Emerging Markets

Feature Valuations, whether for currencies, equities, or bonds, are always at the top of the list of the determinants of any asset's long-term performance. In this optic, we regularly update the set of long-term valuation models for currencies we introduced in a February 16 Special Report titled "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets." Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion.1 These models cover 23 currencies, incorporating both G10 and EM FX markets. Twice a year, we provide clients with a comprehensive update of all these long-term models in one stop. This time around, a few fair value estimates have changed. This reflects the revisions to the productivity estimates we source from the Conference Board. These models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their purpose is therefore threefold. First, they provide guideposts to judge whether we are at the end, beginning, or middle of a long-term currency cycle. Second, by providing strong directional signals, these models help us judge whether any given move is more likely be a countertrend development or not, offering insight on its potential longevity. Third, they help us and our clients to cut through the fog, and understand the key drivers of cyclical variations in a currency's value. The U.S. Dollar Chart 1Upward Revisions To Productivity Have Lifted The USD's Fair Value Upward Revisions To Productivity Have Lifted The USD's Fair Value Upward Revisions To Productivity Have Lifted The USD's Fair Value Based on its key long-term drivers - real yield differentials and the relative productivity trend between the U.S. and its trading partners - the U.S. dollar is trading around 5% above its upward-pointing fair value. Moreover, the equilibrium exchange rate for the USD has risen from previous estimations as the U.S. productivity series computed by the Conference Board have been revised upward. This comforts us in our bullish stance on the U.S. dollar. For one, the valuation premium has fallen relative to its previous estimate. Second, the dollar remains substantially below previous overvaluation peaks, where it traded at a more than 20% premium to fair value (Chart 1). Additionally, with the U.S. slack being much smaller than in most other major economies, the Fed is in a much firmer position to increase rates than most of its counterparts. This suggests that U.S. rates will continue to boost the dollar higher, justifying a growing premium to its long-term equilibrium. Finally, the dollar's recent valuation picture on a broad basis reflects the fact that many EM currencies and commodity producers are still pricey. As such, this also comforts us in our stance to underweight commodity currencies versus European ones and the yen. The Euro Chart 2The Euro Can Cheapen Further The Euro Can Cheapen Further The Euro Can Cheapen Further On a multi-year time horizon, the euro is driven by the relative productivity trend of the euro area with its trading partners, its net international investment position, terms-of-trade shocks, and rates differentials. The euro continues to trade at a 6% discount to its fair value (Chart 2). However, the euro was in fact 15% below equilibrium in both 1984 and 2002, respectively, suggesting that the valuation advantage of the euro is not yet large enough to justify aggressively bidding up the common currency. Additionally, monetary divergences with the U.S. will continue to weigh on the EUR. On a structural basis the euro area continues to exhibit signs of slack. The employment-to-population ratio for prime age workers is at 2008 levels and domestic inflationary pressures remain muted, especially when one considers how cheap the euro is. The ECB policy is therefore likely to remain very easy for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the ECB might leave policy even easier than the broad euro area economic averages would suggest as it focuses its efforts on the weakest members of the union. While in the early 2000s it was Germany, today it is the European periphery that is in need of easy money to create fiscal room and ease latent deleveraging pressures. The Yen Chart 3The Yen Will Stay Cheap The Yen Will Stay Cheap The Yen Will Stay Cheap The yen's long-term equilibrium is a function of Japan's net international investment position, global risk aversion, and commodity prices. The large Japanese current account surplus continues to lift the yen's fair value, albeit at a slower pace than last year. While the yen may have strengthened substantially in recent months against the dollar, on a broader basis the yen is still very cheap (albeit not as cheap as a year ago) (Chart 3). This simply reflects the fact that many Asian currencies and the euro - key competitors of Japan - and the CNY - the currency of the most crucial export market for the Japanese - have also fallen substantially versus the dollar. The current outsized efforts by the Bank of Japan to lift domestic inflation expectations at any costs suggest that Japanese policy will maintain a dovish bias for an extended period of time, even if realized inflation perks up. As such, like the euro, the yen is likely to remain a prey to global monetary policy divergences, especially against the USD. Nonetheless, the yen's attractive valuation - comparable to that which prevailed around the time of the Plaza Accord - implies that USD/JPY could stay as the preferred cross by which to play any dollar correction that should emerge along the upward trajectory of the greenback. The British Pound Chart 4GBP: The Economy Matters More Than Valuations GBP: The Economy Matters More Than Valuations GBP: The Economy Matters More Than Valuations The fair value of the pound has fallen over the past year and is projected to continue doing so in 2017. This development is explained by the U.K.'s poor trend productivity growth, falling real yields, and slowing house price appreciation. Despite this change in the fair value, following the drubbing received by the pound in the Brexit vote aftermath, GBP is cheap on a long-term basis (Chart 4). However, the decline in investment that may materialize following the fall in British FDI inflows mean that the U.K.'s productivity may deteriorate even faster than is currently projected. This would further depress the pound's fair value, implying that the GBP may not be as cheap as the model currently highlights. Even if this prospect were to materialize, the pound could still be an attractive play on a cyclical horizon. For one, British real rates are likely to pick up as the economy continues to surprise to the upside, mitigating some of the negative implications of falling productivity on the GBP's fair value. Additionally, the last legal hurdles to the invocation of the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty are being cleared, suggesting that the Brexit negotiations will begin in earnest in March. While this could create some episodes of currency volatility as the British and EU negotiators establish their stances, the end of the anticipation of this fearful moment may let investors focus on the U.K.'s economic robustness. The Canadian Dollar Chart 5CAD At Fair Value: The Future Depends On Oil CAD At Fair Value: The Future Depends On Oil CAD At Fair Value: The Future Depends On Oil The Loonie's fair value is driven by commodity prices, relative productivity trends, and the Canadian net international position. While the Canadian current account deficit and the nation's poor productivity growth would argue for a lower fair-value, these have been compensated by a rebound in commodity prices, creating stability for the CAD's equilibrium exchange rate. The sharp rebound in the Canadian dollar over the past 12 months means that the exceptional undervaluation in February last year has been fully eradicated (Chart 5). However, the CAD is not experiencing the same level of overvaluation as many of the other commodity currencies, like the AUD, the NZD, the BRL, or the RUB. This could reflect the NAFTA discount now created by Trump's demanding a renegotiation of the trade deal, which puts Canadian exports at marginal risk. Ultimately, with the CAD troughs and peak very much a direct negative function of the USD, our bullish stance on the greenback suggests that the CAD could once again experience a discount in the coming 12 to 18 months, especially as the U.S. dollar carries such a heavy weight in the trade-weighted CAD. In fact, we expect the Canadian economy to underperform that of the U.S. as the Canadian consumer remains hampered by higher debt loads and as Canadian capex remains hurt by excess capacity. This will only accentuate the monetary divergence between the CAD and the USD. The Australian Dollar Chart 6The AUD Has Overshot Fundamentals: Use Further Rallies To Sell The AUD Has Overshot Fundamentals: Use Further Rallies To Sell The AUD Has Overshot Fundamentals: Use Further Rallies To Sell The fair value of the Aussie, driven by Australia's net international position and commodity prices, has stabilized. However, it may begin to deteriorate anew if commodity prices lose some of their luster, a growing probability event in the face of a strong USD. Moreover, the AUD's rally has only caused this currency to become ever more expensive and it now offers one of the poorest risk-reward profiles in the G10. Historically, current levels of overvaluation have proved a reliable sell-signal for the Aussie and warrant shorting this currency right now (Chart 6). Our portfolio has a negative AUD bias. The AUD's poor valuations suggest that it is discounting an extremely positive growth outcome in the Chinese economy. We think China is likely to surprise to the downside, especially against such lofty expectations. Raising the AUD's risk profile even further, China has not only exhausted its latest fiscal stimulus and clamped down on the real estate market, but also cracked down on excess steel production. This means that the demand for iron ore and coking coal - of which China has accumulated large inventory piles - could weaken even more than a Chinese economic deceleration would imply. Australian terms-of-trades could suffer a nasty shock. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7NZD Is Expensive, But Not As Much As The AUD NZD Is Expensive, But Not As Much As The AUD NZD Is Expensive, But Not As Much As The AUD Natural resources prices, real rate differentials, and the VIX are the key determinants of the Kiwi's fair value, highlighting the NZD's nature as both a commodity currency and a carry currency. Both the fall in the VIX and the rebound in commodities are currently causing the gradual appreciation in the New Zealand's dollar equilibrium exchange rate. Thus, this trend could easily reverse if the global reflation trade begins to wane. Currently, the NZD is expensive (Chart 7), albeit not as exceptionally so as the AUD, the BRL, or the RUB. This partly explains why we like the Kiwi more than these currencies. In fact, while we worry about the outlook for the NZD versus the USD, the attractive domestic situation in New Zealand, where growth is the highest in the G10 and employment is growing at an eye-popping 6% annual rate, suggests that the RBNZ could abandon its new-found neutral bias in favor of a hawkish one later this year. Hence, we like the Kiwi against the AUD, the BRL, or the RUB. The Swiss Franc Chart 8The Swiss Net International Investment Position Makes The SNB's Life Difficult The Swiss Net International Investment Position Makes The SNB's Life Difficult The Swiss Net International Investment Position Makes The SNB's Life Difficult Switzerland's enormous and growing net international investment position continues to be the most important factor lifting the fair value of the Swiss franc. Yet, in the short-term, this is irrelevant. The SNB has demonstrated its capacity and credibility when it comes to keeping a floor under EUR/CHF. Thus, the Swiss franc will continue to trade in line with the euro, even if the current French political risks would have normally caused an appreciation in the Swiss Franc versus the euro. This means that the real trade-weighted CHF should not deviate much from its long-term fair value estimate (Chart 8). Nonetheless, this peg contains the seeds of its own demise. The cheaper the CHF gets, the larger the economic distortions in the Swiss economy become. Already, Switzerland sports the most negative interest rates in the world. This directly reflects the large injections of liquidity required from the SNB to stem any CHF appreciation. A consequence of these low real rates has been the appreciation in the already-expensive Swiss real estate. Ultimately, we expect the SNB to be forced to capitulate to all the inflows and abandon its floor. While this will not happen tomorrow, it will likely result in a comparable move to the one that followed the tentative unpegging of January 2015. Back then, the CHF was not particularly cheap. While it is too early to make this bet, we suspect that a pick-up in actual inflation will constitute the key signal for investors to begin betting against the SNB's current policy. The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Riksbank Has Achieved One Of Its Goal: SEK Is Cheap The Riksbank Has Achieved One Of Its Goal: SEK Is Cheap The Riksbank Has Achieved One Of Its Goal: SEK Is Cheap The Swedish krona continues to trade cheaply, even if its long-term fair value remains on a secular downward trajectory (Chart 9). Yet, the undemanding valuations of the SEK hides a complex picture. It is approximately fairly valued against the GBP and expensive against the NOK, two of its largest trading partners. However, the SEK is cheap against the USD and the euro. Amongst the latter two, we prefer buying the Swedish krona against the EUR rather than against the USD. The SEK has historically been very sensitive to the USD; therefore, USD/SEK is very exposed to the dollar's cyclical bull market. However, the current widening of European government spreads echoes the 2010-2012 period, when EUR/SEK softened considerably as the survival of the euro was up in the air in investors' minds. Dutch, French, and potential Italian elections this year could prove similarly unnerving for investors, creating a source of downside risk in EUR/SEK. Moreover, Swedish domestic fundamentals remain much stronger than those of the euro area, further strengthening the case of for shorting EUR/SEK. The Norwegian Krone Chart 10NOK, Still Undervalued Despite The Rally NOK, Still Undervalued Despite The Rally NOK, Still Undervalued Despite The Rally A year ago, when global markets were in full panic mode, the Norwegian krona became the most attractive currency in the world on a valuation basis. After a blistering rally, this is not the case anymore (Chart 10). Nonetheless, it continues to trade on the cheap side, and remains the cheapest commodity currency in the world along with the Colombian peso. We therefore maintain a positive bias toward the NOK against the rest of the commodity complex, especially the very expensive and equally oil-exposed RUB. While USD/NOK, like USD/SEK, is very exposed to general dollar strength, we remain short EUR/NOK on a 12-month basis. The NOK's main long-term favorable factor still is its enormous net international investment position of 194% of GDP, which creates a structural upward bias on the country's current account surplus. Today, while the euro area runs a record high current account surplus of 3% of GDP, its net international investment position remains negative at 8% of GDP. Additionally, in an almost perfect mirror image to the euro area, Norway shows little signs of having entered a liquidity trap post-2008. The money multiplier remains high, loan growth has stayed strong, and inflation has remained perky. This means that the Norges Bank is in a better position to cyclically increase rates than the ECB. Chinese Yuan Chart 11Can The Yuan Weaken More? Can The Yuan Weaken More? Can The Yuan Weaken More? As commodity prices strengthened and Chinese productivity growth slowed, the strong upward bias to the yuan's long-term fair value paused in 2016 and may even fall a bit in 2017. Nonetheless, the CNY continuous fall has cheapened this currency considerably since 2015 (Chart 11). Does this mean that the CNY is a buy at this juncture? No. First, on a trade-weighted basis, the experience of the past 20 years has been that it bottoms at greater discounts to fair value. Moreover, while testing the current model, we also tried various productivity series for China. Depending on the one used, the yuan's discount to fair value would considerably shrink, implying a high degree of uncertainty around the actual cheapness of the RMB. Second, China continues to suffer from capital outflows, suggesting that domestic expected returns have yet to be equilibrated with those available in the rest of the world. A lower RMB would help generate this adjustment. Third, China is still an economy with too much capacity and too much debt that also intends to liberalize its internal markets and external accounts, even if slowly. Historically, this set of circumstances has most often come along with a weak currency, a key tool to alleviate the deflationary tendencies created by these forces. Fourth, and more specific to the dollar, the PBoC now targets a basket of currencies which means that when the DXY strengthens, USD/CNY also rallies. The dollar bull market will therefore continue to hurt the RMB versus the USD. Finally, Trump's protectionist rhetoric represents a big risk for China as exports to the U.S. represent 4% of China's GDP. A simple way to regain some of the competitiveness that would be lost to tariffs would be for the PBoC to let the CNY drift lower against the USD, though this would also aggravate the trade tensions. The Brazilian Real Chart 12Trouble In Rio Trouble In Rio Trouble In Rio Hampered by poor productivity trends, which weigh on the Brazilian current account balance, the fair value of the real remains quite depressed, even as commodity prices have sharply rebounded over the course of the past 12 months. In fact, the violent rally in the BRL over the same timeframe has made it one of the most expensive currencies tracked by our models (Chart 12). At current levels of overvaluation, the next 6 months return on the BRL has always been negative. The potential downside for BRL over the next 12-18 months is large. The rally reflected a general easing in EM financial conditions, fiscal stimulus in China, and the ejection of Dilma Rousseff, replaced by Michel Temer. While the change of government has depressed the geopolitical risk premium, any real improvement rests on the Temer administration's stated goal of slashing the size of the public sector. In the Mundell-Fleming model, the resulting destruction in domestic demand cuts local real rates, and therefore, the BRL's appeal to international investors. This a severe headwind to overcome, especially when coupled with as clear of a message as the one currently sent by valuations. Finally, the recent strength in the dollar along with the rise in DM global rates is creating a tightening of global and EM liquidity conditions, exactly as the Chinese fiscal stimulus wanes. This is a very poor risk profile for the BRL. The Mexican Peso Chart 13MXN Is Not Cheap Enough Yet MXN Is Not Cheap Enough Yet MXN Is Not Cheap Enough Yet Interestingly, despite the surge in USD/MXN in the wake of Trump's electoral victory, the MXN is not very cheap on a real trade-weighted basis (Chart 13). The peso's equilibrium rate has been pulled lower by the nation's persistent current account deficit which has continuously hurt its net international investment position. Conceptually, this is akin to a relative oversupply of Mexican assets to the rest of the world, depressing the peso's fair-value. The large stock of Mexican USD-denominated debt is a testament to this phenomenon. At this juncture, while PPP valuations suggest that the peso is attractive relative to the USD, Mexico's negative net international investment position and its large stock of U.S.-dollar debt warrant cautiousness. The Mexican economy is very exposed to a tightening in global liquidity conditions and the borrowing-costs squeeze represented by a higher dollar and higher U.S. rates. Hence, USD/MXN could have more upside from here on a 12-to-18 month basis. Compared to other EM currencies like the BRL, the RUB, or the CLP, however, the Mexican peso seems very attractively priced as all these currencies currently trade at large premia to their fair value. Additionally, a "Trump-protectionism" risk premium is already embedded in the Mexican peso, but the above currencies do not seem to suffer from the same handicap. While not as directly exposed to this risk as Mexico, these countries would nonetheless be affected by a trade war between the U.S. and Asia, and particularly between the U.S. and China. The Chilean Peso Chart 14The CLP Has Overshot The CLP Has Overshot The CLP Has Overshot The Chilean peso real effective exchange rate is driven by the country's productivity trend relative to its trading partners and the real price of copper - which proxies the Chilean terms-of-trade. As a result of the rally since the winter of 2015, the real CLP is at a 4-year high and is now in expensive territory (Chart 14). Global risks point to downside for the CLP, as copper is likely to underperform against other commodities. EM liquidity conditions should dry up due to the rising dollar, compounding potential problems created by China's efforts to crack down on real estate activity, the biggest source of copper consumption by a wide margin. The recent meteoric surge in copper prices will leave the red metal vulnerable to such dynamics. Domestic factors also don't bode well for the peso. The Chilean housing market is currently going through its biggest downturn since 2008 while economic activity remains anemic. Furthermore, the worker's strike in "La Escondida", the world's biggest copper mine, should cause strains on Chilean exports. All of these factors will be too great for the CLP to overcome. Thus, we remain short the peso. The Colombian Peso Chart 15COP Is A Cheap Oil Play COP Is A Cheap Oil Play COP Is A Cheap Oil Play The real COP is driven by Colombia's relative productivity trends and the price of oil, the country's main export. With oil prices having rebounded, the fair value has returned to 2014 levels. Nevertheless, the COP still undershoots its fundamentals (Chart 15). This reflects the premium demanded by investors to compensate for Colombia's large current account deficit equal to 6.3% of GDP. The outlook for the COP has brightened, especially against other commodity currencies. The OPEC deal to cut oil production seems to be on track so far, with 90% compliance amongst OPEC members. Furthermore, the potential for a strong economic performance in DM economies suggests that oil demand should remain firm. This should help the COP outperform currencies that have a higher sensitivity to metals like the BRL and the ZAR. Domestic factors also paint a positive picture for the peso. The Colombian economic situation is more robust than in other EM economies. During the commodity boom years, Colombian banks were much more orthodox in their lending than their EM counterparts. Thus, this Andean country does not suffer from unsustainable debt dynamics, and therefore, if EM suffers a liquidity-induced slowdown, Colombia should withstand this shock better. The South African Rand Chart 16ZAR Has Outshined Gold, Higher Rates Will Be A Problem ZAR Has Outshined Gold, Higher Rates Will Be A Problem ZAR Has Outshined Gold, Higher Rates Will Be A Problem South Africa's dismal productivity trends continue to force a downtrend upon the rand's long-term fair value. The rally in commodity prices has nonetheless lifted the current fair value of the ZAR for early 2017 compared to estimates run last year. Despite this improvement, the rand's 6% rally in real terms has still overshot any justifiable fundamentals, leaving this currency overvalued (Chart 16). Furthermore, if commodity prices were to correct, not only would the fair value of the rand fall, but the current overshoot would also correct. This implies substantial downside risk to the ZAR. The ZAR may remain stable in the short term as the dollar's correction continues and gold prices enjoy a healthy bounce. However, the rand's copious handicaps will come back to haunt investors once the previous dollar strength is fully digested and the USD resumes its cyclical bull market. Moreover, such a move is likely to come hand-in-hand with rising U.S. rates, embracing both gold and the rand in an inescapable kiss of death. The Russian Ruble Chart 17RUB Has Fully Priced Any Russia-American Rapprochement RUB Has Fully Priced Any Russia-American Rapprochement RUB Has Fully Priced Any Russia-American Rapprochement Buoyed by both the perceived benefits to the Russian economy of OPEC oil production cuts and the fall in the geopolitical risk premium coming from the expected Trump/Putin rapprochement, the Ruble is now very expensive (Chart 17). While RUB was more expensive in the years prior to the 1998 Russian default, it still manages currently to trade at its highest premium in more than 18 years. Trump and Putin really need to get along famously well - and it is not clear that they will at the moment. As the RUB is massively expensive, we would not chase it higher from here. Not only is the upside to oil prices limited, since at current oil prices, shape of the oil curve, and financing costs, shale producers are once again investing in their oil fields, pointing to higher U.S. production in the coming quarters. Also, the civility between Trump and Putin is likely to prove ephemeral: Russia's commercial links are with Europe and China, not the U.S. If anything, the U.S.'s growing exports of energy products mean that both nations will soon compete in that market. We know how much Trump loves foreign competition. Thus, we prefer other petro currencies to the RUB. At the current juncture, buying CAD/RUB and NOK/RUB makes sense. Especially as the valuation disadvantage is clear enough to point to a large ruble-bearish move in both crosses. The Korean Won Chart 18No Big Discount In The KRW No Big Discount In The KRW No Big Discount In The KRW The fair value of the won is positively correlated with the nation's net international investment position, but shows a strong negative relationship with oil prices. This reflects the status of the nation as an oil importer, and thus lower oil prices constitute a positive terms-of-trade shock for Korea. Also, the real trade-weighted won is inversely correlated with EM spreads. This makes sense as the won is a very pro-cyclical currency reflecting the tech and manufacturing bias of the Korean economy. At the current juncture, the won is moderately cheap (Chart 18). The Korean won may be trading on the cheap side, but we worry that this good value may prove somewhat illusory. A strong U.S. dollar and rising DM real rates are likely to result in stresses for many EM borrowers, whether they borrow in USD, produce commodities, or even worse, do both. Such an event would put pressure on EM spreads and push down the fair value of the KRW. An additional problem for the won is Donald Trump. Korea has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the expansion of globalization from 1980 to 2008, as its export growth was some of the strongest in the world. Today, if Trump's protectionist tendencies gather momentum, Korea is likely to end up on his line of sight. The passage of import-punishing tax reform, cancellation of the KORUS free trade agreement, or imposition of tariffs on that country would have two potential effects on the won. They could cause the country's current account to deteriorate, hurting the prospective path of Korea's net international position and dragging the KRW fair value lower. This would be a slower drag on the won. Or, the other path, which we judge more likely, market participants (probably helped by Korean monetary authorities) could embed a discount into the KRW's fair value equivalent to the expected impact of the tariffs. This discount would alleviate the pain of the tariff, and would materialize in swift fashion. The Indian Rupee Chart 19SGD Has Downside INR Real Equilibrium Keeps Rising, But Inflation Still Clouds The Outlook INR Real Equilibrium Keeps Rising, But Inflation Still Clouds The Outlook The fair value of the real trade-weighted INR is driven by India's productivity performance relative to its trading partners - the key factor behind the gentle upward slope in the equilibrium value for the rupee, its net international investment position, and Indian real interest rate differentials. However, the elevated level of inflation by global standards in India means that despite its long-term nominal downtrend, the INR is not cheap (Chart 19). Yet, while it will be difficult for this currency to rally against the USD if the dollar is in a broad-based uptrend, things are looking up for the INR relative to other EM currencies. The swift implementation of the currency reform last year was a bit of a debacle, but results are beginning to show through: deposit growth is improving. Thus, the constant shortage of loanable savings that has structurally hurt Indian capex and fomented elevated inflation in that country might begin to decrease. This means that over the long term, India's relative productivity performance might improve further and the country's stubborn inflation might decrease. This would lift the INR's fair value over time. The key to this positive outlook will be the RBI. With the personnel and political-administrative changes at its helm, it is hard to judge whether the Indian central bank will lift rates enough as capex perks up. That would limit future inflation and protect the value of the fiat currency and hence the long-term attractiveness of keeping money in Indian banks. We are optimistic, but await clearer proofs. The Philippine Peso Chart 20The Duterte Discount The Duterte Discount The Duterte Discount President Rodrigo Duterte's politics have been a source of fear for investors. As a result, PHP has depreciated against the USD and is now trading at a 10% discount (Chart 20). The fair value of the peso, driven by the cumulative current account and commodity prices, is on an uptrend. This will likely continue as a strong USD should depress commodity prices, improving the Philippines' trade balance and terms of trade. Additionally, improving DM economies will likely generate higher remittances to the Philippines, boosting the current account balance, domestic consumption, and the PHP's long-term value. These dynamics underpin our bullish long-term view on the PHP. However, potential political risks still loom large for the economy. So far Duterte has allowed technocrats to run economic policy, but if he takes a greater personal interest in this area it is likely to be unfriendly to foreign investors, potentially endangering broader FDI inflows. This could erode the PHP long-term equilibrium value over time. Relations with the Trump administration do not have any clarity yet but potentially offer substantial downside risks. Tempering our fear for now, Duterte is taking a reasonable approach to economic management and opening the way for new investment from China, suggesting political risks to foreign investment remain contained. The Singapore Dollar Chart 21INR Real Equilibrium Keeps Rising, But Inflation Still Clouds The Outlook SGD Has Downside SGD Has Downside Our model points to a relatively stable long-term valuation of the Singaporean Dollar. The currency displays little statistical significance with economic factors, with its relationship with commodities being one of indirect statistical coincidence. This is because the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) utilizes the currency as its main monetary policy tool, underpinning the SGD's cyclical nature. As inflation has only just stepped back into positive territory in December 2016, and retail prices remain weak, MAS is unlikely to deviate from its current policy stance and will remain accommodative. Therefore, SGD is likely to depreciate from its current 3.6% overvaluation (Chart 21). This strong mean-reverting characteristic warrants a short position on the SGD. Last September, we suggested selling SGD against USD over JPY, a recommendation we stick to, since a dollar bull market will add additional pressure onto the SGD. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 22HKD Is Expensive But The Peg Will Survive HKD Is Expensive But The Peg Will Survive HKD Is Expensive But The Peg Will Survive While USD/HKD is pegged, the real trade-weighted Hong-Kong dollar can still experience wild swings. Since 2011, its real appreciation has been driven by a wave of EM currency weakness and higher inflation in HK than the U.S. Also, the strength in USD/CNY since January 2014 has added to the HKD's surge. Thanks to this combination, the Hong Kong dollar remains more expensive than it was in 1997, on the eve of the Asian Crisis (Chart 22). This does not mean that HKD is about to depreciate. In fact, we expect the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to keep the peg alive as it has been a pillar of stability since its introduction in 1983. With reserves of 114% of GDP, not only does the HKMA have the financial fire-power to support the HKD, but also Hong Kong continues to sport a current account surplus of 4%. While it is possible that USD/HKD will appreciate toward 7.85, the upper range of the target zone, any depreciation in the real HKD will be a consequence of deepening deflation. This suggests that HK real estate prices will suffer more, especially as they remain significantly overvalued. The Saudi Riyal Chart 23Saudi Needs Higher Oil Prices Or An Internal Devaluation Will Rage For Years To Come Saudi Needs Higher Oil Prices Or An Internal Devaluation Will Rage For Years To Come Saudi Needs Higher Oil Prices Or An Internal Devaluation Will Rage For Years To Come The Saudi Riyal shares two attributes with the HKD: It is a pegged currency and a prohibitively expensive one (Chart 23). Moreover, the very poor productivity performance of the Saudi economy necessitates a perpetually falling real effective exchange rate. Like the HKMA, SAMA will continue to defend its exchange rate for now, as it holds reserves of US$538 billion to protect its currency. Also, Saudi budget deficits can be curtailed further and the Saudi government can continue to borrow in the debt market. Finally, the production-cut agreements between OPEC and Russia have put a floor under oil prices for the time being, exactly as the market was already moving into deficit. They give SAMA even more time. However, one cannot forget that following the 1986 oil collapse, USD/SAR rose by 11%. Therefore, if oil prices relapse as U.S. shale production picks up anew or as the broad USD rallies further, the probability of a SAR surprise devaluation grows. Moreover, selling SAR could also act as insurance against further trouble in the Middle East, especially if Trump follows through on his demand that America's allies pay more for their own defense. At the current juncture, a small long USD/SAR position within a portfolio is equivalent to owning an instrument with a deep out-of-the-money option-like payoff: It costs little, has a small probability of being exercised, but if it does, it will pay great rewards. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Assistant juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 For a more detailed discussion of the various variables incorporated in the models, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets," dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Chinese fiscal stimulus, both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment, has slowed significantly since late last year. This raises a red flag on the sustainability of the cyclical upturn. The Chinese economy should remain buoyant in the near term, despite fiscal retrenchment. Policy initiatives should be closely monitored. Tactically upgrade H shares back to "overweight." Stay cyclically positive, and favor Chinese equities in global and EM portfolios. There are early signs that deflation is re-emerging in Hong Kong. Feature The Chinese economy has maintained strong momentum since the beginning of the year. Some sectors are showing remarkable strength, an extraordinary development considering that January is historically a lackluster month for industrial activity due to seasonality factors. The recent strength is all the more noteworthy as policymakers have apparently rolled back fiscal support significantly since late last year, and have more recently also tightened on the monetary front.1 The divergence between strengthening growth momentum and waning policy support raises hopes that the economy has finally found its footing with self-sustainable dynamics, but at the same time raises the risk that growth may relapse anew without policy tailwinds - especially if struck by an exogenous shock. For now we maintain our benign view on China's cyclical growth outlook, but the risk is tilted to the downside, and policy initiatives should be closely monitored going forward. Meanwhile, we remain positive on Chinese equities on a cyclical basis. This week we are also upgrading our tactical "bullishness rating" on H shares back to "overweight." Strengthening Growth Versus Waning Fiscal Support Despite seasonal noise in the macro data in the first two months of the year, most macro numbers coming out of China of late have surprised significantly to the upside. Producer prices have continued to accelerate, heavy-machine sales have been booming, and even exports have rebounded sharply (Chart 1). The regained strength in the economy is partly attributable to early last year's low base, which has supercharged year-over-year growth rates. However, there is little doubt at this stage that China's growth recovery since early last year has developed into a mini boom. Beneath the robust growth numbers, there are some disconcerting undercurrents on the policy front (Chart 2). Fiscal spending growth has decelerated sharply since early 2016, and actually contracted towards year end. More importantly, capital spending on infrastructure construction, which can be viewed as an indicator for broader policy-driven spending in the economy, also slowed sharply in the last quarter. Fixed asset investment in transportation networks and utility concerns have also abruptly slowed. Investment in railway construction contracted by almost 30% in the final months of last year from a year earlier. All of this underscores a synchronized reduction in the public sector's involvement in the economy of late. Chart 1Growth Recovery... Growth Recovery... Growth Recovery... Chart 2... Meets Waning Fiscal Stimulus ... Meets Waning Fiscal Stimulus ... Meets Waning Fiscal Stimulus It is not immediately clear why the government has significantly scaled back fiscal support. Combined with the latest interest rate adjustments by the People's Bank of China, it is likely that the authorities have become content with the economy's performance to a degree that any direct policy pump-priming in their view is no longer necessary or justified. If China's ongoing cyclical growth improvement was due to the authorities' reflationary efforts, then the abrupt change in policy course certainly raises a red flag on how long the recovery may last. Can The Growth Recovery Continue Without Fiscal Support? Chart 3Monetary Conditions Matter More Than Fiscal Monetary Conditions Matter More Than Fiscal Monetary Conditions Matter More Than Fiscal We expect the Chinese economy to remain buoyant in the next two quarters, even without major acceleration in fiscal spending, for the following reasons: First, China's growth recovery since last year has been driven primarily by easing monetary conditions through a weakening exchange rate and falling real interest rates, rather than strong fiscal boost. Chart 3 shows that industrial sector growth deterioration worsened dramatically in 2014, which in hindsight was due to a combination of aggressive fiscal retrenchment and tighter monetary conditions index (MCI). Even though fiscal expenditures began to accelerate strongly starting in early 2015, the economy only began to improve a year later when the MCI started to ease. In fact, the industrial sector continued to improve throughout 2016 along with a rising MCI when fiscal expenditures decelerated. In other words, the industrial sector's performance is much more tightly correlated with the country's monetary conditions than the cyclical swings in fiscal spending. On one hand, the RMB exchange rate matters fundamentally for the manufacturing sector, which is heavily exposed to overseas markets. On the other hand, lower real interest rates, either through easing deflation or falling nominal rates, has been a primary driver of corporate profitability and overall business conditions, given the country's debt-centric financial intermediation system (Chart 4). As PPI is still rising rapidly and the trade-weighted RMB has once again rolled over, monetary conditions will likely continue to ease, which will further boost the industrial sector despite the fiscal cuts. Second, the slowdown in infrastructure spending will likely be compensated by accelerating investment in other sectors, manufacturing and mining in particular. Easing monetary conditions and ensuing growth improvement have significantly boosted corporate profitability, which should in turn boost manufacturing capital spending (Chart 5). It is likely that the multi-year slowdown in manufacturing sector capital spending has run its course and will accelerate going forward, albeit gradually.2 Investment in the mining sector is still contracting sharply. However, there has also been a dramatic improvement in profits among mining related industries, particularly coal and base metals (Chart 5, bottom panel). If historical correlations hold, the dramatic contraction in mining sector investment has likely already become very advanced, if not already bottomed. At minimum, it is highly unlikely that mining-related capex will continue to contract at an accelerating pace. Chart 4Interest Rates Versus Corporate Profits Interest Rates Versus Corporate Profits Interest Rates Versus Corporate Profits Chart 5Profits Versus Capital Spending Profits Versus Capital Spending Profits Versus Capital Spending A potential revival in manufacturing and mining capex will reverse a major growth headwind the Chinese economy has faced in recent years, which will continue to buoy growth despite slowing infrastructure construction. Manufacturing and mining account for over 33% of China's total fixed asset investment, higher than the 25% share of infrastructure alone (Chart 6). Indeed, there are signs that the corporate sector's intentions to expand capital investment may already be improving. In recent months medium- to long-term new loans to the corporate sector have accelerated strongly, which could be a sign that the corporate sector is beefing up on investment capital (Chart 7). Chart 6Manufacturing And Mining Capex ##br##Versus Infrastructure Construction Manufacturing And Mining Capex Versus Infrastructure Construction Manufacturing And Mining Capex Versus Infrastructure Construction Chart 7Longer Term Loans##br## Have Accelerated Sharply Longer Term Loans Have Accelerated Sharply Longer Term Loans Have Accelerated Sharply Finally, we maintain the view that overall inventory levels in the economy are unsustainably low, and improving growth and easing deflation should push producers to re-stock (Chart 8). This should also ease any near-term pressure on production, even if new orders are hit by slowing public sector demand. In other words, the economy has a built-in buffer for a period of weaker demand which could allow policymakers to re-orient demand-side policies in light of the new growth situation. Chart 8The Case For Inventory Restocking The Case For Inventory Restocking The Case For Inventory Restocking In short, we expect that waning fiscal support in the economy will not derail the cyclical recovery. Macro numbers may look toppy in the coming months, as the favorable base effect from last year's low levels wears out, but business activity should remain buoyant at least in the coming two quarters. Nonetheless, in a global environment that is still facing enormous challenges and mounting uncertainties, domestic policy tightening obviously raises downside risks. The annual People's Congress in early March should offer some important clues on the Chinese government's growth priorities and policy directions, and should be closely monitored. Tactically Upgrade H Shares In terms of Chinese stocks, our attempt to time a market correction in H shares ahead of the U.S. presidential elections in October did not bear fruit as expected.3 This week we are upgrading our tactical "bullishness rating" on H shares back to "overweight". Even though H shares did correct, they found support at key technical levels and have broken out of late, underscoring a strong technical pattern (Chart 9). We are still concerned that some global markets, especially U.S. stocks, appear frothy and are vulnerable to some sort of shakeout, but the market appears to be in a melt-up phase in the near term. The risk of being left out in a rising market is higher than otherwise. More importantly, Chinese H shares are not nearly as frothy, if not outright cheap, which should further limit downside risks. The Trump administration has notably toned down the anti-China rhetoric, and the near term risk of escalating trade tension between the U.S. and China has abated.4 This should also soothe investors' concerns on Chinese stocks. Bottom Line: Tactically upgrade H shares back to "overweight." A shares will likely remain largely trendless. Meanwhile, stay cyclically positive, and favor Chinese equities in global and EM portfolios. Hong Kong: Is Deflation Coming Back? Hong Kong's GDP numbers to be released next week are likely to show the economy accelerated in the final quarter of the year, according to our model (Chart 10). However, the improvement was likely almost entirely driven by exports rather than domestic factors. In fact, retail sales contracted by 3% in December from a year ago. More importantly, with the exception of essential items such as food, alcohol and tobacco, the growth rates of all other major consumer goods are in deeply negative territory. Durable goods, an important barometer for consumer confidence and spending power, dropped by a whopping 20% in value, or 15.8% in real terms from a year ago, underscoring very weak domestic demand. Therefore, Hong Kong's growth outlook will remain heavily dependent on external demand. Chart 9H Shares: A Technical Breakout H Shares: A Technical Breakout H Shares: A Technical Breakout Chart 10Hong Kong's Growth Recovery Hong Kong's Growth Recovery Hong Kong's Growth Recovery Weak domestic demand also weighs heavy on inflation. Hong Kong's headline inflation is falling rapidly, primarily driven by declining rental prices, and odds are high that inflation may dip below zero in the coming months. This means that deflation may re-emerge for the first time since 2005. These developing deflationary pressures underscore the frothy housing market, and also suggest the Hong Kong dollar may have become expensive again. The currency board system prevents nominal exchange rate adjustments, and therefore any adjustment has to be through changes in domestic prices. There is little systemic risk in Hong Kong's financial system, but the re-emergence of deflationary pressures further weakens domestic demand, augments growth difficulties and bodes poorly for asset prices, especially real estate. We will follow up on these issues in the coming weeks. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "On Chinese Tightening," dated February 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth Watch," dated January 19, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010," dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard," dated January 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Chart I-1No Recovery In Domestic Demand A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Feature Today we are publishing charts on cyclical economic conditions within developing economies. The aim of this report is to aid investors in gauging the business cycle profiles of these individual emerging economies. Global trade and manufacturing have recovered, driven by an acceleration in U.S. and euro area demand. Chinese imports have also recovered, supporting global trade amelioration. Although there has been improvement in EM manufacturing PMIs (diffusion indexes), "hard" EM economic data have not recovered (Chart I-1). This is especially true for EM domestic demand measures such as consumer spending and real gross fixed capital formation. Given the still-lingering credit excesses in many EM countries, credit growth is likely to decelerate further, leaving little chance of domestic demand recovering. Bottom Line: Continue underweighting EM equities and credit markets versus their DM peers. China Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5, Chart I-6, Chart I-7 Chart I-2C2 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-3C3 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-4C4 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-5C5 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-6C6 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-7C7 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Korea Chart I-8, Chart I-9, Chart I-10, Chart I-11 Chart I-8C8 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-9C9 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-10C10 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-11C11 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Taiwan Chart I-12, Chart I-13 Chart I-12C12 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-13C13 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies India Chart I-14, Chart I-15, Chart I-16, Chart I-17 Chart I-14C14 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-15C15 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-16C16 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-17C17 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Indonesia Chart I-18, Chart I-19 Chart I-18C18 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-19C19 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Malaysia Chart I-20, Chart I-21 Chart I-20C20 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-21C21 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Thailand Chart I-22, Chart I-23, Chart I-24 Chart I-22C22 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-24C24 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-23C23 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Philippines Chart I-25, Chart I-26 Chart I-25C25 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-26C26 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Brazil Chart I-27, Chart I-28, Chart I-29, Chart I-30, Chart I-31, Chart I-32 Chart I-27C27 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-28C28 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-29C29 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-30C30 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-31C31 C31 C31 Chart I-32C32 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Mexico Chart I-33, Chart I-34, Chart I-35, Chart I-36, Chart I-37 Chart I-33C33 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-34C34 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-35C35 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-36C36 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-37C37 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Colombia Chart I-38, Chart I-39, Chart I-40, Chart I-41 Chart I-38C38 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-39C39 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-40C40 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-41C41 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Peru Chart I-42, Chart I-43, Chart I-44 Chart I-42C42 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-43C43 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-44C44 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chile Chart I-45, Chart I-46, Chart I-47, Chart I-48 Chart I-45C45 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-46C46 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-47C47 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-48C48 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Argentina Chart I-49, Chart I-50, Chart I-51, Chart I-52, Chart I-53 Chart I-49C49 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-50C50 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-51C51 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-52C52 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-53C53 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Russia Chart I-54, Chart I-55 Chart I-54C54 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-55C55 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Turkey Chart I-56, Chart I-57, Chart I-58, Chart I-59 Chart I-56C56 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-57C57 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-58C58 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-59C59 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies South Africa Chart I-60, Chart I-61, Chart I-62, Chart I-63 Chart I-60C60 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-61C61 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-62C62 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-63C63 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Central Europe Chart I-64, Chart I-65 Chart I-64C64 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Chart I-65C65 A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies A Cyclical Growth Profile Of EM Economies Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The latest adjustment of the interest rates of some PBoC lending facilities reflects China's ongoing moves toward market-driven interest rate reforms. Domestic growth improvement calls for higher interest rates, but it is too soon to conclude whether the latest interest rate adjustment is the beginning of a new tightening cycle or a temporary pause in a broad reflation process. The PBoC will remain data dependent and policy will remain accommodative. The interest rate increases in the PBoC lending facilities will likely lead to higher cost of funding for the corporate sector as well as mortgage borrowers The economic impact of the rising cost of funding should not be significant. Feature In the past three weeks, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) has raised the interest rates it charges financial institutions through various lending facilities. Questions abound over how the PBoC's latest maneuvers differ from their traditional monetary policy tools, and more importantly how these changes impact the economy and financial markets. What? In a slew of actions since late January, the PBoC has increased interest rates on several liquidity management facilities. On January 25th interest rates on the Medium-Term Lending facility (MLF) were raised, the first increase since the MLF debuted in 2014. Last week interest rates on reverse repurchase agreements (repos) were also hiked by 10 basis points. Meanwhile, interest rates on the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) were also lifted. Overall, these actions have increased financial institutions' funding costs on borrowing from the central bank. Table 1The PBoC's Tool Box On Chinese Tightening On Chinese Tightening There have been important changes in how the PBoC conducts monetary policy in recent years. While conventional measures such as the benchmark lending rate and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) have not been abandoned, the PBoC has been increasingly focusing on utilizing various new tools (Table 1).1 The RRR has been left unchanged, while the central bank has been actively dealing with financial institutions directly to manage interbank liquidity. The latest move shows a further departure from conventional monetary operations: instead of directly adjusting benchmark policy rates on lending and deposits of commercial banks, the PBoC has targeted interest rates on its claims to financial institutions. These changes reflect China's ongoing moves toward market-driven interest rate reforms, which at this stage have become quite advanced. Commercial banks are no longer under the administrative constraints on interest rates they pay to depositors and charge borrowers, and therefore their marginal cost of funding has become increasingly important for setting their own loan rates. Meanwhile, targeting interest rates of these lending facilities rather than benchmark interest rates or the RRR provides some important advantages from the PBoC's point of view. The newly created alphabet soup of various lending facilities gives the PBoC much more flexibility to "fine-tune" interbank liquidity in terms of both magnitude and timing, and can be quickly reversed if necessary. The RRR adjustment, on the other hand, is inherently much more blunt and harder to turn. These lending facilities can aid the central bank's macro-prudential policy. For example, banks that fail to meet certain conditions of the macro-prudential assessment (MPA) will have to pay punitive interest rates to borrow from the PBoC. Similarly, the PBoC can offer subsidized loans to policy lenders for certain prioritized projects. Direct adjustment on commercial banks' loan and deposit rates is not only against the broad trend of the country's interest rate reform, but also requires coordination of various government departments under the State Council. The PBoC has much higher discretion in changing its own interest rates that it charges commercial banks. Chart 1Policy Rates Catch Up To The Market Policy Rates Catch Up To The Market Policy Rates Catch Up To The Market Why? The PBoC's latest adjustments on interest rates of various lending facilities and open market operations should not be surprising, given the significant increase in interbank interest rates and domestic bond yields since late last year. For example, both the seven-day interbank rate and one-year government bond yields have increased from about 2.3% to 2.6% (Chart 1). If the PBoC left its short-term lending rates unchanged, it would potentially create arbitrage opportunities in which commercial banks could borrow from the central bank and lend out to other institutions. In other words, the PBoC has already begun to tighten by allowing market interest rates to inch higher since late last year, and the recent policy rate adjustment is in fact a "catch-up." A few reasons may be behind the central bank's tightening bias. The economy has recovered considerably, with both quickening activity and easing deflation. Nominal GDP growth accelerated to 9.6% in the last quarter, up from a bottom of 6.5% in late 2015 when benchmark interest rates were cut to current levels2 (Chart 2). The January macro numbers are likely distorted by the Chinese New Year effect, but holiday sales have been quite strong compared with a year ago, and the latest PMI numbers suggest continued acceleration in both the industrial and service sectors. All of this naturally calls for higher interest rates. It is possible that the January credit numbers are uncomfortably high for the PBoC, which may have pushed the authorities to send a signal to lenders to cool things off to prevent overheating and damp further property price gains. The central bank has been concerned about leverage and overtrading in the interbank market as well as local bond markets by financial institutions, and the latest tightening moves have also been designed to reduce financial excess (Chart 3). Repo transactions in the interbank market have already dropped sharply since late year when the PBoC began to push interest rates higher. This, together with regulators' latest administrative overhaul on commercial banks' wealth management products and off-balance-sheet items, all underscore the determination to rein in excesses in the banking sector. Chart 2Growth Rebound Generates Upward Pressure ##br##On Interest Rates Growth Rebound Generates Upward Pressure On Interest Rates Growth Rebound Generates Upward Pressure On Interest Rates Chart 3The PBoC Aims To Tame##br## Financial Excess The PBoC Aims To Tame Financial Excess The PBoC Aims To Tame Financial Excess So What? Whatever the reason, the PBoC will likely continue to shift away from "conventional" tools and increasingly focus on the new framework that has emerged in recent years in conducting monetary policy. Benchmark loan and deposits rates are already on the way out, and the RRR will also be gradually faded. The problem is that the RRR is still at 17% for large banks and 15% for smaller lenders - both of which are still elevated compared with historical norms. As a result, commercial banks have been putting ever rising reserve deposits with the central bank, while at the same time their borrowings from the PBoC have also skyrocketed - leading to an ever-expanding balance sheet at the PBoC (Chart 4). Technically, it is likely that the RRR will be lowered to a more reasonable level, cutting the central bank's liability, while at the same time the PBoC can reduce its claims to commercial banks on the asset side. This operation will shrink the PBoC's balance sheet, but does not necessarily change the liquidity situation in the banking system. It is too soon to conclude whether the latest interest rate adjustment is the beginning of a new tightening cycle or a temporary pause in a broad reflation process. We expect the PBoC will remain data dependent, and that the Federal Reserve's actions will also be taken into consideration. In the near term, a few observations can be made. First, the interest rate increases in the PBoC lending facilities, together with the increase in market-driven interest rates, will likely lead to higher cost of funding for the corporate sector as well as mortgage borrowers (Chart 5). Already, discount rates of bank acceptance bills, a proxy for short-term funding costs of the corporate sector tightly linked with interbank rates, have surged in recent months. The expected returns of Wealth Management Products (WMPs), an alternative to conventional bank deposits that set banks' marginal funding costs, have also picked up notably since October. This means the average interest rate on commercial banks' loans likely have already been rising. Chart 4The PBoC's Liquidity Operation The PBoC's Liquidity Operation The PBoC's Liquidity Operation Chart 5Corporate Cost Of Borrowing Will Likely Rise Corporate Cost Of Borrowing Will Likely Rise Corporate Cost Of Borrowing Will Likely Rise The economic impact of the rising cost of funding should not be meaningful, in our view, as it is accompanied by a strengthening economy and easing deflation. The overall monetary conditions index, which takes into consideration both real interest rates and the exchange rate, has continued to ease, thanks largely to the rapid increase in producer prices. Furthermore, there is still massive scope for the Chinese authorities to reform the financial sector and reduce the funding costs of the country's dynamic smaller private enterprises - although falling sharply in recent years, the Wenzhou private loan rate, a proxy for private enterprises' borrowing costs, still stands at 16% (Chart 6). This will likely continue to drift lower as the country's financial reforms continue to deepen. In short, the latest policy tightening does not change our cyclical assessment on the broader economy. In this vein, higher interest rates may introduce some near-term turbulence in stocks, but will not change the cyclical profile. The marginal increase in interest rates will not derail the growth improvement, profit growth should continue to recover and policymakers are unlikely to overkill. Meanwhile, strategically we continue to favor Chinese equities in global and EM portfolios. Finally, rising interest rates in China should lend some support to the RMB, due to the close link between China-U.S. interest rate differentials and the USD/CNY exchange rate (Chart 7). The interest rate gap between Chinese government bonds and U.S. Treasurys has widened notably since late last year, which should marginally make RMB assets more attractive in the near term. Nonetheless, the broad trend of the dollar against other majors will remain the dominant force setting the USD/CNY cross rate. The PBoC still faces challenges to contain capital outflows and maintain exchange rate stability. Chart 6Private Loan Rate Needs ##br##To Drop Further Private Loan Rate Needs To Drop Further Private Loan Rate Needs To Drop Further Chart 7China - U.S. Interest Rate Gap And##br## USD/CNY China - U.S. Interest Rate Gap And USD/CNY China - U.S. Interest Rate Gap And USD/CNY Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At The PBoC's Balance Sheet," dated September 23, 2015, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth Watch," dated January 19, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Weekly swings in U.S. inventories notwithstanding, we believe global storage is on track to draw ~ 10% by early- to mid-3Q17, which will have achieved the goal of the OPEC - Russia production Agreement negotiated late last year. This will not require an extension of the pact beyond June, based on our modeling. Unexpectedly high compliance by OPEC producers to agreed cuts is being offset somewhat by increased production in those states exempted from the deal. Strong oil consumption on the back of a synchronized global uptick in GDP growth, which started to emerge late last year, provides the impetus for sustained storage draws. Markets are overestimating offshore production's resilience, particularly in the U.S. Gulf, where we see material declines beginning to set in next year. Backwardation likely persists in 2018, absent a U.S. policy-induced USD rally that crimps EM demand and spurs production ex U.S. Energy: Overweight. The return of contango in the WTI forward curve gives us the opportunity to reset our strategic front-to-back position (long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18) at tonight's close. Our balances assessment supports our view backwardation will return in the deferred part of the curve. Our Dec/19 short WTI vs. long Brent spread buy stop was elected at $0.07/bbl. Base Metals: Neutral. We remain neutral base metals, but are keeping a close watch on copper. Unions working at BHP's Escondida mine, the world's largest, are set to strike today. Negotiations resumed this week, following BHP's request for government mediation. Precious Metals: Neutral. We continue to look to get long gold at $1,180/oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grain fundamentals remain unsupportive for a rally. We remain underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global oil storage levels remain on track to hit the ~ 10% draw targeted in last year's OPEC - Russia production Agreement by early- to mid-3Q17, weekly gyrations in U.S. inventories notwithstanding. This means an extension of the agreement beyond its June expiry will not be required. Early reports suggest compliance with the deal is unexpectedly high by OPEC states that agreed to cut production by up to 1.2mm b/d - exceeding 80% by various accounts. However, OPEC states not required to cut - Libya, Nigeria, and Iran - have increased production and partially offset those declines, which took total reductions in OPEC output to ~ 840k b/d, based on a Bloomberg tally last week.1 This brought total Cartel compliance to ~ 60% of the agreed cuts, which, as we noted in our 2017 Commodity Outlook in December, would be sufficient to achieve the Agreement's goal of pulling inventories in the OECD down by ~ 10% by 3Q17.2 Non-OPEC producers also appear to be complying with the Agreement. Notable among them is Russia, which is ahead of its commitment with cuts of close to 120k b/d in January, due partly to extreme cold in Siberian fields. We expect cuts in Russia to average 200k b/d in 1Q17, going to 300k b/d in 2Q17. These cuts will allow demand to outstrip supply in 1H17 and into year-end. By early- to mid-3Q17, draws to OECD storage of 300mm bbl can be expected, without extending the OPEC - Russia production agreement (Chart of the Week). We expect to see these cuts show up in OECD inventory data this month and next and continue into the end of 2017. For non-OECD states, the draws will show up in JODI data beginning in March.3 The physical deficits - i.e., supply less than demand - will force storage to draw, backwardating the WTI forward curve later this year (Chart 2).4 If markets are not surprised by a policy-induced rally in the USD on the back of a U.S. border-adjustment tax (BAT), or a too-aggressive tightening by the Fed as it seeks to normalize monetary policy, we expect the drawdown in inventories to continue keeping markets backwardated. Even with production returning to pre-Agreement levels in 2H17 in states with the capacity to expand and reliably sustain production - Gulf Arab producers, Russia and U.S. shales - we expect storage to continue to draw through the year and into 2018 (Chart 3). Chart 2We Continue To Expect Backwardation We Continue To Expect Backwardation We Continue To Expect Backwardation Chart 3Storage Drawdown On Track Storage Drawdown On Track Storage Drawdown On Track In 4Q16 the impact of the higher Kuwaiti and UAE output is apparent, along with higher Russian production. This put more crude on the market, which found its way into storage late in 4Q16 and early 1Q17, reversing the trend in draws seen earlier in 2H16. This put the market back in a temporary surplus condition, with the result being more storage will have to be worked off in 1H17 than our earlier estimates indicated. But these draws will occur, following the implementation of the production accord. Extending The KSA - Russia Deal Beyond June Is Unnecessary In our estimates, OPEC crude production increases by ~ 850k b/d in 2H17 versus 1H17 levels. Despite this recovery, the storage drawdown continues. Our modeling assumes Gulf OPEC will account for slightly more than +1mm b/d growth, and non-Gulf OPEC will see production continue to fall by 170k b/d. Russia's total liquids production goes from 10.95mm b/d in 1H17 to 11.34mm b/d in 2H17. We estimate U.S. shale production grows at an average rate of ~ 300k b/d in 2H17, while total U.S. liquids production increases 720k b/d over the same interval. Setting aside the possibility of a policy-induced rally in the USD on the back of too-aggressive Fed tightening or a border-adjusted tax becoming the law of the land, both of which would depress demand and raise production ex U.S., we expect the crude-oil market to remain backwardated next year. The globally synchronized upturn in GDP will keep demand robust, with growth coming in close to even with this year's rate of ~ 1.50mm b/d. We have global liquids production and OPEC crude output growing less than 1.0% next year. We believe the market is overestimating the resilience of offshore production next year, particularly in the U.S. Gulf, based on the stout performance put in last year and expected for this year. Our colleague Matt Conlan notes in BCA's Energy Sector Strategy, U.S. production growth since October has almost exclusively been from the Gulf of Mexico's new projects. Output in the Gulf continues to increase due to the lagged effect of final investment decisions made during 2012 - 2014, when WTI prices were consistently trading above $100/bbl. GOM production will peak in 2017 then decline in 2018 due to lack of new investments made since 2014. Indeed, as "increasing decline rates overwhelm a shrinking inventory of new projects, GOM production should peak sometime in 2017 and then start decreasing. The EIA's estimate for another 200,000 b/d increase in GOM production in 2017 seems overly-optimistic."5 Once this becomes apparent to the market, we believe backwardation will reassert itself and persist into 2018. The backwardation of the forward curve structure will affect U.S. shale production economics in 2018. However, our base case is for U.S. shale-oil production in the "Big Four" basins - Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken and Niobrara - to grow 700k b/d next year, given the current structure of the WTI forwards, which were taken higher along with the WTI price rally at the front of the curve. This triggered the revival of rig counts; however, we want to point out that different curve shapes at different price levels produce different expected rig-count responses.6 Chart 4Barring a Policy Shock Demand Will Remain Robust bca.ces_wr_2017_02_09_c4 bca.ces_wr_2017_02_09_c4 Global Demand Firing On All Cylinders Robust demand growth - ~ +1.50mm b/d in 2017 and 2018 in our modeling - provides the impetus for the continued draws in storage this year and next (Chart 4). We revised our demand estimates for 2015 - 16 in line with the IEA's just-revised assessment of global consumption published in its January 2017 Oil Market Report.7 The IEA brought 2016 oil demand growth up to 1.50mm b/d, in line with our earlier estimates, but significantly revised 2015 demand growth upward to 2.0mm b/d. The Agency expects higher prices to crimp demand this year, taking it to 1.30mm b/d; our estimate, however, is higher, largely on the back of the first global synchronized growth we've seen since the Global Financial Crisis, which will be supported by accommodative monetary conditions worldwide, all else equal.8 Investment Implications Our analysis suggests there will be no need to extend the OPEC - Russia production accord into 2H17. In addition, it reinforces our view markets will backwardate later this year and stay backwardated in 2018, provided we do not see a BAT-induced rally in the USD, or an overly aggressive Fed normalization trajectory. As we noted in previous research, a BAT would lift the value of the USD, which would lower demand ex U.S. and raise supply at the margin.9 We make the odds of a BAT becoming the law of the land in the U.S. this year 50:50, so this is a non-trivial risk. This would be unambiguously bearish for oil prices. While we do not expect oil to be included among the imported commodities subject to a BAT, we do, nonetheless, expect the imposition of a BAT to lift the USD by 10%. This, coupled with the 5% increase in the greenback we'd already penciled in due to the Fed's monetary-policy normalization, will lift the USD 15% if it goes through. Should this occur, we would be preparing for prices to again fall below $50/bbl and push back to the $40/bbl area, which would cause supply and capex to once again contract significantly. That said, we are reinstating our long front-to-back WTI recommendation (long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI), given our updated balances assessment. Our expectation for inventories to continue to draw after the OPEC - Russia production-cutting agreement expires in June supports this recommendation. In addition, if we do see a BAT in the U.S., we believe markets will take the deferred WTI curve significantly lower in expectation of reduced demand and higher marginal supplies that almost surely will ensue in 2018. While the Dec/17 contract also will trade lower, more damage to prices will occur in 2018 contracts. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC Cuts Oil Output, But More Work Needed to Fulfill Deal," published by Bloomberg February 2, 2017. Iraq stands out among OPEC producers agreeing to cut, but apparently not following through as diligently as the rest of the Gulf Arab states; we are assuming production of 4.5mm b/d for 1H17, going to 4.6mm b/d in 2H17 for Iraq. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," dated December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 JODI refers to the Joint Organisations Data Initiative, a supranational producer-consumer oil-market data provider headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 4 "Backwardation" describes a forward price curve in which the price for a commodity for prompt delivery (e.g., tomorrow) exceeds the price of a commodity delivered in the future (e.g., next year). It is the opposite of a contango curve structure. 5 Please see issue of BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy "Gulf Of Mexico Oil Production Likely To Peak In 2017," dated January 11, 2017, available nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 In next week's report, we will present scenario analysis of shale-oil production as a function of WTI forward curve shape - i.e., the implications of backwardation for shale rig counts. This will update our assessments of price sensitivities to interest rates and USD movements. 7 Please see the IEA's Oil Market Report of 19 January 2017. 8 We discuss this in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy feature article entitled "Gold Will Perform...," dated February 2, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy "Taking A BAT To Commodities," dated January 26, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Brazilian growth will recover modestly in 2017, but it will be insufficient to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio. With interest rates still at double digits, public debt dynamics will become unsustainable as the ratio reaches or surpasses 85-90% of GDP over the next couple of years. The central bank has been financing the government by buying local currency bonds. Going forward, the path of least resistance, and most likely scenario, is direct or indirect public debt monetization by the central bank of Brazil. This will allow the nation to avoid fiscal stress/crisis but the price for it will be large exchange rate depreciation. In the end, investors will lose capital in Brazilian financial markets in U.S. dollar terms. Feature Brazil's financial markets have rallied sharply over the past 12 months, even as the economy has continued to disappoint. Growth has fallen short of even our downbeat expectations, yet the tremendous rally in its financial markets had sent our bearish strategy wide of the mark. In the past year, we have argued that even if the Brazilian economy recovers, it is likely headed towards a public debt trap because the recovery will be muted and the starting point of fiscal accounts/government debt is already quite poor. So, has Brazil achieved escape velocity - i.e., has growth gained enough momentum to thwart concerns about public debt sustainability? Escape Velocity Chart I-1Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, ##br##Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing It is tempting to conclude that the rally in Brazilian markets has been so powerful that the country has broken away from its five-year bear market, and hence that public debt sustainability is not an issue at all. In other words, financial markets seem confident that Brazil has achieved escape velocity. We do not think so. Notably, in recent months Brazil's economy has surprised to the downside, despite the ongoing improvement in global growth: Brazil's manufacturing PMI overall index has rolled over decisively, despite broad-based strength in the global business cycle (Chart I-1). More importantly, export prices in general, and iron ore and soybean prices in particular, have rallied a lot in the past year. Hence, the external sector has been a positive force for the economy, yet the latter has failed to revive. Having appreciated dramatically, the currency is no longer cheap. This is confirmed within Brazil's trade dynamics since export volumes are slipping relative to import volumes. As fiscal spending growth has until now been decent, the epicenter of the retrenchment has clearly been household consumption and business investment (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Brazilian Households Are ##br##Still Feeling Massive Pain... Brazilian Households Are Still Feeling Massive Pain... Brazilian Households Are Still Feeling Massive Pain... Chart I-3...As Is The ##br##Business Sector ...As Is The Business Sector ...As Is The Business Sector Household debt-service costs remain elevated at 22% of disposable income (Chart I-4). This, and ongoing job losses, are keeping a lid on consumer spending. Manufacturing production is still collapsing, and capacity utilization is at a 20-year low (Chart I-3, bottom panel). This is not a sign of a competitive exchange rate or vibrant manufacturing sector. Due to the economic contraction, Brazil's primary and overall fiscal deficits have reached 2.5% and 8.9% of GDP (Chart I-5), respectively, despite the authorities' attempts to secure considerable one-off revenues. Chart I-4Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness ##br##Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Chart I-5Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Remarkably, the level of Brazil's real GDP has already contracted by 7.6% from its peak in 2014, producing the worst depression in more than 116 years (Chart I-6). Bottom Line: Not only has Brazil failed to achieve escape velocity, but also its growth dynamics have underwhelmed even the most pessimistic of forecasts. As a result, public debt dynamics have become unsustainable. Fiscal And Credit Impulses In 2017 Going forward the outlook for Brazil's economy will hinge on credit and fiscal impulses: If government spending rises by 6.3% in 2017, which is equivalent to the 2016 IPCA inflation rate as mandated by the fiscal spending cap (known as PEC 55), the federal fiscal spending impulse in 2017 will be 79 billion BRL, or 1.23% of GDP (calculated using our 2017 nominal GDP estimate) (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Chart I-7Fiscal And Credit Impulses Fiscal And Credit Impulses Fiscal And Credit Impulses The impact of fiscal policy on growth is defined by government spending and taxes. Odds are that taxes need to be hiked to achieve the 2017 budget targets. Unless growth recovers strongly, doubtful in our view, there are non-trivial odds of impending tax hikes. The latter will counteract the positive fiscal impulse from government expenditures. The credit impulse is calculated as an annual change in credit growth, or the second derivative of the outstanding stock of credit. If we assume private and public banks' credit growth will be 0% and -5%, respectively, in 2017 overall loan growth will contract by 2.5%, and the credit impulse will be 0.54% of GDP (Chart I-7, middle panel). Even though interest rates are declining, real (inflation-adjusted) rates remain high at 5.4%, and banks' balance sheets are impaired by mushrooming NPLs following the credit boom years. This will preclude a revival in loan growth in the banking system. Aggregating the fiscal spending and credit impulses together, there will be about a 2% boost to nominal GDP growth in 2017 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). However, as it is likely that taxes will rise, the overall combined effect on the economy will be less than that. Bottom Line: Odds are that the aggregate fiscal and credit impulse will be only mildly positive in 2017 - assuming no tax hikes. This portends only moderate nominal GDP growth in 2017. Government Debt Simulation Revisited The Brazilian economy will probably recover and our baseline view assumes real GDP growth will be modestly positive for 2017. However, the recovery will not be vigorous enough to halt the exponential rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Table I-1 presents a scenario analysis for Brazil's public debt. Table I-1Brazil: Public Debt Sustainability Scenarios 2016-2019 Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? We considered three scenarios: base case, optimistic and pessimistic. For each scenario, we have made assumptions for nominal GDP growth, nominal government revenue growth, nominal government expenditure growth (based on the fiscal spending cap), and on the average (or blended) interest rate on all local currency public debt. Chart I-8Brazil's Is Headed Towards ##br##A Public Debt Crisis Brazil's Is Headed Towards A Public Debt Crisis Brazil's Is Headed Towards A Public Debt Crisis In our base case scenario, the public debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 84% in 2018 and 91% in 2019 (Chart I-8). With double-digit interest rates, the 91% public debt load spirals out of control. In short, even in our base case scenario, which assumes a return to modest growth in 2017 and a decent recovery in economic activity in 2018 and 2019, Brazil is unlikely to avoid a debt trap. For the base case, we use the following assumptions For nominal GDP growth in 2017 we use the most recent Brazilian Central Bank Survey year-end forecast of real GDP growth of 0.5% plus our estimate of 5% inflation to arrive at 5.5%. In 2018, we assume real GDP growth of 2.5% plus 4.5% inflation to arrive at 7%. And in 2019 we also assume growth of 7%. For nominal government revenue growth, we use 5% in 2017 and 8% for both 2018 and 2019, as we assume government revenue reasonably tracks nominal GDP growth. A caveat: the actual 2016 federal government revenue growth number of 4.3% was heavily boosted by non-recurring revenues such as privatization revenue, repayment by the national development bank (BNDES) of 100 billion BRL, tax amnesty/repatriation programs, and so on. In brief, the government used all means at its disposal to boost its revenue via one-off items. As these are non-recurring and impossible to predict, we did not attempt to account for them. Yet, in future, these non-recurring sources of fiscal revenue will be harder to come by. To be consistent, we do not incorporate one-off expenditures, such as financial support for local governments, or recapitalization of public banks and state-owned companies. In a nutshell, we assume potential one-off public sector revenues will offset one-off expenditures. With the dire state of the economy, and likely need for bailouts and financial assistance from the federal government, this is a reasonable assumption. Besides, with most states and local governments near bankruptcy, staving off insolvency remains a much more urgent matter that will likely drain central government coffers in the near term. As to nominal government expenditures, since these are capped by the previous year's inflation rate due to the fiscal spending cap (or PEC 55), we use 6.3% growth in 2017 (i.e. 2016 IPCA inflation), and 5% in both 2018 and 2019, respectively. Investors, however, should keep in mind that the spending cap only applies to primary expenditures. Critically, it does not include interest on public debt, spending on education and health in 2017, and nonrecurring expenditures. If anything, federal government spending will likely exceed the 2017 cap as the government may spend more on healthcare and education to offset overall fiscal austerity. Table I-2Composition Of Brazilian Federal Debt Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? For the average, or blended, interest rate on public debt, we used calculations by Dr. Jose Carlos Faria, Chief Brazil Economist at Deutsche Bank.1 We use Dr. Faria's assumptions for local currency average interest rate on public debt in 2017, 2018 and 2019, for our pessimistic scenario. The impact of lower policy interest rates (i.e. the central bank's SELIC rate) on the public debt service is a drawn out process because not all debt is rolled/re-priced over every year. Table I-2 illustrates the breakdown of Brazil's public debt by type. Therefore, the impact of declining interest rates on public debt dynamics will be slow. Bottom Line: With interest rates still in the double digits, Brazil's public debt dynamics will become unsustainable if the ratio reaches or surpasses 85-90% of GDP. The odds are substantial that this limit will be breached in the next few years. The best cure for debt sustainability is growth. So far, however, Brazil has failed to achieve growth strong enough to stabilize its public debt trajectory. A Word On Social Security Reform It is widely accepted that pension (social security) reform is desperately needed to help keep Brazil's public debt on a sustainable path. It does appear that reforms will be passed this year, as they have good momentum in Congress. That said, it will take many years for the positives of pension reforms to kick in and help the fiscal accounts, and in turn improve Brazil's public debt profile. According to the IMF,2 it will take roughly until 2020-2025 to see any decrease in social security expenses as a percentage of GDP, even if the reforms involve an increase in the retirement age, a benefits freeze, and a removal or change of the indexation of pensions to the minimum wage (and/or a change to the minimum wage formula). Bottom Line: The benefits of social security reform will only come into effect after 2020-30 or so, if passed in full. Therefore, they will not prevent Brazil's public debt-to-GDP ratio from surpassing the 85-90% mark in 2019. A Way Out: Debt Monetization? Chart I-9Brazil's Central Bank Has Been ##br##Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Brazil's Central Bank Has Been Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Brazil's Central Bank Has Been Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Being strangled by economic contraction, high debt/fiscal deficits, and a lack of political capital to embark on painful fiscal austerity, the path of least resistance for any country in general and Brazil in particular is debt monetization. That would lead to a considerable exchange rate depreciation. There are already hints that the central bank has been funding the government since 2014. In particular: The Brazilian central bank's domestic currency assets have expanded dramatically - by 640 BRL billion, or 10% of GDP - since January 2015 (Chart I-9). Most of this balance sheet expansion - 460 BRL billion or 7% GDP has been due to the rise in the central bank's holdings of federal government securities (Chart I-10). On the liability side of the central bank's balance sheet, a considerable rise has occurred in Banco Central do Brasil repos with commercial banks and deposits received from financial institutions. The amount of outstanding repos and these deposits has risen by 220 BRL billion since January 2015 (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The Central Bank Has Been ##br##Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... The Central Bank Has Been Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... The Central Bank Has Been Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... Chart I-11....But Withdrawing Liquidity Via ##br##Repos & Deposits Received ...But Withdrawing Liquidity Via Repos & Deposits Received ...But Withdrawing Liquidity Via Repos & Deposits Received Essentially, the central bank has purchased 460 BRL billion of government securities since January 2015 and, hence, injected a lot of liquidity into the banking system. Then, Banco Central do Brasil simultaneously withdrew liquidity via repo agreements and deposits received from financial institutions. This has basically sterilized half of the central bank's government bond purchases, i.e. the operation withdrew half of the liquidity expansion that was first made. Without the central bank intervention to buy 460 BRL billion of government securities in the past two years, the 626 BRL billion and 557 BRL billion overall fiscal deficits in 2015 and 2016, respectively, would not have been financed and local bond yields would have risen. Chart I-12The BRL Is Expensive Again The BRL Is Expensive Again The BRL Is Expensive Again Looking ahead, as the fiscal accounts continue bleeding, public debt burden will rise to around 85% of GDP and the banking system - wounded by non-performing loans - will struggle to expand its balance sheet further. In turn, the central bank might be tempted to continue monetizing the government's debt without, however, sterilizing its operations. In such a scenario, the currency will depreciate meaningfully. Markedly, Brazil's real effective exchange rate has risen above its historical mean and is somewhat expensive (Chart I-12). Brazil needs lower interest rates, more abundant banking system liquidity and a cheaper currency to embark on a sustainable recovery. The latter is required to avoid the fiscal debt trap. The exchange rate depreciation is an important relieve valve. Given that only 4% of government debt is denominated in foreign currency, a deprecation of the Brazilian real is the least painful solution. Bottom Line: Going forward, the only way for Brazil to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio is to boost nominal GDP growth. This can be achieved by reducing interest rates aggressively, injecting large amounts of liquidity into the wounded banking system and devaluing the currency. Unless financial markets in Brazil sell off, there is a non-trivial probability that the authorities will embark on outright or covered public debt monetization. This would allow the country to avoid fiscal stress/crisis. Yet, the price will be large exchange rate depreciation. Chart I-13Stay Underweight Brazil ##br##Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Stay Underweight Brazil Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Stay Underweight Brazil Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Investment Implications We have been wrong on Brazilian markets in the past 12 months, but we do not see a reason to alter our view. The currency will plunge due to the ongoing debt monetization, and foreigners will not make money in Brazilian financial markets in U.S. dollar terms. We reiterate our short positions in the BRL versus the U.S. dollar, ARS and MXN. Stay long CDS and underweight Brazilian credit within EM sovereign and corporate credit portfolios. Continue underweighting this bourse within an EM equity portfolio (Chart I-13). Interest rate cuts will continue, but with the BRL set to depreciate considerably versus the U.S. dollar in the next 12 months - as we expect - buying local bonds for the U.S. dollar based investors is not the best strategy. Santiago E. Gomez, Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 These figures come from the appendix on page 9 of the Deutsche Bank report titled, "Brazil at a Debt Crossroad - Again", dated January 23, 2017. 2 Please refer to the following IMF report on Brazil, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16349.pdf Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors appear complacent. Foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks has reached a new record high. Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares. Feature Taiwan's economy and financial markets have shown remarkable resilience of late. Last week's advance GDP release confirmed that the Taiwanese economy continued to accelerate in the final quarter of the year. The Taiwanese dollar (TWD) is among the few currencies that have strengthened since early last year, not only in trade-weighted terms but also against the mighty greenback. Taiwanese stocks have been a bright spot in the emerging market universe, which has been plagued with structural challenges and political instability in recent years. Taiwan's remarkable strength of late is notwithstanding the sudden deterioration in its relationship with mainland China since the DPP party regained power last year, and more recently brewing trade tensions among the major global economies kicked off by the Trump Administration. This highlights the growing disconnect between Taiwan's macro outlook and its financial asset performance, offering a particularly poor risk-return profile. We remain underweight Taiwan among the greater China bourses, and recommend a short position in the TSE versus Chinese H shares. Macro Risks Are Rising... In a nutshell, three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. First, Taiwan is among the most open economies in the world, and will suffer disportionally in any disruption in global trade (Chart 1). Although having fallen sharply since the global financial crisis, exports of goods and services still account for over 60% of Taiwan's GDP, among the highest of the major economies. Therefore, Taiwan's growth outlook is almost completely dictated by global demand, making it particualrly vulnerable at times of rising global uncertainty. Indeed, Taiwan's growth acceleration since mid-last year has been entirely driven by a synchronized acceleration in overseas demand. Both China and the U.S. have been strengthening, which will likely continue to support Taiwan's growth outlook in the near term.1 However, the strength in the Taiwanese currency is worrisome, as the exchange rate has historically been tightly correlated with overseas new orders and domestic producer prices. Chart 2 shows that the strong TWD has the potential to lead to a sudden deterioration in deflation as well as new export orders. Chart 1Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Chart 2TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports Second, the cross-strait relationship has already deteriorated notably, and a vicious feedback loop appears to be developing. On the one hand, the Chinese authorities are worried that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen will not uphold the "1992 Consensus" that forms the foundation of cross-straight integration,2 and will step up efforts to contain her "pro-independence" initiatives. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government, faced with increasing pressure from the mainland, feels the urge to reach out to a broader global audience, which in turn may be perceived by Beijing as provocative. President Tsai's controversial phone call with Donald Trump, her stop-over visit to the U.S. en route to South America and the attendance of the government's delegation to President Trump's inauguration have only further reinforced Beijing's suspicion - and propelled forward a self-feeding negative dynamic in the cross-strait relationship that is difficult to reverse. The consequence of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan is unimaginably costly, and still extremely unlikely. However, the economic ties between the two will continue to cool. A telltale sign is that number of mainland Chinese visitors to Taiwan has already dropped precipitously since early last year, causing visible stress in Taiwan's tourism industry (Chart 3). Furthermore, exports to China account for over 40% of total Taiwanese exports, far higher than to any other market, and its trade surplus with China accounts for 5% of Taiwanese GDP - both of which are at risk should cross-strait tensions continue to rise (Chart 4). Moreover, the deteriorating relationship with the mainland is also hurting domestic confidence. Chart 5 shows that Taiwanese consumer confidence has historically been tightly linked with stock market performance, but a widening gap has developed since early last year when stocks began to rebound but confidence continued to weaken, which we suspect is to some extent attributable to the DPP party's dealings with the mainland. Weakening confidence bodes poorly for consumption, making the economy even more vulnerable to external shocks. Chart 3Cross - Strait Relationship ##br##Has Cooled Sharply Cross - Strait Relationship Has Cooled Sharply Cross - Strait Relationship Has Cooled Sharply Chart 4China Trade ##br##Is Crucial For Taiwan China Trade Is Crucial For Taiwan China Trade Is Crucial For Taiwan Chart 5Cooling China - ties##br## Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Cooling China - ties Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Cooling China - ties Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Finally, tensions between China and the U.S. are bound to rise under President Trump, and Taiwan may fall victim to the "clash of the Titans." Trump has openly questioned the "One China" policy that fundamentally underpins the Sino-U.S. relationship. John Bolton, a top adviser to President Trump, has even recommended positioning U.S. troops in Taiwan to counter the mainland. It is likely that Trump is using the "Taiwan card" as a bargaining chip to win concessions from China on trade-related issues.3 However, these remarks are dangerously provocative. Any miscalculation could lead to a drastic escalation in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the Taiwanese economy will suffer profoundly. Even if trade tensions are contained between China and the U.S., Taiwan will also suffer because it is a critical part of the highly complex and integrated supply chain in the global technology and electronics industries. It is premature and overly alarmist to predict any "war-like" scenario, but stakes are exceedingly high for Taiwan, and any move in this direction should be monitored extremely carefully. ...But Investors Appear Complacent Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors still appear comfortable in Taiwanese stocks. Foreign capital has continued to flock to Taiwan, despite gloomy sentiment among global investors on emerging markets overall. Net foreign purchases of Taiwanese stocks, historically tightly linked with fund flows to U.S. emerging market mutual funds, have rebounded sharply, while EM mutual fund sales have weakened, a rare divergence historically (Chart 6). Cumulative foreign net purchases of Taiwanese stocks have pushed foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks to 37%, a new all-time high (Chart 7). Foreign fund flows have been a key reason behind the relative strength of both Taiwanese stocks and its exchange rate of late. Chart 6Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Chart 7Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Granted, Taiwan's macroeconomic conditions are largely stable, characterized by its massive current account surplus, small fiscal deficit and low government debt - which make it stand out in an otherwise perilous, crisis-prone EM world. However, we suspect large foreign flows to Taiwan in recent years are also due to the tech-heavy nature of its stock market. Chart 8 shows the relative performance of global tech stocks bear a strong resemblance to Taiwan's relative performance against the EM benchmark after the global financial crisis. In other words, investors are largely attracted to the Taiwanese market as a way to play the global tech rally rather than because of any specific macro factors unique to Taiwan. This also means that investors could be blindsided by any escalation of trade or geopolitical tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the large percentage of foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks risks a disorderly unwinding and sudden exodus - and an ensuing sharp spike in volatility. The last episode of military tension between Taiwan and the mainland in the mid-1990s offers the only precedent in terms of how financial markets might respond. China reacted to the U.S. visit of Taiwan's then President Lee-Teng-hui with aggressive saber-rattling by mobilizing troops and firing missiles, which led to the "third Taiwan Strait Crisis" (Chart 9). Even though the crisis officially lasted from July 1995 to March 1996, Taiwanese stocks tumbled well in advance when the tensions first began to emerge. In fact, the crisis itself, and the resolution of it, marked the bottom in Taiwanese stock prices. Chart 8Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Chart 9The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension Long H Shares, Short Taiwan Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable bourse in the Greater China region. A short position of the TSE versus Chinese H shares offers an attractive risk-return profile. Chinese stocks have long been punished by various macro concerns, and are likely under-owned by global investors. Investor sentiment on Taiwan, on the other hand, appear to be unduly complacent, and Taiwanese stocks have likely been overweighted and over-owned. Chinese stocks are much less exposed to global trade than their Taiwanese counterparts. Even though tech stocks are the largest sectors for both markets, the largest Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu are mainly software and service providers, and derive the majority of their revenue from the domestic market.4 In contrast, Taiwanese tech companies, also the largest constituents in the Taiwanese index, such as TSMC, Hon Hai and Largan, are all hardware producers, and are overwhelmingly dependent on the global market, making them more vulnerable to any disruption in global trade flows. Valuations of Taiwanese stocks are not particularly demanding by global comparison, but they are trading at a premium to their mainland peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Moreover, the recent improvement in Taiwanese earnings will be tested, given the strength of the TWD and deterioration in terms of trade (Chart 11). Historically, Taiwanese earnings have been highly cyclical and prone to sharp swings, led by global business cycles. Technically speaking, the multi-year underperformance of Chinese investable shares against the Taiwanese market has become very advanced and appears to have formed an enduring bottom (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 10Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: ##br##Valuation And Technical Perspective Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: Valuation And Technical Perspective Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: Valuation And Technical Perspective Chart 11Taiwanese Earnings Improvement##br## Will Be Tested Taiwanese Earnings Improvement Will Be Tested Taiwanese Earnings Improvement Will Be Tested Bottom Line: Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares as a trade. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The "1992 Consensus" refers to the outcome of a meeting in 1992 between China and Taiwan's then ruling party KMT. The terms means that both sides recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but both sides agree to interpret the meaning of that one China according to their own definition. 3,4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard," dated January 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The U.S. has two geopolitical imperatives: domination of the world's oceans and ensuring the disunity of Eurasia; The Trump Doctrine, as currently defined, has no room for transatlantic alliances; President Trump is pursuing both mercantilism and an isolationist foreign policy; This combination imperils the transatlantic alliance and thus the American anchor in Eurasia; If pursued to its logical conclusion, the Trump Doctrine will end American global hegemony. Feature "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the world." - Sir Halford John Mackinder Geopolitics is parsimonious and predictive because it posits that states are imprisoned by their geography. For academia, geopolitics is too parsimonious. And the professors are correct! Mountainous terrain combined with ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has destined Afghanistan and Bosnia to centuries of conflict, but Switzerland seems to be doing just fine. As such, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, despite our name, very rarely relies on pure geopolitics for its analysis. The world is just too complex and geopolitics operates on long time horizons that are rarely investment-relevant. Geography is not destiny. Rather, geography is the ultimate constraint, an immutable factor that can only be conquered with a massive effort or new technology that comes but once in a generation. To fight geography is folly, even for a hegemon. The Trump Doctrine, as it has taken shape thus far, looks to be just such a folly. In this analysis, we explain why and what the investment relevance may be for the U.S. and the world. We still think the U.S. is likely to regain power in relative terms, but Trump's "charismatic authority" and foreign policy pose a risk to this view. American Geopolitical Imperatives There are two notable "fathers" of geopolitics: Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford John Mackinder. They both dedicated their life to elucidating great power "Grand Strategy," the implicit but real geopolitical imperatives, rooted in geography, from which a country derives its day-to-day foreign policy. For Mahan, a U.S. Navy Admiral and lecturer at the Naval War College, the imperative of the U.S. was to build a navy to dominate the oceans, the global "commons" that is indispensable to modern trade, economy, and thus "hard power."1 A strong navy is the defining characteristic of a great power. It affords the hegemon military supremacy over vital trade routes and ensures that global commerce operates in its interest. If this sounds like present-day U.S. "Grand Strategy," it is because Mahan had a great influence on American policymakers in the early twentieth century. Theodore Roosevelt supported Mahan's thinking, which included building the Panama Canal. Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, and similar work by British strategists, provided a historical and strategic framework for the naval race between the U.K. and Germany that ultimately contributed to the start of World War I.2 Mackinder, a British geographer and academic, focused on the Eurasian landmass, rather than the oceans.3 In his view - perhaps colored by Britain's history of fending off invaders from the continent - Eurasia had sufficient natural resources (Russia), population (China), wealth (Europe), and a geographic buffer from naval powers (the seas surrounding it) to become self-sufficient. Hence any great power that managed to dominate Eurasia, or "the World Island" as Mackinder coined it, would have no need for a navy as it would become a superpower by default (Map 1). Map 1The World According To Mackinder The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine American Grand Strategy is today a combination of both Mahan's and Mackinder's thinking. The U.S. has had two explicit geopolitical imperatives since the end of World War II: Dominate the world's oceans (Mahan); Prevent any one power from dominating Eurasia (Mackinder). To accomplish the first, the U.S. has expended an extraordinary amount of resources to build and operate the world's greatest blue-water navy. To accomplish the second, the U.S. has entered two world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and spent a good part of the twentieth century containing the Soviet Union. In addition, Washington has fostered a close transatlantic alliance to ensure that Europe, its anchor in Eurasia, remains aligned with the U.S. These were not arbitrary decisions made by a corrupt, Beltway elite looking to enrich itself with the spoils of globalization. These were decisions made by American leaders looking to expand American power, establish global hegemony, and retain it against rivals for centuries to come. Both imperatives are necessary for the U.S. to remain a hegemon. And U.S. hegemony is the foundation of the global monetary and financial system. Not least, it underpins the role of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency. Bottom Line: The U.S. has two geopolitical imperatives: domination of the world's oceans and ensuring the disunity of Eurasia. The Trump Doctrine: America First, Second, And Third Every U.S. president tries to enshrine a foreign policy "doctrine" during their presidency. There is no single document that does the job of elucidating the doctrine; scholars and journalists weave the ideas together from speeches, policy decisions, resource allocation, and rhetoric. This early in the Trump presidency, it is not fair to determine what his foreign policy doctrine will be. Already, with Trump's executive orders on immigration and refugees, it is clear that there is a process of trial and error underway, with the administration reversing its position on green card holders (U.S. permanent residents). We therefore take liberty in projecting the little information we have forward. Chances that we are wrong are high and our conviction level is low. Nevertheless, we have two broad conclusions. If the Trump Doctrine develops as these early clues suggest, then it will either be rejected by Congress and the American policy establishment, or it will initiate the collapse of the geopolitical and economic institutions of our era, ushering in something profoundly different. We see no alternatives. So what are the early outlines of the Trump Doctrine? We see three factors that stand out: Isolationism: Long-term alliances and commitments abroad must have a clear, immediate, and calculable benefit for the U.S. economic "bottom line." Therefore, Japan and South Korea should pay more for the benefits of U.S. alliance, and NATO is a drain on American resources. All alliances and American commitments are negotiable. Mercantilism: The U.S. has no permanent allies, only trade balances that must be positive. Trump has not only threatened China and Mexico with protectionism, but also longstanding allies like Germany and Japan.4 Any country that sports a significant trade surplus with the U.S. is in Washington's crosshairs (Chart 1). Chart 1Trump's Hit List The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Sovereignty: Trump said in his inaugural address, "it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first" and that America does "not seek to impose our way of life on anyone." This is a stark departure from ideologically-driven foreign policies of both the Bush and Obama White House. However, there is an ideology underpinning Trump's foreign policy: nationalism. Professor Ted Malloch, tipped as the next U.S. Ambassador to the EU, revealed in a BBC interview that the new U.S. President "is very opposed to supranational organizations, he believes in nation states." This statement makes explicit what many of Trump's speeches have implied. Under the tenets of this inchoate Trump Doctrine, NATO and the EU are not just nuisances, but are positively detrimental to U.S. interests. This marks a profound shift in U.S. foreign policy thinking, if it stands. First, both NATO and the EU break the ideological tenet of nationalism. They are international organizations that pool sovereignty for some predetermined common goal. Given that the common goal has nothing to do with the immediate, domestic and economic goals of the U.S., the two organizations are not worth supporting, under this interpretation of the emerging Trump Doctrine. Second, NATO demands a U.S. overseas commitment with little material gain in return. This is not a new argument. President Obama complained about the failure of NATO member states to pay their fair share (2% of GDP on defense) for collective self-defense (Chart 2). However, Obama's intention was to cajole European allies to boost defense spending; NATO's existence was not in question. Trump does not see a point in America paying for Germany's defense, especially when Germany sports a sizeable trade surplus with the U.S. Chart 2NATO States That Need To 'Pay Up' The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Third, the EU runs a large current account surplus in general and a trade surplus with the U.S. in particular (Chart 3). For the Trump administration, the EU is therefore a rival, perhaps more so even than Russia, which, when viewed through a purely mercantilist lens, is not a foe. Trump's foreign policy is based on an understanding that the world is multipolar and that the U.S. is in relative geopolitical decline. Our data supports President Trump's assertion (Chart 4). In that way, Trump's doctrine is similar to that of the Obama presidency. Both recognize that the U.S. can no longer act unilaterally and that it must retrench from its global responsibilities. But while Obama sought to enhance U.S. power by relying on allies and supranational organizations, Trump seeks to withdraw into Fortress America and geopolitically deleverage. Such a deleveraging, when combined with mercantilism, may cause America's traditional allies to try harder for its approval, like Trump assumes, or it may push America's traditional allies away from Washington's orbit. Chart 3Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Chart 4American Power In Relative Decline American Power In Relative Decline American Power In Relative Decline Bottom Line: President Trump believes in a "what can you do for me" world.5 This world has no room for twentieth-century alliances, which did not anticipate the disenchantment and polarization of the American public (or the benefit of Trump's wisdom!) in their original design. Transatlantic Drift The most important feature of the Trump Doctrine is that it seeks to replace transatlantic links between the U.S. and Europe with bilateral, ad-hoc alliances. The one such alliance that has received much media attention is the thaw between the U.S. and Russia. To be clear here, we are very much aware that many U.S. presidents have had deep disagreements with Europe and that every president since Reagan has tried to thaw relations with Russia early in his presidency. However, Trump is different in that he is the first U.S. president to: Openly question the very existence of NATO; Openly oppose European integration;6 Openly engage in mercantilist trade policies towards allies while simultaneously undermining geopolitical alliances with them. The problem with this course of action is that other countries will pursue alternative economic and security relationships to hedge against America's perceived lack of commitment, or outright hostility. Japan and South Korea, for example, concerned that they may face tariffs and a drop in U.S. military support, will need to turn more friendly toward China to avoid conflict and access new consumer markets. The same goes for Europe, with Germany and others eager to substitute for the U.S. by selling more to China amid U.S.-China trade conflicts.7 Thus, if we are to take the Trump Doctrine to its conclusion, we end up with an American foreign policy that pushes Eurasia towards the kind of integration - if not exactly alliance - that Mackinder feared. Since greater Eurasian coordination could eventually develop into a dynamic of its own, this process directly contravenes the second tenet of American grand strategy: Prevent any one power from dominating Eurasia. But wait, Trump supporters will cry, Trump is going to throw a wrench in Eurasian coordination by allying with Russia! No, he won't. Russia and America will not be allies. At best, they will be friends with benefits. The two countries have no shared economic interests. Russia sees both Europe and China as its economic partners. The former for supply of badly needed technology and investment (Chart 5), the latter as an energy market and another source of investment (Chart 6).8 Chart 5Russia Needs European Technology ... The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Chart 6... And Chinese Energy Demand ... And Chinese Energy Demand ... And Chinese Energy Demand Russian policymakers may be cheering Trump for the moment, but that is only because he brings relief from the extremely anti-Kremlin policies of the Obama (and potentially Hillary Clinton) presidency. The Kremlin will take advantage of the change in the White House. Bear in mind, all that Russian policymakers know of the U.S. in recent memory is conflict and realpolitik: It was the U.S. that pushed for NATO to expand into Ukraine and Georgia. Chancellor Angela Merkel, in fact, vetoed those plans at the 2008 NATO Summit; It was the Bush Administration that pushed for Kosovo's independence in 2008; Both the Bush and Obama administrations sought to construct a ballistic missile defense shield on Russia's doorstop in Central and Eastern Europe. If Trump stumbles in the next four years, who is to say that Moscow won't have to deal with an antagonistic Washington by the end of 2020? Trump's olive branches will not alter Russian thinking about the country's long-term interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin is going to do what is good for Russia, no matter how much he may think that Trump is a great guy to party with. And what is good for Russia is deeper economic integration with China and Europe. In fact, with the U.S. becoming an energy producer - and potentially a significant LNG exporter soon - America may become Russia's competitor for Europe's natural gas demand. Trump, his supporters and advisors, may believe that the twentieth century is over and that post-WWII American alliances have atrophied. They have! Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is no surprise that NATO is having an identity crisis when it no longer has a peer enemy to defend against. But geography has not changed. The U.S. is still far from Eurasia and Eurasia is still the "World Island." The Trump Doctrine ignores the entire twentieth century during which the U.S. had to intervene in Europe twice, and Asia three times, at a huge cost of blood and treasure, due to the threat of the continent unifying under a single hegemon. The international organizations that the U.S. set up after the Second World War, including NATO and the EU but also the UN, IMF, and others, were created to ensure that the U.S. did not have to intervene in Europe again. The security alliance and commercial system in Asia Pacific served a similar purpose. Bottom Line: Trans-oceanic alliances and organizations are not vestiges of a past that has changed, but vestiges of a geography that is immutable. The Trump Doctrine, such as it is, threatens to undermine an imperative of American hegemony. If pursued to its professed conclusion, it will therefore end American hegemony. Eurasian Alliance How can Europe, Russia, and China overcome their vast differences and unite in an anti-American alliance? It is not easy, but nor is it impossible. Russian point of view: The U.S. remains Russia's chief strategic threat. Sino-Russian distrust and tensions are overstated, as we discussed in a 2014 Special Report.9 Russia depends on China and Germany for 32% of its imports and 17% of its exports (Chart 7). It is deeply integrated with both economies. The U.S., meanwhile is about as relevant for the Russian economy as Poland in terms of imports and as Belarus in terms of exports. China's point of view: The U.S. is also China's chief strategic threat - and probably the only thing standing between China and regional hegemony over the course of this century. For China, integrating with the denizens of Eurasia makes a lot of sense. First, it would allow China to avoid the folly of competing with the U.S. in direct naval and maritime conflict. Overland transportation routes - which Beijing seeks to develop via its ambitious "The Silk Road Economic Belt" project - will bypass China's contentious and cramped South and East China Seas. Second, Europe has everything China needs from the U.S. (technology, aircraft, IT), and could offer them at discount rates due to a weak euro and general economic malaise (entire continent is for sale, at a discount!). Third, neither Europe nor Russia care what China does with its neighborhood in East Asia. If China wants to take some shoal from the Philippines, Berlin and Moscow will be okay with that. Europe's point of view: The European Union has never spent much time thinking seriously about the U.S. as a threat to its existence. The possibility, at very least, will promote efforts at economic substitution. Europe and Russia must overcome their differences over Ukraine in order to cooperate again. However, as we pointed out above, it was not Europe that sought to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, it was the United States. Europe needs Russian energy and Russia needs Europe's technology and investment. As long as they delineate where each sphere of influence begins and ends, which they have done before (in 1917 and 1939 if anyone is still counting!) they will be fine. Finally, trade with emerging markets is already more important for the EU than with the U.S. (Chart 8). And China remains a major potential growth market for EU products. Chart 7U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners Chart 8Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. We do not think that a formal EU-Russia-China axis is around the corner, or even likely. However, if the U.S. should pursue a policy of undermining its transatlantic and transpacific alliances, cheerleading the dissolution of the EU, and treating foes and allies equally when it comes to trade protectionism, the probability that it faces a united front from Eurasia increases. We are not sure that the Trump Administration understands this, or even cares. From what we can tell right now, the Trump White House is singularly focused on trade and commercial matters. It is mercantilist, pure and simple. But geopolitics is not a single dimension. It is like a game of three-dimensional chess. Foreign policy and security are on the top chess board, trade and economic matters are in the middle, and domestic politics are played on the bottom board. When the Trump administration threatens the "One China" policy or encourages EU dissolution because the bloc has "overshot its mark," it corners its counterparts on the geopolitical and political chess boards for the sake of trade and commercial interests. This is a mistake. Europe and China will give up chess pieces on the economic board to preserve their position on the geopolitical and political boards. In other words, Trump's strategy of tough-nosed negotiations - which he learned in the global real estate sector - will only strengthen opposition against the U.S. in the real world. We don't think that Trump is playing three-dimensional chess. He is singularly focused on America's economy and commercial interests and his own domestic political coalition. This is unique in post-World War Two American foreign policy. Ronald Reagan, who cajoled Japan and West Germany into the 1985 Plaza Accord, did so because both Berlin and Tokyo understood they owed their security to America. If Reagan threatened to withdraw America's security commitment to either, he would not have gotten the economic deal he wanted. Bottom Line: If pursued to its logical conclusion, the Trump Doctrine will end U.S. hegemony. Trump's foreign policy has raised a specter, however faint at present, which has not been seen since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Russia and Germany in 1939: a united Eurasian continent marshalling all its human, natural, and technological resources against the U.S. The last time that happened, 549,865 U.S. lives were needed to preserve American hegemony, not to mention the global cost in blood and treasure. Investment Implications In our 2017 Strategic Outlook we posited that investors should get used to the revival of charismatic authority.10 We borrow the concept from German sociologist Max Weber, who identified it in his seminal essay, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule."11 Weber argues that legal-rational authority flows from the institutions and laws that define it, not the individuals holding the office. Today, we are seeing the revival of charismatic authority, which Weber defined as flowing from the extraordinary characteristics of an individual. Such leaders are difficult to predict as they often rise to power precisely because of their opposition to the institutions and laws that define the legal-rational authority. The Trump Doctrine is one example of how charismatic authority can lead to uncertainty. Twentieth century institutions may be flawed, but they have underpinned and continue to underpin American hegemony. The U.S. cannot, at the same time, maintain global hegemony, pursue mercantilist commercial policy, and seek to undermine its global alliances. The Trump White House threatens to push allies and foes, pursuing their own interests, to work in concert to isolate the United States. Perhaps President Trump and his advisors are comforted by the fact that the U.S. has always profited from global chaos. The U.S. benefits from being surrounded by two massive oceans, Canada, and the Sonora-Chihuahuan deserts. Following both the First and Second World Wars, the U.S.'s relative geopolitical power skyrocketed (Chart 9). This is why Trump's election led us to believe that global multipolarity would peak in the coming year and set the stage for an American revival.12 Chart 9The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos However, to maintain primacy while sowing global discord, the U.S. needs more than just Anglo-Saxon allies in the world. It needs an anchor in Eurasia, which is and always will be Europe. Without an anchor, Trump's policies will not sow discord, they will create concord, and unite the "World Island" against America. That is why it is important to see how the Trump Doctrine develops in terms of real policy, as opposed to a year's worth of mostly campaign statements. Already the administration has made some appropriate noises about standing "100% behind NATO" and having an "ironclad commitment" to Japan. But make no mistake, Trump's open doubts have reverberated farther and deeper than these minimal reassurances. It is critical to monitor how the Trump administration approaches NATO, the EU, and bilateral negotiations with key partners. We are already seeing evidence of serious coordination - particularly between Germany and China - that could be a counterweight to U.S. power in the marking. These two outcomes - renewed U.S. hegemony, or U.S. downfall - are essentially binary and it is too soon to know which will prevail. What is the probability of downfall? It is low, but rising. If Trump does not adjust his foreign policy - or, barring that, if the U.S. Congress or American foreign policy, defense, and intelligence establishment do not "correct" Trump's course - then U.S. hegemony will begin to unravel. And with it will go a range of "certainties" underpinning global economic growth and trade, including the U.S. dollar's reserve currency status. If America loses its hegemony, one victim may be the U.S. dollar's role as a safe haven asset. The notion that the greenback is a safe-haven asset even when the chief global risks emanate from the U.S. will be tested. We recommend that long-term investors diversify into other currencies, including the Swiss franc, euro, and, of course, gold. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest Of America In Sea Power: Present And Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1918). 2 Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, 15th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1949). 3 Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals And Reality: A Study In The Politics Of Reconstruction, 15th ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996). 4 Trump has surprised U.S. ally Japan by coupling it with China in some of his statements threatening tariffs. Meanwhile Peter Navarro, chief of the new National Trade Council, has recently accused Germany of currency manipulation and structural trade imbalances. Please see Shawn Donnan, "Trump's top trade adviser accuses Germany of currency exploitation," Financial Times, January 31, 2017 available at www.ft.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Trump has said that the U.K. was "smart" to leave the EU, and has expressed indifference to the existence of the EU and a belief that "others will leave" following the U.K. Please see "Full Transcript of Interview with Donald Trump," The Times of London, January 16, 2017, available at www.thetimes.co.uk. Also, the aforementioned Professor Malloch, potential U.S. Ambassador to the EU, said in his interview with the BBC that "Trump believes that the European Union has in recent decades been tilted strongly and most favorably towards Germany" and that "the EU has overshot its mark." 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Embrace Of The Dragon And The Bear," dated April 11, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Max Weber, "The Three Types Of legitimate Rule," Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1) (1958): 1-11. Translated by Hans Gerth. Originally published in German in the journal Preussiche Jahrbücher 182, 1-2 (1922). 12 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Table 1Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update The Reflation Trade Continues It is wrong to think that the recent rally in risk assets is mainly due to the election of President Donald Trump. Yes, since November 8, U.S. equities have risen by 7% and global equities by 3%. But the rally began as long ago as February last year, and since then U.S. and global equities have risen by 25% and 20% respectively. A more useful narrative is that the U.S. went through a "mini-recession" in late 2015/early 2016 (as indicated by the manufacturing ISM and credit spreads, Chart 1). Since then, assets have moved as they typically do in the first year of a cyclical recovery: small caps, cyclicals and value stocks have outperformed, bond yields risen, and equity multiples expanded in anticipation of a recovery in earnings. Expectations of Trump's fiscal stimulus and deregulation merely gave that momentum an extra boost. Our view is that global economic growth is likely to continue to accelerate. With the U.S. now at full employment, wage growth should rise further (Chart 2). Trump's policies are igniting animal spirits among companies, whose capex intentions have jumped sharply (Chart 3). U.S. real GDP growth this year could be 2.5-3%, somewhat above the consensus forecast of 2.3%. Meanwhile, Europe is growing above trend, and China will continue for a while longer to see the effects from last year's massive monetary stimulus (Chart 4). Chart 1One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession Chart 2Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Chart 3Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Chart 4China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through In the short term, a correction is possible: the rally looks technically over-extended, and investors have begun to notice that in addition to "good Trump" (tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending), there is also a "bad Trump" (market unfriendly measures such as immigration control, confrontation with China, and arbitrary interference in companies' investment decisions). But, on a 12-month view, our expectations of accelerating growth and only a moderate rise in inflation imply that the "sweet spot" for risk assets will continue, and so we maintain the overweight on equities and underweight on bonds we instituted in late November. What could end the reflation trade? The main risks we see (and the reasons we don't think they are serious enough to derail the rally for now) are: Extreme moves by the new U.S. administration. The biggest risk is a confrontation with China over trade. Our view is that Trump will use the threat of recognizing Taiwan to force concessions out of China. A precedent is the way the U.S. handled its trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s (note that new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer was deputy USTR at the time). China is unlikely to accept significant currency appreciation, understanding how this caused a bubble in Japan. But it might agree to voluntary export restrictions, to increasing investment in the U.S., opening the Chinese market more to foreign companies, and to stimulating domestic consumption, as Japan did in the 1980s (Chart 5). This may even chime with how Xi Jinping wants to reform the economy, though missteps by the U.S. could force him into a nationalistic position. Fiscal policy fails. The details of tax cuts are complex: alongside lowering the headline rate of corporate tax to 15% or 20%, for example, Republicans are discussing a border-adjustment tax, one-year depreciation, and an end of the tax offset for interest payments. Infrastructure spending won't happen quickly either, not least since it is disliked by Republican fiscal hawks (who are much less averse to tax cuts). BCA's geopolitical strategists, however, believe that Trump will able to get a program of personal and corporate tax cuts through Congress by August. Economic (and earnings) growth stumble. While corporate and consumer sentiment have picked up recently, hard data has not yet. U.S. 4Q GDP growth of only 1.9%, for example, was disappointing. Earnings growth will need to recover this year to justify elevated multiples. EPS growth for the S&P500 stocks in Q4 2016 looks to have been around 4% YoY according to FactSet. Stocks might fall if earnings do not come in somewhere close to the 12% that the bottom-up consensus forecasts for 2017. Inflation risks rise, triggering the Fed and the European Central Bank to rush to tighten monetary policy. Core U.S. PCE inflation, at 1.7% YoY, is not far below the Fed's 2% target and inflation could accelerate as fiscal policy stimulates an economy where slack has already disappeared. However, it is likely to take some time for inflation expectations to rise, and over the past few months core PCE inflation has, if anything, slowed (Chart 6). We expect the Fed to raise rates three times this year (compared to market expectations of twice) but not to move faster than that. German inflation, at 1.9% YoY, is starting to get uncomfortably high too, but the ECB will probably continue to set policy with more focus on the periphery, especially Italy. Chart 5When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's Chart 6Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Equities: We prefer U.S. equities over European ones in common currency terms. This is partly because we expect further U.S. dollar appreciation. But we also remained concerned about the structural weakness in the European banking system, and by the higher volatility of eurozone equities. Moreover, European earnings will not be boosted by currency depreciation as much as will Japanese earnings, since the euro has hardly weakened on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). We continue to like Japanese equities (with a currency hedge). The Bank of Japan remains committed to an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, which should weaken the yen and boost earnings. We are underweight Emerging Market equities: structural vulnerabilities remain, and the inverse correlation with the U.S. dollar is intact. Chart 7Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Fixed Income: For now, U.S. 10-year Treasury bonds are at around fair value. But we expect the yield to rise moderately further, as growth and inflation pick up, to about 3% by year-end. Yields on eurozone government bonds will also rise, but not by as much. This means that global sovereigns could produce a YoY negative return for the first time since 1994. In the U.S. we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds: inflation expectations are still 30-40 bps below a normalized level (Chart 8). With risk assets likely to outperform, we recommend exposure to spread product, but find investment grade bonds more attractively valued than high-yield. Currencies: Short term, the dollar has probably overshot and could correct. But growth and interest rate differentials (Chart 9) suggest that the dollar will appreciate further until such time as Europe and Japan can contemplate raising rates. Additionally, if the proposal of a border-adjustment tax looks like becoming reality, the dollar could appreciate sharply: a BAT of 20% would theoretically be offset by a 25% rise in the dollar. The yen is likely to depreciate further (perhaps back to JPY125 against the dollar) as the Bank of Japan successfully maintains its target of a 0% 10-year government bond yield. The euro will fall by less, especially if the market begins to worry about ECB tapering in the face of rising inflation. Chart 8TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise Chart 9Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Commodities: The supply/demand picture for industrial metals looks roughly balanced for the year, with Chinese demand likely to remain robust, suppliers more disciplined, but the stronger dollar acting as a headwind. In the oil market, Saudi Arabia and Russia seem to be sticking to their commitment to cut supply, but U.S. shale oil producers are filling the gap, with the rig count up 23% in Q4 over the previous quarter. We continue to expect crude oil to average US$55 a barrel for the next two years. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Highlights The DXY correction has a bit more to run as G10 economic surprises are likely to roll over. EM-related plays like commodity currencies can rally for a few more months, but the outlook for 2017 is troublesome. China is at risk of a deceleration. Global liquidity is tightening. Protectionism is rising. Feature Dollar Correction: It Ain't Over 'til It's Over Can the dollar correction advance further, or is the dollar bull market about to resume? We prefer to position ourselves for additional dollar weakness in the coming months. Despite persistently high bond yields, the DXY is still softening. It is being dragged down by a euro supported by strong economic news such as this week's Belgian business confidence, our favorite bellwether for the euro area. The pound too continues to show some vigor, which is also a byproduct of economic data pointing toward better growth (Chart I-1). We expect the support for the greenback from higher Treasury yields to be temporary. Momentum in U.S. 10-year government bond yields is driven by G10 economic surprises (Chart I-2). Currently, economic surprises are flirting with the upper end of their distribution of the past 12 years. Chart I-1The British Economy Is Picking Up The British Economy Is Picking Up The British Economy Is Picking Up Chart I-2G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields Accentuating the odds of a rollover in surprises are two factors: First, as bond yields and risk-asset prices attest, investors are revising their growth expectations upward, lifting the hurdle for data to surprise to the upside. Second, having expanded for 10 months, the global credit impulse has experienced its longest upswing in a decade. Yet, the increase in global borrowing costs, along with the widening in cross-currency basis swap spreads, points to tightening global liquidity conditions, a poison for the credit cycle (Chart I-3). As credit slows, the economy will deteriorate. Chart I-3The Credit Cycle Is Stretched The Credit Cycle Is Stretched The Credit Cycle Is Stretched This means that the key factor that has supported the stronger dollar in recent months - higher U.S. yields - will begin to dissipate, putting downward pressure on the USD. Finally, our dollar capitulation index, after hitting overbought conditions, is now falling. Moreover, it currently stands below its 13-week moving average, conditions under which the greenback has recorded an average 8.1% annualized weekly loss since 1994, and an average 5.3% annualized weekly loss since 2011 (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Negative Momentum For The Dollar Negative Momentum For The Dollar Negative Momentum For The Dollar We continue to play this correction by shorting USD/JPY. As we have pointed out before, USD/JPY remains a function of the level of global bond yields (Chart I-5). Additionally, a negative surprise in global growth is likely to hurt risk assets. To conclude with the favorable backdrop for the yen, the high degree of uncertainty created by the seemingly erratic policy changes of the new Trump administration suggests that equity implied volatility remains too low. After all, we do not know what changes will hit global tax regimes, what the Fed policy will look like, nor how protectionist Trump will really be. Imbedding a premium for these risks will require higher equity implied vols. A higher VIX tends to support the yen against the USD (Chart I-6). Chart I-5USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields Chart I-6The Yen Likes Uncertainty The Yen Likes Uncertainty The Yen Likes Uncertainty Bottom Line: The correction in the dollar should continue, as bond yields still have downside on a one- to three-month basis. The yen remains the best-placed currency to take advantage of these dynamics, especially if risk assets experience a correction. Focus - Emerging Markets and Liquidity: A March To The Scaffold This week, we re-examine our bearish view on emerging markets, a key theme underpinning our bearish stance on commodity currencies. EM assets, and therefore commodity currencies, have outperformed our expectations, reflecting the percolation of previous positive economic surprises in EM relative to the U.S. (Chart I-7). EM and commodity currencies are priced for perfection, with the risk-reversals on EM currencies displaying elevated levels of optimism (Chart I-8). For EM and commodity currencies to rally further, EM economies need to continue to outperform durably. This requires the Chinese economy and the global liquidity backdrop to only improve further. Can this happen? Chart I-7Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has ##br##Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Chart I-8EM And Commodity Currencies ##br##Priced For Perfection EM And Commodity Currencies Priced For Perfection EM And Commodity Currencies Priced For Perfection While the next month or two may continue to generate generous returns for EM-related plays, the rest of 2017 may not prove as kind. The China Syndrome Let's begin with China. The recent upsurge in metal prices has reflected an improvement in Chinese economic activity (Chart I-9). As we have pinpointed before, the Keqiang index is near cycle highs, and, Chinese railway freight volumes have been growing at their fastest pace since 2010. This situation is unlikely to continue much longer. The upsurge in Chinese commodity intake - metals in particular - has been fueled by a vigorous rebound in Chinese real estate construction. However, Chinese real estate price appreciation has hit dangerous levels, and the authorities are already leaning against it, with the PBoC increasing rates by 10 basis points this week. The roll-over in Chinese real estate activity should deepen Chart I-10), hurting commodity prices - particularly iron ore, steel and copper - and commodity currencies along the way. Chart I-9China's Rebound Explains ##br##The Metals Rally China's Rebound Explains The Metals Rally China's Rebound Explains The Metals Rally Chart I-10The Risk Of A China Real Estate ##br##Slowdown Is Growing The Risk Of A China Real Estate Slowdown Is Growing The Risk Of A China Real Estate Slowdown Is Growing Moreover, some of the upswing in Chinese economic activity was also related to large amounts of fiscal stimulus in that nation. In mid-2015, the Middle Kingdom was inching ever closer to a hard landing, prompting a panicked Beijing to boost fiscal support and to speed up the roll-out of US$1.2 trillion of infrastructure public-private partnerships. Today, this fiscal hand-out is fading (Chart I-11). This could once again cause industrial activity and investments to weaken as Chinese capacity utilization remains near recession troughs. The recent disappointing investment growth reading in the latest Chinese GDP release could be a harbinger of this reality. Finally, as we have highlighted last week, Chinese monetary conditions have massively improved as Chinese producer-price inflation rebounded, pushing down Chinese real rates in the process. However, with commodity price inflation set to slow - courtesy of a dissipating base effect and of last year's dollar rally - Chinese PPI should roll over, pulling up real rates and tightening monetary conditions (Chart I-12). A tightening in Chinese monetary conditions represents a big problem for EM as it portends a slowdown in economic activity (Chart I-13). This will ultimately lead to a big drag on DM commodity producers, as EM commodity intake decreases, pushing down the likes of the AUD, CAD, and NZD as their terms of trade suffer. Chart I-11Fading Chinese##br## Fiscal Stimulus Fading Chinese Fiscal Stimulus Fading Chinese Fiscal Stimulus Chart I-12Commodity Inflation Will Peak, ##br##So Will Chinese Inflation Commodity Inflation Will Peak, So Will Chinese Inflation Commodity Inflation Will Peak, So Will Chinese Inflation Chart I-13Tightening China Monetary Conditions##br## Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Tightening China Monetary Conditions Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Tightening China Monetary Conditions Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Bottom Line: In early 2016, global markets were not positioned for a rebound in Chinese economic activity. Yet, Chinese industrial activity improved, resulting in a rebound in EM assets, commodity prices, and commodity currencies. The crackdown on real estate activity, the removal of Chinese fiscal stimulus, and the expected tightening in Chinese monetary conditions should result in a reversal of these trends, hurting commodity producers and their currencies in the process. Global Liquidity In Retreat While China represents a problem for EM plays and commodity currencies, deteriorating global liquidity could prove an even stronger hurdle. Our tactical expectation of a lower dollar and lower rates may support EM plays temporarily, but the cyclical outlook remains grim. To begin with, EM economies are dependent on global liquidity as they run a current account deficit expected to hit US$140 billion in 2017, or US$400 billion if China is excluded. Moreover, they sport large external debts of US$4.8 trillion, excluding Taiwan and China. Especially worrisome are the large funding requirements of many EM countries, especially for Turkey, Malaysia, and Colombia. (Chart I-14). Chart I-14EM Debt Vulnerability Ranking Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Why is this a problem? Two reasons: Global Interest rates and the dollar. Global Interest rates, driven by higher Treasury yields, are rising as the U.S.'s economic slack vanishes, suggesting that the current tightening campaign by the Fed will be durable (Chart I-15). Higher U.S. rates lift the U.S. dollar against EM currencies, tightening EM liquidity conditions. But an unrelated shock is also putting exogenous upward pressure on the dollar. This force is the widening in LIBOR spreads (Chart I-16). This is the result of the regulation-related 90% melt down in the asset under management of U.S. prime money-market funds, an important source of global dollar liquidity. Moreover, U.S. banks, with their balance sheets under pressure by the binding constraints of Basel III, have not been able to fill the gap. Chart I-15The Fed has A Green Light To Hike The Fed has A Green Light To Hike The Fed has A Green Light To Hike Chart I-16Stresses In The Libor Market Remain Stresses In The Libor Market Remain Stresses In The Libor Market Remain The end result has been a widening of cross-currency basis swap spreads, which usually tends to boost the dollar (Chart I-17). This phenomenon increases the hedging costs to foreign investors of holding U.S. dollar assets. These investors become increasingly tolerant of purchasing U.S. assets unhedged, pushing up the value of the dollar in the process. This is best illustrated by the fact that net portfolio investments in the U.S. moved from a deficit of US$300 billion in Q1 2015 to a surplus of more than US$550 billion. Yet, hedges put in place, as approximated by the BIS's volume of OTC FX derivatives, have flat-lined since 2013 (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Chart I-18Hedging Activity is Receding Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism A rising dollar and LIBOR stresses are tightening global dollar liquidity, creating a big problem for EM. Wider-than-normal cross-currency basis swap spreads have been associated with declining global trade (Chart I-19). The stronger dollar plays a role, as it hurts the price of globally-traded good prices. Also, higher borrowing costs result in a mild disintermediation of global trade flows. As physical exports are 26% of EM GDP versus 13% for the U.S., this represents a huge drag on EM currencies, especially versus the USD. As a corollary, it is also a problem for the small open commodity producing DM economies like Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. Furthermore, the strength in the dollar associated with LIBOR shocks further hurts EM domestic economies by impeding EM credit growth (Chart I-20). The combined assault of a stronger dollar and higher rates increases the cost of EM foreign debt. Also, according to the BIS, between 2002 and 2014, 55% of EM commodity producers' debt issuance has been in USD.1 When the dollar rises, they see both their borrowing costs rise and the prices of the products they sell fall. Altogether, these forces preempt capex and credit accumulation in EM nations. Chart I-19Tightening Global Liquidity##br##Is Bad For Trade Tightening Global Liquidity Is Bad For Trade Tightening Global Liquidity Is Bad For Trade Chart I-20A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper##br## EM Credit Growth A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper EM Credit Growth A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper EM Credit Growth Bottom Line: The global liquidity backdrop is deteriorating. DM rates are rising cyclically, which is lifting the dollar. Moreover, a global dollar shortage is also supporting the greenback, further hurting EM liquidity conditions. Thus, we expect EM growth to deteriorate, hurting EM assets and commodity currencies. Protectionism The final issue affecting EM economies is the rise of protectionism, especially in the United States. EM - Asia and China in particular - have been the main beneficiaries of globalization (Chart I-21). Currently, they are in the line of sight of President Trump. Thus, we expect that any potential trade war between the U.S. and the rest of the world will focus on EM economies and China. Chart I-21EM And Asia Are In Trump's Line Of Sight Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism EM are much more dependent on the U.S. than the other way around. As an example, China's exports to the U.S account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for less than 1% of U.S. GDP. EM economies have a lot more to lose from a trade war than the U.S. Because of this imbalance in relative trade-exposures, EM economies are at risk from the border-adjustment tax being discussed in the U.S. These taxes would be very deflationary for EM economies as they could force a downward adjustment in EM labor costs and further depress capex in these nations. To ease these adjustments, falling EM exchange rates would be required. Once again, commodity currencies would suffer from these developments. First, lower capex in EM hurts Australian, New Zealand, or Canadian terms of trade. Second, lower EM exchange rates means that that exports from the dollar bloc to EM would suffer. Finally, and most perversely, lower EM exchange rates will give EM commodity producers an advantage versus DM producers, in that a stronger U.S. dollar means their local-currency costs are falling. EM commodity producers would keep producing more than warranted, putting additional downward pressure on commodity prices and stealing market shares from the dollar bloc producers. This is not a pretty picture. Bottom Line: EM should bear the brunt of the pain of any rise in U.S. protectionism. The tight link between EM economies and DM commodity producers suggests that this pain should adversely affect the AUD, the CAD, and the NZD. Risks To Our View Chart I-22Chinese Tariffs Are Falling Chinese Tariffs Are Falling Chinese Tariffs Are Falling The biggest risk to our view is a redoubling of Chinese fiscal stimulus. The threat of U.S. tariffs and trade sanctions is obviously deflationary and negative for the Chinese economy. We know this, as do the relevant powers in Beijing. A tool to mitigate any of these negative repercussions on the Chinese economy might be for Beijing to press on the gas pedal once more. Additionally, as our colleague Yan Wang wrote in this week's China Investment Strategy, key members of the new U.S. administration have been on record saying that the threat of tariffs is not an end game, but rather a negotiating tool to extract concessions from U.S. trade partners, implying a potentially more pragmatic stance from the U.S. than current rhetoric suggests.2 Moreover, the Chinese side of the negotiation table is also more open minded than most observers fear. China has been cutting its own tariffs and could continue to do so (Chart I-22). Moreover, Premier Li Keqiang has made a new pledge to move faster toward opening and liberalizing Chinese markets for access by foreign companies. A deal may be less elusive than feared. Finally, regarding the global liquidity deterioration, the recent rebound in gold and silver prices may be a harbinger of improving liquidity conditions globally. We doubt that the economic situation will let this rally be durable, but it remains something to monitor. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Bruno Valentina, and Hyun Song Shin, "Global Dollar Credit And Carry Trades: A Firm-level Analysis", BIS, Working Papers, August 205. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard", dated January 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed this week. The labor market saw both continuing and initial jobless claims rise above expectations. However, the economy is still near full employment and the Fed will not respond to this news. Furthermore, the Beige Book, released last week, also highlights that the U.S. economy remains resilient with employment and pricing activity particularly strong. This week the DXY broke through the key 100 level, as the market continues to reprice capricious assumptions of Trump's policies. Nevertheless, it has rebounded since then. The dollar is unlikely to see any real movement until the administration releases concrete information about its policies. For the time being, the Fed also seems to be on the sidelines in anticipation of more information. Report Links: U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017 - January 20, 2017 Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Although the euro area has seen a brighter economic environment as of late, this week's data has been mixed: German and overall euro area services and composite PMI underperformed, while manufacturing PMI outperformed consensus. The IFO Business Climate and Expectations both underperformed consensus, while the Current Assessment remained in line with consensus. All measures still remain over 100. Finally, Belgian Business Confidence accelerated sharply. The ECB is unlikely to change its dovish stance. The euro will therefore see little upside. The recent uptrend in EUR/USD is due to dollar weakness, but the recent downtrend in EUR/GBP and EUR/SEK indicate that the market is not necessarily hopeful that the ECB will reach its inflation target anytime soon. Report Links: GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data indicates that last year's sharp depreciation of the yen is helping the Japanese economy: Exports increased by 5.4% YoY, crushing expectations of 1.2% growth. Nikkei Manufacturing PMI reached 52.8, also beating expectations. In November machinery orders grew by more than 10% YoY. The BoJ will be more resolute on its radical monetary measures, as recent data shows that their approach is working. This will prove very bearish for the yen on a cyclical basis, given that the cap in Japanese rates will cause the rate differential between the U.S. and Japan to widen. In the short term, USD/JPY will resume its correction. We estimate that USD/JPY will cease to be attractive as a short opportunity at around 110. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 On Tuesday, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, requiring a parliamentary vote to authorize the exit of the U.K. from the European Union. This news is an added boon for cable, which has surged by almost 5% after bottoming at 1.20 about 10 days ago. As political risks start to dissipate, and the currency trades more on economic fundamentals, the pound should become a more attractive buy, particularly against the euro, given that the U.K. economy should outperform the market's dismal expectations. Recent data supports this view: Average earning growth outperformed expectations in November. GDP growth was 2.2% YoY in Q4, also outperforming expectations. Furthermore, short-term technicals point to a stronger pound. EUR/GBP has broken through its 100-day moving average, which indicates that momentum should continue to drive this cross downwards for the time being. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Two weeks ago, we argued that the rally in AUD lacks fundamental domestic causes. This week, the momentum of the recent AUD rally, caused by rising iron ore and copper prices, has seemingly paused. Exacerbating this change of pace is recent data which indicates a weak economic backdrop: the RBA trimmed mean CPI, and the more common CPI measure, underperformed consensus at both a quarterly and yearly pace. This could be due to depressed consumer sentiment, as the labor market remains mired in a slump, with the unemployment rate increasing to 5.8%, and total hours worked falling. Given recent data, it is likely that markets reprice growth prospects in Australia. U.S. trade policies could also potentially curtail global trade, painting a bearish picture for AUD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The Kiwi has appreciated 4.4% since the start of 2017. Although this rally might eventually be limited against the U.S. dollar, the NZD will likely have more upside against its crosses, particularly the AUD. Indeed it seems that low inflation, one of the only sore spots for the RBNZ in an otherwise stellar kiwi economy, has turned the corner, surging to 1.3% on the latest reading Wednesday. More importantly, not only did inflation beat expectations but it also surpassed 1% for the first time since 2014. This is a significant development, given that persistently low inflation in New Zealand was keeping the dovish bias of the RBNZ. With this hurdle gone, and an economy that continues to be the best performing in the G10, this dovish bias should disappear, which will ultimately lift the NZD against its crosses. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Despite the dissipating oil slump, potential risks may weigh on Canada's future. These risks are likely to emanate from an international sphere. Key concerns revolve around U.S. policies: recent statements have increased yields and tightened financial conditions, but global trade worries are not fully priced in. Recent news indicates that Trump has no ill-intentions aimed at Canada, however, protectionist policies could hurt global trade, indirectly curtailing Canadian exports. A U.S. corporate tax cut can also deviate investment from Canada to the U.S. The recent appreciation in the CAD against major currencies can also hurt Canadian competitiveness going forward. As oil is likely to remain relatively stable in the near future, we may again see a disassociation of CAD with oil, and a continued tight relationship with interest rate spreads. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Yesterday, EUR/CHF fell below the crucial 1.07 level. As we have recommended many times, any time that this cross falls below this threshold, it becomes an excellent buying opportunity. The SNB has not been shy to intervene in the currency markets, and they have been very clear that they will not tolerate any currency strength past a certain threshold as it could add additional deflationary pressures to an economy that has not had a positive inflation rate since 2014. We have identified a level of 1.07 for EUR/CHF as this threshold. Moreover given that the euro is the currency of reference for interventions, the behavior of USD/CHF should roughly mirror the behavior of the dollar against the Euro. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The Norwegian Krone has rallied along other commodity currencies so far this year, in spite of the meek performance of oil over this timeframe. This surge might prove unsustainable in the short term, as USD/NOK is very close to oversold territory. In the long term, the outlook for the NOK is more positive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Rising oil prices resulting from the OPEC cuts should supercharge the already high inflationary pressures in the Norwegian economy. This factor will eventually push the Norges Bank off its dovish bias, and the NOK higher in the process. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy seems to be finally benefitting from last year's weaker krona; PPI numbers came in at 2.1% MoM, and 6.5% YoY, higher than previous numbers. This will feed into CPI in the near future. Additionally, 1-year, 2-year, as well as the important 5-year Prospera Inflation Expectations have all picked up, with the 5-year at 2%, in line with the Riksbank's target. The bank is aware of the krona's recent strength against major currencies, and realizes that it is important that the appreciation slows. In the short term, the SEK could continue to rally on the back of the dollar's correction and the Swedish economic outperformance vis-à-vis the euro area. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades