly, we have raised the probability OPEC 2.0 keeps its production cuts in place in 2H18 to 100% from 80%. This added $2/bbl to our 2018 Brent forecast. We expect a wider Brent - WTI differential this year, and left our 2018 WTI forecast at $70/bbl. Chart 3Iran Exports Down 500k b/d By 2H19, In BCA Model Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 The steady decline in Venezuelan production and the loss of Iranian exports, coupled with an extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, will take total OPEC crude oil production to 32.0mm b/d this year (down 300k b/d y/y), and 31.7mm b/d next year. Non-Gulf OPEC production also falls: coming in at 7.5mm b/d this year, these producers account for a 300k b/d y/y loss, and, at 7.0mm b/d next year, a 500k b/d y/y loss in 2019. Once again this leaves non-OPEC production as the leading source of new supply: We have total non-OPEC liquids (crude, condensates and other liquids) up 2.12mm b/d to 60.7mm b/d this year, and up 2.11mm b/d next year. This is led - no surprise - by U.S. shales, which we expect to increase by 1.3mm b/d this year to 6.52mm b/d, and 1.5mm b/d next year to 7.98mm b/d, respectively (Chart 4). Net, we expect global crude and liquids supply to average 99.73mm b/d this year, and 101.76mm b/d in 2019. On the demand side, our growth estimates are unchanged in our latest balances model. We continue to expect global demand growth of 1.7mm b/d this year and next - the prospects of which strengthened with an apparent dialing back of U.S. - China trade animosities over the past week (Chart 5). This will move the level of global consumption up to 100.3mm b/d this year and 102mm b/d next year, as can be seen in Table 1. Chart 4Steady Decline In Venezuela Exports,##BR##Iran Sanctions Tighten Markets Steady Decline In Venezuela Exports, Iran Sanctions Tighten Markets Steady Decline In Venezuela Exports, Iran Sanctions Tighten Markets Chart 5Global Demand Remains Strong In##BR##Our Updated Balances Models Global Demand Remains Strong In Our Updated Balances Models Global Demand Remains Strong In Our Updated Balances Models The effect of the supply-side adjustments to our model - holding our demand assumptions pretty much constant - can be seen in the new path of OECD inventories vis-à-vis the 2010 - 2014 five-year average level of stocks (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's strong compliance with its production-management agreement, along with losses of Venezuelan and Iranian exports and above-average demand growth caused estimated OECD commercial inventories to fall ~ 303mm bbls versus Jan/17 levels. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Chart 6Tighter Markets, Lower Inventories,##BR##Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets, Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Tighter Markets, Lower Inventories, Keep Forward Curves Backwardated Keeping OECD inventories below their 2010 - 2014 average levels means Brent and WTI forward curves will remain backwardated at least to the end of 2019, which, we believe, is OPEC 2.0's ultimate goal. This will ensure the coalition's member states receive the highest price along these forward curves, while the coalition's U.S. shale-oil rivals are forced to hedge at a lower price a year or two forward. Backwardation also works to the advantage of commodity index investors, particularly when the investable index is heavily weighted to oil and refined products like the S&P GSCI.4 This recommendation is up 18.9% since it was recommended Dec 7/17. Net, we expect Brent prices to average $78/bbl in 2H18, while WTI goes to $72/bbl. For next year, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl and WTI to average $72/bbl. Simulation Of A Venezuela Supply Shock To Oil Markets The likelihood Venezuela manages to maintain exports of ~ 1mm b/d this year and next falls daily.5 Were markets to lose these export volumes, they initially would scramble to replace them, leading to a short-term price spike, in our view. We simulated the loss of Venezuela's ~ 1mm b/d of exports, assuming these volumes fall off in June, and starting, in Jul/18, OPEC 2.0 gradually restores the 1.2mm b/d it actually cut from production over 2H18. By Jan/19 OPEC 2.0's 1.2mm b/d cuts are fully restored, in our simulation. However, the loss of Venezuela exports is only fully realized in 2H19, assuming oil consumption stays strong. Brent prices end 2019 ~ $100/bbl (Chart 7). OECD inventories fall to ~ 2.65 billion bbls by end 2018, and to ~ 2.32 billion bbls by end-2019 (Chart 8). This is not unreasonable, given the inelasticity of demand to price over the short term, but we would expect that in 1H20, demand would fall in response to higher prices. Chart 7Oil Prices Move Higher In Our Simulation,##BR##If Venezuela's Exports Collapse... Oil Prices Move Higher In Our Simulation, If Venezuela"s Exports Collapse... Oil Prices Move Higher In Our Simulation, If Venezuela"s Exports Collapse... Chart 8... OECD Inventories Drop Sharply,##BR##As Well ... OECD Inventories Drop Sharply, As Well ... OECD Inventories Drop Sharply, As Well Of course, by that time, the supply side likely would have adjusted as well. We will be exploring this further and developing additional simulations to understand the evolution of prices beyond 2020. How this plays out is unknowable at present. But, as a starting point for understanding the implications of losing Venezuela's exports, this is a reasonable set of assumptions, given the challenges in not only returning OPEC 2.0 volumes removed from the market, but getting them to refining centers in 2H18. What is unclear at present is how governments will use their strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs), and whether OPEC will fire up spare capacity to handle the loss of Venezuela's exports, should this occur. Much will depend on how OPEC 2.0 and consumer governments' SPRs interact if exports collapse. Production Cuts, Inventories, SPRs And Spare Capacity In the simulation above, we reckon OPEC 2.0 flowing production can be brought back to market in fairly short order, and that still-ample inventories and spare capacity would be available to cover the sudden loss of Venezuela's exports, to say nothing of strategic petroleum reserves held in the U.S., China, Japan, and the EU. The key, though, is how long it would take to get this supply to market, and how governments holding SPRs react. We estimate it will take anywhere from one to three months to begin to restore the volumes OPEC 2.0 took off the market if Venezuela goes offline. It will take a few months for the restored crude production to start flowing into pipelines and on to ships, followed by 50- to 60-day journeys from the Gulf to be delivered to refining centers. Chart 9OPEC Spare Capacity ~ 2% Of Global Supply,##BR##Lower Than 2003 - 2008 Price Run-Up OPEC Spare Capacity ~ 2% Of Global Supply, Lower Than 2003 - 2008 Price Run-Up OPEC Spare Capacity ~ 2% Of Global Supply, Lower Than 2003 - 2008 Price Run-Up In the meantime, refiners would continue to draw crude inventory to supply product markets, along with product inventories, a critical consideration going into the northern hemisphere's summer driving season. In a short-term pinch, governments could draw their strategic petroleum reserves to fill the gaps while OPEC 2.0 production is being restored, and markets get back to the status-quo ante prevailing prior to the loss of Venezuela's exports.6 OPEC's ~ 1.9mm b/d of spare capacity - most of which is located in KSA - could be called upon in an emergency; however, this requires 30 days to be brought on line, per U.S. EIA, and can only be sustained for at least 90 days (Chart 9). The EIA is forecasting OPEC spare capacity will fall from current levels of 1.9mm bbls to ~ 1.3mm bbls by end-2019.7 Given these uncertainties, we continue to recommend investors remain long Brent crude oil option call spreads, which we recommended over the course of the past few months.8 We expect prices and volatility to move higher, both of which are positive for option positions. Bottom Line: Venezuela's crude oil production is in free-fall. We estimate it will drop to 1.2mm b/d by the end of this year, and to 1.0mm b/d by the end of next year. Iran's exports could fall 500k b/d by the end of 1H19, as a result of the re-imposition of nuclear sanctions by the U.S. These geopolitically induced supply losses tighten markets in 2019, raising our prices forecasts for Brent and WTI to $80 and $72/bbl, respectively. We are raising our Brent forecast for 2018 by $2/bbl, expecting prices to average $76 and $70/bbl, respectively, since these risks likely do not kick in until late in 2018. A collapse in Venezuelan production could spike prices to $100/bbl by the end of 2019, even as OPEC 2.0 restores the 1.2mm b/d of production it removed from markets beginning in 2H18. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Its production cuts of ~ 1.2mm b/d and natural declines have removed ~ 1.8mm b/d from the market. 2 Backwardation is a term of art used in commodity markets to describe an inverted forward price curve - i.e., prompt-delivery commodities trade higher than the same commodity delivered in the future. The opposite of backwardation is contango. 3 There is an extremely high degree of uncertainty around this estimate, which is why we are treating it as our Bayesian prior, and will be revising it as additional information becomes available. We do not believe all of the production restored by Iran post-sanctions - 1mm b/d - will be lost to export markets, but starting with a prior of ~ half of it being lost due to less-than-full re-imposition of sanctions is reasonable. 4 Commodity-index total returns are the sum of price appreciation registered by being long the index; "roll yield," which comes from buying deferred futures in backwardated markets, letting them roll up the forward curve as they approach delivery, selling them, then replacing them with cheaper deferred contracts in the same commodity; and collateral yield, which accrues to margin deposits on the futures comprising the index. Roll yield can be illustrated by way of a simplistic example: Assume the oil exposure in an index is established in a backwardated market - say, spot is trading at $62/bbl and the 3rd nearby WTI future trades at $60/bbl. Assuming nothing changes, an investor can hold the 3rd nearby contract until it becomes spot, then roll it (i.e., sell it in the spot month and replace it with another 3rd nearby contract at $60/bbl) for a $2/bbl gain. This process can be repeated as long as the forward curve remains backwardated. 5 Matters have only gotten worse since the Council on Foreign Relations published its so-called Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 33 February 13, 2018, titled "A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis," which opened with the following: Venezuela is in an economic free fall. As a result of government-led mismanagement and corruption, the currency value is plummeting, prices are hyperinflated, and gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen by over a third in the last five years. In an economy that produces little except oil, the government has cut imports by over 75 percent, choosing to use its hard currency to service the roughly $140 billion in debt and other obligations. These economic choices have led to a humanitarian crisis. Basic food and medicines for Venezuela's approximately thirty million citizens are increasingly scarce, and the devastation of the health-care system has spurred outbreaks of treatable diseases and rising death rates. The CFR's memo is available at https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis 6 There is no way to model exactly how this will play out, absent a detailed plan put forward by the IEA and China, where the largest SPRs reside. IEA members have bound themselves to hold reserves equal to 90 days of net petroleum imports. Among the largest SPRs, U.S. holds just over 660mm barrels of oil in its SPR; China held ~ 290mm barrels at the end of last year, based on IEA estimates. Germany and Japan together hold close to 550mm bbls, according to the Joint Organizations Data Initiatives (JODI). KSA's crude oil inventories - not exactly SPRs - stood at ~ 235mm barrels in March, according to JODI. We are highly confident disposition of these reserves in the event of a shock to Venezuela's exports is being discussed in Washington, Paris, Riyadh and Beijing. Please see p. 2 of the U.S. Government Accountability Office's Testimony Before the subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, "Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Preliminary Observations on the Emergency Oil Stockpile," released for publication Nov. 2, 2017. 7 This actually is a fairly low level of spare capacity, amounting to ~ 2% of global supply. During, the price run-up of 2003 - 2008, OPEC's total spare capacity was near or below 3% of supply and that was considered tight at the time. 8 Please see p. 11 for a summary of these trades' performance. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019 Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019