Emerging Markets

Highlights The Fed is the usual culprit for killing business cycles — but the Fed is on hold. This makes geopolitics the likeliest candidate to kill the cycle. The key geopolitical risks are US political turmoil, China’s economic policy, and the US-Iran confrontation. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to the threat of recession, which points to a continuation of this long-in-the-tooth expansion. The US-China talks will be driven by Trump’s need for an economic boost ahead of the US election. If the economy or Trump’s approval rating fails anyway, then all bets are off. Go long gold as a strategic hedge. Feature Great power struggle, or “multipolarity,” continues to be our mega-theme in 2020. The world does not operate like a normal society, with a single government that possesses a monopoly on the use of force and ensures stability. Nations are individualistic, armed, and dangerous, creating what scholar Hedley Bull once called “The Anarchical Society.” This is not pure chaos, but rather a community of nations that lacks a clear and undisputed leader. Hence, quarrels break out often. Updating our geopolitical power index shows that the rise of China remains the most disruptive trend in global politics (Chart 1). The gap between the US and China has closed until recently, with China’s downshift in growth rates, but American fear is just being awakened (Chart 2). Given that Beijing threatens the US’s military and technological dominance over the long run, Washington will continue to develop a containment policy. Chart 1China's Geopolitical Rise Is Disruptive Chart 2China-US Power Gap Is Narrowing China is too big to quarantine, especially for a relatively unpopular first-term American president who eschews international coalition-building. The European Union’s decline in relative power is more marked than that of the United States, but China does not pose as much of a security threat to Europe. This trend exacerbates the already serious divergence in the trans-Atlantic alliance – which will worsen if Trump wins on November 3, 2020. Hence, globalization faces persistent challenges, as indicated by the falling import share of global output (Chart 3). This multi-decade process has peaked, creating a headwind for trade-exposed firms over the long run. What about the next 12 months? Will geopolitics kill the bull market? Not necessarily. Just as central bankers have cut interest rates to guard against deflationary risks (Chart 4), so the key governments are adjusting policies to avoid recessionary risks, especially with the memory of 2008 still fresh. Simply put: The Fed is on pause, Trump wants to be reelected, and China cannot afford a hard landing. Chart 3Globalization Faces Challenges Chart 4Policymakers Are Reacting To Deflationary Risks Clearly the risks to this view are elevated. The chief ones: (1) President Trump becomes a lame duck, cannot run on an economic platform, and thus makes a desperate attempt to win as a “war president” (2) Xi Jinping overestimates his advantage, in domestic or foreign policy, and makes a policy mistake (3) the US-Iran conflict spirals out of control due to Iran’s economic vulnerability. Other risks, such as Brexit, pale by comparison. Fear And Loathing On The Campaign Trail It is too soon to declare that Trump’s presidency is finished. On the contrary he is slightly favored to win reelection: • The Senate is unlikely to remove him from office. Republican support for the president is well above average despite evidence that Trump tried to get Ukrainian officials to investigate his political rival (Chart 5). The implication is that a year from now Democrats will have suffered a policy failure while Trump will have been cleared of charges. Chart 5Trump Still Popular Among Republicans • The odds of recession in the coming year are low. The US voter is buffered by rising real incomes and wages and high net wealth (Chart 6). To unseat a sitting president requires a recessionary backdrop that fundamentally discredits him and his party – not just slowing growth. Chart 6Pocketbook Voter Theory To The Test • Trump’s low approval rating does not prohibit him from reelection. While historically low, it is also historically stable. Our quantitative election model – which predicts Trump will win the Electoral College with 279 votes by clinging onto Pennsylvania – shows that Trump’s victory margin would increase if we looked not at the average level of his approval but at its change, momentum, or low range (i.e. stability). Table 1 shows the results of all four variations of his approval rating, with ascending chances of winning key swing states. Table 1All Measures Of Trump’s Approval Rating Get Him 270 Electoral College Votes Trump’s odds of winning will affect the US equity market throughout the year. As long as he remains competitive, i.e. neither scandal nor the economy cause his approval rating to break down, he will have reason to temper his policies to cater to US financial markets. Foreign and trade policies are Trump’s only ways to improve the economy and voter support. Trump’s only remaining way to boost the economy and improve voter support lies in foreign policy and trade policy. Specifically, he will stop increasing tariffs on China – and maybe even roll back tariffs to August 2019 or even April 2019 levels (Chart 7) – at least as long as the manufacturing recession persists. Chart 7Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible China is unlikely to implement painful structural changes when Trump could be gone in 12 months’ time. Strategic tensions outside of trade will undermine any ceasefire. Hence economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated even though it will drop off from recent peaks. Assuming the electoral constraint prevents Trump from levying sweeping tariffs on China or Europe, he will be limited to other foreign and trade policies to try to boost his approval rating or fire up his base: • We expect a third summit with Kim Jong Un of North Korea. Trump is rumored to be considering some troop reduction in exchange for progress on denuclearization (neither of which would be irreversible). • Otherwise Trump could turn to saber-rattling, since Pyongyang is threatening to resume long-range tests and the economic consequences of another round of “fire and fury” would be limited. • Trump could also rattle the saber against Iran, Venezuela, or other rogue states. If Trump becomes uncompetitive in the election, then the market will sell off. The market will have to price not only policy discontinuity (e.g. higher taxes), but also the chance of a progressive-populist taking the White House. Moreover, if a Democrat is able to unseat an incumbent president, the Democrats will take the Senate as well. Trump is a known unknown; this scenario would be an unknown unknown. The Democratic Party’s primary election will consume the first half of the year. It culminates in the Democratic National Convention, strategically chosen to take place in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16. Wisconsin is one of three critical swing states. Will former Vice President Joe Biden win the nomination? A high conviction is not warranted. Biden is clearly the frontrunner, but we think a progressive can pull it off. A simulation of the Democratic Convention “pledged delegates,” based on November polling in the first four primary elections, shows Biden far short of a majority (Chart 8). He needs to outperform his polls, but this will be difficult given that he is well-known, has not performed well in debates, and will have Mayors Pete Buttigieg and Michael Bloomberg nipping at his heels in the Midwest and Northeast, respectively. Chart 8Do Not Discount A Progressive Win Over time, candidates will drop out, so it is more informative to look at the “centrist” candidates as a whole compared to the “progressives.” Here the early primary polling suggests that the progressives will come closest to victory (Chart 9). Chart 9Progressives Come Closest To Victory The trend within the party is to move to the left. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders are tied as voters’ second choice – even Buttigieg supporters are split between Biden and Warren (Chart 10). What is unknown is whether Warren (or Sanders) can consolidate the progressive vote faster than Biden (or Buttigieg) consolidates the centrist vote. Chart 10If Biden Falters, Progressives Are Next In Line Chart 11Structural Imbalances Give Rise To Populism Trends pointing toward a progressive victory may not at first trouble the market, but any signs that a progressive is pulling ahead decisively will force investors to sharply upgrade the probability that he or she will win the White House. This will cause equity volatility, which could become self-reinforcing. A progressive nominee would force investors to recognize that populism and political risk are here to stay – which is our expectation given that they are motivated by polarization, inequality, and other structural imbalances in the United States (Chart 11). Left-wing or progressive populism is far more negative for corporate earnings than Trump’s right-wing or “pluto-populism.” Sanders or Warren present the worst case for investors because they favor trade protectionism in addition to higher taxes and minimum wages. Most presidents achieve their chief legislative priority in their first term and there is no reason to assume a progressive presidency would be any different. The implication is higher corporate taxes as well as individual taxes to pay for a sweeping expansion of the social safety net – positive for the economy perhaps but negative for corporate earnings. Chart 12A Progressive Win Threatens Key Sectors An extensive re-regulation of the US economy would occur regardless, since it falls under executive authority. It would affect the key equity sectors in the US bourse, technology and health (Chart 12), as well as energy and financials. The choice of a centrist Democrat like Biden (or Buttigieg) would be the least negative outcome for US equities of all the Democrats. The market would probably cheer a Trump versus Biden matchup for this reason. Biden favors higher taxes and regulation but is an establishment politician and known quantity. However, even Biden will be pulled to the left by the current within his party once in office; and Buttigieg will govern to the left of Biden. Trump’s reelection would spur a relief rally in US equities, but it would be short-lived. He would solidify low taxes and deregulation and would have a real chance of passing an infrastructure package. But he would also curtail labor force growth with his border wall and double down on trade protectionism – likely against Europe as well as China this time. His unpredictable and aggressive tendencies would be turbo-charged by a new popular mandate. We expect to cut back on risk exposure upon Trump’s reelection, assuming the bull market has survived to return him to office. A Democratic victory would mark another reversal in US policy orientation. Given our view that the White House call is also the Senate call, this would be the third time since 2008 that the country has witnessed a total reversal. Domestic American political risk will not end with the election: a legitimacy crisis could follow a narrow election, and institutional erosion continues regardless. It is too soon to call peak polarization, as the election will result in either a left-wing government bent on redistributing wealth or a right-wing Trump administration that exacerbates inequality. A centrist "return to normalcy" is possible with a Biden or Buttigieg victory. This reinforces our constructive cyclical view. Bottom Line: The chief risk from US politics in 2020 is Trump becoming a lame duck and resorting to belligerent foreign policy to try to win back voters through a rally around the flag. The chief risk of the Democratic nomination, and the general election, is a left-wing populist winning the White House. Any Democratic victory would likely bring the Senate, removing a key constraint. Over time the median voter is moving to the left. The Man Who Changed China Chart 13Xi Is Purging Misallocated Capital Xi Jinping undoubtedly represents a “new era” in China – a reassertion of Communist Party rule. The party faced a crisis of legitimacy amid the Great Recession and Arab Spring and was determined to regain political, economic, and social control. Xi had previously been anointed but was all too happy to take on the role of neo-Maoist strongman. Yet Xi’s playbook is close to that of President Jiang Zemin’s: centralize the party, repress dissent, modernize the military, restructure banks and the economy, upgrade the country’s science and technology, and expand China’s global influence. The difference is that while Jiang rode the high tide of globalization, Xi is riding the receding tide. Jiang culled two-thirds of the country’s state-owned enterprises, laying off over 40 million people, confident that a surge of new growth would ensue. Xi is also cracking down – allowing bankruptcies to purge misallocated capital (Chart 13) – but with a large debt load and shrinking labor force, he needs the state sector to put a floor under growth rates. The takeaway is that Xi will act pragmatically to boost growth when China’s stability is threatened, as he did in 2015-16. The trade war has already forced him to backtrack on the 2017-18 deleveraging campaign and stimulate the economy. The combined fiscal and credit impulse amounts to 6.6% of GDP from trough to now, and it hasn’t peaked. The implication is that Chinese growth – and global growth – will pick up from here (Chart 14). Chinese authorities are still trying to contain the growth in leverage, which has kept this year’s stimulus in check. But the chief banking regulator has also stated that as long as the macro-leverage ratio is not growing faster than 10%, this goal is met (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Growth Will Pick Up Chart 15China Says Leverage Already Contained The economy has not yet durably bottomed, so the state will continue adding support. The coming year is the third and final year of the “Three Battles” – against poverty, pollution, and systemic risk – as well as the final year of the thirteenth five-year plan. Beijing is falling short on its targets for real urban per capita income (Chart 16) and poverty elimination (Chart 17). A last-minute rush to meet these targets is likely and will require more fiscal stimulus. Chart 16Beijing Falls Short Of Urban Income Target... Chart 17...And Poverty Target This is not an argument for a blowout credit splurge. China is saving dry powder for a further escalation in the US containment strategy and a worse economic downturn. Do not expect a blowout Chinese credit splurge. The core constraint on policy is unemployment. Stimulus efforts have created a bottom in the employment component of the manufacturing PMI as well as a notable uptick in the demand for urban labor (Chart 18). To withdraw stimulus now – or tighten policy – would be to trigger a relapse in an economy that is ultimately at risk of a debt-deflation trap. Chart 18Chinese Stimulus Shows Up In Employment Chart 19A Banking Crisis Is A Risk To The Chinese Economy Tougher controls on credit and shadow banking have seen an uptick in corporate defaults and bank failures. With the government deliberately imposing pain on bloated sectors of the economy, financial turmoil could spread. Newspaper mentions of defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies have only slightly subsided since stimulus efforts began (Chart 19). If bank failures spiral out of control, the economy will tank. The state will have to fight fires. Tariffs have accelerated the trend of firms relocating out of China, which began because of rising wages and a darkening business environment (Chart 20). A questionable trade ceasefire will not reverse the process as American and Asian companies are seeking a lasting solution, which requires them to set up shop elsewhere. China will want to mitigate the process, first by stabilizing domestic growth, and second by accepting Trump’s tactical trade retreat. Xi is also trying to avoid diplomatic isolation by courting trade partners other than the US, since the ceasefire is unreliable and the US containment strategy is presumed to continue. This involves outreach to the rest of Asia, Russia, and Europe, and even to distrustful neighbors like Japan and India. Europe is the swing player. China’s Asian neighbors, and Australia and New Zealand, have reason to fear Beijing’s growing clout and seek the US’s security umbrella. Russia and China are informal allies. But the European public is not interested in the new cold war – China does not threaten Europe from next door, like Russia does, and the Trump administration is threatening Europe with both trade war and Middle Eastern instability. European leaders are happy to take the market share that the US is leaving, as is clear from direct investment (Chart 21). Only a concentrated US diplomatic effort can address this divergence, which is not forthcoming in 2020. Chart 20Firms Are Relocating Out Of China Chart 21Europe Exploits US-China Rift A new Democratic administration, or a change in Trump strategy in the second term, could eventually produce a multilateral western coalition demanding that China open up and liberalize parts of its economy. But Europe will need to be convinced of the underlying reality that China is doubling down on the state-led industrial policies that provoked the Americans to begin with. Beijing is after economic self-sufficiency, indigenous innovation, and leadership in high-tech production and new frontiers. Its official research and development budget is not its only means for achieving this end (Chart 22) – it also has state-backed acquisitions and cyber campaigns. Germany and Europe have begun scrutinizing Chinese investment, separately from the United States. Chart 22Beijing Is After Economic Self-Sufficiency The danger to China – and the world – is that Xi Jinping might overplay his hand. He could overtighten money, credit, or property regulations and spoil the economy when global growth is vulnerable. His anti-corruption campaign is a telling reminder of his heavy hand in domestic affairs (Chart 23). Chart 23Xi Jinping Risks Overplaying His Hand Chart 24China Needs To Calm Things Down He could also suppress protesters in Hong Kong and rattle sabers over Taiwan or the South China Sea in a way that undermines the trade ceasefire. Or he could fail to bring the North Koreans to heel. These strategic tensions are significant only insofar as they undermine the trade ceasefire or provoke US-China saber-rattling. Failing to act as an honest broker in the Iran crisis would also irk Europeans and give them an excuse to side with the US. Bottom Line: China will continue modestly stimulating the economy next year to achieve a durable stabilization in growth. The risk of debt-deflation and rising unemployment ultimately necessitates this policy. Beijing can accept Trump’s tariff rollback for the sake of stability – China’s policy uncertainty relative to the rest of the world is off the charts and Beijing has an interest in calming things down (Chart 24). Yet Beijing will double down on indigenous innovation, while courting the rest of the world so as to preempt criticism and isolate the Americans. The risk is that Xi proves too heavy-handed when it comes to domestic leverage, the tech grab, strategic disputes, or trade talks with Washington. The Strait Of Hormuz Risk Chart 25US-Iran Conflict Still Unresolved In a special report earlier this year entitled “The Polybius Solution” we argued that while the US-China conflict is the major long-term geopolitical conflict, the US-Iran showdown could supersede it in the short term. This remains a risk for 2020, as the Trump administration’s confrontation with Iran is fundamentally unresolved (Chart 25). The Trump administration is still enforcing “maximum pressure” sanctions, which have reduced Iranian oil exports from 1.8 million barrels per day at their recent peak to 100,000 barrels per day in November (Chart 26). These are crippling sanctions that have sent Iran’s economy reeling. Chart 26Iran Remains Under Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled out negotiations with Trump. They would be unpopular at home without a major reversal on sanctions from Trump (Chart 27). Chart 27Major US Reversal Prerequisite For Iran Talks Trump presumably aims to avoid an oil shock ahead of the election. The US and its allies have visibly shied away from conflict in the wake of Iran’s provocations, including the spectacular attack on eastern Saudi Arabia that knocked 5.7 million barrels of oil per day offline in September. However, this does not mean the odds of war are zero. The Americans or the Iranians could miscalculate. Both sides might think they can improve their standing at home by flexing their muscles abroad. Iran is a rational actor and would not normally court American airstrikes or antagonize a potentially lame duck president. Yet it is under extreme pressure due to the sanctions. It faces significant unrest both at home and in its sphere of influence (Iraq and Lebanon). Opinion polls show that the public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy, and yet that American sanctions are siphoning off some of this anger (Chart 28). This could tempt the leaders to continue staging provocations in the Strait of Hormuz or elsewhere in the region. Chart 28Iranians Blame Tehran, Tehran Blames America Hardline military leaders and politicians currently receive the most favor in polling, while the reformist President Rouhani – undercut by the American withdrawal from the 2015 deal – is among the least popular (Chart 29). The Majlis (parliament) elections in February will likely reverse the reformist turn in Iranian politics that began in 2012. The regime stalwarts are gearing up for the supreme leader’s succession in the coming years. While a Democratic White House could restore the 2015 deal, that ship may have sailed. Chart 29Rouhani And Reformists In Trouble A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Chart 30The Iranians May Take Excessive Risk Trump, under impeachment, could seek to distract the public. This was Bill Clinton’s tactic with Operations Infinite Reach, Desert Fox, and Allied Force in 1998-99. These operations were minor and not comparable to a conflict with Iran. However, Trump may be emboldened. On paper the US strategic petroleum reserve (along with OPEC and other petroleum reserves) could cover most major oil shock scenarios. According to Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, a supply outage the size of the Abqaiq attack in September would have to persist for four months to cause enough price pressure to harm the US economy and decrease Trump’s chances of winning reelection. The simulations in Chart 30 overstate the gasoline price impact by assuming that global oil reserves remain untapped. Thus while the Iranians may take excessive risks, the Trump administration may not refrain this time from airstrikes. Bottom Line: While the Middle East is always full of risks to oil supply, Iran’s vulnerability and Trump’s status at home make the situation unusually precarious. A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Europe Is A Price Taker, Not A Price Maker Just as the US and China have a shared incentive to avoid tariff-induced recession, so the UK and EU have a shared incentive to prevent a shock reversion to basic WTO tariffs. The December 31, 2020 deadline for the UK-EU trade deal, like the various deadlines for Brexit itself, can be delayed. Even Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proved unwilling to exit without a deal and even a hung parliament has proved capable of preventing him from doing so. The negotiation of a trade deal – which is never easy and always drags on – will be a lower-order risk in the wake of the past two years’ Brexit-induced volatility. Johnson will not be held hostage by hardline Brexiters given that Brexit itself will be complete. If our view on Chinese growth is correct, then Europe’s economy can recover and European political risk will be a “red herring” in 2020, as it was in 2019. Instead the EU presents an opportunity. Chart 31Euro Area Breakup Risk Has Subsided Euro Area break-up risk has subsided after a series of challenges in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis (Chart 31). There is not a basis for a reversal of this trend, at least not until a full-blown recession afflicts the continent. The rise in anti-establishment parties coincided with a one-off surge in migration that is finished – and successful populists from Greece to Italy have moderated on euro membership once in power. Germany is entering a profound transition driven by de-globalization and tensions with the United States. It is more likely to have an early election than the consensus holds. But it is fundamentally stable and supportive of European integration. In fact the great debate about fiscal policy poses an upside risk over the long run both for European equities and the European project. We remain optimistic on French structural reforms even though President Emmanuel Macron must overcome significant public opposition. An eerie quiet hangs over Russia, making it one of our “Black Swan” risks for 2020. Oil prices are not very high, which discourages foreign adventures, and President Vladimir Putin has spent his fourth term trying to consolidate international gains and improve domestic stability. But approval of the government is weak, the job market is deteriorating, and social unrest is cropping up. There is plenty of room to ease monetary and fiscal policy, but a sharp downturn could provide the basis for an aggressive foreign policy action to shore up regime support. The US election also presents the risk of renewed US-Russian tensions, whether over election interference or a Democratic victory. Investment Conclusions Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to derail the global bull market in 2020. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to their constraints. Trump and Xi are negotiating a ceasefire and a disorderly Brexit is off the table. Even Trump’s impeachment shows that the US system of checks and balances remains intact. After all, there is nothing to prevent removal from office if Trump further antagonizes public opinion and the Republican Senate. This means that policy uncertainty will decline on the margin in 2020, even as it remains elevated due to the danger of the underlying events. The nature of US economic imbalances suggests that the policy discontinuity of a Democratic victory on November 3, 2020 would be better for the economy (via household consumption) than it would be for corporate earnings. Policy continuity with the Trump administration suggests the opposite. On a sectoral basis we recommend going long US energy large cap stocks and short info-tech and communications. Energy has limited downside even if a progressive wins whereas tech has limited upside even if Trump wins. The BCA Research House View expects the US dollar to weaken as global growth rebounds, stocks to outperform bonds and cash, and developed market equities to outperform those of the United States. But a Republican victory in November would push against these trends as it is more bullish for the greenback and for US equities relative to global. As a play on the global growth rebound we expect, we recommend going long industrial metals. Like our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, we are initiating this as a tactical trade but it may become strategic. We are reinitiating a tactical long Korea / short Taiwan equity trade. Taiwanese political risk is understated ahead of January’s election and the island is the epicenter of the US-China cold war. We are restoring our long gold trade as a strategic hedge. Populism and de-globalization are potentially inflationary, but they are also linked with great power competition which will increase the frequency of geopolitical crises. In either case, gold is the right safe haven to own.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights A 400k b/d addition to OPEC 2.0’s official production cut of 1.2mm b/d will have little effect on actual supplies. The market already has seen ~ 2.0mm to 2.5mm b/d of output removed from the market via excess voluntary cuts (e.g., from Saudi Arabia and others) and involuntary cuts (e.g., from Iran and Venezuela). The incremental 400k b/d would just be another target for free-rider states to ignore. However, if Iraq and other states with on-and-off compliance at the margin can be persuaded to follow through on producing at lower quotas following OPEC 2.0’s meetings today and tomorrow, markets could rally as actual output falls (Chart of the Week). A rally on the back of lower OPEC 2.0 production would support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, which is expected to price while the producer coalition is meeting in Vienna. Production from the “Other Guys” – our moniker for all producers excluding Gulf OPEC, US shale and Russia – will account for a lesser and lesser share of global output. New production – much of it from the last of the big conventional projects sanctioned prior to the 2014 price collapse – from Norway, Brazil, Guyana and the US Gulf of Mexico will come on strong in 2020 – but most of this has been priced in already. The rate of growth of US shale-oil production will slow. Feature Brent crude oil prices could get a boost from OPEC 2.0, if free-rider states – specifically Iraq and states with marginal quota compliance shown in the Chart of the Week – actually were to abide by production cuts they agree to. This would be amplified if cuts are extended to end-June, from end-March. The impact would be marginal, to be sure, given most of the production cuts that matter to the market already are in place – i.e., Saudi Arabia’s overcompliance of ~ 400k b/d, and Iran and Venezuela’s involuntary production cuts of ~ 1.8mm b/d resulting from US sanctions, as of October 2019. Ahead of the Vienna meetings today and tomorrow, the putative leaders of the producer coalition – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – have been lobbying at cross purposes. KSA is seeking support for deeper cuts and an extension to mid-year of the deal. Russia is lobbying to keep the original deal’s expiry at end-March, and also is seeking to have its ultra-light crude (i.e., condensates) production excluded from its quota, as it is from OPEC members’ production calculations. Russia is creating additional volumes of condensate – ~ 800k b/d this year of its total 11.2mm b/d output – to dispose of as it ramps natural gas production to new feed markets, particularly China.1 Our expectation is the production-cutting deal will be extended to end-June with an official target of 1.6mm b/d removed from the market. Whether the new deal matters to the market will depend on the actions of heretofore free-rider OPEC 2.0 states. Prices could go up, but market share for the producer coalition will remain under pressure (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekAdditional OPEC 2.0 Cuts Could Be Bullish For Crude Oil Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Market Share Under Pressure Saudi Aramco IPO Due To Price Follow-through by all OPEC 2.0 members on additional production cuts would benefit Saudi Arabia, as it is expected to price the Saudi Aramco IPO while the producer coalition is meeting in Vienna. The Aramco IPO price is expected to value the company between $1.5 and $1.8 trillion. We recently looked at the IPO and believe Aramco will be valued closer to $2 trillion than to $1 trillion, the literal range in which the offering was being valued by banks and analysts.2 To briefly recap, in the first six months of this year, Aramco produced 10.0mm b/d of crude oil and condensates. Aramco accounted for 12.5% of global crude output in 2016 - 18 and reported in its red herring that its proved liquids reserves were ~ five times larger than the combined proved liquids reserves of the five major independent oil companies. Aramco’s 3.1mm b/d of refining capacity makes it the fourth largest integrated refiner in the world. In 2018, Aramco’s free cash flow amounted to almost $86 billion. Net income last year was $111 billion, more than the combined profits of the next six largest oil companies in the world. For its first year as a public company, Aramco has indicated it will pay an annual dividend of $75 billion. Improving compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting deal is of obvious importance for the Aramco IPO. The member states are quick to stress they support the deal and will do their part, but free riding has been a problem in terms of compliance. As we noted above, full compliance will lower OPEC 2.0 crude oil production from current levels, but Saudi Arabia’s voluntary over-compliance, coupled with the involuntary production losses from Iran and Venezuela already are doing most of the work in restraining production. The “Other Guys” Continue Treading Water Since 2010, most of the growth in world oil production came from three regions: US onshore shale-oil producers, Gulf OPEC and Russia. These regions added 14mm b/d of supply between 2010 and 2019. The “Other Guys” often are overlooked in the oil market, but they still accounted for 45% of global oil production this year on average. Production from the “Other Guys” – our moniker for all producers excluding Gulf OPEC, US shale and Russia – has been falling as a share of global production for years, due to a lack of domestic and foreign direct investment in their energy sectors. We expect their production will remain flat next year and could start falling in 2021. The “Other Guys” often are overlooked in the oil market, but they still accounted for 45% of global oil production this year on average: Their combined output was ~ 45mm b/d of crude and liquids (Chart 3). The “Other Guys’” production is mostly long-cycle projects and these countries do not possess spare capacity. Thus, they are reacting to oil prices and maximizing production now, if they can. Even so, their share of global production continues to fall (Chart 4). Chart 3The "Other Guys" Production Is Stagnant Chart 4The "Other Guys" Market Share Plummets The 3- to 5-year lag between final investment decisions and first production for projects in these states strongly suggests the global oil market is entering a period of lower supply additions from the “Other Guys,” given the last mega-projects were probably sanctioned in 2014 while prices still were above $100/bbl for both Brent and WTI. The "Other Guys’" rig count recovered, along with oil prices, since the 2016 downturn. However, this is still a low level of rigs vs. the 2010-2014 period – a period during which production from this group barely grew despite prices averaging more than $100/bbl. We expect their rig count to remain weak next year (Chart 5). Conventional production takes time to ramp up, therefore we should not expect a large increase in production over the next few years. Chart 5The "Other Guys" Rig Counts Will Remain Under Pressure Oil Supply Looks Tighter Toward 2021 Globally, the last of the big projects sanctioned prior to the oil-price collapse beginning in 2H14 and lasting to 1H16 are coming online in Norway, Brazil, Guyana and the US Gulf. Up to this year, US onshore production was the sole growing region globally. If capital discipline caps growth prospects in key US shale basins, global oil supply will grow only modestly in 2020 and 2021. For the most part, the “Other Guys” haven't been attracting the capital needed to sustain and grow their production. Given the ongoing drive by E&P companies globally to return capital to shareholders via buybacks or dividends, and the insistence of capital markets to fund only solid, profitable projects, capital likely will remain constrained for the “Other Guys.” States that were able to attract capital prior to the 2014 oil price collapse – Canada, Brazil, Norway, Guyana and the US – are expected to increase production next year; however, we believe much of this production increase already has been priced in by the market, as it has been by BCA (Chart 6). In our balances, we have oil production for Canada up 50k b/d next year vs 2019; Brazil +330k b/d and Norway +360k b/d. This is 740k b/d ex-Guyana in 2020. Guyana is still doing exploratory drilling and recently announced they expect to have their first commercial flows online this month. Oil markets are expecting initial commercial flows of ~ 120k b/d between December and 1Q20, and a ramp to 750k b/d by 2025, which would be significant. We will be updating our balances in two weeks, in our final publication of the year. Up to this year, US onshore production was the sole growing region globally. If capital discipline caps growth prospects in key US shale basins, global oil supply will grow only modestly in 2020 and 2021 (Chart 7). US shale output reaches ~ 9.35mm b/d on average next year in the Big Five basins (Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara and Anadarko), in our modeling. This amounts to an 800k b/d increase in our US lower 48 production estimate for the US, vs. a 900k b/d increase we expected earlier.3 Chart 6"The New Guys" Production vs. The "Other Guys" Production Chart 7US Shale Oil Production Growth Will Slow Going forward, it is important to re-emphasize that even the prolific shales in the US are being constrained by investors demanding the shale guys either return capital to shareholders via share buybacks or steady dividends and dividend increases. If they don’t accommodate investor interests, these shale producers – and all oil producers for that matter – will simply be denied access to funding markets. Capital is, finally, the binding constraint on the growth of global oil supplies. This has not always been the case, as we’ve noted. 2020 Could See Stronger Prices Markets generally are responding as expected to more accommodative financial conditions globally, which will allow oil demand growth, particularly in the EM economies, to revive in 2020. As a result, we are maintaining our expectation for growth of 1.4mm b/d next year, which is up 300k b/d from our expectation for growth this year. The rebound in demand we expect next year will force prices higher to incentivize additional supply and the release of inventories – mostly in 2H20. This will push the entire futures curve up, especially nearby futures, which will steepen the backwardation in Brent and WTI futures. Bottom Line: Further actual production cuts by OPEC 2.0, emerging threats to US shale growth, and stagnant output from the “Other Guys” facing off against higher demand growth next year could result in higher prices than we currently expect for 2020 – i.e., $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices remain stuck between $60/bbl and $65/bbl awaiting clear signals about the US-China trade negotiations and OPEC 2.0’s decisions on its supply management beyond March 2020. Money managers are increasing their net long position, expecting bullish news on both these developments. They are increasing their Brent exposure to 414k long contracts vs. 64k short. Base Metals: Neutral SHFE copper inventories fell 11% on a week on week basis to 120k MT as of last Friday. Combined, the LME, COMEX and SHFE fell by 6%. The larger decline in Chinese inventory is partly attributed to the reduced import quotas on copper scraps, which limited the total available supply to meet domestic demand. As discussed in last week’s report, fundamentals in the two largest components of the LMEX – i.e. copper and aluminum – are tight and the rebound in demand showing up in our proprietary indicators will support prices. We remain long the LMEX tactically. Last week, we recommended getting long the LMEX index. We have subsequently learned the LME ceases trading the index. We will, nonetheless, continue to track the reported level of the index, as if it were tradeable. Precious Metals: Neutral Closing at $1479/bbl on Tuesday, gold prices broke out of the narrow range in which the metal has traded over the past month. Gold’s daily-return 1-year rolling correlation with the U.S. dollar is at its weakest level since 2011 and is below the 5th percentile of its distribution since 2004. On the other hand, the correlation with U.S. 10-year TIPS yields is strengthening and is now above the 95th percentile of its distribution. As safe-haven demand dissipates – alongside the rebound in global growth we expect – we believe these correlations will move back to their historical relationships, supporting gold as the U.S. dollar depreciates. Ags/Softs: Underweight CBOT Corn March Futures Contracts rallied at the beginning of the week on the back of a blizzard in the Midwest that stalled the already delayed corn harvest, which the USDA reported to be 89% complete as of Dec. 1, well behind the five-year average of 98%. After reaching multi-months highs last week, wheat futures fell due to profit taking and weaker than expected export figures. Soybean fell for the eighth straight day on Monday, with the most active contract closing at $8.73/Bu, the lowest in six months. A possible delay in the US-China trade deal together with expectations of a bumper crop in Brazil remain headwinds to prices.   Footnotes 1     Please see Russia to press OPEC+ to change its oil output calculations published by reuters.com November 27, 2019. 2     Please see our Special Report Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China, published November 15, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    We discuss further risks to shale oil production growth in Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade, including the high levels of flaring in the Permian and Bakken basins.  This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within an EM equity portfolio. Fixed-income investors should consider purchasing 5-year local currency government bonds. The balance-of-payments adjustment is probably over. Hence, the currency will be stable, allowing inflation and interest rates to drop. Feature The country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Chart I-1Pakistani Stocks: The Worst Is Over We downgraded Pakistani equities in March 2017  and put this bourse on our upgrade watch list this past May (Chart I-1). In the past two years, the country has been going through a severe balance-of-payments crisis and a correspondingly painful adjustment. In recent months, the country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Today we are upgrading Pakistani stocks to overweight within an EM equity portfolio and recommend buying 5-year local currency government bonds. The worst is over for the economy and its financial markets for the following reasons. First, the country’s balance-of-payments position will improve. In real effective exchange rate (REER) terms, the Pakistani rupee has depreciated 15% over the past two years (Chart I-2). This will boost exports and cap imports, narrowing both trade and current account deficits further (Chart I-3).   Chart I-2Considerable Depreciation In Pakistani Rupee… Chart I-3…Will Boost Exports And Cap Imports We expect exports to grow 5-10% next year. The country’s competitiveness has improved considerably, with its top commodities exports all having shown impressive growth in volume terms, despite weakening global growth (Chart I-4). Besides, in order to boost exports, the government has reduced the cost of raw materials and semi-finished products used in exportable products by exempting them from all customs duties in fiscal 2020 (July 2019 – June 2020). The government has also promised to provide sales tax refunds to the export sector. Chart I-4Increasing Competitiveness In Pakistan Exports In addition, falling oil prices will help reduce the country’s import bill. Remittance inflows – currently equaling 9% of GDP – have become an extremely important source of financing for Pakistan’s trade deficit. In the past 12 months, remittances sent from overseas have risen to US$22 billion, and have covered most of the US$28 billion trade deficit.   Financial inflows are also likely to increase in 2020 and will be sufficient to finance the current account deficit. The IMF will disburse roughly US$2 billion to Pakistan. Other multilateral/bilateral lending/grants and planned issuance of Sukuk or Euro bonds will provide the government with much-needed foreign funding.  As the economy recovers, net foreign direct inflows are also likely to increase. Net foreign direct investment received by Pakistan has grown 24% year-on-year in the past six months, with 56% of the increase coming from China. Overall, the improvement in Pakistan’s balance-of-payments position will continue, resulting in a refill of the country’s foreign currency reserves. Odds are that the central bank will purchase foreign currency from the government as the latter gets foreign funding. This will provide the government with local currency to spend. At the same time, the central bank’s purchases of these foreign exchange inflows will boost the local currency money supply – a positive development for the economy and stock market. Chart I-5 shows that the Pakistani stock market closely correlates with swings in the nation’s narrow money growth. The Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Chart I-5Pakistan: Ameliorating Balance-Of-Payments Position Will Benefit Stock Prices Chart I-6Pakistan: Improving Fiscal Balance Second, Pakistan’s fiscal balance also shows signs of improvement. Pakistan and the IMF have agreed to set the target for the overall budget and primary deficits at 7.2% of GDP and 0.6% of GDP, respectively, for the current fiscal year (Chart I-6). This will be a considerable improvement from the 8.9% of GDP and 3.3% of GDP, respectively, last fiscal year. In early November, the IMF praised Pakistan for having successfully managed to post a primary budget surplus of 0.9% of GDP during the first quarter (July 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019) of its current fiscal year. The authorities are determined to maintain strict fiscal discipline. The country’s tax-to-GDP ratio is at about 12%, one of the lowest in the world, so there is room to expand the tax base. Third, the Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Both headline and core inflation seem to have peaked (Chart I-7). Headline inflation fell to 11% in October, which already lies within the central bank’s target range of 11-12% for the current fiscal year. The policy rate is currently 225 basis points higher than headline inflation. As inflation drops and the currency finds support, interest rates will be reduced to facilitate the economic recovery. In addition, there has been much less public debt monetization by the central bank. After borrowing Rs3.16 trillion from the central bank in the previous fiscal year, the federal government has curtailed such borrowing to only Rs122 billion in the first three months of this fiscal year. Diminishing debt monetization will also help ease domestic inflation. Chart I-7Inflation Has Peaked Chart I-8Manufacturing Activity Is Likely To Recover Soon Fourth, manufacturing activity in Pakistan has plunged to extremely low levels, comparable to the 2008 Great Recession (Chart I-8). With a more stabilized local currency, easing domestic inflation and interest rate reductions, Pakistan’s economic activity is set to recover soon from a very low base.  Finally, Phase II of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is set to begin this month. Under Phase II of the CPEC, five special economic zones will be established with Chinese industrial relocation. Phase II will also bring forward dividends from Phase I projects. The nation’s infrastructure facilities built by China over the past several years have enhanced the productive capacity of the Pakistani economy. The significant increase in electricity supply and improved railway/highway transportation will promote higher productivity/efficiency gains. Bottom Line: We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within the emerging markets space. Both absolute and relative valuations of Pakistani stocks appear attractive (Charts I-9 and I-10). Chart I-9Pakistani Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive In Absolute Terms... Chart I-10…And Relative To EM Equities Meanwhile, we recommend going long Pakistani 5-year local currency government bonds currently yielding 11.5%, as we expect interest rates to drop quite a bit (Chart I-11).  Chart I-11Go Long Pakistani 5-Year Local Currency Government Bonds   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Chile is undergoing a paradigm shift from a neoliberal economic model to a Welfare State. It will not be a smooth transition, as the political and business elites are resisting such a transformation. Indeed, protesters will continue to renounce the status quo until their demands are satisfied. Hence, the clash between these two predispositions will ensure that political volatility persists and financial markets continue selling off. Feature Chart I-1The CLP Is Not Very Cheap The current socio-political turmoil in Chile has taken the world by surprise. What seemed to be a periodical increase of 3.75% of public transport fares in October ended up being the trigger for the country’s longest and most violent uprising in 30 years. These protests have had a drastic effect on Chilean markets: Equities are down 8% in local currency terms and the peso has depreciated 9% versus the dollar since October 21st. Will the selloff in Chilean markets continue? Are the Chilean peso and equities cheap enough for value investors to step in? Odds are that the protests will endure, and financial markets remain at risk. According to the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) based on unit labor costs – our most favored currency valuation measure – the peso is only slightly cheap (Chart I-1). Yet, odds are that the peso will undershoot and will approach one and a half or two standard deviations below its fair value due to collapsing growth on the back of ongoing protests and political uncertainty, a rising risk premium on Chilean assets, as well as a further decline in copper prices. This entails another 12-15% depreciation versus the USD in the coming months. Investment conclusions for equities and fixed-income markets are presented at the end of this report. Politicians Are Playing With Fire In an attempt to quell protesters, the government and the opposition have scheduled a referendum in April for a new Constitution. While it might be tempting to interpret this positively, odds are that it will be insufficient to calm protesters and allow the authorities to regain control over the situation. The government will ultimately meet the popular demands of protesters, albeit not immediately. We expect Chile to move towards a Welfare State-style of government, but not towards Socialism. It seems Chile's political elite is still underestimating the depth and gravity of the popular frustration. By setting a national vote five months away (with a subsequent election in November of next year), the government and the opposition are not dealing with the issues “head on.” This will test the patience of the protesters and risks continued violence on the streets. Hence, we expect the protest to linger at least until the referendum in April. Consequently, the selloff in financial markets will persist. The Roots Of Public Discontent It is important to note that the current uprising is not against President Sebastián Piñera specifically but against the entire political class, including the opposition. National polls from CADEM, one of Chile’s most respected polling companies, suggest voters disapprove of both Piñera’s party and the center-left opposition. In a survey conducted in April of this year (several months before the protests began), there were only two political parties with a net positive approval rating: Renovación Nacional (Piñera’s party) and Revolución Democrática, which was founded by students in the wake of the 2011 national protests. Since then, the President’s approval rating has fallen from 36% to 12%. It is therefore safe to assume the President’s party currently has a net disapproval rating. This means that the only party that Chileans view in a positive light is one led by students – not politicians. This nationwide distrust in the political and economic elites is evidenced by the historically low voter turnout of 49% in the 2017 general election. Voters have become increasingly frustrated at politicians in the past decade as their main demands have not been addressed. These include the provision of an effective social safety net and programs as well as more inclusive economic growth. The roots of the discontent are income inequality, a poor social security net and stagnating median incomes. Income Inequality Chart I-2GINI Coefficient Across Various Nations Income Distribution: Although Chile has made some progress over the past 20 years in terms of reducing its Gini coefficient, income inequality remains very high. Chart I-2 shows that even though the Gini coefficient has drifted lower it remains high. A falling/low Gini coefficient entails diminishing/ low inequality. Among OECD nations, Chile currently stands as one of the most unequal countries in terms of income distribution (Chart I-3), only surpassed by South Africa. Moreover, it also ranks as the fourth country with the highest P90/P10 disposable income ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the top 10% of the income distribution (wealthiest individuals) versus the bottom 10% (poorest individuals) (Chart I-4). According to CADEM, Chileans cite income inequality as the number one reason for the civil unrest. Chart I-3Chile: High Income Inequality Relative To Other Nations Chart I-4Disposable Income Is Highly Concentrated In Chile Tax policy: Chile has the lowest corporate tax rate in Latin America (Chart I-5A). This has made the country an attractive destination for large international conglomerates, as well as incentivized investment by domestic corporations. Yet, it has also exacerbated income inequality and capped the government’s capacity to fund social programs and education. Moreover, even though the top personal marginal tax rate in the country is in line with those in the rest of Latin America, it still falls short compared to the OECD average (Chart I-5B). Overall, Chile has low tax rates for individuals and corporations. Low tax rates are typically correlated with a higher degree of income and wealth inequality, as public investment in social services is sacrificed at the expense of shareholders/business owners. Chart I-5AChile: Low Corporate Tax Rates Chart I-5BChile: High Incomes Are Not Taxed Heavily ​​​​​​ Oligopolies versus SMEs: Even though Chile is perceived to be a very business friendly economy, the country still lacks a high level of competition that is present in many OECD countries. In particular, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are disfavored against large businesses. SMEs in Chile suffer from high interest rates on their loans relative to large firms and from excessive regulatory burdens (Chart I-6). Likewise, government support for new and existing companies is quite dismal. Among OECD members, Chile has the second-lowest direct government funding and tax incentives for businesses. These barriers to new businesses have allowed large domestic and international companies to dominate the marketplace and accumulate wealth at the expense of small businesses and individual entrepreneurs. The latter has contributed to the discontent with the economic and political elites. Chart I-6Small And Medium Businesses Are In An Inferior Position Chart I-7Workers' Share Of Income Is Depressed Employees’ share of national income: The share of wages and salaries of national income has been between 36-40% while operating profits have hovered around 50% (Chart I-7, top panel). By comparison, in the US, wages and salaries make up 54% of GDP, while corporate profits amount to just 24% (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Such a small share of the pie going to employees in Chile explains the popular discontent against the economic elite. Lack Of A Social Safety Net Over the past few weeks, Chilean protesters’ key demands have been a restructuring of social security programs, more investment in healthcare and increased funding for public primary and secondary education. Essentially, Chileans want the state to play a larger role in securing basic social services. Pension System: Once highly praised by institutions such as the IMF and World Bank as well as many renowned economists as a revolutionary system to guarantee pensions with a minimal impact on public finances, Chile's problematic pension system is currently one of the most dire economic issues facing the country. Mandatory pension contribution rates are among the lowest in the world. New retirees are facing the consequences of a fully employee-based contribution plan, under which the government claimed people would be able to retire with a very high share of their salary. However, average retirees are currently receiving monthly pension payments equivalent to or less than the minimum wage. Among OECD nations, Chile currently stands as one of the most unequal countries in terms of income distribution, only surpassed by South Africa. Low government spending on social programs: Government expenditures on social programs as a percentage of GDP is among the lowest in the OECD. Moreover, Chile ranks at the bottom in terms of cash transfers as a percentage of disposable income (Chart I-8). The OECD defines cash transfers as the agglomeration of social payments such as unemployment insurance, pension benefits, education transfers and health subsidies. Chile also lags both advanced and developing economies when it comes to public spending on healthcare, pensions, education and unemployment benefits (Chart I-9). This has created a system in which lower- and middle-income employees must pay out-of-pocket for basic social services. In short, Chileans are protesting due to a lack of financial security. Chart I-8Chileans Don’t Receive Help From The Government Chart I-9Public Expenditure On Social Programs Stagnating Income Growth Real GDP per capita has been stagnating in Chile in recent years – its growth rate falling to its lowest level since the mid-1980s (Chart I-10). Real income per-capita growth is contingent on labor productivity growth, which has been consistently decelerating for two decades. The drop in productivity growth can be attributed to two factors. First, small and medium firms tend to be snubbed in favor of large domestic and international firms, as we discussed above. Yet SMEs have been successful in generating higher productivity growth than large ones (Chart I-11). The lack of preferential regulatory treatment and more expensive financing for SMEs has hindered their expansion and development, capping overall productivity growth. Importantly, SMEs employ 65% of the labor force, and their subdued expansion has resulted in weaker income growth across the nation. Chart I-10Labor Productivity Has Been Decelerating Chart I-11Small Firms Are The Most Productive Chart I-12Real Capex Has Stagnated Second, real gross fixed capital investment has been stagnant since 2014 (Chart I-12). Falling capital expenditures lead to lower productivity and therefore stagnant real income levels as technology and production processes become antiquated. Further, large bouts of immigration, particularly from Venezuela, have expanded the labor force and dampened wage growth among middle- and low-income workers. As a share of the population, foreign-born residents have risen from 2.3% in 2015 to 7% in 2019. This influx of new workers has also expanded non-formal employment. Notably, labor informality in Chile is presently 30% of employment. While these workers do not declare taxes on their income, their salaries tend to be lower than the minimum wage, and they do not qualify for social programs such as social insurance and healthcare. This has dampened employee income growth and promoted a sense of financial insecurity. Where Is Chile Headed? The government will ultimately meet the popular demands of protesters, albeit not immediately. We expect Chile to move towards a Welfare State-style of government, but not towards Socialism. Under a Welfare State system the government prioritizes the provision of a social security net, such as healthcare, state-funded education and generous pension benefits and unemployment insurance, while not interfering in the functioning of the economy and/or financial markets. Chile also lags both advanced and developing economies when it comes to public spending on healthcare, pensions, education and unemployment benefits. In the past decade, mandataries from both sides of the political spectrum – both the ruling and opposition parties – have been reluctant to finance a larger social security net. Yet Chile can actually afford to do so. First, Chile has a low tax burden as a percentage of GDP and has ample room to expand taxation (Chart I-13). Second, at 27% of GDP, Chile’s public debt is among the lowest in the world (Chart I-14). 40% of if its public debt is local currency and 42% is inflation-linked. Its fiscal overall and primary budget deficits are 2.2% and 1.2% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-13Chile's Government Budget Is Small Chart I-14Chile: Gross Public Debt Is Minimal   Therefore, to finance these social policies, the government can raise marginal tax rates for wealthy individuals and large corporations, and it can issue more debt. Given the starting point of government debt is so low, Chile is not facing a fiscal crunch in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, without substantial reforms in social spending and the pension system, it will be difficult to pacify protesters. Investment Recommendations The peso: We continue recommending shorting the peso versus the US dollar. Chart I-15Chilean Equities: More Downside Chart I-16Chilean Equities Are Inexpensive Equities: Stay neutral on this bourse within an EM equity portfolio. While the outlook is still downbeat, it may be too late to move to underweight. Chilean equities in US$ terms have already broken below their 6-year and 12-year moving averages (Chart I-15). We argued in an October Report that the protests imply a structural de-rating for Chilean equities. Chilean stocks have always traded at a premium versus the EM aggregate, mainly due to the perceived socioeconomic stability of the country and the extreme orthodox liberal policies that were pursued in the past 30 years. According to our Cyclically-Adjusted P/E ratio, Chilean equities are inexpensive (Chart I-16). Another 16% drop in share prices in local currency terms will push this valuation ratio to one standard deviation and a 58% decline to two standard deviations below fair value. Chart I-17Take Profits On Swap Rates Fixed income: Today we are closing our recommendation of receiving 3-year swap rates. The rationale is that as the peso continues to depreciate, it is likely that interest rates may rise further in the near term. This position was initiated on May 31st, 2018 and has produced a gain of 125 basis points (Chart I-17).     Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Highlights China’s PMIs continue to flash a positive signal, but the hard data trend remains negative. There has been a notable improvement in China’s cyclical sectors (versus defensives) over the past month, but broad equity market performance has been flat-to-down. China’s lackluster equity index performance in the face of rising PMIs suggests that investors can afford to wait for an improvement in the hard economic data before tactically upgrading to overweight. Cyclically, we continue to recommend an overweight stance towards both the investable and A-share markets versus the global benchmark, favoring the former over the latter. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, China’s November PMIs were clearly positive, and the rise in the official manufacturing PMI above the 50 mark is notable. However, the odds continue to favor a bottoming in the economy in Q1 rather than Q4, in large part because China’s “hard” economic data has continued to deteriorate during the time that the Caixin PMI has been signaling an expansion in manufacturing activity. In this vein, China’s November update for producer prices and total imports have high potential to be market-moving, and should be closely monitored. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Within financial markets, China’s cyclical sectors have outperformed defensives, which is consistent with the positive message from China’s PMIs. But China’s broad equity markets have been flat-to-down versus the global index over the past month, suggesting that investors can afford to wait for confirmation of a hard data improvement before upgrading their tactical stance to overweight (from neutral). Cyclically, we continue to recommend an overweight stance towards both the investable and A-share markets, but favor the former over the latter in a trade truce scenario. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Both measures of the Li Keqiang index (LKI) that we track indicated no obvious improvement in Chinese economy activity in October. The BCA China Activity indicator, a broader coincident measure of China’s economy, also moved sideways in October and (for now) remains in a downtrend. Thus, based on the “hard data”, Chinese economic activity has not yet bottomed. Chart 1A Moderate Strength Economic Recovery Will Begin In Q1 The components of our LKI leading indicator continue to tell a story of easy monetary conditions and sluggish money & credit growth (Chart 1). The indicator itself remains in an uptrend, but it is a shallow one that does not match the intensity of previous credit cycles. While the uptrend in the indicator suggests that China’s economy will soon bottom, the shallow pace suggests that the coming rebound in growth will be less forceful than during previous economic recoveries. The uptrend in headline CPI is a notable macro development, with prices having risen 3.8% year-over-year in Oct (the fastest pace in almost eight years). This rise has been driven almost entirely by a surge in pork prices, which have risen over 60% relative to last year (panel 1 of Chart 2). While some investors have questioned whether the rise in headline inflation will cause the PBoC to tighten its stance at the margin, we argued with high conviction in our November 20 Weekly Report that this will not occur.1 Panel 2 of Chart 2 shows that periods of easy monetary policy line up strongly with periods of deflating producer prices, arguing that the PBoC will see through transient shocks to headline inflation. China’s October housing market data highlighted three points: housing sales are modestly improving, the pace of housing construction has again deviated from the trend in sales, and housing price appreciation is slowing in Tier 2 and Tier 3 markets. For now, we are inclined to discount the surge in floor space started, given previous divergences that proved to be unsustainable. The bigger question is whether investors should be concerned about slowing housing prices. Chart 3 shows that floor space sold and property prices have been negatively correlated over the past three years, in contrast to a previously positive relationship. Deteriorating affordability and tight housing regulations have contributed to this shift in correlation, which helps explain why the PBoC’s Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program has been so closely related to housing sales over the past few years. While the growth in PSL injections is becoming less negative, it has not risen to the point that it would be associated with a strong trend in sales. As such, we continue to see poor affordability as a threat to further housing price appreciation, absent stronger funding assistance. Poor affordability will continue to be a headwind for China’s housing market. Chart 2The PBoC Will See Through Transient Shocks To Headline Inflation Chart 3Poor Affordability Will Continue To Weigh On Housing Demand Chart 4Investors Need To See Concrete Signs Of A Hard Data Improvement China’s November PMIs were quite positive, which legitimately increases the odds that China’s economy is beginning the process of recovery. However, we see two reasons to believe that the odds continue to favor a bottoming in the economy in Q1 rather than Q4. First, while they improved in November, several important elements of the official PMI remain in contractionary territory, particularly the new export orders subcomponent. Second, while the Caixin PMI has now been above the 50 mark for 4 consecutive months, China’s hard data has continued to deteriorate since the summer (Chart 4). Given the historical volatility of the Caixin PMI, we advise investors to wait for concrete signs of a hard data improvement before firmly concluding that China’s economy is recovering. Over the last month, China’s investable stock market has rallied roughly 1% in absolute terms, while domestic stocks have fallen about 3%. In relative terms, A-shares underperformed the global benchmark, while the investable market moved sideways. In our view, the underperformance of China’s domestic market reflects increased sensitivity to monetary conditions and credit growth compared with the investable market,2 and a weaker credit impulse in October appears to have been the catalyst for A-share underperformance. Over the cyclical horizon, earnings will improve in both the onshore and offshore markets in response to a modest improvement in economic activity, suggesting that an overweight stance is justified for both markets. But we think the investable market has more upside potential in a trade truce scenario. The outperformance of cyclical versus defensive sectors is sending a positive signal, but investors can afford to wait for better economic data before tactically upgrading. Chart 5A Positive Sign From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Within China’s investable stock market, it is quite notable that cyclicals have outperformed defensives over the past month on an equally-weighted basis (Chart 5). Interestingly, key defensive sectors such as investable health care and utilities have sold off significantly, and equally-weighted cyclicals have also outperformed defensives in the domestic market. The outperformance of cyclicals and underperformance of defensives is consistent with the positive message from China’s PMIs, but the fact that this improvement is occurring against the backdrop of flat-to-down relative performance for China’s equity market suggests that investors can afford to wait for confirmation of a hard data improvement before upgrading their tactical stance to overweight. In this vein, China’s November update for producer prices and total imports have high potential to be market-moving, and should be closely monitored. China’s government bond yields fell slightly in November, potentially reflecting expectations of further modest easing. Our view that monetary policy will likely remain easy over the coming year even in a modest recovery scenario suggests that Chinese interbank rates and government bond yields are likely to range-trade over the coming 6-12 months. We expect onshore corporate bonds to continue to outperform duration-matched government bonds in 2020. Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads eased modestly over the past month. Despite continued concerns about onshore corporate defaults, the yield advantage offered by onshore corporate bonds have helped the asset class generate a 5.4% year-to-date return in local currency terms. Barring a substantial intensification of the pace of defaults, we expect onshore corporate bonds to continue to outperform duration-matched government bonds in 2020. The RMB has moved sideways versus the US dollar over the last month. USD-CNY had fallen below 7 in October following the announcement of the intention to sign a “phase one” trade deal, but the move ultimately proved temporary given the deferral of an agreement. We would expect the RMB to appreciate following a deal of any kind (a truce or something more), and it is also likely to be supported next year by improving economic activity. Still, it would not be in the PBoC’s best interests to let the RMB appreciate too rapidly, because an appreciating Chinese currency would act as a deflationary force on China’s export and manufacturing sectors. As such, we expect a modest downtrend in USD-CNY over the coming year.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Questions From The Road: Timing The Turn," dated November 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated November 27, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature Recommended Allocation In late November, BCA Research published its 2020 Outlook titled Heading Into The End Game, an annual discussion between BCA’s managing editors and the firm’s longstanding clients Mr. and Ms X.1 We recommend GAA clients read that document for a full analysis of the macro and investment environment we expect in 2020. In this Monthly Portfolio Outlook, we focus on portfolio construction: how we would recommend positioning a global multi-asset portfolio for the 12-month investment horizon in light of that analysis. First, a brief summary of the BCA macro outlook. We believe the global manufacturing cycle is starting to bottom out, partly because of its usual periodicity of 18 months from peak to trough, and also because of easier financial conditions, and some moderate fiscal and credit stimulus from China (Chart 1).  Central banks will remain dovish next year despite accelerating growth. The Fed, in particular, worries that inflation expectations have become unanchored (Chart 2) and, moreover, will be reluctant to raise rates ahead of the US presidential election. This environment implies a moderate rise in long-term interest rates, with the US 10-year Treasury yield rising to 2.2-2.5%. Chart 1Reasons To Expect A Rebound Chart 2Unanchored Inflation Expectations Worry The Fed For an asset allocator, this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks like a very positive environment for risk assets (Chart 3). We, therefore, remain overweight equities and underweight fixed income. We have discussed over the past few months the timing to turn more risk-on and pro-cyclical in our recommendations.2 Since we are increasingly confident about the probability of the manufacturing cycle turning up, this is the time to make that change. Consequently, the shifts we are recommending in our global portfolio, shown in the Recommended Allocation table and discussed in detail below, add to its beta (Chart 4).   Chart 3A Positive Environment For Risk Assets Chart 4Raising The Beta Of Our Portfolio Chart 5Some Signs Of Risk-On Still Missing Nonetheless, we still have some concerns. China’s stimulus (particularly credit growth) remains half-hearted compared to previous cyclical rebounds in 2012 and 2016. We expect a “phase one” ceasefire in the trade war. But even that is not certain, and it would not anyway solve the long-term structural disputes. To turn fully risk-on, we would want to see signs of a clear rebound in commodity prices and a depreciation of the US dollar, which have not yet happened (Chart 5). The 2020 Outlook proposed some milestones to monitor whether our scenario is playing out and whether we should turn more or less risk-on. We summarize these milestones in Table 1. Given these uncertainties, to hedge our pro-cyclical positioning we continue to recommend an overweight in cash, and we are instituting an overweight position in gold. Table 1Milestones For 2020 Chart 6Recessions Are Caused By Inflation Or Debt How will this cycle end? All recessions in modern history have been caused either by a sharp rise in inflation, or by a debt-fueled asset bubble (Chart 6). The Fed will likely fall behind the curve at some point as, after further tightening in the labor market, inflation starts to pick up. How the Fed reacts to that will determine what triggers the recession. If – as is most likely – it lets inflation run, that could blow up an asset bubble (and it was the bursting of such bubbles which caused the 2000 and 2007 recessions); if it decides to tighten monetary policy to kill inflation, the recession would look more like those of the 1970s and 1980s. But it is hard to see either happening over the next 12-18 months. Equities: As part of our shift to a more pro-risk, pro-cyclical stance, we are cutting US equities to underweight, and raising the euro zone to overweight, and Emerging Markets and the UK to neutral. US equities have outperformed fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 7) – except during the two periods of accelerating global growth, in 2012-13 (when Europe did better) and 2016-17 (when EM particularly outperformed). The US today is expensive, particularly in terms of price/sales, which looks more expensive than the P/E ratio because the profit margin is at a record high level (Chart 8). The upside for US stocks in 2020 is likely to be limited. In 2019 so far, US equities have risen by 29% despite earnings growth close to zero. Multiples expanded because the Fed turned dovish, but investors should not assume further multiple expansion in 2020. Our rough model for US EPS growth points to around 8% next year (sales in line with nominal GDP growth of 4%, margins expanding by a couple of points, plus 2% in share buybacks). Add a dividend yield of 2%, and US stocks might give a total return of 10% or so. Chart 7US Doesn't Always Outperform Chart 8US Equities Are Expensive To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Euro zone stocks have a higher weighting in sectors we like such as Financials and Industrials (Table 2). European banks, in particular, look attractively valued (Chart 9) and offer a dividend yield of 6%, something investors should find appealing in this low-yield world. EM is more closely linked to China and commodities prices, which are not yet sending strong positive signals. We worry about the excess of debt in EM (Chart 10), which remains a structural headwind: the IMF and World Bank put total external EM debt at $6.8 trillion (Chart 11). Table 2Equity Sector Composition Chart 9Euro Zone Banks Are Especially Cheap Chart 10EM Debt Remains A Headwind Japan is another likely beneficiary of a cyclical recovery. But, before we turn positive, we want to see (1) signs of a stabilization of consumption after the recent tax rise (retail sales fell by 7% year-on-year in October), and (2) clarification of a worrying new investment law (which will require any investor which intends to “influence management” to get prior government approval before buying as little as a 1% stake in many sectors). For an asset allocator this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks very positive for risk assets. We raise the UK to neutral. The market has been a serial underperformer over the past few years, but this has been due to the weak pound and derating, rather than poor earnings growth (Chart 12). It now looks very cheap and, with the risk of a no-deal Brexit off the table, sterling should rebound further. The UK is notably overweight the sectors we like (Table 2). However, political risk makes us limit our recommendation to neutral. Although the Conservatives look likely to win a majority in this month’s general election, which will allow them to push through the negotiated Brexit deal, subsequent arguments over the future trade relationship with the EU will be divisive. Chart 116.8 Trillion In EM External Debt Chart 12The UK Has Been Derated Since 2016   Fixed Income: We remain underweight government bonds. Stronger economic growth is likely to push up long-term rates (Chart 13). Nonetheless, the rise in yields should be limited. The Fed looks to be on hold for the next 12 months, but the futures market is not far away from that view: it has priced in only a 60% probability of one rate cut over that time. The gap between market expectations and what the Fed actually does is what our bond strategists call the “golden rule of bond investing”. US inflation is also likely to soften over the next few months due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth and appreciating dollar. We do not expect the 10-year US Treasury to rise above 2.5% – the current FOMC estimate of the long-run equilibrium level of short-term rates (Chart 14). Chart 13Growth Will Push Up Rates...   Chart 14...But Only As Far As 2.5%   Within the fixed-income universe, we remain positive on corporate credit. But US investment-grade bond spreads are no longer attractive and so we downgrade them to neutral (Chart 15). Investors looking for high-quality bond exposure should prefer Agency MBS, which trade on an attractive spread relative to Aa- and A-rated corporate bonds. European IG should do better since spreads are not so close to historical lows, risk-free rates should rise less than in the US, and because the ECB is increasing its purchases of corporate bonds. Chart 15US IG Spreads Are Close To Historical Lows Chart 16US Caa Bonds Have Some Catching Up To Do We continue to like high-yield bonds, both in the US and Europe. But we would suggest moving down the credit curve and increasing the weight in Caa-rated bonds. These have underperformed this year (Chart 16), mainly because of technical factors such as their overweight in the energy sector and relatively smaller decline in duration.3 With a stronger economy and rising oil prices, they should catch up to their higher-rated HY peers in 2020. To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Currencies: Since the US dollar is a counter-cyclical currency (Chart 17), we would expect it to weaken against more cyclical currencies such as the euro, and commodity currencies such as the Australian dollar and Canadian dollar. But it should appreciate relative to the yen and Swiss franc, which are the most defensive major currencies. We expect EM currencies to continue to depreciate. Most emerging markets are experiencing disinflation (Chart 18), which will push central banks to cut rates and inject liquidity into the banking system. This will tend to weaken their currencies. Overall, we are neutral on the US dollar. Chart 17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency Chart 18Disinflation Will Push EM Currencies Down Further     Commodities: Industrials metals prices are closely linked to Chinese stimulus (Chart 19). A moderate recovery in Chinese growth should be a positive, and so we raise our recommendation to neutral. But with question-marks still lingering over the strength of the rebound in the Chinese economy, we would not be more positive than that. Oil prices should see moderate upside over the next 12 months, with supply tight and demand growth recovering in line with the global economy. Our energy strategists forecast Brent crude to average $67 a barrel in 2020 (compared to a little over $60 today). Chart 19Metals Prices Depend On China Chart 20Gold: Short-Term Negatives, But Remains A Good Hedge   Gold looks a little overbought in the short term, and less monetary stimulus and a rise in rates next year would be negative factors (Chart 20). Nonetheless, we see it as a good hedge against our positive economic view going awry, and against geopolitical risks. If central banks do decide to let economies run hot next year and ignore rising inflation, gold could do particularly well. We, therefore, raise our recommendation to overweight on a 12-month horizon.     Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    Please see "Outlook 2020," dated November 22 2019, available at bcaresearch.com 2   Please see, for example, last month’s GAA Monthly Portfolio Update, “Looking For The Turning-Point,” dated November 1, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3   For a more detailed explanation, please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Signs Or Buying Opportunity,” dated 26 November 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Investors should remain overweight global stocks relative to bonds over the next 12 months and begin shifting equity exposure towards non-US markets. Bond yields will rise next year as global growth picks up, while the dollar will sell off. The extent to which bond yields increase over the long term depends on whether inflation eventually stages a comeback. Today’s high debt levels could turn out to be deflationary if they curtail spending by overstretched households, firms, and governments. However, high debt levels could also prompt central banks to engineer higher inflation in order to reduce the real burden of debt obligations. Which of these two effects will win out depends on whether central banks are able to gain traction over the economy. This ultimately boils down to whether the neutral rate of interest is positive or negative in nominal terms. While there is little that policymakers can do to alter certain drivers of the neutral rate such as the trend rate of economic growth, they do have control over other drivers such as the stance of fiscal policy. Ironically, a structural shift towards easier fiscal policy could lead to a decline in government debt-to-GDP ratios if higher inflation, together with central bankers' reluctance to raise nominal rates, pushes real rates down far enough. This suggests that the endgame for today’s high debt levels is likely to be overheated economies and rising inflation.   Stay Bullish On Stocks But Shift Towards Non-US Equities We returned to a cyclically bullish stance on global equities following the stock market selloff late last year, having temporarily moved to the sidelines in June 2018. We have remained overweight global equities throughout 2019. Two weeks ago, we increased our pro-cyclical bias by upgrading non-US stocks within our recommended equity allocation at the expense of their US peers. Our decision to upgrade non-US equities stems from the conviction that global growth has turned the corner. Manufacturing has been at the heart of the global slowdown. As we have often pointed out, manufacturing cycles tend to last about three years – 18 months of weaker growth followed by 18 months of stronger growth (Chart 1). The current slowdown began in the first half of 2018, and right on cue, the recent data has begun to improve. The global manufacturing PMI has moved off its lows, with significant gains seen in the new orders-to-inventories component. Global growth expectations in the ZEW survey have rebounded. US durable goods orders surprised on the upside in October. The regional Fed manufacturing surveys have also brightened, suggesting upside for the ISM next week (Chart 2). Chart 1A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle Chart 2Some Manufacturing Green Shoots     Unlike in 2016, China has not allowed a major reacceleration in credit growth this year. Instead, fiscal policy has been loosened significantly. The official general government deficit has increased from around 3% of GDP in mid-2018 to 6.5% of GDP at present. The augmented budget deficit – which includes spending through local government financing vehicles and other off-balance sheet expenditures – is on track to reach nearly 13% of GDP in 2019. This is a bigger deficit than during the depths of the Great Recession (Chart 3). As a result of all this fiscal easing, the combined Chinese credit/fiscal impulse has continued to move up. It leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 4). Chart 3China Has Been Stimulating, Fiscally Chart 4Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth The dollar tends to weaken when global growth strengthens (Chart 5). The combination of stronger global growth and a softer dollar will disproportionately benefit cyclical equity sectors. Financials will also gain thanks to steeper yield curves (Chart 6). The sector weights of non-US stock markets tend to be more tilted towards deep cyclicals and financials. As a consequence, non-US stocks typically outperform when global growth picks up (Chart 7). Chart 5The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 6Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials In addition, valuations favor stocks outside the US. Non-US equities currently trade at 13.8-times forward earnings, compared to 18.1-times for the US. The valuation gap is even greater if one looks at price-to-book, price-to-sales, and other measures (Chart 8). Chart 7Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart 8US Stocks Are Relatively More Expensive Trade War Remains A Key Risk The US-China trade war remains a key risk to our bullish equity view. President Trump continues to send conflicting signals about the status of the talks. He complained last week that Beijing is not “stepping up” in finalizing a phase 1 agreement, adding that China wants a deal “much more than I do.” This Wednesday he struck a more optimistic tone, saying that negotiators were in the “final throes” of deal. However, he made this statement on the same day that he decided to sign the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act into law, a decision that was bound to antagonize China. According to our BCA geopolitical team, Trump had little choice but to sign the bill. The Senate approved it unanimously, while the House voted for it 417-1. Failure to sign it would have resulted in an embarrassing veto by the Senate. The key point is that the new law does not force Trump to take any immediate actions against China. This suggests that the trade talks will continue. In fact, from China's point of view, Congress’ desire to pass a Hong Kong bill may provide a timely reminder that getting a deal done with Trump now may be preferable to waiting until after the election and potentially facing someone like Elizabeth Warren who is likely to make human rights a key element of any deal to roll back tariffs. Waiting For Inflation If global growth accelerates next year, history suggests that bond yields will rise (Chart 9). Looking further out, the extent to which bond yields will continue to increase depends on whether inflation ultimately stages a comeback. Right now, most of our forward-looking inflationary indicators remain well contained (Chart 10). However, this could change if falling unemployment eventually triggers a price-wage spiral. Chart 9Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Chart 10An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent     Many investors are skeptical that such a price-wage spiral could ever emerge. They argue that automation, globalization, weak trade unions, and demographic changes make an inflationary outburst rather implausible. We have addressed these arguments in the past1 and will not delve into them in this report. Instead, we will focus on one argument that also gets a fair bit of attention, which is that high debt levels will prove to be deflationary. Are High Debt Levels Inflationary Or Deflationary? Total debt levels in developed economies are no lower today than they were during the Great Recession. While private debt has fallen, public debt has risen by roughly the same magnitude, leaving the overall debt-to-GDP ratio unchanged (Chart 11). Meanwhile, debt levels in emerging markets have risen substantially. A common rebuttal to any suggestion that inflation might rise over the medium-to-longer term is that high debt levels around the world will cause households, firms, and governments to pare back spending. While this may be true, it could also be argued that high debt levels could prompt central banks to engineer higher inflation in order to reduce the real burden of debt obligations. So which effect will win out? Given the choice, it is likely that most policymakers would opt for higher inflation. This is partly because high unemployment and fiscal austerity are politically toxic. It is also because falling prices make it very difficult to reduce real debt burdens. The experience of the Great Depression bears this out: Private debt declined by 25% in absolute terms between 1929 and 1933. However, due to the collapse in nominal GDP, the ratio of debt-to-GDP actually increased more in the first half of the 1930s than during the Roaring Twenties (Chart 12). Chart 11Global Debt Levels Remain High Chart 12The Experience Of The Great Depression Shows Deleveraging Is Impossible Without Growth   Means, Motive And Opportunity Chart 13A Kinked Relationship: It Takes Time For Inflation To Break Out There is a big difference between wanting to engineer higher inflation and being able to do so. The distinction between success and failure ultimately boils down to a seemingly technical question: Is the neutral rate of interest – the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – positive or negative in nominal terms? When the neutral rate is above zero, central banks can gain traction over the economy. Even if the neutral rate is only slightly positive, a zero rate would be enough to keep monetary policy in expansionary territory. When monetary policy is accommodative, the unemployment rate will tend to drop. Eventually the “kink” in the Phillips curve will be reached, resulting in higher inflation (Chart 13). In contrast, when the neutral rate is firmly below zero, monetary policy loses traction over the economy. Since there is a limit to how deeply negative policy rates can go before people decide to hold cash, the central bank could find itself out of ammunition. This could set off a vicious circle where high unemployment causes inflation to drift lower, leading to an increase in real rates. Rising real rates will then further curb spending, causing inflation to fall even more. Drivers Of The Neutral Rate Two of the more important determinants of the neutral rate of interest are the growth rate of the economy and the national savings rate. If either the savings rate rises or economic growth slows, the stock of fixed capital will tend to pile up in relation to GDP, leading to a higher capital-to-output ratio.2 As Chart 14 shows, this has already happened in Europe and Japan. An increase in the capital-to-GDP ratio will drag down the rate of return on capital. A lower interest rate will be necessary to ensure that the capital stock is fully utilized. Chart 14Capital Stock-To-Output Ratios Have Risen Realistically, there is not much that policymakers can do to raise trend GDP growth. While looser immigration policy would allow for a faster expansion of labor force growth, this is politically contentious. Increasing productivity growth is also easier said than done. Fiscal Policy And The Neutral Rate In contrast, policymakers already have a ready-made mechanism for lowering the savings rate: fiscal policy. The fiscal balance is a component of national savings. If the government runs a larger budget deficit in order to finance tax cuts or higher transfer payments to households, national savings will decline and aggregate demand will rise. Is the endgame for today’s high debt levels deflation or inflation? The answer is inflation. Since one can think of the neutral rate as the interest rate that brings aggregate demand in line with the economy’s supply-side potential, anything that raises demand will also lift the neutral rate. Once the neutral rate has risen above the zero bound, monetary policy will gain traction again. This implies that central banks should never run out of ammunition in countries whose governments can issue debt in their own currencies. While higher inflation stemming from fiscal stimulus will erode the real value of private sector debt obligations, won’t the impact on total debt be offset by the increase in public debt? Not necessarily. True, larger budget deficits will raise the stock of government debt. However, nominal GDP will also rise on account of higher inflation. Standard debt sustainability equations state that the government debt-to-GDP ratio could actually fall if higher inflation pushes real policy rates down far enough. As discussed in Box 1, such an outcome is quite likely when inflation accelerates in response to an overheated economy, but the central bank nevertheless refrains from raising nominal rates. The Final Verdict We are finally ready to answer the question posed in the title of this report: Is the endgame for today’s high debt levels deflation or inflation? The answer is inflation. People with a 30-year fixed rate mortgage will always favor inflation over deflation. And there are more voters who owe mortgage debt than own mortgage debt. Chart 15Germany's Competitive Advantage Over The Rest Of The Euro Area Is Deteriorating Politics is moving in a more populist direction. Whether it is left-wing populism of the Elizabeth Warren/Jeremy Corbyn variety or right-wing populism of the Donald Trump/Matteo Salvini variety, the result is usually bigger budget deficits and higher inflation. Even in those countries where populism has been slow to take hold, there may be pragmatic reasons for loosening fiscal policy. For example, Germany’s trade surplus with the rest of the euro area has fallen in half since 2007, largely because German unit labor costs have increased more than elsewhere (Chart 15). As Germany loses its ability to ship excess production to the rest of the world, it may end up having to rely more on easier fiscal policy to bolster demand. Of course, the path to higher inflation is paved with interest rates that stay lower for much longer than the economy needs to reach full employment. This means we are entering a period where first the US economy, and then many other economies, will start to overheat, and yet central banks will still refrain from tightening monetary policy until inflation rises well above their comfort zones. Such an environment will be positive for stocks for as long as it lasts, even if it eventually produces a mighty hangover.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 When Does A Large Budget Deficit Lead To A Lower Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio?   Footnotes 1    Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could It Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018. 2   This point can be seen through the lens of the widely used Solow growth model. In steady state, the desired level of investment in the model is given by the formula: I=(a/r)(n+g+d)Y where a denotes the output elasticity of capital, r is the real rate of interest, n is labor force growth, g is productivity growth, d is the depreciation rate, and Y is GDP. Savings is assumed to be a constant fraction of income, S=sY. Equating savings with investment yields: r=(a/s)(n+g+d). A decrease in the growth rate of the economy (n+g) shifts the investment schedule downward, leading to a lower equilibrium rate of interest. This initially makes investing in fixed capital more attractive than buying bonds. Over time, however, the marginal return on capital will fall as the capital stock expands in relation to GDP.    Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades