Emerging Markets

Highlights Geopolitical risks were overstated in 2017, but have now become understated; If Donald Trump becomes an early "lame duck" president, he will seek relevance abroad; This could mean a protectionist White House, or increased geopolitical tensions with Iran and North Korea; North Korean internal stability could come into question as economic sanctions begin to bite; Political risks in the U.K. and Italy could rise with markets overly complacent on both; Emerging markets, particularly Brazil and Mexico, will see renewed political risk. Feature Buoyant global growth, political stability in Europe, and steady policymakers' hands in China have fueled risk assets in 2017. As the year draws to a close, investors also have tax cuts in the U.S. to celebrate. Our high conviction view that tax cuts would happen - and that they would be fiscally profligate - is near the finish line.1 In making this call, we ignored the failure to repeal Obamacare, the "wisdom" of old "D.C. hands," and direct intelligence from a source inside the White House circle who swore tax reform would be revenue neutral. Throughout the year, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy remained confident that the GOP would ignore its fiscal conservative credentials and focus on the midterm elections.2 That election is increasingly looking like a bloodbath-in-the-making for the Republican Party (Chart 1). What of the latest opinion polls showing that the tax cuts are unpopular with half of all Americans? The polls also show that a solid one-third of all Americans remain in support of the Republican plan (Chart 2). We suspect - as do Republican strategists - that those are the Republicans who vote in midterm elections. Given the atrociously low turnout in midterm elections - just 36.4% of Americans voted in 2014 - Republicans need their base to turn out in November. The tax cuts are not about the wider American public but the Republican base. Chart 1Midterm Election: A Bloodbath? Midterm Election: A Bloodbath? Midterm Election: A Bloodbath? Chart 2Republican Base Supports Tax Cuts Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 As we close the book on 2017, we look with trepidation towards 2018. Our main theme for next year is that the combination of economic stimulus from the tax cuts in the U.S. and structural reforms in China will create a U.S.-dollar-bullish policy mix that will combine into a headwind for global risk assets, particularly emerging market equities.3 However, in this report, we focus on some of the more exotic risks that investors may have to deal with. In particular we focus on five potential "black swans" - low probability, high market-impact events - that are neither on the market's radar nor the media's. To qualify for our list, the events must be: Unlikely: There must be less than a 20% probability that the event will occur in the next 12 months. Out of sight: The scenario we present should not be receiving media coverage, at least not as a serious market risk. Geopolitical: We must be able to identify the risk scenario through the lens of our geopolitical methodology. Genuinely unpredictable events - such as meteor strikes, pandemics, crippling cyber-attacks, solar flares, alien invasions, and failures in the computer program running the simulation that we call the universe - do not make the cut. Black Swan 1: Lame Duck Trump "Lame duck" presidents - leaders whose popularity late in their term has sunk so low that they can no longer affect policy - are said to be particularly adventurous in the foreign arena. While this adage has a spotty empirical record, there are several notable examples in recent memory.4 American presidents have few constitutional constraints when it comes to foreign policy. Therefore, when domestic constraints rise, U.S. presidents seek relevance abroad. Chart 3The Day After The Midterms, Trump's Overall Popularity Will Matter More Than That Among Republicans Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 President Trump may become the earliest, and lamest, lame duck president in recent U.S. history. While his Republican support remains healthy, his overall popularity is well below the average presidential approval rating at this point in the political cycle (Chart 3). Based on these poll numbers, his party is likely to underperform in the upcoming midterm election (Chart 4). A Democrat-led House of Representatives would have the votes to begin impeachment, which we would then consider likely in 2019. As we have argued in our "impeachment handbook," the market impact of such a crisis would ultimately depend on market fundamentals and the global context, not political intrigue.5 Chart 4Trump Is Becoming A Liability For The GOP Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 President Trump's political capital ahead of the midterm elections is based on his ability to influence Republican legislators. Despite low overall poll numbers, President Trump can use the threat of endorsing primary challengers against conservative peers in Congress to move his agenda in the legislature. He has effectively done this with tax cuts. However, the day after the midterm elections, President Trump's own numbers will matter for the GOP. Given that President Trump will be on the ballot in the 2020 general election, his low approval numbers with non-Republican voters will hang like an albatross around the party's neck. This is a serious issue, particularly given that 22 of the 33 Senators up for reelection in 2020 will be Republican.6 Robust economic growth and a roaring stock market have not boosted Trump's popularity so far. At the same time, a strong economy ready to translate into higher wages is about to be "pump-primed" by stimulative tax cuts (Chart 5). We would expect the result to be a stronger dollar, which should keep the U.S. trade deficit widening well into Trump's second year in office. At some point, this will become a sore political point, given Trump's protectionist rhetoric and his administration's focus on the trade balance as a key measure of U.S. power. Chart 5Wage Pressures Are Building Wage Pressures Are Building Wage Pressures Are Building What kind of adventures would we expect to see President Trump embark on in 2018? There are three prime candidates: China-U.S. trade war: The Trump administration started off with threats against China and then proceeded to negotiations. However, neither the North Korean situation nor the trade deficit has seen substantial improvement, and a lame duck Trump administration would be more likely to resort to serious punitive actions. Even improvements on the Korean peninsula would not necessarily prevent Washington from getting tougher on Beijing over trade, as the Trump administration will be driven by domestic politics. Investors should carefully watch whether the World Trade Organization deems China a "market economy," which could trigger a U.S. backlash, and whether the various investigations by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross result in anti-dumping and countervailing duties being imposed more frequently on specific Chinese exports. Thus far, the empirical evidence suggests that the Trump administration has picked up the pace of protectionist rulings (Chart 6). Notably, the Trump administration claims that the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue has "stalled," and it is reviving deeper, structural demands on Chinese policymakers.7 Iran Jingoism: Rumors that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may be replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo - who would be replaced at the CIA by Senator Tom Cotton - can only mean one thing: the White House has Iran in its sights. Both Pompeo and Cotton are hawks on Iran. The administration may be preparing to shift its focus from North Korea, where American allies in the region are urging caution, to the Middle East, where American allies in the region are urging aggression. Investors should watch whether Tillerson is removed and especially how Congress reacts to President Trump's decision on October 15 to decertify the Iran nuclear agreement (also called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). The Republican-controlled Congress has until December 15 to reimpose sanctions on Iran that were suspended as part of the deal, with merely a simple majority needed in both chambers. However, President Trump will also have an opportunity, as early as January, to end waivers on a slew of sanctions that were not covered under the JCPOA. North Korea: It would be natural to slot North Korea as first on our list of potential foreign policy adventures for President Trump. However, it does not really fit our qualification of a black swan. North Korea is not "out of sight." Additionally, President Trump has already broken with the tradition of previous administrations by upping the pressure on Pyongyang. In fact, a North Korean black swan would be if President Trump succeeded in breaking the regime in Pyongyang. To that scenario we turn next. Chart 6Trump: Game Changer In U.S. Trade Policy? Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 Bottom Line: Geopolitics has not affected the markets in 2017, with risk assets reaching record highs and the VIX reaching record lows (Chart 7). This was our view throughout the year and we called for investors to "buy in May and have a nice day" as a result of our analysis.8 We do not see this as likely in 2018. The Trump administration has no credible legislative agenda after tax cuts. We expect Congress to stall as we enter the summer primary season and for the GOP to lose the House to the Democrats. President Trump is an astute political analyst and will sense these developments before they happen. There is a good chance that he will attempt to sway the election and pre-empt his lame duck status with an aggressive foreign policy. Chart 72017 Goldilocks: S&P 500 Up, VIX Down 2017 Goldilocks: S&P 500 Up, VIX Down 2017 Goldilocks: S&P 500 Up, VIX Down Investment implications are twofold. First, we continue to recommend an equally weighted basket of Swiss 10-year bonds and gold as a portfolio hedge.9 Second, risk premium for oil prices should rise in 2018. Not only is the supply-demand balance favorable for oil prices, but geopolitical risks are likely to rise as well. Black Swan 2: A Coup In Pyongyang Our colleague Peter Berezin, BCA's Chief Global Strategist, has suggested that a coup d'état against Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un could be a black swan trigger that spooks the markets.10 While Peter used the scenario as a tongue-in-cheek way to weave Kim into a narrative that tells of a late 2019 recession, we have long raised North Korean domestic politics as the true Korean black swan.11 Here we entertain Peter's idea for three reasons.12 First, China has upped the economic pressure on Pyongyang. Under Kim Jong-un, the North Korean state has attempted some limited economic "opening up," namely to China. But the attempt to finalize the nuclear deterrent has delayed an already precarious process. There has now been a $617 million drop in Chinese imports from the country since the beginning of the year (Chart 8), with coal imports particularly affected (Chart 9). China has also pulled back on tourism. Meanwhile, North Korea's imports of Chinese goods have risen, which suggests that the country's current account balance may be widening. At some point, if these trends continue, Pyongyang will run out of foreign currency with which to purchase Chinese and Russian imports. Chart 8China Is Turning The Screws On Pyongyang... China Is Turning The Screws On Pyongyang... China Is Turning The Screws On Pyongyang... Chart 9...Particularly On Coal Imports ...Particularly On Coal Imports ...Particularly On Coal Imports Second, Pyongyang is well aware of pressures against the regime. The assassination of Kim Jong-nam - the older half-brother of Kim Jong-un - in February of this year sent a message to the world, but especially to China, which kept Kim Jong-nam around as an alternative to the current Kim. That Pyongyang went to the extreme lengths of poisoning Kim Jong-nam with VX nerve agent in a foreign airport suggests that Kim Jong-un is still worried about threats to his rule.13 If Beijing's economic sanctions continue to tighten in 2018, the military could conceivably see the Supreme Leader's aggressive foreign policy as a risk to regime survival. Third, Pyongyang could miscalculate and create a crisis from which it cannot deescalate. A provocation that disrupts international infrastructure and commerce or kills civilians from the U.S. or Japan could trigger a downward spiral. For instance, an attack against international shipping in the Yellow Sea or Sea of Japan by North Korean submarines would be an unprecedented act that the U.S. and Japan would likely retaliate against.14 We could see the U.S. following the script from Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf in 1988 - the largest surface engagement by the U.S. Navy since the Second World War. In that incident, the U.S. sunk half of Iran's navy in retaliation for the mining of the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts. In the case of North Korea, this would primarily mean taking out its approximately 20 Romeo-class submarines and an unknown number of domestically-produced - Yugoslav-designed - newly built submarines. Such a conflict is not our baseline case, but we assign much higher probability to it than an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. How would Pyongyang react to the sinking of its submarines? Our best case is that the regime would do nothing. The leadership in Pyongyang is massively constrained by its quantifiable military inferiority. True, North Korea has around 6 million military personnel - about 25% of the total population is under arms - but unfortunately for Pyongyang, this large army is arrayed against one of the most sophisticated defenses ever constructed by man: the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To support its ground forces, North Korea would have at its disposal only about 20-30 Mig-29s. Countering two dozen jets would be South Korea's combined 177 F-15s and F-16s, plus American forces that would vary in size depending on how many aircraft carriers were deployed in the vicinity. Given that a single American aircraft carrier holds up to 48 fighter jets, North Koreans would quickly find themselves fighting a losing battle. Which is why they may never initiate one. If Kim Jong-un insists on retaliation, the military could remove and replace him with, for instance, his 30-year old sister, who has recently risen in party ranks, or his 36-year old brother Kim Jong-chul, who is apparently not entirely uninvolved in the regime despite living an unassuming life in Pyongyang. What would a regime change mean for the markets? It depends on whether it is successful or not. An unsuccessful coup could lead to a massive purge and likely a total break in Pyongyang's relations with the outside world, including China. This would seriously destabilize North Korea's decision-making. The global community would have to begin contemplating a total war on the Korean peninsula. Alternatively, a successful coup could lead to temporary volatility, yet long-term stability. The military regime in the North may even be open to reunification over the long term, depending on how U.S.-China relations evolve. Bottom Line: China does not want to cripple North Korea or throw a coup. But it is cooperating with sanctions and could therefore trigger one by mistake. At least two regimes have collapsed in the past when facing the pincer movement of economic sanctions and American military pressure - South Africa's apartheid regime in 1991 and Slobodan Miloševic's Yugoslavia in 1999. Kim Jong-un could face a similar fate, particularly if China applies excessive economic pressure. Black Swan 3: Prime Minister Jeremy Corbyn There is no election scheduled in the U.K. for 2018, but if one were to be held the ruling Tories would be in trouble (Chart 10). In fact, the combined anti-Brexit forces are currently in a solid lead over the pro-Brexit parties, Conservatives and the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) (Chart 11). Chart 10Labour Is In The Lead... Labour Is In The Lead... Labour Is In The Lead... Chart 11...As Are Anti-Brexit Forces Writ-Large ...As Are Anti-Brexit Forces Writ-Large ...As Are Anti-Brexit Forces Writ-Large What could trigger such an election? Ultimately, the final exit deal may prompt a new election. More immediately, the ongoing negotiations over the status of the Irish border would be a prime candidate. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi, head of BCA's European Investment Strategy noted recently, Prime Minister Theresa May's government is propped up by the Northern Irish Unionists to whom May has promised that there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This will likely create a crisis as the EU negotiations may inadvertently threaten the Good Friday peace agreement. The Northern Ireland Unionists will not tolerate the border moving to the Irish Sea. This would effectively take Northern Ireland into the EU customs union and single market, and out of the U.K.'s domestic trading zone. It would also embolden Scotland's push for single market access. In essence, the Tory government may collapse because of differences within the U.K.'s "three kingdoms" before it even has the chance to collapse over differences with the EU.15 The market may cheer a Labour-Scottish National Party (SNP) coalition government, a potential winner of an early election, as it would mean that a new referendum on the U.K. leaving the EU could be held. The latest polls suggest that "Bremorse" (remorse for Brexit) has set in, as a clear majority in the U.K. thinks that Brexit was a bad idea (Chart 12). However, we suspect that it would take Prime Minister Jeremy Corbyn several months, if not over a year, before he called such a referendum. First, Corbyn is on record supporting a soft Brexit, not a new referendum, and he has only just begun to adjust this position. Second, a soft Brexit is far more difficult to achieve than the hard Brexit of Prime Minister Theresa May since it requires the U.K. to subvert its sovereignty in significant ways (i.e., accepting EU regulation) in order to access the EU Common Market. Third, the most politically palatable way to re-do the referendum is to put a U.K.-EU deal up to the people to decide, which means that Corbyn first has to spend a long time negotiating that deal. Chart 12Bremorse Sets In Bremorse Sets In Bremorse Sets In The market may be disappointed to find out that PM Corbyn is not willing or able to put the question of the U.K.'s EU exit up to a vote right away. Instead, the market would have to deal with Corbyn's economic policies, which are markedly left-wing. Corbyn harkens back to the 110 Propositions pour la France of French President François Mitterrand, if not exactly to the ghastly 1970s of the U.K.'s own history. A brief sample platter of Labour's proposals under Corbyn includes: Increasing the U.K. corporate tax rate to 26% from 20%; Increasing the minimum wage; Forcing companies not to out-source operations; Nationalizing public infrastructure companies. How should investors play a Corbyn victory? We think that the U.K. pound would likely rally on a higher probability of reversing Brexit. However, this "no Brexit" rally would quickly dissipate as PM Corbyn reiterated his promise to fulfill the democratic desire of the population to exit the EU. While Corbyn's negotiating team set to work on getting a better Brexit deal out of Brussels, the market would quickly turn its attention to the reality that Corbyn is not kidding about socialism.16 The result would be a selloff in the pound. Bottom Line: BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy has pointed out that the pound remains well below its fair value (Chart 13). However, as BCA's chief FX strategist Mathieu Savary points out, the valuation technicals may be misleading as the currency has entered a new economic, trade, and political paradigm. A Corbyn premiership is not clearly positive for Brexit, while opening up a completely different question: is the U.K. also exiting the free-market, laissez-faire paradigm that it has helped lead since May 1979? Black Swan 4: Italy Is A Black Swan Hiding In Plain Sight The spread between Italian and German 10-year government bonds has narrowed 72 basis points since April, suggesting that investors have grown comfortable with the risks associated with the Italian election due by May (Chart 14). There are three reasons why we agree with the market: Chart 13Pound Valuation Reflects Post-Brexit Paradigm Pound Valuation Reflects Post-Brexit Paradigm Pound Valuation Reflects Post-Brexit Paradigm Chart 14Investors Not Worried About Italy Investors Not Worried About Italy Investors Not Worried About Italy New electoral rules passed in October make it highly likely that a center-right alliance will take shape between the Forza Italia of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the mildly Eurosketpic Lega Nord. These two could form a government alone, or in a grand coalition with the center-left Democratic Party (PD) (Chart 15). Both Lega Nord and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) have moved to the center on the questions of European integration and membership in the currency union; The European migration crisis is over and its supposedly constant impact on Italy is waning (Chart 16). Meanwhile, Italy's economy is on the mend, with its banking sector finally following the Spanish trajectory with a drop in non-performing loans (Chart 17). Chart 15Italy Set For A Hung Parliament Italy Set For A Hung Parliament Italy Set For A Hung Parliament Chart 16Migration Crisis Is Over (Yes, Even In Italy) Migration Crisis Is Over (Yes, Even In Italy) Migration Crisis Is Over (Yes, Even In Italy) Chart 17Italian Recovery Is Just Starting Italian Recovery Is Just Starting Italian Recovery Is Just Starting That said, we continue to warn clients that the underlying support for the common currency is lagging in Italy. The support level is just above 55%, despite a strong rally in the rest of the Euro Area (Chart 18). Similarly, over 40% of Italians appear confident in the country's future outside of the EU (Chart 19). Chart 18Italians Stand Out For Distrust Of Euro Italians Stand Out For Distrust Of Euro Italians Stand Out For Distrust Of Euro Chart 19Italians Not Enthusiastic About EU Italians Not Enthusiastic About EU Italians Not Enthusiastic About EU Our baseline case is that Italian elections will produce a weak and ineffective government, though crucially not a Euroskeptic one. How could we be wrong? Easy: one of the three reasons why we agree with the market could shift. For example, M5S could alter its pledge to remain in the Euro Area and surprisingly win on a Euroskeptic platform. Why would the party do something like that? Because it makes sense! Polls are already showing that M5S's recent moderation on the euro is not paying political dividends, with its support sharply sliding since the summer. With power quickly slipping out of reach for the party, why wouldn't they put a down-payment on the next election by trusting the underlying trend in opinion polling and investing in a Euroskeptic platform that might pay political dividends in the future? If we think that this strategy makes sense based on the data, then the M5S leadership might as well. Chart 20Can MIB Keep Outperforming? Can MIB Keep Outperforming? Can MIB Keep Outperforming? Another scenario is a major terror attack perpetrated by recent migrants from North Africa. Italy has been spared from radical Islamic terror. As such, the country may not be as desensitized to it as other European nations. A strong showing by Lega Nord and the far-right Fratelli d'Italia could force Forza Italia to move to the right as well. On our travels, we have noticed that few investors want to talk about Italy. There is wide acknowledgement of the structural trends pointing to a rise of Euroskepticism in the country, but also an appearance of consensus that this is a problem for a later date. We agree with this consensus, but our conviction is low. Bottom Line: Italian election risk is completely unappreciated by the markets. The country's equity market is one of the best performing this year (Chart 20), while government bonds are pricing in no political risk as the election approaches. We believe that shorting both would present a good hedging opportunity. Black Swan 5: Bloodbath In Latin America Our last black swan risk is not really a black swan to us but a forecast we believe will happen. As we outlined last month, we fear that Chinese policy-induced credit contraction will be negative for emerging markets, as BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy data asserts (Chart 21). BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy has pointed out in its latest missive that its "Carry Canary Indicator" - performance of EM/JPY crosses - is signaling that a sharp deceleration in global growth is coming in Q1 2018 (Chart 22).17 Latin America (especially Chile, Peru, and Brazil) is the region most exposed to the combination of a slowing China and a China-induced drop in commodity prices. Chart 21When China Sneezes, EM Gets The Flu When China Sneezes, EM Gets The Flu When China Sneezes, EM Gets The Flu Chart 22Ominous Signal From EM/JPY Ominous Signal From EM/JPY Ominous Signal From EM/JPY From a political perspective, this is most negative for Brazil and Mexico. Both countries hold elections in 2018, with the Mexican election further complicated by the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations. We believe that the future of NAFTA hangs in the balance, with a high probability that the Trump administration will decide to abrogate the deal.18 Currently, anti-market political forces are in the lead in both countries. In Brazil, no pro-market candidate is leading in the polls (Chart 23). In fact, anti-market options have a 48% lead on the centrists. Granted, there are ten months until the election, but we are skeptical that the Brazilian population will change its mind and support reformers. If the "median voter" in Brazil supported reforms, the current Temer administration would have passed them already. In Mexico, anti-establishment candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (also known as AMLO) is leading in the polls (Chart 24), as is his new party Morena (Chart 25). If Morena wins the most seats in the Mexican Congress, it will be more difficult for the opposition parties to combine to counter it.19 Chart 23There Is No Pro-Market Option In Brazil There Is No Pro-Market Option In Brazil There Is No Pro-Market Option In Brazil Chart 24AMLO Is In The Lead ... Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 Chart 25...As Is Morena Five Black Swans In 2018 Five Black Swans In 2018 In 2017, we argued that politics were not a tailwind for EM asset performance. Instead, investors chased yield in the favorable economic context of Chinese economic stimulus, low developed market yields, and a weak U.S. dollar. In reality, politics was just as dire in much of EM as it was in prior years of asset underperformance, but the surge of global liquidity in 2018 masked the problems. We do not think the EM rally is sustainable in 2018. As the global economic and market context shifts, investors will start paying attention. Suddenly, political problems will enter into focus. Here we argue that Brazil and Mexico are likely to be the main targets of portfolio outflows, but a strong case could be made for South Africa and Turkey as well.20 Bottom Line: Political risk in Latin America will return. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, and "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, "How Long Can The 'Trump Put' Last?" dated June 14, 2017, and "Is King Dollar Back?" dated October 4, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Geopolitics - From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 President Clinton launched the largest NATO military operation against Yugoslavia amidst impeachment proceedings against him while President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia a month after losing the 1992 election. Ironically, President George H. W. Bush intervened in Somalia in order to lock in the supposedly isolationist Bill Clinton, who had defeated him three weeks earlier, into an internationalist foreign policy. President George W. Bush ordered the "surge" of troops into Iraq in 2007 after losing both houses of Congress in 2006; President Obama arranged the Iranian nuclear deal after losing the Senate (and hence Congress) to the Republicans in 2014. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Particularly vulnerable, in our view, will be Cory Gardner (R, Colorado), Joni Ernst (R, Iowa), Susan Collins (R, Maine), and Thom Tillis (R, North Carolina). 7 U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs David Malpass recently claimed that high-level talks had "stalled" and re-emphasized the U.S.'s structural complaints: "We are concerned that China's economic liberalization seems to have slowed or reversed, with the role of the state increasing ... State-owned enterprises have not faced hard budget constraints and China's industrial policy has become more and more problematic for foreign firms. Huge export credits are flowing in non-economic ways that distort markets." The growing presence of Communist Party cells within corporations is another important structural concern that puts the administration at loggerheads with China's leaders. Please see Andrew Mayeda and Saleha Mohsin, "US Rebukes China For Backing Off Market Embrace," Bloomberg, November 30, 2017, available at www.bloomberg.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy, "A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II," dated December 1, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see "North Korea: From Overstated To Understated" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2016: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. A notable coup attempt occurred in 1995-96 in North Hamgyong; something like a coup attempt may have occurred in 2013; and defectors from North Korea have reported various stories of plots and conspiracies against the regime. 12 After all, Peter predicted that Donald Trump would be a serious candidate for the U.S. presidency back in September 2015! 13 Still worried, that is, even after Kim Jong-un's supposed "consolidation of power" in 2013-14 when he executed his influential and China-aligned uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and purged the latter's faction. There were reports of rogue military operations at that time. With low troop morale reported by North Korean defectors, the possibility of insubordination cannot be ruled out. 14 A North Korean submarine sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, and North Korean artillery shelled two islands killing South Korean civilians later that year, but these attacks were still within the norm of North Korean provocations. The two countries are still technically at war and have contested maritime as well as land borders. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 To help investors get ready for a Corbyn premiership, we thought his appearance on President Nicolás Maduro's weekly radio show would be a good place to start: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eL8_wtS-0I 17 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades," dated December 1, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy "Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America," dated August 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "South Africa: Crisis Of Expectations," dated June 28, 2017, and "Turkey: Military Adventurism And Capital Controls," dated December 7, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights We are putting the Indonesian stock market on an upgrade watch list. Indonesia's financial markets' beta relative to EM peers has been declining. As such, Indonesian markets will likely outperform the EM benchmark in a sell-off. Inflation in Mexico is peaking and will drift lower. The Mexican peso is particularly attractive relative to the South African rand and the Brazilian real. However, we still recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance on Mexican assets relative to EM peers until more clarity emerges from the NAFTA negotiations. Feature Indonesia: Putting On Upgrade Watch List Indonesian share prices have considerably underperformed the EM benchmark since February 2016 (Chart I-1). This has occurred despite exports growing at an annual rate of 18% in U.S. dollar terms in 2017. The surge in Indonesian exports has been largely driven by soaring prices for thermal coal, palm oil and copper. Export prices have soared by 24% for coal and copper and 11% for palm oil from their lows in early 2016. Nevertheless, their export volumes have been rather stagnant (Chart I-2). These commodities are large drivers of Indonesia's exports. Thermal coal and palm oil account for around 20% of total exports, while copper accounts for around 4%, in value terms. Chart I-1Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Chart I-2Indonesian Exports: Volume Vs. Prices Indonesian Exports: Volume Vs. Prices Indonesian Exports: Volume Vs. Prices We expect coal1 and base metals prices to drop considerably in 2018 due to China's meaningful growth slowdown. Having this backdrop in mind, we discuss the outlook for Indonesia's stock market in both absolute and relative terms. We continue recommending a neutral allocation to Indonesian stocks within an EM equity portfolio for now, but are putting this bourse on an upgrade watch list and will wait for the following triggers to go overweight: Chart I-3Chinese & Indonesian Equities: ##br##A Rotating Dance Investors Rotating Between Chinese And ASEAN/Indonesian Equities Investors Rotating Between Chinese And ASEAN/Indonesian Equities The first trigger is when Chinese H-shares and large-cap tech stocks begin underperforming the EM overall equity index. Interestingly, the relative performance of Indonesian equities and Chinese stocks has been negatively correlated (Chart I-3). Indonesia's stock market's underperformance relative to the EM benchmark can be also partially explained by the manic rise in a small number of EM large-cap tech stocks. Tech stocks are absent from Indonesia's stock exchange and when tech stocks' relative performance does turn south, it will be easier for the Indonesian bourse to outperform the EM benchmark. The second trigger for upgrading Indonesian stocks is when the initial phase of decline in commodities prices (10-15%) occurs. This phase could be the most painful for commodities plays like Indonesia, as nervous investors bail out. In short, we are waiting for the momentum of Indonesia's relative performance to turn up before overweighting the bourse. Domestic Demand And Exports: Parting Ways? The Indonesian economy and its financial markets have historically been highly correlated with commodities prices and exports: a positive external shock would trigger an export boom and foreign inflows would ensue. These inflows would in turn lead to currency appreciation and a subsequent fall in interest rates. The end result was the overheating of the economy and financial markets. Recently, however, Indonesia's economy and financial markets have been slowly disconnecting from exports in general and commodities prices in particular. The top panel of Chart I-4 shows that while exports used to be extremely correlated with the rupiah, these correlations have been breaking down since early 2016. Similarly, a disconnect is occurring between exports and other domestic macro variables like bank loans (Chart I-4, bottom panel). What is also noteworthy is the absence of a notable pickup in domestic demand growth amid the strong recovery in global trade. Chart I-5 shows that car and motorcycle sales are still anemic. Chart I-4Disconnect Between Indonesian ##br##Exports Vs. Rupiah & Bank Loans Disconnect Between Indonesian Exports Vs. Rupiah & Bank Loans Disconnect Between Indonesian Exports Vs. Rupiah & Bank Loans Chart I-5Indonesia's Domestic Sector Remains Sluggish Indonesia's Domestic Sector Remains Sluggish Indonesia's Domestic Sector Remains Sluggish Below are some of the reasons that help shed light as to why this divergence between exports and domestic demand has been taking place: First, the ratio of Indonesia's commodities' exports to total has fallen more sharply than in other commodities-producing EM nations (Chart I-6). Exports have also become generally less important for the overall Indonesian economy post the global financial crisis. Chart I-7 shows that private non-financial debt as a whole has risen, while exports have fallen as a share of GDP. Chart I-6Indonesia's Commodities ##br##Exports Ratio Has Plunged Indonesia's Commodities Exports Ratio Has Plunged Indonesia's Commodities Exports Ratio Has Plunged Chart I-7Private Debt Is A Bigger Driver Of ##br##Indonesia's Economy Than Exports Private Debt Is A Bigger Driver Of Indonesia's Economy Than Exports Private Debt Is A Bigger Driver Of Indonesia's Economy Than Exports The government has been following cautious and prudent policies. This is another reason why domestic demand growth has been mediocre amid robust exports. Chart I-8 signifies that growth in government expenditures has stalled in nominal terms and contracted in real terms. Indeed, the impulse in the banking system's net domestic assets (the combined aggregate of the central bank and commercial banks) remains negative, albeit improving on a rate of change basis (Chart I-9). Net domestic assets (NDA) measure the banking system's2 credit to the domestic sector - i.e. the government and the private sector. Chart I-8Indonesia's Government ##br##Has Been Prudent Indonesia's Government Has Been Prudent Indonesia's Government Has Been Prudent Chart I-9Banking System's Net Domestic ##br##Assets & Fiscal Deposit Drain Banking System's Net Domestic Assets & Fiscal Deposit Drain Banking System's Net Domestic Assets & Fiscal Deposit Drain The NDA impulse has been negative because the government has borrowed less from the banking system. In addition, the government has been shifting deposits from commercial banks to the central bank (Chart I-9, bottom panel). This has drained liquidity in the system and has slowed broad money growth and capped commercial banks' reserves at Bank Indonesia. As the potential negative term-of-trade shock transpires, the government will have enough of a buffer to spend by deploying its deposits from the central bank and by borrowing and spending more. That will in turn provide support for the economy when commodities prices fall and the external sector suffers. Chart I-10Central Bank Has Been Building FX Firepower Central Bank Has Been Building FX Firepower Central Bank Has Been Building FX Firepower As for the currency, the central bank has recently accumulated plenty of foreign exchange assets, creating commercial bank reserves in the process (Chart I-10). The central bank now has plenty of room to defend the currency by selling foreign assets when the rupiah comes under selling pressure. Bank Indonesia will also have more leeway managing a reasonable balance between a depreciating currency and rising local interbank rates. Bottom Line: Indonesia's domestic demand has been mediocre, despite the surge in exports and commodities prices. Meanwhile, the central bank and the government have used the positive global environment to accumulate firepower. This puts them in a position to act as shock absorbers when the external environment turns hostile. As a result, the Indonesian financial markets' beta to their EM peers will decline. We therefore recommend putting the Indonesian stock market on an upgrade watch list. Consistently, the potential downside in the currency and a sell-off in the domestic bond markets will be smaller than we previously anticipated. While still advocating a cautious/neutral stance on this market, we will be looking to upgrade it to overweight versus its EM peers after the first phase of a potential EM and commodities sell-off transpires. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Waiting For A Better Entry Point In Mexico, inflation has very likely peaked and will drift lower as the central bank maintains a tight monetary policy stance: A large part of the rise in inflation in 2017 was caused by depreciation in the peso. The firmness in the peso this year entails that inflation will roll over soon (Chart II-1). Consumer spending and capital expenditure are set to contract as the impact of higher interest rates continue to filter through the economy (Chart II-2). In fact, domestic vehicles sales are shrinking sharply. Chart II-1Mexico: Peso & Inflation Mexico: Peso Inflation Mexico: Peso Inflation Chart II-2Higher Interest Rates Are ##br##Slowing Domestic Spending Higher Interest Rates Are Slowing Domestic Spending Higher Interest Rates Are Slowing Domestic Spending Furthermore, weak real wage growth will continue to weigh on consumer spending (Chart II-3). In addition, contracting fiscal non-interest expenditures will remain a headwind on economic growth (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Lower Real Wages = Lower Inflation Lower Real Wages = Lower Inflation Lower Real Wages = Lower Inflation Chart II-4Belt-Tightening By The Government Belt-Tightening By The Government Belt-Tightening By The Government Finally, one-off effects on inflation - such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of last year - will subside as the base effect of these price increases abates. The inflation rate will in turn moderate. Despite all this, Banxico will continue to keep monetary policy tight due to lingering uncertainty related to NAFTA negotiations. Within the EM currency universe, the Mexican peso is particularly attractive relative to the South African rand and the Brazilian real. We will be looking to reinstate long positions in the MXN versus both the ZAR and the BRL for the following reasons: Relative trade balance dynamics will continue to favor Mexico relative to South Africa and Brazil. Mexican exports are likely to remain robust due to strong U.S. growth (Chart II-5), while South African and Brazilian exports will slow down as China's growth and imports falter (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Mexican Exports Will Remain ##br##Robust Due To Strong U.S. Growth Mexican Exports Will Remain Robust Due To Strong U.S. Growth Mexican Exports Will Remain Robust Due To Strong U.S. Growth Chart II-6South African & Brazilian Exports ##br##Will Take A Hit As China Slows bca.ems_wr_2017_12_06_s2_c6 bca.ems_wr_2017_12_06_s2_c6 Furthermore, metals prices will be affected more negatively than oil prices due to China's growth slump. China's share of world consumption in base and industrial metals at 50-55% is much larger than oil (12.5%). This will leave Mexican exports less negatively affected than those of Brazil and South Africa. Mexico does not suffer from rapidly rising public debt like Brazil and South Africa (Chart II-7). Large fiscal deficits and rising public debt burdens in Brazil and South Africa require a higher risk premium in their respective financial markets, leaving further room for the MXN to outperform both the BRL and the ZAR. While Mexico has already gone through some structural reforms, Brazil and South Africa have yet to deliver any substantial efforts on that front. This leaves Mexico in a much better position to attract long-term capital inflows compared to Brazil and South Africa. Finally, on a real effective exchange rate basis, the peso remains cheap relative to the rand and the real (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Public & Private Debt Is Lower In Mexico Public & Private Debt Is Lower In Mexico Public & Private Debt Is Lower In Mexico Chart II-8The Mexican Peso Is Still Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Still Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Still Cheap We closed our long MXN/BRL and long MXN/ZAR trades on October 25th because at present there is too much uncertainty with respect to NAFTA negotiations that could have a negative impact on the peso. However, with regards to the national general elections, uncertainty in South Africa and Brazil is even greater than in Mexico. In Mexico, the anti-establishment candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is currently leading the polls, but his new party - National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) - is unlikely to gain a majority in Congress. Investment Conclusions We recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance across all asset classes in Mexico and wait for clarity on NAFTA3 negotiations before going overweight the country's currency and fixed-income markets relative to their EM peers. Mexican stocks have been selling off sharply in absolute terms and have substantially underperformed the EM benchmark. This poor performance is mainly attributed to financials and consumer discretionary stocks. While these two sectors only account for 20% of the total MSCI market cap, the retrenchment in their share price has been large enough to bring the whole market down. We have the following observations on these two equity sectors: The consumer discretionary sector has been underperforming due to disappointing earnings. Our bias is that it is still too early to call a bottom in the consumer cycle in Mexico. With regards to banks, we believe that tight monetary policy will continue to weigh on their share prices. More importantly, the yield curve remains inverted, and until we see it steepen, it will be hard for banks to rally. All in all, we continue recommending a neutral weighting in Mexican stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, the link is available on page 15. 2 Banking system is the sum of the central bank and commercial banks. 3 Please refer to the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Nafta - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights EM/JPY carry trades represent an important "canary in the coal mine" for the global economy that investors need to monitor very closely. They are currently sitting at a key resistance. A breakout above these levels would suggest that global growth will only strengthen, a move down would point to a deceleration in EM and global industrial activity. If EM/JPY carry trades indeed suffer, the key reasons are likely to be the combined onslaught of Chinese policy tightening and DM removal of monetary accommodation. While still not a base case, this breakdown would affect commodity currencies, the AUD in particular, most severely. Scandies would also suffer but the JPY and CHF would be much stronger than we currently anticipate. The ECB is unlikely to match the Fed next year, thus rate differentials will move against EUR/USD. GBP is still stuck in its post-Brexit range. It is likely to weaken anew toward its lower bound once the upper bound is hit during the coming weeks. Feature Chart I-1EM/JPY Carry Trades: ##br##A Canary To Monitor EM/JPY Carry Trades: A Canary To Monitor EM/JPY Carry Trades: A Canary To Monitor A "canary in the coal mine" for the global economy, EM / JPY crosses, have hit what has been their ceiling for the past ten years, and have begun to roll over (Chart I-1). We believe that carry trades are a key component to global liquidity that historically provide important signals for global industrial activity and EM assets. The weakness in EM/JPY carry trades is in the early innings, but further deterioration would raise dark flags heading into 2018. On the other hand, if EM/JPY carry trades manage to break out of their historical ceiling, the likelihood that the global industrial cycle accelerates further and EM assets strengthen will only grow. Therefore, EM/JPY carry trades need to be both monitored and understood. In this report, we examine one of the two key dynamics affecting these EM carry trade returns: Chinese policy and EM growth dynamics. In another report later this month, we will examine the other key factor: changes in DM monetary policy. Why Do Carry Trades Matter? In a carry trade, funds are borrowed from nations where they are plentiful and cheap - countries like Japan, with high current account surpluses, plenty of foreign assets and low interest rates. Then, these funds are lent to countries experiencing savings shortfalls, but where prospective returns are perceived to be high. These countries tend to have higher growth, current account deficits and higher interest rates. Through this activity, the funding currencies depreciate, and the high-carry currencies appreciate. Chart I-2After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, ##br##Global IP Weakens After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, Global IP Weakens After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, Global IP Weakens This transfer of funds supports global economic activity, as it facilitates a more efficient allocation of capital: Carry trades distribute liquidity to the faster-growing corners of the global economy where investment opportunities are plentiful. In the process, this liquidity further supports economic activity, profit growth and asset returns in those attractive markets. A virtuous loop ensues: As asset and currency returns in the high-carry nations remain elevated, further liquidity finds its way into these economies, which supports additional economic and profit growth. All that said, the virtuous loop can quickly mutate into a vicious downward spiral. If returns in the economies that need the borrowed foreign liquidity disappoint, liquidity can quickly find its way out of these nations. This outflow of funds not only hurts the exchange rate of the high-returns economies, it creates a dearth of liquidity in their domestic markets, which hurts domestic asset returns, profits and growth. This invites further outflows, further currency depreciation, and further economic pain. As Chart I-2 illustrates, when EM carry currencies outperform the yen, this tends to support global industrial activity. However, when EM carry currencies weaken relative to the yen, this tends to lead to a sharp deceleration in global growth by an average of three months. What is surprising is the reliability of the signals, especially when picking episodes of decelerating growth. We posit that this relationship works because of three factors. On one hand, EM are where most of the global capex happens (Chart I-3). Capital goods are the key driver of both global industrial production and global trade. Moreover, EM excluding China still needs foreign capital, as they are expected to run a combined current account deficit of US$300 billion in 2018. Thus, industrial activity is greatly influenced by the cost of financing of EM economies. On the other hand, Japan is still the greatest creditor nation in the world, with a net international investment position (NIIP) of US$3 trillion (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM Are Where Capex Happens EM Are Where Capex Happens EM Are Where Capex Happens Chart I-4Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor As a result of these dynamics, when EM currencies underperform the yen, it is a symptom that a key source of liquidity is leaving EM economies, and that global industrial activity is set to suffer. Chart I-5EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade Unsurprisingly, the performance of EM currencies vis-à-vis the yen also tends to lead dynamics for euro area industrial growth. As Chart I-5 illustrates, the euro area manufacturing PMI is a function of the performance of this supercharged carry trade. The European economy and its manufacturing sector in particular are very exposed to the EM business cycle. This relationship is a confirmation of the validity of the link between EM carry trades and global growth. Bottom Line: EM/JPY carry trades provide a reliable leading signal on global industrial activity. It is because carry trades are a key mechanism of redistributing global liquidity - taking savings from countries where they are oversupplied, and bringing them to countries where they are needed. EM countries are where the marginal capex in the global economy takes place today. Hence, a deterioration in carry trades' returns signals a deterioration of liquidity conditions in the economies that matter most for the global industrial cycle. It is noteworthy that EM/JPY carry trades have recently begun to lose steam. What Lies behind the Weakness in EM/JPY carry Trades? Chinese Policy! What could explains the recent slowdown in EM carry trades? The yen does not seem to be the culprit, as USD/JPY continues to follow the path charted by U.S 10-year yields this year. Instead, we posit that the source of the weakness is Chinese dynamics, the other key driver of EM returns beyond global liquidity conditions. Chinese policymakers have been curtailing their support to the domestic economy this year. Fiscal spending had decelerated massively, and Chinese monetary conditions have been on a tightening path since the end of 2016 (Chart I-6). Moreover, the administrative and regulatory tightening of the shadow banking system is also beginning to leave its mark. Small financial institutions have not been borrowing as aggressively as in recent years. Historically, this leads to a slowdown in the Chinese credit impulse (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese##br## Policy Has Been Tightened Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese Policy Has Been Tightened Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese Policy Has Been Tightened Chart I-7The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy##br## Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary This is especially important as China is very reliant on policy support. As Chart I-7 shows, fiscal spending and credit creation contributed nearly twice as much to Chinese GDP as exports. This is because the Chinese economy's private savings exceed investments by 5% of GDP. If government spending or the lending machine slows, these excess savings are not used, creating deficient demand which imparts a deep deflationary influence on China and the global economy. We are already seeing early signs that the removal of stimulus is beginning to bite. The diffusion index of Chinese house prices, a key leading indicator of prices themselves, has fallen below the 50% line. Since Chinese real estate construction tends to lag prices, a slowdown in this sector is likely to emerge (Chart 8). Additionally, the slowdown in the leading economic indicator also highlights the risks to China's industrial activity as measured by the Keqiang Index (Chart I-8, bottom panel). The implications for EM are straightforward. EM economies outside of China have exhibited little domestic momentum, with poor credit growth of 5.5% and retail sales growth of 1.1%. Thus, a slowdown in Chinese monetary conditions could do what it historically does: lead to a slowdown in EM industrial production that will reverberate throughout the world (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Policy Is ##br##Biting Policy Is Biting Policy Is Biting Chart I-9EM Economies Don't Respond ##br##Well When China Tightens EM Economies Don't Respond Well When China Tightens EM Economies Don't Respond Well When China Tightens Bottom Line: The crucial factor that could explain why our favorite canary in the coal mine has begun to lose momentum is most likely to be tightening Chinese policy. China is dependent on policy actions to allocate its vast amount of savings. The tightening that began this year is already causing some symptoms to pop up in the Chinese economy. Since China has been the key driver of growth in other EM economies, these dynamics could begin to weigh on EM returns. EM/JPY carry trades will be the canary in the coal mine to judge whether or not these risks begin to weigh on global growth. Other Considerations And Some Implications Positioning considerations could exacerbate the negative impulse emanating from Chinese policy. To begin with, investors are not positioned for this. Not only are risk reversals in EM currencies still pricing in a very benign outcome, short interest in popular EM bond plays remain very low. Thus, the risk of a sharp repositioning in EM plays is high; in fact, it is much higher than for much-maligned assets like the supposedly over-loved S&P 500 (Chart I-10). Japanese investors have been heavily investing outside of their country, and since 2016, EM markets have been the recipients of these portfolio flows. But as Chart I-11 shows, these Japanese flows seem to have been chasing momentum into EM. Thus, if EM assets begin to suffer from a tightening of policy in China, the Japanese flows could reverse, causing a drying out of liquidity conditions in EM and exacerbating the pain already induced by China. Chart I-10Investors Are Oblivious ##br##To EM Risks Investors Are Oblivious To EM Risks Investors Are Oblivious To EM Risks Chart I-11Japanese Investors Are ##br##Chasing EM Momentum Japanese Investors Are Chasing EM Momentum Japanese Investors Are Chasing EM Momentum DM monetary policy and inflation dynamics also can play a key role. Carry trades have historically been a play on low volatility in capital markets. An environment of improving growth, low inflation surprises, and easy monetary policy has been key to support this low-volatility state. However, BCA believes that U.S. inflation is set to surprise to the upside, which will contribute to a tighter Federal Reserve. The European Central Bank will begin tapering its asset purchases and the Bank of Japan has ramped up its hawkishness despite the absence of inflation in Japan. This is likely to contribute to an increase in volatility that should prove especially harmful for carry trades in the FX space. This should tighten global liquidity conditions, especially in emerging markets. We will explore this angle in more detail in an upcoming report. Chart I-12EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD In terms of investment implications, if EM carry trades were to break down in the near future, this would represent a major risk to the views espoused in the BCA Outlook and the investment recommendations associated with it. Most obviously, it would have an immediate negative impact on commodity currencies, since it would point to tightening liquidity and financial conditions in EM economies that will impact global industrial activity. The expensive AUD would be the currency most likely to suffer in this environment. The Scandinavian currencies would also suffer against the euro. Scandinavian economies have been highly levered to EM growth, and historically the SEK and the NOK have been greatly affected by EM spreads and commodity prices.1 The dovish bend of the Norges Bank and the Riksbank would only strengthen these negative impulses. EUR/USD would also likely suffer. As we argued two weeks ago, in the past 12 months, the euro has not behaved as a risk-off currency. In fact, quite the contrary, the euro has rallied alongside traditional EM plays, as the euro area has benefited from the positive economic impulse emanating from EM economies.2 Moreover, historically, EUR/USD has weakened when EM/JPY canaries have depreciated (Chart I-12). Finally, the yen would obviously enjoy such an unwinding of carry trades. We are currently negative the yen on U.S. bond yield dynamics. However, an underperformance of carry trades would prompt much short covering in the JPY as well as repatriation flows into Japan. If the EM canaries weaken further. We will be forced to change our stance on the JPY. Bottom Line: Investors are not positioned for any meaningful weakness in EM/JPY carries, and Japanese flows could move in reverse in a heartbeat. DM policy too is becoming a risk for these carry plays. China's tightening is thus coming at a terrible time for these carry trades. If canaries were to weaken, the AUD would bear the brunt of the pain among G10 currencies. The NOK and the SEK would also underperform a euro that would be falling against the USD. The yen would likely be able to rally in this environment. EUR/USD: Focus On The Western Shores Of The Atlantic Last week, data from Europe once again confirmed that growth in the euro area is stellar. Meanwhile, rate expectations declined in the U.S. as the Fed minutes displayed an FOMC increasingly concerned with the conundrum of a very tight labor market and weak inflation. EUR/USD rallied by 1%. But what really drove the rally in EUR/USD this year? It first and foremost reflected a massive repricing in relative rate expectations between the euro area and the U.S. However, most of this repricing was caused by a decline in the U.S. terminal rate, not an upward adjustment in the European policy end-point (Chart I-13). Chart I-13EUR/USD: All About Falling ##br##U.S. Terminal Rates EUR/USD: All About Falling U.S. Terminal Rates EUR/USD: All About Falling U.S. Terminal Rates Chart I-14Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced##br## Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 U.S terminal rates have fallen because the market doesn't believe the Fed's interest rate forecast, as core PCE has collapsed by nearly 45 basis points despite a U.S. economy at full employment. Meanwhile, long-term rate expectations in the euro area have remained flat because core inflation did not move much in the major euro area economies (Chart I-14). Going forward, the U.S. terminal rate is likely to move higher against that of the euro area. U.S. inflation is set to accelerate versus the euro area as financial conditions in Europe have tightened massively versus the U.S. since early 2016, a factor we have highlighted in the past.3 The strength in the U.S. economy is also considerable, and would argue that since the U.S. is more advanced in the business cycle than the euro area, this strength is more likely to generate inflationary pressures in the U.S. than in the euro area (Chart I-15). Moreover, U.S. tax cuts are looking increasingly likely in 2018, which will only add fuel to the U.S. fire. We continue to expect the Fed to follow its "dots," generating a policy outcome well in excess of what is currently priced into the OIS curve. If our base-case scenario for the Fed unfolds, for interest rate differentials to stay constant, the EONIA rate would need to be at 1% by the end of 2020 (Chart I-16). In our view, this is highly unlikely, and we expect rate differentials to move in favor of the USD. Chart I-15Europe Is Strong, ##br##But So Is The U.S. Europe Is Strong, But So Is The U.S. Europe Is Strong, But So Is The U.S. Chart I-16Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To ##br##Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver An EONIA rate of 1% by the end of 2020 will not only defy what the ECB is currently forecasting, it will also be the highest rates since Trichet committed his infamous 2011 policy mistake of hiking rates. In order for European rates to be that high by that date, global growth will have to still be stellar. If this is the case, U.S. rates are likely to be even higher than what the Fed dots are currently implying. This means that based on our expectations for global growth, U.S. inflation and European inflation, the most likely path for rate differentials is that they widen in favor of the U.S. as the Fed still is in a better position to increase rates than the ECB. This expected widening in spreads between the U.S. and the euro area will favor a move in EUR/USD toward 1.10 by the middle of 2018. An adverse move in EM liquidity conditions only adds credence to these dynamics as it will affect European growth more than it will affect U.S. growth. Moreover, safe-haven flows associated with EM weakness would only add to global demand for the USD. Bottom Line: EUR/USD rallied in line with changes in relative terminal rates in 2018. However, this did not reflect an upgrade to the expected terminal rate in the euro area; it mostly reflected a downgrade to the U.S. terminal rate. We do anticipate this downgrade in the expected U.S. terminal rate to reverse course, especially when compared to the euro area. U.S. growth will accelerate further and U.S. inflation will outpace that of the euro area. In an environment where the Fed hikes in line with its "dots," the EONIA rate will not be able to follow, which will put downward pressure on EUR/USD. GBP/USD: Divorce-Bill Rally? This week, the U.K. agreed that its share of liabilities to the EU is around EUR100 billion, which would mean a net payment of around EUR50 billion. The GBP rallied massively in response to this news as markets interpreted this as a sign that negotiations on future trade relationships would start. The pound is very cheap on a PPP basis, and is likely to generate attractive returns on a long-term time horizon. However, Brexit is far from being over. Nagging questions regarding the Irish border remain, and the EU clearly has the upper hand in the negotiations. Moreover, Brexit would hurt both British trade and British potential growth. While abandoning Brexit down the road would help the GBP, this would happen around much political turmoil and result in a likely Corbyn government. When we compare all these positives and negatives, at the current juncture, it is highly unlikely that GBP/USD and EUR/GBP will escape their post-June 2016 trading range. In the short term, EUR/GBP is likely to hit 0.84, and cable, 1.37. We would use moves to such levels to sell the pound on a tactical basis. A move below the post Brexit lows is also highly unlikely as long as the stalemate continues. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market", dated September 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off?", dated November 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Best Of Possible Worlds?", dated October 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was positive this week: Annualized GDP growth came in at 3.3%, above the expected 3.2%; The PCE price deflator grew at a 1.6% annual rate, above the expected 1.5%, while the core PCE deflator stayed in line with expectations at 1.4%; Initial jobless claims were lower than expected at 238,000; However, the dollar was only up against the CAD and the NZD, while down against all other G10 currencies as the nomination of Marvin Goodfriend as a member of the FOMC was interpreted as a potential dovish move by the markets. The U.S. 10-year yield was up 4 basis points on higher inflation expectations. U.S. growth is now beginning to outperform Germany's 3.2% annualized GDP growth which should help translate into higher inflation relative to the euro area next year, which will shift upside risk in the favor of the dollar. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 It's Not My Cross To Bear - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 European data was mixed: German CPI was strong, with the headline measure growing at 1.8%, and the harmonized index also at 1.8%; German retail sales contracted at an annual rate of 1.4%; The number of unemployed people in Germany declined by 18,000 yet the unemployment rate stayed flat at 5.6%; European unemployment decreased to 8.8% from 8.9%; Euro area inflation increased by less than expected at 1.5% on an annual basis. Despite this mixed data, the euro was up 0.6% against the dollar on Thursday. Certain European metrics such as Industrial Confidence are also at all-time highs, levels at which a reversal is increasingly likely. Robust U.S. growth and higher inflation could serve as an indicator that the tide is about to turn in the favor of the greenback as the Fed resumes its hiking cycle. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Temporary Short-Term Rates - November 10, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Nikkei Manufacturing PMI outperformed expectations, coming in at 53.8. Meanwhile, large retailers sales growth also outperformed expectations, coming at -0.7%. Nevertheless, this was a decline from last month's 1.9% expansion. Industrial production growth surprised to the downside, coming in at 5.9%. Finally housing starts also underperformed expectations, coming in at -4.8% and declining even more from last month's -2.9% reading. On Sunday, the BoJ unexpectedly shifted to a less dovish stance, as they hinted that their yield curve control program might be watered down next year. This change in rhetoric could limit the JPY's downside. In fact, the risk growing risk that EM carry trades could begin to crack down even raises the probability that a yen rally unfolds. In this environment trades like short AUD/JPY and short NZD/JPY would benefit greatly. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Temporary Short-Term Rates - November 10, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been negative Consumer credit underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.451 billion pounds, and declining from the previous month's number. Moreover, mortgage approvals also underperformed expectations, coming in at 64,575. This number was also decline from last month's reading. GBP/USD has appreciated by almost 1% this week, as the United Kingdom and the European Union seem to have agreed that the cost to the U.K. for leaving the EU will be 50 billion euro. Overall, it is unclear whether this breakthrough in the negotiations will be positive or negative for the pound, as many details are yet to be defined. We continue to be negative on cable on the short term, as we expect rate differentials to favor the U.S. over the U.K. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Data for Australia was mixed: Private sector credit grew at a 5.3% annual pace, albeit slower than the previous 5.4% figure; Building permits increased sharply by 18.4% annually; Private capital expenditure grew in line with expectations at 1%; Chinese Manufacturing PMI was strong, coming in at 51.8 - stronger than the previous 51.6 and the expected 51.4; Stronger Chinese data buoyed the AUD, however, the Aussie is still weighed down by low wages and a dovish RBA stance. The recent outperformance of the yen versus high carry currencies could be foreshadowing a growth-negative event, especially as Chinese authorities are tightening policy. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 On Tuesday, the RBNZ announced that they will ease mortgage lending restrictions, as it expects policies by the new government to dampen the housing market. After January 1st, banks will be allowed to provide more low-deposit home loans to owner occupiers. Moreover the down payment required to obtain a mortgage will also decline. This announcement by the RBNZ goes in line with our view that the new populist government, will curb immigration, and thus curb pressures in the kiwi economy. Overall we remain bearish on the NZD against the U.S. dollar and against the yen, as we expect global growth to slow down momentarily by the end of the year, as China continues to tighten monetary policy. However, we remain bearish on AUD/NZD as the AUD would suffer more than the NZD in this environment. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada was decent: Industrial product prices are growing at a 1% monthly pace, higher than the expected 0.5% pace; Raw materials Index increased by 3.8% in October, higher than the previous 0.2% contraction, pointing to higher inflation; The current account deficit grew to CAD -19.53 bn, better than the expected CAD -19.50 bn. However, the CAD has displayed some weakness recently following Governor Poloz's comments about financial stability within the economy. These fragilities mostly involve household debt and the housing market, which continue to be carefully monitored by the BoC. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Gross domestic Product growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2%. This measure also increased form a growth rate of 0.5% the previous quarter. Moreover, the KOF leading indicator also surprised to the upside, coming in at 110.3. Industrial production yearly growth also continued to increase, coming in at 5.5% However real retail sales growth underperformed expectations substantially, contracting at a 3% pace, after a 0.5% growth in September. EUR/CHF has appreciated by nearly 0.8% this week. Overall we continue to believe that Swiss inflation is still too weak for the SNB to stop intervening in the franc. We will continue to monitor the Swiss economy and global economy for inflationary pressures, to get an idea when the SNB might shift its monetary stance. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been negative: Retail sales growth underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.2%. Moreover Norway's credit indicator also underperformed coming in at 5.7%. USD/NOK has rallied by roughly 2% this week, as the NOK has experienced a dramatic sell off across the board. This sell off has been caused by the decline in oil prices that we have experienced this week. This is partly because positioning in oil seems to be over stretched, thus a tactical correction in oil prices is expected. Overall, regardless of the outlook for oil prices, we continue to be bullish on USD/NOK, as this cross will mostly trade on rate differentials between Norway and the U.S. rather than on oil prices. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Data out of Sweden was disappointing: Retail sales growth slowed to 0.1% monthly and 2.6% annually, compared to the expected 0.2% and 3.4% rates, respectively; The trade balance went into negative territory, coming in at SEK -3.1 bn, compared to the previous SEK 3.2 bn; Annual GDP growth in Q3 was only 2.9% compared to the expected 3.5%. The Q2 data point was also revised downwards from 4% to 2.7%. While quarterly growth was in line with expectations at 0.8%, it still weakened from the previous quarterly growth of 1.2% - which was also revised down from 1.7%. The Riksbank will take these data points into account in their next meeting in two weeks and is likely to stay dovish especially as Stefan Ingves has been re-appointed as governor, adding downward pressure on the krona against the dollar. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Dear Client, In this report, we image a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. The events described in the report correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature I. The Blow-Off Phase December 4, 2017: U.S. stocks fall by 1.7% on reports that Mitch McConnell does not have enough votes to get the tax bill through the Senate. A sell-off in high-yield markets and a tightening of financial conditions in China aggravate the situation. December 13, 2017: The Fed hikes rates by 25 basis points, taking the Fed funds target range to 1.25%-to-1.5%. December 14, 2017: Global equities continue to weaken. The S&P 500 suffers its first 5% correction since June 2016. December 15, 2017: The correction ends on news that the Senate will consider a revised bill which trims the size of corporate tax cuts and uses the savings to finance a temporary reduction in payroll taxes. President Trump and House leaders promise to go along with the proposal. The PBoC also injects fresh liquidity into the Chinese financial system. December 29, 2017: Global equities rally into year-end. The S&P 500 hits 2571 on December 29, placing it just shy of its November high. The dollar also strengthens, with EUR/USD closing at 1.162. The 10-year Treasury yield finishes the year at 2.42%. January 10, 2018: The global cyclical bull market in stocks continues. European and Japanese indices power higher. Both the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 hit fresh record highs. EM stocks move up but lag their DM peers, weighed down by a stronger dollar. January 12, 2018: U.S. retail sales surprise on the upside. Department store stocks, having been written off for dead just a few months earlier, end up rising by an average of 40% between November 2017 and the end of January. February 14, 2018: The euro area economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. Nevertheless, inflation stays muted due to high levels of spare capacity across most of the region and the lagged effects of a stronger euro. The 2-year OIS spread between the U.S. and the euro area widens to a multi-year high. February 26, 2018: China's construction sector cools a notch, but industrial activity remains robust, spurred on by a cheap currency, strong global growth, and rising producer prices. Chinese H-shares rise 13% year-to-date, beating out most other EM equity indices. March 14, 2018: The U.S., Canada, and Mexico reach a last-minute deal to preserve NAFTA. The Canadian dollar and Mexican peso breathe a sigh of relief. March 16, 2018: In a surprise decision, Donald Trump nominates Kevin Hassett as Fed vice-chair. Trump cites the "tremendous job" Hassett did in selling the GOP's tax cuts. A number of Fed appointments follow. Most of the picks turn out to be more hawkish than investors had expected. This gives the greenback further support. March 18, 2018: Pro-EU parties do better than anticipated in the Italian elections. Italian bond spreads compress versus the rest of Europe. March 21, 2018: The Fed raises rates again, bringing the fed funds target range up to 1.50%-to-1.75%. April 8, 2018: Bank of Japan governor Kuroda is granted another term in office. He pledges to remain single-mindedly focused on eradicating deflation. April 11, 2018: Chinese core CPI inflation reaches 2.9%. Producer price inflation stays elevated at 6%. A major market theme in 2018 turns out to be how China went from being a source of global deflationary pressures to a source of inflationary ones. April 30, 2018: U.S. core PCE inflation jumps 0.3% in March, reaching 1.7% on a year-over-year basis. Goods and service inflation both pick up, while the base effects from lower cell phone data charges in the prior year drop out of the calculations. May 17, 2018: Oil prices continue to rise on the back of ongoing discipline from OPEC and Russia, smaller-than-expected shale output growth, and production disruptions in Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. June 13, 2018: Strong U.S. growth in the first half of the year, a larger-than-projected decline in the unemployment rate, and higher inflation keep the Fed in tightening mode. The FOMC hikes rates again. June 25, 2018: Global capital spending accelerates further. Global industrial stocks go on to have a banner year. June 27, 2018: Wage growth in the U.S. accelerates to a cycle high. Donald Trump takes credit, stating that "this wouldn't have happened" without him or his tax cuts. July 31, 2018: The Japanese labor market tightens further. The unemployment rate falls to 2.6%, 1.2 percentage points below 2007 levels, while the ratio of job vacancies-to-applicants moves further above its early-1990s bubble high. A number of high-profile companies announce plans to raise wages. August 2, 2018: A brief summer sell-off sees global equities dip temporarily, but strong global earnings growth keeps the cyclical bull market in stocks intact. August 28, 2018: The London housing market continues to weaken, with home prices falling by 9% from their peak. The rest of the U.K. economy remains fairly resilient, however. EUR/GBP closes at 0.87. August 31, 2018: The Greek bailout program ends and a new one begins. Greece's economy continues to recover, but Tsipras fails to obtain debt relief from creditors. September 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to a 49-year low of 3.7%, nearly a full percentage below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. September 26, 2018: The Fed raises rates again. By now, the market has gone from pricing in only two hikes for 2018 at the start of the year to pricing in almost four. September 27, 2018: Profit growth in the U.S. moderates somewhat as higher wage costs take a bite out of earnings. Nevertheless, stock market sentiment remains buoyant. Retail participation, which had been dormant for years, takes off. CNBC sees a surge in viewers. Micro cap stocks go wild. October 7, 2018: The outcome of Brazil's elections shows little appetite for major structural reforms. Economic populism lives on. October 31, 2018: Realized inflation and inflation expectations continue grinding higher in Japan, triggering market speculation that the BoJ will abandon its yield-curve targeting policy. The resulting rally in the yen is short-lived, however. At its monetary policy meeting, the Bank of Japan indicates that it has no near-term plans to modify its existing strategy. November 6, 2018: The Democrats narrowly regain control of the House but fail to recapture the Senate. Investors shrug off the results, figuring correctly that a Republican Senate will keep Trump's corporate tax cuts in place and that Democrats will agree to extend the expiring payroll tax cut and other tax measures that benefit the middle class. December 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to 3.5%. Donald Trump tweets "You're welcome, America". December 19, 2018: The Fed raises rates for the fourth time that year - one more hike than it had signaled in its December 2017 "dot plot" - taking the fed funds target range to 2.25%-2.5%. December 31, 2018: The MSCI All-Country Index finishes up 12% for the year (in local-currency terms), led by the euro area and Japan. U.S. stocks gain 8%. EM equities manage to rise 6%. Small caps edge out large caps, value stocks beat growth stocks, and cyclical stocks outperform defensives. December 31, 2018: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finishes the year at 3.05%. German bund yields reach 0.82%, U.K. gilt yields rise to 1.7%, Canadian yields hit 2.3%, and Australian yields back up to 3%. Japanese 10-year yields remain broadly flat, but the 20-year yield moves up 40 basis points to nearly 1%. Credit spreads finish the year close to where they started, providing a modest carry pick-up over high-quality government bonds. December 31, 2018: The DXY index rises 4% to 98. EUR/USD closes at 1.11, USD/JPY at 123, GBP/USD at 1.31, and AUD/USD at 0.76. The Canadian dollar manages to edge up against the greenback on the year, with CAD/USD finishing at 0.81. The Chinese yuan also strengthens to 6.4 versus the dollar. December 31, 2018: Brent and WTI spot prices finish the year at $65 and $63, respectively. Copper and metal prices are broadly flat for the year, having faced the dueling forces of a stronger dollar (a negative) and above-trend global growth (a positive). Gold sinks to $1,226. II. The Clouds Darken February 22, 2019: The global economy starts to decelerate. The slowdown is led by China, where the government's crackdown on shadow banking activities begins to take a bigger toll on growth. Most measures of U.S. economic activity also soften somewhat in the first two months of the year. Investors take heart in the hope that the economy will achieve a soft landing, allowing the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. February 27, 2019: In an otherwise mundane day, the S&P 500 edges up 0.3% to 2832. Little do investors know that this marks the cyclical peak in the U.S. stock market. March 13, 2019: Hopes that the Fed can take its foot off the brake are dashed when the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that inflation rose by more than expected in February. U.S. core CPI inflation increases to 2.9% while the core PCE deflator accelerates to 2.4%. Market chatter turns from whether the Fed can slow the pace of rate hikes to whether it needs to start hiking more rapidly than once-per-quarter. The S&P falls 2.1% on the day. March 20, 2019: The Fed lifts the funds rate target range to 2.5%-to-2.75% and signals a readiness to keep hiking rates. The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.3%. EUR/USD sinks to 1.08. The first quarter of 2019 marks a watershed of sorts. In 2018, the Fed raised rates because of stronger growth; in 2019, it kept raising them because of brewing inflation. As it turned out, risk assets were able to tolerate the former, but not the latter. March 29, 2019: The U.K. does not leave the EU two years after Britain invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU votes to prolong negotiations given growing political support within Britain for the country to remain part of the European bloc. April 5, 2019: The S&P 500 sinks further and is now 10% below its February high, returning close to where it was at the start of 2018. The increasingly sour mood on Wall Street does not appear to be hurting Main Street very much, however. The U.S. unemployment rate edges down further to 3.4%. Euro area growth remains resilient. May 31, 2019: The Brazilian government announces that the fiscal deficit will come in larger than originally expected. USD/BRL slips to 3.45. June 4, 2019: Jens Weidmann, who had gone out of his way to soften his hawkish rhetoric over the preceding months, is chosen to succeed Mario Draghi, whose term expires in October. Nevertheless, the euro still strengthens on the news. June 6, 2019: Markets temporarily regain their composure. The S&P 500 gets back to within 4% of its all-time high. The reprieve does not last long, however. June 12, 2019: The Fed hikes rates, taking the fed funds target range to 2.75%-to-3%. The FOMC cites inflation as its primary concern. July 8, 2019: Global risk assets weaken anew as a fiscal crisis grips Brazil. Turkey, South Africa, and a number of other emerging markets show increasing signs of fragility. August 20, 2019: Korean exports, a leading indicator of the global business cycle, decelerate once again. Global PMIs sag, as do most measures of business confidence. September 25, 2019: Despite a slowing U.S. economy, the Fed hikes rates again, bringing the fed funds target range to 3%-to-3.25%. The FOMC justifies the decision based on the fact that the unemployment rate is below NAIRU, core inflation is above the Fed's 2% target, and real rates are less than 1%. To assuage markets, Jay Powell suggests that the Fed could keep rates on hold in December. This turns out to be more prescient than he realizes. It will be another three years before the Fed raises rates again. By then, Powell is no longer the Fed chair. September 30, 2019: Commodity prices tumble, further adding to the pressure facing emerging markets. The U.S. yield curve inverts for the first time during this business cycle. The dollar, which previously strengthened due to a hawkish Fed, now starts strengthening on flight-to-safety flows back into the U.S. The yen appreciates even more than the greenback. October 15, 2019: The bottom falls out of the Canadian housing market. Home sales dry up and prices begin to sink. The Canadian dollar, which peaked back in February at 83 cents, falls to 74 cents against the U.S. dollar. October 19, 2019: A failed North Korean launch lands a missile 80 kilometres from Japanese shores. Prime Minister Abe pledges swift retaliation. October 21, 2019: The negative feedback loop between a rising dollar, falling commodity prices, and EM stress intensifies. Sentiment towards emerging markets deteriorates dramatically. Rumours begin to swirl that Brazil will miss a debt payment. October 23, 2019: Trump tweets "Dopey Rocketman thinks he is so smart, but we know where all his hideouts are. Sweet dreams!" October 24, 2019: News reports are abuzz about a massive buildup of troops on the North Korean side of the border. Panic grips Seoul. Asian bourses sell-off, taking global stock markets down with them. III. The Reckoning October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights In this report we use a statistical approach to test the ability of a broad array of macro data series to reliably predict the Chinese business cycle. Out of 40 series that we examined, only 6 passed our test criteria. All 6 of these series are measures of money & credit, supporting the view that money growth deserves to be closely watched as an indicator for the Chinese economy. A composite leading indicator of the 6 "passing" series suggests that the Chinese economy will continue to slow over the coming months, but in a benign, controlled fashion. Investors should stay overweight investable Chinese stocks in US$ terms, versus both the EM and global equity benchmark. Feature Over the past two months we have significantly heightened our focus on the cyclical condition of China's economy. We presented our framework for tracking the end of China's mini-cycle in our October 12 Weekly Report,1 and recently followed up with a two-part report that examined the key differences facing China today from what prevailed in mid-2015, when the economy operated below what investors and market participants considered to be a "stable" pace of growth.2 All of these reports have been anchored by our view that China's economy suffered from a "double whammy" in 2015; a weak external demand environment and overly tight monetary conditions. In this report, we take a different approach to gauging the slowdown in China's economy by testing a wide range of commonly-watched macro data series for signs that they reliably lead economic activity. While our criteria for testing these series in our "data lab" are statistical in nature, they are not overly difficult for investors to grasp, and they help provide an empirical basis for understanding what data are relevant in predicting the direction and magnitude of China's economic growth trend. The conclusions of our study are revealing, in that they strongly point to measures of money & credit as the most reliable predictors of the Chinese economy since 2010. While a composite leading indicator of these predictors suggests that the Chinese economy will continue to slow over the coming months, the pace and magnitude of the decline are both consistent with our view that China will experience a benign, controlled deceleration. A Brief Methodological Overview Below we provide a brief overview of our approach, by addressing three key questions: what are we trying to predict, what series do we use as predictors, and how do we judge what series are "useful" in explaining the Chinese business cycle? What are we trying to predict? We use the Li Keqiang Index (LKI) as a proxy for the Chinese business cycle in this report, for three reasons (described below): Despite the potential to eventually become a consumer-oriented society, the Chinese economy remains highly geared to investment (and the industrial sector more generally). Investors are very familiar with the LKI, ever since a 2007 U.S. diplomatic cable (leaked in late-2010) quoted Li, then Communist Party Secretary of Liaoning, as saying to U.S. Ambassador Randt that China's GDP figures are "man-made" and unreliable. Li's focus on electricity consumption, rail cargo volume, and bank loans have since become a standard metric for China analysts to track. More importantly, however, we use the LKI as a proxy because it continues to provide important information about the Chinese economy: Chart 1 shows that it correlates well with the growth in earnings for the MSCI China index ex technology, and Chart 2 highlights that it also leads China's nominal import growth. As such, the index is particularly relevant for global investors, who are most concerned with China's investible stock performance and the country's impact on global exports. What series were used in our approach? Chart 1The Li Keqiang Index Predicts Investable EPS... The Li Keqiang Index Predicts Investable EPS... The Li Keqiang Index Predicts Investable EPS... Chart 2...And Nominal Import Growth ...And Nominal Import Growth ...And Nominal Import Growth In order to test the predictability of China's business cycle, we compiled a list of 40 highly-tracked macroeconomic variables (presented in Table 1) and grouped them into six distinct categories: Economy-wide measures, such as composite LEIs and models of GDP growth Measures related to investment and the corporate sector, such as PMIs, fixed-asset investment, and industrial production Variables related to the consumer sector, such consumer confidence, retail sales, and the employment component of the official PMIs Housing indicators, such as house price indexes and residential floor space sold Government spending, and A variety of money, credit, and financial conditions measures Table 1List Of Macroeconomic Data Series Included In Our Study The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle As part of this analysis, all series, including the LKI, were smoothed with a 3-month moving average. Government spending was the exception, which was smoothed with a 6-month average. How do we judge which series help predict the business cycle? Using a sample of January 2010 to September 2017, we test whether any of these measures can reliably predict the LKI using two statistical concepts: a lead/lag correlation profile, and the Granger causality test. A summary of these concepts is presented below: Lead/Lag Correlation Profile: While most investors are quite familiar with the Pearson correlation coefficient, in this report we present it in a unique way. For each variable, we calculate the correlation between the Li Keqiang index and leading and lagged values of the variable, to create a series of correlations which we present as a function of time. Variables that reliably lead the LKI should have a higher correlation with future values of the LKI, and vice versa. Chart 3 presents the ideal correlation profile for a predictor of the LKI (which we will use as a reference point), given that it illustrates the correlation profile of the LKI with itself in six-months. Granger Causality Test: While somewhat technical, the concept of Granger causality is fairly simple and is similar to the correlation profile presented above. The logic of the test is that if one variable predicts another, lagged values of the predictor should help explain the dependent variable in a regression model. Granger causality simply takes the extra step of controlling for the possibility that the dependent variable predicts itself, by including lagged values of itself in the regression. Our criteria for a good leading indicator for the LKI is thus: A correlation profile that leads rather than lags (i.e., a profile that peaks in advance of t=0, like that shown in Chart 3) A relatively strong correlation profile, defined as a peak correlation coefficient that exceeds 0.5 A causality test result that suggests the indicator "Granger-causes" the LKI. Chart 3The Best Profile Will Look Like The Correlation Of The LKI With Future Values Of Itself The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Importance Of Money & Credit: Results From The "Data Lab" Chart 4 presents the average correlation profiles for the six data categories described above, alongside the "ideal" profile. Individual correlation profiles for all 40 of the underlying macro series used in this report are available in Appendix I. Chart 4Measures Of Money & Credit Are ##br##The Best Predictors Of The LKI The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The chart presents several important conclusions: First, it highlights that while economy-wide measures and those related to investment and the corporate sector have tended to have a high correlation with the LKI, their correlation profiles lag rather than lead. In other words, the LKI tends to predict these variables, not the other way around. The Markit/Caixin and NBS manufacturing PMIs stand out as notable exceptions to this conclusion. Second, variables related to both consumer spending and government expenditure appear to have little ability to predict the Chinese business cycle as defined in this report. In fact, in the case of government spending, the evidence points to the fact that the LKI reliably leads expenditure by approximately a year, which suggests that fiscal policy in China is responsive and countercyclical (but not leading). Third, measures of money and credit, and housing indicators to a lesser degree, appear to fulfill the first two of our criteria for a good leading indicator of the LKI. Both profiles peak in advance of t=0, and at least in the case of money & credit, have a decently strong relationship. To test the third criterion listed above, we selected all of the individual macro series that passed the correlation profile test and subjected them to a Granger causality test. Table 2 presents the variables that were selected as well as the results of the test, expressed as a probability that the variable in question "Granger-causes" the LKI, and vice versa. Of the 12 variables that were selected, Table 2 highlights that only 6 passed, all of which belong to the money & credit category. This is noteworthy, especially given the focus of many investors on the private and official manufacturing PMIs. Among these 6 remaining variables, the relative strength of the probabilities shown in columns 3 and 4 suggest that monetary conditions and the Bloomberg China Credit Impulse Index (the flow of adjusted total social financing expressed as a percent of GDP) appear to be the most reliable, with money measures being the least. Table 2Granger Causality Test Results For Select Macro Series The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Still, our results show that it is more accurate to state that money supply measures "cause" the LKI than vice versa, supporting the view that money growth deserves to be closely watched as an indicator for the Chinese economy. Investment Implications Chart 5 presents a composite leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index based on the six variables presented above. The indicator is advanced by 4 months, and currently suggests that the LKI will end up retracing about 50% of its late-2015 to early-2017 rise. For now, this is consistent with our view that the Chinese economy will experience a benign, controlled deceleration. An additional factor that strengthens our conviction in this view is the fact that the weakest components of the indicator on a YoY basis, M2 and M3 (as defined by our Emerging Markets Strategy service), have been growing more rapidly over the past three months (Chart 6). Chart 5Our Composite LKI Indicator Suggests ##br##A Benign Slowdown In Growth Our Composite LKI Indicator Suggests A Benign Slowdown In Growth Our Composite LKI Indicator Suggests A Benign Slowdown In Growth Chart 6Money Supply Growth ##br##Has Recently Rebounded Money Supply Growth Has Recently Rebounded Money Supply Growth Has Recently Rebounded Given this economic outlook, our view is that investors should remain overweight Chinese investible stocks relative to the EM and global benchmarks. The first factor in favor of an allocation towards China is its tech sector weight; 42% of the index is made up of technology stocks, versus 29% and 19% in the EM and global benchmarks. While China's tech sector has already massively outperformed this year, Chart 7 highlights that it is a clear domestic/consumer play and thus unlikely to underperform significantly over the coming year. Chart 7Chinese Tech Companies ##br##Are A Domestic Play Chinese Tech Companies Are A Domestic Play Chinese Tech Companies Are A Domestic Play Excluding technology, we noted in our November 9 Weekly Report3 that while a deceleration in the LKI would weigh on the earnings growth of ex-tech investable stocks, we also expect earnings growth to moderate in the developed world. However, this ambiguous ex-tech relative earnings outlook is buttressed by the fact that Chinese ex-tech stocks are extremely undervalued compared to their global peers, a valuation gap that we believe will lessen if the end of China's recent mini-cycle is truly benign. Bottom Line: A broad test of China's macro data suggests that several money & credit measures have been the best predictors of the Chinese business cycle since early-2010. While these measures suggest that Chinese economic activity is set to decelerate even further, a return to 2015-like conditions does not appear to be likely. Investors should stay overweight Chinese investable stocks in US$ terms, versus both the EM and global equity benchmark. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, and "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part II): Monetary Policy", dated November 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part II): Monetary Policy", dated November 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix I Li Keqiang Lead/Lag Correlation Profile For All Variables In Our Study Chart A1 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A2 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A3 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A4 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A5 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A6 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A7 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Chart A8 The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Agricultural markets are informationally efficient for the most part, which is to say that at any given time, prices already reflect most public information available to traders, and a lot of private information as well. Even so, we believe markets are underestimating the Fed's resolve in normalizing interest-rate policy next year - particularly when it comes to the number of rate hikes we are likely to see - and thus are underestimating the likelihood of lower grain prices in 2018. Energy: Overweight. Oil markets will emerge from their suspended animation following OPEC 2.0's Vienna meeting today. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in May, July and December 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 50.2%. Our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI trade anticipating steepening backwardation is up 13.3%. Base Metals: Neutral. China's refined zinc imports were up 145% yoy to 61,355 MT in October, based on customs data. Metal Bulletin noted tight domestic supplies accounted for the increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is breaking away from its attachment to $1,280/oz., as the USD weakens. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 5.2% since inception May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Global financial conditions will become increasingly important to grain prices going forward, a trend we explore below. Feature Record output and ending stocks will ensure that ag markets remain well supplied globally next year. While we see risks as balanced in the upcoming year, and remain neutral ags generally, we believe markets are underestimating the Fed's resolve when it comes to normalizing interest rates, and thus underestimate upside USD potential. This means the likelihood of lower grain prices also is being underestimated. Weather will add volatility to the mix, as well. We believe the fundamentals supporting the assessment of record output and season-ending stocks-to-use ratios are fully reflected in prices. However, financial conditions - particularly USD strength next year - are not being fully priced by markets. This makes grains, in particular, vulnerable to the downside. Financial conditions driving ag markets: Fed policy & real rates: we expect U.S. financial conditions to tighten, and for the Fed to hike rates once more this year, and up to three more times in 2018.1 FX rates: With higher U.S. policy rates next year, the USD is likely to strengthen. This will weaken grain prices generally. Wheat, in particular, is most vulnerable to a strengthening USD and a weakening of the currencies of some of the commodity's top exporters - the European Union, Russia, and Australia. We've narrowed down the fundamental factors to look out for in 2018 as follows: Strong demand amid an extension of supply cuts by the OPEC 2.0 coalition will support oil prices in 2018. Higher energy prices will increase profit-margin pressure in ag markets through input and shipping costs. Weather risks from La Nina threaten to curb yields this winter, especially in Argentina and Brazil, which will add volatility to prices. Policy shifts in Argentina, China, and Brazil will influence farmers' planting decisions in the upcoming crop year. A Look Back At 2017 Chart of the WeekGrains Outperformed Softs This Year Grains Outperformed Softs This Year Grains Outperformed Softs This Year As predicted in our 2017 outlook, grains reversed their 2016 underperformance vis-à-vis softs this year, and outperformed them.2 While prices for sugar, coffee, and cotton were up 28%, 8%, and 12% in 2016, they have since declined by 21%, 8%, and 2%, respectively. In fact, sugar - our top ag in 2016 - took the biggest hit this year (Chart of the Week). On the other hand, as a complex, grains currently stand at largely the same level as the beginning of last year. However, there are some idiosyncrasies within the class. The two worst performing grains last year - rice and wheat - have been the strongest performers so far this year. Rice rallied 30% year-to-date (ytd) on the back of tighter supplies, completely reversing its 19% decline in 2016. Similarly, wheat, which lost 13% of its value last year, is up a modest 3% ytd. On the other hand, soybeans surrendered its title as the most profitable grain in 2016. After gaining 14% last year, its fate turned and it fell 3% ytd. Finally, out of the lot, corn is the only ag we cover that has fallen in both years consecutively, by a minor 1.9% in 2016, and an additional 4.4% so far this year. A Recap Of Long Term Trends According to the International Grains Council's November estimates, grains production is projected to come down this crop year. With an increase in consumption, this will ultimately lead to a 5.2% decline in ending stocks - the first drawdown in five years. Despite the year-on-year (y-o-y) decline, grain inventories are expected to stand at their second highest level on record (Table 1). Table 1Grain Production Down While Consumption Inches Higher Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 The decline in expected grain ending stocks is mainly driven by corn, which - despite a large upwards revision to U.S. yields in the most recent WASDE - is expected to experience a 3.6% decline in production. This, together with a boost in consumption, leads to a 13.6% fall in ending stocks - the first drawdown since the 2010/11 crop year. The decline in corn expectations reflects a shift in the planting preferences of some of the major producers. The U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China are the top soybean and corn exporters - accounting for 78% and 49% of global soybean and corn area harvested in the 2016/17 crop year, respectively. What is significant in the current cycle is that farmers in these countries are moving away from planting corn and towards more soybeans (Chart 2). China, which accounted for 19% of global corn area harvested and 6% of global soybean area harvested in 2016/17, is leading this change. While corn area harvested fell by an average 4.2% in the 2015 and 2016 crop years, soybean area harvested gained 9.8% during that period. Similarly, in Brazil, which accounted for 10% and 28% of global corn and soybean area harvested in 2016/17, respectively, corn area harvested by farmers has been growing at a much slower rate than soybean area harvested, with the former expanding by 16.4% and the latter by 39.6% since 2010/11. Likewise, harvested area in the U.S., which accounted for 18% and 29% of global corn and soybean area harvested, respectively, shrunk by 0.9% in the case of corn, and expanded by 21.3% in the case of soybeans since 2010/11. The exception to this rule is Argentina. Argentine farmland accounted for 3% and 15% of global corn and soybean area harvested in 2016/17, respectively. Since 2010/11, both corn area harvested as well as soybean area harvested increased by roughly the same level - 1.6 Mn Ha for the former and 1.5 Mn Ha for the latter - representing a 44.4% and 8.6% increase in area harvested for corn and soybeans, respectively. However, this is due to export policies, which in effect, encourage corn production over soybeans. As we discuss below, soybean export tariffs will be phased out in the coming years, likely changing the incentives structure for Argentine farmers. This trend is mirrored in production data, with global soybean output gaining 32% since 2010/11, compared to a 25% increase in global corn production. However, this shift is in large part due to demand patterns which also favor soybeans to corn. Over the same period, global soybean consumption increased by 36%, compared to 24% in the case of corn (Chart 3). Chart 2Farmers Favor Soybeans Over Corn... Farmers Favor Soybeans Over Corn... Farmers Favor Soybeans Over Corn... Chart 3...As Do Consumers ...As Do Consumers ...As Do Consumers In fact, at 28%, global soybean stock-to-use ratios are significantly more elevated than that of corn, which stand at 19%. Furthermore, while soybeans are expected to record a 3.9mm MT surplus by the end of the current crop year, corn is projected to experience a 17.7mm MT deficit. Powell's Fed And Dollar Movements Our modelling of ags reveals that U.S. financial factors are important determinants of agriculture commodity price developments.3 Fed policy decisions and their impact on real rates have a direct effect on ag commodity prices, as well as an indirect effect through the exchange rate channel (Chart 4). Chart 4Fed Policy Drives Ag Markets Fed Policy Drives Ag Markets Fed Policy Drives Ag Markets While U.S. inflation has remained stubbornly low, forcing the Fed to slow down their interest rate normalization process, the anticipation - and eventual acceleration - of the Fed tightening cycle will weigh on ag prices. However, thanks in part to softer-than-expected inflation readings coming out of the U.S. this year, the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) has weakened by 6.8% since the beginning of the year. In terms of the impact of real rates, monetary policy impacts agriculture markets through the following channels: The Fed's interest-rate normalization process will, all else equal, increase borrowing costs for farmers, and discourage investments in general - impacting both agricultural investments as well as outlays in research and development. Tighter credit also leads to a slowdown in growth which - ceteris paribus - depresses consumption and demand for goods and services generally, and agricultural commodities specifically. Finally, real rates have an indirect effect on agricultural commodity prices through its effect on the U.S. dollar. Higher U.S. rates encourage investment in U.S. bonds and entail a strengthening of the U.S. dollar making U.S. exports less competitive vis-à-vis those of its international competitors. Since commodities are priced in U.S. dollars while costs are priced in local currencies, a weakening of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the dollar would increase profitability for farmers selling in international markets. This can incentivize farmers to plant more, despite depressed global ag prices, which increases supply. As our modelling reveals, the net effect is an inverse relationship, whereby easier monetary policy is generally more favorable for agriculture markets. The Fed Will Remain Behind The Inflation Curve Our U.S. Bond Strategy team expects the Fed to remain behind inflation, in which case the USD will remain weak in the beginning of next year. The 2/10 Treasury curve is flat highlighting the market's belief that the Fed will continue with interest rate normalization despite below target levels of inflation.4 Since this would be a huge error on the part of new Chairman Powell, our U.S. bond strategists believe that the Fed will avoid such a policy mistake. Consequently, if inflation does not pick up soon, the Fed will be forced to turn dovish. In any case, U.S. monetary policy will "fall behind the curve." This means that the U.S. dollar will remain weak until inflation starts to tick higher, and the Fed can resume its interest rate normalization process. In fact, our bond strategists find that there is a resemblance between the current cycle and that of the late 1990s where the unemployment rate significantly undershot its natural level before inflation started to accelerate. Thus, they find it significant that most of the indicators that predicted the 1999 increase in inflation are now positive. This reinforces our faith that inflation will soon rebound, allowing the Fed to fall behind the curve and simultaneously hike rates at a pace of one more hike this year, and three more in 2018.5 In terms of the future path of the U.S. dollar, our foreign exchange strategists argue interest rate differentials will be a more significant determinant of dollar dynamics going forward. They expect inflation will start its ascent sometime before the end of 1H2018, which would lift the interest rate curve and the dollar. Our expectation is that inflation will bottom towards the end of this year/beginning of next, giving room for the Fed to proceed with its anticipated rate-hiking cycle, resulting in two to three hikes next year. Markets are pricing one to two rate hikes next year, which means our out-of-consensus rates call could cause the USD to rally far more than what markets have priced in to the USD TWIB. Following a 4.4% appreciation in trade weighted terms in 2016, the U.S. dollar has depreciated by 6.8% so far this year. The U.S. accounts for a larger share of global exports of corn and soybeans than rice and wheat, which means a strengthening of the USD TWIB will likely have a bigger impact on wheat and rice, in which the U.S. faces greater international competition for market share (Table 2). Table 2Wheat & Rice Vulnerable To USD Dynamics Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 This is, in fact, in line with the price behavior that we have observed. Wheat and rice prices fell the most in 2016 as the U.S. dollar appreciated, and have outperformed soybeans and corn so far this year, as the U.S. dollar depreciated. Thus, in the absence of supply shocks that affect a particular grain, changes in the U.S. dollar going forward will have a greater impact on rice and wheat than on corn and soybeans. Keep An Eye On The Brazilian Real Of the major ag exporters, Brazil is most vulnerable to USD depreciation risk. Poor productivity trends have made our foreign exchange strategists single out the Brazilian Real (BRL) as one of the most expensive currencies they track. While they expect the BRL to depreciate over a one- to two-year horizon, the current strength in EM asset prices means that the BRL is likely to remain at its current level in the near term. However, given that the BRL provides an high carry, it will likely move sideways until U.S. interest rate expectations adjust to a rebound in inflation - which we expect toward the end of this year, or beginning of next. Brazil is a major ag producer - making up 45%, 44%, 27%, 23% and 12% share of the global export pies for soybeans, sugar, coffee, corn and cotton, respectively. Thus, a weaker BRL vis-à-vis the USD is a major downside risk to these commodity prices. Downside FX Risks Will Keep Wheat Prices Depressed Chart 5Downside FX Risks For Wheat Exporters Downside FX Risks For Wheat Exporters Downside FX Risks For Wheat Exporters In addition to the risks from an overvalued BRL, our foreign exchange strategists have highlighted the EUR, RUB, and AUD as currencies that are at risk of falling back to their fair value in the near term. Given that these regions are major wheat exporters, this would weigh on the grain's price as exports increase (Chart 5).6 On the back of expectations that the European Central Bank will adopt a significantly less aggressive monetary policy than the Fed, our foreign exchange strategists expect the EUR to weaken toward the end of the year and beginning of next. Given that Europe is a major wheat exporter - making up ~20% of global exports - a weaker EUR would make European wheat more attractive, weighing on prices in 2018. The currencies of other major exporters could be drawn in different directions in the near term. Our FX strategists see the Russian Rouble (RUB) as overvalued and at risk of weakening when U.S. inflation starts accelerating late this year or early next. However, higher oil prices would push up the ruble's fair value, correcting some of its overvaluation. As with the EUR, the wheat market is most vulnerable to a weaker RUB since Russia accounts for 14% of global wheat exports. Likewise, Australia - another major wheat exporter which accounts for 10% of world exports - has been identified as having an expensive currency. It is at risk of a depreciation over the next 24 months, but could rally if iron ore markets turn higher. Some Additional (Potential) Fundamental Forces Among the news and noise in the ags sphere, we see higher oil prices and La Nina as the most significant near-term risks to current supply/demand dynamics. Longer term, shifting policies in China, Argentina, and Brazil will become more relevant in determining the trajectory of ag markets. Our Out-Of-Consensus Call On Oil Is Bullish For Ags Chart 6Higher Energy Prices Upside Risk Higher Energy Prices Upside Risk Higher Energy Prices Upside Risk We expect oil prices will tread higher next year - averaging $65/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - on the back of stronger demand and an extension of the OPEC 2.0 coalition's supply restrictions.7 This will support ag commodity prices. Higher oil prices affect ags by increasing input costs and global shipping prices. In addition, the supply of ocean-going transport for grains is tight. The Baltic Dry index, a measure of the global cost of shipping dry goods, and has been on the uptrend this year, as freight costs have more than doubled since mid-February, mostly on the back of a slowdown in shipping transportation supply (Chart 6). La Nina: A Literal Tailwind? Against a backdrop of falling stocks-to-use ratios in the corn and soybean markets, weather will add volatility to prices into 1H2018. In the near term La Nina, which is predicted to continue through the 2017-18 Northern Hemisphere winter, threatens to curb agricultural output. This phenomenon affects weather and rainfall, causing floods and droughts, by cooling the Pacific Ocean. Australia's Bureau of Meteorology recently pegged the chance of a La Nina at 70%, expecting it to last from December to at least February. However, this season's La Nina is forecast to be weak and weather conditions are expected to neutralize in 1Q2018.8 In the case of ags, the greatest threat from La Nina is the risk of droughts in Brazil and Argentina which could hurt the regions soybean, corn, sugar, and cotton harvests. Furthermore, excess rainfall in Australia and Colombia threaten wheat, cotton, and sugar yields in the former and coffee output in the latter. Furthermore, the weather phenomenon raises chances of a potential drought in the U.S. Midwest.9 However, it is noteworthy that by the time La Nina hits, much of the harvest in the Northern Hemisphere will have been completed. So the main risk will be to harvests in the Southern Hemisphere. Gradualismo In Argentina, Stockpiling In China, And Ethanol In Brazil 1. Since taking office late 2015, Argentine President Mauricio Macri has reversed his predecessor's unfavorable agricultural policies - allowing the Argentine peso to float, and eliminating export taxes on wheat and corn. Marci's Gradualismo reforms have been successful - incentivizing plantings and leading to record harvests (Chart 7). While a 30% export tax remains on soybeans - Argentina's main cash crop - it is down from 35% under the presidency of Macri's predecessor. Further cuts to soybean export taxes have been delayed in order to finance the country's fiscal deficit, however they are expected to resume next year with a 0.5pp reduction/month for the next two years. This would stimulate soybean plantings, if it materializes. Argentine farmers produce 18% of global soybean output, and account for 9% of global soybean exports. The change in export policy, as it unfolds, will thus weigh on soybean prices as Argentine farmers increase their soybean acreage in the coming crop years. 2. Although we will likely get more clarity regarding Chinese ag policies with the release of China's Number 1 Central document - which for the past 14 years has focused on agriculture - in February, we expect Beijing to continue incentivizing soybean farming over corn. China's soybean inventory levels stand significantly lower than its notoriously massive stocks of corn, wheat, and cotton (Chart 8). Chart 7Argentine Reforms Will Raise Soybean Exports Argentine Reforms Will Raise Soybean Exports Argentine Reforms Will Raise Soybean Exports Chart 8China's Soybean Stocks Are Relatively Low China's Soybean Stocks Are Relatively Low China's Soybean Stocks Are Relatively Low As such, China's top corn producing province - Heilongjian - cut the subsidy for corn farmers by 13 percent this year. Farmers there now receive 8.90 yuan/hectare of corn, down from the 10.26 yuan/hectare they received last year. This compares with subsidies for soybean farmers which at 11.56 yuan/hectare is much higher. According to the China National Grain and Oils Information Center, corn acreage in Heilongjiang is down 9.3 percent in 2016/17. However, with corn prices in China increasing, the higher subsidy for soybeans may not be sufficient. Nonetheless, according to a report by the Brazilian state Mato Grosso's official news agency, over the next five years the Chinese commodities trader COFCO intends to almost double its soybean imports from the Brazilian grains state. This means that China's demand for soybeans will drive the market in the near term as they look to buildup soybean reserves and bring down their corn stocks.10 Chart 9Higher Oil Prices Incentivize Ethanol Over Sugar Higher Oil Prices Incentivize Ethanol Over Sugar Higher Oil Prices Incentivize Ethanol Over Sugar 3. Ethanol Demand will raise the opportunity costs of bringing sugar and corn to market. In addition to the direct effect of higher oil prices on ag commodities in general, our forecast of increasing prices will pressure sugar prices indirectly through the ethanol channel in Brazil. Since July, Brazil's state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, has shifted its pricing policy allowing gasoline and diesel prices to follow those of international oil markets. As a result, the gasoline-ethanol price gap is widening.11 This will revive demand for the biofuel, which will cause mills to divert sugarcane away from the sweetener in favor of producing more ethanol (Chart 9). In fact, according to UNICA - the Brazilian sugarcane industry association - mills in the country's center-south region - from which 90% of Brazil's sugar output is derived - are favoring ethanol production over sugar. Data for the first half of October shows that 46.5% of sugarcane was diverted to producing sugar, down from 49.6% in the same period last year. However, in the near term, increased production from the EU amid their scrapping of domestic sugar production quotas will likely keep the global market in balance.12 Global sugar supply is forecast to remain strong on the back of supplies from Thailand, Europe and India. There are reports that ethanol producers in Brazil are evaluating the adoption of "corn-cane flex" ethanol plants.13 However this is a longer run risk which would increase demand for corn, and reduce demand for sugar. Bottom Line: Financial conditions will drive ag prices in 2018. The Fed's resolve to normalize interest rates - more so than markets expect - will keep a lid on prices. This will offset risks from higher energy prices. Nonetheless, some weather induced volatility is likely into 1Q2018. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 In fact, our Global Investment Strategists expect the Fed to hike rates in December 2017, and again four more times in 2018. Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "A Timeline For the Next Five Years: Part I," dated November 24, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "2017 Commodity Outlook: Grains & Softs," dated December 22, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 A 1% move in the USD TWI is associated with a 1.4% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. Similarly, a 1pp move in 5-year real rates is associated with a 18% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. The adjusted R2 is 0.84. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary titled "Into The Fire," dated November 7, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve," dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models," dated September 15, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Oil Balances Continue To Point To Higher Prices," dated November 23, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) alternates between warm ("El Nino") and cool ("La Nina") phases, impacting global precipitation and temperatures. These episodes are identified by looking at temperatures in the "Nino region 3.4" whereby readings of at least 0.5 degrees Celsius above or below seasonal average for several months would qualify as an El Nino or La Nina. 9 La Nina is often associated with wet conditions in eastern Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Asia. It usually leads to increased rainfall in northeastern Brazil, Colombia, and other northern parts of South America, and drier than normal conditions in Uruguay, parts of Argentina, coastal Ecuador and northwestern Peru. The effect on the U.S. and Canada tends to be milder since they are located further away from the heart of ENSO, on the other hand it has the greatest impact on countries around the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 10 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Ags in 2017/18: Move To Neutral," dated October 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 Flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil means that ethanol demand is not constrained by a "blending wall". Thus ethanol is a substitute for gasoline- rather than a complement to, as in the U.S. 12 France, Belgium, Germany and Poland reportedly have the capacity to ramp up sugar beet production. 13 Please see "Brazil mills eye corn-cane flex plant to extend production cycle," dated November 7, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018 Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through EM and commodities in 2018. Granted the ongoing policy tightening in China will likely dampen money growth further, the only way mainland nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. Assigning equal probabilities to various scenarios of velocity of money, the outcome is as follows: one-third probability of robust nominal growth (continuation of the rally in China-related plays) and two-third odds of a non-trivial slowdown in nominal growth with negative ramifications for China-related plays. Hence, we reiterate our negative stance on EM risk assets Feature The key question for emerging markets (EM) in 2018 is whether a slowdown in Chinese money growth will translate into a meaningful growth deceleration in this economy, and in turn produce a reversal in EM risk assets. This week we address the above question in detail elaborating on what could make China's business cycle defy the slowdown in its monetary aggregates and how investors should approach such uncertainty. Before this, we review the status of financial markets going into 2018. Priced To Perfection Or A New Paradigm? Several financial markets are at extremes. Our chart on the history of financial market manias reveals that some parts of technology/new concept stocks may be entering uncharted territory (Chart I-1). Tencent's share price, for instance, has surged 11-fold since January 2010. Chart I-1History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade This is roughly on par with the prior manias' average 10-year gains. As this chart indicates, the manias of previous decades run wild until the turn of the decade. It is impossible to know whether technology/new concept stocks will peak in 2018 or run for another two years. Regardless whether or not the mania in tech/new concept stocks endures up until 2020, some sort of mean reversion in their share prices is likely next year. This has relevance to EM because the magnitude of the EM equity rally in 2017 has been enormously boosted by four large tech/concept stocks in Asia. Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. market suggests that equity valuations are reaching their 2000 overvaluation levels (Chart I-2, top panel). The difference between our measure and Shiller's measure of CAPE is that Shiller's CAPE is derived by dividing share prices by the 10-year moving average of EPS in real terms (deflated by consumer price inflation). Our measure is calculated by dividing equity prices by the time trend in real EPS (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Our CAPE measure assumes that in the long run, U.S. EPS in real terms will revert to its time trend. Meanwhile, the Shiller CAPE is based on the assumption that real EPS will revert to its 10-year mean. Hence, the assumptions behind our CAPE model are quite reasonable if not preferable to those of Shiller's P/E. Remarkably, the U.S. (Wilshire 5000) market cap-to-GDP ratio is close to its 2000 peak (Chart I-3). With respect to EM equity valuations, the non-financial P/E ratio is at its highest level in the past 15 years (Chart I-4). EM banks have low multiples and seem "cheap" because many of them have not provisioned for NPLs. Hence, their profits and book values are artificially inflated. In short, excluding financials, EM stocks are not cheap at all, neither in absolute terms nor relative to DM bourses. Chart I-2A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation Chart I-3The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak Chart I-4EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap Such elevated DM & EM stock market valuations might be justified by currently low global long-term bond yields. Yet, if and when long-term bond yields rise, multiples will likely shrink. The latter will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices, as multiples are disproportionately and negatively linked to interest rates - especially when interest rates are low - but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 As a result, a small rise in long-term bond yields will lead to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Despite very high equity valuations, U.S. advisors and traders are extremely bullish on American stocks. Their sentiment measures are at all time and 11-year highs, respectively. So are copper traders on red metal prices (Chart I-5). The mirror image of the strong and steady rally in global stocks is record-low implied volatility. The aggregate financial markets' implied volatility index is at a multi-year low (Chart I-6). Finally, yields on junk (high-yield) EM corporate and sovereign bonds are at all-time lows (Chart I-7). They are priced for perfection. Chart I-5Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Chart I-6Aggregate Global Financial Markets ##br##Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Chart I-7EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low Are we in a new paradigm, or are we witnessing financial market extremes that are unsustainable? In regard to the timing, can these dynamics last throughout 2018 or at least the first half of next year, or will they reverse in the coming months? We have less conviction on the durability of the U.S. equity rally, but our bet is that EM risk assets will roll over in absolute terms and begin underperforming their DM peers very soon. What could cause such a reversal in EM risk assets? China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through emerging markets and commodities. China: "Financial Stability" Priority Entails Tighter Policy The Chinese authorities are facing unprecedented challenges: The outstanding value of broad money in China (measured in U.S. dollars) is now larger than the combined U.S. and euro area broad money supply (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China As a share of its own GDP, broad money in China is much higher compared to any other nation in history (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In brief, there is too much money in China and most of it - $21 trillion out of $29 trillion - has been created by the banking system since early 2009. We maintain that the enormous overhang of money and credit in China represents major excess/imbalances and has nothing to do with the nation's high savings rate.2 Rather, it is an outcome of animal spirits running wild among bankers and borrowers over the past nine years. Easy money often flows into real estate and China has not been an exception. Needless to say, property prices are hyped and expensive relative to household income. Policy tightening amid lingering excesses and imbalances makes us negative on China's growth outlook. In a nutshell, we place more weight on tightening when there are excesses in the system, and downplay the importance of tightening in a healthy system without excesses. Importantly, excessive money creation seems to finally be pushing inflation higher. Consumer price services and core consumer price inflation rates are on a rising trajectory (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). As a result, banks' deposit rates in real terms (deflated by core CPI) have plunged into negative territory for the first time in the past 12 years (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Remarkably, the People's Bank of China's existing $3 trillion of international reserves is sufficient to "back up" only 13% and 11% of official M2 and our measure of M3, respectively (Chart I-10). If Chinese households and companies decide to convert 10-15% of their deposits into foreign currency and the PBoC takes the other side of the trade, its reserves will be exhausted. Chart I-9China: Inflation Is Rising And ##br##Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart I-10China: Low Coverage Of ##br##Money Supply By FX Reserves bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 Therefore, reining money and credit expansion is of paramount importance to China's long-term financial and economic stability. "Financial stability" has become the key policy priority. "Financial stability" is policymakers' code word for containing and curbing financial imbalances and bubbles. Having experienced the equity bubble bust in 2015, policymakers are determined to preclude another bubble formation and its subsequent bust. Consequently, the ongoing tightening campaign will not be reversed in the near term unless damage to the economy becomes substantial and visible. By the time the authorities and investors are able to identify such damage in the real economy, China-related plays in financial markets will be down substantially. Chart I-11China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve Faced with significant excesses in money, leverage and property markets, the Chinese authorities have been tightening - and have reinforced their policy stance following the Party's Congress in October. There is triple tightening currently ongoing in China: 1. Liquidity tightening: Money market rates have climbed, and onshore corporate bond yields are rising (Chart I-11, top panel). Remarkably, the yield curve is flat, pointing to weaker growth ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). 2. Regulatory tightening: The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, and is reining banks' involvement in shadow banking activities. In addition, financial regulators are trying to remove the government's implicit "put" from the financial system, and thereby curb speculative and irresponsible investment behavior. Finally, many local governments are tightening investors' participation in the real estate market. 3. Anti-corruption campaign is embracing the financial institutions: The powerful anti-corruption commission is planning to dispatch groups of inspectors to examine financial institutions' activities. This could dampen animal spirits among bankers and shadow banking organizations. The Outlook: The "Knowns"... In China, broad money growth has already slumped to an all-time low (Chart I-12). The money as well as the credit plus fiscal spending impulses both point to a considerable slowdown in the mainland's industrial cycle and overall economic activity (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Broad Money ##br##Growth Is At All-Time Low bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 Chart I-13China: Money And Credit & ##br##Fiscal Impulses Are Negative bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 The slowdown is not limited to money growth; there are a few real business cycle indicators that are already weakening. For example, the growth rate of property floor space sold and started has slumped to zero (Chart I-14). Electricity output and aggregate freight volume growth have both decisively rolled over (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again Chart I-15China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown That said, based on the past correlation between money and credit impulses on the one hand and the business cycle on the other, China's economy should have slowed much more, and its negative impact on the rest of the world should have already been felt (Chart I-13, on page 9). This has been the key pillar of our view on EM, but it has not yet transpired. Is it possible that the relationship between money/credit impulses and the business cycle has broken down? If so, why? And how should investors handle such uncertainty? Bottom Line: China's ongoing policy tightening will ensure that money and credit impulses remain negative for some time. Can the country's industrial sectors de-couple from its past tight correlation with money and credit? ...And The "Unknowns" By definition, the only way to sustain nominal economic growth in the face of a decelerating money supply is if the velocity of money increases. This is true for any economy. Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money Provided China's policy tightening will likely further dampen money growth, the only way nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. This is the main risk to our view and strategy. Chart I-16 portrays all three variables. Chart I-16China: Money, Nominal GDP ##br##And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money Even though the velocity of money has fallen structurally over the past nine years (Chart I-16, bottom panel), it has risen marginally in 2017, allowing the mainland's nominal economic growth to hold up despite a considerable relapse in money supply growth. Notably, this has been the reason why our view has not worked this year. What is the velocity of money, and how can we forecast its fluctuations and, importantly, the magnitude of its variations? The velocity of money is one of the least understood concepts in economic theory. The velocity of money is anything but stable. In our opinion, the velocity of money reflects animal spirits of households and businesses as well as government spending decisions. Forecasting animal spirits and the magnitude of their variations is not very a reliable exercise. In a nutshell, the banking system (commercial banks and the central bank) creates money via expanding its balance sheet - making loans to or acquiring assets from non-banks. However, commercial banks have little direct influence on the velocity of money. The latter is shaped by non-banks' decisions to spend or not (i.e., save). Significantly, non-banks' spending and saving decisions do not alter the amount of money in the system. Yet they directly impact the velocity of money. The banking system creates money, and non-banks churn money (make it circulate). At any level of money supply, a rising number of transactions will boost nominal output, and vice versa. Further, there is a great deal of complexity in the interaction between money supply and its velocity. Both are sometimes independent, i.e. they do not influence one another, but in some other cases one affects the other. For example, with the ongoing triple tightening in China and less money being originated by the banking system, will households and businesses increase or decrease their spending? Our bias is that they will not increase spending. This is especially true for the corporate sector, which has record-high leverage and where access to funding has been tightening. It is also possible that rising velocity will lead to more money creation as more spending leads to higher loan demand and banks accommodate it - i.e., originating more loans/money. These examples corroborate that money supply and the velocity of money are not always independent of each other. On the whole, it is almost impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude of changes in velocity of money. In the same vein, it is difficult to forecast animal spirit dynamics in any economy. Chart I-17U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money ##br##Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money One recent example where nominal GDP has decoupled from broad money growth is the U.S. Chart I-17 demonstrates that in the past 12 months, U.S. nominal GDP growth has firmed up even though broad money (M2) growth has slumped. This decoupling can only be explained by a spike in the velocity of M2. In other words, soaring confidence and animal spirits among U.S. households and businesses have boosted their willingness to spend, even as the banking system has created less money and credit growth has slowed considerably over the past 12 months. Going back to China, how should investors consider such uncertainty in changes in the velocity of money? Investing is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Hence, an investment process is about assigning probabilities to various scenarios. Provided the velocity of money is impossible to forecast, we assign equal probabilities to each of the following scenarios for China in 2018 (Figure I-1): One-third odds that the velocity of money rises more than the decline in broad money growth, producing robust nominal GDP growth; One-third probability that the velocity of money stays broadly flat - the outcome being meaningful deceleration in nominal GDP growth; A one-third chance that the velocity of money declines - the result being a severe growth slump. Figure I-1How Investors Can Consider Uncertainty Related To Velocity Of Money Questions For Emerging Markets Questions For Emerging Markets In short, a positive outcome on China-related plays has a one-third probability of playing out, while a negative outcome carries a two-thirds chance. This is why we continue to maintain our negative view on EM and commodities. Commodities Our view on commodities and commodity plays is by and large shaped by our view on China's capital spending. Given the credit plus fiscal spending impulse is already very weak, the path of least resistance for capital expenditures is down. Besides, the government is clamping down on local governments' off-balance-sheet borrowing and spending (via Local Government Financing Vehicles). A deceleration in capital expenditures in general and construction (both infrastructure and property development) in particular is bearish for industrial metals (Chart I-18). Money and credit impulses herald a major downturn in Chinese imports values and volumes (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Industrial Metals / Copper Are At Risk bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 Chart I-19China Will Be A Drag On Its Suppliers bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 As to China's commodities output reductions, last week we published a Special Report3 on China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal. The report concludes the following: The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. Importantly, the mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity in order to replace almost entirely obsolete capacity. The combination of demand slowdown and modest production recovery will weigh on non-oil raw materials. As for oil, the picture is much more complicated. Oil prices have been climbing in reaction to declining OECD inventories as well as on expectations of an extension to oil output cuts into 2018. One essential piece of missing information in the bullish oil narrative is China's oil inventories. In recent years, China has been importing more crude oil than its consumption trend justifies. Specifically, the sum of its net imports and domestic output of crude oil has exceeded the amount of refined processed oil. This difference between the sum of net imports and production of crude oil and processed crude oil constitutes our proxy for the net change of crude oil inventories. Chart I-20 shows that our proxy for mainland crude oil inventories has risen sharply in recent years. This includes both the nation's strategic oil reserves as well as commercial inventories. There is no reliable data on the former. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the country's commercial crude oil inventories. Chart I-20China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories Nevertheless, whether crude oil inventories have risen due to a build-up of strategic petroleum reserves or commercial reserves, the fact remains that crude oil inventories in China have surged and appear to be reaching the size of OECD total crude and liquid inventories (Chart I-20). In short, China has been a stabilizing force for the oil market over the past three years by buying more than it consumes. Without such excess purchases from China, oil prices would likely have been much weaker. Going forward, the pace of Chinese purchases of crude oil will likely slow due to several factors: (a) China prefers buying commodities on dips, especially when it is for strategic inventory building. With crude oil prices having rallied to around $60, the authorities might reduce their purchases temporarily, creating an air pocket for prices, and then accelerate their purchases at lower prices; (b) Commercial purchases of oil will likely decelerate due to tighter money/credit, possibly high inventories and a general slowdown in industrial demand for fuel. Bottom Line: Raw materials and oil prices4 are at risk from China and overly bullish investor sentiment. Beyond Commodities The slowdown in China will impact not only commodities but also non-commodity shipments to the mainland (Chart I-21). In fact, 47% of the nation's imports are commodities and raw materials and 45% are industrial/capital goods - i.e., China's imports are heavily exposed to investment expenditures, not consumer spending. This is why money/credit impulses correlate so well with this country's imports. Consistently, China's broad money (M3) impulse leads EM corporate profit growth by 12 months - and currently heralds a major EPS downtrend (Chart I-22). In addition, aggregate EM narrow money (M1) growth also points to a material slump in EM EPS (Chart I-23). Chart I-21China Is A Risk To ##br##Non-Commodity Economies Too bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 Chart I-22Downside Risk To EM EPS bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 The only EM countries that are not materially exposed to China and commodities are Turkey and India. The former is a basket case on its own. Indian stocks are expensive and will have a difficult time rallying in absolute terms when the EM equity benchmark relapses. As for Korea and Taiwan, their largest export destination is not advanced economies but China. China accounts for 25% of Korea's exports and 28% of Taiwan's. This compares to a combined 22% of total Korean exports and 20% of total Taiwanese exports going to the U.S. and EU combined Can robust growth in the U.S. and EU derail the growth slowdown in China when capital spending slows? This is very unlikely, in our view. Chart I-24 portends that China's shipments to the U.S. and EU account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP, while capital spending and credit origination constitute 45% and 25% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-23EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS Chart I-24What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? A final word on tech stocks. EM's four large-cap tech stocks (Tencent, Ali-Baba, Samsung and TSMC) have gone exponential and are extremely overbought. At this juncture, any strong opinion on tech stocks is not warranted because they can sell off or continue advancing for no fundamental reason. We have been recommending an overweight position in tech stocks, and continue recommending overweighting them, especially Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies. As for Tencent and Alibaba, these are concept stocks, and as a top-down house we have little expertise to judge whether or not they are expensive. These are bottom-up calls. Investment Strategy EM Stocks: Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM, and absolute-return investors should stay put. Our overweights are Taiwan, China, Korean tech stocks, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Chart I-25EM Currencies: A Canary In ##br##Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? Stay short a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs (or our currency overweights) are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Continue underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. The mix of weaker EM/China growth, lower commodities prices and EM currency depreciation bode ill for already very tight EM credit spreads (Chart I-25). Within the sovereign credit space, our underweights are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and Malaysia and our overweights are Russia, Argentina and low beta defensive credits. The main risk to EM local currency bonds is EM currency depreciation. With foreign ownership of EM domestic bonds at all-time highs, exchange rate depreciation could trigger non-trivial selling pressure. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, China, India, Argentina and Central Europe. Other high-conviction market-neutral recommendations: Long U.S. banks / short EM banks. Long U.S. homebuilders / short Chinese property developers. Long the Russian ruble / short oil. Long the Chilean peso / short copper. Long Big Five state-owned Chinese banks / short small- and medium-sized banks. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, given that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model, a one percentage point change in interest rates from a low level can have a significant impact on the fair value P/E ratio. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, link available on page 22. 4 This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and is different from BCA's house view on commodities. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear Client, Today we are sending you a two-part Special Report prepared by my colleague Billy Zicheng Huang of our Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy team, entitled “A Sector Guide To A-shares”. Part I of the report was published in September, and emphasized the key takeaways from MSCI’s decision to include A-shares in the MSCI EM index beginning in June 2018. More importantly, it provided a comprehensive analysis of the financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples sectors. Part II of the report was published at the end of October, and provided an analysis of the remaining sectors not included in Part I. The reports underscore that while the top-down impact of MSCI’s decision is limited, it is significant in terms of expanding potential alpha from security selection. I trust that you will find this report to be useful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports Part I of the Special Report discussed the market impact of MSCI's decision to include A-shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, followed by a comprehensive analysis of the four most investment-relevant sectors with corresponding company calls in each sector. In the second part of the Special Report, the EMES team will analyze the remaining sectors, and provide investment recommendations. We will publish an Investment Case by the end of this year, highlighting our best sector picks from Part I and Part II of the Special Reports to construct an A-share portfolio. A Recap In the first part of our A-shares special report, the EMES team discussed the key takeaways from A-shares' inclusion in the MSCI EM index and concluded that, despite a limited near-term impact on the market from a passive investment standpoint, the MSCI's decision will provide an expansion of the investable universe for active EM investors, and more opportunities to allocate assets and generate alpha.1 Moreover, we looked at the four sectors most relevant for investors - financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples - analyzing valuations, profitability, leverage, and the growth outlook. In this special report, we will continue our journey through the remaining sectors: energy, healthcare, IT, materials, real estate, and utilities. Please note that only one company, Dr.Peng Telecom & Media (CH 600804), will be added to telecoms, and will not result in material changes to the sector. Thus we omitted analysis of this sector. Energy Seven companies from the energy sector will be included into the MSCI EM index, including six from the oil & gas industry. The equally weighted basket of the seven A-share energy companies has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 26.2%, and by 19.8% over a one-year period (Table 1). With the Chinese government's mandate to cut excess capacity, capex growth in the energy sector will continue to be weak, which will weigh on the growth outlook for the sector. Image In terms of valuation, stripping out two dual-listed names that are already in the MSCI EM Index (Sinopec and PetroChina - please see Appendix I for the full list), Lu'an Environmental and Xishan Coal & Electric Power are trading at significantly cheaper valuations than their peers. On the other end of the spectrum, Guanghui Energy and Wintime Energy's P/Es have expensive valuations. Looking at profitability, low P/E names tend to have high ROEs, while Guanghui Energy suffers from the weakest ROE (Charts 1A & 1B). From a profitability-versus-valuation perspective, Lu'an Environmental offers a superior risk-reward profile, while Guanghui Energy has the least favorable risk-reward profile (Chart 1C). Image Image Image Wintime and Lu'an reported the strongest operating margins, while Offshore Oil Engineering has the weakest margin among peers (Chart 1D). On leverage, Offshore Oil Engineering has the lowest debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio, mainly because its core business is energy equipment and service rather than oil & gas exploration. All energy producers are highly leveraged, with Wintime and Guanghui topping the list. On free cash flow yield, Lu'an leads the table, while both Guanghui and Wintime have negative yields which, together with high leverage, is a negative combination (Charts 1E, 1F, 1G). Image Image Image Image The A-share Energy companies have a dividend yield of less than 2%, with Offshore Oil Engineering enjoying the highest yield among peers, while Xishan Coal & Electric Power has the lowest yield (Chart 1H). Screening the earnings forecasts, all companies' EPS are expected to growth by more than 10%, led by Offshore Oil Engineering and Guanghui Energy (Chart 1I). Image Image Taking all the factors into consideration, we suggest investors should be cautious on the energy sector, and should be especially cautious about betting on the likelihood of Guanghui Energy's turnaround. The company registered surprising positive bottom-line growth in 1H17, but this was mainly due to a low base in 2016. The commencement of its new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Jiangsu Province will not help much to lift sales volumes or margins, given little LNG price recovery and growing competition from well-positioned larger players such as Kunlun and CNOOC. Healthcare There are 13 companies in the A-share healthcare sector. Stocks in the sector have a heavy tilt towards pharmaceutical producers. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 1.8%, and outperformed by 0.9% over a one-year period (Table 2). On an absolute return basis performance was resilient across various time horizons. The EMES team has been bullish on healthcare sector on a long-term investment horizon, with overweight calls on Fosun Pharma (2196 HK) from among the current MSCI EM constituents.2 We prefer companies with innovative drug R&D pipelines, which will more likely take advantage of the new China FDA rule encouraging biopharmaceutical innovation. Image Shanghai Pharma and Fosun Pharma are excluded from our analysis, as their H-listed shares are already in the MSCI EM index. Examining valuations, on a trailing P/E basis we favor Sanjiu Medical and Dong-E-E-Jiao. By contrast, Hengrui Medicine and Guizhou Bailing look expensive (Chart 2A). Looking at the profitability side, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao have the strongest ROE, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan Pharma lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 2B). In summary, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao will likely outperform, based on a valuation-versus-profitability comparison (Chart 2C). Image Image Image Furthermore, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao also lead by operating margin, with relatively safe leverage levels at the same time (Chart 2D). On the other hand, Jointown suffers from the highest debt level, the only one with debt-to-equity surpassing 100%. In terms of free cash flow, Sanjiu Medical and Salubris have the most attractive FCF yield, while Jointown and Tasly, both companies with the highest debt levels, also display a worryingly negative FCF yield (Charts 2E, 2F, 2G). Salubris and Baiyun Shan dominate the dividend yield rank (Chart 2H). Image Image Image Image Concerning the earnings outlook, Huadong Medicine and Kangmei are expected to see fast bottom-line growth in 2018, driven by robust antibiotic and cardiovascular sales respectively, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan are likely to fall behind the industry average (Chart 2I). Image Image In summary, we prefer Salubris Pharma among the A-share healthcare basket, supported by its stronger fundamentals and the bullish outlook on innovative drug R&D and sales in China, in which Salubris Pharma is specialized. IT 14 names from the IT sector will be added to the MSCI EM index. The equally weighted basket has outperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 22.3%, and outperformed by 23.3% over a one-year period (Table 3), with most stocks performing strongly across various investment horizons. We believe the A-share IT basket provides investors with attractive opportunities in the investable universe given that it is less expensive than its H-share counterpart. The inclusion will also dilute the weight of IT sector ADRs, such as Alibaba and Sina Weibo, in the index. Please note that Protruly Vision Tech has been suspended from trading due to legal issues, with no further detail released by the court. Stripping out ZTE because of its H-share listing already in the MSCI EM index, there are 12 names left. Image Regarding valuations, most companies are trading at a below-50 trailing P/E, with the exceptions of Hundsun Tech and iFlytek, both of which are above 150x, while Aisino and BOE are relatively undervalued compared to other names in the sector. It is worth mentioning that Hundsun is 100% owned by Zhejiang Finance Credit Network Technology, a company 99% owned by Alibaba. From a profitability perspective, Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech have the highest ROE, while Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour lie at the other end of the spectrum (Charts 3A & 3B). Taking these two factors into consideration, we highlight Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech as the most attractive based on their risk-reward profile (Chart 3C). Image Image Image When looking at the income statement, Sanan Optoelectronics displays robust operating margins, with 2345 Network following suit. By contrast, Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour report the most disappointing margins (Chart 3D). On the positive side, Hundsun Tech has virtually zero debt on the balance sheet, while Dongxu Optoelectronic is more than 80% leveraged. Meanwhile, only four companies register positive FCF yields. Taking both metrics into account, Aisino can most easily service its debt with free cash flow (Charts 3E, 3F, 3G). By dividend yield, Aisino and Hikvision rank top (Chart 3H). Image Image Image Image With respect to forward EPS growth, iFlytek and Hundsun Tech are expected to see the fastest bottom-line expansion, while Aisino's and BOE Tech's bottom lines will increase at the slowest pace (Chart 3I). Image Image Based on our criteria, we like video surveillance manufacturers Hikvision and Dahua Tech for their robust fundamentals and reasonable valuations. In particular, Hikvision is likely to have the largest market cap among A-share tech companies newly included in the MSCI indexes. Materials Currently only seven Chinese companies from the materials sector are included into the MSCI EM Index. After the inclusion, some 26 more companies will be added, substantially expanding the investable universe. Two subsectors will most likely draw investors' attention due to the significant exposure increase: metals & mining, and chemicals. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 2%, but outperformed by 4.6% over a one-year period (Table 4). We exclude five names, which are already in the current MSCI EM index: Sinopec Shanghai Petrochem, Anhui Conch Cement, Aluminum Corp of China, Jiangxi Copper, and Zijin Mining. Among the other companies, we have been underweight Maanshan Iron & Steel (H-share listing) and Aluminum Corp of China (H-share listing) in our China Materials trade, and overweight Tianqi Lithium in the lithium supply chain trade. Image Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel have attractive valuations, with trailing P/Es below 15. On the other end of this scale, China Northern Rare Earth and Baotou Steel appear very expensive (Chart 4A). On profitability, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium top the ROE rank, while Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Baotou Steel sit at the bottom (Chart 4B). Screening the risk-reward profile, it is noticeable that chemicals normally demonstrate a better ROE vs. P/E metric than companies from the metals & mining industry. Specifically, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium are the most attractive, while Jindiucheng Molybdenum is the least attractive (Chart 4C). Image Image Image In terms of operations, Tianqi Lithium reported the strongest operating margin, followed by Junzheng, while Hainan Rubber and Jinduicheng Molybdenum are the only companies that registered negative operating margins (Chart 4D). Looking at the balance sheet, Jinduicheng Molybdenum has the healthiest leverage, while Hesteel shows the most worrisome leverage. Moreover, it has the lowest FCF yield. In terms of FCF yield versus leverage, Kingenta offers the best tradeoff, while Hesteel is the least attractive (Charts 4E, 4F, 4G). Furthermore, dividend yield favors Longsheng and disfavors Northern Rare Earth (Chart 4H). Image Image Image Image In terms of projected EPS growth, Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Shandong Gold Mining have the strongest outlook for next year, while Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel are likely to report profit declines (Chart 4I). Image Image In summary, apart from Maanshan Iron & Steel, Hainan Rubber is a good candidate for the underweight basket due to its relatively expensive valuation, negative margin and FCF yield. Moreover, its focus on the rubber business diversifies the portfolio risk from metal & mining-concentrated underweight exposure. China Molybdenum, with its above-average risk-reward profile, moderately strong operations and financial position, as well as robust growth outlook, is a good candidate for the overweight basket of our lithium supply trade to replace Ganfeng Lithium. The company has a strong market presence in Congo, where over 60% of cobalt is mined. Real Estate Some 14 developers will be added to the existing MSCI EM index. Among the top 10 Chinese developers, measured by contracted sales and floor space sold, existing MSCI EM constituents account for six, while the A-share list will add two (Poly Real Estate and China Fortune Land). In the environment of property market tightening in China, primary land supply has remained stagnant. The government is unlikely to ease the supply restrictions in the near-term, especially in the residential land space. In this vein, we believe large market players will be better-positioned in this market, due to their bargaining power. Also, developers with heavy exposure to commercial property will be less affected by policy uncertainty than their residential counterparts. Looking at historical performance, the equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 20.5%, and by 17.1% over a one-year period (Table 5). Image Xinhu Zhongbao and Financial Street are trading at the cheapest valuations, while Zhejiang China Commodities and China Fortune Land seem to be slightly overpriced compared to peers. The ROE for Xinhu Zhongbao is remarkable, while Zhangjiang High-tech Park is the only company with ROE under 10% (Charts 5A, 5B). Taking both dimensions into account, Xinhu Zhongbao and Gemdale display an attractive risk-reward profile (Chart 5C). Image Image Image Looking at operational metrics, Zhejiang China Commodities and Financial Street enjoy the highest margin, while Xinhu Zhongbao and Tahoe lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 5D). Due to the nature of business, leverage is high across the sector. In particular, Oceanwide and Tahoe have a high debt-to-equity ratio, while Zhejiang China Commodities and Gemdale have a more prudent capital structure. Furthermore, FCF yields vary a lot across companies, with Financial Street and Xinhu Zhongbao on the positive end, and Tahoe and Oceanwide on the negative. Financial Street also beats other developers in terms of cash generation for debt payment (Charts 5E, 5F, 5G). Image Image Image Image Gemdale and Risesun have the highest dividend yield, while Tahoe and Zhejiang China Commodities have the lowest (Chart 5H). Image Regarding the full-year 2018 expectations, Financial Street and Zhejiang China Commodities have a robust growth outlook with respect to funds from operations (FFO) and EPS respectively, while Gemdale is likely to see sluggish growth on both metrics (Charts 5I & 5J). In summary, we believe Financial Street Holding is likely to outperform in the real estate sector, given its appealing risk-reward profile, decent dividend yield, superior cash flow yield and operating margin, reasonable debt ratio, and robust FFO growth. Its large-scale and commercial property exposure is expected to be more immune to policy tightening in China. Image Image Utilities Some 12 utility companies will be added to the existing MSCI EM index, most of which are in power generation and renewables. EMES published in July an investment case on China utilities, underlining our preference toward companies with a focus on the environment and clean power, in line with the Chinese government's emphasis in the 13th five-year plan.3 In the A-share basket, we highlight Yangtze Power, the hydro power large cap, National Nuclear, as its name suggests the state-owned nuclear power operator, and Beijing Capital, the water utility provider. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 19.2%, and by 14.2% over a one-year period (Table 6). Image Huaneng Power is excluded from our analysis, as its H-share is already in the MSCI EM Index. Screening valuations, the trailing P/E factor favors Shenery and Chuantou Energy. By contrast, Huadian Power and Beijing Capital look expensive (Chart 6A). On profitability, Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy have the strongest ROE, while Huadian Power and Shenzhen Energy fall far behind the average (Chart 6B). Based on valuation versus profitability, Chuantou Energy, Yangtze Power, and SDIC Power will likely outperform (Chart 6C). Image Image Image Yangtze Power and SDIC Power have remarkably high operating margins, while Shenery and Beijing Capital are at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 6D). Concerning leverage, most large-scale players such as Datang International Power and National Nuclear Power are highly leveraged. By contrast, low leveraged players, such as Hubei Energy and Shenergy, tend to have small market caps of around US$ 5 bn. In terms of FCF yield, we highlight Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy, while we are cautious on Shenzhen Energy and National Nuclear Power due to their deeply negative yields. In summary, we like Chuantou Energy, Yangzte Power, Zheneng Electric, and Shenergy with respect to FCF yield versus leverage, which also coincides with dividend yield rank (Charts 6E, 6F, 6G, 6H). Image Image Image Image Finally, Huadian Power and Datang are expected to show the fastest bottom-line growth next year, while Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy are likely to see limited earnings expansion (Chart 6I). Image Image Therefore, within utilities sector, we expect Yangtze Power to outperform in the long term, supported by its appealing risk-reward profile, margin expansion, and debt service ability. We also like the fact that the company's dominant strength of hydropower is the Yangtze River Delta. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "A Sector Guide To A-shares - Part I ", dated September 19, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "China Healthcare, Getting Healthier", dated August 9, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "Budding Green Equities In China", dated July 11, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com Appendix - I Image Appendix - II Overweight Company Profile Image Image Image Image Underweight Company Profile Image Image

Dear Client, Today we are sending you a two-part Special Report prepared by my colleague Billy Zicheng Huang of our Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy team, entitled “A Sector Guide To A-shares”. Part I of the report was published in September, and emphasized the key takeaways from MSCI’s decision to include A-shares in the MSCI EM index beginning in June 2018. More importantly, it provided a comprehensive analysis of the financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples sectors. Part II of the report was published at the end of October, and provided an analysis of the remaining sectors not included in Part I. The reports underscore that while the top-down impact of MSCI’s decision is limited, it is significant in terms of expanding potential alpha from security selection. I trust that you will find this report to be useful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports The EMES team will be publishing a series of Special Reports in the coming weeks, analyzing sector dynamics and company highlights of Chinese A shares that MSCI has decided to include in the MSCI EM index from next June. In the first part of our report, we emphasize the key takeaways from A-shares' inclusion, followed by a comprehensive analysis of the four sectors that investors will probably most focus on. The second part of our report to be released in the coming weeks will analyze the remaining sectors. MSCI's decision to include Chinese A shares will likely have only a limited near-term impact on the market from a passive investment perspective. A 5% inclusion factor will not cause significant changes to the current sector weightings of the MSCI EM index or the MSCI China index. The symbolic effect - that global investors are becoming more confident in the Chinese market's efficiency and transparency - is likely to have a larger impact. From an active investment perspective, however, an expansion of the investable universe will give investors with EM mandates more opportunities to allocate assets and generate alpha. Impact Is Limited On A Macro Perspective... On June 20, MSCI announced its decision to include Chinese A shares in the MSCI EM index and the MSCI ACWI index on a gradual basis starting from June 2018.1 The inclusion process will be finalized in two steps following the May semi-annual index review and August quarterly review in 2018, at a 5% inclusion factor. Full inclusion of the remaining A-share universe is expected to take place gradually over five to 10 years. After three previous proposals of an A-shares inclusion having been rejected by investors surveyed by MSCI, the successful start of the inclusion process signifies that the A-share market is gaining broad support from institutional investors. This follows the Chinese government's and regulators' focus on improving market accessibility via stock connect programs (Hong Kong-Shanghai connect, and Hong Kong-Shenzhen connect) as well as improving market liquidity via loosening requirements for index-linked financial instruments. Further steps regarding capital movement and better reporting standards are expected to be implemented in due course. influence of the inclusion is minimal from a broad market perspective. As is planned, 222 A-share companies will be added to the MSCI EM index, accounting for a pro-forma weight of only 0.73% of the MSCI EM index, or 2.5% of the MSCI China index (Charts 1A and 1B). A shares will boost China's weight in the MSCI EM by approximately only 1%, given the 5% inclusion factor. Sector-wise, it will not substantially move the current weights of each sector either. Company wise, all selected stocks are large caps, with 43 being "A" and "H" dual-listed companies already included in the current MSCI EM index, mostly concentrated in the financials, industrials and materials sectors (see Appendix I). This means the inclusions are unlikely to make any meaningful contribution to index performance in the upcoming year. Similarly, capital inflows from passive fund trackers are expected to be negligible, only marginally adding to the trading income of the Hong Kong Exchange through the northbound stock connect program. refore, we believe the impact from an investor perspective is more symbolic, confirming a positive outlook on market transparency and corporate governance. Image Image ...But Significant In Stock Selection Despite immaterial near-term market impact, the 222 A-share large-cap stocks will expand the investable universe, providing active investors with plenty of opportunities to extract alpha. In particular, compared to the current weights of the 11 sectors, industrials, financials, consumer staples, materials, healthcare, utilities, and real estate would see weight expansion, while IT, telecom, energy, and consumer discretionary would see weight contraction (Table 1). Image Newly added stocks mainly come from the financial and industrial sectors, with the name count by far outpacing other sectors. Given an overall larger market cap, these two sectors will experience the most substantial incremental weight boost under the full inclusion scenario. However, this does not mean sectors with fewer companies to be added are negligible. Instead, liquidity in these sectors is expected to improve significantly, with specific stocks drawing strong interest from investors. Since the launch of BCA's EMES service, we have made several calls on A-share stocks as out-of-benchmark plays, including Yutong Bus (600066 CH) and Tianqi Lithium (002466 CH) from our best-performing trade, overweight the lithium supply chain. In this vein, in this Special Report we will identify and analyze four sectors that we believe are most investment-relevant. A second Special Report examining the remaining sectors will follow in the coming weeks. Financials Some 50 companies from the financials sector will be included in the MSCI EM index, with a strong tilt toward brokerage firms (27). The rest will be split between banks (19) and insurers (4). Banks The equally weighted basket of 19 A-share banks has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 13.4%, and underperformed by 11.6% over a one-year period (Table 2). In absolute return terms, however, performance has been resilient across various time horizons. It is worth mentioning that the "big five banks" are all listed in both mainland China and Hong Kong. Therefore, investors will focus more on joint-stock banks and regional banks in the A-share universe, which makes analysis on shadow banking activities within the earnings profile crucial. Image In terms of valuation, stripping out dual-listed banks that already exist in the MSCI EM index, Huaxia Bank and CITIC Bank are trading below their book values, displaying relatively cheap valuations. Looking at profitability, three regional banks top the earnings profile: Bank of Guiyang, Bank of Ningbo, and Bank of Nanjing, while the two "cheapest" banks, Huaxia and CITIC, display the lowest ROE (Charts 2A & 2B). From a profitability versus valuation perspective, companies such as Huaxia Bank, Industrial Bank, Bank of Beijing and Pudong Development Bank offer a superior risk-reward profile (Chart 3). Image Image Image Bank of Guiyang and Ping An Bank report the highest net interest margins, but pay a relatively low dividend yield. On the other hand, Industrial Bank and Bank of Beijing have the lowest net interest margins, but relatively high dividend yields (Charts 4A & 4B). Image Image In terms of asset quality, Bank of Nanjing and Bank of Ningbo report the lowest NPL ratios, both under 1%, while Pudong Development Bank and Ping An Bank are at the top of the table. Meanwhile, Bank of Nanjing and Bank of Guiyang show the most robust loan growth, while Bank of Shanghai and Huaxia Bank suffer from the most sluggish loan growth (Charts 5A & 5B). Therefore, on a two-dimensional measure, we prefer Bank of Nanjing, and Bank of Guiyang (Chart 6). Image Image Image Screening the earnings forecast, Bank of Guiyang and Bank of Ningbo are expected to see the fastest growth in two years, while CITIC Bank and Ping An Bank will see the slowest growth (Chart 7). Image Diversified Financials The equally-weighted basket of 27 diversified financial companies has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 26.5%, and by 27.8% over a one-year period (Table 3). Currently there are only nine diversified financial companies in the MSCI EM, with seven securities companies and two state-owned asset management companies specializing in distressed asset management. As mentioned, the inclusion of A shares will not improve brokerage fees dramatically in the near term, but this milestone event could trigger a positive outlook on market sentiment, especially for the broad A-share market, where the dominant players are retail investors. This could explain the subsector's resilient performance over the past three months. Therefore, it is reasonable to be bullish on diversified financials, with the largest securities names expecting a revenue boost in the longer term. Some pure A-share names include Shenwan Hongyuan, Guosen, and Avic Capital. Image Similar to banks, after stripping out dual-listed names already included in MSCI EM (CITIC, Everbright, GF, Haitong, and Huatai), Northeast Securities and Guotai Junan Securities have the cheapest valuations, while Anxin Trust seems to be the overpriced compared to its peers. Accordingly, its ROE is remarkable (Charts 8A & 8B). Taking both dimensions into account, Guotai Junan Securities and Northeast Securities display attractive risk-reward profile (Chart 9). Image Image Image Looking at the top line, performances diverge across various securities companies. Pacific and Guoyuan generate the highest net interest margin, while Orient and Northeast suffer from serious top-line contraction (Chart 10A). Meanwhile, Guoyuan and Anxin score the highest dividend yield, exceeding 2%, while Sinolink pays less than a 0.5% dividend yield (Chart 10B). Image Image Looking at the earnings forecast, Western Securities, AVIC Capital and Sealand Securities are expected to see the strongest bottom-line growth in 2018, while local securities companies Shanxi and Huaan rank at the bottom of the spectrum (Chart 11). Image Insurance The following four insurers are already constituents of the MSCI EM index: China Life, China Pacific, New China Life and Ping An. The equally weighted basket has outperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 12.4%, and outperformed by 21.2% over a one-year period (Table 4). We will not analyze the subsector in much detail, given none of them are pure A-share companies. As such, market impact from the inclusion will not be material. EMES has been overweight Ping An's H shares since August 9, 2016.2 Image Industrials There are 44 companies in the industrials sector, the second-largest name count after financials. This sector is also expected to make the greatest impact on sector weights, assuming full A-shares inclusion. Stocks in the sector are split between airlines, national defense, machinery, construction and transportation. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 20.5%, and by 22.8% over a one-year period (Table 5). We believe increasing construction activity boosted by the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative will drive sales growth of construction equipment, while disputes in the South China Sea, India, Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous districts will continue to boost the defense industry. Image Air China, Southern Airline, China Communications Construction, China Railway Construction, China Railway Group, China State Construction Engineering, CRRC, Weichai Power, and COSCO are excluded from our analysis, as their H-listed shares are already in the MSCI EM index. Looking at valuations, the trailing P/E varies significantly across companies. Defense stocks in general are more expensive compared to other industries. By contrast, Daqin Railway stands on the lowest end of the P/E ranking, while electrical equipment companies normally display lower valuations (Chart 12A). Looking at the profitability side, Yutong Bus, one of our overweight calls, leads the ROE ranking, while Zoomlion lies on the lowest end by registering a net loss (Chart 12B). In summary, Yutong Bus, Chint Electrics, Gold Mantis and Beijing Orient Landscape will likely outperform, based on a valuation versus profitability profile comparison (Chart 13). Image Image Image Furthermore, the EV/EBITDA forecast for 2017 coincides with our overweight call on national defense stocks. It is worth noting that Eastern Airline would likely see unsatisfactory growth in terms of firm value (Chart 14A). Shanghai International Airport, Tus-sound Environment and Beijing Landscape rank as the top three measured by operating margin, while XCMG Construction Machine displays a negative margin, despite excavator sales in China surging year over year (Chart 14B). In terms of dividend and free cash flow, Yutong Bus and Zoomlion score highest on dividend yield, and Sany Heavy Industry, Daqin Railway, and XCMG secure highest free cash flow yield. On the other hand, Sany and other (check) defense stocks generate the least in dividend yields, and more than half of the companies post negative free cash flow yield (Charts 14C & 14D). Investors should be cautious on airline companies with negative free cash flow, such as Eastern Airline and Hainan Airline. Image Image Image Image Looking at leverage, Shanghai International Airport and AECC Aero-engine Control have the lowest debt-to-equity ratio, while Power Construction and China Eastern Airline are highly leveraged (Chart 14E). Image Last but not least, looking at expected growth profile, XCMG is forecast to see the highest bottom-line growth, driven by growing demand for excavators, while China Eastern Airline and Zoomlion are expected to suffer from negative growth (Chart 15). Image Consumer Discretionary Some 26 names from the consumer discretionary sector will be added to the MSCI EM index. Stripping out Fuyao Glass, BYD, Guangzhou Auto, and Haier, which are already included in the index, there are still six automakers and auto components manufacturers to be included. This should provide investors with enough investable stocks for an auto industry play. Furthermore, six A-share media companies will be added to the index over a one-year period (Table 6). Sector performance has been overall disappointing, with some exceptions being CITIC Guoan Information, Chinese Universe Publishing, Wanxiang Qianchao and China International Travel. Image Regarding valuations, CITIC Guoan Information, Suning Commerce and Alpha Group are the most expensive, with trailing P/Es surging above 50, while two automakers (SAIC and Huayu) along with a travel agency (Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town) are relatively undervalued in the sector. From a profitability perspective, Robam Appliances and Midea Group generate solid ROE, while CITIC Guoan Information and Sunning Commerce dominate the other end of the spectrum (Charts 16A & 16B). Taking these two factors into consideration, we highlight Robam Appliances, Midea Group, and Xinhua Media as the most attractive (Chart 17) based on a risk/reward profile. Investors should be cautious on Suning Commerce, not only from a fundamental perspective but also because its acquisition of Inter Milan is unlikely to generate synergy amid the Chinese government's tightening of rules on overseas M&A in the entertainment and leisure industries. Image Image Image Looking at the income statement, Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town displays robust operating performance, matching its high valuation. Robam Appliances and China South Publishing follow suit. By contrast, Suning Commerce suffers from negative margins (Chart 18A). When comparing free cash flow, Midea Group and China South Publishing register the highest yield, while Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town, Gran Automotive Service, and CITIC Guoan Information have negative yields (Chart 18B). Meanwhile, autos and auto components manufacturers enjoy the highest dividend yields, such as SAIC Motor, Huayu Automotive System, Weifu High-Tech, and Grand Automotive Service (Chart 18C). Image Image Image With respect to leverage, the media industry normally displays the lowest D/E ratio, seen in firms such as China Film, Xinhua Media and China South Publishing. On the other hand, auto and auto component manufacturers as well as large retailers are highly leveraged (Chart 18D). Image Based on our criteria, Guoan Information and Robam Appliances are expected to see the fastest bottom-line growth, while Xinhua Media, Wanxiang Qiaochao, and Xinjiekou Dept.'s bottom lines would remain stagnant (Chart 19). Image Consumer Staples Currently only nine Chinese consumer staples constituents are included in the MSCI EM Index. After the inclusion, 14 more companies will be added, substantially expanding the investable universe. Two subsectors will most likely draw investors' attention: food producers such as Yili and Henan Shuanghui, as well as beverage producers, especially premium liquor producers such as Moutai, Wuliangye Yibin and Yanghe Brewery. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 19.6%, and by 11% over a one-year period (Table 7). The sector has not deviated much from the EM benchmark across the selected time horizon. In particular, premium liquor manufacturers have been the main contributor to overall sector performance. Their sales are expected to experience a seasonal peak in September and October during the Chinese mid-autumn festival and National Day. Both Wuliangye Yibin and Moutai announced robust top-line and bottom-line growth in their second-quarter financial results, largely beating market expectations. Image Stripping out the one dual-listed name already in the MSCI EM index (Tsingtao Brewery), Changyu Pioneer, New Hope Liuhe, and Shuanghui display attractive valuations, with trailing P/Es under 20. On the other end of the metrics, Yonghui Superstores, and Luzhou Laojiao are the most expensive (Chart 20A). Examining profitability measures, Shuanghui and Moutai top the ROE rank, while Bailian Group and Yonghui Superstores sit at the bottom of the rank (Chart 20B). Looking at risk/reward profile, it is noticeable that Shuanghui, Yili and Yanghe Brewery are well positioned (Chart 21). Image Image Image In terms of operations, premium liquor makers reported overall strong operating margins, led by Moutai and Yanghe Brewery, while Bailian Group and New Hope Liuhe stand at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 22A). Looking at the capex-to-sales ratio, Wuliangye and Shuanghui score the best measures, driven by strong sales with less capex. While Changyu Pioneer demonstrates a much higher ratio compared to all peers (Chart 22B), this can be partially explained by its high capex requirement, as it is the only wine maker in the sector. Nonetheless, we believe its top line is expected to be under downward pressure as the wine market in China becomes increasingly competitive, and as premium products from France, Australia, and the U.S. gain easier market access through not only traditional in-store sales but also authorized e-commerce platforms like JD.com. Similarly, free cash flow measure also indicates that Changyu Pioneer is the only liquor player that suffers from negative yield (Chart 22C). Image Image Image In terms of financial position, with the exception of COFCO Tunhe Sugar, all companies in the sector display reasonable levels of leverage (Chart 22D). Image Looking at top-line growth, sales forecasts in FY2017 are more in favor of Moutai, Dabeinong Technology, and Luzhou Laojiao, but less in favor of Bailian Group, Shuanghui, and Changyu Pioneer (Chart 23A). Moreover, when looking at bottom-line growth two years out, Luzhou Laojiao and Yonghui Superstores score the highest rankings, while Changyu Pioneer and Shuanghui are at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 23B). Image Image In summary, among food producers, we are inclined to overweight Shuanghui. Among beverage producers, we like Yanghe Brewery, and Wuliangye, but are avoiding Changyu Pioneer. What's Next? We will highlight the following sectors in part 2 of our Special Report: Materials, energy, IT, telecoms, healthcare, and real estate. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com Appendix - I Image Appendix - II Overweight Company Profile Image Image Image Image Underweight Company Profile Image Image 1 For the full MSCI press release, please visit: https://www.msci.com/eqb/pressreleases/archive/2017_Market_Classification_Announcement_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf 2 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy - Investment case "China Healthcare, Getting Healthier", dated August 9, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. The Mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. Both the steel and coal industries in China are becoming more efficient and more competitive, with low-quality output falling and high-quality supply rising. Feature Reducing capacity (also called "de-capacity") in the oversupplied commodities markets (e.g., steel, coal, cement, and aluminum) has been a key priority within China's structural supply side reforms over the past two years. The reforms were announced by President Xi Jinping in November 2015 and have focused primarily on steel and coal, and to a lesser extent on the aluminum and cement sectors. China's "de-capacity" reforms have been aiming to reduce inefficient productive capacity and low-quality output of the above mentioned commodities, as well as boost medium-to-high-quality production. The main focus of this report is to dissect China's supply side "de-capacity" reforms, and to assess their impact on steel, coal and iron ore prices. The de-capacity reforms were announced in late 2015 and, coincidentally, all major industrial commodities prices made a synchronized bottom in late 2015/early 2016 (Chart I-1). Chart I-1ASynchronized Bottom & Rally: ##br##Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Chart I-1BSynchronized Bottom & Rally: ##br##Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? China is the largest producer and consumer of various raw materials, ranging from steel and coal to base metals. Hence, two interesting questions arise: was it the "de-capacity" reforms or other factors that caused the various raw materials to bottom in early 2016 and rally thereafter? How will China's ongoing "de-capacity" reforms affect steel, coal, and iron ore prices going into 2018 and 2019? Progress Of "De-Capacity" Reforms Three main approaches have been used by policymakers with respect to de-capacity reforms: The government sets up capacity reduction targets and then implements concrete plans to achieve these targets. The government conducts inspections to ensure the reforms are being implemented or for environmental protection purposes. The government aims to eliminate outdated capacity by setting up electricity price rules (higher electricity prices for producers with inefficient technologies) as well as ordering banks to curtail lending to those producers. In terms of timelines, the Chinese supply side "de-capacity" reforms so far have been rolled out in three phases: Phase I: Initiation and preparation phase (2015 Q4 - 2016 H1): The first phase involved policy makers drawing related policies and capacity reduction targets in the steel and coal industries. Local governments and related SOEs began implementing the so-called "de-capacity" reforms. During this period, only 30% of the 2016 capacity reduction targets for both steel and coal markets were achieved. Phase II: The accelerating implementation phase (2016 H2): The second phase included a ramp-up of "de-capacity" reforms, with over 70% of 2016 steel and coal capacity reduction targets being implemented. Meanwhile, steel production disruptions increased due to more stringent environmental rules, more frequent inspections, and government-ordered closures of low-quality steel (called "Ditiaogang" in Chinese) production in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces. Phase III: The reform-deepening phase (2017): The third phase, implemented in the first half of this year, was a clamping down on overcapacity to eliminate all illegal sub-standard steel (Ditiaogang) production and capacity by the end of June 2017. To date, the Chinese authorities have succeeded in their "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal: both the steel and coal industries in China have become more efficient, more competitive, and have much less obsolete excess capacity: The government's plan was to reduce capacity by 100-150 million metric tons in steel and 1 billion metric tons in coal within "three to five years." This equated to a 9-13% and 18% reduction of existing 2015 Chinese capacity in steel and coal, respectively. In addition, this is equivalent to 7-9% for steel and 10% for coal of 2015's global output (Table I-1). As of August 2017, within less than two years since the beginning of the supply side reforms, 77% of the steel "de-capacity" target (or 10% of 2015 capacity) and 52% of the coal "de-capacity" target (or 7% of 2015 capacity) have been achieved (Table I-1). Table I-1Chinese Supply-Side Reform - Capacity Reduction Target And Actual Achievement China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed With declining capacity and rising production, the capacity utilization rates (CUR) of the steel and coal industries have increased meaningfully. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that as of the third quarter of 2017, the CUR for the steel industry has risen to 76.7% (the highest since 2013, and an increase of 4.4 percentage points from a year ago). As for the coal sector, the CUR reached 69% (the highest since 2015, and an increase of 10.6 percentage points from a year ago). With outdated and illegal production capacity exiting the marketplace, the number of companies and the number of employees have declined significantly in both the steel and coal industries (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Since the start of the "de-capacity" reforms, the central government has allocated 100 billion yuan (0.1% of GDP and 3.6% of central government spending) to a special fund for the relocation of employees in the coal and steel industries. Chart I-2Consolidation In Chinese Steel ##br##And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Consolidation In Chinese Steel And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Consolidation In Chinese Steel And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Chart I-3...And Fewer Employees ...And Fewer Employees ...And Fewer Employees Higher prices for steel and coal have greatly boosted producers' profitability. From January 2016 to September 2017, the number of loss-making enterprises as a share of all enterprises has dropped from 25% to 17% in the steel industry and from 34% to 21% in the coal sector. Improving financial conditions have enhanced steel and coal companies' ability to invest in industrial upgrades (i.e., more investment in advanced technologies and new equipment). Bottom Line: Chinese "de-capacity" reforms have been successfully implemented, which has improved economic efficiency in the steel and coal industries by reducing high-cost and low-quality supply, and by increasing lower-cost and high-quality output. Understanding The Cycle In this section, we try to connect the dots between the progress of China's supply side reforms, and steel and coal prices. Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B show the fascinating dynamics among policy actions, production and prices. Chart I-4APolicy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Chart I-4BPolicy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Here are our major findings: (A) Except for coal, Chinese "de-capacity" reforms were not the major trigger for the price bottom in major industrial commodities in early 2016. As the period from November 2015 to June 2016 was only the initiation stage of the reforms, not much steel capacity reduction - only 1.2% of total existing 2015 capacity - occurred in the first half year of 2016. Moreover, most of the reduced capacity was outdated capacity and probably had been offline for years. Therefore, the policy driven capacity cut in the first half of 2016 was unlikely the reason for the rally in steel prices. The reasons behind the bottom in raw materials prices in general and steel in particular during the first half of 2016 were the following: 1. Production cuts in both 2015 and the first half of 2016 was market-driven. In other words, it was not government reforms but natural market forces (the dramatic drop in raw materials prices in 2015) that caused company closures and declines in various raw materials output in both 2015 and the first half of 2016 (Chart I-4A). The price recovery in the first half of 2016 was not sufficient to make most producers profitable. 2. Remarkably, the authorities injected considerable amounts of credit and fiscal stimulus in late 2015 and early 2016. As a result, demand recovery was another major trigger for the synchronized bottom in early 2016. The rise in the aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse led to a revival in property construction, automobile production and infrastructure investment in the first half of 2016 (Chart I-5). 3. Financial/speculative demand for commodities was also a driving force behind the early 2016 price recovery. Chart I-6 illustrates that Mainland trading volumes in various commodities futures surged in the first half of 2016, and specifically in coal in the third quarter of 2016, coinciding with their respective price spikes. Chart I-5Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Chart I-6Speculative Buying In Early 2016 Speculative Buying In Early 2016 Speculative Buying In Early 2016 All of these factors contributed to the synchronized price bottom in early 2016 and the consequent price rally in the first half of 2016, in which Chinese "de-capacity" reforms only played a minor role, especially in the steel market. (B) Chinese "de-capacity" reforms were the determining factor for the coal price spike in 2016 and steel price appreciation in 2017. Coal in 2016: "De-capacity" reforms were behind the surge in coal and coke prices throughout 2016. In February 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) stipulated that domestic coal mines could operate no more than 276 working days in one year, down from 330 working days in the past. This was equivalent to the immediate removal of 16% of existing operating capacity off the market. Before this decision, Chinese coal production had already declined 2.5% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015 (Chart I-4B on page 6). On top of this decision, the government enforced a 250 million metric ton capacity cut target in the coal industry in 2016. Furthermore, actual coal capacity reduction in 2016 was 116% of that year's target (Table I-1). The end result was a 10% decline in Chinese coal production during the period of January and September of 2016 from the same period of 2015, triggering an exponential rise in both thermal coal and coking coal prices (Chart I-1 on page 2). Coking coal is mainly used for coke production, and coke is employed as a fuel in smelting iron ore in a blast furnace to produce steel. Therefore, a shortage of coking coal combined with a revival in steel production made coke the best-performing commodity last year, with its price skyrocketing by 300%. Chart I-7Diverging Prices In 2017 DIVERGING PRICES IN 2017 DIVERGING PRICES IN 2017 Towards the end of last year, the authorities realized that "de-capacity" in the coal market was too aggressive, and began loosening up coal production restrictions in September 2016. Last November the NDRC further eased policy by allowing companies to operate 330 days a year again (Chart I-4B on page 6). In response to these adjustments, thermal coal, coking coal and coke prices all peaked in December 2016/early 2017 (Chart I-1 on page 2). This reveals how Chinese supply side reforms can be a determining factor for global commodities prices. Steel prices in 2017: Steel prices have exhibited a steady rally throughout 2017, even though prices for coal, coke and iron ore all declined. There has been considerable price divergence this year between steel, on one hand, and coal, coke and iron ore, on the other. Prices for thermal coal, coking coal, coke and iron ore all peaked in late 2016/early 2017, while prices for steel continued to rise and reached a six-year high in September, expanding profit margins for steel producers (Chart I-7). The resilience of steel prices this year was because the Mainland had dismantled all "Ditiaogang" capacity by the end of June 2017, resulting in an accelerated drop in steel products production (Chart I-4A on page 6). "Ditiaogang" is low-quality steel made by melting scrap metal in cheap and easy-to-install induction furnaces. These steel products are of poor quality, and also lead to environmental degradation. "Ditiaogang" is often converted into products like rebar and wire rods. As steel produced this way is illegal, it is not recorded in official crude steel production data. However, after it is converted into steel products, official steel products production data do include it. Both falling steel products production and surging scrap steel exports entail that the "Ditiaogang" capacity elimination policy has been very effective (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has ##br##Been Successfully Implemented The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has Been Successfully Implemented The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has Been Successfully Implemented As reported by the government, about 120 million metric tons per year of "Ditiaogang" capacity has been eliminated, more than double this year's steel "de-capacity" target of 50 million metric tons. A considerable portion of the 120 million metric ton "Ditiaogang" capacity was still in operation early this year when "Ditiaogang" producers enjoyed higher profit margins than large steel producers. This rapid change created a sudden squeeze on steel products supply, which consequently boosted their prices. Bottom Line: China's "de-capacity" reforms have played a major role in driving the rallies in steel prices in 2017 and in the coal markets in 2016. In short, China's supply-side reforms have been effective in shaping prices and boosting efficiency in Mainland industries by eliminating weak/inefficient producers or forcing their industrial upgrade. However, the government efforts at times have also produced large price swings, as in the case of both coal and coke. The Outlook For 2018 And 2019 Given past success and the nation's leadership adherence to reforms, China will firmly proceed with its "de-capacity" reform strategy over the next two years. However, steel and coal prices are likely to decline going forward. The most aggressive phase of "de-capacity" reforms is now behind us. The pace of capacity reduction for both steel and coal will decrease over the next two years as more than half of the 2016-2020 target has already been achieved for both sectors. Both steel and coal producers currently enjoy near-decade high profit margins, and their profits have swelled (Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B). Not surprisingly, steel and coal producers have already sped up their investment in advanced technologies to augment their capacity - by introducing ecologically friendly equipment that can produce medium- to high-end quality products. Chart I-9AStrong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Rising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Rising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Chart I-9BRising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Strong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Strong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Importantly, the capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity to replace obsolete capacity at a ratio of 1:1-1.25 (the range depends on region). In short, having eliminated the inefficient/outdated capacity, producers are now allowed to add as much capacity as they had before, but using efficient technologies. This will weigh on steel and coal prices as output gains and production costs will likely be lower with new technologies. In addition, Chinese steel producers are accelerating the expansion of advanced electric furnace (EF) capacity. At 6%, current Chinese EF steel output as a share of total steel production is much lower than the same ratio for the major world steel producers and the world average (Chart I-10). The Chinese government's target is to raise the share of EF crude steel production as a share of total production to 15% by 2020. It usually takes at least 1-2 years to build a new EF plant. Hence, newly installed EF capacity will likely come into operation in 2018-'19. On the whole, this points to lower prices for crude steel and steel products. The EF steel-making process only requires scrap steel and electricity to produce crude steel. It does not need either iron ore or coke. This is negative for iron ore and coke prices. With the abundance of used cars and used home appliances in China, the domestic availability of scrap steel has significantly improved over the past few decades. In addition, electricity prices for industrial use have declined by about 5% since March 2015. Therefore, easing resource constraints (availability of scrap steel) and lower electricity costs will facilitate EF steel capacity expansion in China. Some words about the policy-driven steel production cut during the winter season. More than two dozen cities in northern China drew up detailed action plans during September and October to fight the notorious winter smog. China has set a target to reduce the level of Particulate Matter (PM) 2.5 pollution by at least 15% in cities around the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region between October 2017 and March 2018. The new rules will require seasonal suspensions or production cuts of steel, aluminum and cement (with the most focus on steel) during the winter heating season from November 15 to March 15. Therefore, over the next four months, downside in steel and coal prices may be limited due to support from these output cuts. This also entails less short-term demand for coke and iron ore, prices for these commodities may remain under downward pressure. Nonetheless, Chinese crude steel output is set to continue rising over the next two years, which in turn will eventually reverse the recent decline in steel products production and assure expansion in steel products production in 2018-'19 (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Chinese Electric Furnace Crude ##br##Steel Production Will Go Up China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed Chart I-11Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up For coal, production will accelerate in 2018. The NDRC expects coal production capacity to rise by a net 200 million metric tons this year as increases at more "advanced" mines exceed shutdowns of outmoded facilities. This will be a 50 million metric ton gain over this year's 150 million metric ton obsolete capacity reduction target. In addition, China's coal utilization rate as of the third quarter of 2017 was still below 70%, implying substantial additional capacity remains, potentially boosting coal output, so long as the government does not alter the 330 working-day rule. Importantly, on the demand side, China is aiming to reduce coal usage for electricity generation while promoting renewable energy like hydro, nuclear, wind and solar. This constitutes a structural headwind to coal prices. This is especially significant, given than China accounts for half of global coal consumption. The supply side reforms of the past two years (shutting down inferior capacity) along with the adoption of new, more efficient technologies, has already strengthened the competitiveness of Chinese steel and coal producers. This entails that China will soon resume net exports of steel products, and that its net imports of coal will drop (Chart I-12). This is bad news for international steel and coal producers, who in the past two years have benefited from higher steel and coal prices on the back of a revival in Chinese demand, and curtailed supply. Last but not least, our broad money impulse as well as the aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse shows that economic growth in general and demand for industrial metals in particular are set to decelerate considerably in the next nine to 12 months or so (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports ##br##And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports Chart I-13Demand Is Set To Decelerate bca.ems_sr_2017_11_22_s1_c13 bca.ems_sr_2017_11_22_s1_c13 Chinese steel and coal markets will determine the direction of coke and iron ore prices, both of which will likely be headed lower as well. Coke: Rising coking coal output as a result of coal production ramping up will increase coke supply sizably. As an increasing share of steel output will come from non-coke-reliant EF capacity, coke demand growth will be constrained. Iron ore: Recovering domestic iron ore production could cap China's imports of iron ore (Chart I-14). First, a marginal rise in profit margins for Chinese iron ore domestic producers and a declining number of loss-generating companies heralds modest upside for iron ore output in China (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chart I-15Chinese Iron Ore Producers: ##br##Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Chinese Iron Ore Producers: Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Chinese Iron Ore Producers: Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Second, more vertical integration - a rising number of Chinese steel producers that have bought iron ore mines - will result in higher domestic iron ore output. Steel companies' current fat profit margins could prompt them to boost iron ore output from the mines that they have integrated into their production chain. Although profits from iron ore production specifically are likely to be limited. This will be the case especially if the government encourages them to do so. Last year, Chinese iron ore imports accounted for 87% of national total consumption - an all-time high. The authorities dislike such great dependence on resource imports, and the government will likely introduce policies such as reducing taxes for domestic iron ore producers or other efforts to boost domestic production. Bottom Line: China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. The Mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist EllenJ@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations