Emerging Markets

Please note that yesterday we published Special Report on Egypt recommending buying domestic bonds while hedging currency risk. Today we are enclosing analysis on Hungary, Poland and Colombia. I will present our latest thoughts on the global macro outlook and implications for EM during today’s webcast at 10 am EST. You can access the webcast by clicking here. Yours sincerely, Arthur Budaghyan Hungary Versus Poland: Mind The Reversal Conditions are set for the Hungarian forint to outperform the Polish zloty over the coming months. We recommend going long the HUF against the PLN. Hungarian opposition parties criticized the government about the considerable depreciation in the forint. As a result, we suspect that political pressure from Prime Minister Viktor Orban led monetary authorities to alter their stance since April. Critically, the main architect of super-dovish monetary policy Marton Nagy resigned from the board of the central bank on May 28. In line with tighter liquidity, interbank rates have risen above the policy rate. This is marginally positive for the forint. The Hungarian central bank (NBH) tweaked its monetary policy in April after the currency had plunged to new lows against the euro, underperforming its Central European counterparts. The NBH widened its policy rate corridor by hiking the upper interest band to 1.85% and keeping the policy rate at 0.90%. The wider interest rate corridor makes it more costly for commercial banks to borrow reserves from the central bank. Hence, such liquidity tightening is positive for the forint. For years, Hungary was pursuing a super-easy monetary policy and consumer price inflation rose to 4% (Chart I-1). With the NBH keeping interest rates close to zero, real rates have plunged well into negative territory (Chart I-2, top panel). Chart I-1Hungary: Inflation Could Pause For Now Hungary: Inflation Could Pause For Now Hungary: Inflation Could Pause For Now Chart I-2Hungary Vs. Poland: Real Rates Reversal Is Coming Hungary Vs. Poland: Real Rates Reversal Is Coming Hungary Vs. Poland: Real Rates Reversal Is Coming     In brief, the central bank has been behind the inflation curve. As a result, the forint has been depreciating against both the euro and its central European peers. In such a situation, the key to reversal in the exchange rate trend would be the monetary authority’s readiness to raise real interest rates. The NBH has made a small step in this direction. Going forward, the central bank will be restrained in its quantitative easing (QE) program and will not augment it any further. So far, QE uptake has been slow: around half out of the available HUF 1,500 billion has been tapped by commercial banks and corporates. Importantly, the NBH announced its intention to sterilize its government and corporate bond purchases. Already, the commercial banks excess reserves at the central bank have fallen to zero, which suggests that liquidity is no longer abundant in the banking system (Chart I-3). In line with tighter liquidity, interbank rates have risen above the policy rate. This is marginally positive for the forint. Hungarian authorities have become more cognizant of the economic and financial risks associated with their ultra-accommodative policies. For instance, they initiated a clampdown on real estate speculation, which is leading to dwindling real estate prices. This will lead to a decline in overall inflation expectations and, thereby, lift expected real interest rates. The open nature of Hungary’s economy – whereby exports of goods and services constitute 85% of GDP - makes it much more sensitive to pan-European tourism and manufacturing cycles. With the collapse in its manufacturing and tourism revenues, wage growth in Hungary is bound to decelerate rapidly (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Hungary: Central Bank Has Drained Liquidity Hungary: Central Bank Has Drained Liquidity Hungary: Central Bank Has Drained Liquidity Chart I-4Economic Growth: Hungary Is More Vulnerable Than Poland Economic Growth: Hungary Is More Vulnerable Than Poland Economic Growth: Hungary Is More Vulnerable Than Poland   Rapidly deteriorating wage and employment dynamics reduces the odds of an inflation breakout anytime soon. This will cool down inflation and, thereby, increase real rates on the margin. The central bank in Poland will stay super accommodative while the National Bank of Hungary will be a bit less aggressive. Bottom Line: Although this monetary policy adjustment does not entail the end of easy policy in Hungary, generally, it does signal restraint on the part of monetary authorities resulting from a much reduced tolerance for currency depreciation. This creates conditions for the forint to outperform. Poland In the meantime, Polish monetary authorities have switched into an ultra-accommodative mode. Recent policy announcements by the National Bank of Poland (NBP) represent the most dramatic example of policy easing in Central Europe. Such a policy stance in Poland will produce lower real rates than in Hungary, which is negative for the Polish zloty against the forint. The NBP is set to finance the majority of a new 11% of GDP fiscal spending program enacted by the government amid the COVID-19 lockdowns. This amounts to de-facto public debt and fiscal deficit monetization. The latter will not be sterilized unlike in Hungary and will therefore lead to an excess liquidity overflow in the banking system. The Polish central bank has cut interest rates by 140 bps to 10 bps since March. Pushing nominal rates down close to zero has produced more negative real policy rates than in Hungary (Chart I-2, top panel on page 2). Also, Polish prime lending rates in real terms have fallen below those in Hungary (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Chances are that inflation in Poland will also prove to be stickier than in Hungary due to the minimum wage raise at the beginning of the year and very aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus since the pandemics has erupted (Chart I-5). Critically, the Polish economy is much less open than Hungary’s, and it is therefore less vulnerable to the collapse of pan-European manufacturing and tourism. This will ensure better employment and wage conditions in Poland. All in all, Poland’s final demand outperformance, versus Hungary, will contribute to a higher rate of inflation there. Bottom Line: The central bank in Poland will stay super accommodative while the National Bank of Hungary will be a bit less aggressive. This is producing a U-turn in both countries’ nominal and relative real interest rates, which heralds a reversal in the HUF / PLN cross rate (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Polish Inflation Will Be Sticker Than In Hungary Polish Inflation Will Be Sticker Than In Hungary Polish Inflation Will Be Sticker Than In Hungary Chart I-6Go Long HUF / Short PLN Go Long HUF / Short PLN Go Long HUF / Short PLN   Investment Strategy For Central Europe A new trade: go long the HUF versus the PLN. Take a 3% profit on the short HUF and PLN / long CZK trade. Close the short IDR / long PLN trade with a 20% loss. Downgrade central European bourses (Polish, Czech and Hungarian) from an overweight to a neutral allocation within the EM equity benchmark. Lower for longer European interest rates disfavor bank stocks that dominate central European bourses. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Colombia has been badly hit by two shocks: the precipitous fall in oil prices and the strict quarantine measures to constrain the spread of the COVID-19 outbreak. An underwhelming fiscal stimulus in response to the lockdowns will further weigh on private demand. An underwhelming fiscal stimulus in response to the lockdowns will further weigh on private demand. We have been recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in Colombia since April 23rd and this strategy remains unchanged: While oil prices seem to have rebounded sharply, they will remain structurally low (Chart II-1). The Emerging Markets Strategy team's view is that oil prices will average $40 per barrel this year and next.1 After the recent rally, chances of further upside in crude prices are limited. Chart II-1A Long-Term Perspective On Oil Prices A Long-Term Perspective On Oil Prices A Long-Term Perspective On Oil Prices Table II-1Colombia’s Fiscal Package Is The Lowest In The Region Hungary Versus Poland; Colombia Hungary Versus Poland; Colombia Colombia's high sensitivity to oil prices is particularly visible via its current account balance. Indeed, Colombia’s net crude exports cover as much as 50% of the current account deficit, such that low oil prices severely affect the currency and produce a negative income shock for the economy. Fiscal policy remains unreasonably tight, especially in the face of the global pandemic. The government’s fiscal response plan amounts to only a meagre 1.5% of GDP. This is low not only compared to advanced economies but also to the rest of Latin America (Table II-1). Moreover, President Duque’s administration has been running the tightest fiscal budget in almost a decade, with the primary fiscal balance reaching 1% of GDP before the pandemic. The country’s COVID-19 response has been fast and effective. Colombia has managed to achieve the lowest amount of infections and deaths among major economies in Latin America (Chart II-2). Chart II-2COVID-19 Casualties Across Latin America COVID-19 Casualties Across Latin America COVID-19 Casualties Across Latin America Duque’s administration has taken a pragmatic approach to handling the pandemic by enforcing strict lockdowns and banning international and inter-municipal travel since late March, only three days after the country’s first casualty. Further, the nationwide confinement measures have been extended until July 1st, with particularly stringent rules applying to major cities. These have helped the country avoid a nation-wide health crisis, but they will engender prolonged economic pain. Regarding monetary stimulus, the central bank (Banrep) has cut interest rates by 150 basis points since March of this year. It also embarked on the first and largest QE program in the region. Banrep has committed to purchase 12 trillion pesos worth of government and corporate securities (amounting to a whopping 8% of GDP). Consumer price inflation is falling across various core measures and will drop below the low end of Banrep’s target range (Chart II-3). This will push the central bank to continue cutting rates. Despite the monetary easing, nominal lending rates are still restrictive. Real lending rates (deflated by core CPI) remain elevated at 7% (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Colombia: Inflation Will Fall Below Target Colombia: Inflation Will Fall Below Target Colombia: Inflation Will Fall Below Target Chart II-4Colombia: Real Lending Rates Are Still High Colombia: Real Lending Rates Are Still High Colombia: Real Lending Rates Are Still High Chart II-5The Colombian Economy Was Already Under Pressure The Colombian Economy Was Already Under Pressure The Colombian Economy Was Already Under Pressure Importantly, there has not been an appropriate amount of credit support and debt waving programs for SMEs, as there has been in many other countries. Given that SMEs employ a large share of the workforce, and that household spending accounts for about 70% of GDP, consumer spending and overall economic growth will contract substantially and be slow to recover. Employment rates had already been contracting, and wage growth downshifting, before the pandemic started (Chart II-5). Household income is now certainly in decline as major cities are in full lockdown and economic activity is frozen. Investment Recommendations Even though we are structurally positive on the country due to its orthodox macroeconomic policies, positive structural reforms, and low levels of debt among both households and companies, we maintain a neutral allocation on Colombian stocks within an EM equity portfolio. This bourse is dominated by banks and energy stocks. The lack of both fiscal support and bank loan guarantees amid the recession means that banks will carry the burden of ultimate losses. They will suffer materially due to loan restructuring and defaults. For fixed income investors, we reiterate our call to receive 10-year swap rates and recommend overweighting local currency government bonds versus the EM domestic bond benchmark. The yield curve is steep and real bond yields are elevated (Chart II-6). Hence, long-term interest rates offer great value. Additional monetary easing, including quantitative easing, will suppress yields much further. Chart II-6A Great Opportunity In Colombian Rates A Great Opportunity In Colombian Rates A Great Opportunity In Colombian Rates Chart II-7The COP Has Depreciated Considerably The COP Has Depreciated Considerably The COP Has Depreciated Considerably   We are upgrading Colombia sovereign credit from neutral to overweight within an EM credit portfolio. General public debt (including the central and state governments) stands at 59% of GDP. Conservative fiscal policy and the central bank’s large purchases of local bonds will allow the government to finance itself locally. Presently, 40% of public debt is foreign currency and 60% local currency denominated. As a result, sovereign credit will outperform the EM credit benchmark. In terms of the currency, we recommend investors to be cautious for now. Even though the peso is cheap (Chart II-7), another relapse in oil prices or a potential flare up in social protests could cause further downfall in the currency. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com   1 This differs from the view of BCA’s Commodities and Energy Strategy service. We believe structural forces such as the lasting decline in air travel and commuting will impede a recovery in oil demand while, at the same time, US shale production will rise again considerably if crude prices rise and remain well above $40   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The economic and health crises since Q1 2020 have accelerated the breakdown in the US-China relationship. Although the US is in a much weaker economic position this year than in 2019, President Trump may have fewer political constraints to an escalation in the trade war. President Xi Jinping is fueling provocations with the US, adding instability and unpredictability to the geopolitical equation. The Phase One trade deal may be collapsing. We recommend a defensive stance on Chinese risk assets and the RMB during the summer. Feature The outbreak of COVID-19 this year has sparked the worst economic contraction in China and the US in decades. Economic calamities and social unrest should have tied the hands of leaders in both countries. However, as our Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken reminds us, this is an atypical election year in the US and some constraints that previously deterred both sides from taking aggressive actions may be diminishing.1 We agree that the economic and health crises have likely accelerated the possibility of a breakdown in the relationship between the US and China. The risk will likely reach a new height in the summer, when pressure on Trump’s election campaign intensifies leading up to the vote in November. While there is a growing bipartisan hawkish view on China in Washington, China is also playing a part in fanning the flames. The USD/CNY exchange rate will be extremely volatile during this episode of heightened geopolitical turbulence. We continue to hold a long USD-CNH position, with the expectation that the RMB will likely weaken further in the summer. Trump Facing Fewer Constraints Whether Trump’s chances of reelection increase through a strong recovery in the US stock market and economy, or decrease through an economic recession and/or weak public support, either scenario could remove constraints preventing Trump from confronting China.     Trump’s current priority may be to secure a recovery in the equity market and improve his polling, which will require economic improvement. Ironically, the US stock market has been on fire despite the battered real economy. The S&P 500 Index has gone up by 44% since its trough on March 23, nearly erasing its losses for the year. The higher the market rises, the more Trump may believe that the market can sustain a shock even if he resorts to imposing tariffs on Chinese export goods - particularly if his approval rating does not rise along with the market. The market’s reaction in 2018 and 2019 provides a good example of how the US financial markets shrugged off any negative impact from a trade war between the US and China (Chart 1). If the pandemic prevents the US economy from fully reopening and/or recovering in the summer, then an equity market correction could send a negative signal about Trump’s reelection prospects. In this case, Trump may not be as enslaved by financial constraints as he would have been if the economy was in an expansionary state.  A falling approval rating, coupled with domestic social unrest, would make Trump a “lame duck” President (Chart 2).  Therefore, he may try to divert attention away from the economy and adopt an aggressive foreign and trade policy. China is already perceived negatively by a majority of American voters and certain political communities, thus there could be a political upside for Trump to escalate his confrontation with China. Chart 1US Stocks Kept Reaching New Highs In 2019 Despite An Ongoing Trade War US Stocks Kept Reaching New Highs In 2019 Despite An Ongoing Trade War US Stocks Kept Reaching New Highs In 2019 Despite An Ongoing Trade War Chart 2Trump’s Polling Drops Below Average Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions) Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions) All bets are off if Trump’s approval rating continues to trend downwards, regardless of whether the US equity market continues to rally and/or if the US economy is mired in recession. Our Geopolitical Strategy illustrates the scenarios as follows (Diagram 1). If Trump’s approval rating is high and the market is up, then Trump is “winning” and the only risk of a tariff hike would come from overconfidence or Chinese provocation. If his approval is up but the market falls, then he may become more inclined to use tariffs. If his approval rating is low but the market is up, then he has ammunition to get tougher on China. If his approval and the market are collapsing, then he is a “lame duck president” and all bets are off. Combined, these scenarios imply there is a 59% probability that Trump refrains from large tariffs, and a 41% chance that he reverts to large tariffs. Diagram 1Odds President Trump Will Hike Tariffs On China Before US Election Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions) Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions) Bottom Line: All bets are off if Trump’s approval rating continues to trend downwards, regardless of whether the US equity market continues to rally and/or if the US economy is mired in recession. Both scenarios would remove financial and economic constraints that Trump faced in 2019. If Trump's polling is weak, he may spend financial ammunition to shore up his “America First” credentials.      Adding China To The Geopolitical Instability Equation China itself may be an independent source of geopolitical instability and unpredictability. While President Xi Jinping does not have any electoral constraints, he needs to restore the confidence of Chinese people in the wake of the worst public health crisis and economic performance in decades. Like Trump, the pandemic gives President Xi an incentive to distract his populace from domestic crises by adopting hawkish foreign policies.  This hawkish approach was demonstrated when a new Hong Kong SAR national security law was proposed and approved at this year’s National People’s Congress (NPC). The new law would give Beijing greater direct control over Hong Kong, in contravention of its promise of 50 years of substantial autonomy enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.  China’s foreign policy tone recently shifted to a more combative one. This “wolf warrior diplomacy" has gained popularity among Chinese diplomats.2 During a news conference at this year’s NPC, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi defended the “wolf warrior diplomacy” by stating that the country will stand firm in defending its national interest and combating “smears.”  Chart 3Chinese Imports Of American Goods Are Falling Far Short Of The Target Set By The Trade Deal Chinese Imports Of American Goods Are Falling Far Short Of The Target Set By The Trade Deal Chinese Imports Of American Goods Are Falling Far Short Of The Target Set By The Trade Deal The response from the Trump administration has been lukewarm. While Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will strip Hong Kong of its autonomous status, President Trump is taking limited sanctions on mainland China and eschewing more drastic punitive measures. China may see the timid response as a sign that Trump is reluctant to take action on China and tip the bilateral relationship into an outright confrontation. This perception is, in itself, a risk that may lead to more provocation on both sides. Lastly, the Phase One trade deal is tenuous. US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer last week stated that "China has done a pretty good job" at meeting its trade-deal quotas,3 but we have long argued China was never going to honor the commitment to its full extent.4 The latest data shows that Chinese purchases of American exports in the first four months of 2020, from manufacturing goods to agricultural produce and energy, have fallen far short of the huge expansion agreed in the deal (Chart 3). The recent depreciation in the RMB may be another sign that China is abandoning the Phase One trade deal.5 Weakness in economic fundamentals and renewed tensions between the US and China may have contributed to the RMB’s recent depreciation. However, the decline was reinforced by the PBoC’s move to set the CNY/USD fixing rate to its lowest point since 2008 (Chart 4). Given that the RMB has become an anchor for emerging market currencies, a rapid drop in the RMB would lead to selloffs in emerging Asian and Latin American currencies and, in turn, would strengthen the USD (Chart 5). The Trump administration may see a swift RMB depreciation as China is deliberately violating the Phase One trade deal, which will prompt Trump to seek retaliatory actions against China. Chinese purchases of American goods in the first four months of 2020 have fallen far short of the Phase One trade agreement. Chart 4Is The PBoC Sending A Warning Signal To Trump? Is The PBoC Sending A Warning Signal To Trump? Is The PBoC Sending A Warning Signal To Trump? Chart 5The RMB Has Been The Anchor Currency In EM The RMB Has Been The Anchor Currency In EM The RMB Has Been The Anchor Currency In EM Bottom Line: While China is prioritizing its own economic recovery, its foreign policy stance has decisively swung to a more combative one. Additionally, the Phase One trade deal is on the verge of collapsing.  Investment Conclusions The USD/CNY exchange rate will likely be extremely volatile in the next quarter amid heightened geopolitical turbulence, with more downside risks to the RMB. As such, we continue to recommend that investors hedge their RMB exposure in Chinese stocks by holding a long USD-CNH position. We remain neutral on Chinese stocks in relative terms in view of the non-trivial, near-term vulnerability of risk assets. As in 2019, investable stocks are particularly exposed to an escalation in the US-China conflict (Chart 6). Chart 6Large Divergence In Onshore Versus Offshore Stock Performance During The Trade War Large Divergence In Onshore Versus Offshore Stock Performance During The Trade War Large Divergence In Onshore Versus Offshore Stock Performance During The Trade War Chart 7Stocks In Some Domestic Demand-Oriented Sectors Are Still Relatively Safe Bets Stocks In Some Domestic Demand-Oriented Sectors Are Still Relatively Safe Bets Stocks In Some Domestic Demand-Oriented Sectors Are Still Relatively Safe Bets Price corrections in both China’s onshore and offshore aggregate equity markets are likely to occur during the summer. Nevertheless, cyclical plays that closely track Chinese stimulus are relatively safe bets, especially for China’s domestic investors and in absolute terms (Chart 7).   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Spheres Of Influence (GeoRisk Update)," dated May 29, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2South China Morning Post, “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi defends ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats for standing up to ‘smears’”, May 24, 2020 3Bloomberg, “Lighthizer Says He Feels ‘Very Good’ About Phase One China Deal”, June 4, 2020 4Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Managing Expectations," dated January 22, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5The Phase One trade deal prohibits both the US and China from manipulating exchange rates to devalue their currencies for competitive purposes. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Egypt’s balance of payments have deteriorated materially due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. The country’s foreign funding requirements in 2020 are high and the currency is under depreciation pressures. Unless domestic interest rates are brought considerably lower, the nation’s public debt is on an unsustainable trajectory. Hence, Egypt needs to reduce local interest rates substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the central bank cannot control or defend the exchange rate. The latter is set to depreciate. Investors should buy Egyptian local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. Feature The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is depleting its foreign exchange (FX) reserves to defend the currency (Chart I-1). As the CBE’s foreign exchange reserves diminish, so will its ability to support the currency. As such, the Egyptian pound will likely depreciate in the next 6-9 months. Interestingly, despite being a net importer of energy, many of Egypt’s critical macro parameters are positively correlated with oil prices (Chart I-2). Egypt is in fact deeply integrated in the Gulf oil-economy network via trade and capital flows. In other words, Egypt is a veiled play on oil. Chart I-1The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency Chart I-2Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil   Although oil prices have rallied sharply recently, the Emerging Markets Strategy team believes upside is limited and that oil prices will average about $40 over the next three years.1  In addition, local interest rates that are persistently above 10% are disastrous for both Egypt’s domestic demand and public debt sustainability. Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. To preclude a vicious cycle in both the economy and public debt, the CBE should reduce interest rates materially and rapidly. Therefore, higher interest rates cannot be used to defend the exchange rate. Balance Of Payments Strains Egypt’s balance of payments (BoP) dynamics have deteriorated and the probability of a currency devaluation has risen: Current Account: The current account deficit – which stood at $9 billion and 3% of the GDP as of December 2019 – is widening significantly due to the plunge in oil prices this year (Chart I-2, top panel). Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. The latter have been hard hit by the twin shocks of the coronavirus pandemic and the oil crash. First, Egypt’s $27 billion in annual remittances are drying up (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The majority of these transmittals come from Egyptian workers working in Gulf countries. Second, Egypt’s tourism industry – which brings in $13 billion in annual revenues or 4% of GDP – has collapsed due to the pandemic. Tourist arrivals from Middle Eastern countries – which makeup 20% of total tourist arrivals into Egypt – will diminish substantially due to both the pandemic and the negative income shock that the Gulf economies have experienced (Chart I-3). Third, Egyptian exports are in freefall (Chart I-4, top panel). Not only is this due to the freeze in global trade, but also because the country’s exports to the oil-leveraged Arab economies have taken a massive hit. The latter make up 25% of Egypt’s total goods shipments. Chart I-3Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Chart I-4Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices   Furthermore, since 2019 Egypt has been increasingly exporting natural gas. The collapse in gas prices has probably already wiped out a large of chunk its natural gas export revenues (Chart I-5). Chart 6 exhibits the structure of Egypt’s exports of goods and services. Energy, tourism and transportation constituted 67% of total exports in 2019. Chart I-5Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Chart I-6Egypt: Structure Of Goods & Services Exports Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Chart I-7Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Finally, while export revenues have plunged, imports remain resilient (Chart I-7). Critically, 26% of Egypt’s imports are composed of essential and basic items such as consumer non-durable goods, wheat and maize. Consumption of these staples and goods are less sensitive to business cycle oscillations. Therefore, the nation’s current account deficit has ballooned. A wider current account deficit needs to be funded by foreign inflows. With foreign investors reluctant to provide funds, the CBE has lately been financing BoP by depleting its foreign exchange reserves (Chart I-1, on page 1). Foreign Funding Requirements: Not only is Egypt facing a massively deteriorating current account deficit, but the country also carries large foreign funding debt obligations (FDO). FDOs are the sum of debt expiring in the next 12 months, and interest as well as amortization payments over the next 12 months. FDOs due in 2020 were $24 billion.2 In turn, Egypt’s total foreign funding requirements (FFR) – which is the sum of FDOs and the country’s current account deficit – has risen to $33 billion.3 Importantly, this FFR amount is based on the current account for 2019 and, thereby, does not take Egypt’s deteriorating current account deficit into consideration – as discussed above. Meanwhile, the central bank has net FX reserves of only $8 billion.4 If the monetary authorities continue to fund FFR of $33 billion in 2020 to prevent the pound from depreciating, the CBE will soon run out of its net FX reserves. Overall, Chart I-8 compares Egypt to the rest of the EM universe: with respect to (1) exports-to-FDO on the x-axis and (2) foreign exchange reserves-to-FFR on the y-axis. Based on these two measurements, Egypt is among the most vulnerable EM countries in terms of the balance of payments as it has the lowest FX reserves-to-FFR ratio and a low export-to-FDO ratio as well. Chart I-8Egypt Is One Of The Most Exposed EM Countries To Currency Depreciation Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Chart I-9FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish Foreign Funding of Private Sector: Egypt will struggle to attract private-sector foreign inflows to meet its large FFR amid this adverse regional economic environment and the likely renewed relapse in oil prices in the months ahead. FDI inflows are set to drop (Chart I-9). The oil & gas sector has been the largest recipient of FDI inflows recently (around 55% in 2019 according to the central bank). The crash in both crude oil and natural gas prices will therefore ensure that FDIs into this sector will dry up. Besides, overall FDI inflows emanating from Gulf countries are poised to shrink substantially.5 Chart I-10The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive Foreign Funding of Government: With FDI inflows diminishing, the Egyptian government has once again been forced to approach the IMF for assistance. The country managed to secure $8 billion in assistance from the IMF ($2.8 billion in May and $5.2 in June). This has ameliorated international investor confidence in Egypt. Indeed, the country raised $5 billion by issuing US dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in May. Egypt is now seeking another $4 billion from other international lenders. Crucially, assuming Egypt manages to get the $4 billion loan, which would allow it to raise a total of $17 billion, Egypt would still be short on foreign funding to finance its $33 billion in FFR. Therefore, the currency will come under pressure of devaluation. As we argue below, the nation’s public debt sustainability is in jeopardy unless local currency interest rates are brought down substantially. This can only happen if the currency is allowed to depreciate. Consistently, foreign investors might be unwilling to lend to Egypt until interest rates are pushed lower and the country’s public debt trajectory is placed back on a sustainable path. Finally, the Egyptian pound has once again become expensive according to the real effective exchange rate (REER) which is based on both consumer and producer prices (Chart I-10). Bottom Line: Egypt is facing sharply slowing foreign inflows due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. This is occurring amid increased FFRs. Meanwhile, the CBE’s net FX reserves are insufficient to defend the exchange rate. Public Debt Sustainability The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. In turn, without currency devaluation that ultimately allows local interest rates to drop dramatically, the sustainability of Egypt’s public debt will worsen considerably. The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. To start, Egypt’s public debt stands at 97% of GDP – local currency and foreign currency debt account for 79% and 18% of GDP respectively (Chart I-11, top panel). Chart I-12 illustrates that interest payments on public debt is already using up 60% of government revenue and stands at 10% of GDP. Chart I-11Egypt: Public Debt Profile Egypt: Public Debt Profile Egypt: Public Debt Profile Chart I-12The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable   Therefore, if the CBE keeps interest rates at the current level, then the government will continue to pay high interest on its debt. Generally, two conditions need to be met to ensure public debt sustainability in any country (i.e., to ensure that the public debt-to-GDP ratio does not to surge). Nominal GDP growth needs to be higher than government borrowing costs. The government needs to run persistently large primary fiscal surpluses. Chart I-13Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Regarding the first condition, nominal GDP growth was already dangerously close to the level of Egypt’s government borrowing costs even before the pandemic hit Egypt (Chart I-13). With the pandemic, both domestic demand and exports have plunged. Consequently, nominal GDP is likely close to zero while local currency borrowing costs are above 10%. So long as nominal GDP growth remains below borrowing costs, the public debt sustainability will continue to deteriorate. As to the second condition, Egypt only started running primary fiscal surpluses in 2018 as it implemented extremely tight fiscal policy by cutting non-interest expenditures (Chart I-14). However, that was only possible because economic growth was then strong. As growth has slumped, government revenue is most likely shrinking. Chart I-14Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Tightening fiscal policy amid the economic downturn will be ruinous. Cutting non-interest expenditures further will depress the already weak economy, drying up both nominal GDP and government revenues even more. This will bring about a vicious economic cycle. Needless to say, the latter option is politically unviable. The most feasible option to ensure sustainability of public debt dynamics is to bring down domestic interest rates considerably. Lower local interest rates will reduce interest expenditures on its domestic debt and will either narrow overall fiscal deficit or free up space for the government to spend elsewhere, boosting much needed economic growth. Meanwhile lower interest rates will boost demand for credit and revive private-sector domestic demand. Provided Egypt’s public debt has a short maturity profile, lower interest rates will reasonably quickly feed into lower interest payments for the government. This means that lower interest rates could reasonably quickly feed to lower interest payments for the government. Importantly, there is a trade-off between the exchange rates and interest rates. Lowering interest rates entail currency depreciation. According to the impossible trinity theory, a central bank facing an open capital needs to choose between controlling interest rates or the exchange rate, it cannot control both simultaneously. As such, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts to bring down local interest rates, while keeping the capital account reasonably open, it needs to tolerate a weaker currency amid its ongoing BoP strains. Bottom Line: Public debt dynamics are treading on a dangerous path. Egypt needs to bring down local interest rates down substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the CBE cannot control and defend the exchange rate. Devaluation Is Needed All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. The latter will help stimulate economic growth and make public debt sustainable. Specifically, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts for defending the currency from depreciation, it will need to tolerate much higher interest rates for a long period of time. The CBE would essentially need to deplete whatever little net FX reserves it currently has to fund BoP deficits. This would simultaneously shrink local banking system liquidity, pushing domestic interbank rates higher.  All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. Worryingly, not only would high interest rates devastate the already shaky Egyptian economy, but higher domestic interest rates carry major ramifications for Egypt’s public debt sustainability as discussed earlier. A one-off currency devaluation is painful and carries some political risks yet, it is still the least worst choice for Egypt from a longer-term perspective. Although inflation will spike due to pass-through from currency devaluation, it will be a transitory one-off increase (Chart I-15). Besides, the pertinent risk to the Egyptian economy currently is low inflation and high real interest rates (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Chart I-16Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High     In turn, currency depreciation will ultimately provide the CBE with scope to reduce its policy rate which will help stimulate the ailing economy as well as make public debt trajectory more sustainable. Finally, odds are high that Egyptian authorities might choose to devalue the currency sooner rather than later. The basis for this is that the government’s foreign public debt is still relatively small at 18% of the GDP and 19% of the total government debt (Chart I-11, on page 8). Further, the majority (70%) of Egypt’s foreign public debt remains linked to international and bilateral government loans making it easier to renegotiate their terms than in the case of publicly traded sovereign US dollar bonds (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This means that currency depreciation will not materially deteriorate the government’s debt servicing ability. Furthermore, Egypt has experience managing and tolerating currency depreciation. The currency depreciated against the US dollar by 50% in 2016 and before that by 12% in 2013. Bottom Line: The Central Bank of Egypt will not hike interest rates or sell its foreign currency reserves for too long to defend the pound. Odds are high that it will allow the currency to depreciate and will cut interest rates materially. Investment Recommendations Chart I-17Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Investors should buy Egyptian 3-year local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. The basis is that low inflation and a depressed economy in Egypt will lead the CBE to cut rates by several hundred basis points over the next 12 months while allowing currency to depreciate. Forward markets are pricing 5% depreciation in the EGP in the next 6 months and 10% in the next 12 months (Chart I-17). We would assign a higher probability of depreciation.   For now, EM credit portfolios should have a neutral allocation on Egyptian sovereign credit. While another potential drop in oil prices and the currency devaluation could push sovereign spreads wider (Chart I-18), eventually large rate cuts by the CBE will make public debt dynamics more sustainable. Absolute return investors should wait for devaluation to go long on Egypt’s US dollar sovereign bonds. Chart I-18Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Chart I-19Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities   Equity investors should keep a neutral allocation on Egyptian stocks with an EM equity portfolio (Chart I-19). Lower interest rates ahead will eventually boost this stock market. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com      1 This is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service and it differs from the view of BCA’s Commodities and Energy Strategy service. 2 We exclude the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in 2020 as they are mostly deposits at the Central Bank of Egypt owed to Gulf countries. It is highly likely that Gulf lenders will agree to extend these deposits given the difficulties Egypt is experiencing. 3 Excluding the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in the next 12 months. Please refer to above footnote. 4 The amount of net foreign exchange reserves currently at the Central Bank – i.e. excluding the Bank’s foreign liabilities– are now low at $8 billion. 5 Gulf Co-operation Countries (GCC) are in no position to provide much financial assistance due to the pandemic and oil crash as they are under severe financial strain themselves. Also, GCC countries run strict currency pegs and need to preserve their dwindling foreign exchange reserves to defend their currency pegs to the US dollar.

Highlights Our base case reflects our view that China’s strong fiscal and monetary stimulus, combined with a weaker US dollar, will provide a favorable backdrop for copper markets in 2H20. Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current copper prices. In 2H20, the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for prices. Global policy uncertainty remains high.  Assessing the joint effects of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, along with consumers’ willingness to spend once lockdowns are lifted will keep uncertainty at relatively high levels.  A possible second wave of COVID-19 returning large economies to lockdown status looms large for copper markets, and for commodity markets generally. The combination of safe-haven demand and a continued dollar shortage for borrowers without access to US swap lines could keep the dollar well bid, suppressing foreign flows to EM economies and commodity demand at the margin. Tactically, we remain on the sidelines until the fog clears around these known and unknown unknowns.  A $3/lb COMEX refined copper price is likely in 2H20, but the risks to this outlook remain high. Feature Copper prices will end the year higher vs. current levels in our base case. But uncertainty remains elevated. Copper prices will end the year higher vs. current levels in our base case. But uncertainty remains elevated. Assessing the synchronicity of EM recoveries and the joint effects of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, along with consumers’ willingness to spend once lockdowns are lifted is extremely difficult. Looming over all of these considerations: A possible second wave of COVID-19 returning large economies to lockdown status loom large. Tactically, we remain on the sidelines as the fog clears around some of these known and unknown unknowns. Importantly, our positive view rests on our expectation of a robust recovery in China’s economic activity and, to a lesser extent, in its main export destinations, which were hit later by the pandemic. A weak recovery in China would slow the rate at which the current copper supply surplus subsides. At ~ $2.50/lb, copper prices have recovered significantly since bottoming in March at $2.11/lb on the COMEX. Still, clearing the $3.30/lb double top reached in June 2018 will require either a significant increase in global demand or a sharp contraction in supply, which we do not expect. Copper markets were severely hit by the global pandemic: Prices fell 10% in January, as the case count grew in China – the largest copper-consuming market – followed by another 19% decline as the virus spread globally (Chart of the Week). The intensification of lockdowns globally pushed copper markets to a 60k MT surplus as of March – the latest data reported by the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) – from a 20k MT deficit in 2019. Bearish sentiment moved our Tactical Composite Indicator – which captures sentiment, positioning, and momentum dynamics – to oversold territories on in March (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekCopper Prices Were Severely Hit By The Pandemic Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 2Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices After reaching a low of $2.11/lb on March 23, COMEX copper prices surged 18% with few interruptions as the Chinese economy reopened, and global monetary and fiscal authorities supplied unprecedented economic support (Chart 3). This prompted a wave of short-covering by money managers, releasing some of the downward pressure on prices (Chart 4). Chart 3Unprecedented Fiscal Response Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 4Money Managers Neutral For Now Money Managers Neutral For Now Money Managers Neutral For Now Still, hedge funds have not yet entered bullish positions on the metal. And, importantly, inventory levels are not drawing sharply. China’s Economy Bottomed, World ex-China Still Contracting Our outlook hinges primarily on our assessment of China’s policy-driven copper demand – both from domestic usage perspective, and, to a lesser extent, from copper-intensive exported goods. Since the end of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), copper prices have mostly shadowed China’s economic cycles (Chart 5). China’s importance for copper markets now dominates that of major DM countries (Chart 5, panel 3). The influence of global supply-demand fundamentals on copper prices has declined. Prices are increasingly policy-driven with supply adjusting to demand as dictated by Chinese policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of total social financing funds in that economy. Thus, our outlook hinges primarily on our assessment of China’s policy-driven copper demand – both from domestic usage perspective, and, to a lesser extent, from copper-intensive exported goods. According to the International Copper Study Group (ICSG), around 17% of Chinese copper demand comes from exports of products containing copper.1 In “normal” times, we rely heavily on our monthly indicators to gauge economic and commodity cycles. However, the speed with which the COVID-19 pandemic evolves – and the associated fiscal and monetary responses to it – makes short-term forecasting of cyclical commodities a perilous task. Chart 5DM Consumption Pales Vs. China DM Consumption Pales Vs. China DM Consumption Pales Vs. China High-frequency data suggest Chinese economic growth bottomed in March and is rapidly recovering (Chart 6). Chart 6Chinese Economy Returning To Normal Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Meanwhile in China’s major export destinations, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases appear to be flattening, containment measures are gradually easing, and mobility is improving (Chart 7, panel 1 and 2). Globally, the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios have stabilized, and stock prices for nine of the largest copper producers have trended up since March 23 (Chart 7, panel 3 and 4). That said, we believe it is still too early to adopt a high-conviction view about a price recovery trajectory. For one, China recently reintroduced containment measures in certain regions, as clusters of coronavirus cases were detected, highlighting the fragility of the current recovery.2 Chart 7China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon Chart 8Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Moreover, the rebound in overall Chinese demand hasn’t fully offset the collapse in its exports. As a result, the reopening of the supply side of the economy outpaced demand growth (Chart 8). Extrapolating this to its copper market: Chinese refined copper production (40% share of world output) is facing robust domestic demand but weak export demand for copper (44% and 9% of world demand), leaving its market with a supply surplus. Nonetheless, absent a severe second wave of COVID-19 cases, the infrastructure-focused stimulus and market-friendly real estate policies in the country will allow internal demand to overtake production in 2H20, despite limited external demand (more on this below). China’s Credit Growth To Drive Copper Demand Higher The key message emerging from the NPC is that policymakers are willing to do whatever it takes – including abandoning their deleveraging objectives – to reflate the economy.  Markets were unimpressed by the fiscal package announced during China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) last month, which, for the first time in decades, did not contain an annual economic growth target in the Government Work Report (Table 1). Even so, the key message emerging from the NPC is that policymakers are willing to do whatever it takes – including abandoning their deleveraging objectives – to reflate the economy. Broad money and total social financing growth will accelerate relative to last year and notably exceed nominal GDP growth. Our Emerging Markets strategists expect China’s fiscal and credit impulse will reach 15.5% this year (Chart 9).3 Table 1No Economic Growth Target In The Government Work Report Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Additionally, China pledged to stabilize employment and targeted the creation of 9 million new jobs in urban areas. This is an ambitious target amidst the massive layoffs induced by the COVID-19 pandemic this year. Chart 9Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Policymakers also reserved policy space to be used – without the approval of the NPC at the Politburo’s mid-year review – in the event the shock from the pandemic proves persistent.4 Past episodes of Chinese stimulus resulted in strong rallies in base metals prices. Given China now represents more than half of global copper consumption (vs. 43% in 2009 following the GFC, and 32% in 2012 following the euro area debt crisis), we expect this new round of stimulus will lead to a sharp increase in copper prices.5 By and large, refined copper prices are highly sensitive to growth in EM imports – particularly China’s – which are closely tied to income growth. The latest CPB World Trade Monitor data for March shows EM ex-China imports have been resilient suggesting the rebound in China’s economic activity might be spilling over to other EMs highly leveraged to China (Chart 10). Still, our main cyclical commodity demand indicators were declining as of April. We expect stimulus-driven EM income and investment growth will show up in our indicators in 2H20 (Chart 10). Chart 10Awaiting A Rebound In Our Cyclical Indicators Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Stalling Primary And Secondary Supply Growth In addition to the demand implications, lockdowns also resulted in restrictions – and few complete shutdowns – in mining activities in copper-producing countries. The ICSG revised down its global mine and refined copper output by 950k MT and 1.1mm MT, respectively, for this year on the back of the COVID-19 pandemic.6 The group now expects 2020 mine supply to decline by 3% this year and refined production to remain flat y/y, for a second consecutive year. While important, these adjustments were insufficient to completely offset the large negative demand shock in 1Q and 2Q20.7 In 2H20, the supply-side outlook rests on the evolution of COVID-19 cases and associated governments’ responses in major ore and refined copper-producing countries (i.e. Chile, Peru, US, DRC, China, Russia, and Japan). So far, mining activities were mostly treated as essential and allowed to operate at reduced capacity under additional sanitary and social distancing guidelines. Confirmed cases in these countries appears to be slowing, this could allow activity to slowly return to normal (Chart 11). Chart 11Further Supply Disruptions Are Unlikely Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current prices. Going forward the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for copper prices.  While mining and refining of copper concentrates were often classified as essential, scrap activities were not. According to the ICSG, copper scrap supplied decreased significantly as trade flows and generation, collection, and disassembling activities were disrupted by the pandemic. China’s import of scrap copper – a key input for Chinese refiners – declined 37% in 1Q20. This prompted the government to allow more scrap imports to fill the gap, but it might struggle to find suppliers. Globally, scrap makes up ~ 25% of total refined copper supply, thus, it usually plays a non-negligible role in the rebalancing of global markets. Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current prices. Going forward the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for copper prices. In addition, the crisis began at an abnormally low inventory level. Thus, despite the temporary build in 1Q20, inventories are still below their 2010 to 2019 average. The rebound in demand, combined with flat supply and limited scrap availability, will move Chinese inventory down in 2H20 and offset any builds at the LMEX and COMEX warehouses, supporting copper prices this year (Chart 12). Chart 12Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 USD Depreciation Leads To EM Economic Growth Uncertainty over the duration of lockdowns globally continues to fuel safe-haven demand for USD. As the COVID-19 shock abates we expect a weaker US dollar to be more supportive to copper demand. Uncertainty over the duration of lockdowns globally continues to fuel safe-haven demand for USD (Chart 13). The shortage of USD experienced by EM debtors servicing dollar-denominated debt continues to hamper their recovery. The combination of safe-haven demand and a continued dollar shortage for borrowers without access to US swap lines is keeping the dollar well bid, suppressing foreign flows to EM economies and commodity demand at the margin (Chart 14, panel 1). Chart 13Global Financial Cycles Hurting EM Economies Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 14Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid The Fed will continue to accommodate USD demand, in an ongoing attempt to reverse a tightening of global financial conditions. EM economies – the bulk of base metals demand growth – are facing dual domestic demand and global financial shocks.8 These economies have become more dependent on foreign portfolio inflows, both in debt and equity markets (Chart 14, panel 2). Thus, global financial cycles now have a significant impact on their growth. The main factors influencing these flows are risk appetite, EM exchange rates, and DM interest rates.9 We expect all factors to support inflows to emerging markets as the COVID-19 shock abates. The Fed will continue to accommodate USD demand, in an ongoing attempt to reverse a tightening of global financial conditions. A lower USD will decrease the local-currency cost of consuming commodities ex-US. Metals producers' ex-US will face higher local-currency operating costs, reducing supply growth at the margin. A depreciating USD is a necessary factor for our bullish cyclical commodities view (Chart 15). The risk to this view is a severe second wave of COVID-19 infection which would cause safe assets to spike anew. Chart 15Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar $3.00/lb Copper Price Likely; Geopolitical Risks Mounting Over the short term, geopolitical risks – chiefly mounting Sino-US tensions – could derail the rally in copper prices and other risk assets.  For April, our copper demand model suggested prices were at equilibrium relative to underlying demand trends (Chart 16). Chart 16Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates When simulating a 10% decline in the USD and a rebound in EM import growth in 2H20, our model suggests COMEX copper prices could move 25% higher, holding everything else constant. In reality, the USD’s path and the extent of the EM import rebound are among the key known unknowns we confront in estimating a model for copper prices. We do not have a precise view on these variables, which is why we run simulations. Theory would suggest the stimulus we are seeing globally points to a lower USD and a pick-up in EM imports, however, and these factors will create a more supportive environment for metals prices. Over the short term, geopolitical risks – chiefly mounting Sino-US tensions – could derail the rally in copper prices and other risk assets. With the US election now only 5 months away, President Trump’s odds of being reelected on the back of a strong economy are fading amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. According to our Geopolitical strategists, Trump is the underdog and will need to double down on foreign and trade policies to prop-up his chances of winning. Meanwhile, China is seeking to solidify its sphere of influence.10 This is causing US-China tensions to intensify. Depending on the nature of the actions taken by the Trump administration (i.e. increasing tariffs on US imports of Chinese goods vs. cutting China’s access to foreign technology), metals prices could suffer, as was the case in 2018. With these geopolitical risks in mind, we maintain that China’s strong fiscal and monetary stimulus, combined with a falling US dollar will provide a favorable backdrop for copper markets in 2H20.   Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Doubts about OPEC 2.0’s commitment to extending their deepest-ever production cuts expiring this month to July, perhaps August, took some of the steam out of crude-oil rally earlier in the week. In our modeling, we do not see the need to extend the massive voluntary cuts announced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its Gulf allies: KSA’s cuts of ~ 4.5mm b/d vs. its April output level of 12mm b/d starting this month will take the Kingdom’s output to ~ 7.5mm b/d. The UAE and Kuwait also voluntarily added cuts of 100k and 80k b/d, respectively, to their agreed quotas. We continue to believe the current schedule of production cuts will result in a physical supply deficit in 3Q20, which will require OPEC 2.0 to begin raising production to keep prices from getting too high going into a US presidential election. We expect Brent prices to average $40/bbl this year and $68/bbl next year, with WTI trading $2 - $4/bbl below that (Chart 17).11 Base Metals: Neutral Iron ore prices breached $100/MT this week, as COVID-19-induced supply disruptions in Brazil – the largest exporter of high-grade ore – and South Africa leave the seaborne market open to Australian suppliers to meet higher Chinese demand as port inventories are rebuilt. FastMarkets MB, a sister company of BCA Research, reported May exports to China from Brazil were down 28% y/y to 21.5mm MT from just under 30mm MT the year prior. Iron ore exports from Australia are expected to exceed A$100 billion this year, according to government estimates reported by the Financial Times.12 Precious Metals: Neutral As we go to press, gold prices retreated to $1,700/oz from ~ $1,740/oz last week, exhibiting a positive correlation with the dollar. This is a result of rising risk appetite globally as economies exit lockdowns. In the US, interest rates are continuing to support gold. Going forward, the probability of negative rates is remains low, but the Fed will continue to buy more debt from the public and private sectors to push the shadow rate further down. This supports gold prices (Chart 18). Chart 17Crude Prices Will Rebound Crude Prices Will Rebound Crude Prices Will Rebound Chart 18Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on World Copper Supply,” published by the International Copper Study Group on May 21, 2020. 2     A resurgence of infection triggered renewed lockdowns over a region of 100 million people in May. Please see More than 100 million people in China's northeast back under lockdown to thwart potential second wave published by the National Post on May 19, 2020. 3    Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM Stocks Are At A Critical Resistance Level," published May 28, 2020. It is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Taking The Pulse Of The People’s Congress," published May 28, 2020. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5    There remains a risk global monetary stimulus fails to ignite strong consumer and business consumption. The unprecedented shock could raise precautionary savings and keep risk aversion elevated for an extended period. Based on the Quantity Theory of Money, money supply times velocity (the rate at which money changes hands) equals nominal GDP. Low confidence translates to a low velocity of money limiting the reach of monetary policy. This value is extremely difficult to forecast. 6    Please see “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on World Copper Supply,” published by the International Copper Study Group on May 21, 2020. 7     According to BGRIMM Lilan Consulting, China’s real demand for refined copper declined by ~22% in 1Q20. This implies a ~11% decline in global copper consumption. Please see footnote 6 for more details. 8    Global financial cycles capture how global financial conditions affect individual economies. The analysis of these cycles stressed the importance of common factors in global risk asset prices which are driven by risk appetite and US monetary policy. These factors are mainly explained by developments in advanced economies but have a drastic effect on emerging markets. Please see Iñaki Aldasoro, Stefan Avdjiev, Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat (2020). “Global and domestic financial cycles: variations on a theme,” BIS Working Papers, No 864. 9    Please see Chapter 3 of the Global Financial Stability Report titled “Managing Volatile Portfolio Flows,” published by IMF. 10   Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Spheres Of Influence (GeoRisk Update)," published May 29, 2020. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11    Please see our May 21, 2020 report entitled US Politics Will Drive 2H20 Oil Prices for our latest view on oil fundamentals and prices, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 12    Please see Australia’s iron ore miners exploit supply gap as Covid-19 hobbles rivals published by the Financial Times June 3, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices

Highlights Risks assets have entered­ a FOMO-driven mania phase that could last for a few more weeks. Markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. A weaker than expected global recovery and rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China are the two primary risks that will weigh on EM risk assets after this mania phase runs out of steam.  We are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. Within EM, local rates will perform well in both risk-on and risk-off phases. Feature The recovery in global risk assets has entered a fear-of-missing-out, or FOMO, mania phase. Like any mania, this one could last longer and go further than any fundamental analysis could presume. Investors who are long or cannot afford to stay on the sidelines should play this rally with tight stop points. Investors with longer time horizon should wait for a pullback in EM equities and currencies to buy. Within EM, local rates offer the best risk-reward profile.  A recovery in global trade and mainland industrial sectors is necessary for EM equities and currencies to rally on a sustainable basis. The global equity rally has taken place amid a shrinking forward EPS. The top panel of Chart I-1 demonstrates that even the ever-bullish bottom-up analysts have been cutting their expectations of the level of corporate 12-month forward earnings per-share. As a result, the global forward P/E ratio has spiked to a 18-year high (Chart I-1, bottom panel).   Chart I-1An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels Chart I-2EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling Chart I-2 illustrates that the same phenomenon is true for EM equities. Their forward EPS has been contracting and their forward P/E has jumped to a decade high.  Any overdrive in asset prices without supporting fundamentals can last for a while but typically ends with a crash. This FOMO-driven mania is unlikely to be any different. It is fair to say that during the March carnage, many investors operated on a “sell now, think later” principle. Since the rally began, they have switched to a “buy now, ask questions later” attitude. As this rally persists, global stocks and credit will become overbought and expensive. At that point, any negative shock could produce a sharp pullback that would likely devolve into another nasty selloff as investors shift back to a “sell now, think later” mentality. The Narratives Driving The Rally The narratives supporting this mania are simple and seem to be both accepted and embraced by a growing number of investors. We agree with some and disagree with others: Economies around the world are opening, which will ensure that an economic recovery will follow. Our interpretation: Surely as confinement policies are eased, activity will improve. However, in our opinion, this should not come as a surprise to investors. This is especially pertinent for the trend-setting US stock market. With US equity valuations not particularly cheap, the market was never pricing in extended lockdowns. Hence, it appears strange to us that markets have so exuberantly cheered the reopening of the economy. Looking forward, the key to the medium-term (six-month) equity outlook is the shape of the recovery following the initial partial normalization. The latter presently looks V-shaped because as stores and businesses reopen economic activity is bound to improve. Yet the odds are that following this initial normalization, the shape of the recovery is most likely to be U-shaped. For what it’s worth, manufacturing PMIs in export-oriented economies like Korea, Japan and Taiwan made new lows in May (Chart I-3). We are not suggesting these indicators will not improve in the months ahead; they surely will. Nevertheless, a marginal rise in diffusion indexes like PMIs from extraordinary depressed levels do not signify a profit recovery. This recession differs from previous ones as the level of business activity has dropped below breakeven points for more businesses than it did in other recessions. When a company operates below its breakeven level, a marginal rise in sales may not be sufficient to improve its debt-servicing capacity, hiring and capital spending intentions. However, it seems markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. This is why we feel risk assets are in a FOMO-driven mania phase, where fundamentals do not matter. Authorities around the world are stimulating, with the US pumping enormous amounts of fiscal and credit stimulus into the economy (Chart I-4, top panel). Chart I-3Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Chart I-4An Unparalleled Global Money Boom An Unparalleled Global Money Boom An Unparalleled Global Money Boom   Chart I-5China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China has finally embarked on aggressive stimulus. The National People’s Congress has set the monetary policy objective for 2020 as follows: Substantially accelerate the growth of broad money supply and total social financing (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Our interpretation: Indeed, government stimulus worldwide is massive. Yet, it is hard to know if it will be sufficient to produce a V-shaped recovery. The rise in money supply at the moment is being offset by the drop in the velocity of money. As a result, nominal GDP levels are extremely low. That said, last week we upgraded our growth outlook for China because of the above-mentioned aggressive policy stimulus. It is possible that China’s credit and fiscal impulse will reach about 15% of GDP before year-end (Chart I-5). What presently deters us from recommending outright long positions in China-related plays is the escalating US-China confrontation and the risk of a relapse in global stocks. Central banks around the world both in DM and EM are monetizing debt and injecting immense liquidity into the system. Our interpretation: Correct, but equally relevant is investors’ animal spirits. The latter will determine whether and when these liquidity injections leak into risk assets. For now, it seems that once again central banks’ actions have been successful in lifting asset prices, despite poor fundamentals. Equity valuations are cheap, especially outside the US. This is especially true given the low risk-free rate. Our interpretation: We agree that EM equities are cheap, something we have been highlighting since mid-March (Chart I-6). Yet valuations are not a good timing tool, as they can stay depressed so long as profits are not worsening.  Meanwhile, US equities are expensive (Chart I-7). Critically, we argued in a recent report that equity multiples depend not only on the risk-free rate but also on the equity risk premium (ERP). Chart I-6EM Equities Are Cheap EM Equities Are Cheap EM Equities Are Cheap Chart I-7US Stocks Are Expensive US Stocks Are Expensive US Stocks Are Expensive   Given the immense ambiguities investors are facing with respect to both the business cycle and economic, political and geopolitical trends, the ERP should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount factor – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. In this context, US equity valuations are rather expensive, despite the very low risk-free rate. In short, the expensive US stock market has until very recently been the locomotive of this rally. If US share prices had not rallied hard in the past two months, EM and other international bourses would not have caught a bid. The Fed’s public debt monetization is a structural, not near-term negative for the greenback. The US dollar is expensive and will depreciate a lot due to unrestrained fiscal and monetary stimulus in the US. Our interpretation: The US dollar is one standard deviation expensive (Chart I-8) and EM currencies have become cheap (Chart I-9). Chart I-8US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated Chart I-9EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap   Chart I-10EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals We do not disagree with the view that the US dollar is vulnerable in the long term due to the Federal Reserve’s aggressive debt monetization and that the Fed will eventually fall behind the inflation curve. Yet inflation is not imminent, and the Fed’s public debt monetization is a structural, not near-term negative for the greenback. As such, these potholes for the US dollar may not be pertinent in the next several months. Critically, Chart I-10 illustrates that EM currencies move with industrial metals prices, and EM stocks correlate with global materials stocks. The common driver of all of these markets is global growth in general and China’s industrial sectors in particular. In short, a recovery in global trade and mainland industrial sectors is necessary for EM equities and currencies to rally on a sustainable basis. Investors are underinvested in global equities in general and cyclical plays in particular. Our interpretation: Indeed, we showed last week that institutional equity investors had been skeptical of this rally. What has driven or supercharged this equity rally since late March has been unsophisticated retail investors. They have been opening up broker accounts worldwide and aggressively trading since March lockdowns. We cited a few pieces of anecdotal evidence confirming this phenomenon in last week’s report.  However, it seems that institutional investors in recent weeks have capitulated by raising their risk exposure in general and their exposure to cyclical plays in particular. This explains the recent surge in cyclical equities and currencies.  Bottom Line: The narratives driving this rally are only partially correct. Markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. A weaker than expected global recovery and rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China are the two primary risks that will weigh on EM risk assets after this FOMO-driven mania phase runs out of steam.  Nuances To Beware Of There are several nuances about the market’s internals and characteristics that we would like to draw investors’ attention to: There is mixed evidence as to whether China’s economy in general and its industrial sectors in particular have entered a sustainable recovery. First, examining the Taiwanese manufacturing PMI data could help in assessing the growth outlook for both the mainland economy and for global trade. The basis is that Taiwan has done extremely well by avoiding COVID-19 outbreaks and lockdowns. Therefore, there are no domestic reasons for weak output growth. In addition, its manufacturing sector is very export-oriented, with about 40% of exports destined for mainland China. PMI export orders for Taiwan's aggregate manufacturing and its three key sectors plunged to new lows in May (Chart I-11). This includes both the electronic optical (semiconductor) and basic materials sectors. The latter correlates well with global materials stocks. There has so far not been a bullish signal from this indicator (Chart I-11, second panel).    Second, China’s domestic A-share market in general and its cyclical sectors in particular have not yet broken out (Chart I-12). Given China was the first nation to exit from lockdowns, its share prices should be the first to signal a sustainable economic recovery. Yet onshore share prices have been rather subdued. China’s economy will eventually stage a recovery later this year. Our point is that global cyclicals might have run ahead of themselves by pricing in a recovery too early. Chart I-11Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Chart I-12Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery   Equity market and sector leadership changes occur during selloffs or at the inception of rallies.  Chart I-13 illustrates EM relative stock prices versus DM along with the global equity index. Over the past 25 years, there have been several major leadership changes between EM and DM. And all of them occurred during selloffs in global share prices. Chart I-13EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs Similarly, the relative performance of global growth versus value stocks experiences trend reversals during global bear markets (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Chart I-15EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks Leadership of US equities and global growth stocks did not change during the March crash nor during the following two-month rally from the bottom. Only in the past week or so have US equities and global growth stocks begun to lag EM bourses and global value, respectively (Chart I-15). In brief, the latest leadership rotation from US to EM did not occur during the selloff or at inception of the rally – i.e., it does not fit the typical profile of sustainable leadership reversal. As such, it may not be enduring. The internals of this rally are consistent with the fact that it might already be at a late stage. During rallies, laggards are the last to catch a bid. Contrarily, during selloffs, outperformers are the last to be liquidated. For example, US growth stocks were the last ones to be liquidated in both the 2015-early-2016 and 2018 selloffs. When the decade-long leaders – US growth stocks – were finally stamped out, it marked the bottom of those selloffs. We are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. The Fed’s purchases of US bonds will likely continue pushing investors into EM credit markets. Using an analogous framework for this rally, the latest extraordinary spike in the laggards such as EM, Europe and both value and cyclical stocks could be a sign of bear capitulation, and could signify the final phase of this equity rally.  Bottom Line: There are several nuances to the current equity market rally, but investors seem reluctant to consider them amid a FOMO-driven mania. Investment Considerations The FOMO-driven rally could last for several more weeks. Afterwards it will be followed by a major setback. Investors who are long or cannot afford to stay on the sidelines should play this rally with tight stop points. Investors with longer time horizon should wait for a pullback in EM equities and currencies to buy.  Chart I-16EM Local Rates Offer Value EM Local Rates Offer Value EM Local Rates Offer Value We are making the following adjustments and changes to our strategy and trade recommendations: In regard to our EM versus DM asset allocation strategy, we are making one change: we are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. The Fed’s purchases of US bonds will likely continue pushing investors into EM credit markets. Consistently, we are closing two positions: (1) our short EM corporate and sovereign credit / long US investment-grade corporate bond trade; and (2) our long Asian investment-grade /short high-yield corporate bond trade. Within the EM credit space, we continue to favor sovereigns versus corporates – a strategy recommended on April 23. We are still reluctant to strategically upgrade EM stocks versus DM ones even though odds of EM outperforming DM stocks are high in the coming weeks. In light of the potential FOMO-driven rally, to protect profits we are closing the following two currency positions: Take profits on short BRL/long USD trade. It was initiated on November 29, 2019 and has produced a 19% gain. Book profits on short SGD/long JPY position. This recommendation has generated a 2.3% gain since its initiation on June 8, 2018. We are still maintaining shorts in the following EM currencies: CLP, ZAR, TRY, IDR, PHP and KRW. They could continue rallying in the near term but will relapse afterwards. We are also structurally short low beta currencies: the RMB and the Saudi riyal. Within EM, local rates offer the best risk-reward profile: they will perform well in both risk-on and risk-off phases. Real bond yields remain somewhat elevated in many EMs, as shown in Chart I-16. We continue to receive long-term rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, China and Korea, as well as 2-year rates in South Africa. Their central banks will reduce policy rates much further. In addition, several of these local bond markets will benefit from ongoing quantitative easing by their central banks. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations