Emerging Markets

Highlights Both the US and Iran have the intention and capability of restoring the 2015 nuclear deal so investors should presume that an escalation in tensions will conclude with a new arrangement by August this year. However, the deal that the Iranians will offer, and that Biden can accept, may be unacceptable to the Israeli government, depending on Israel’s March 23 election. Moreover if a deal is not clinched by August, the timeframe will stretch out for most of Biden’s term and strategic tensions will escalate. Major Middle Eastern conflicts and crises tend to occur at the top of the business cycle when commodity prices are soaring rather than in the early stages where we stand today. But regional instability is possible regardless, especially if the US-Iran talks fall apart. Maintain gold and safe-haven assets as the Iranian question can lead to near-term escalation even if a deal is the end-game. Feature Geopolitics is far from investors’ concerns today, so it could create some nasty surprises. Two urgent tests await the Biden administration – China/Taiwan and Iran – and provide a basis for investors to add some safe-haven assets and hedges amidst an exuberant stock rally in which complacency is very high. The past week’s developments underscore these two tests. First, Chinese officials flagged that they would cut off rare earth elements to the US, implying that they would retaliate if Biden refuses to issue waivers for US export controls on semiconductors to China.1 Second, Biden spoke on the phone with Benjamin Netanyahu for the first time. The delay signaled Biden’s distance from Netanyahu and intention to normalize ties with Israel’s arch-enemy Iran. In both the Taiwan Strait and the Persian Gulf, the base case is not a full-fledged military conflict in the short run. This is positive for the bull market. But major incidents short of war are likely in the near term and major wars cannot be ruled out. In this report we update our view of the Iran risk. A long-term solution to the nuclear threat is not at hand, which means that Israel could in the worst-case take military action on its own. Meanwhile tensions and attacks will escalate until a deal is agreed. Iranian-backed forces in Iraq have already attacked a US base near Erbil, killing an American military contractor.2 In the event of an Iranian diplomatic crisis, the stock market selloff will be short. The macro backdrop is highly reflationary and investors will buy on the dips. In the event of full-scale war, the US dollar will suffer for a longer period. Oil Price A Boon But Middle East Regimes Still Vulnerable Chart 1Oil Recovery A Boon For Middle East Markets Oil Recovery A Boon For Middle East Markets Oil Recovery A Boon For Middle East Markets Brent crude oil prices have rebounded to $65 per barrel on the global economic recovery. Middle Eastern equities are rallying in absolute terms, though not relative to other emerging markets (Chart 1). This underperformance is fitting given that the region suffers from poor governance, obstacles to doing business, resource dependency, insufficient technology and capital, and high levels of political and geopolitical risk. Non-oil producers and non-oil sectors in the Middle East have generally lagged the global economic recovery (Chart 2). The continuation of the recovery is essential to these regimes because most of them lack the fiscal room to provide large fiscal relief packages. The global average in fiscal support over the past year has been 7.4% but most Middle Eastern governments have provided 2% or less (Chart 3). Current account deficits have plagued oil producers since the commodity bust of 2014 and twin deficits have become a feature of the region, limiting the fiscal response to the global pandemic. Chart 2Middle East Economy Starts To Recover Middle East Economy Starts To Recover Middle East Economy Starts To Recover Chart 3Middle Eastern Regimes Fiscally Constrained Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets The good news is that the recovery is likely to continue on the back of vaccines and fiscal pump-priming in all of the major economies. The bad news is that a black cloud hangs over the Middle East in the form of geopolitics. Given the underperformance of regional equities, global investors are not ignoring these risks – but they are a persistent factor until the Biden administration survives its initial tests in the region to create a new equilibrium. The unfinished geopolitical business in the region centers on the role of the US and the question of Iran. It is widely understood that the US has less and less interest in the region due to its newfound energy independence on the back of the shale revolution (Chart 4). This is why the US can afford to sign and break deals as it pleases under different administrations, namely the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). The Obama administration spent two terms concluding the deal while the Trump administration spent one term nullifying it, leaving the central geopolitical question of the region in limbo. Israel and Arab governments feel increasingly insecure in light of the US’s apparent lack of foreign policy coherence and declining interest in the region. The US has not truly abandoned the region – if anything the Biden administration is looking to maintain or increase US international involvement.3 Washington still sees the need to preserve a strategic balance between Iran and the Arab states, prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, and maintain security in the critical oil chokepoint of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz (Chart 5). But Washington’s appetite for commitment and sacrifice is obviously waning. The American public is openly hostile to the idea of Middle Eastern entanglements, and three presidents in a row have been elected on the assurance that they would scale down America’s “forever wars.” A decisive majority of Americans, including military veterans and Republicans, believe the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not worth fighting.4 And only 6% of Americans view Iran as the top threat to their country. Chart 4Waning US Interest In Middle East Waning US Interest In Middle East Waning US Interest In Middle East Chart 5Strait Of Hormuz Critical To Global Stability Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets America’s lack of concern about the Iranian threat marks a difference from the early 2000s and especially from its critical Middle Eastern ally Israel. Naturally Israelis have a much greater fear of Iran, and 58% see it as the nation’s top threat (Chart 6). Israel and the Gulf Arab states are drawing together, under the framework of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, in case the US abandons the region. A deal normalizing relations with Iran would enable Iran to expand its power and influence and, if unchecked by the US, would pose a long-lasting threat to US allies. Chart 6No US Appetite For War With Iran – Israel A Different Story Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets Chart 7China/Asia, Not Iran, The Strategic Priority For The US China/Asia, Not Iran, The Strategic Priority For The US China/Asia, Not Iran, The Strategic Priority For The US The US’s reason for dealing with Iran is that it needs to devote more attention to its strategy in the western Pacific in countering China (Chart 7). But China is also a reason for the US to stay involved in the Middle East. China’s role is expanding because of resource dependency and the desire to expand economic integration. Beijing wants to deepen its global investments, open up new markets, and create closer links with Europe (Chart 8). Chart 8AChina's Expanding Role In Middle East China's Expanding Role In Middle East China's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 8BChina's Expanding Role In Middle East China's Expanding Role In Middle East China's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 9Unresolved US-Iran Deal A Geopolitical Risk Unresolved US-Iran Deal A Geopolitical Risk Unresolved US-Iran Deal A Geopolitical Risk The opening of the Iranian economy would give the US (and EU) a greater role in Iran’s development, where China has a special advantage as long as Iran is a pariah. The US would add economic leverage to its military leverage in a region that provides China with its energy. The Chinese are not yet as capable of projecting power into the region but that is changing rapidly. There is a possible strategic balance to be established between these simultaneous foreign policy revolutions: the US-Iran détente, the Israeli-Arab détente, and the rise of Mideast-China ties. But balance is an ideal and not yet a reality. In the meantime these foreign policy revolutions must actually take place – and revolutions are rarely bloodless. It is possible for a meltdown to occur in light of the region’s profound changes. In particular, the US-Iran détente is incomplete and faces Israeli/Arab opposition, Iranian paranoia, and US foreign policy incoherence. At the moment it is premature to declare an end to the bull market in US-Iran tensions. That will come when a deal is actually sealed, and then tested and enforced. In the meantime Iranian incidents will occur (Chart 9). Geopolitical risks threaten to reduce global oil supply. Different regimes and their militant proxies will strike out against each other to establish red lines. But a US-Iran deal is highly likely – and once that occurs, the risk to oil supply shifts to the upside, as Iran’s economy will open up. Not only will Iran start exporting again but Gulf Arab producers will want to preserve their market share, which means they will pump more oil. Iran’s Regime Hardens Its Shell Ahead Of Leadership Succession The COVID-19 crisis has weakened regimes in the Middle East, much like the Great Recession sowed the seeds for the Arab Spring and many other sweeping changes in the region. But unlike the Arab Spring, the regimes most at risk today are majority Shia Muslim – with Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq all teetering on the verge of chaos (Chart 10). Chart 10Iranian Sphere De-Stabilized Amid COVID Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets Chart 11Iranian Economy Weak (Despite Green Shoots) Iranian Economy Weak (Despite Green Shoots) Iranian Economy Weak (Despite Green Shoots) Chart 12Jobless Iranian Youth Jobless Iranian Youth Jobless Iranian Youth The Iranian economy is starting to show the faintest green shoots but it is far too soon to give the all-clear signal. US sanctions have shut off access to oil export revenues. Domestic demand is weak and imports are still contracting, albeit much less rapidly. The country has seen a double dip recession over the past ten years (Chart 11). Unemployment is rife, especially among the youth. The working-age population makes up 60% of total and periodically rises up in protest (Chart 12). Inflation is soaring and the currency is still wallowing in deep depreciation (Chart 13). All of these points suggest Iran is weaker than it looks and will seek to negotiate a deal with the Biden administration. But Iran cannot trust the US so it will simultaneously prepare for the worst outcome – no deal, sanctions, and eventually war. Chart 13Iran Still Ripe For Social Unrest Iran Still Ripe For Social Unrest Iran Still Ripe For Social Unrest Chart 14Iranian Regime Turning Hawkish Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets Iran’s response to the US’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and imposition of maximum pressure sanctions has been to adopt a siege mentality and fortify the regime for a potential military confrontation. The country is preparing for a highly uncertain and vulnerable transition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to a future leader or group of leaders. The government fixed the 2020 parliamentary elections so that hardliners or “principlists” rose to prominence at the expense of independents and especially the so-called reformists. The reformists have been humiliated by the US betrayal of the deal and re-imposition of sanctions, which exploded the economic reforms of President Hassan Rouhani, who will step down in August (Chart 14). The Timeline Of Biden’s Iran Deal Still, it is likely that the US and Iran will return to some form of the 2015 nuclear deal. Lame duck Rouhani is politically capable of returning to the deal: President Rouhani is a lame duck president whose popularity has cratered. If he can restore the deal before August then he can salvage his legacy and provide a pathway for Iran out of economic ruin by removing sanctions. It is manifestly in Iran’s interests to restore the deal – one reason why it has never left the deal and has only made incremental and reversible infractions against it. If Rouhani falls on his sword he provides the Supreme Leader and the next administration with a convenient scapegoat to enable the deal to be restored. Freshman President Biden has enough political capital to return to the deal: Biden is capable of restoring the deal, as he clearly intends to do judging by his statements, cabinet appointments, and diplomatic actions thus far. He has demanded that Iran enter back into full compliance with the deal before he eases sanctions but even this demand can be fudged. After all, it was the US that exited the deal in the first place, and Iran remains in partial compliance, so it stands to reason that the US should make the first concession to bring Iran back into compliance. None of the signatories have nullified the deal other than the US, and it was an executive (not legislative) deal, so President Biden can ultimately rejoin it by fiat. This would not be a popular move at home but the US public is preoccupied. Biden would achieve a foreign policy objective early in his term. The timeline is critical – an early deal is our base case. But if it falls through, then it could take the rest of Biden’s term in office, or longer, to forge a deal. Tensions would skyrocket over that period. The timeline is shown in Table 1. The US has identified April or May as the time when Iran will reach “breakout” capability, i.e. produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. The Israelis, for their part, estimate that breakout phase will be reached in August – the same month Rouhani is set to step down. Both the US and Israel view breakout as a red line, though there is some room for interpretation. Table 1Can Lame Duck Rouhani Salvage US Deal For Legacy By August? Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets The option of rejoining the old deal with Rouhani as a scapegoat will end when Rouhani exits in August. The next Iranian president is unlikely to repeat Rouhani’s mistake of pinning his administration on a promise from the Americans that could be revoked as early as January 20, 2025. The next Iranian president will be a nationalist or hardliner. Opinion shows that the public looks most favorably upon the firebrand ex-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the hardline candidate from 2017 Ebrahim Raisi. Another possible candidate is Hossein Dehghan, a brigadier general. The least favorable political figures are the reformists like Rouhani (Chart 15). Chart 15Iran’s Next President Will Be Hawkish Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets We cannot vouch for the quality of these opinion polls but they are corroborated by other polls we have seen and they make sense with what we know and have observed in recent years. Apparently the public has turned its back on the dream of greater economic opening, with self-sufficiency making a comeback in the face of US sanctions (Chart 16). The regime will promote this attitude in advance of the leadership transition as it must be prepared to conduct a smooth succession even under the worst-case scenario of sanctions or war. Chart 16Iran Preparing For Supreme Leader’s Succession Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets Chart 17Nuclear Bomb Key To Regime Survival Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets The hitch is that Iran is interested in rejoining the deal it signed in 2015, not a grander deal. It will not sign an expanded deal that covers its regional militant proxies and ballistic missile program or requires irreversible denuclearization. The Supreme Leader has witnessed that an active nuclear weapon program and ballistic missile program provide the surest guarantees of regime survival over the long haul. The contrasting cases of Libya and North Korea illustrate the point (Chart 17). Libya gave up its nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 only to see the regime collapse in 2011 and leader Muammar Gaddafi die under NATO military pressure. By contrast, North Korea refused to give up its nuclear and missile programs and repeatedly cut deals with the US that served only to buy time and ease sanctions, and today North Korea possesses an estimated 30-45 nuclear weapons deliverable through multiple platforms. Leader Kim Jong Un has used this leverage to bargain with the great powers. The lesson for Iran could not be clearer: a short-term deal with the Americans may buy time and a reprieve from sanctions. But total, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization means regime suicide. The Biden administration would prefer to create a much more robust deal rather than suffer the criticism of rejoining the 2015 deal, given its flaws and that the first set of deadlines in 2025 is only four years away. But Biden cannot possibly reconstruct the P5+1 coalition of countries to force Iran into a grander bargain in the context of US-Russia and US-China tensions. The sacrifices that would be necessary to bring Russia and China on board would not be worth it. Therefore Biden’s solution will be to rejoin the existing deal plus an Iranian promise to enter negotiations on a more comprehensive deal in future. The Iranians can accept this option since it serves their purpose of buying time without making irreversible concessions on their nuclear and missile programs. Israel then becomes the sticking point, as Iranian officials have said that the US rejoining the original 2015 deal would be a “calamity” and unacceptable. The Israeli government is studying options for military action in the event that Iran reaches nuclear breakout. However, the Israeli election on March 23 will determine the fate of Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s hawkish approach to Iran. A change of government in Israel would likely bring the US and Israel into line on concluding a deal with Iran so as to avoid military conflict for the time being. If Netanyahu wins, yet the US and Iran fall back into compliance with the 2015 deal (Table 2), then Iran is still limiting its nuclear capabilities through 2025, obviating the need for a unilateral Israeli strike in the near term. Israel will not launch a unilateral strike except as a last resort, as it fears permanent alienation from its greatest security guarantor, the United States. Table 2Iran’s Compliance (And Non-Compliance) With The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets If a deal cannot be put together by the time Rouhani steps down then the risk of conflict will increase as there will not be a prospect of a short-term fix. A much longer diplomatic arc will be required as Iran would draw out negotiations and the US would have to court allies to pressure Iran. The US and/or Israel could conduct sabotage or air strikes to set back the Iranian nuclear program. It is possible that the Iranian leadership or the increasingly powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps could overplay their hand in the belief that the US has no stomach for waging war. While it is true that the US public is war-weary, it is also true that that attitude would change overnight in the event of a national humiliation or attack. Investment Takeaways The Trump administration drew a hard line on nuclear proliferation. Trump’s defeat marks a softening in the US line regarding proliferation. This does not mean that the Biden administration will be ineffective – it could be even more effective with a more flexible approach – but it does mean that nuclear aspirants currently feel less pressure to make major concessions. This will hold at least until Biden demonstrates that he too can impose maximum pressure. Hence nuclear and missile tests will go up in the near term – as will various countries’ demonstrations of credible threats and red lines. The global economic recovery will strengthen oil producers by giving them greater government revenues with which to stabilize their domestic politics and restart foreign policy initiatives. The global oil price is reasonably correlated with international conflicts involving oil producers (Chart 18). With rising oil revenues, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and others will be emboldened to pursue their national interests. Chart 18Oil Price And Global Conflict Go Hand In Hand Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets While the Biden administration’s end-game is a nuclear deal with Iran, the period between now and the conclusion of a deal will see an increase rather than a decrease in tensions and tit-for-tat military strikes across the region. Unexpected cutoffs of oil supplies and a risk premium in the oil price will be injected first, as we have argued. When a deal is visible on the horizon then oil prices face a downside risk, due to the resumption of Iranian oil exports and any loss of OPEC 2.0 discipline. It is possible that this moment is already upon us. This report shows a clear path to a US-Iran deal by August. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is reaching out to the Iranians. Saudi Arabia has recently announced that it will not continue with large production cuts. Russian oil officials have argued that the global market is balanced and production cuts are no longer necessary.5 But given that the Russians and Saudis fought an oil market share war as recently as last year, it is not clear that a collapse in OPEC 2.0 discipline is imminent. What will be the market impact if hostilities revive in anticipation of a deal? Or worse, if a deal cannot be achieved and a much longer period of US-Iran conflict opens up for Biden’s term in office? Table 3 provides a list of major geopolitical incidents and crises in the Middle East since the Yom Kippur war. We look at the S&P500’s peak and trough within the three months before and after each crisis. The median drawdown is 8% and the market has usually recovered within one month. Twelve months later the S&P is up by 12%. Table 3Stock Market Reaction To Middle East Geopolitical Crises Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets Table 4 shows a shortened list of the same incidents with the impact on the trade-weighted dollar, which is notable in the short run but is only persistent in the long run in the case of full-fledged wars like the first and second Persian Gulf wars. Table 4US Dollar Falls On Middle East Geopolitical Crises Biden, Iran, Markets Biden, Iran, Markets The stock market impact can last for a year if the crisis coincides with a bear market and recession. Middle Eastern crises tend to occur at the height of business cycles when economic activity is running hot, inflationary pressures are high, and governments feel confident enough in their economic foundation to take foreign policy risks. The Yom Kippur war and first oil shock initiated a recession in 1973. The first Iraq war also coincided with the onset of a recession. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole occurred near the height of the Dotcom bubble and was followed by the 2001 recession. The 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq refinery also occurred at the peak of the cycle. More analogous to the situation today are crises that occurred in the early stages of the global cycle. The Arab Spring and related events in 2011 coincided with a period of market weakness that lasted for most of the year as the aftershocks of the Great Recession rippled across the emerging world. This scenario is relevant in 2021 and especially 2022, as global stimulus wears off and governments strive to navigate the deceleration in growth. Middle Eastern instability could compound that problem. The chief risk in the coming years would be a failure to resolve the Iranian question followed by a US-Iran or Israel-Iran conflict that generates instability across the Middle East. Such a catastrophe could cause major energy supply shock that would short-circuit the global economy. History shows this risk is more likely to come late in the cycle rather than early but the above analysis indicates that a failure of the Biden administration to conclude a deal this year could lead to a multi-year escalation in strategic tensions with a new hawkish Iranian president. That path, in turn, could bring forward the time frame of a major war and supply shock. The Iranians have taken a hawkish turn, are fortifying their regime for the future, and will reject total denuclearization. The US is fundamentally less interested in the region and thus susceptible to continued foreign policy incoherence. The Israelis are just capable of taking military action on their own in the event of impending Iranian nuclear weaponization. These points suggest that the risk of war with Iran is non-trivial, even though a US-Iran deal is the base case.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Sun Yu and Demetri Sevastopulo, "China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defence industry," Financial Times, February 15, 2021, ft.com. 2 For the US response to the Erbil attack see Jim Garamone, "Austin Pleased With Discussions With NATO Leaders," Department of Defense News, February 17, 2021, defense.gov. 3 For example, Biden is unlikely to withdraw precipitously from the region, including Afghanistan, as Trump intended, especially as long as he is in a high-stakes negotiation with Iran. 4 Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, "Majorities of U.S. veterans, public say the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth fighting," Pew Research, July 10, 2019, pewresearch.org. 5 See Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, "Saudi Arabia Set to Raise Oil Output Amid Recovery in Prices," Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2021, wsj.com; Yuliya Fedorinova and Olga Tanas, "Global Oil Markets Are Now Balanced, Russia’s Novak Says," Bloomberg, February 14, 2021, Bloomberg.com.

Global equity valuations are at a level where they are very sensitive to changes in the discount rate. Chart 1 shows that the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield on the S&P 500 is slightly below its 2000 low. Equity investors have thus far taken comfort from the fact that US bond yields have been depressed, and taking into consideration low bond yields the US equity market is not as bubbly as it was in the 2000s. Chart 1Rising US Bond Yields Threatens US Equity Valuations Rising US Bond Yields Threatens US Equity Valuations Rising US Bond Yields Threatens US Equity Valuations However, the fact that the US equity market’s valuations after accounting for the level of interest rates are not as expensive as they were in 2000 does not mean share prices cannot experience a meaningful shakeout. Notably, there is a lot of speculation and euphoria among investors, reminiscent of the late 1990s (please refer to Charts 24-26 below). Critically, when equity multiples are very elevated and bond yields are extremely low, the sensitivity of multiples to interest rates is most pronounced. Hence, rising US Treasury yields could result in a setback in share prices. All in all, our themes for now are as follows: Chart 2A Full-Fledged Mania In Asian TMT Stocks A Full-Fledged Mania In Asian TMT Stocks A Full-Fledged Mania In Asian TMT Stocks Enormous US fiscal and monetary stimulus, strong economic growth and supply bottlenecks will push up the US core inflation rate. As a result, the ongoing sell-off in long-term US bond yields will continue. EM and DM credit spreads are currently very tight and credit spreads might not be able to compress further to offset the rise in US Treasury yields. Hence, rising US Treasury yields will trigger higher corporate and EM sovereign bond yields. In brief, rising EM bond yields is the key risk to EM share prices. Charts 5 and 6 below illustrate these points. Given that the US trade-weighted dollar is extremely oversold, rising US Treasury yields will likely trigger a countertrend rally in the greenback. This will cause a shakeout in EM currencies, fixed-income markets and commodities prices. Historically, the greenback has not had a stable relationship with US Treasury yields – they were both positively and negatively correlated in different periods. In such an environment, DM growth stocks will underperform DM value stocks. We have less conviction in growth/value performance in the EM space. The reason lies in the speculative frenzy taking place in Chinese new economy stocks trading in Hong Kong as well as tech share prices in Korea and Taiwan. As Chart 2 reveals, the Hang Seng Tech index and EM TMT stocks have been rising exponentially. Visibility is very low. The timing of a reversal of this equity euphoria is impossible to predict. Outside these TMT stocks, the relative performance of EM equities has been rather underwhelming, as is illustrated in Charts 71-73. Notably, the economic recovery in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has been much weaker than those in DM and North Asian economies (please refer to Charts 63 and 66). This will continue as many of these nations are lagging in vaccine rollouts and their fiscal and monetary support has been much smaller. In addition, peak stimulus in China means that the mainland’s construction and infrastructure investment will slow meaningfully in H2 2021. This is another risk to EM economies supplying to China. Weighing pros and cons, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to EM in a global equity portfolio. The same is true for EM credit (sovereign and corporate) within a global credit portfolio. For local bonds, inflation in EM – including China – is still very low and will likely stay depressed. As a result, we continue recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, Malaysia, India and China. Investors should use a rebound in the US dollar  to transition from receiving rates to being long on cash bonds. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Yellow Flags For Share Prices Rising US corporate bond yields pose a risk to the equity rally. Interestingly, New Zealand’s stock market has begun correcting. Often but not always, this development heralds a pullback in EM share prices (albeit for unknown reasons). Chart 3Yellow Flags For Share Prices Yellow Flags For Share Prices Yellow Flags For Share Prices Chart 4Yellow Flags For Share Prices Yellow Flags For Share Prices Yellow Flags For Share Prices Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Historically, rising EM corporate USD bond yields led to a selloff in EM share prices. If rising US Treasury yields begin pushing up EM sovereign and corporate bonds yields, which is quite likely, the EM equity rally will be jeopardized. Chart 5Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Chart 6Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields Beware Of Potential Rise In EM Sovereign And Corporate USD Bond Yields EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery So far, the EM equity index has snubbed the rollover in China’s credit impulse and plummeting gold prices in non-US dollar currencies. The ongoing EM corporate earnings recovery has justified the rally in of share prices. However, much  of the good news has already been priced in. Chart 7EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery Chart 8EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery Chart 9EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery EM Equities Are Ignoring Many Warning Signs Due To Profit Recovery   Investors Are Super Bullish European investors are very bullish on EM equities and European growth. From a contrarian perspective, this does not always herald a bear market but suggests that odds of a meaningful shakeout are non-trivial. Chart 10Investors Are Super Bullish Investors Are Super Bullish Investors Are Super Bullish Chart 11Investors Are Super Bullish Investors Are Super Bullish Investors Are Super Bullish Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Our proxy for global growth expectations as well as EM net EPS revisions are elevated. Similarly, analysts’ EM 12-month forward EPS growth differential vs. US are the widest since 2001. Chart 12Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Chart 13Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High Investor Growth Expectations Are Super High US Inflation And Rates US core goods inflation has been rising due to strong US household demand and supply bottlenecks. When the economy fully reopens, US core service inflation will rise as pent-up demand for services is unleashed. This will push up US bond yields regardless of the Fed’s rhetoric. Chart 14US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates Chart 15US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates   Chart 16US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates US Inflation And Rates Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space A rise in US TIPS and nominal yields will likely send shockwaves through EM risk assets and commodities that have greatly benefited from the plunge in TIPS yields. Watch out for cracks in the EM high-yield bond space. Chart 17Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Chart 18Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Chart 19Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Chart 20Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space Look Out For Cracks In EM High-Yield Bond Space   EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought Although cyclically and for some countries structurally speaking EM currencies have more upside and their appreciation path will not be without major setbacks. In fact, several key currencies like MXN and ZAR are facing an important technical resistance. Investors should not chase them higher but accumulate them on a relapse. Chart 21EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought Chart 23EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought Chart 22EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought EM Currencies Are Not Yet Expensive But Are Overbought   Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Certain measures of stock market activity – like the call-put ratio, trading volumes and margin loans –  reveal engulfing speculative behavior not only in the US but also in other markets like Korea. Chart 24Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Chart 25Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Chart 26Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild Equity Market Euphoria Is Running Wild   A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision The IPO boom is not as expansive as it was at its 2000 and 2007 peaks and there is some US dollar cash left to be put to work. Visibility is very low. Chart 27A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision Chart 28A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision Chart 29A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision A Mania Can Run Further And Longer Than Rational Analysis Can Envision   Steep Equity Volatility Curves A steep equity volatility curve heralds a correction. Chart 30Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Chart 31Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Chart 32Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Chart 33Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves Steep Equity Volatility Curves   Volatilities Across FX, Bonds And Commodities Oil volatility has been and remains in a bull market – making higher lows. Currency volatility remains elevated while US bond volatility is still very low and is bound to rise. Chart 34Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Chart 35Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Chart 36Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Chart 37Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities   Chart 38Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Chart 39Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities Volatilities Across FX, Bonds and Commodities   Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Global cyclical stocks’ relative performance versus defensive stocks might be due for a pause. Growth will underperform value in DM due to rising bond yields. We are less convinced about the growth/value performance in the EM equity space due to the mania occurring in EM TMT stocks. Chart 40Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Chart 41Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Chart 42Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Chart 43Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance Cyclicals Vs. Defensives And Growth Vs. Value Performance   Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Many global equity indexes excluding US or TMT have either not broken out or have done so only marginally. Chart 44Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Chart 45Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Chart 46Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Chart 47Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes Profiles Of Various Global Equity Indexes   EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive Excluding TMT stocks, EM equity indexes have not broken above their previous highs. It has been a mania in TMT stocks that has boosted the EM overall equity index. Chart 48EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive Chart 49EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive Chart 50EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive Chart 51EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Unimpressive   A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks Chinese offshore stocks ex-TMT and onshore equal-weighted and small caps have done rather poorly. The latest euphoria in Hong Kong-listed Chinese stocks has been due to an increased quota for mainland investors to buy offshore stocks. This has led to massive southbound outflows and has propelled Chinese stock trading in Hong Kong. Chart 52A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks Chart 53A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks   Chart 54A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks A Mania In Chinese Stocks, Especially In TMT Stocks The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 Rollover in credit and fiscal stimulus in Q4 2020 entails weak growth in H2 2021 in segments leveraged to stimulus. Chart 55The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 Chart 56The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021   Chart 57The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 Chart 58The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021 The Chinese Economy: Peak Stimulus = Weak Growth In H2 2021   Commodity Prices The end of commodities restocking in China, weaker demand from mainland construction in H2 and elevated investor net long positions in commodities constitute the basis for a setback in commodities prices this year. Nevertheless, such a pullback will occur only if the USD rebounds and global equity prices sell off. Chart 59Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart 60Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart 61Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart 62Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices   The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The economic recovery in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has been much weaker than those in DM and North Asian economies. Chart 63The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued Chart 64The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued Chart 65The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued Chart 66The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Has Been Very Subdued   The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag EM ex-North Asia’s economic underperformance will continue as many of these nations are lagging in vaccine rollouts and their fiscal and monetary support has been much smaller. Besides, their banks are reluctant to lend due to high NPLs. Chart 67The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag Chart 68The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag Chart 69The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag Chart 70The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag The Recovery In EM ex-North Asia Will Continue To Lag   EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming A slow recovery in EM ex-TMT industries explains why EM equity performance outside TMT stocks has been underwhelming. Chart 71EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming Chart 72EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming Chart 73EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming EM ex-TMT Equity Performance Has Been Underwhelming   Footnotes

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (today at 10:00 AM EST, 3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist