Emerging Markets

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary China’s Property Bust To Dwarf Japan’s China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China’s confluence of internal and external risks will continue to weigh on markets in 2022. Internally China’s property sector turmoil is one important indication of a challenging economic transition. The Xi administration will clinch another term but sociopolitical risks are underrated. Externally China faces economic and strategic pressure from the US and its allies. The US is distracted with other issues in 2022 but US-China confrontation will revive beyond that. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran, though it will not encourage belligerence. It needs their help to execute its Eurasian strategy to bypass US naval dominance and improve its supply security over the long run. China will ease monetary and fiscal policies in 2022 but it has no interest in a massive stimulus. Policy easing will be frontloaded in the first half of the year. Featured Trade: Strategically stay short the renminbi versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and the euro. Stay short TWD-USD as well. Recommendation INCEPTION Date Return SHORT TWD / USD 2020-06-11 0.5% SHORT CNY / EQUAL-WEIGHTED BASKET OF EURO AND USD 2021-06-21 -3.9% Bottom Line: Beijing is easing policy to secure the post-pandemic recovery, which is positive for global growth and cyclical financial assets. But structural headwinds will still weigh on Chinese assets in 2022. China’s Historic Confluence Of Risks Global investors continue to clash over China’s outlook. Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, recently praised China’s “Common Prosperity” plan and argued that the US and “a lot of other countries” need to launch similar campaigns of wealth redistribution. He warned about the US’s 2024 elections and dismissed accusations of human rights abuses by saying that China’s government is a “strict parent.”1 By contrast George Soros, founder of the Open Society Foundations, recently warned against investing in China’s autocratic government and troubled property market. He predicted that General Secretary Xi Jinping would fail to secure another ten years in power in the Communist Party’s upcoming political reshuffle.2 Geopolitics can bring perspective to the debate: China is experiencing a historic confluence of internal (political) and external (geopolitical) risk, unlike anything since its reform era began in 1979. At home it is struggling with the Covid-19 pandemic and a difficult economic transition that began with the Great Recession of 2008-09. Abroad it faces rising supply insecurity and an increase in strategic pressure from the United States and its allies. The implication is that the 2020s will be an even rockier decade than the 2010s. In the face of these risks the Chinese Communist Party is using the power of the state to increase support for the economy and then repress any other sources of instability. Strict “zero Covid” policies will be maintained for political reasons as much as public health reasons. Arbitrary punitive measures will put pressure on the business elite and foreigners. The geopolitical outlook is negative over the long run but it will not worsen dramatically in 2022 given America’s preoccupation with Russia, Iran, and midterm elections. Bottom Line: Global investor sentiment toward China will remain pessimistic for most of the year – but it will turn more optimistic toward foreign markets, especially emerging markets, that sell into China. China’s Internal Risks Chart 1China's Demographic Cliff China's Demographic Cliff China's Demographic Cliff By the end of 2021, China accounted for 17.7% of global economic output and 12.1% of global imports. However, the secular slowdown in economic growth threatens to generate opposition to the single-party regime, forcing the Communist Party to seek a new base of political legitimacy. Most countries saw a drop in fertility rates in the third quarter of the twentieth century but China’s “one child policy” created a demographic cliff (Chart 1). At first this generated savings needed for national development. But now it leaves China with excess capacity and insufficient household demand. Across the region, falling fertility rates have led to falling potential growth and falling rates of inflation. Excess savings increased production relative to consumption and drove down the rate of interest. The shift toward debt monetization in the US and Japan, in the post-pandemic context, is now threatening this trend with a spike in inflation. China is also monetizing debt after a decade of deflationary fears. But it remains to be seen whether inflation is sustainable when fertility remains below the replacement rate over the long run, as is projected for China as well as its neighbors (Chart 2). China’s domestic situation is fundamentally deflationary as a result of chronic over-investment over the past 40 years. China’s gross fixed capital formation stands at 43% of GDP, well above the historic trend of other major countries for the past 30 years (Chart 3). Chart 2Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? ​​​​​​ Chart 3Over-Investment Is Deflationary, Not Inflationary China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Like other countries, China financed this buildup of fixed capital by means of debt, especially state-owned corporate debt. While building a vast infrastructure network and property sector, it also built a vast speculative bubble as investors lacked investment options outside of real estate. The growth in property prices has tracked the growth in private non-financial sector debt. The downside is that if property prices fall, debt holders will begin a long and painful process of deleveraging, just like Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. Japan only managed to reverse the drop in corporate investment in the 2010s via debt monetization (Chart 4). Chart 4Japan’s Property Bust Coincided With Debt Deleveraging China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 5China's Debt Growth Halts China's Debt Growth Halts China's Debt Growth Halts Looking at the different measures of Chinese debt, it is likely that deleveraging has begun. Total debt, public and private, peaked and rolled over in 2020 at 290% of GDP. Corporate debt has peaked twice, in 2015 and again in 2020 at around 160% of GDP. Even households are taking on less debt, having gone on a binge over the past decade (Chart 5). In short China is following the Japanese and East Asian growth model: the stark drop in fertility and rise in savings created a huge manufacturing workshop and a highly valued property sector, albeit at the cost of enormous private and considerable public debt. If the private sector’s psychology continues to shift in favor of deleveraging, then the government will be forced to take on greater expenses and fund them through public borrowing to sustain aggregate demand, maximum employment, and social stability. The central bank will be forced to keep rates low to prevent interest rates from rising and stunting growth. China’s policymakers are stuck between a rock and a hard place. New regulations aimed at controlling the property bubble (the “three red lines”) precipitated distress across the sector, emblematized by the failure of the world’s most indebted property developer, Evergrande. Other property developers are looking to raise cash and stay solvent. Property prices peaked in 2015-16 and are now dropping, with third-tier cities on the verge of deflation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction As the property bubble tops out, Chinese policymakers are looking for new sources of productivity and growth. Chart 7Productivity In Decline China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Productivity growth is subsiding after the export and property boom earlier in the decade, in keeping with that of other Asian economies. And sporadic initiatives to improve governance, market pricing, science, and technology have not succeeded in lifting total factor productivity (Chart 7). The initial goal of the Xi administration’s reforms, to rebalance the economy away from manufacturing toward services, has stumbled and will continue to face headwinds from the financial and real estate sectors that powered much of the recent growth in services (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Structural Transition Falters China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Indeed the Communist Party is rediscovering the value of export-manufacturing in the wake of the pandemic, which led to a surge in durable goods orders as global consumers cut back on services and businesses initiated a new cycle of capital expenditures (Chart 9). The party encouraged the workforce to shift out of manufacturing over the past decade but is now rethinking that strategy in the face of the politically disruptive consequences of deindustrialization in the US and UK – such that the state can be expected to recommit to supporting manufacturing going forward (Chart 10). Policymakers are emphasizing economic self-sufficiency and “dual circulation” (import substitution) as solutions to the latent socioeconomic and political threat posed by disillusioned former manufacturing workers. Chart 9China Turns Back To Exports China Turns Back To Exports China Turns Back To Exports ​​​​​​ Chart 10De-Industrialization Will Be Halted De-Industrialization Will Be Halted De-Industrialization Will Be Halted Even beyond ex-manufacturing workers, the country’s economic transition risks generating social instability. The middle class, defined as those who consume from $10 to $50 per day in purchasing power parity terms, now stands at 55% of total population, comparable to where it stood when populist and anti-populist political transformations occurred in Turkey, Thailand, and Brazil (Chart 11). China’s middle class may not be willing or able to intervene into the political process, but the government is still concerned about the long-term potential for discontent. Otherwise it would not have launched anti-corruption, anti-pollution, and anti-industrial measures in recent years. These measures vary in effectiveness but they all share the intention to boost the government’s legitimacy through social improvements and thus fall in line with the new mantra of “common prosperity.” For decades the ruling party claimed that the “principle contradiction” in society arose from a failure to meet the people’s “material needs,” but beginning in 2021 it emphasized that the principle contradiction is the people’s need for a “better life.” Real wages continue to grow but the pace of growth has downshifted from previous decades. The bigger problem is the stark rise in inequality, here proxied by skyrocketing housing prices. Hong Kong’s inequality erupted into social unrest in recent years even though it has a much higher level of GDP per capita than mainland China (Chart 12). In major cities on the mainland, housing prices have outpaced disposable income over the past two decades. Youth unemployment also concerns the authorities. Chart 11Social Instability A Genuine Risk China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Bottom Line: The Chinese regime faces historic social and political challenges as a result of a difficult structural economic transition. The ongoing emphasis on “common prosperity” reveals the regime’s fear of social instability. The underlying tendency is deflationary, though Beijing’s use of debt monetization introduces a long-term inflationary risk that should be monitored. Chart 12Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China ​​​​​​ China’s External Risks Geopolitically speaking, China’s greatest challenge throughout history has been maintaining domestic stability. Because China is hemmed in by islands that superior foreign powers have often used as naval bases, it is isolated as if it is a landlocked state. A stark north-south division within its internal geography and society creates inherent political tension, while buffer regions are difficult to control. Hence foreign powers can meddle with internal affairs, undermine unity and territorial integrity, and exploit China’s large labor force and market. However, in the twenty-first century China has the potential to project power outward – as long as it can maintain internal stability. Power projection is increasingly necessary because China’s economy increasingly depends on imports of energy, leaving it vulnerable to western maritime powers (Chart 13). Beijing’s conversion of economic into military might has also created frictions with neighbors and aroused the antagonism of the United States, which increasingly seeks to maintain the strategic anchor in the western Pacific that it won in World War II. Chart 13Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat As China’s influence expands into East Asia and the rest of Asia, conflicts with the US and its allies are increasingly likely, especially over critical sea lines of communication, including the Taiwan Strait. China’s reinforcement of its manufacturing prowess will also provoke the United States, while the US’s erratic attempts to retain its strategic position in Asia Pacific will threaten to contain China. Yet the US cannot concentrate exclusively on countering China – it is distracted by internal politics and confrontations with Russia and Iran, especially in 2022. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran. As an energy importer, China would prefer that neither Russia nor Iran take belligerent actions that cause a global energy shock. But both Moscow and Tehran are essential to China’s Eurasian strategy of bypassing American naval dominance to reduce its supply insecurity. And yet, in 2022 specifically, the US and China are both concerned about maintaining positive domestic political dynamics due to the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. This includes a desire to reduce inflation. Hence both would prefer diplomacy over trade war, with regard to each other, and over real war, with regard to Ukraine and Iran. So there is a temporary overlap in interests that will discourage immediate confrontation. China might offer limited cooperation on Iranian or North Korean nuclear and missile talks. But the same domestic political dynamics prevent a significant improvement in US-China relations, as neither side will grant trade concessions in 2022, and the underlying strategic tensions will revive over the medium and long run. Bottom Line: China faces historic external risks stemming from import dependency and conflict with the United States. In the short run, the US conflicts with Russia and Iran might lead to energy shocks that harm China’s economy. Japan never recovered its rapid growth rates after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. In the long run, while Washington has little interest in fighting a war with China, its strategic competition will focus on galvanizing allies to penalize China’s economy and to substitute away from China, in favor of India and ASEAN. China’s Macro Policy In 2022: Going “All In” For Stability In last year’s China Geopolitical Outlook, we maintained our underweight position on Chinese equities and warned that Beijing’s policy tightening posed a significant risk to global cyclical assets – and yet we concluded that policymakers would avoid overtightening policy to the extent of spoiling the global recovery. This view prevailed over the course of 2021. Policymakers tightened monetary and fiscal policy in the first half of the year, then started loosening up in the summer. Chinese equities crashed but global equities powered through the year. In December 2020, at the Central Economic Work Conference, policymakers stated that China would “maintain necessary policy support for economic recovery and avoid sharp turns in policy” in 2021. In the event they did the minimal necessary, though they did avoid sharp turns. For 2022, the key word is “stability.” At the Central Economic Work Conference last month, the final communique mentioned “stability” or “stabilize” 25 times (Table 1). Hence the main objective of Chinese policymakers this year is to prioritize both economic and social stability ahead of the twentieth national party congress. Authorities will avoid last year’s tight policies. Table 1Key Chinese Policy Guidance 2021-22 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China’s quarterly GDP growth slipped to just 4% in Q4 2021, from rapid recovery growth of 18.3% in Q1 2021. Considering the low base effect of 2020, the average growth of 2020 and 2021 ranged from 5-5.5% (Chart 14). This growth rate is in line with the pre-pandemic trajectory of 2015-2019. In Jan 2022, the IMF cut China’s 2022 growth forecast to 4.8%, while the World Bank lowered its forecasts to 5.1%. Considering the two-year average growth and government’s goal of “all in for stability,” we see an implicit GDP target of 5-5.5%. Chart 14Breakdown Of China’s GDP Growth China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Does this target matter? Although China stopped announcing explicit GDP growth targets, understanding the implicit target helps investors predict the turning point in macro policy. Due to robust global demand, net exports are now making a sizable contribution to GDP growth. However, due to the high base effect of 2021, there is limited room for exports to grow in 2022. Hence economic growth has to rely on final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation. Yet as a result of policy tightening, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP has decreased significantly, from positive in H1 2021 to a rare negative contribution to GDP in the second half. At the same time, the contribution from final consumption expenditure also slipped over the course of 2021, due to worsening Covid conditions, one of the three pressures stated by the government. What does that mean? It means that loosening up macro policies is the pre-condition for stabilizing growth and the economy. Just like the officials said (see Table 1), the Chinese economy is “facing triple pressure from demand contraction, supply shocks, and weakening expectations,” so that “all sides need to take the initiative and launch policies conducive to economic stability.” Bottom Line: It is reasonable to expect accommodative fiscal and monetary policies in 2022, at least until the party congress ends. In fact, authorities have already started to make these adjustments since Q4 2021. China Avoids Monetary Overtightening Credit growth can be seen as an indicator for gross capital formation. In the second half of 2021, China’s total social financing (total private credit) growth plunged below 12% (Chart 15), the threshold we identified for determining whether authorities overtightened policy. Correspondingly, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP dropped into the negative zone (see Chart 14 above). However, money growth did not dip below the threshold, and authorities are now trying to boost credit growth. Starting from December 2021, the market has seen marginally positive news out of the People’s Bank of China: December 15, 2021: The PBOC conducted its second reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut in 2021. The 50 bps cut was expected to release $188 billion in liquidity to support the real economy. December 20, 2021: The PBOC conducted its first interest rate cut since April 2020 by cutting 1-Year LPR by 5 bps on December 20 (Chart 16). Chart 15China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold ​​​​​​ Chart 16China Monetary Policy Easing China Monetary Policy Easing China Monetary Policy Easing ​​​​​​ January 17, 2022: The PBOC cut the interest rate on medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans and 7-day reverse repurchase (repos) rate both by 10 bps. January 20, 2022: The PBOC further lowered the 1-year LPR by 10 basis points and cut the 5-year LPR by 5 basis points, the first cut since April 2020. Chart 17China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes The timing and size of the last two rate cuts came as a surprise to the market, signaling more comprehensive easing than was expected (confirming our expectations).3 The market saw a clear turning point: Chinese authorities are now fully aware of the need to loosen up monetary policy to counter intensifying downward pressure on the economy. Incidentally, the fine-tuning of the different lending facilities suggests the government aims to lower borrowing costs and stimulate the market without over-heating the property sector again. PBOC officials claim there is still some space for further cuts, though narrower now, when asked about if there is any room to further cut the RRR and interest rates in Q1. They added that the PBOC should “stay ahead of the market curve” and “not procrastinate.”4 Recent movements have validated this point. Going forward, M2 growth should stay above 8%. Total social financing growth should move up above our “too tight” threshold, although weak sentiment among private borrowers could force authorities to ease further to ensure that credit growth picks up. If the government is still committed to fighting housing speculation, as before, then we could see a smaller adjustment to the 5-Year LPR in the future. Otherwise the government is taking its foot off the brake for stability reasons, at least temporarily. Bottom Line: China will keep easing monetary policy in 2022, at least in the first half. This will result in an improvement in Chinese import volumes and ultimately emerging market corporate earnings, albeit with a six-to-12-month lag (Chart 17). China Avoids Fiscal Overtightening China will also avoid over-tightening fiscal policy in 2022. In December the government stressed the need to “maintain the intensity of fiscal spending, accelerate the pace, and moderately advance infrastructure investment.” In 2021, local government bond issuance did not pick up until the second half of the year. Considering the time lag of construction projects, it was too late for local government investment to stimulate the economy. By Q3 2021, local government bond issuance had just completed roughly 70% of the annual quota. By comparison, in 2018-2020, local governments all completed more than 95% of the annual quota by the end of September each year (Chart 18A). Chart 18AChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​ Chart 18BChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ There are several reasons behind the slow pace last year. The central government refused to pre-approve and pre-authorize the quota for bond issuance at the beginning of the year in 2021, in order to restore discipline after the massive 2020 stimulus measures. The quota was not released until after the Two Sessions in March, which means local government bond issuance did not pick up until April 2021, causing a 3-month vacuum in local government fiscal support (see Chart 18B). In contrast, for 2019 and 2020, the central government pre-authorized the bond issuance quota ahead of time to try to provide fiscal support evenly throughout the year. Starting from 2020, the central government strengthened supervision and evaluation of local government investment projects, again to instill discipline. Previously local governments could easily issue general-purpose bonds and the funds were theirs to spend. But now local governments are required to increase the transparency of their investment projects and mainly finance these projects via special-purpose bonds, i.e. targeted money for authorized projects (Table 2). In 2021 local governments were less willing to issue bonds. At the April 2021 Politburo meeting, the central government vowed to “establish a disposal mechanism that will hold local government officials accountable for fiscal and financial risks.” This triggered risk-aversion. Beijing wanted to prevent a growth “splurge” in the wake of its emergency stimulus, like what happened in 2008-11. The fiscal turning point came in the second half of the year. The central government called for accelerating local government bond issuance several times from July to October. The pace significantly picked up in the second half of 2021 and Q4 accounted for a significant portion of annual issuance (Chart 18). As a result, fixed asset investment and fiscal impulse should pick up in Q1 2022. Thus, unlike last year, authorities are trying to avoid a sharp drop in the fiscal impulse. The Ministry of Finance has already frontloaded 1.46 trillion yuan ($229 billion) from the 2022 special purpose bonds quota. This amount is part of the 2022 annual local government bond issuance quota, with the rest to be released at the Two Sessions in March. Pulling these funds forward indicates the rising pressure to stabilize economic growth in Q1 this year. That being said, investors should differentiate easing up fiscal policy and “flood-like” stimulus in the past. The government still claims it will “contain increases in implicit local government debts.” In fact, pilot programs to clean up implicit debts have already started in Shanghai and Guangdong. This means, China will not reverse past efforts on curbing hidden debts. Hence fiscal support will be more tightly controlled in future, like water taps in the hands of the central government. The risk of fiscal tightening is backloaded in 2022. The tremendous amount of local government bonds issued in Q4 2021 will start to kick in early 2022. These will combine with the frontloaded special purposed bonds. Fiscal impulse should tick up in Q1. However, fiscal impulse might decelerate in the second half. A total of $2.7 trillion yuan worth of local government bonds will reach maturity this year, with $2.2 trillion yuan reaching maturity after June 2022 (Table 3). This means that in the second half, local governments will need to issue more re-financing bonds to prevent insolvency risk, thus undermining fiscal support for the economy. And this last point underscores the threat of economic and financial instability that China faces over the long run. Table 2Breakdown Of China Local Government Bond Issuance China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Bottom Line: Stability is the top priority in 2022. China will continue to easy up monetary and fiscal policy in H1, to combat the economic downward pressure ahead of the twentieth national party congress (Chart 19). Policy tightening risk is backloaded. Structural reforms will likely subside for now until the Xi administration re-consolidates power for the next ten years. Table 3China: Local Government Debt Maturity Schedule China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 19Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Note: An error in an earlier version of this report has been corrected. Chinese fixed asset investment in Chart 19 is growing at 0.1%, not 57.6% as originally shown. The chart has been adjusted. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Bei Hu and Bloomberg, “Ray Dalio thinks the U.S. needs more of China’s common prosperity drive to create a ‘fairer system,’” Fortune, January 10, 2022, fortune.com. 2     See George Soros, “China’s Challenges,” Project Syndicate, January 31, 2022, project-syndicate.org. 3     The 5-year LPR had remained unchanged after the December 2021 cut. At that time, only the 1-Year LPR was cut by 5bps. Furthermore, the different magnitudes of the January 20 LPR cut also have some implications. The 1-Year LPR mostly affects new and outstanding loans, short-term liquidity loans of firms, and consumer loans of households. In comparison, the 5-Year LPR has a larger impact, affecting the borrowing costs of total social financing, including mortgage loans, medium- to long-term investment loans, etc. The MLF rate was cut by 10 basis points on January 17; in theory the LPR should also be cut by the same size. However, the 5-Year LPR adjustments was very cautious and was only cut by 5 bps, smaller than the MLF cut and the 1-Year LPR cut. The 5-year LPR serves as the benchmark lending rate for mortgage loans. 4     To combat the negative shock caused by the initial outburst of COVID-19, altogether China lowered the MLF and 1-year LPR by 30 bps and 5-year LPR by 15 bps in H1 2020. This also suggests that there is still room for future interest rate cuts or RRR cuts in the coming months. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary The golden rule for investing in the stock market simply states: “Stay bullish on stocks unless you have good reason to think that a recession is imminent.” The catch, of course, is that it is difficult to know whether a recession is lurking around the corner. Still, we can learn a lot from past recessions. As we document in this week’s report, every major downturn was caused by the buildup of imbalances within the economy, which were then laid bare by some sort of catalyst, usually monetary tightening. Today, the US is neither suffering from an overhang of capital spending, as it did in the lead-up to the 2001 recession, nor an overhang of housing, as it did in the lead-up to the Great Recession. US inflation has risen, but unlike in the early 1980s, long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. This gives the Fed scope to tighten monetary policy in a gradual manner. Outside the US, vulnerabilities are more pronounced, especially in China where the property market is weakening, and debt levels stand at exceptionally high levels. Fortunately, the Chinese government has enough tools to keep the economy afloat, at least for the time being. Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Bottom Line: Equity bear markets rarely occur outside of recessions. With global growth set to remain above trend at least for the next 12 months, investors should continue to overweight equities. However, they should underweight the tech sector since tech stocks remain disproportionately vulnerable to rising rates, increased regulation, and a retrenchment in pandemic-induced spending on electronics and online services. Macro Matters Investors tend to underestimate the importance of macroeconomics for stock market outcomes. That is a pity. Charts 1, 2, and 3 show that the business cycle drives the evolution of corporate earnings; corporate earnings, in turn, drive the stock market; and as a result, the business cycle determines the path for stock prices. Chart 1The Business Cycle Drives Earnings… The Business Cycle Drives Earnings... The Business Cycle Drives Earnings... Chart 2…Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices… ...Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices... ...Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices... An appreciation of macro forces leads to our golden rule for investing in the stock market. It simply states: Stay bullish on stocks unless you have good reason to think that a recession is imminent. Chart 3…Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns ...Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns ...Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns Historically, stocks have peaked about six months before the onset of a recession. Thus, it usually does not pay to turn bearish on stocks if you expect the economy to grow for at least another 12 months. In fact, aside from the brief but violent 1987 stock market crash, during the past 50 years, the S&P 500 has never fallen by more than 20% outside of a recessionary environment (Chart 4). Peering Around The Corner The catch, of course, is that it is difficult to know whether a recession is lurking around the corner. Leo Tolstoy began his novel Anna Karenina with the words “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” By the same token, every economic boom seems the same, whereas every recession has its own unique features. This makes forecasting recessions difficult. Difficult, but not impossible. Even though recessions differ substantially in their magnitude and causes, they all share the following three characteristics: 1) The buildup of imbalances that make the economy vulnerable to a downturn; 2) A catalyst that exposes these imbalances; and 3) Amplifiers or dampeners that either exacerbate or mitigate the slump. Let us review six past recessions to better understand what these three characteristics reveal about the current state of the global economy. Chart 4Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand The 1980 And 1982 Recessions The double-dip recessions of 1980 and 1982 were the last in which inflation played a starring role. Throughout the 1970s, the Fed consistently overstated the degree of slack in the economy (Chart 5). This led to a prolonged period in which interest rates stayed below their equilibrium level. The resulting upward pressure on inflation from an overheated economy was compounded by a series of oil shocks, the last of which occurred in 1979 following the Iranian revolution. Chart 6The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation Chart 5The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s In an effort to break the back of inflation, newly appointed Fed chair Paul Volcker raised rates, first to 17% in April 1980, and then following a brief interlude in which the effective fed funds rate dropped back to 9%, to a peak of 19% in July 1981 (Chart 6).   The 1990-91 Recession Overheating also contributed to the early 1990s recession. After reaching a high of 10.8% in 1982, the unemployment rate fell to 5% in 1989, about one percentage point below its equilibrium level at that time. Core inflation began to accelerate, reaching 5.5% by August 1990. The Fed initially responded to the overheating economy by hiking interest rates. The fed funds rate rose from 6.6% in March 1988 to a high of 9.8% by May 1989. By the summer of 1990, the economy had already slowed significantly. Commercial real estate, still reeling from the effects of the Savings and Loan crisis, weakened sharply. Defense outlays continued to contract following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The final straw was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, which caused oil prices to surge and consumer confidence to plunge (Chart 7).   The 2001 Recession An overhang of IT equipment sowed the seeds of the 2001 recession. Spending on telecommunications equipment rose almost three-fold over the course of the 1990s, which helped lift overall nonresidential capital spending from 11.2% of GDP in 1992 to 14.7% in 2000 (Chart 8). Chart 7Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession The recession itself was fairly mild. After subsequent revisions to the data, growth turned negative for just one quarter, in Q3 of 2001. However, due to the lopsided influence of the tech sector in aggregate profits – and even more so, in market capitalization – the dotcom bust had a major impact on equity prices (Chart 9). Chart 9The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings Chart 8A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession Having raised rates to 6.5% in May 2000, the Fed responded to the downturn by easing monetary policy. Falling rates were effective in reviving the economy – indeed, perhaps too effective. The resulting housing boom paved the way for the Great Recession.   The Great Recession (2007-2009) The housing sector was the source of imbalances in the lead-up to the Great Recession. In the US, and in other countries such as Spain and Ireland, house prices soared as lenders doled out credit on increasingly lenient terms. Chart 10A Long House Party A Long House Party A Long House Party Rising house prices stoked a consumption boom and incentivized developers to build more homes. In the US, the personal savings rate fell to historic lows. Residential investment reached a high of 6.7% of GDP, up from an average of 4.3% of GDP in the 1990s (Chart 10). While the housing bubble would have burst at some point anyway, tighter monetary policy helped expedite the downturn. Starting in June 2004, the Fed raised rates 17 times, pushing the fed funds rate to 5.25% by June 2006. The ECB also hiked rates; it raised the refi rate from 2% in December 2005 to 4.25% in July 2008, continuing to tighten policy even after the Fed had begun to cut rates. Once global growth started to weaken, a number of accelerants kicked in. As is the case in every recession, rising unemployment led to less spending, which in turn led to even higher unemployment. To make matters worse, a vicious circle engulfed the housing market. Falling home prices eroded the collateral underlying mortgage loans, producing more defaults, tighter lending standards, and even lower home prices. The Fed responded to the crisis by cutting rates and introducing an alphabet soup of programs to support the financial system. However, the zero lower-bound constraint limited the degree to which the Fed could cut rates, forcing it to resort to unorthodox measures such as quantitative easing. While these measures arguably helped, they fell short of what was needed to resuscitate the economy. Fiscal policy could have picked up the slack, but political considerations limited the scale and scope of the 2009 Recovery Act. The result was a needlessly long and drawn-out recovery.   The Euro Crisis (2012) Chart 11The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess A reoccurring theme in economic history is that financial crises often force governments to assume private-sector liabilities in order to avoid a full-scale economic collapse. Unlike Greece, where government debt stood at very high levels even before the GFC, debt levels in Spain and Ireland were quite modest before the crisis. However, all that changed when Spain and Ireland were forced to bail out their banks (Chart 11). Unlike the US, UK, and Japan, euro area member governments did not have access to central banks that could serve as buyers of last resort for their debts. This limitation created a feedback loop where rising bond yields made it more onerous for governments to service their debts, which led to a higher perceived likelihood of default and even higher yields (Chart 12). Chart 12Multiple Equilibria In The Debt Market Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The ECB could have short-circuited this vicious cycle. Unfortunately, under the hapless leadership of Jean-Claude Trichet, instead of providing assistance, the central bank raised rates twice in 2011. This helped spread the crisis to Italy and other parts of core Europe. It ultimately took Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes pledge” to restore some semblance of normality to European sovereign debt markets. Lessons For Today The current environment bears some resemblance to the one preceding the recessions of the early 1980s. As was the case back then, inflation today has surged well above the Federal Reserve’s target, forcing the Fed to turn more hawkish. Oil prices have also risen, despite slowing global growth. Even Russia has returned to its status as the world’s leading geopolitical boogeyman. Yet, digging below the surface, there is a big difference between today and the early ‘80s. For one thing, long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. While expected inflation 5-to-10 years out has risen to 3.1% in the latest University of Michigan survey, this just takes the reading back to where it was not long after the Great Recession. It is still nowhere near the double-digit levels reached in the early ‘80s (Chart 13). Market-based inflation expectations are even more subdued. In fact, the widely watched 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently well below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 14). Chart 13Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Chart 14Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Higher oil prices are unlikely to have the sting that they once did. The energy intensity of the global economy has fallen steadily over time, especially in advanced economies (Chart 15). Today, the US generates three-times as much output for every joule of energy consumed than it did in 1970. Household spending on energy has declined from a peak of 8.3% of disposable income in 1980 to 3.8% in December 2021. The US also produces over 11 million barrels of oil per day, more than Saudi Arabia (Chart 16). Chart 15The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time Chart 16When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 Unlike in the late 1990s, advanced economies do not face a significant capex overhang. Quite the contrary. Capital spending has been fairly weak across much of the OECD. In the US, the average age of the nonresidential capital stock has risen to the highest level since the 1960s (Chart 17). Looking out, far from cratering, capital spending is set to rise, as foreshadowed by the jump in core capital goods orders (Chart 18). Chart 17The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock Chart 18The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright Chart 19Need More Houses Need More Houses Need More Houses In contrast to the glut of housing that helped precipitate the Global Financial Crisis, housing remains in short supply in many developed economies. In the US, the homeowner vacancy rate has fallen to a record low. There are currently half as many new homes available for sale as there were in early 2020 (Chart 19). Even in Canada, where homebuilding has held up well, government officials have been hitting the panic button over a brewing home shortage.   The Biggest Risk Is Debt The biggest macroeconomic risk the global economy faces stems from high debt levels. While household debt has fallen by 20% of GDP in the US, it has risen in a number of other economies. Corporate debt has generally increased everywhere, in many cases to finance share buybacks and M&A activity (Chart 20). Public debt has also soared to the highest levels since during World War II. Chart 20Mo' Debt Mo' Debt Mo' Debt Among emerging markets, China’s debt burden is especially pronounced. Total private and public debt reached 285% of GDP in 2021, nearly double what it was in early 2008. The property market is also slowing, which will weigh on growth. Like many countries, China finds itself in a paradoxical situation: Any effort to pare back debt is likely to crush nominal GDP by so much that the debt-to-GDP ratio rises rather than falls. Ironically, the only solution is to adopt reflationary policies that allow the economy to run hot. In the near term, this could prove to be a favorable outcome for investors since it will mean that monetary policy stays highly accommodative. Over the long haul, however, it may lead to a stagflationary environment, which would be detrimental to equities and other risk assets. In summary, investors should remain overweight stocks for now. However, they should underweight the tech sector since tech stocks remain disproportionately vulnerable to rising rates, increased regulation, and a retrenchment in pandemic-induced spending on electronics and online services.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary Risk Premium In EU Gas Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase ​​ Regardless of whether Russia invades all, part of or none of Ukraine again, its current standoff with the West will force the EU to reconfigure its gas markets to assure reliability of supplies, and remove geopolitical supply disruptions. We expect the EU's renewable energy taxonomy scheduled for release Wednesday will include natgas as a sustainable fuel, which will help build more diversified sources of supply and deeper spot and term markets.  Success here will increase market share of natgas in EU power generation. In the short run (1-2 years), neither the EU nor Russia can afford Gazprom's pipeline supplies to be significantly curtailed. Over the medium term (3-5 years), alternative supplies from US and Qatari LNG exports will be required to deepen EU gas-market liquidity and supply. Longer term (i.e., beyond 2025), EU energy markets will remain volatile as the renewable-energy transition progresses. High and volatile natgas prices will translate into persistent EU inflation – particularly food prices, because of higher fertilizer costs, and base metals' prices.  Shortages in these markets will slow the energy transition, and raise its price tag. Bottom Line: The Russian standoff with the West over Ukraine puts a higher risk premium in EU gas prices.  We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI, and COMT ETF), and the XME ETF.  We are getting long the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP) at tonight's close. Feature We expect the EU's financial taxonomy for renewable energy scheduled for release Wednesday will include natgas as a sustainable fuel. This will help in building out more diversified sources of supply and deeper spot and term markets. Success here will increase the market share of natgas in the EU's power generation (Chart of the Week). This coincides with natural gas supply uncertainty, arising from geopolitical tensions. On the back of already-low inventory levels, European natural gas markets are forced to handicap the odds of a major curtailment of Russian pipeline gas supplies resulting from another invasion of Ukraine (Chart 2).  This is keeping a significantly increased risk premium embedded in natgas prices: Russian exports to the EU account for 40% of total gas supplies.  Germany is particularly exposed, as  ~65% of its gas comes from Russia (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekEU Natgas Generation Will Rise In Energy Transition Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy desk upgraded the odds of Russia invading Ukraine to 75% from 50% in its latest research report.1  Our colleagues, however, keep the probability of Russia invading all of Ukraine low.  Their analysis concludes Russia will only invade a part of Ukraine, so as to argue for lighter sanctions being imposed on it by the West, as opposed to having to incur the full wrath of US and EU sanctions.  The other 25% of the probability space includes a diplomatic settlement between the West and Russia. Chart 2Risk Premium In EU Gas Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase While Russia has been trying to diversify its customer base – by increasing natgas exports to China, e.g. – data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy shows ~ 78% of total natural gas exports (pipeline + LNG) from Russia went to the EU in 2020.2  Chart 3EU Highly Dependent On Russian Gas Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase In light of the fact that Russia likely will face watered-down sanctions, and the EU’s gargantuan share of total Russian exports, we do not believe Europe’s largest natural gas exporter will stop all supply to the EU now or in the near future. In case Russia does go through with its invasion, it likely will cut off natural gas supply to Ukraine, implying Europe will loose slightly more than 6% of total natgas imports as opposed to 40% in the event of a halt to all natgas exports to Europe (Chart 4).  Gas consumption of the EU-27 in 2021 was ~ 500 Bcm, according to the Oxford Institute For Energy Studies (OIES).  Some 85% of EU gas consumption was met by imports. Chart 4Imports Cover Most EU Gas Consumption Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Can The EU Mitigate The Loss Of Russian Gas? The EU and the US have entered discussions with other countries to plug the potential 6% reduction in imports from Russia.  While in theory, there is enough spare pipeline capacity to import natural gas from existing and new sources (Chart 5), practical limitations may prevent this from occurring.3 The US is working with the EU to ensure energy supply security in case Russia cuts off natural gas supply. However, as can be seen in Chart 6, Panel 1, the US currently is and likely will continue to export nearly at capacity until end-2023. Panel 2 shows global liquefaction also is nearly at capacity. Chart 5EU Gas Import Capacity Exists, But Filling It Will Be Problematic Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Chart 6US LNG Export Capacity Maxed Out Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase While an increase in gas production at the earthquake-prone Groningen field in the Netherlands is theoretically viable, it will induce a public backlash, as was evidenced when the Dutch government announced plans to double output from the field earlier this year. In the short run, facing few sources of alternate gas supply, the EU will need to focus on curtailing demand. Fossil fuels will need to be considered as an alternative for electricity and heating, since nuclear is not used in all EU countries.  The depth of this crisis and the Dutch TTF price rise will be capped by the fact that we expect the EU to lose a relatively small fraction of total imports.  Further, while we expect Dutch TTF prices to be volatile and face upward pressure, any price increases also will be capped by the fact that the colder-than-expected Northern Hemisphere winter has not yet materialized, and the warmer Spring and Summer months will be approaching soon. Medium-, Long-Term EU Gas Supply On the supply side, over the medium- and long-term, the EU will need to deepen and stabilize its gas supply, so that firms and households can rationally forecast and allocate spending and investment.  This would include finding back-up or alternative supplies to Russian imports, which carry with them uncertain geopolitical risk.  If Brussels includes natural gas as a sustainable fuel in its energy taxonomy, over the medium term (3-5 years), alternative supplies from US and Qatari LNG exports will be required to deepen EU gas-market liquidity and supply.  Longer term (i.e., beyond 2025), EU energy markets will remain volatile as the renewable-energy transition progresses.  Natgas will be a critical component of this transition, until utility-scale battery storage is able to support renewable generation and grid stability.  We believe over the remainder of this decade, high and volatile natgas prices will translate into persistent EU inflation, as pricing pressures spill into oil and coal markets at the margin, as happened over the course of last year.  This will work in the other direction as well – e.g., higher coal prices will spill over into gas and oil markets as price pressures incentivize fuel switching at the margin. Food prices will be right in the inflationary cross-hairs, given the fertilizer required to produce the grains and beans consumed globally consists mostly of natgas in urea and ammonia fertilizers (Chart 7).  This will feed into higher food prices (Chart 8). Chart 7High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices Chart 8… And Higher Food Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Base metals' prices also will be upwardly biased as natgas price volatility remains elevated.  Supply shortages in natgas markets will, at the margin, slow the energy transition by reducing reliable energy supplies in the EU, forcing states to compete for back-up and replacement supply in the global LNG markets.  Fuel-switching into oil, gas and coal will transmit EU gas volatility to markets globally. Tight energy and base metals markets also will feed directly into higher inflation and inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 9Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher   Investment Implications The standoff between the West and Russia over the latter's amassing of troops on the Ukraine border, plus the marked increase in the tempo of Russian naval operations, will keep the risk premium in EU natgas prices high.  This is not a sustainable equilibrium over the medium- to long-term.  We expect little if any curtailment of Russian natgas exports over the short term; however, prudence suggests EU member states will be forced to find back-up and alternative gas supplies over the medium- to longer-term, as the global renewable-energy transition gains traction. The knock-on effects from the current European geopolitical standoff are keeping EU natgas prices elevated via a higher risk premium to cover possible supply losses.  This will feed into other markets – particularly metals and ags – which will feed directly into inflation and inflation expectations. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF – and metals producers via the XME ETF.  At tonight's close, we will be getting long the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP).   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0's decision to stay with its policy of returning 400k b/d every month appeared to be a foregone conclusion in the markets.  In our January 2022 balances and price forecasts, we anticipated a larger increase, given the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia has fallen significantly behind its goal of returning 400k b/d to the market monthly due to declining production among OPEC 2.0 member states ex-Gulf GCC member states, chiefly KSA, UAE and Kuwait (Iraq's exports fell in December and January; production data have not been released).  In the past, KSA has said it will not make up for production shortfalls of OPEC 2.0 member states, and would abide by its production allocation. The upside risk to prices remains, in our estimation, and we continue to expect KSA and its GCC allies to increase output if production from the price-taking cohort led by the US shale-oil producers fails to materialize in over the coming months.  Failure to cover production shortfalls among OPEC 2.0 member states would lift Brent prices by $6/bbl above our baseline forecast, which assumed higher production from the GCC states would be forthcoming at Wednesday's OPEC 2.0 meeting (Chart 10, brown curve). Base Metals: Bullish An environmental committee in Chile's Senate voted out a proposed bill that would, among other things, reportedly make it easier for the government to seize mines developed and operated by private companies.  The proposed legislation still has a long road ahead of it, but copper prices rallied earlier in the week as this news broke.  Even if the odds of the bill's passage are slim, a watered down version of the proposed legislation would markedly change the economic proposition of developing and maintaining copper mines in Chile (Chart 11).  We continue to follow this closely.   Chart 10 Brent Forecast Restored To $80/bbl For 2022 Brent Forecast Restored To $80/bbl For 2022 Chart 11 Bullish For Copper Prices Bullish For Copper Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update), published by BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service 27 January 2022.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see bp's Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 | 70th edition. 3    Norway, the EU’s second largest gas exporter after Russia stated that its natural gas production is at the limit. Apart from the issue of production, current LNG flows will need to be redirected from Asia and the Americas. Defaulting on long-term contracts to redirect fuel to Europe could mire exporters’ relationships with importing countries. Finally,  infrastructure in the Eastern and Central section of the EU may not be equipped to receive supplies from the West, thus increasing costs and time associated with putting these systems in place.    Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary Asian Inflation Has Diverged From US Emerging Asia: Domestic Bond Strategy Emerging Asia: Domestic Bond Strategy Inflation has been largely subdued in emerging Asia and will remain so for now. This argues for the outperformance of emerging Asian local bonds versus their EM peers, as well as DM/US bonds.   The most important macro driver of Asian domestic bond yields is inflation. Rising inflation usually also hurts local currencies – creating a toxic cocktail for bonds’ total returns in US dollar terms. Diverging currency dynamics in emerging Asia is what will determine the relative performances of individual bond markets. Chinese, Indian, and Malaysian currencies have a better outlook than currencies in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Book profits on the short Korean won position: this trade has generated a 5.2% gain since its initiation on March 25, 2021. Recommendation   Initiation Date Return to Date Short KRW / Long USD 2021-03-25 5.2% Bottom Line: Regional fixed income managers should overweight China, Korea, India and Malaysia, and underweight Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines within an emerging Asian bond portfolio. In an overall EM domestic bond portfolio however, Thailand and the Philippines should be accorded a neutral allocation, given their better inflation outlook compared to their peers in EMEA and Latin America. Feature US Treasury yields will likely go up further. If history is any guide, EM Asian bond yields should also rise in tandem (Chart 1). The basis is that business cycles in Asia and the US usually move together. Yet, in this cycle, inflation in emerging Asia has diverged considerably from that of the US. US core consumer price inflation has surged while in Asia, core inflation remains largely contained (Chart 2). How should bond investors position themselves in Asian domestic bond markets? Chart 1Asian Bond Yields Usually Move In Line With US Treasury Yields... Asian Bond Yields Usually Move In Line With US Treasury Yields... Asian Bond Yields Usually Move In Line With US Treasury Yields... Chart 2...But Diverging Inflation Means Asian Bonds Will Outperform US Bonds ...But Diverging Inflation Means Asian Bonds Will Outperform US Bonds ...But Diverging Inflation Means Asian Bonds Will Outperform US Bonds Chart 3Relative Domestic Bond Performances In Asian Markets Relative Domestic Bond Performances In Asian Markets Relative Domestic Bond Performances In Asian Markets In this report, we will discuss some of the common factors that drive Emerging Asian bond markets. We will also highlight each individual market’s idiosyncrasies to explain our recommended allocation across local currency bond markets in emerging Asia for the coming year.     Our recommended allocation is as follows: China, Korea, India and Malaysia merit an overweight stance in an emerging Asia domestic bond portfolio, while Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines warrant an underweight allocation (Chart 3). That said, given a much more benign inflation outlook in Asia than elsewhere in EM, we recommend that Thailand and the Philippines be accorded a neutral allocation in an overall EM domestic bond portfolio. The Two Drivers For international investors in local bonds, total returns are predicated on two main drivers: (1) the direction and magnitude of change in bond yields; and (2) currency performance. In all Asian countries, the most potent macro factor that drives local bond yields is the country’s inflation. Rising inflation is usually a harbinger of higher bond yields (and hence, worsening bond performance); and falling inflation is an indicator of lower yields (Charts 4 and 5). Chart 4Inflation Is The Most Important Macro Driver … Inflation Is The Most Important Macro Driver... Inflation Is The Most Important Macro Driver... Chart 5… Of Bond Yields In Emerging Asia ... Of Bond Yields In Emerging Asia ... Of Bond Yields In Emerging Asia What’s more, rising inflation in a country is also often associated with a depreciating currency. Currencies in countries with higher/rising inflation in general do worse than in countries with lower/falling inflation. This aspect is especially important when doing a cross-country comparison. The fact that higher inflation negatively impacts both the drivers of bond performance – it pushes up yields and weakens the currency – can indeed be seen happening in Asian financial markets. Rising inflation leads to poor performance of domestic bonds’ total return in dollar terms; and falling inflation leads to a better performance. The upshot is that the potential inflation trajectory is key to any country’s domestic bond performance in both absolute and relative terms. Inflation In Asia Is Benign Most of the Asian countries have their core and trimmed mean consumer price inflation running at or well below their central banks’ targets (Charts 6 and 7). Their inflation outlook also remains largely benign.1 As such, bond yields in these countries are unlikely to rise materially in the near future. Chart 6Inflation Is Running At Or Below … Inflation Is Running At Or Below... Inflation Is Running At Or Below... Chart 7… Central Banks’ Target in Asia ... Central Banks' Target in Asia ... Central Banks' Target in Asia Notably, even the recent surge in US yields did not spook Asian bond yields. The yield differentials between individual Asian domestic and US yields have remained flattish in the past few months. All this implies that Asian domestic bonds, in general, would likely fare better relative to the rest of the EM and the US – where inflation is high and well above their central banks’ targets. Currency Is A Key Differentiator Given inflation, and therefore the bond yield trajectories among Asian economies are unlikely to deviate significantly from one another, the key differentiator of their bond market performance (on a total return basis) will be their exchange rates. In fact, Asian currencies do vary considerably in their outlooks as their fundamentals differ.  For instance, in China and Korea, higher bond yields are usually associated with an appreciating currency (Chart 8, top and middle panels). The key driver of bond yields in these economies is the business cycle. Accelerating growth often pushes up both the currency as well as interest rates. The opposite is also true: decelerating growth usually leads to a weaker currency and falling bond yields.  The consequence is that in these countries, bond performance is tempered by two opposing forces. For example, the effect of falling yields (which is a positive for total return) is often mitigated by the effect of a falling currency (which is a negative for total return), or the other way around. In contrast to China and Korea, ASEAN countries usually experience rising bond yields accompanied by a depreciating currency (Chart 9). A crucial reason for this is significantly higher foreign ownership of their domestic bonds. In periods of stress, when foreigners exit their bond holdings, this leads to both higher yields and a falling currency. During risk-on periods, foreigners’ purchases do the opposite. Chart 8Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Stronger Currency In China And Korea Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Stronger Currency In China And Korea Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Stronger Currency In China And Korea Chart 9Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Weaker Currency In ASEAN Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Weaker Currency In ASEAN Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Weaker Currency In ASEAN In this context, foreign ownership of domestic bonds in ASEAN countries has fallen in the past few years, but remains non-trivial: 19% in Indonesia, 24.2% in Malaysia, 19.9% in the Philippines, and 11.3% in Thailand. Hence, the currency view on ASEAN countries is crucial to get the outlook right for their domestic bond performance. Incidentally, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia have a weak currency outlook, while Malaysia’s is neutral. We discuss the individual currency outlooks in more detail in the respective country sections below. But in summary, this warrants a more positive stance on Malaysian domestic bonds compared to Indonesian, Thai and Filipino bonds. Finally, in case of India, bond yields and the rupee have little correlation (Chart 8, bottom panel). The main reasons for that are near absence of foreign investors in Indian government bond markets, and large captive domestic bond investors (its commercial banks). Yet, unlike China and Korea, India also has higher inflation and a persistent current account deficit. All these make the correlation of bond yields with the exchange rate different in India from both ASEAN as well as China and Korea. In the sections below, we discuss each country’s currency and overall bond outlook in more detail. We also explain the reasons behind our relative bond strategy. China: Overweight Chart 10Chinese Bond Yields Will Likely Fall More Chinese Bond Yields Will Likely Fall More Chinese Bond Yields Will Likely Fall More China’s economy will remain weak in the coming months. The hit to the economy from slowing property construction is material. Besides, COVID-induced rotational lockdowns are hurting consumption, income and investment in the service sector. The latest round of stimulus has so far not been sufficient to produce an immediate recovery. We expect growth to revive only in H2 2022. For now, the PBOC will reduce its policy rate further. This and the fact that the yield curve is positively slopped heralds more downside in Chinese government bond yields (Chart 10). Concerning the exchange rate, the ongoing US dollar rally could eventually cause a short period of yuan weakness. However, the latter will be small and short lived. In brief, Chinese domestic bonds will outperform both their Asian and EM peers in the coming months. Korea: Overweight The following factors argue for overweighting Korean bonds within both emerging Asian and EM domestic bond portfolios: Chart 11Korea Has No Genuine Inflation Korea Has No Genuine Inflation Korea Has No Genuine Inflation The Korean won has already depreciated quite a bit against the US dollar. While further downside is possible in the very near term, the medium-term outlook is positive. Even though headline and core inflation have exceeded the central bank’s target of 2%, trimmed mean consumer price inflation has not yet exceeded 2% (Chart 4, middle panel) and services CPI, excluding housing, seems to have rolled over. Importantly, no wage inflation spiral is evident. Unit labor costs have been falling in both the manufacturing and service sectors (Chart 11). Hence, there is little pressure for companies to hike prices. India: Overweight Indian bonds should continue to outperform other EM domestic bonds (Chart 3, middle panel). The combination of prudent fiscal policy, a benign inflation outlook and a cheap currency makes Indian bonds attractive to foreign investors. Even though yields will go up somewhat given a recovering economy, the rise will be capped as the inflation outlook remains benign. The reason for a soft inflation outlook is wages and expectations thereof are quite low (Chart 12). Global commodity prices will also likely soften in the months ahead. That will ease price pressures in India. The Indian rupee is cheap – it is now trading 12% below its fair value versus the US dollar (Chart 13). The rupee will likely be one of the best performers among EM currencies in the year ahead. Chart 12Low Urban And Rural Wages Will Keep A Lid on Indian Inflation Low Urban And Rural Wages Will Keep A Lid on Indian Inflation Low Urban And Rural Wages Will Keep A Lid on Indian Inflation Chart 13Indian Rupee Is Cheap Indian Rupee Is Quite Cheap And Will Likely Outperform Many EM Currencies Indian Rupee Is Quite Cheap And Will Likely Outperform Many EM Currencies   The spread of India’s 10-year bonds over that of GBI-EM Broad index is 190 basis points. The currency performance will likely offset any possible capital loss owing to rising yields, while a positive carry will boost total returns. Stay overweight. Indonesia: Underweight Indonesian relative bond yields versus both EM and the US have already fallen massively and at multi-year lows (Chart 14). The currently low yield differential between Indonesia and the aggregate EM local bonds as well as US Treasury yields is a negative for Indonesia’s relative performance going forward. Chart 15 shows that the rupiah is also vulnerable over the next several months as the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has fallen to its previous lows while the rupiah has not yet depreciated. We believe raw material prices will correct in the coming months, weighing on the rupiah. Hence, the country’s local bonds’ relative performance is facing a currency headwind too. Chart 14Indonesian Relative Bond Yields Are Quite Low Indonesian Bond Yields Are Quite Low Relative To Their EM And US Counterparts Indonesian Bond Yields Are Quite Low Relative To Their EM And US Counterparts Chart 15Indonesian Rupiah Is Vulnerable Indonesian Rupiah Is Vulnerable Indonesian Rupiah Is Vulnerable   Notably, a weaker currency by itself could cause bond yields to rise – because that may prompt foreign bond holders to exit this market. For now, investors would do well to underweight this domestic bond market in an emerging Asian or global EM portfolio. Malaysia: Overweight Chart 16Malaysian Yield Curve Is Too Steep Given The Deflationary Macro Backdrop Malaysian Yield Curve Is Too Steep Given The Deflationary Macro Backdrop Malaysian Yield Curve Is Too Steep Given The Deflationary Macro Backdrop Malaysian domestic bonds will likely fare well as the nation’s economy is still working through credit excesses of the previous decade. Domestic demand weakness has been exacerbated by a constrained fiscal policy. All of this has paved the way for a strong disinflationary backdrop.   The job market has not recovered either: the unemployment rate is hovering at a high level. That in turn has put downward pressures on wages. Average manufacturing wages are weak. Dwindling wages have contributed to depressed household incomes, leading to weak consumption and falling house prices (Chart 16). Considering the economic backdrop, Malaysia’s yield curve is far too steep (Chart 16, bottom panel). Odds are that the curve will flatten going forward – yields at the long end of the curve are likely heading lower. At a minimum, they will rise less than most other EM countries. Notably, the ringgit is quite cheap, and is unlikely to depreciate much versus the US dollar. Hence, it will outperform many other Asian/EM currencies. That calls for an overweight position in Malaysian local bonds within an Asian/EM universe.  Thailand: Underweight To Neutral Given the high correlation between Thai bond yields and the baht (rising yields coincide with a weakening currency), the total return of Thai bonds in USD terms is highly dependent on the baht’s performance. (Chart 17). The baht outlook remains weak, as the two main drivers of the currency, exports and tourism revenues, remain sluggish and absent, respectively. As such, absolute return investors in Thai domestic bonds should continue to avoid this market. Asset allocators should underweight Thai domestic bonds in an emerging Asia basket. In an overall EM domestic bond portfolio, however, Thai bonds warrant a neutral allocation. That’s because Thailand has been a defensive bond market due to its traditionally strong current account, very low inflation, and lower holding of bonds by foreigners (now at 11.3% of total). In periods of stress, the baht usually falls less than most other EM currencies; and often Thai bond yields fall more (or rise less) than overall GBI-EM yields (Chart 18, top panel). Chart 18Thai Bonds' Relative Performance Can Get Better During Periods Of Risk-Off Thai Bonds' Relative Performance Can Get Better During Periods Of Risk-Off Thai Bonds' Relative Performance Can Get Better During Periods Of Risk-Off Chart 17Thai Domestic Bonds' Absolute Performance Is Highly Contingent On The Baht Thai Domestic Bonds' Absolute Performance Is Highly Contingent On the Baht Thai Domestic Bonds' Absolute Performance Is Highly Contingent On the Baht   The net result is that Thai bonds outperform their overall EM brethren in common currency terms during risk-off periods. This is what happened during the EM slowdown of 2014-15, and again during the pandemic scare in early 2020 (Chart 18, bottom panel). Given we are entering a period of volatility in risk assets, it makes sense to have a neutral positioning on Thai bonds in an EM domestic bond portfolio. The Philippines: Underweight To Neutral The Philippines also merits an underweight allocation in an emerging Asian domestic bond portfolio, but a neutral stance within EM. This is because of this market’s dependence on the appetite of foreign debt investors for Philippine debt securities. This appetite depends on how much extra yield the country offers over US Treasuries. Chart 19 shows that whenever the yield differential between the Philippines’ local bonds and US Treasuries widens to 400 basis points or more, the Philippines typically witnesses net debt portfolio inflows over the following year. On the other end, when the yield differential narrows to around 300 basis points or less, foreign fixed income inflows typically stop, and often turn into outflows during the following year. This is what is happening now. Chart 19Narrow Yield Differential With US Treasuries Is Hurting Philippines' Portfolio Inflows Narrow Yield Differential With US Treasuries Is Hurting Philippines' Portfolio Inflows Narrow Yield Differential With US Treasuries Is Hurting Philippines' Portfolio Inflows Chart 20Philippines Peso Is At Risk As The Current Account Has Slid Back Into Deficit Philippines Peso Is At Risk As The Current Account Has Slid Back Into Deficit Philippines Peso Is At Risk As The Current Account Has Slid Back Into Deficit Going forward, rising US yields would mean that the Philippines’ bond spreads over US Treasuries will continue to stay less than 300 basis points. Consequently, reduced foreign debt inflows will weigh on the peso. Notably, the Philippines’ current account balance has also slid back to deficit, which makes the peso more vulnerable (Chart 20). On a positive note, contained inflation means little upward pressure on bond yields. Further, there might be a lower need of new bond issuances this year as a substantial amount of proceeds from past bond issuances are lying unspent with the central bank. This would help put a cap on bond yields.  Investment Conclusions Emerging Asian local bonds will outperform their counterparts in Latin America and EMEA in common currency terms for now. In the medium and long run, emerging Asian bonds will outperform US/DM bonds on a total return basis in common currency terms. We will discuss rationale for the latter in our future reports. Considering both the overarching macro backdrop as well as their individual situations, it makes sense to overweight China, Korea, India and Malaysia in an emerging Asian domestic bonds portfolio. Whereas Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines warrant an underweight allocation. Yet, in an overall EM domestic bond portfolio, we recommend a neutral allocation for Thailand and the Philippines. The reason is they have a much better inflation outlook compared to economies in EMEA and Latin America. Chart 21Book Profit On Our Recommended Short Korean Won Trade Book Profit On Our Recommended Short Korean Won Trade Book Profit On Our Recommended Short Korean Won Trade Notably, among the Asian currencies, we have a positive bias on the Chinese yuan and the Indian rupee. On the contrary, we have been shorting the Korean won, the Thai baht, the Philippine peso and the Indonesian rupiah vis-à-vis the US dollar. That said, this week we recommend taking profits on the short Korean won position: this trade has generated a 5.2% gain since its initiation on March 25, 2021 (Chart 21). Our view on the won has played out well. While the exchange rate might continue depreciating in the near run, the risk/reward of staying short is not very attractive now. Finally, we recommend continuing to receive 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     For a detailed discussion on each country’s inflation dynamics, please click on our reports on China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines.

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Dear Clients, On behalf of the China Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a very happy, healthy, and prosperous Chinese New Year of the Tiger! Gong Xi Fa Chai, Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Executive Summary Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022 Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022 Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022 Chinese investable stocks passively outperformed their global counterparts in the first month of the year. However, we do not think January’s outperformance in the aggregate MSCI China Index will be sustained beyond the next six months. On a cyclical basis, when global stocks recover, growth stocks will likely underperform value stocks. The tech-heavy MSCI China Index is therefore less attractive to investors than other EM and developed market (DM) equities that are more value centric. Chinese investable ex-tech stocks are cheaply valued versus their global peers. Even if the earnings recovery in 2H22 are modest, Chinese investable value stocks are still attractive on a risk-reward basis. For investors that look to increase exposure to China on a cyclical basis, we recommend long Chinese investable value stocks while minimizing exposure to the tech sector. CYCLICAL RECOMMENDATIONS (6 - 18 MONTHS) INITIATION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT EQUITIES Long MSCI China Value Index /Short MSCI China Growth Index 02-02-22     Bottom Line: We expect the tech sector’s passive outperformance in January to be short lived. Value stocks in Chinese investable equities, on the other hand, offer a better risk-reward profile relative to their TMT peers and for investors with a 6- to 12-month investment horizon. Feature Chart 1Chinese Investable Stocks Passively Outperformed In January This Year Chinese Investable Stocks Passively Outperformed In January This Year Chinese Investable Stocks Passively Outperformed In January This Year Chinese investable stocks dropped by 5% in January from December last year, giving up a 3% gain in the first three weeks (Chart 1). Still, the MSCI China Index outperformed global stocks by 2%. Some media reports stated that global investors have been drawn to Chinese offshore equities for their relatively cheap valuations and China’s easier monetary policy compared with other major economies . In our January 19 report we recommended investors tactically (0 to 6 months) upgrade the MSCI China Index to overweight within a global equity portfolio, based on the notion that the MSCI China Index would passively outperform since it would fall less than global equities. We maintain this view but do not expect the outperformance in aggregate Chinese investable stocks to endure on a cyclical basis. Our judgment is that while both China’s investable TMT (technology, media, and telecommunications) and ex-TMT stocks have been deeply discounted versus global stocks, beyond the next six months the investable TMT stocks will likely be a drag on the aggregate MSCI China Index. Thus, for investors looking for trades to increase their cyclical exposure to Chinese stocks, we recommend minimize their exposure to the tech sector. Meanwhile, we continue to favor onshore stocks versus their offshore counterparts, despite cheaper relative valuations in offshore stocks. We will discuss our view of the onshore market in next week’s report. A Valuation Catch-Up A valuation catch-up, as opposed to an improvement in China’s economic fundamentals, appears to be driving the passive outperformance in Chinese investable stocks. Our assessment is based on the following observations: Chart 2Chinese Stocks Normally Fall In Risk-Off Environment Chinese Stocks Normally Fall In Risk-Off Environment Chinese Stocks Normally Fall In Risk-Off Environment The beta of Chinese investable stocks has been steadily increasing over the past few years, versus both EM and global stocks. The high beta and pro-risk nature of Chinese investable stocks suggest their prices should fall in a risk-off market. Generally investors would not favor Chinese stocks during global market selloffs. Chart 2 shows that both EM and global stock benchmarks have fallen below their 200-day moving averages. Therefore, investors have been buying Chinese stocks against a risk-off market backdrop because Chinese stocks offer better risk-reward profile either due to their favorable valuations or higher earnings growth. It is simplistic to assume that investors favor Chinese investable stocks because of the country’s easier monetary policy versus the rest of the world. Chinese A-share stocks, which valuations are neutral, have been selling off more than the offshore stocks (Chart 3). Chinese onshore tech company stocks also suffered large losses in January, similar to their US peers (Chart 3, middle and bottom panels). Therefore, the divergence in the relative performance between the Chinese onshore and offshore markets suggests that discounted valuations in offshore Chinese stocks rather than economic fundamentals have driven the relative gains in the investable bourse. The mirror image in regional equity performance this year compared with last year also suggests that factors other than monetary policy explain equity dynamics (Chart 4). While the tech-heavy US bourse was the worst performer among major indices, markets that generated the greatest returns in 2021 have suffered the biggest losses so far in 2022. This phenomenon suggests that investors may be locking in last year’s gains, which is accentuating the underperformance of 2021’s winners and the outperformance of last year’s losers. Chart 42022 Is A Mirror Image Of 2021 Chinese Investable Stocks In A Global Equity Selloff Chinese Investable Stocks In A Global Equity Selloff Chart 3Chinese Onshore Stocks Followed The Global Market Downtrend Chinese Onshore Stocks Followed The Global Market Downtrend Chinese Onshore Stocks Followed The Global Market Downtrend   Bottom Line: Chinese investable stocks ended January with a much smaller loss than their global peers. The relative outperformance in the MSCI China Index has been mainly driven by its cheaper valuations relative to its global peers. Complacency Risk And Chinese Investable Stocks We see the recent global stock market selloff as a sharp reduction in complacency in the market, particularly in the high-flying tech sector (Chart 5). The correction in global tech stock prices will likely continue for a few months while the market digests a sudden rise in bond yields. As such, the prices in Chinese offshore tech companies will also fall in absolute terms but can still passively outperform their global counterparts, given their deeply discounted relative valuations. Nonetheless, several factors make us cautious about the exposure of China's outsized tech sector beyond the next six months. Hence, our overweight stance on Chinese investable stocks (in relative terms) is limited to the short term (i.e. in the next 0 to 6 months). The growth rates of the 12-month trailing and forward earnings for global tech stocks are both above the 85th percentiles (Chart 6). This indicates that a substantial amount of profit growth has already been priced into global tech stocks, raising the risk of earnings disappointment in the next 6 to 12 months. By contrast, China's TMT-stock 12-month trailing and forward earnings have fallen to below the 25th percentiles (Chart 6, bottom panel). This suggests that the global exuberance in tech earnings is less priced in among Chinese TMT stocks. Chart 5A Sharp Complacency Reduction In The Tech Sector A Sharp Complacency Reduction In The Tech Sector A Sharp Complacency Reduction In The Tech Sector Chart 6Global Tech Earnings Growth Remains Significantly Stretched Global Tech Earnings Growth Remains Significantly Stretched Global Tech Earnings Growth Remains Significantly Stretched However, as noted in our previous reports, Chinese growth/tech companies’ price discount relative to their earnings reflects structural risks that investors are pricing in. These structural headwinds may not intensify in the near term but are not going away either. The regulatory backdrop has not improved enough to justify a sustained faster multiple expansion in China’s internet giants. Beijing continues to rein in its internet behemoths and tighten regulations related to data. It is not yet clear what impact some of the new regulations announced last year will have on the tech sector’s business models. At the very least, antitrust regulations will chip away at the competitive advantage of these tech titans. Furthermore, China's investable TMT sector appears to be a domestic consumer play and thus, likely to weaken in the coming 6 to 12 months given the poor outlook for consumption (Chart 7). Even though China has stepped up its policy support for the aggregate economy, its stringent measures to counter the domestic COVID situation will significantly weigh on its service sector and consumption. The downbeat prospect on China's housing market will also curb consumption growth based on the expectations for employment and income dynamics (Chart 8). Chart 7Outlook For Chinese Internet Sales Remains Downbeat Outlook For Chinese Internet Sales Remains Downbeat Outlook For Chinese Internet Sales Remains Downbeat Chart 8Housing Market Slump A Significant Drag On Household Consumption Housing Market Slump A Significant Drag On Household Consumption Housing Market Slump A Significant Drag On Household Consumption Chart 9Rising Rates Are A Tailwind For Value Stocks Rising Rates Are A Tailwind For Value Stocks Rising Rates Are A Tailwind For Value Stocks Lastly, we expect the pace of increases in bond yields to slow and global equities to trend higher beyond the next couple months. In this case, we are not convinced that Chinese investable stocks will continue to outperform their global peers. The reason for our skepticism is that in a climate of rising interest rates, growth stocks tend to underperform value ones (Chart 9). Given that China's TMT sector’s weight (43%) is considerably higher than the global benchmark (30%), Chinese investable stocks will underperform once valuations in China’s TMT stocks catch up to be in line with those of the global tech sector. Bottom Line: From a valuation perspective, Chinese investable stocks currently look reasonable. In the next a few months when global tech stocks continue to sell off, Chinese offshore tech companies and stocks in general will likely passively outperform their global peers. However, from a risk-reward standpoint and beyond the next six months, the MSCI China Index is at a disadvantage due to a high concentration of stocks in the tech sector. Investment Conclusions On a cyclical basis, Chinese investable stocks will not be immune from global market selloffs due to the offshore market’s high volatility and positive correlation with global stocks. In addition, the MSCI China Index will likely underperform global equities in an up market because of a higher-than-average stake in tech stocks. As such, in a global portfolio we continue to favor onshore stocks over the investable bourse, despite cheaper relative valuations in offshore market equities. Next week’s report will discuss our views on the onshore market. Meanwhile, given the risks facing stocks in China’s tech sector, we propose a new trade recommendation for investors with a cyclical time horizon: long MSCI China Value Index /Short MSCI China Growth Index. The trade will increase cyclical exposure to Chinese offshore stocks, while minimizing stake in the offshore tech sector. The MSCI's China growth index is almost entirely made up of TMT equities, meaning that a relative value play will effectively mimic an ex-TMT position. Extremely cheap valuations in Chinese ex-TMT equities versus global stocks indicate that investors have already priced in a degree of weakness in China's economy (Chart 10). We remain alert to the possibility of a more pronounced near-term slowdown in the business cycle, but we expect China’s economy to regain its footing and stabilize by mid-2022. Our model shows that earnings will decelerate sharply in 1H22 (Chart 11). However, even if the upcoming stimulus and earnings recovery in 2H22 are modest, Chinese value stocks are still attractive on a risk-reward basis given the sizeable valuation discount levied on China relative to global stocks. Chart 10Chinese Investable Value Stocks Are Trading At A Huge Discount Versus Global Chinese Investable Value Stocks Are Trading At A Huge Discount Versus Global Chinese Investable Value Stocks Are Trading At A Huge Discount Versus Global Chart 11Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022 Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022 Chinese Investable Value Stocks Earnings Growth Will Likely Stabilize By Mid-2022   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations