Emerging Markets

Highlights China’s 14th Five Year Plan and broader national strategy will continue to provoke opposition from the US and the West, regardless of the US election. China’s economic blueprint will focus on self-sufficiency, “dual circulation” (import substitution), state subsidies, and high-tech advancement – all factors that will continue to provoke western ire. US political polarization creates geopolitical risks, particularly for China, which will support the dollar and US equity outperformance, depending on the election result. If Trump wins, polarization will persist, he will face gridlock at home, and he will thus continue his aggressive foreign and trade policies, with China facing disruptive consequences. The CNY, EUR, and especially TWD would suffer. If Biden wins, he could face either gridlock or full Democratic control. The former case presents a greater risk of a focus on trade and foreign policy. The latter would result in a domestically focused Washington, which gives China breathing space. The CNY and EUR would benefit, but the TWD would face limited upside. Either way, investors are likely to become over-exuberant about assets that are exposed to the US-China relationship in the event of a Biden victory. Over the long run, this is a bull trap.  Feature In the years after the 2008 financial crisis, the global news media proclaimed the rise of China and the demise of the United States as a global leader. The US’s free-wheeling democracy and capitalism led to economic collapse, partisan gridlock, and nearly a self-inflicted default on sovereign debt. Meanwhile China’s state-controlled system stimulated its economy, cracked down on the first inklings of unrest in the spring of 2011, and expanded its regional and global influence.  The conclusion is similar today in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. The US has squandered its response to the pandemic, while partisan gridlock threatens the economic recovery. China has suppressed the virus that started within its borders and its economy is rapidly on the mend. The orgy of social unrest and political dysfunction in the US has weighed on its international image and leadership. What the past decade showed, however, is that the first narrative to take hold after a global crisis is not likely to be the final narrative. In fact, the past decade was the most difficult for China since the 1980s. The next decade will be even more challenging. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to an official conclusion the unprecedented economic boom of the past four decades (Chart 1). Though Chinese policy makers have navigated relatively well, the social and political system faces greater challenges in a new economic and international environment. Chinese potential GDP growth has now fallen to 3%, as the labor force contracts and productivity remains flat. Chart 1China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China is well-situated in the short run to benefit from domestic and global economic stimulus, but over the long run its challenges are significantly underrated. China Faces Headwinds From Abroad Chinese leaders are prepared for any of the possible outcomes in the US election. With regard to US foreign and trade policy, the election is about tactics, not strategy. US grand strategy clearly dictates that Washington focus on curbing China, which is the only country that can challenge the US for global supremacy over the long run. But the US is not alone – other countries are also taking a more skeptical stance toward China’s geopolitical prominence. The result is that China will continue to emphasize self-sufficiency, a centrally guided economic model, and state-supported technological advancement in its fourteenth Five Year Plan for 2021-25 (see Appendix). This policy trajectory, combined with the key policy developments of the past decade, suggests that China’s self-sufficiency drive will continue to attract geopolitical opposition from the US and the West: Capital Controls: China tightened its capital controls aggressively during the financial turmoil of 2015-16. This emergency decision undercut the liberal reform agenda and alienated the western world on one of its critical structural demands. With China having grown its money supply from 175% to 197% of GDP since 2009, and capital flowing out again amid this year’s crisis (Chart 2), Beijing will not be able to fully liberalize its capital account anytime soon. Chart 2China's Capital Controls China's Capital Controls China's Capital Controls Chart 3China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived State-Owned Enterprises: The current administration has struggled with slowing trend growth and deflationary pressures. This is not an environment opportune for restructuring or liquidating inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is the opposite of the 1990s, when SOEs were last culled. The regime has instead promised to make SOEs bigger and stronger (Chart 3). While it has pursued reforms to allow more private ownership of state assets, it has also encouraged public ownership of private assets, thus producing “mixed ownership” and a fusion of state and corporate power. The US and western countries resent this reassertion of state-backed economic power, notwithstanding the fact that all countries are increasing state support amid the collapse in global demand. Notably, China will likely resist cutting manufacturing capacity any faster than it will already be cut due to the global recession and foreign protectionism, meaning that stimulus-fueled overcapacity will continue to be a problem for foreign competitors. Chart 4The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race: Beijing is continuing a frantic dash to upgrade its science and technology capabilities in order to lift total factor productivity, which is essential to maintaining growth in the coming decades in the post-export-industrial phase. Expenditures on research and development are skyrocketing, now rivaling the United States. True, R&D spending is flattening out as a percentage of GDP, but this is likely temporary — even faster R&D spending will probably become an official target for the next five years (Chart 4). The full weight of the political system is being thrown behind the goal of creating a “Great Leap Forward” in advanced and emerging technologies. Western countries are increasingly sensitive to China’s advances in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, new vehicles, new energy, new materials, and computing. The new strategy of “dual circulation” will consist of import substitution, especially for critical tech goods, and will incorporate programs like “Made in China 2025” as well as “new infrastructure” that are high tech and have become targets of the West. The US and others are openly adopting export controls and reducing supply chain dependency on China. Beijing will struggle to maintain its rapid innovation drive without inviting more punitive measures from the West. Chart 5US Fears China’s Military Rise Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Military Spending: China adopted a more assertive foreign policy in the mid-2000s and intensified this approach after 2012. Military spending has risen along with economic heft and western experts have long believed that China spends considerably more than it lets on. If we assume that China began to spend 3.75% of GDP per year after its strategic break with the US – a reasonable number in keeping with Russia’s long-term average – then China is narrowing the defense spending gap with the US more rapidly than is widely believed (Chart 5). Given the US’s giant defense spending, this is a continual source of distrust. Bear in mind that China’s defense and security aims are more limited than those of the US, at least in the short run. While the US must maintain the ability to project power globally, China need only grow its regional sphere of influence. Regionalism: While the Xi administration consolidates power within the Communist Party and central government in Beijing, it is also consolidating Beijing’s authority within Greater China. This includes efforts to bring to heel wayward provinces and regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Much of this is a fait accompli that western governments can do little about. Even in Hong Kong, public opinion is showing signs of resignation to the new legislative powers that Beijing has asserted. However, Taiwan is the clear outlier. Public opinion has shifted sharply against mainland China. Given that Taiwan is the epicenter of the new cold war with the US, both for reasons of political legitimacy as well as technological capability, a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is looming (Chart 6). China has economic leverage to use first, but if this fails then a military confrontation cannot be ruled out. The above points do not hinge on the US election outcome or other cyclical factors, and highlight that geopolitical tensions will persist, particularly with the United States. The US’s adoption of a confrontational rather than cooperative posture toward China is a paradigm shift in international relations. Unlike Washington’s crackdown on Japanese trade in the 1980s, the US and China do not have an underlying trust or sense of shared security interests. Beijing’s willingness to increase US imports or appreciate its currency arbitrarily, to suit the shifting demands of US administrations, have substantial limits. Economic decoupling will continue in an environment of strategic insecurity (Chart 7). Chart 6Struggles In Greater China Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Chart 7US Redistributes Trade Deficit US Redistributes Trade Deficit US Redistributes Trade Deficit   President Trump’s biggest mistake in pursuing his trade war with China lies in his failure to build a grand alliance, or coalition of the willing, among likeminded liberal democracies. This would have amplified his leverage over China in making demands for structural reform and opening up. But this point can be overstated. China’s international image has collapsed, in Europe and Asia as well as in North America, despite the Trump administration’s diplomatic failures. Much of this effect stems from COVID-19, but that does not mean it is less grave. If the US courts allies in the trade conflict with China, it will find governments willing to cooperate (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Image Suffers Under Trump Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Map 1Proxy Battles In Asia Pacific Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Chart 9US Arms Sales To Taiwan US Arms Sales To Taiwan US Arms Sales To Taiwan China’s perennial geopolitical challenge is shown in Map 1. It is geographically encircled by nations that have grown increasingly wary of its regional ambitions and will reach out to the US and West. These countries wish to continue benefiting from China’s economic rise but seek security guarantees to offset China’s rising strategic clout. The result will be “proxy battles,” in some cases political, in others military (Chart 9). Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam each face substantial geopolitical risk. In the case of South Korea and the Philippines, this risk is partially priced by financial markets. But in the case of Taiwan and Vietnam, it is almost entirely underrated. Taiwan has only an ambiguous defense commitment from the US, while Vietnam is a Chinese rival that entirely lacks a security guarantee from the United States. Bottom Line: Geopolitical risk will remain elevated in Asia Pacific regardless of what occurs in the US election. The growth of Chinese power, and its state-led economic model, will ensure that trade tensions persist. These will culminate in strategic conflicts in certain neighboring countries. China Will Re-Consolidate Power When Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, we argued that the looming US-China trade war would not be determined solely by relative economic size and export exposure. Instead, political unity would be a critical factor. While the US ostensibly had the economic advantage, China had the political advantage. The nineteenth National Party Congress would see Xi Jinping consolidate power domestically, while President Trump would struggle with domestic opposition and divisions within the US and the West over his protectionism. Having secured an economic rebound this year, China is likely to consolidate domestic power even further in 2021-22. This period culminates in the critical twentieth National Party Congress. Originally Xi Jinping was expected to step down at this time and hand the reins to the leader of the opposing faction. Now the opposing faction has been laid low, and Xi is likely to promote his faction and entrench his rule. The period will likely be marked with at least one major crackdown on the regime’s political rivals. Ultimately, social and political control will be tightened, particularly beginning in late 2021. These events provide good reasons for anticipating that Chinese monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy will not tighten drastically, but rather will merely normalize by mid-2021, assuming that the recovery stays on track (Chart 10). Yet this logic only goes so far – it is more bullish for the macro view today and in 2021, than it is in 2022. Obviously the regime wants to avoid a slump in 2021, the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party, and investors should keep this in mind. But the 2017 party congress was attended by a deleveraging campaign that surprised the world in its intensity. The point is that stability, not rapid growth, is the imperative in 2022. If speculative bubbles have become a greater threat by that time, then the monetary and fiscal policy backdrop will lean hawkish rather than dovish. Tightening central control over the economy helps the Xi administration consolidate power. Chart 10China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 US Polarization A Risk For China If China continues to consolidate, the key question is what will happen in the United States. The answer will be known in short order, but what is critical to observe is that US political polarization is a geopolitical risk, and therefore if it continues to escalate it will be positive for the US dollar and negative for Chinese and other emerging market assets. The past several years have been marked by an increase in US social and political instability. Indeed, according to Worldwide Governance Indicators, the US’s governance has declined while China’s has improved, notably on the issue of political stability and the absence of violence (Chart 11). While these rankings are partial, nevertheless they point to the reality of US political division. The decade’s giant increase in political polarization has coincided with a bull market in US equities and the greenback, best exemplified by the outperformance of the US technology sector (Chart 12). Chart 11US Instability A Source Of Global Risk Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? If President Trump prevails, this trend will continue. Trump cannot win the popular vote, but his regional support could grant him a victory in the Electoral College. Or he could prevail through a contested election adjudicated by the Supreme Court or the House of Representatives. If this should occur, polarization will intensify, as the government’s legitimacy will suffer due to lack of popularity in a democracy. Facing gridlock at home, Trump would pursue trade war – not only with China, but also conceivably with the European Union. The consequence is that a surprise Trump victory (45% odds) would be negative for the euro, the renminbi, and especially the Taiwanese dollar (Chart 13). Chart 12US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status Chart 13Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD However, if former Vice President Biden prevails, he could win in two possible ways: one with gridlock in Congress, the other with a Democratic sweep of the House and Senate. In the former case, US polarization will persist. Biden will be incapable of executing his domestic agenda, as he will be obstructed by a Republican Senate. This will drive him into foreign policy, where he will ultimately prove to be tough on China – and certainly tougher than the Obama administration. In the latter case, a Democratic sweep of legislative and executive branches, Biden will not face domestic constraints and will be primarily focused on an ambitious agenda for rebuilding and rebalancing the US economy, with elements of the New Deal and the Green New Deal. He will be less focused on international affairs, at least initially. Trade risks will decline, along with US fiscal risks, thus producing a higher-growth macro policy environment. In both cases, while we expect a President Biden to seek a diplomatic “reset” with China, he is unlikely to repeal President Trump’s tariffs. Instead he will seek to utilize the leverage that Trump has built up, while pursuing a new strategic and economic dialogue with China. Ultimately this dialogue will be undermined by China’s state-backed economic policies and foreign policy assertiveness (see previous section), as well as Biden’s simultaneous courting of Europe and other liberal democracies. But clearly there is more room for Chinese assets to outperform under a Biden victory, especially a Democratic sweep. Investment Takeaways If Biden wins, the stock market is likely to become overly exuberant about a Biden administration’s positive implications for China-exposed companies (Chart 14). The same can be said for Chinese tech companies that are highly export-oriented (Chart 15). In a Democratic sweep, this rally can be prolonged, as US equities will face greater political risk than international equities. But any rally in assets exposed to the US-China relationship will ultimately be a bull trap, as US grand strategy calls for containing China, while Chinese grand strategy calls for breaking through containment. The US and Chinese tech sectors and Taiwanese assets are by far the most vulnerable to this dynamic, given their lofty valuations. Chart 14Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Chart 15Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions If we are correct that geopolitical risk will persist for China regardless of US political party, then the primary beneficiaries of Chinese stimulus and US decoupling will be domestic-oriented Chinese equities as well as “China plays” – external markets that export machinery and resources to China, such as Australia, Brazil, and Sweden. China will still invest heavily in traditional infrastructure, property, and manufacturing to shore up demand whenever it sags amid the difficulties of the economic transition. Our China Play Index, designed by Mathieu Savary of our flagship The Bank Credit Analyst, neatly captures the potential for this index to outperform on the back of Chinese stimulus, which will be even more necessary if US policy continues to be punitive (Chart 16). The near term could involve substantial US fiscal risks as well as geopolitical risks with China, which can occur under a gridlocked Biden administration or a second term Trump administration. Over the next year, the looming Chinese and global recovery, combined with ultra-dovish US monetary policy, spells continued downside for the US dollar and upside for Chinese and emerging market currencies and risk assets (Chart 17). But while the dollar may face challenges to its reserve currency dominance, China’s geopolitical risks, at home and abroad, will prevent the renminbi from making more than incremental gains on the dollar. The euro is a much likelier alternative for the foreseeable future. Chart 16China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation Chart 17King Dollar Persists … But Cyclical Downside Looms King Dollar Persists ... But Cyclical Downside Looms King Dollar Persists ... But Cyclical Downside Looms   Appendix Table 1China’s 14th Five Year Plan Goals Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden?   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Highlights New position: Go structurally overweight DM equities versus EM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally overweight healthcare versus basic resources. New position: Go cyclically underweight the resource-heavy Finland stock market. Structurally underweight European equities versus DM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally overweight technology and communications. Structurally neutral European equities versus EM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally neutral between healthcare and technology. Cyclically underweight basic resources versus financials. Fractal trade: Fractal analysis confirms that Finland is overbought. Underweight Finland versus Switzerland. Feature Chart of the WeekOverweight DM Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Basic Resources Overweight DM Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Basic Resources Overweight DM Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Basic Resources A Major Misunderstanding About Valuation One of the biggest misunderstandings that we come across in investment is in assessing an asset’s valuation versus its own history. It is common to read claims such as ‘asset X is undervalued by two standard deviations.’ Yet these claims often betray a major flaw. The comparison with a historical average is meaningful only if there has not been a ‘phase-shift’ in the historical time-series. In mathematical terms, the time-series must be stationary. If the time-series is non-stationary, meaning that it has undergone a phase-shift, then the concepts of the historical average and standard deviation are meaningless.  The comparison with a historical average is meaningful only if there has not been a ‘phase-shift’ in the historical time-series. To draw a simple analogy, we cannot compare our adult bodyweight with our lifetime average bodyweight. This is because our bodyweight undergoes a phase-shift from childhood to adulthood. If we did compare our adult bodyweight with the lifetime average it would give the false signal that we were permanently overweight! Clearly, we should compare our adult bodyweight only with its history in the adult phase. Likewise, as the structural prospects for financials and resources phase-shifted at the start of the 2000s, their average valuations also phase-shifted. The average forward price-to-earnings multiple dropped from 13 to 10 for financials and from 18 to 11 for resources. In contrast, the average multiple of healthcare did not phase-shift, remaining at around 17 (Chart I-2-Chart I-4). Chart I-2The Valuation Of Financials Experienced A Phase-Shift Down The Valuation Of Financials Experienced A Phase-Shift Down The Valuation Of Financials Experienced A Phase-Shift Down Chart I-3The Valuation Of Basic Resources Experienced A Phase-Shift Down The Valuation Of Basic Resources Experienced A Phase-Shift Down The Valuation Of Basic Resources Experienced A Phase-Shift Down Chart I-4The Valuation Of Healthcare Did Not Experience A Phase-Shift The Valuation Of Healthcare Did Not Experience A Phase-Shift The Valuation Of Healthcare Did Not Experience A Phase-Shift It follows that we should compare the valuations of all sectors only with their history in their current phase. Unsurprisingly, this shows that healthcare is now modestly expensive versus its history. But surprisingly, and against the popular perception, financials and resources are not cheap. They are expensive versus their current phase history. In fact, the valuation of a long-duration sector such as healthcare should also take account of the bond yield. On this basis, healthcare’s forward earnings yield at 5 percent might look slightly expensive versus its history. But it looks extremely attractive versus the 0.8 percent yield on the 10-year T-bond (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield At 5 Percent... Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield At 5 Percent... Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield At 5 Percent... Chart I-6...Looks Very Attractive Versus The 10-Year T-Bond Yield At 0.8 Percent ...Looks Very Attractive Versus The 10-Year T-Bond Yield At 0.8 Percent ...Looks Very Attractive Versus The 10-Year T-Bond Yield At 0.8 Percent This valuation analysis carries repercussions for regional and country allocation, which we will now discuss. What Drives European Equity Performance Versus Developed Markets? Europe recently overtook the US to become the region with the largest stock market weighting in healthcare. The lead is slim. Europe’s stock market exposure to healthcare now stands at 16 percent versus the US at 14 percent, and the lead is mostly the result of Europe’s value sectors withering away. Nevertheless, it does mean that Europe is now the leader in a growth sector, at least in terms of its stock market exposure. That’s the good news.1 The bad news is that European stock market exposure to the other growth sectors – technology and communications – at 12 percent, remains a very distant laggard behind the US, at 40 percent. This is important, because Europe’s massive underweighting to technology and communications versus the US is by far the biggest determinant of the two stock markets’ relative performance. European stock market exposure to technology and communications, at 12 percent, remains a very distant laggard behind the US, at 40 percent. To be clear, currency moves matter too. Stock prices are denominated in the currency of their home stock market, yet the companies that dominate the major stock markets are international companies with multi-currency earnings. If the international currencies appreciate versus the home currency – meaning, the home currency weakens – the stock market gets an uplift from the so-called ‘positive currency translation effect’. Hence, our expectation of a gradually weakening dollar versus European currencies should give the US stock market a mild relative tailwind versus Europe from such a currency translation effect. That said, sector relative moves tend to dominate currency moves. This makes the sector outlook combined with the regional and country sector ‘fingerprints’ the key driver of regional equity relative performance (Tables 1-3). Table I-1The Sector Fingerprints Of Major Regional Stock Markets Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Table I-2The Sector Fingerprints Of Euro Area Stock Markets Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Table I-3The Sector Fingerprints Of Non Euro Area European Stock Markets Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Healthcare Versus Resources Is The Big Bet Our expectation of long-term outperformance from technology and communications is the main reason to structurally favour the US over Europe (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Overweight Europe Vs. US = Underweight Technology Overweight Europe Vs. US = Underweight Technology Overweight Europe Vs. US = Underweight Technology What Drives European Equity Performance Versus Emerging Markets? The European equity market’s combined exposure to the growth sectors – healthcare, technology, and communications – is massively underweight versus the US, and therefore also versus the developed markets (DM) equity index. Interestingly though, Europe’s growth sector exposure is not significantly different to that in the emerging markets (EM) equity index. Europe’s key difference with EM is the distribution of growth sector exposure. Europe has a high exposure to healthcare but a massive underexposure to technology and communications. The emerging markets (EM) equity market is the precise opposite – EM is overweight in technology and communications but massively underweight in healthcare.  Europe versus EM relative performance boils down to healthcare versus technology. The upshot is that Europe versus EM relative performance boils down to healthcare versus technology. Chart I-8 should leave you in no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant! It follows that investors that favour healthcare versus technology should overweight Europe versus EM. Albeit, right now, we do not have a high conviction on this view. Chart I-8Overweight Europe Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Technology Overweight Europe Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Technology Overweight Europe Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Technology The Case For Overweight Healthcare Versus Resources, And Overweight DM Versus EM Our high conviction view is to overweight DM versus EM. This view boils down to DM’s overexposure to healthcare versus EM’s overexposure to the classic cyclicals, epitomised by basic resources. Again, the Chart of the Week should leave you in no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. The long-term case for healthcare versus resources hinges on the outlook for their profits. Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life. In contrast, resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. And even the physical stuff that we do rely on contains less mass. Think about how light your phones, TV screens, and cars are compared to a couple of decades ago. What about the expected surge in resource-heavy infrastructure investment as governments open the fiscal taps? The problem is that as the world changes to a post-pandemic way of living, working, and interacting, it will take a long time to establish which, if any, infrastructure investments make sense. For example, previously sensible high-speed rail links between city centres and extra runways at airports could turn out to be white elephants. Hence, we think that major infrastructure projects may not arrive in the way that the market is anticipating. The short-term case for healthcare versus resources hinges on monetary developments in China. When looking at money supply and bank credit growth and impulses, conventional analysis focusses on 1-year rates of change. We have no objections with that. However, we prefer to focus on the shorter-term 6-month rates of change, because we find that they have a greater predictive power for the financial markets. China’s bank credit 6-month impulse has fallen off a cliff. Right now, China’s bank credit 6-month impulse has fallen off a cliff. When this happened in late 2016, early 2018, and early 2019 it presaged an underperformance of the resources sector. We anticipate the same to happen again, especially given the scale of the drop in the bank credit impulse and the scale of the recent outperformance of the resources sector (Chart I-9). Chart I-9When China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse Falls, Basic Resources Underperform When China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse Falls, Basic Resources Underperform When China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse Falls, Basic Resources Underperform Hence, we expect resources to underperform in the short term too, and our preferred near-term expression is to underweight resources versus financials. Looking at sector fingerprints of equity markets, one consequence is that Finland’s resource-heavy stock market is also likely to underperform. Accordingly, go underweight Finland. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental arguments to underweight Finland, its 130-day fractal structure also appears to be near a tipping-point of fragility. The recommended trade is to short Finland versus Switzerland, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 7 percent. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 53 percent. Chart I-10Finland Vs. Switzerland Finland Vs. Switzerland Finland Vs. Switzerland When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Sector weightings based on MSCI indexes. 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Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Highlights The signaling of QE programs by central banks has the greatest short-term impact on financial markets. However, the staying power of that impact depends on how fast QE operations expand money supply and what commercial banks and economic agents do with newly created excess reserves and deposits, respectively. QE programs in 2020 are creating more money supply, i.e. more potential purchasing power for goods, services and assets, than did QE programs of the last decade. Therefore, going forward QE programs will have a greater impact on financial markets than they did in the past ten years. Considerably faster money creation increases the odds of meaningfully higher goods and services inflation in the coming years. Rising velocity of money will be the key to inducing and sustaining higher inflation. Feature There are varying explanations in the investment community over how quantitative easing (QE) programs affect asset prices and consumer price inflation. For example, investors often struggle to dissect the impact of QE on equity prices and exchange rates: (1) Is it the level of central bank assets or their rate of change that affects financial markets? or (2) Is it the signaling mechanism of QE that moves asset prices and currencies? (3) Why did QE programs in the last decade not lead to higher consumer price inflation? We use a question-answer format to elaborate on these and other questions related to QE programs.  QE operations create new money (deposits at commercial banks) when central banks purchase assets from or lend to non-banks. Question: Do QE programs amount to money printing? Answer: Not always. QE operations by central banks might or might not create new money supply. First, we have to define money. In all countries, broad money supply is commonly defined and calculated as the sum of cash in circulation and all types of deposits in the commercial banking system. Cash in circulation makes only 11% of broad money supply in the US, 9% in the euro area, 3.8% in China and 7.3% in Japan. Hence, various types of deposits in commercial banks constitute the overwhelming portion of broad money supply. Deposits in commercial banks are not a part of a central bank’s balance sheet. Therefore, neither central bank assets nor liabilities are valid measures or proxies of money supply. Chart I-1A and I-1B illustrates that changes in central bank assets and broad money supply have contrasted greatly.     Chart I-1ACentral Bank Assets ≠ Money Supply Central Bank Assets Money Supply Central Bank Assets Money Supply Chart I-1BCentral Bank Assets ≠ Money Supply Central Bank Assets Money Supply Central Bank Assets Money Supply   When central banks expand their balance sheets, they create excess reserves (ERs) “out-of-thin air”. ERs are commercial bank deposits at the central bank. There is a close relationship between ERs and central bank balance sheets as ERs constitute a large part of the latter’s liabilities. As a mirror image of ERs, the asset side of central banks’ balance sheet expands as they acquire securities or originate loans.  However, ERs are not a part of either narrow or broad money supply. In fact, in the last decade QE programs in the US, Japan and the euro area created a lot of ERs but little money supply as can been seen in Chart I-2A and I-2B. Chart I-2ATrends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ Trends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ Trends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ Chart I-2BTrends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ Trends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ Trends In Excess Reserves And Money Supply Differ   In China, it was the opposite: commercial banks have created a lot of money and expanded their assets even as the central bank has provided little ERs (Chart I-2B, bottom panel).  ERs are liquidity for the banking system; commercial banks use ERs to settle payments among themselves and with the central bank. ERs do not spill over into the real economy as commercial banks do not lend out ERs to companies and households. When a central bank buys securities or lends money, it always creates ERs but it does not always create money supply. Households, companies, non-bank financial institutions, organizations and governments (hereafter, economic agents) use money supply – deposits in the banking system and cash in circulation – to buy goods, services and assets. They do not have access to or do not use ERs. Given that central bank QE operations create ERs but not always money supply (deposits), they have a much more nuanced impact on the money supply. Question: In which cases do QE operations create money supply (or not)?  Answer: Whether a QE operation will lead to money creation depends on the counterparty of the central bank transaction: 1. When the central bank lends to or buys securities from commercial banks, it creates ERs but not money supply (deposits). In this case, the central bank’s balance sheet expands but the amount of deposits/money supply in the banking system does not change (Figure I-1). Figure I-1 Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation This operation creates ERs (liquidity for the banking system) but not money supply/deposits at banks that economic agents can use to purchase goods, services, and assets. That said, commercial banks with a large quantity of ERs might decide to originate more loans/lend more to economic agents so that money supply (purchasing power) can expand. In this scenario, QE operations do not affect money supply directly, but they may do so indirectly. 2. When the central bank lends to or purchases securities from economic agents, both ERs and new money supply/deposits are created “out of thin air” (Figure I-2). In this case, not only do commercial banks get ERs but economic agents also get deposits that did not exist before. These newly created deposits constitute an increase in money supply and boost the purchasing power of these economic agents. Figure I-2 Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation 3. Absent QE operations, central banks do not typically directly alter money supply; money is almost entirely created by commercial banks. When a commercial bank buys securities from or lends to economic agents, ERs do not change but a new deposit is created “out of thin air”, therefore the money supply expands. Conversely, when a bank sells a security to a non-bank, or a non-bank repays a loan, the money supply (i.e., the amount of deposits in the banking system) shrinks. To sum up, QE operations create new money (deposits at commercial banks) when central banks purchase assets from or lend to non-banks. When central banks purchase assets from commercial banks, no new money is created. Importantly, the main source of money creation outside QE programs is commercial bank purchases of securities from or loans to economic agents. Changes in the velocity of money explain fluctuations in core consumer price inflation much better than money growth in major economies. Question: How can we forecast if any particular QE program is going to create more or less money? Answer: There is no way to predict it. All depends on the counterparties involved in central bank transactions. One can only observe the evolution of money supply to gauge the direct impact of a QE program on money supply. Further, commercial bank actions have a great deal of impact on money supply. When the commercial banking system as a whole shrinks its assets (loan book, holdings of securities and other claims or assets), money supply contracts, ceteris paribus. In short, to forecast changes in money supply one need to not only forecast central bank transactions with economic agents (non-banks) but also commercial banks loans to, and purchases of securities from, economic agents. Chart I-3Broad Money Growth: Now Versus Last Decade Broad Money Growth: Now Versus Last Decade Broad Money Growth: Now Versus Last Decade Question: In regard to their impact on money supply, how do QE programs presently differ from those of the last decade? Answer: The key difference between the outcomes of QE programs this year and the ones undertaken in the last decade is that broad money growth in advanced economies is skyrocketing now but it was tame during the QE programs of the last decade (Chart I-3). To recap, QE programs in the US, Japan and the euro area, over the past 10 or so years have created a lot of ERs but little money supply. The reasons for this are as follows: deleveraging by banking systems in the last decade – commercial banks assets shrank or grew modestly – partially offset QE operations’ boost to money supply. Chart I-4 illustrates commercial banks’ assets contracted in 2009-10 in the US, in 2012-17 in the euro area and in the 1990s in Japan. Shrinking commercial bank assets reduces money supply, ceteris paribus. That is why QE programs of the last decade had a muted impact on broad money supply. Presently, commercial banks assets are rising rapidly in the US, the euro area and Japan. Hence, the simultaneous expansion of both central bank and commercial banks assets ensures much more robust money growth now than during the past two decades. Further, advanced economies are moving from monetary to fiscal dominance as their fiscal policies become much more proactive in stimulating growth. This entails running larger fiscal deficits. Mushrooming government bond supply will have to be absorbed by central banks to preclude a substantial rise in bond yields that can threaten economic expansions. Consequently, central banks will purchase a lot of government bonds not from commercial banks but from governments or other investors. This will directly boost money supply. Finally, commercial banks in DM have plenty of ERs and they do not need to sell their bonds in exchange for ERs like they did when they deleveraged last decade. Hence, DM central banks will primarily be purchasing bonds from non-banks resulting in new money creation. All in all, money supply in advanced economies will grow much faster this decade than it did in the past ten years.       Question: Does the current booming money supply in the US not reflect an overflow of excess savings? Answer: As we discussed in our previous reports on money, credit and savings, changes in money supply are not at all contingent on national or household savings. As was discussed above, outside of QE operations, money is primarily created by commercial banks “out-of-thin air” when they lend to or purchase assets from non-banks. Chart I-5 illustrates that there has been no positive correlation between the savings rate and money supply in China, Korea, Japan and the US. The same holds true for any other economy. Chart I-4Commercial Bank Assets Have Great Impact On Money Supply Commercial Bank Assets Have Great Impact On Money Supply Commercial Bank Assets Have Great Impact On Money Supply Chart I-5National Or Household Savings Do Not Drive Changes In Money Supply National Or Household Savings Do Not Drive Changes In Money Supply National Or Household Savings Do Not Drive Changes In Money Supply Chart I-6The US: Household Savings Rate And Money Supply The US: Household Savings Rate And Money Supply The US: Household Savings Rate And Money Supply The reason why the surge in US money supply this year has coincided with the rise in the US savings rate is as follows (Chart I-6): the Federal Reserve bought an enormous amount of US Treasury securities creating new money “out of thin air”; households received these fiscal transfers from the government in their bank accounts in the form of deposits. Hence, new money was created as a result of public debt monetization and this occurred before consumers made their choice between spending and saving. Critically, changes in economic agents’ propensity to save are reflected not in money supply but in the velocity of money. When households or companies decide to spend their deposits, the velocity of money rises. Conversely, when households and companies decide to save (retain) their deposits, the velocity of money drops. In brief, changes in the propensity to save alter the velocity of money, but not the amount of money supply. Chart I-7Velocity Of Money Explains Changes In Core Inflation Velocity Of Money Explains Changes In Core Inflation Velocity Of Money Explains Changes In Core Inflation Question: What is more important to inflation in goods and services: money supply or the velocity of money? Answer: Empirical evidence shows that the changes in the velocity of money explain fluctuations in core consumer price inflation much better than money growth in major economies (Chart I-7). Overall, there is no direct link between interest rates and money supply on the one hand and goods and service inflation on the other hand. That said, low interest rates or rapid money growth might encourage economic agents to save less, i.e., spend a larger share of their income. Stronger spending – which leads to an acceleration in the velocity of money – will raise inflationary pressures in the real economy. Even if QE programs succeed in generating rapid money growth, the latter does not automatically bring about higher inflation in goods and services. The willingness of consumers and businesses to consume more is critical to generating consumer and producer price inflation. Question: How does money supply differ from liquidity that flows into financial markets? Answer: Investors and market commentators often refer to “liquidity” as a driving force for financial markets. Yet definitions and calculations of liquidity vary tremendously. What investors refer to as “liquidity” can by and large be classified into three groupings: (1) banking system liquidity (excess reserves); (2) broad money supply (all deposits and cash in circulation) available to purchase goods, services and assets, including securities; and (3) liquidity in asset markets – the portion of broad money supply that is channeled to purchase financial assets. Figure I-3 provides a visual representation of money supply and liquidity groupings. All other measures of “liquidity” generally fall into one of these three groupings. Figure I-3Liquidity Groupings And Linkages Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation Deposits/money supply can be used to acquire both financial and real assets as well as to purchase goods and services. They could also be kept idle. In a given period of time, it is impossible to envisage what portion of deposits in the banking system will be allocated to securities investments. Ultimately, this decision rests with each individual and institutional investor. Therefore, it is impossible to forecast the true size of liquidity flow into and out of asset markets. Chart I-8Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization Overall, gauging liquidity flows to asset markets boils down to predicting investor behavior. Liquidity flows into financial assets when “animal spirits” among investors improve. In contrast, deteriorating investor confidence can lead to a dearth of liquidity in asset markets, despite abundant broad money supply. This topic of liquidity flows into and out of financial markets was extensively discussed in our report titled A Primer On Liquidity. Question: Is there a shortage of financial assets relative to available liquidity? Answer: Probably yes. QE programs in advanced economies have removed high-quality financial assets – valued at about $22 trillion – from global markets. Yet, money supply has expanded tremendously. This has left more money chasing few assets. The top panel of Chart I-8 demonstrates that US institutional and retail money market funds – a measure of cash on the sidelines – presently stand at $4 trillion. Notably, the Fed and US commercial banks have increased their debt securities holdings by $3.2 trillion since February and are currently holding $10.9 trillion of debt securities (Chart I-8, middle and bottom panel). These securities, held by the Fed and US commercial banks, are not available to non-bank investors. We reckon that cash on the sidelines is equal to 8% of the combined value of US equities and US-dollar debt securities available to non-bank investors, i.e. excluding debt securities owned by the Fed and commercial banks (Chart I-9). There is room for this ratio to drop further to its January 2020 level. Chart I-9Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Has Room To Drop Further Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Has Room To Drop Further Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Has Room To Drop Further To recap, the amount of liquidity flowing into and out of financial assets is ultimately contingent on investor behavior. When investors are willing to invest, liquidity flows into asset markets. On the contrary, when investors turn cautious, they withhold liquidity and asset prices drop.   Overall, barring negative shocks and relapses in growth, risk assets will be supported by tailwinds of expanding money supply. Conclusions And Investment Strategy The signaling of QE programs by central banks has the greatest short-term impact on financial markets – positive on risk assets and negative on the exchange rate. However, the staying power of that impact depends on how fast QE operations expand money supply and what commercial banks and economic agents do with newly created ERs and deposits, respectively. Besides, the amount of securities withdrawn from circulation by central banks relative to assets under management also determines the impact of QE operations on asset prices. QE programs in 2020 are creating more money supply, i.e. more potential purchasing power for goods, services and assets, than did QE programs of the last decade. Going forward, QE programs will have a greater impact on financial markets than they did in the last decade because they will create more money supply (Chart I-10). Besides, as central banks absorb more securities, the availability of securities to private investors will decline. This will be especially pertinent if the pool of assets under management expands faster along with rapidly growing money supply. This ceteris paribus warrants high asset prices. Interestingly, Chart I-11 demonstrates that during the last decade there was no positive correlation between G4 QE programs - central banks’ balance sheets - and EM risk assets and currencies. Based on this Chart I-11, during the last decade we often downplayed the importance of QE programs for EM financial markets. Chart I-10Global Money Does Not Always Drive Share Prices Global Money Does Not Always Drive Share Prices Global Money Does Not Always Drive Share Prices Chart I-11DM Central Banks' Assets And EM: No Correlation In The Last Decade DM Central Banks' Assets And EM: No Correlation In The Last Decade DM Central Banks' Assets And EM: No Correlation In The Last Decade   However, we have changed our view on the impact of the current round of QE programs on financial markets since May when we published a report titled Understanding QE Programs In EM And DM.  3. Considerably faster money creation increases the odds of meaningfully higher goods and services inflation. A rising velocity of money will be the key to inducing and sustaining higher inflation. De-globalization, policies targeting income redistribution from high- to low-income households, and the oligopolistic structure of a growing number of industries all argue for higher price inflation in the real economy this decade. Only technological advances and automation will be working the opposite way and thus keeping a lid on consumer price inflation. In short, odds favor higher inflation this decade.  4. Concerning EM financial markets, QE programs in EM and DM are especially positive for EM local currency bonds and sovereign and corporate credit markets. We remain long duration in EM domestic bonds but neutral on their currencies versus the US dollar. We expect a rebound in the US dollar before the end of this year. We will use this rebound in the greenback to recommend investors to be long local bonds without hedging currency risk. As for EM credit markets, we are neutral and expect to buy on a dip. The ability of governments to finance themselves locally will limit the supply of US dollar bonds and support this asset class. The latter will also benefit from DM QE programs. While EM and DM QE programs can meaningfully affect the trend in share prices and currencies, the primary long-term trend in EM equities and exchange rates will depend on the return on capital in their respective economies. A high or rising return on capital will supercharge share prices and lead to substantial currency appreciation. A low or plunging return on capital will weigh on both stock prices and currencies, regardless of QE programs. Equity investors should remain neutral on EM equities versus DM. We are presently short a basket of EM currencies versus the euro, CHF and JPY. For country allocation with equities, local bonds, credit markets and currencies, please refer to tables at the end of each report (pages 17-18). The signaling of QE programs by central banks has the greatest short-term impact on financial markets. 5. Finally, Chart I-12 presents a graph that combines two variables: the increase in broad money supply since February as a share of GDP (X-axis) and each country’s central bank purchases of government bonds as a share of net government bond issuance since February (Y-axis).  Chart I-12Monetization Of Fiscal Deficit And Rapid Money Growth Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation Dissecting The Impact Of QE Programs On Asset Prices And Inflation This chart gauges the degree of public debt/fiscal deficit monetization by central bank QE operations and aggregate money creation by the central bank and commercial banks. It reveals that the US, the euro area, the Philippines and Poland since February have experienced a money boom stemming from their central banks buying government bonds. India and Turkey are a notch below them. In the majority of EM countries, central bank QE programs and money creation by banks have been timid. This confirms our theme that the majority of EM except China, Korea, and Taiwan are facing tight budget constraints. This will slow down a recovery in these economies. However, it will also force companies and commercial banks to restructure and boost efficiency. The ones that undertake such restructuring will enjoy a bull market in share prices and their currencies will appreciate in the long run.     Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Under the newly released deleveraging policies, Chinese real estate developers have no choice but to deleverage. Over the next six months, the most likely scenario will be moderate growth in property sales, starts and completions, but a drop in land purchases. We expect Chinese onshore and offshore property stocks to continue underperforming their respective benchmarks. However, we recommend buying Chinese property developers’ offshore corporate bonds. Feature The country’s real estate sector has exhibited clear signs of improvement. As both commodity buildings’ floor space starts and sales showed four consecutive months of year-on-year growth, Chinese real estate investment has returned to its pre-pandemic annual rate of acceleration (Chart 1). In addition, our broad measures of Chinese real estate construction activity – the “building construction” floor area starts and completions – have also rebounded sharply (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Property Market: A Sustainable Recovery Ahead? Chinese Property Market: A Sustainable Recovery Ahead? Chinese Property Market: A Sustainable Recovery Ahead? Chart 2Sharp Rebound In Post-Pandemic Construction Activity Sharp Rebound In Post-Pandemic Construction Activity Sharp Rebound In Post-Pandemic Construction Activity One driving force behind the real estate sector’s recovery was that China loosened up its monetary policy and implemented fiscal stimulus earlier this year. However, since July, the government has implemented a flurry of restrictive policies to clamp down on flows of capital into the real estate sector, and has repeatedly stressed the mantra: “Houses are for living in, not for speculation.” Most importantly, in late August the government released a framework mandating Chinese property developers to deleverage. As Chinese homebuilders have no choice but to reduce their debt load, will the property market recovery continue? Chart 3Constrained Financing May Lead To A Drop In Land Sales Going Forward Constrained Financing May Lead To A Drop In Land Sales Going Forward Constrained Financing May Lead To A Drop In Land Sales Going Forward Over the next six months, we expect a 4-6% year-on-year growth in property sales. The government-set deleveraging mandate will likely result in considerable property sales promotion by real estate developers. In the meantime, faced with constrained financing, homebuilders may prioritize completion of already sold but unfinished buildings over land investment (Chart 3). This may result in a moderate pickup in construction activity, but a drop in profit margins and land sales. Beyond the next six months, property sales in China will likely struggle to grow, as price discounts may not be enough to outweigh demand headwinds. In turn, construction activity may falter, as the government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will curtail the cash flow to homebuilders.  Mandated Deleveraging Chart 4Property Developers Will Have No Choice But To Deleverage Property Developers Will Have No Choice But To Deleverage Property Developers Will Have No Choice But To Deleverage The Chinese real estate sector is highly indebted. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the sector’s total liability-to-asset ratio rose to 80%, and its debt-to-equity ratio was at 4.1 by the end of last year (Chart 4). Policymakers in Beijing well recognize that excesses in the property market in general, and leverage among property developers in particular, constitute a major risk to financial stability. As part of the strategy to establish a long-term, sustainable mechanism for the real estate sector, the Chinese central bank and the housing ministry issued a framework – essentially a deleveraging mandate for Chinese property developers. This framework includes Three Red Lines and Four Tiers. Three Red Lines There will be a 70% ceiling on liabilities to assets, excluding advanced payments from presold houses; The net debt-to-equity ratio needs to be less than 100%; Short-term borrowings cannot exceed cash reserves. Four Tiers Companies that exceed all three red lines are placed into the red tier, while those passing any two of the three red lines are in the orange tier and enterprises that cross one of the three lines are in the yellow tier. Firms with financials within the three red lines are classified in the green tier. The government is using these debt tiers to control which firms will have access to new financing and how much new financing they can apply for. Failing to meet all three “red lines” (i.e., the red tier) may result in them being cut off from access to new loans from banks. If a firm passes all three red lines (i.e., the green tier), it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 15% in the next year. If it is in the yellow or orange tier, it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 10% and 5% in the following year, respectively (Table 1). Table 1The Mandated Deleveraging Framework: Three Red Lines And Four Tiers China: The Implications Of Deleveraging By Property Developers China: The Implications Of Deleveraging By Property Developers Enterprises that break all three red lines are required to submit a report on their debt-reduction plan, listing their planned deleveraging measures to reduce the number of red-line breaches within one year, as well as the planned measures to reach the green tier within three years. Based on the 2020 mid-year data released by 100 major public-traded property-developing companies listed as either A-shares or H-shares, 86% of them are breaking at least one of the red lines, 22% of them are breaching all three red lines and only 14% of them are in the green tier. Bottom Line: Chinese home developers are set to embark on the deleveraging path due to the new regulation. This will limit their access to financing and has implications for their activity and, thereby, the overall economy. What Does This Mean? Property development is an asset-heavy and capital-intensive business, and this industry typically relies a lot on debt. Chart 5Chinese Real Estate Investment: A Breakdown Of Funding Source China: The Implications Of Deleveraging By Property Developers China: The Implications Of Deleveraging By Property Developers There are several ways for homebuilders to finance themselves. Chart 5 shows the breakdown of the source of Chinese real estate investment funding, with 15.5% of the total funding from domestic and foreign loans, 32% from a self-raising fund through issuances of bonds or equity, 33.2% from deposits and advanced payments, and 16.2% from homebuyers’ mortgages.  With limited financing from the loan and bond markets, the country’s real estate developers will have to seek more financing from deposits and advanced payments, homebuyers’ mortgages and equity issuances. Chart 6Property Developers Need To Boost Their Sales To Raise More Cash Property Developers Need To Boost Their Sales To Raise More Cash Property Developers Need To Boost Their Sales To Raise More Cash As equity issuance dilutes existing shareholders' profits and drives down share prices, developers often opt for presales to raise financing, i.e., they pre-sell more properties to increase their revenue from deposits and advanced payment, as well as mortgages (Chart 6).  Hence, in the short term, i.e., over the next six months, many property developers may need to cut home prices to boost their sales and shore up cash for their operations. For example, the country’s biggest real estate developer – Evergrande – falls short on all three metrics and lies in the red tier. The company announced in early September that it would do aggressive sales of properties by lowering the selling prices for all types of properties by 30% across the country during the period of September 7 to October 8. Indeed, the company’s sales reached a record high for this period. The aggressive sales promotion of properties will encourage demand. We expect the year-on-year growth of floor space sales to reach 4-6% over the next six months – an acceleration from 1.3% during the pre-pandemic period of 2H2019, but a moderation from the 6.4% growth in the post-pandemic months (Chart 7). Beyond the next six months, home sales may struggle to grow as the impact from price discounts diminishes and demand will face the following headwinds:  The authorities continued to show their determination to crack down on speculative housing demand. Stricter policies, including tighter restrictions on both first and second home purchases and mortgage applications, as well as raising the down payment ratio, have been implemented recently in cities experiencing a rapid rise in property prices, such as Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Tangshan, Zhengzhou and many other cities. The government also set new bank lending regulations to the real estate sector; new bank loans issued to the real estate sector, measured as a share of total new bank loans, should be kept under 30% of total banks’ loans (Chart 8). The ratio has declined to the current 25% from 30-50% in the past four years. We believe the ratio will remain below 30% over the next six to twelve months. Chart 7Chinese Property Sales, Starts And Completions Will Grow Moderately In Coming Months Chinese Property Sales, Starts And Completions Will Grow Moderately In Coming Months Chinese Property Sales, Starts And Completions Will Grow Moderately In Coming Months Chart 8Constrained Lending To Chinese Real Estate Sector From Banks Constrained Lending To Chinese Real Estate Sector From Banks Constrained Lending To Chinese Real Estate Sector From Banks Lending to the real estate sector includes housing mortgages and loans for real estate development. The capped bank loans to the property sector suggests that tighter lending standards will be applied to mortgage loans as well as property development loans. This will likely curb demand for housing. The authorities stopped the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program in 2020. The PSL was a driving force behind property demand in China during 2015-2018, but this time the government has refrained from PSL injections. The government-subsidized shantytown renovation program (e.g., adding elevators, building parking spots, painting interior and exterior walls, paving roads, etc.) will reduce demand for new properties. With improved living conditions, some households may not need to buy new properties. The government’s renovation project covers 7 million houses this year, of which 76.4% (5.4 million) were completed during the first eight months of this year. Moreover, a renovation project of a similar scale will be implemented next year.   The government’s active promotion of rental housing will also reduce the demand for new housing. Rental prices have been falling due to the pandemic, and that may delay home buyers from purchasing residential properties.    Chart 9Chinese Property Demand Faces Structural Headwinds Chinese Property Demand Faces Structural Headwinds Chinese Property Demand Faces Structural Headwinds The Chinese property market also faces strong structural headwinds. For example, property demand in China has already entered a saturation phase, and the working-age population (15-64 years of age) is shrinking (Chart 9). What about the outlook of property starts and completions? Constrained net borrowing will weigh on floor space starts and floor space completions. As such, we only expect moderate growth (i.e., smaller than 5%) in both property starts and completions over the next six months (Chart 7 on page 6). With constrained financing, homebuilders may have to allocate an increasing amount of funding to complete their unfinished projects instead of purchasing new land (Chart 3 on page 2). The pace of property completion has to catch up with both sales and starts. Property developers are currently under increased pressure to deliver units that were pre-sold about two years ago (Chart 10). Rising property sales will provide more financing for the developers to complete these projects under construction. The moderate growth in floor space starts and completions will lift construction activity slightly in the commodity buildings market (Chart 11). Chart 10Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects Chart 11Construction Activity In China: Moderate Increase Ahead Construction Activity In China: Moderate Increase Ahead Construction Activity In China: Moderate Increase Ahead That said, construction activity may relapse beyond the next six months. Both the enduring government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will lead to funding shortages for Chinese homebuilders to carry on new construction projects. Bottom Line: Floor space sales, starts and completions will expand moderately despite the mandated deleveraging of developers in the next six months.  Investment Implications First, it is reasonable to expect a moderate pickup in real estate construction activity in China over the next six months. This will be marginally positive for construction-related commodities demand.  Chart 12Commodity Prices: Hold A Neutral Stance For Now Commodity Prices: Hold A Neutral Stance For Now Commodity Prices: Hold A Neutral Stance For Now However, commodity prices have already rebounded sharply since April, and China's infrastructure-related construction activities usually peak in October. Therefore, a marginal increase in commodity demand from the real estate sector is not a catalyst for further price increases in commodities such as steel, cement, and glass. For now, we prefer to hold a neutral stance on these commodities (Chart 12).  Beyond six months, the possibility of negative growth in home sales, starts and construction is rising, raising warning signs for construction-related commodities demand. Second, property developers may cut their land purchases in order to allocate more funds to completing unfinished homes. This heralds that a drop in the local government’s revenue may lie ahead. This will have ramifications for their spending in 2H2021. Third, regarding property stocks, they have been moving sideways in absolute terms this year, having significantly underperformed the benchmark (Charts 13 and 14). This reflects their poor profit growth prospects and weak financial fundamentals. We expect the Chinese property stocks to continue to underperform their benchmark, as the aggressive selling strategy will reduce companies’ profit margins. Chart 13Chinese Property Stocks: A Tapering Wedge In Absolute Terms, And… Chinese Property Stocks: A Tapering Wedge In Absolute Terms, And... Chinese Property Stocks: A Tapering Wedge In Absolute Terms, And... Chart 14…Continuing Underperformances Relative To Their Respective Benchmarks ...Continuing Underperformances Relative To Their Respective Benchmarks ...Continuing Underperformances Relative To Their Respective Benchmarks Lastly, we recommend buying Chinese offshore real estate bonds, as moderate growth recovery in the country’s real estate sector and deleveraging will lead to a narrowing of the sector’s corporate spread. In addition, the ongoing global search for yields will intensify the demand for high-yield bonds.   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations