Emerging Markets

Highlights 2019 was a good year for our constraint-based method of political analysis. Trump was impeached, the trade war escalated, and China (modestly) stimulated – all as predicted. Nevertheless Trump caught us by surprise in Q2, with sanctions on Iran and tariffs on China. Our best trades were long defense stocks, gold, and Swiss bonds. Our worst trade was long rare earth miners. Feature Jean Buridan’s donkey starved to death because, faced with equal bundles of grain on both sides, it could not decide which to eat. So the legend goes. Investors face indecision all the time. This is especially the case when a geopolitical sea change is disrupting the global economy. Two or more political outcomes may seem equally plausible, heightening uncertainty. What is needed is a method for eliminating the options that require the farthest stretch. That’s what we offer in these pages, but we obviously make mistakes. The purpose of our annual report card is to identify our biggest hits and misses so we can hone our ability to combine fundamental macro and market analysis with the “art of the possible,” delivering better research and greater returns for clients. This is our last report for 2019. Next week we will publish a joint report with Anastasios Avgeriou of BCA Research’s US Equity Strategy. We will resume publication in early January. We wish all our clients a merry Christmas, happy holidays, and a happy new year! American Politics: Unsurprising Surprises Chart 1Our 2019 Forecast Held Up Our 2019 Forecast Held Up Our 2019 Forecast Held Up On the whole our 2019 forecast held up very well. We argued that the global growth divergence that began in 2018 would extend into 2019 with the Fed hiking rates, a lack of massive stimulus from China, and an escalation in the US-China trade war. The biggest miss was that the Fed actually cut rates three times – addressed at length in our BCA Research annual outlook. But the bulk of the geopolitical story panned out: the US dollar, US equities, and developed market equities all outperformed as we expected (Chart 1). Geopolitical risk in the Trump era is centered on Trump himself. Beginning in 2017, we argued that the Democrats would take the House of Representatives in the midterm elections and impeach the president. Congress would not be totally gridlocked: while we argued for a government shutdown in late 2018, we expected a large bipartisan budget agreement in late 2019 and always favored the passage of the USMCA trade deal. Still, Congress would encourage Trump to go abroad in pursuit of policy victories, increasing geopolitical risks. We also argued that, barring “smoking gun” evidence of high crimes, the Republican-held Senate would acquit Trump – assuming his popularity held up among Republican voters themselves (Chart 2). These views either transpired or remain on track. The implication is that Trump-related risk continues and yet that Trump’s policies are ultimately constrained by the guardrails of the election. The latter factor helped propel the equity rally in the second half of the year. We largely sat out that rally, however. We overestimated the chances that Senator Bernie Sanders would falter and Senator Elizabeth Warren would swallow his votes, challenging former Vice President Joe Biden for the leading position in the early Democratic Party primary. We expected a significant bout of equity volatility via fears of a sharp progressive-populist turn in US policy (Chart 3). Instead, Sanders staged a recovery, Warren fell back, Biden maintained his lead, and markets rallied on other news. Chart 2Trump Will Be Acquitted How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 3Fears Of A Progressive Turn Did Not Derail The H2 Rally How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Warren could still recover and win the nomination next year. But the Democratic Primary was not a reason to remain neutral toward equities, as we did in September and October. China’s Tepid Stimulus In recent years China first over-tightened and then under-stimulated the economy – as we predicted. But we misread the credit surge in the first quarter as a sign that policymakers had given up on containing leverage. In total this year’s credit surge amounts to 3.4% of GDP, about 1.2% short of what we expected (based on half of the 9.2% surge in 2015-16) (Chart 4). China’s credit surge was about 1.2% short of what we expected, but the direction was correct. While the government maintained easy monetary policy as expected, its actions combined with negative sentiment to snuff out the resurgence in shadow banking by mid-year (Chart 5). Chart 4China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming China's Credit Surge Was Underwhelming Still, China’s policy direction is clear – and fiscal policy is indeed carrying a greater load. The authorities are extremely unlikely to reverse course next year, so global activity should turn upward (Chart 6). Our “China Play Index” – iron ore prices, Swedish industrials, Brazilian stocks, and EM junk bonds, all in USD terms – has appreciated steadily (Chart 7). Chart 5China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure China's Shadow Banking Remained Under Pressure   Chart 6Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Global Activity Should Turn Upward In 2020 Chart 7Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well Our 'China Play Index' Performed Well US-China: Underestimating Trump’s Risk Appetite We have held a pessimistic assessment of US-China relations since 2012. We rejected the trade truces agreed at the G20 summits in December 2018 and June 2019 as unsustainable. Our subjective probabilities of Trump achieving a bilateral trade agreement with China have never risen above 50%. Since September we have expected a ceasefire but not a full-fledged deal. Nevertheless we struggled with the timing of the trade war ups and downs (Chart 8). In particular we accepted China's new investment law as a sufficient concession and were surprised on May 5 when talks collapsed and Trump increased the tariffs. The lack of constraints on tariffs prevailed in 2019 but in 2020 the electoral constraint will prevail as long as Trump still has a chance of winning. Our worst trade recommendation of the year emerged from our correct view that the June G20 summit would lead to trade war escalation. We went long rare earth miners based outside of China. We expected China to follow through on threats to impose a rare earth embargo on the US in retaliation for sanctions against Chinese telecom giant Huawei. Not only did the US grant Huawei a reprieve, but China’s rare earth companies outperformed their overseas rivals. The trade went deeply into the red as global sentiment and growth fell (Chart 9). Only with global growth turning a corner have these high-beta stocks begun to turn around. Chart 8Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Expect A Ceasefire, Not A Full-Fledged Trade Agreement Chart 9Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Our Worst Call: Long Rare Earth Miners Chart 10North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) North Korean Diplomacy Has Not Collapsed (Yet) Our sanguine view on North Korea was largely offside this year. Setbacks in US negotiations with North Korea have often preceded setbacks in US-China talks. This was the case with the failed Hanoi summit in February and the inconsequential summit at the demilitarized zone in June. This could also be the case in 2020, as Washington and Pyongyang are now on the verge of breaking off talks with the latter threatening a “Christmas surprise” such as a nuclear or missile test. It is not too late to return to talks. Beijing is the critical player and is still enforcing crippling sanctions on North Korea (Chart 10). Beijing would benefit if North Korea submitted to nuclear and missile controls while the US reduced its military presence on the peninsula. We view this year as a hiccup in North Korean diplomacy but if talks utterly collapse and military tensions break out then it would undermine our view on US-China talks, Trump’s reelection odds, and US Treasuries in 2020. Hong Kong, rather than Taiwan, became the site of the geopolitical “Black Swan” that we expected surrounding Xi Jinping’s aggressive approach to domestic dissent. We have never downplayed Hong Kong. The loss of faith in the governing arrangement with the mainland began with the Great Recession and shows no sign of abating (Chart 11). We shorted the Hang Seng after the protests began, but closed at the appropriate time (Chart 12). The problem is not resolved. Also, Taiwan can test its autonomy much farther than Hong Kong and we still expect Taiwan to become ground zero of Greater China political risk and the US-China conflict. Chart 11Hong Kong Discontent Is Structural How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 12Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Our Hang Seng Short Is Done Chart 13Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump Needs A Trade Ceasefire Trump is unlikely to seek another trade war escalation given the negative impact it would have on sentiment and the economy (Chart 13). He could engage in another round of “fire and fury” saber-rattling against North Korea, as the economic impact is small, but he will prefer a diplomatic track. Taiwan, however, cannot be contained so easily if tempers flare. As we go to press it is not clear if Trump will hike the tariff on China on December 15. Some investors would point to his tendency to take aggressive action when the market gives him ammunition (Chart 14). We doubt he will, as this would be a policy mistake – possibly quickly reversed or possibly fatal for Trump. Trump’s electoral constraint is more powerful in 2020 than it was in 2019. Chart 14Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Trump Ceasefire Will Last As Long As Economy Is At Risk Chart 15Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our 'Doomsday Basket' Captured Trump's First Three Years Our best tactical trade of the year stemmed from the geopolitical risk in Asia (and the Fed’s pause): we recommended a long gold position this summer that gained 16%. We also closed out our “Doomsday Basket” of gold and Swiss bonds, initiated in Trump’s first year, for a gain of 14% (Chart 15). Now that the market has digested Trump’s tactical retreat, we have reinitiated the gold trade as a long-term strategic hedge against both short-term geopolitical crises and the long-term theme of populism. Iran: Fool Me Once, Shame On You … This is the second year in a row that we are forced to explain our analysis of Iran – we were only half-right. Our long-held view is that grand strategy will push the US to pivot to Asia to counter China while scaling back its military activity in the Middle East. Two American administrations have confirmed this trend. That said, there is still a risk that President Trump will get entangled in Iran and that risk is growing. Global oil volatility – which spiked during the market share wars of 2014 – declined through the beginning of 2018, until the Trump administration took clearer steps toward a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran. The constraints on Trump are obvious: the US economy is still affected by oil prices, which are set globally, and Iran can damage supply and push up prices. Therefore Trump should back down prior to the 2020 election. Yet Trump imposed sanctions, waivered on them, and then re-imposed them in May 2019 – catching us by surprise each time (Chart 16). Chart 16Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Trump Flip-Flopped On Iran Policy Chart 17Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets Iran Tensions Backwardated Oil Markets This saga is not resolved – we are witnessing what could become a secular bull market in Iran tensions. True, a Democratic victory in 2020 could lead to an eventual restoration of the 2015 nuclear deal. True, the Trump administration could strike a deal with the Iranians (especially after reelection). But no, it cannot be assumed that the US will restore the historic 2015 détente with Iran. Within Iran the regime hardliners are likely to regain control in advance of the extremely uncertain succession from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and this will militate against reform and opening up. We went long Brent crude Q1 2020 futures relative to Q1 2021 to show that tensions were not resolved (Chart 17) – the attack on Saudi Arabia in September confirmed this view. And yet the oil price shock was fleeting as global supply was adequate and demand was weak. Our current long Brent spot trade is not only about Iran. Global growth is holding up and likely to rebound thanks to monetary stimulus and trade ceasefire, OPEC 2.0 has strong incentives to maintain production discipline (driven by both Saudi Arabian and Russian interests), and the Iranian conflict has led to instability in Iraq, as we expected. The UK: Not Dead In A Ditch British Prime Minister Boris Johnson proclaimed this year that he would "rather be dead in a ditch” than extend the deadline for the UK to leave the EU. The relevant constraint was that a disorderly “no deal” exit would have meant a recession, which we used as our visual illustration of why Johnson would not actually die in a ditch (Chart 18). The test was whether parliament could overcome its coordination problems when it reconvened in September, which it immediately did, prompting us to go long GBP-USD on September 6 (Chart 19). This trade was successful and we remain long GBP-JPY. Chart 18The Reason We Rejected How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 19UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit UK Parliament Voted Down No-Deal Brexit Populism faltered in Europe, as expected. As we go to press, the UK Christmas election is reported to have produced a whopping Conservative majority. This year Johnson mounted the most credible threat of a no-deal Brexit that we are ever likely to see and yet ultimately delayed Brexit. The Conservative victory will produce an orderly Brexit. The trade deal that needs to be negotiated next year will bring volatility but it does not have a firm deadline and is not harder to negotiate than Brexit itself. The UK has passed through the murkiest parts of Brexit uncertainty. Moreover, our high-conviction view that more dovish fiscal policy would be the end-result of the Brexit saga is now becoming consensus. Europe: Not The Crisis You Were Looking For The European Union was a geopolitical “red herring” in 2019 as we expected. Anti-establishment feeling remained contained. Italy remains the weakest link in the Euro Area, but the political “turmoil” of 2018-19 is the populist exception that mostly proves the rule: Europeans are not as a whole rebelling against the EU or the euro. On France, Italy, and Spain our views were fundamentally correct. Even in the European parliament, where anti-establishment players have a better chance of taking seats than in their home governments, the true Euroskeptics who want to exit the union only make up about 16% of the seats (Chart 20). This is up from 11% prior to the elections in May this year. Chart 20Euroskepticism Was Overstated How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Yet the European political establishment is losing precious time to prepare for the next wave of serious agitation, likely when a full-fledged recession comes. Chart 21Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Trump Did Not Pile Tariffs Onto Auto Sector Germany is experiencing a slow transition from the long reign of Angela Merkel, whose successor has plummeted in opinion polls. The shock of the global slowdown – particularly heavy in the auto sector (Chart 21) – hastened Germany’s succession crisis. Chart 22Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk Overstated EU Political Risk, Understated Chinese Risk There is a silver lining: this shock is forcing the Germans to reckon with de-globalization. Attitudes across the country are shifting on the critical question of fiscal policy. Even the conservative Christian Democrats are loosening their belts in the face of the success of the Green Party and a simultaneous change in leadership among the Social Democrats to embrace bigger spending. The Trump administration refrained from piling car tariffs onto Europe amidst this slowdown in the automobile sector and overall economy. We expected this delay, as there is little support in the US for a trade war with Europe, contra China, and it is bad strategy to fight a two-front war. But if the US economy recovers robustly and Trump is emboldened by a China deal then this risk could reignite in future. With European political risk overstated, and Chinese mainland risk understated, we initiated a long European equities relative to Chinese equities trade (Chart 22), as recommended by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy. And now we are initiating the strategic long EUR/USD recommendation that we flagged in September with a stop at 1.18. Japan: Shinzo Abe Has Peaked Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is still in power and still very popular, whether judged by the average prime minister in modern memory or his popular predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. But he is at his peak and 2019 did indeed mark the turning point – it is all downhill from here. First, he lost his historic double super-majority in the Diet by falling to a mere majority in the upper house (Chart 23). He is still capable of revising the constitution, but now it is now harder – and the high water mark of his legislative power has been registered. Chart 23Abe Lost His Double Super Majority How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card Chart 24Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Consumption Tax Hike Shows Limits Of Abenomics Second, he proceeded with a consumption tax from 8% to 10% that predictably sent the economy into a tailspin given the global slowdown (Chart 24). We thought the tax hike would be delayed, but Abe opted to hike the tax and then pass a stimulus package to compensate. This decision further supports the view that Abe’s power will decline going forward. It is now incontrovertible that the Liberal Democrats are eschewing a radical plan of debt monetization in which they coordinate ultra-dovish fiscal policy with ultra-dovish monetary policy. “Abenomics” has not necessarily failed but it is a fully known quantity. Abe will next preside over the 2020 summer Olympics and prepare to step down as Liberal Democratic party leader in September 2021. It is conceivable he will stay longer, but the likeliest successors have been put into cabinet positions, including Shinjiro Koizumi, son of the aforementioned, whom we would not rule out as a future prime minister. Constitutional revision or a Russian peace deal could mark the high point of his premiership, but the peak macro consequences have been felt. Japan suffered a literal and figurative earthquake in 2011. Over the long run Tokyo will resort to more unorthodox economic policies and redouble its efforts at reflation. But not until the external environment demands it. This suggests that the JPY-USD is a good hedge against risks to the cyclically bullish House View in 2020 and supports an overweight stance on Japanese government bonds. Emerging Markets: Notable Mentions India: We were correct that Narendra Modi would be reelected as prime minister, but we did not expect that he would win a single-party majority for a second time (Chart 25). The risk is that this result leads to hubris – particularly in foreign policy and domestic social policy – rather than accelerating structural reform. But for now we remain optimistic about reform. Chart 25 How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card How Are We Doing? ... Geopolitical Strategy 2019 Report Card East Asia: We are optimistic on Southeast Asia in the context of US-China competition. But we proved overly optimistic on Malaysia and Indonesia this year, while we missed a chance to close our long Thai equity trade when it would have been very profitable to do so. Turkey: Domestic political challenges to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have led to a doubling down on unorthodox monetary policy and profligate fiscal policy, as expected. Early in the year we advised clients that Erdoğan would delay deployment of the Russian S-400 air defense system in deference to the US but it quickly became clear that this was not the case. Thus we correctly anticipated the sharp drop in the lira over the autumn (Chart 26). The US-Turkey relationship continues to fray and additional American sanctions are likely. Russia: President Vladimir Putin focused on maintaining domestic stability amid tight fiscal and monetary policy in 2019. This solidified our positive relative view of Russian currency and equities (Chart 27). But it also highlighted longer-term political risks. We expect this trend to continue, but by the same token Russia is a potential “Black Swan” risk in 2020. Chart 26The Lira's Autumn Relapse The Lira's Autumn Relapse The Lira's Autumn Relapse Chart 27Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Russia's Eerie Quiet In 2019 Venezuela: Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro eked out another year of regime survival in 2019 despite our high-conviction view since 2017 that he would be finished. However, the economy is still collapsing and Russian and Chinese assistance is still limited (Chart 28). Before long the military will need to renovate the regime, even if our global growth and oil outlook for next year is positive for the regime on the margin. Chart 28Maduro Clung To Power Maduro Clung To Power Maduro Clung To Power Chart 29Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Our 2019 Winner: Global Defense Stocks Brazil: We were late to the Brazilian equity rally. While we have given the Jair Bolsonaro administration the benefit of the doubt, a halt to structural reforms in 2020 would prove us wrong. Our worst trade of the year was long rare earth miners, mentioned above. Our best trade was long global defense stocks (Chart 29), a structural theme stemming from the struggle of multiple powerful nations in the twenty-first century. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Jingnan Liu Research Associate jingnan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com

  Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, I will be hosting a webcast on Wednesday, December 18th at 10:00 AM EST, where I will discuss the major investment themes and views I see playing out for 2020. This will be the last Global Investment Strategy report of 2019, with publication resuming early next year. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Healthy New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist   Overall Investment Strategy: Global growth should accelerate in 2020. Favor stocks over bonds. A more defensive stance will be appropriate starting in late 2021. Equities: Upgrade non-US equities to overweight at the expense of their US peers. Cyclical stocks, including financials, will outperform defensives. Fixed Income: Central banks will stay dovish, but bond yields will nevertheless rise modestly thanks to stronger global growth. Favor high-yield corporate credit over investment grade and sovereigns. Currencies: The US dollar will weaken in 2020 against EUR, GBP, CAD, AUD, and most EM currencies. The dollar will be flat against the yen and the Swiss franc. Commodities: Oil and industrial metals prices will move higher. Gold prices will be range-bound next year, but should rally in 2021 once inflation finally breaks out. GIS View Matrix Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead   I. Global Macro Outlook Stronger Global Growth Ahead We turned bullish on global equities last December after temporarily moving to the sidelines in the summer of 2018. Last month, we increased our procyclical bias by upgrading non-US stocks within our recommended equity allocation at the expense of their US peers. The decision to upgrade non-US equities stems from our expectation that global growth will strengthen in 2020. Global financial conditions have eased sharply this year, largely due to the dovish pivot by many central banks. Monetary policy affects the economy with a lag. This is one reason why the net number of central banks cutting rates has historically led global growth by about 6-to-9 months (Chart 1). Chart 1The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy In addition, there is mounting evidence that the global manufacturing cycle is bottoming out (Chart 2). The “official” Chinese PMI produced by the National Bureau of Statistics rose above 50 in November for the first time since May. The private sector Caixin manufacturing PMI has been improving for five consecutive months. The euro area manufacturing PMI increased over the prior month, led by gains in Germany and France. Chart 2A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle Chart 3The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (I) The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (I) The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (I)   The PMI data for the US has been mixed. The ISM manufacturing index weakened in November. In contrast, the Markit PMI rose to a seven-month high. Despite its shorter history, we tend to give the Markit PMI more credence. It is based on a larger sample of companies and has sector weights that closely match the actual composition of US output. As such, the Markit PMI is better correlated with hard data on manufacturing production, employment, and factory orders. The auto sector has been particularly hard hit during this manufacturing downturn. Fortunately, the industry is showing signs of life. The Markit euro area auto sector PMI has rebounded, with the new orders-to-inventory ratio moving back into positive territory for the first time since the autumn of 2018. US banks stopped tightening lending standards for auto loans in the third quarter. They are also reporting stronger demand for vehicle financing (Chart 3). In China, vehicle production and sales are improving on a rate-of-change basis (Chart 4). Both automobile ownership and vehicle sales in China are still a fraction of what they are in most other economies, suggesting further upside for sales (Chart 5). Chart 4The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (II) The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (II) The Auto Sector Is Showing Signs Of Life (II) Chart 5China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright     Trade War Uncertainty The trade war remains the biggest risk to our sanguine view on global growth. As we go to press, rumors are swirling that the US and China have reached a “Phase One” trade deal that would cancel the scheduled December 15th tariff hike and roll back as much as half of the existing tariffs. If this were to occur, it would be consistent with our expectation of a trade truce. Nevertheless, it is impossible to be certain about how things will unfold from here. The best we can do is think through the incentives that both sides face and assume they will act in their own self-interest. For President Trump, the key priority is to get re-elected next year. Trump generally gets poor grades from voters on most issues. The one exception is the economy. Rightly or wrongly, the majority of voters approve of his handling of the economy (Chart 6). An escalation of the trade war would hurt the US economy, especially in a number of Midwestern states that Trump needs to win to remain president (Chart 7). Chart 6Trump Gets Reasonably High Marks On His Handling Of The Economy, But Not Much Else Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Chart 7Economic Health Of The US Midwest Matters For Trump Economic Health Of The US Midwest Matters For Trump Economic Health Of The US Midwest Matters For Trump A resurgence in the trade war would also hurt Trump’s credibility. The point of the tariffs was not simply to raise revenue; it was to get China to the negotiating table. As a self-described master negotiator, President Trump now has to produce a “great” deal for the American people. If he had finalized an agreement with China a year or two ago, he would currently be on the hook for showing that it resulted in a smaller trade deficit. But with the presidential election only a year away, he can semi-credibly claim that the trade balance will only improve after he is re-elected. For their part, the Chinese would rather grapple with Trump now than face him after the election when he will no longer be constrained by re-election pressures. China would also like to avoid facing someone like Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders, who may insist on including stringent environmental and human rights provisions in any trade deal. At least with Trump, the Chinese know that they are getting someone who is focused on commercial issues. Contrary to most media reports, there is a fair amount of overlap between what Trump wants and what the Chinese themselves would like to achieve. For example, as China has moved up the technological ladder, many Chinese companies have begun to complain about intellectual theft by their domestic rivals. Thus, strengthening intellectual property protection has become a priority for Chinese officials. Along the same vein, China aspires to transform the RMB into a reserve currency. A country cannot have a reserve currency unless it also has an open capital account. Hence, financial market liberalization must be part of China’s long-term reform strategy. These mutual interests between the US and China could provide the basis for a trade truce. The Changing Nature Of Chinese Stimulus Chart 8China: Credit Growth Is Only A Few Percentage Points Above Nominal GDP Growth China: Credit Growth Is Only A Few Percentage Points Above Nominal GDP Growth China: Credit Growth Is Only A Few Percentage Points Above Nominal GDP Growth If a détente in the trade war is reached, will this prompt China to go back to its deleveraging campaign? We do not think so. For one thing, there can be no assurance that a trade truce will last. Thus, China will want to maintain enough stimulus as an insurance policy. In addition, credit growth is currently running only a few percentage points above nominal GDP growth (Chart 8). With the ratio of credit-to-GDP barely rising, there is little need to bring credit growth down much from current levels. This does not mean that the Chinese authorities will allow credit growth to increase significantly further. Instead, the authorities will continue shifting the composition of credit growth from the riskier shadow banking sector to the safer formal banking sector, while increasingly leaning on fiscal policy to buttress growth. One of the developments that has gone largely unnoticed by investors this year is that China’s general government deficit has climbed from around 3% of GDP in mid-2018 to 6.5% of GDP at present (Chart 9). Some of this stimulus has been used to finance tax cuts for households. Some of it has also been used to finance infrastructure spending, which requires imports of raw materials and capital goods. As a result of this fiscal easing, the combined Chinese credit/fiscal impulse has risen to a two-year high. It leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 10). Chart 9China Has Been Stimulating, Fiscally China Has Been Stimulating, Fiscally China Has Been Stimulating, Fiscally Chart 10Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth   Europe On The Upswing Chart 11Euro Area Growth: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Euro Area Growth: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Euro Area Growth: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Chart 12German Economy: Some Green Shoots German Economy: Some Green Shoots German Economy: Some Green Shoots The weakness in euro area growth this year has been concentrated in Germany and Italy. France and Spain have actually grown at a trend-like pace (Chart 11). Germany should benefit from stronger global growth and a recovery in automobile production next year. The recent rebound in the German PMI, as well as improvements in the expectations components of the IFO, ZEW, and Sentix surveys are all encouraging in this regard (Chart 12). Italy should also gain from an easing in financial conditions and receding political risks (Chart 13). The Italian 10-year government bond yield has fallen from a high of 3.69% in October 2018 to 1.23% at present. Chart 13Easing Financial Conditions And Less Political Uncertainty Will Help Italy Easing Financial Conditions And Less Political Uncertainty Will Help Italy Easing Financial Conditions And Less Political Uncertainty Will Help Italy Chart 14Euro Area Fiscal Thrust Euro Area Fiscal Thrust Euro Area Fiscal Thrust   Fiscal policy across the euro area is also turning more stimulative. The fiscal thrust in the euro area rose to 0.4% of GDP this year mainly due to a somewhat larger budget deficit in France (Chart 14). The thrust should remain positive in 2020. Even in Germany, fiscal policy should loosen. Faster wage growth in Germany is eroding competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area (Chart 15). That could force German policymakers to ratchet up fiscal stimulus in order to support demand. Already, the Social Democrats are responding to poor electoral performance by adopting a more proactive fiscal policy, hoping to stop the loss of votes to the big spending Greens. Chart 15Germany: Faster Wage Growth Eroding Competitiveness Relative To The Rest Of The Euro Area Germany: Faster Wage Growth Eroding Competitiveness Relative To The Rest Of The Euro Area Germany: Faster Wage Growth Eroding Competitiveness Relative To The Rest Of The Euro Area Chart 16Boris Johnson Won't Pursue A No-Deal Brexit Boris Johnson Won't Pursue A No-Deal Brexit Boris Johnson Won't Pursue A No-Deal Brexit   The UK economy should start to recover next year as Brexit uncertainty fades and fiscal policy turns more stimulative. Exit polls suggest that the Conservatives will command a majority government following today's election. There is not enough appetite within the Conservative party for a no-deal Brexit (Chart 16). As such, today's victory will allow Prime Minister Boris Johnson to push his proposed deal through Parliament. It will also allow him to fulfill his pledge to pass a budget that boosts spending.   Japan: Own Goal Japan has been hard hit by the global growth slowdown, given its close ties to its Asian neighbors, namely China. Add on a completely unnecessary consumption tax hike, and it is no wonder the economy has been faltering. Despite widespread weakness, there have been some very preliminary signs of improvement of late: The manufacturing PMI ticked up in November, while the services PMI rose back above 50. Consumer confidence also moved up to the highest level since June. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe announced a multi-year fiscal package worth approximately 26 trillion yen. The headline number grossly overstates the size of the stimulus because it includes previously announced measures as well as items such as land acquisition costs that will not directly benefit GDP. Nevertheless, the package should still boost growth by about 0.5% next year, offsetting part of the drag from higher consumption taxes.  US: Chugging Along Despite the slowdown in global growth, a stronger dollar, and the trade war, US real final demand is on track to grow by 2.5% this year (Chart 17). This is above the pace of potential GDP growth of 1.7%-to-2%. Chart 17Underlying US Growth Remains Above Trend Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead The Fed’s 75 basis points of rate cuts has moved monetary policy even further into accommodative territory. Not surprisingly, residential housing – the most interest rate-sensitive part of the economy – has responded favorably (Chart 18). While the tailwind from lower mortgage rates will dissipate by next summer, we do not anticipate much weakness in the housing market. This is because the inventory levels and vacancy rates remain near record-low levels (Chart 19). The shortage of homes should buttress both construction and prices. Chart 18US Housing: On Solid Ground (I) US Housing: On Solid Ground (I) US Housing: On Solid Ground (I) Chart 19US Housing: On Solid Ground (II) US Housing: On Solid Ground (II) US Housing: On Solid Ground (II)   Strong labor and housing markets will support consumer spending, which represents nearly 70% of the economy. Business capital spending should also benefit from lower rates, receding trade tensions, and rising wages which are making firms increasingly eager to automate. II. Financial Markets Global Asset Allocation We argued in the section above that global growth should rebound next year thanks to easier financial conditions, an upturn in the global manufacturing cycle, a detente in the trade war, and modest Chinese stimulus. Chart 20 shows that stocks usually outperform bonds when global growth is accelerating. This occurs partly because corporate earnings tend to rise when growth picks up. BCA’s US equity strategy team expects S&P 500 EPS to increase by 5% next year if global growth merely stabilizes. An acceleration in global growth would surely lead to even stronger earnings growth. On the flipside, investors also tend to price out rate cuts (or price in rate hikes) when growth is on the upswing, resulting in lower bond prices (Chart 21). Chart 20Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Global Growth Is Accelerating Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Global Growth Is Accelerating Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 21Improving Global Growth Boosts Earnings Growth...And Expectations Of Rate Hikes Improving Global Growth Boosts Earnings Growth...And Expectations Of Rate Hikes Improving Global Growth Boosts Earnings Growth...And Expectations Of Rate Hikes Relative valuations also favor stocks over bonds. Despite the stock market rally this year, the MSCI All-Country World Index currently trades at a reasonable 15.8-times forward earnings. This is below the forward PE ratio of 16.7 reached in January 2018 and even below the forward PE ratio of 16.4 hit in May 2015. Analysts expect global EPS to increase by 10% next year, below the historic 12-month expectation of 15% (Chart 22). In contrast to most years when analyst forecasts prove to be wildly overoptimistic, the current EPS forecast is likely to be met. Chart 22Analyst Expectations Are Not Wildly Optimistic Analyst Expectations Are Not Wildly Optimistic Analyst Expectations Are Not Wildly Optimistic Chart 23Equity Risk Premium Remains Quite Elevated Equity Risk Premium Remains Quite Elevated Equity Risk Premium Remains Quite Elevated   If one inverts the PE ratio, one can calculate an earnings yield for global equities of 6.3%. One can then calculate the implied equity risk premium (ERP) by subtracting the real long-term bond yield from the earnings yield. As Chart 23 illustrates, the ERP remains quite elevated by historic standards. Some observers might protest that the ERP is elevated mainly because bond yields are so low. If low bond yields are discounting very poor economic growth prospects, perhaps today’s PE ratio should be lower than it actually is? The problem with this argument is that growth prospects are not so bad. The IMF estimates that global growth will be slightly above its post-1980 average over the next five years (Chart 24). While trend growth is falling in both developed and emerging economies, the rising share of faster-growing emerging markets in global GDP is helping to prop up overall growth. Chart 24The Trend In Global Growth Has Remained Steady Thanks To Faster-Growing EM The Trend In Global Growth Has Remained Steady Thanks To Faster-Growing EM The Trend In Global Growth Has Remained Steady Thanks To Faster-Growing EM Sector And Regional Equity Allocation US stocks have outperformed their overseas peers by 10% year-to-date and by 137% since 2008. About half of the outperformance of US equities since the Great Recession was due to faster sales-per-share growth, a third was due to stronger margin growth, and the rest was due to relative PE expansion (Chart 25). Chart 25Faster Sales Growth, Rising Margins, And Relative PE Expansion Helped Drive US Outperformance Over The Past Decade Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead It is worth noting that the outperformance of US stocks is a fairly recent phenomenon. Between 1970 and 2008, European equity prices and EPS actually rose slightly faster than in the US (Chart 26). EM stocks also outperformed the US in the decade leading up to the Global Financial Crisis. Chart 26US Earnings Have Not Always Outpaced Their Peers US Earnings Have Not Always Outpaced Their Peers US Earnings Have Not Always Outpaced Their Peers We expect US stocks to rise in 2020 by about 5%-to-10%, but to lag their foreign peers in common-currency terms. There are four reasons for this: Sector skews favor non-US equities. Cyclical stocks tend to outperform defensives when global growth is strengthening and the US dollar is weakening (Chart 27). Cyclical sectors are overrepresented outside the US. We would include financials in our definition of cyclicals. Faster global growth next year will lift long-term bond yields. Since central banks are unlikely to raise rates, yield curves will steepen. Steeper yield curves will boost net interest margins, thus helping bank shares (Chart 28). European banks are more dependent on the spread between lending and borrowing rates than US banks, since the latter derive more of their profits from fees. Non-US stocks are quite a bit cheaper than their US peers. The forward PE for US equities currently stands at 18.1, well above the forward PE of 13.6 for non-US equities. Other valuation measures reveal an even bigger premium on US stocks (Chart 29). Differences in sector weights account for about a quarter of the valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world. The rest of the gap is due to cheaper valuations within sectors. Financials, for example, are notably less expensive in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe (Chart 30). The valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world is even starker if we compare earnings yields with bond yields. Since bond yields are lower outside the US, the implied equity risk premium is significantly higher for non-US stocks. Profit margins have less scope to rise in the US than in the rest of the world. According to MSCI data, net operating margins currently stand at 10.3% in the US compared to 7.9% abroad. Unlike in the US, margins in Europe and EM are still well below their pre-recession peaks (Chart 31). While US margins are unlikely to fall next year thanks to stronger global growth, rising wage growth will negatively impact profits in some labor-intensive industries. Labor slack is generally greater abroad, which should limit cost pressures. Uncertainty over the US election is likely to limit the gains to US equities. All of the Democratic frontrunners have pledged to roll back the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act to one degree or another. A full repeal of the Act would reduce S&P 500 EPS by about 10%. While such a dramatic move is far from guaranteed – for starters, it would require that the Democrats gain control of both the White House and the Senate – it does pose a risk to investors. The same goes for increased regulatory actions, which Senators Sanders and Warren have both vocally championed. Chart 27Cyclicals Do Well Versus Defensives When Global Growth Is Strengthening And The US Dollar Is Weakening Cyclicals Do Well Versus Defensives When Global Growth Is Strengthening And The US Dollar Is Weakening Cyclicals Do Well Versus Defensives When Global Growth Is Strengthening And The US Dollar Is Weakening Chart 28Steeper Yield Curves Help Financials Steeper Yield Curves Help Financials Steeper Yield Curves Help Financials   Chart 29US Equities Are More Expensive Than Stocks Abroad US Equities Are More Expensive Than Stocks Abroad US Equities Are More Expensive Than Stocks Abroad Chart 30European Financials Trade At A Substantial Discount To Their US Peers European Financials Trade At A Substantial Discount To Their US Peers European Financials Trade At A Substantial Discount To Their US Peers     Chart 31Profit Margins Have Less Scope To Rise In The US Than In The Rest Of The World Profit Margins Have Less Scope To Rise In The US Than In The Rest Of The World Profit Margins Have Less Scope To Rise In The US Than In The Rest Of The World Within the non-US universe, euro area stocks have the most upside potential. In contrast, we see less scope for Japanese stocks to outperform the global benchmark because of uncertainties over the impact of the consumption tax hike on domestic demand. In addition, a weaker trade-weighted yen next year will annul the currency translation gains that unhedged equity investors can expect to receive from other non-US stock markets. Lastly, the passage of a new investment law that requires investors wishing to “influence management” to receive prior government approval could cast a pall over recent efforts to improve corporate governance in Japan. Fixed Income Chart 32Inflation Excluding Shelter Has Been Muted Inflation Excluding Shelter Has Been Muted Inflation Excluding Shelter Has Been Muted Chart 33Long-Term Bond Yields Will Move Higher As Faster Growth Pushes Up Estimates Of The Neutral Rate Long-Term Bond Yields Will Move Higher As Faster Growth Pushes Up Estimates Of The Neutral Rate Long-Term Bond Yields Will Move Higher As Faster Growth Pushes Up Estimates Of The Neutral Rate Central banks will remain on the sidelines next year. Inflation is still running well below target in most economies. Even in the US, where slack has largely been absorbed and wage growth has risen, core inflation excluding housing has averaged only 1.2% over the past five years (Chart 32). Nevertheless, long-term bond yields will still move higher next year as investors revise up their estimate of the neutral rate in response to faster growth (Chart 33). On a regional basis, BCA’s fixed-income experts favor low-beta bond markets (Chart 34). Japanese bonds have a very low beta to the overall Barclays Global Treasury index because inflation expectations are quite depressed and the Bank of Japan will actively intervene to prevent yields from rising. On a USD currency-hedged basis, the Japanese 10-year yield stands at a relatively decent 2.38%, above the yield of 1.79% on comparable maturity US Treasurys (Table 1). Chart 34Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Table 1Bond Markets Across The Developed World Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead In contrast to Japan, the beta of US Treasurys to the overall global bond index is relatively high, implying that Treasurys will underperform other sovereign bond markets in a rising yield environment. The beta for Germany, UK, Australia, and Canada lie somewhere between Japan and the US. Consistent with our bullish view on global equities, we expect corporate bonds to outperform sovereign debt in 2020 (Chart 35). Despite the weakness in manufacturing, US banks further eased terms on commercial and industrial loans in Q3, according to the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey. Chart 35Stronger Growth Causes Corporate Spreads To Tighten Stronger Growth Causes Corporate Spreads To Tighten Stronger Growth Causes Corporate Spreads To Tighten At the US economy-wide level, neither interest coverage nor debt-to-asset ratios are particularly stretched (Chart 36). Admittedly, the picture looks less flattering if we focus solely on high-yield issuers (Chart 37). That said, a wave of defaults is very unlikely to occur in 2020, so long as the Fed is on hold and economic growth is on the upswing. Chart 36Corporate Debt: A Benign Top-Down View Corporate Debt: A Benign Top-Down View Corporate Debt: A Benign Top-Down View Chart 37Corporate Debt: More Concerning Picture Among High-Yield Issuers Corporate Debt: More Concerning Picture Among High-Yield Issuers Corporate Debt: More Concerning Picture Among High-Yield Issuers Chart 38US Corporates: Focus On High-Yield Credit HY Spread Targets US Corporates: Focus On High-Yield Credit HY Spread Targets US Corporates: Focus On High-Yield Credit Moreover, despite narrowing this year, high-yield spreads still remain above our fixed-income team’s estimate of fair value (Chart 38). They recommend moving down the credit curve and increasing the weight in Caa-rated bonds. These have underperformed this year largely because of technical factors such as their large exposure to the energy sector and relatively short duration. As oil prices rise next year, energy sector issuers will feel some relief. Moreover, unlike this year, rising long-term government bond yields in 2020 should also make shorter-duration credit more attractive. In contrast to high-yield spreads, investment-grade spreads have gotten quite tight. Investors seeking high-quality bond exposure should shift towards Agency MBS, which still carry an attractive spread relative to Aa- and A-rated corporate bonds. European IG bonds should also outperform their US peers thanks to faster growth in Europe next year and ongoing support from the ECB’s asset purchase program. Looking beyond the next 12-to-18 months, there is a strong chance that inflation will increase materially from current levels. The unemployment rate across the G7 has fallen to a multi-decade low, while the share of developed economies reaching full employment has hit a new cycle high (Chart 39). Chart 39ADeveloped Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Developed Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Developed Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Chart 39BDeveloped Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Developed Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Developed Markets: Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower... And Full Employment Reaching New Cycle Highs Chart 40The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well   For all the talk about how the Phillips curve is dead, wage growth remains well correlated with labor market slack (Chart 40). Rising wages will boost real disposable incomes, leading to more spending. If economies cannot increase supply to meet higher demand, prices will rise. It simply does not make sense to argue that the price of apples will increase if the demand for apples exceeds the supply of apples, but that overall prices will not increase if the demand for all goods and services exceeds the supply of all goods and services. It will take at least until mid-2021 for inflation to rise above the Fed’s comfort zone. It will take even longer for rates to reach restrictive territory, and longer still for tighter monetary policy to make its way through the economy. However, at some point in 2022, the interest-rate sensitive sectors of the US economy will buckle, setting off a global economic downturn and a deep bear market in equities and credit. Enjoy it while it lasts. Currencies And Commodities The US dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it usually moves in the opposite direction of the global business cycle (Chart 41). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the US, with its large service sector and relatively small manufacturing base, is a “low beta economy.” Strong global growth does help the US, but it benefits the rest of the world even more. Thus, capital tends to flow out of the US when global growth strengthens, which puts downward pressure on the dollar. As global growth picks up in 2020, the dollar will weaken. EUR/USD should increase to around 1.15 by end-2020. GBP/USD will rise to 1.40. USD/CNY will move to 6.8. The Australian and Canadian dollars, along with most EM currencies, will strengthen as well. However, the Japanese yen and Swiss franc are likely to be flat-to-down against the dollar, reflecting the defensive nature of both currencies. Today's rally in the pound has raised the return on our short EUR/GBP trade to 10.5%. For now, we would stick with this position. Chart 42 shows that the pound should be trading near 1.30 against the euro based on real interest rate differentials, which is still well above the current level of 1.20. Chart 41The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 42Interest Rate Differentials Suggest More Upside For The Pound Interest Rate Differentials Suggest More Upside For The Pound Interest Rate Differentials Suggest More Upside For The Pound   The trade-weighted dollar will continue to depreciate until late-2021, and then begin to strengthen again as the Fed turns more hawkish and global growth starts to falter. Commodity prices tend to closely track the global growth/dollar cycle (Chart 43). Industrial metal prices will fare well next year. Oil prices will also move up. Globally, the last of the big projects sanctioned prior to the oil-price collapse in late 2014 are coming online in Norway, Brazil, Guyana, and the US Gulf. Our commodity strategists expect incremental oil supply growth to slow in 2020, just as demand reaccelerates. Gold is likely to be range-bound for most of next year reflecting the crosswinds from a weaker dollar on the one hand (bullish for bullion), and receding trade war risks and rising bond yields on the other hand. Gold will have its day in the sun starting in 2021 when inflation finally breaks out. Our key market charts are shown on the following page. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 43Dollar Weakness Is A Boon For Commodities Dollar Weakness Is A Boon For Commodities Dollar Weakness Is A Boon For Commodities   Key Financial Market Forecasts Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead   MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategy Outlook – 2020 Key Views: Full Speed Ahead Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights An analysis on Thailand is available below. In all scenarios of global market performance, EM will underperform DM in the first half of 2020. Absolute return investors should be mindful of downside risks in EM financial markets. The principal drivers for EM corporate profits are domestic demand in both China and EM ex-China. US and European demand are not particularly relevant. We do not expect a recovery in domestic demand in China and the rest of EM in the early months of 2020. EM corporate profit growth is unlikely to turn positive in H1 2020. Volatility Is A Coiled Spring Chart I-1EM Stocks And Profits: An Unsustainable Divergence EM Stocks And Profits: An Unsustainable Divergence EM Stocks And Profits: An Unsustainable Divergence EM share prices and currencies have been range-bound in 2019, despite the strong rally in DM share prices. On one hand, growing hopes of a US-China trade deal, global monetary easing and expectations of a global growth recovery have put a floor under EM (Chart I-1, top panel). On the other hand, a lack of actual growth recovery in EM/China, a deepening contraction in EM corporate profits and lingering structural malaises in many EM economies have capped upside potential (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Consistent with this sideways market action, implied volatility measures for EM equities and currencies have dropped to record lows (Chart I-2, top and middle panels). Similarly, implied volatility measures for commodities currencies – which tend to be strongly correlated with EM risk assets – have plummeted close to their historic lows (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Remarkably, DM currency markets’ implied volatility has also collapsed to the all-time lows recorded in 2007 and 2014 (Chart I-3, top panel). Chart I-2EM Vol Is A Coiled Spring EM Vol Is A Coiled Spring EM Vol Is A Coiled Spring Chart I-3DM Currency Vol Is At Record Low DM Currency Vol Is At Record Low DM Currency Vol Is At Record Low   Nevertheless, past performance does not guarantee future performance. The fact that global financial market volatility has been very low over the past 12 months does not imply that it will remain subdued going forward. On the contrary, when DM currency volatility was this low in 2007 and 2014, it was followed by a bear market in EM risk assets (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Both EM and DM market volatility resemble a coiled spring. As such, it is quite likely these coiled springs will snap sometime in the first half of 2020. If this is indeed the case, it will be accompanied by a selloff in EM risk assets. We devote this report to discussing the reasons why such dynamics are likely to play out. An urge on the part of investors to deploy capital in EM has supported EM financial markets despite shrinking corporate profits. Hence, investment portfolios should be positioned for a resurgence in financial market volatility in general and currency volatility in particular in H1 2020. As we argued in our November 14 report, the US dollar is still enjoying tailwinds, especially versus EM and commodities currencies. All in all, asset allocators should continue to underweight EM stocks, credit markets and currencies relative to their DM counterparts. In all scenarios of global market performance, EM will underperform DM in the first half of 2020. Absolute return investors should be mindful of downside risks in EM financial markets. As always, the list of our recommended country allocations across EM equities, currencies, credit markets and domestic bonds is presented in the tables at the end of our report – please refer to pages 18-19. An Urge To Deploy Capital Amid Poor EM Fundamentals Investors’ unrelenting urge to deploy capital in EM financial markets put a floor under EM equities and currencies in 2019. Yet poor fundamentals have prevented EM equities and currencies from rallying. Such a battle between two opposing forces has produced a stalemate in EM financial markets. The same is true for commodities and many global market segments sensitive to global growth. Chart I-4Global Industrials: A Rally Without Profit Amelioration Global Industrials: A Rally Without Profit Amelioration Global Industrials: A Rally Without Profit Amelioration This stalemate is unlikely to last forever. Next year will likely be a year of either an EM breakout or breakdown. EM corporate earnings hold the key, and China’s domestic demand is of paramount importance to the EM profit cycle. We discuss our outlook for both the China and EM business cycles below. Following are the reasons why we believe market expectations of a rebound in global growth are too optimistic, and that EM risk assets are at risk: First, there is a widening gap between share prices and corporate profits. Not only are EM per-share earnings shrinking at a double-digit rate, as shown in Chart I-1 on page 1, but also EM EPS net revisions have not yet turned positive. This widening gap between share prices and net EPS revisions is also striking for global industrials (Chart I-4). If corporate profits stage an imminent recovery, stocks will continue to advance. Alternatively, investor expectations will not be met, and a selloff will ensue. As the top panel of Chart I-5 illustrates, the annual growth rate of EM EPS will at best begin bottoming – from double-digit contraction territory – only in the second quarter of 2020. Odds are that investor patience might run out before that occurs and EM markets will sell off in such a scenario. Second, improvement in US and European growth is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to be positive on EM/China growth. In fact, neither US nor euro area consumer spending have been weak (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). Yet, EM growth and corporate profits have plunged. Hence, EM growth is by and large not contingent on consumer spending in the US and Europe. As we have repeatedly argued, EM profit growth and risk assets are driven by China/EM domestic demand, rather than by US or European growth cycles. Third, EM financial markets are not cheap. Our composite valuation indicators based on 20% trimmed-mean and equal-weighted multiples indicate that stocks are trading close to their fair value (Chart I-6). These indicators are composed based on the trailing and forward P/E ratios, price-cash earnings, price-to-book value and price-to-dividend ratios for 50 EM equity subsectors. Chart I-5EM Profits Are Driven By China Not US Or Europe EM Profits Are Driven By China Not US Or Europe EM Profits Are Driven By China Not US Or Europe Chart I-6EM Equities Are Fairly Valued EM Equities Are Fairly Valued EM Equities Are Fairly Valued   When valuations are neutral, stock prices can rise or drop depending on the outlook for corporate profits. Provided we believe EM corporate profits will continue to contract for now, risks to share prices are skewed to the downside. Finally, several markets are still conveying a cautious message regarding EM assets. Specifically: There are cracks forming in EM credit markets. EM sovereign credit spreads are widening. Remarkably, emerging Asian high-yield corporate bond yields – shown inverted in Chart I-7 – are beginning to rise. Rising borrowing costs for high-yield borrowers in emerging Asia have historically heralded lower share prices in the region (Chart I-7). Chains often break in their weak links. Similarly, selloffs commence in the weakest segments and then spread from there. Hence, the budding weakness in emerging Asian junk corporate bonds and EM sovereign credit could be signals of a forthcoming selloff in EM/China plays. Remarkably, emerging Asian and Chinese small-cap stocks have failed to stage a rally in the past three months – despite global risk appetite having been strong (Chart I-8). This also signifies the lack of a meaningful recovery in emerging Asia in general and China in particular. Chart I-7A Canary In A Coal Mine? A Canary In A Coal Mine? A Canary In A Coal Mine? Chart I-8No Rally In Chinese And Emerging Asian Small Caps No Rally In Chinese And Emerging Asian Small Caps No Rally In Chinese And Emerging Asian Small Caps Chart I-9Semiconductor Prices Are Still Subdued Semiconductor Prices Are Still Subdued Semiconductor Prices Are Still Subdued Last but not least, cyclical currencies and commodities markets are not signaling a global business cycle recovery. Neither industrial metals nor oil prices have been able to rally meaningfully. EM currencies have also failed to appreciate versus the dollar. In addition, semiconductor prices – both DRAM and NAND – remain weak (Chart I-9). Bottom Line: An urge on the part of investors to deploy capital in EM has supported EM financial markets despite a poor growth background, in general, and shrinking corporate profits, in particular. China: Structural Malaises To Delay A Cyclical Recovery Recent macro data, particularly PMIs, have once again raised hopes of a business cycle recovery in China. While it is reasonable to infer that the industrial cycle in China has recently stabilized, sequential improvements will be hard to achieve in the coming months for the following reasons: The credit and fiscal spending impulse has historically led the manufacturing cycle in China on average by about nine months. However, this time gap has varied – from three months in the first quarter of 2009 to about 20 months in 2017 (Chart I-10). Chart I-10China Credit/Fiscal Impulse And Business Cycle: Varying Time Lags China Credit/Fiscal Impulse And Business Cycle: Varying Time Lags China Credit/Fiscal Impulse And Business Cycle: Varying Time Lags There are several reasons why the time lag could be longer than nine months in the current cycle: (1) The US-China confrontation is dampening sentiment among both enterprises and households in China. Marginal propensity to spend among households and enterprises is low and has not improved (Chart I-11). A Phase One deal is unlikely to reverse this. The fact remains that the US and China have failed to reach an even small and limited accord in the past year of negotiations. With this in mind, even if there is a Phase One deal, businesses both in China and around the world are unlikely to alter their investment plans substantially. (2) Regulatory pressures on banks and on the shadow banking sector to deleverage remain acute. Although the People’s Bank of China has reduced interest rates and is providing ample liquidity, the regulatory tightening measures from 2016-2018 have not been reversed. Consistently, commercial banks’ assets and broad bank credit growth are rolling over anew (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China: Lack Of Appetite To Spend For Enterprises And Households China: Lack Of Appetite To Spend For Enterprises And Households China: Lack Of Appetite To Spend For Enterprises And Households Chart I-12Banking System Is Now More Restrained Compared With Previous Stimulus Episodes Banking System Is Now More Restrained Compared With Previous Stimulus Episodes Banking System Is Now More Restrained Compared With Previous Stimulus Episodes   (3) There has been no stimulus targeting the real estate market. Without a recovery in the property market – both strong price appreciation and construction activity – it will be difficult to achieve a business cycle recovery. The basis is that real estate – not exports to the US – has been the key pillar driving China’s growth over the past 10 years. Even if there is a Phase One deal, businesses both in China and around the world are unlikely to alter their investment plans substantially. In the onshore bond market, government bond yields do not confirm the sustainability of the improvement in the national manufacturing PMI (Chart I-13). China’s local currency government bond yields have generally been a good coincident indicator for the industrial cycle, and they are not flashing green. Chart I-13Chinese Local Bond Yields Doubt The Sustainability Of A Stronger PMI Chinese Local Bond Yields Doubt The Sustainability Of A Stronger PMI Chinese Local Bond Yields Doubt The Sustainability Of A Stronger PMI November Asian and Chinese trade data have been somewhat mixed. Korea’s total exports and exports to China still show double-digit contraction (Chart I-14, top panel). Similarly, Japanese foreign machine tool orders – both total and from China – remain in deep contraction (Chart I-14, middle panel). In contrast, Taiwanese exports to China and to the world ex-China have improved (Chart I-14, bottom panel). The recuperation in Taiwanese exports to China could be attributed to stockpiling of semiconductors by mainland companies. Odds are that China has decided to stockpile semiconductors from Taiwan, given the lingering uncertainty over the China-US relationship, especially regarding China’s access to semiconductors. Real estate – not exports to the US – has been the key pillar driving China’s growth over the past 10 years. Infrastructure spending remains lackluster, despite a surge in special bond issuance by local governments over the past 12 months (Chart I-15, top panel). Chart I-14Asian Trade Was Still Very Weak In November Asian Trade Was Still Very Weak In November Asian Trade Was Still Very Weak In November Chart I-15China: Domestic Demand Is Lackluster China: Domestic Demand Is Lackluster China: Domestic Demand Is Lackluster   Chart I-16EM Ex-China: No Recovery In Domestic Demand EM Ex-China: No Recovery In Domestic Demand EM Ex-China: No Recovery In Domestic Demand The reason is that special bond issuance accounts for a small share of infrastructure investment. Bank loans, corporate bond issuance by LFGVs and land sales are still the main source of funding for capital expenditures on infrastructure. Finally, on the consumer side, auto sales are contracting for a second straight year, while smartphone sales are flat-to-down for a third year in a row (Chart I-16, middle and bottom panels). EM Ex-China: Mind The Deflationary Forces In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, not only are their exports weak, but their domestic demand trajectory is also downbeat (Chart I-16). Despite rate cuts by EM central banks, their interest rates remain elevated in real terms (adjusted for inflation). The basis is that inflation has dropped as much as policy rate cuts. In fact, in many economies, inflation is flirting with all-time lows (Chart I-17). Furthermore, lending rates by banks have not been adjusted sufficiently low in line with the declines in policy rates. Consequently, local borrowing costs in EM remain elevated. Not surprisingly, broad money growth is close to a record low (Chart I-18). Chart I-17EM Ex-China: Inflation Is At A Record Low EM Ex-China: Inflation Is At A Record Low EM Ex-China: Inflation Is At A Record Low Chart I-18EM Ex-China: More Aggressive Monetary Easing Is Necessary EM Ex-China: More Aggressive Monetary Easing Is Necessary EM Ex-China: More Aggressive Monetary Easing Is Necessary   Table I-1EM Corporate Profits Across Sectors 2020 Key Views: A Resolution Of The EM Stalemate 2020 Key Views: A Resolution Of The EM Stalemate Without recognizing non-performing loans and recapitalizing banks, a sustainable credit cycle - and hence domestic demand recovery - is implausible in many EM countries. This will impede the corporate profit recovery, especially for banks that account for 28% of MSCI EM corporate profits (Table I-1). As we argued in our November 14 report, such deflationary tendencies in many EM economies warrant a weaker currency. Bottom Line: The principal drivers for EM corporate profits are domestic demand in China and EM ex-China, rather than the ones in the US or Europe. We do not expect a recovery in domestic demand in both China and the rest of EM in the early months of 2020. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Thailand: Bet On More Monetary Easing Chart II-1Thailand Is Flirting With Deflation Thailand Is Flirting With Deflation Thailand Is Flirting With Deflation Deflationary pressures are mounting in Thailand. This will lead the central bank to cut interest rates much further. We therefore recommend to continue overweighting Thai domestic bonds within an EM local bond portfolio, currency unhedged.  Thailand’s economy is flirting with deflation and needs lower interest rates, a cheaper currency and a fiscal boost: Core inflation has fallen to a mere 0.5%. Likewise, headline inflation has plunged to 0.2%, which is far below the central bank’s lower-bound target of 1% (Chart II-1). Further, nominal GDP growth has dropped below the prime lending rate (Chart II-2). Adjusted for core inflation, real lending rates are too high for the economy to handle. If lending rates are not brought down, credit demand will decline further and non-performing loans will mushroom (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Thailand: Nominal GDP Growth Is Below Prime Lending Rate Thailand: Nominal GDP Growth Is Below Prime Lending Rate Thailand: Nominal GDP Growth Is Below Prime Lending Rate Chart II-3Thailand: Decelerating Domestic Credit Thailand: Decelerating Domestic Credit Thailand: Decelerating Domestic Credit   High borrowing costs are especially detrimental for the non-financial private sector – households in particular. Consumer debt currently stands at 125% of disposable income. The central bank is set to deliver more rate cuts and will probably begin intervening in the foreign exchange market to weaken the baht. Thailand’s economic growth has decelerated and more downside is likely. Business sentiment is deteriorating, companies’ book orders are falling and manufacturing production is contracting (Chart II-4, top panel). Overall, corporate earnings are shrinking 8% from a year ago in local currency terms (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Declining corporate profitability is beginning to hurt capex and employment. In turn, slower employment and wage growth have hit consumer confidence. Private consumption volume has decelerated decisively (Chart II-5, top panel) and passenger vehicle sales are falling (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Chart II-4Thailand: Business Sentiment Is Falling Thailand: Business Sentiment Is Falling Thailand: Business Sentiment Is Falling Chart II-5Thailand: Consumer Spending Has Been Hit Thailand: Consumer Spending Has Been Hit Thailand: Consumer Spending Has Been Hit Chart II-6Thailand's Real Estate Market Is Weak Thailand's Real Estate Market Is Weak Thailand's Real Estate Market Is Weak The real estate market is also slowing down. Chart II-6 shows various types of residential property prices. Specifically, house price appreciation has either decelerated or turned into deflation. Accordingly, construction activity has been weak. Overall, the Thai economy needs significant monetary and fiscal easing. Yet the 2020 fiscal budget entails only a 6% increase in expenditures in nominal terms, which is insufficient to halt the economy’s downtrend momentum. With the budget already set, aggressive monetary easing - in the form of generous rate cuts and foreign exchange interventions to induce some currency depreciation – is the only tool available to the authorities at the moment. Bottom Line: The Thai economy is facing strong deflationary forces and requires lower interest rates and a cheaper currency. The central bank is set to deliver more rate cuts and will probably begin intervening in the foreign exchange market to weaken the baht. Investment Recommendations Local interest rates will drop further and the Bank of Thailand (BoT) will keep cutting interest rates next year in the face of mounting deflationary trends in the economy. For dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios, we recommend keeping overweight positions in Thai local currency bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM portfolios. While the Thai baht could depreciate because of monetary easing, the currency will still perform better than many other EM currencies. Thailand carries a very robust current account surplus of 6% of GDP. This will provide a cushion for the baht. Furthermore, foreign ownership of local currency bonds is low at 18%. This limits potential foreign outflows from local bonds in case the currency depreciates. In addition, Thailand’s foreign debt obligations - which are calculated as the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months - are small, accounting for 14% of exports. This limits hedging needs by Thai debtors with foreign currency liabilities and, hence, the currency’s potential downside. We recommend EM equity investors to keep an overweight position in Thai equities. First, Thai bourse is defensive in nature – with utilities, consumer staples and healthcare accounting for 27% of the MSCI Thailand market cap – and will begin outperforming as EM share prices come under renewed stress (Chart II-7, top panel). Second, net EPS revision in Thailand vs. EM has plummeted to a 16-year low (Chart II-7, bottom panel). This entails that a lot of bad news has already been priced in relative terms. Finally, narrow money (M1) growth seems to be bottoming. This is occurring because the central bank has begun accumulating foreign exchange reserves. While it might take some time before monetary easing leads to an economic recovery, Thai share prices will benefit from it early on (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Thailand vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Earnings Revisions Thailand vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Earnings Revisions Thailand vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Earnings Revisions Chart II-8Thailand: Narrow Money And Share Prices Thailand: Narrow Money And Share Prices Thailand: Narrow Money And Share Prices   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes     Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights OPEC 2.0 agreed to cut output by another 500k b/d at its Vienna meeting last week, bringing the total official cuts by the producer coalition to 1.7mm b/d. Saudi Arabia added 400k b/d of additional voluntary cuts, bringing its total cuts to almost 900k b/d vs. its October 2018 production level. We think the market will tighten, as a result, and are getting long 2H20 Brent vs. short 2H21 Brent; this is the backwardation trade that worked well this year, producing an average return of 180%. There was no extension of OPEC 2.0 output cuts beyond end-March, although an extraordinary meeting of the coalition was scheduled for March 5, 2020. Anti-government civil unrest in Iraq and Iran has resulted in the killing of hundreds of protesters in both countries by state security forces. The unrest raises the threat of disruptions to oil supplies from Iraq and to ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Clashes between pro-Iranian protesters and Iraqi nationalists in Baghdad prompted a visit to the city by Iran’s top military commander, Qassem Soleimani, over the weekend. Soleimani reportedly is participating in talks to find a new prime minister for Iraq. Soleimani’s visit drew criticism from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most prominent Shia religious leader in Iraq. Feature OPEC 2.0’s deepening of production cuts to 1.7mm b/d will be largely ceremonial, unless free riders in the producer coalition – led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – fully comply with the new levels agreed last week in Vienna (Chart of the Week).1 Contrary to our expectation, the production cuts were not extended beyond end-March, although an extraordinary meeting of the coalition was scheduled for March 5, 2020, in Vienna to review market conditions prior to the deal’s expiry.2 The market was not expecting anything other than symbolism in the just-concluded discussions among OPEC 2.0 members regarding production cuts. The bulk of the cuts in the coalition’s production are the result of US sanctions against Venezuela and Iran, which have removed ~ 1.8mm b/d from the market and KSA's cuts, which will total ~ 900k b/d following OPEC 2.0's Vienna meeting.  We believe this will lead to a tighter market, and will steepen the backwardation in the Brent forward curve.  We are, therefore, recommending a longer 2H20 Brent position vs. a short 2H21 Brent position. The sanctions-induced cuts are squeezing the economies of both Venezuela and Iran, which, in the case of the latter, is producing a blowback on Iraq. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Raises Output Cuts To 1.7mm b/d In Vienna Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iran Fights To Maintain Influence In Iraq Following an unexpected increase in gasoline prices last month, violent anti-government protests erupted around Iran, which provoked a deadly crackdown by the state. The ongoing unrest has resulted in the death of hundreds of protesters, which, by the US’s estimate, stand at more than 1,000. This claim was refuted by Iranian officials.3 It is impossible to overstate the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The unrest that followed the gasoline price hike was the deadliest since that country’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, according to the New York Times. The Times reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps opened fire on protestors calling for the removal of leadership, killing scores.4 Protests also erupted in states closely aligned with Iran in the past couple of months – i.e., Lebanon, Iraq.5 For the oil market, Iraq matters most: It is difficult to overstate the importance of keeping Iraq’s 4.7mm b/d of crude oil production flowing to global markets. Likewise, it is impossible to overstate the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the rest of the world’s oil-consuming markets (Map 1). Map 1The Persian Gulf And Strait of Hormuz Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level More than 20% of the world’s crude oil and condensates supplies transit the Strait on any given day (Chart 2). The anti-government protests in Iraq and Iran raise the threat level to production in Iraq, and attacks on shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz by the latter, or a direct confrontation with the US and its Gulf allies. Our colleagues in BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) are following the evolution of events in Iran and Iraq closely. Following is their assessment of what led to the most recent unrest in Iraq.6 Chart 2Violence Again Threatens Gulf Oil Supply Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Chart 3AFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Deadlock In Iraq While both the grievances and demands of the protesters in Lebanon and Iraq are similar, the unrest in Iraq is of much greater consequence from a global investor’s perspective. The trigger was the removal of the highly revered Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi from his position in the Iraqi army by Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi.7 The popular general was unceremoniously transferred to an administrative role in the Ministry of Defense. Iraqi protesters are united in their economic grievances, frustrated at a political and economic system that is unwilling to translate economic gains to improved livelihoods for its people. The sacking of al-Saadi – considered a neutral figure – was interpreted as evidence of Iranian influence and the greater sway of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of various paramilitary groups. Iraqis all over the country responded by attacking the Iranian consulate in Karbala and offices linked to Iranian-backed militias. Iraqi protesters are united in their economic grievances, frustrated at a political and economic system that is unwilling to translate economic gains to improved livelihoods for its people. The May 2018 parliamentary elections, which ushered in Prime Minster Abdul-Mahdi, failed to generate much improvement. The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services (Charts 3A & 3B). This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace. Chart 3BFertile Ground For Unrest In Iraq Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Most importantly, the ruling elite has failed to respond to key trends that emerged in last year’s parliamentary elections. The extremely low voter turnout reveals that Iraqis are disenchanted with the government's ability to meet their needs. Meanwhile the success of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition – running on a platform stressing non-sectarianism and national unity – in securing the largest number of seats highlights the desire for a reduction of foreign interference (both Iranian as well as US/Saudi) in domestic politics. Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have an appetite to step in and provide the support necessary to counteract Iran. Moreover, Iran and its proxies in Iraq will not back down easily. Thus, the ongoing protests are to a great extent the result of the new government’s failure to heed the warnings brought about by the 2018 election and protests. They have served to deepen the rift between the rival Shia blocs, particularly those Iraqi nationalists who deeply resent the intrusion of Iran into its political structures. Iraq is in a state of deadlock. That said, Iran is unlikely to stand by idly as its influence wanes. As a result, we are likely to witness greater unrest as the rift between the two Shia blocs intensifies. Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have an appetite to step in and provide the support necessary to counteract Iran. Moreover, Iran and its proxies in Iraq will not back down easily. At the same time, the geographical spread of the protest movement demonstrates that Iraqis are fed up with the current system.8 This points to greater instability in Iraq as no side is backing down and the only foreign power willing and able to interfere is Iran. US Sanctions Continue To Pressure Iran The Trump administration’s crippling “maximum pressure” sanctions have sent Iran’s Economy reeling. The Trump administration continues to enforce its “maximum pressure” sanctions, which have reduced Iranian oil exports from 1.8 million barrels per day at their recent peak to 100,000 barrels per day in November (Chart 4). These are crippling sanctions that have sent Iran’s economy reeling. Chart 4Iran Remains Under “Maximum Pressure” Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled out negotiations with Trump. They would be unpopular at home without a major reversal on sanctions from Trump (Chart 5). Chart 5 Major US Reversal Prerequisite For Iran Talks Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Trump presumably aims to avoid an oil shock ahead of the election. The US and its allies have visibly shied away from conflict in the wake of Iran’s provocations, including the spectacular attack on eastern Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure that knocked 5.7 million barrels of oil per day offline in September. However, this does not mean the odds of war are zero. Opinion polls show that the Iranian public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy. The Americans or the Iranians could miscalculate. Both sides might think they can improve their standing at home by flexing military muscle abroad. Iran is a rational actor and would not normally court American airstrikes or antagonize a potentially lame duck president. Yet it is under extreme pressure due to the sanctions, as the riots and protests following the gasoline price hikes indicate. Iran also faces significant unrest in its sphere of influence, as discussed above. Opinion polls show that the Iranian public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy, and yet that American sanctions are siphoning off some of this anger (Chart 6). This could tempt Iran’s leaders to continue staging provocations in the Strait of Hormuz or elsewhere in the region, perhaps with attacks on US assets or those of its GCC allies. Chart 6Iranians Blame Tehran, Tehran Blames America Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Hardline Iranian military leaders and politicians currently receive the most favor in polling, while the reformist President Rouhani – undercut by the American withdrawal from the 2015 deal – is among the least popular. Elections for the Majlis, or Parliament, in February will likely reverse the reformist turn in Iranian politics that began in 2012. The regime stalwarts are gearing up for the supreme leader’s succession in the coming years. While a Democratic White House could restore the 2015 deal Trump unilaterally abrogated, that ship may have sailed. Trump, under impeachment, could seek to distract the public. This was Bill Clinton’s tactic with Operations Infinite Reach, Desert Fox, and Allied Force in 1998-99. These operations were minor and not comparable to a conflict with Iran. However, Trump may be emboldened. On paper the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve – along with OPEC and other petroleum reserves and spare capacity – could cover most major oil-shock scenarios. A supply outage the size of the Abqaiq attack in September would have to persist for four months to cause enough price pressure to harm the US economy and decrease Trump’s chances of winning re-election. The simulations in Chart 7 overstate the gasoline price impact by assuming that global strategic oil reserves remain untapped, along with spare capacity. Chart 7Desperation Could Force Iran To Take Excessive Risks Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Thus while the Iranians may take excessive risks, the Trump administration may not refrain this time from airstrikes. Bottom Line: While the Middle East is always full of risks to oil supply, Iran’s vulnerability and Trump’s status at home make the situation unusually precarious. We continue to believe an historic oil-supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize, or are pricing in currently. Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight Following the long-awaited OPEC 2.0 meeting held last week, the group “surprised” the market by announcing it will deepen its production cut by ~ 500k b/d, pushing the total cut to 1.7mm b/d. The bulk of the additional adjustments comes from Saudi Arabia (Chart of the Week). Importantly, the group emphasizes the importance of full compliance by every member – this would imply a ~225k b/d reduction from Iraq alone. We remain overweight oil in 2020. Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices rose sharply over the past week, reaching $2.71/lb at Tuesday's close, a level last seen in July 2019. US-China trade optimism last Friday sparked the rally. Copper’s physical market remains tight, inventories are low globally, and demand is set to rebound on the back of major central banks’ accommodative monetary policy. Even so, sentiment and positioning remain weak (Chart 8). We expect this to reverse, further supporting prices over the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral Risk-on sentiment following President Trump’s upbeat comments on US-China trade negotiations pushed gold prices down by $18/oz last Friday – one of the largest single-day declines YTD. Precious metals markets continue to follow the ups and downs of trade-war headlines and global growth-related news. Nonetheless, our fair-value model suggests gold is fairly priced at ~ $1,465/oz (Chart 9). Any significant drop below that level would provide an entry opportunity for investors to add gold as a portfolio hedge in 2020. Ags/Softs: Underweight The USDA released its final crop progress update on Monday. Corn was 8% behind full harvest, with North Dakota remaining the laggard with only 43% of the corn picked. Markets ignored this as March Corn futures slid close to 1.5% on a weekly basis. Chinese purchases of at least five bulk cargo shipments of U.S. soybeans lifted prices above $9/bu on Tuesday in anticipation of the USDA monthly crop production report. Wheat prices were flat on a weekly basis, as traders awaited results of an Egyptian purchase tender on Tuesday. Chart 8Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Copper Sentiment And Positioning Remain Weak Chart 9Gold Fair Value Is ~ 5/oz Gold Fair Value Is ~ $465/oz Gold Fair Value Is ~ $465/oz   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see On OPEC 2.0’s Agenda In Vienna: More Production Cuts, Longer Deal, published December 5, 2019.  We noted  most of the production cuts that matter to the market already are in place – i.e., Saudi Arabia’s over-compliance of ~ 400k b/d, along with Venezuela’s and Iran’s involuntary production cuts of ~ 1.8mm b/d resulting from US sanctions, as of October 2019.  Under the amended production cuts, KSA agreed to remove close to 170k b/d more, lifting its total official voluntary quota and over-compliance, which brings its total cuts to close to 900k b/d.  The total OPEC 2.0 additional cuts come to just over 500k b/d.  Based on media reports going into the Vienna meeting last week, it would appear Russia prevailed on the producer coalition in its effort to keep the expiry of the production deal at end-March.  However, the March 5 extraordinary meeting of the coalition states indicates KSA was successful in keeping the discussion re extending the deal alive. 2     In our current modeling, we assume the original 1.2mm b/d of cuts will remain in place to year-end 2020.  We will be updating our balances and price forecasts in next week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. 3    Please see U.S. says Iran may have killed more than 1,000 in recent protests, published by uk.reuters.com December 5, 2019.   Iranian leaders blamed “thugs” aligned with the US and rebels for the violence, and, in a separate report citing an Amnesty International claim that 143 protesters were killed, said “several people, including members of the security forces, were killed and more than 1,000 people arrested.”  Please see Iran says hundreds of banks were torched in 'vast' unrest plot published November 27, 2019, by uk.reuters.com.  The size of the price increase is difficult to ascertain: The government says gasoline costs were increased by 50% with a goal of raising $2.55 billion/year, while other reports claim the hike amounted to as much as 300% in different parts of the country last month. 4    Please see With Brutal Crackdown, Iran Is Convulsed by Worst Unrest in 40 Years, published by the New York Times December 1, 2019. 5    The extent to which these states are entwined with Iran recently came to light via a cache of leaked Iranian diplomatic cables obtained by The Intercept, a not-for-profit news organization established by Pierre Omidyar, a founder of eBay.  The cables were published jointly by The Intercept and the New York Times November 19, 2019.  Please see The Iran Cables: Secret Documents Show How Tehran Wields Power in Iraq, published by the Times.  The article claims “The unprecedented leak exposes Tehran’s vast influence in Iraq, detailing years of painstaking work by Iranian spies to co-opt the country’s leaders, pay Iraqi agents working for the Americans to switch sides and infiltrate every aspect of Iraq’s political, economic and religious life.” 6    This analysis in the remainder of this report is an abridged version of original work published by BCA Research’s GPS service in reports entitled Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated and 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society published November 8 and December 6, 2019.  We believe events over the past week and weekend warrant this in-depth examination of the ongoing unrest and instability in Iraq and Iran.  Both reports are available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7     Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi was recognized and respected among Iraqis for fighting terrorism and his role in ridding the country of the Islamic State. The Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces were uneasy with Saadi’s close relationship with the US military. His abrupt removal was likely a result of the Iraqi government’s growing concern over al-Saadi’s popularity and rumors of a potential military coup. 8    Protests are occurring in all regions in Iraq. They are supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This is a significant development from the 2018 protests which were mainly concentrated in Iraq’s southern region.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level Iraq, Iran Violence Raises Gulf Oil Supply Threat Level

SPX Return In Perspective SPX Return In Perspective Overweight The handsome year-over-year SPX return will hit a zenith later this month of roughly 35%. However, putting this impressive recovery from last year’s doldrums in perspective is instructive. Tech stocks (including GOOGL and FB) have massively outperformed the SPX (top panel). Within the tech universe, software stocks have in turn trounced the tech sector (top panel). In fact, the SPX return profile excluding tech stocks is eerily similar to the emerging markets that have been global laggards and failed to break out to fresh cycle highs (bottom panel). In other words, returns have been extremely concentrated, and if portfolio managers have missed the software rally, then they have left sizable returns on the table. As a reminder, while we recommend a benchmark allocation on the S&P tech sector, we have been secularly overweight the S&P software index since November 27, 2017, and we are currently up 35 percentage points above and beyond the SPX’s return, since inception. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P software index, but maintain the trailing stop at the 27% return mark since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SOFT: MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, NLOK, FTNT, CTXS.  

Highlights We expect tensions from the Sino-US trade war to marginally ease in 2020, in the run-up to the US presidential election. The “Phase One” trade deal will likely be signed with a good possibility of some tariff rollbacks. Chinese policymakers will roll out more stimulus to secure an economic recovery in 2020, and external demand will improve. But we expect growth in both the domestic economy and exports to only modestly accelerate. During the next 6 to 12 months, investors should remain bullish on both Chinese A shares and investable stocks, while keeping in mind that relative outperformance, particularly for A-shares, could be frontloaded in the first half of the year. Despite sharply rising amount of defaults, Chinese onshore bonds are priced at a much higher premium than warranted by their default risk. We continue to favor Chinese onshore corporate bonds in both absolute terms and in relative to duration-matched government bonds. Feature BCA Research recently published its special year end Outlook report for 2020, which described the macro themes that are likely to drive global financial markets over the coming year. In this week’s China Investment Strategy report we elaborate on the Outlook, by reviewing our four key themes for China in the year ahead. Key Theme #1: Tension From The Trade War With The US Will Ease In 2020 Despite the harsh rhetoric and threats of retaliation from both the US and China, we expect that the real risks to the global economy from the Sino-US trade war will decline in 2020. In trade negotiations next year, both President Trump and President Xi will need to adjust to their respective constraints. Both President Trump and President Xi will need to adjust to their respective constraints next year. Trump must sustain a strong domestic economy to increase his re-election odds. He will cater to the US economy and financial markets, by trying to de-escalate trade tensions and keeping negotiations going with China. This means he is likely to hold off on tariffs on China, and quite possibly even agree to roll back tariffs to August 2019 or April 2019 levels (Chart 1). Chart 1Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible President Xi also faces economic constraints as the Chinese economy is on an unsure footing.  The buildup in leverage in the non-financial sector over the past decade has prevented Chinese policymakers from aggressively stimulating the economy by relying on the old debt-oriented policies. Chinese policymakers are concerned about employment stability.1 The private sector, which accounts for 80% of all job creation in China, has been disproportionally hit by the trade war and tariffs compared to the more domestically oriented state-owned enterprises. These economic constraints suggest that it is in China’s best interest to avoid any further friction with the US. Therefore, the “Phase One” trade deal will likely be signed, with a good possibility of some tariff rollbacks. Trade talks will continue in the run-up to the US presidential election, and any escalation will probably occur in non-trade, non-tariff areas. This means that policy uncertainty surrounding the Sino-US trade war will decline in 2020. Bottom Line: We expect tensions from the Sino-US trade war to marginally ease in 2020. However, the risk to this base case view is high and geopolitical uncertainty remains elevated, as suggested by our Geopolitical Strategy team.2 Trade war tensions could re-emerge, which potentially could end the global business cycle and equity bull market. Key Theme #2: Stimulus Versus Shock: Approaching An Inflection Point We presented some simple “arithmetic” in May showing that in order for investors to be bullish on Chinese stocks, the impact of China’s reflationary efforts needed to more than offset the negative shock to the economy from tariffs.3 In other words, a bullish Chinese equity scenario required Stimulus – Shock > 0. In terms of China’s real economy, 2019 essentially panned out to be a Stimulus – Shock =0 scenario, with a “half strength” reflationary response (measured by its credit impulse) barely offsetting the trade shock to the economy (Chart 2). So far on an aggregate level, the shock from tariffs on China’s economy has had a limited direct impact.  This is because exports to the US account for only 3.6% of China’s aggregate economy, whereas domestic capex accounts for more than 40% (Chart 3). Our calculation suggests a 10% annualized decline in export growth to the US would shave off 0.4 percentage points from China’s nominal GDP growth. Chart 2This Year, Measured Stimulus Has Just Offset Shocks To The Economy This Year, Measured Stimulus Has Just Offset Shocks To The Economy This Year, Measured Stimulus Has Just Offset Shocks To The Economy Chart 3Domestic Demand Much More Important Than Exports To The US Domestic Demand Much More Important Than Exports To The US Domestic Demand Much More Important Than Exports To The US Additionally, evidence suggests that a large portion of China’s exports to the US has been rerouted through peripheral countries, such as Taiwan and Vietnam (Chart 4). This fact explains why China’s exports have been in-line with the trend of global trade this year (Chart 5). Chart 4Chinese Exports Finding Alternative Routes To The US... Chinese Exports Finding Alternative Routes To The US... Chinese Exports Finding Alternative Routes To The US... Chart 5...And Total Exports Have Been Holding Up ...And Total Exports Have Been Holding Up ...And Total Exports Have Been Holding Up Chart 6China's Economic Slowdown Predates The Trade War China's Economic Slowdown Predates The Trade War China's Economic Slowdown Predates The Trade War It is important for investors to remember that China’s current economic slowdown predates the trade war and is due to its domestic financial deleveraging campaign that began in early 2017. The trade war exacerbated an existing downward trend in the economy, but was not the cause of it (Chart 6).  In 2020, while we expect a ceasefire in the trade war and a potential rollback of tariffs would ease the shock to China’s economy, we also believe that more pro-growth policy support is underway.4 From an investment perspective, this means both China’s economic conditions and corporate earnings will improve, supporting a bullish cyclical outlook for China-related assets. Still, several reasons point to the overall scale of stimulus being less than that of 2015-16, and the upside to China’s export growth will likely be limited given elevated geopolitical uncertainties. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect a material acceleration in Chinese economic growth in 2020: China is still falling short of its target to double urban income by 2020. Chart 7A 6% Growth Next Year May Just Make The Cut A 6% Growth Next Year May Just Make The Cut A 6% Growth Next Year May Just Make The Cut Next year will mark the final year for Chinese policymakers to accomplish the goal of “Doubling GDP by 2020”. Without the recent upward revision to the level of its 2018 nominal GDP by 2.1%, China's economy would have to expand by at least 6.1% in 2020 to achieve the goal. The upward revision allows a lower economic growth rate in 2020 to reach the goal (Chart 7). China is still falling short of its target to double urban income by 2020 (Chart 8). While keeping economic growth and employment stable remains a top priority, the recent slight improvement in employment should provide some relief to Chinese policymakers (Chart 9). Chart 8China Is Falling Short Of Urban Income Target... China Is Falling Short Of Urban Income Target... China Is Falling Short Of Urban Income Target... Chart 9...But There Is Some Relief In The Labor Market ...But There Is Some Relief In The Labor Market ...But There Is Some Relief In The Labor Market     Monetary policy will remain accommodative, with room for further cuts to interest rates and the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Nonetheless, we think Chinese policymakers will only allow monetary policy to loosen incrementally and modestly, while keeping a lid on corporate leverage. According to a recent article published by Yi Gang, the governor of China’s central bank, the PBoC will be keen to avoid another boom-bust cycle.5  Fiscal stimulus will continue to take the center stage in supporting growth in 2020, as noted in our November 20th China Investment Strategy Weekly.6  We expect that the National People’s Congress in March 2020 will approve higher quotas on issuing local government bonds, and loosened capital requirements will likely further boost local governments’ infrastructure project funding and expenditures. Transportation and urban development infrastructure projects will likely to continue receiving the most policy support in 2020. Other areas such as environmental protection, education, and social security will continue to be the Chinese government’s focus. These areas are unlikely to translate into immediate economic growth, but will improve China’s long-term economic and social structures. In contrast, compared to the 2015-2016 cycle, housing construction will receive less fiscal support (Chart 10). Overall, we expect the Chinese government to set next year’s real GDP growth target between 5.5 - 6.0%, a half of a percentage point lower than the growth target for 2019. Despite slower real output growth, nominal GDP and economic conditions will bottom in the first quarter of 2020, subsequently pushing up core inflation and reversing an ongoing deflation in the industrial sector (Chart 11). Chart 10Transportation And Urban Development Projects Are Again In Favor 2020 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year 2020 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year Chart 11Nominal Output Will Tick Up Soon Nominal Output Will Tick Up Soon Nominal Output Will Tick Up Soon   Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers will roll out more stimulus to secure an economic recovery in 2020, and external demand will improve. But we expect growth in both the economy and export to only modestly accelerate. Key Theme #3: Improved Earnings Outlook Supports A Cyclically Bullish View On Chinese Stocks A combination of further policy support, improved earnings and decreased trade tensions should provide tailwinds to Chinese stocks in 2020. Chinese stocks will outperform the global benchmark over a cyclical time horizon (6- to 12-months), for the following reasons:   Valuations are depressed relative to global averages: the forward P/E ratios of both China’s onshore A-shares and offshore investable stocks are well below the global benchmark (Chart 12).  While the forward P/E ratio of the A-share index is hovering around 12 times, the investable market has particularly suffered a setback from uncertainties surrounding the trade war. Even taking into account that structural weakness in the Chinese corporate earnings growth justifies for a lower multiple than the global average, both Chinese onshore and offshore stocks are offering even deeper discounts than their peaks in 2018, compared to global benchmarks. Chart 12Valuations Of Chinese Stocks Are Depressed Valuations Of Chinese Stocks Are Depressed Valuations Of Chinese Stocks Are Depressed Chart 13Chinese Corporate Earnings Closely Track Economic Conditions Chinese Corporate Earnings Closely Track Economic Conditions Chinese Corporate Earnings Closely Track Economic Conditions Both the economy and earnings growth will improve: We expect the Chinese economy to bottom in the first quarter of 2020. Given the close correlation between the coincident economic activity and earnings cycle, we expect earnings to also improve in 2020 (Chart 13).  Improved corporate earnings next year will be the catalyst for the currently cheap multiples in Chinese stocks to re-rate, and re-approach their early 2018 high. Our Earnings Recession Probability Model shows that the probability of an upcoming earnings recession has dropped to 35% from its peak of 85% in early 2019 (Chart 14).  Additionally, Chart 15 highlights that the 12-month forward EPS momentum has turned modestly positive. Chart 14Probability Of An Upcoming Earnings Recession Has Significantly Dropped Probability Of An Upcoming Earnings Recession Has Significantly Dropped Probability Of An Upcoming Earnings Recession Has Significantly Dropped Chart 1512-Month Forward EPS Momentum Has Turned Modestly Positive 12-Month Forward EPS Momentum Has Turned Modestly Positive 12-Month Forward EPS Momentum Has Turned Modestly Positive There are, however, a few caveats to our bullish cyclical view on Chinese stocks. First, while it is not our base case view, geopolitical risks, particularly the Sino-US trade war, could end the global business cycle and equity bull market in 2020. Within the context of falling global stocks, we think Chinese domestic A shares would passively outperform global benchmarks, as A shares are mostly driven by China’s domestic credit and economic growth, and are less sensitive to trade frictions. But investable stocks would clearly underperform in this scenario. The odds are decent that all of the outperformance of Chinese stocks in 2020 will be frontloaded in the first half of the year. Secondly, the odds are decent that all of the outperformance of Chinese stocks in 2020 will be frontloaded in the first half of the year. We expect credit growth, infrastructure spending and the economy to improve in the first quarter. If the “Phase One” trade deal is also signed during that period, onshore A shares and investable stocks will significantly outperform their global counterparts in the first and possibly the early part of the second quarter. However, in the second half of next year, if the Chinese economy stabilizes but stimulus does not ramp up further, then the upside potential in both bourses may be capped as investors will question whether Chinese stocks will continue to gain ground in relative terms. We will closely monitor Chinese credit growth and trade negotiations throughout 2020 to determine if there is more eventual upside potential to economic growth, and thus Chinese earnings prospects, than we currently believe.  While we recommend a cyclically bullish stance towards Chinese stocks for next year, our tactical (i.e. 0-3 month) stance remains neutral. We expect to align our tactical and cyclical stances soon, and are awaiting confirmation of a hard data improvement alongside a breakout of key technical conditions to do so.7 Bottom Line: During the next 6 to 12 months, investors should remain bullish on both Chinese A shares and investable stocks within a global equity portfolio. However, investors should also keep in mind that the relative outperformance, particularly for the A-share market, could be frontloaded in the first half of 2020. Key Theme #4: We Continue To Favor Chinese Onshore Bonds, Despite Default Concerns  Chart 16Global Investors Are Piling Into The Chinese Bond Market Global Investors Are Piling Into The Chinese Bond Market Global Investors Are Piling Into The Chinese Bond Market Despite sharply rising defaults, Chinese onshore bonds are still priced at a much higher premium than warranted by their default risk. This view is increasingly shared by global investors, as evident in the capital flows into China’s onshore bond market (Chart 16). While the total amount of bond defaults in the first eleven months of 2019 was an astonishing 120.4 billion yuan, they account for only half percent of China’s total onshore bonds issued.  A 0.5 percent default rate is in line with global ex-US, and 160 bps below the default rate in the US (Chart 17). Yet, Chinese corporate bond spreads are about 150-175 bps higher than their US counterparts, an overpriced risk premium in our view (Chart 18). Recently, despite mounting defaults, China’s corporate bond spreads have continued to narrow. This suggests that investors do not expect the record-high level of defaults in the past two years to damage China’s corporate sector in the near future. Moreover, China’s monetary policy remains ultra-loose, liquidity conditions have been largely stable, RMB devaluation and capital outflows have both been under control, and the Chinese economy is expected to bottom in the next quarter. Chart 17Chinese Default Rate Well Below Global Average Chinese Default Rate Well Below Global Average Chinese Default Rate Well Below Global Average Chart 18The Risk Premium Assigned To Chinese Corporate Bonds Seems Overdone The Risk Premium Assigned To Chinese Corporate Bonds Seems Overdone The Risk Premium Assigned To Chinese Corporate Bonds Seems Overdone Bottom Line: We continue to favor Chinese onshore corporate bonds in both absolute terms, and in relative to duration-matched government bonds.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    “China to take multi-pronged measures to keep employment stable,” State Council Executive Meeting, December 4, 2019. 2   Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society," dated December 6, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Simple Arithmetic," dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4, 6, 7   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Questions From The Road: Timing The Turn," dated November 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5   https://www.chainnews.com/articles/745634370915.htm Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations