Emerging Markets

Executive Summary No Funding For Property Developers, No Land Sales Beijing’s plan to bring forward RMB 2.6 trillion of financing for infrastructure expenditures in H2 2022 is a considerable stimulus. However, this new funding will not result in new investments. Rather, it will, by and large, offset the drop in local government (LG) revenues from land sales this year. In short, there is little new stimulus for infrastructure beyond what has been approved in the budget plan earlier this year. Not only is the credit and fiscal impulse smaller in this cycle than in the previous ones, but also the multiplier effect will be lower. This will hinder the recovery in domestic demand. After the one-off rebound in economic activity following the lockdowns in April and May of this year, China’s business cycle recovery will be more U shaped rather than V shaped. Bottom Line: For absolute-return investors neither A-shares nor investable stocks offer an attractive risk-reward profile. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to China’s A-shares and an underweight allocation to Chinese investable stocks. Relative to the EM equity benchmark, investors should continue to overweight A-shares and remain neutral on investable stocks. Maintain the long A-shares / short offshore investable Chinese stocks position.   Alleged plans of an additional RMB 1.5 trillion local government (LG) special bond issuance in H2 2022 have prompted investors to speculate about whether this stimulus initiative is sufficient to produce a considerable acceleration in infrastructure investment.  This stimulus would be added to RMB 800 billion and 300 billion of policy bank funding for infrastructure that the government approved earlier in Q2 this year. Hence, the combined new infrastructure financing made available by Beijing is RMB 2.6 trillion. Below, we elaborate on how this RMB 2.6 trillion of additional infrastructure financing will be largely offset by a drop in LG revenues from land sales. In short, the stimulus will preclude downside in infrastructure investment rather than herald a major acceleration.  In addition, the economic recovery still faces substantial headwinds from other segments of the economy. We believe that, approached as a whole, China’s business cycle recovery will be more U shaped than V shaped. Quantifying Infrastructure Stimulus The degree of new financing for infrastructure is considerable. This RMB 2.6 trillion in new financing in H2 2022 is equal to 7% of planned 2022 LG aggregate expenditures, 6% of planned 2022 aggregate total central and local government spending including budgetary and managed funds, 14% of fixed-asset investment (FAI) in traditional infrastructure, and 2% of GDP.  The composition of general government spending is presented in Table 1. Table 1Structure And Composition Of Government Spending In China However, a caveat is in order: this new funding will not result in new investments. Rather, it will, by and large, offset the drop in LG revenues from land sales. The primary source of financing infrastructure investment is LG managed funds. LG managed funds budgets, however, are under severe stress because of the plunge in revenues from land sales. Notably, proceeds from land sales account for 23% of aggregate LG expenditures (Chart 1). Land sales have contracted by about 30% in the January-June period of this year, and there is little hope that they will pick up in H2 2022. The reason is that property developers’ financing is down by 30% and is unlikely to recover soon (Chart 2). Chart 1Land Sales Are Critical For LG Expenditures Chart 2No Funding For Property Developers, No Land Sales Chart 3Property Developers Are Facing Debt Deflation As we have argued in our past reports, property developers carry a substantial inventory of real estate assets funded by a massive debt build-up (Chart 3, top panel). With housing prices beginning to deflate, property developers are about to face debt deflation – falling asset prices and a high debt burden (Chart 3, bottom panel). Thereby, they have little appetite or capacity to expand their assets and leverage. Assuming land sales for the full year will decline by 30%, this drop would lead to an RMB 2.52 trillion reduction in LGs managed fund revenues in 2022 (Table 2). Hence, the new RMB 2.6 trillion infrastructure financing will be used to offset the RMB 2.5 trillion shortfall in LG managed funds budgets because of the plunge in land transfer proceeds. Table 2China: New Stimulus For Infrastructure in H2 2022 On the whole, there will be very little new funding available to boost infrastructure spending beyond what has been approved by the 2022 National People’s Congress (NPC) earlier this year. Chart 4The Credit And Fiscal Impulse Will Be Moderate Hence, for this full year, there is no change to the aggregate fiscal spending impulse that incorporates central and local government budgetary spending as well as managed funds’ expenditures (Chart 4, top panel). The two scenarios for the non-government credit impulse are shown in the middle panel of Chart 4. The optimistic scenario assumes non-government credit will accelerate to 9.5% from 8.7%, and the pessimistic scenario is based on no acceleration in non-government credit growth. Finally, the bottom panel of Chart 4 illustrates the projections for the combined credit and fiscal spending impulse for the remainder of this year. Although the aggregate fiscal and credit impulse is non-trivial, it is smaller than those in 2020, 2016, 2013, and 2009. Bottom Line: The government has announced RMB 1.1 trillion in infrastructure funding and will likely raise the LG special bond quota by RMB 1.5 trillion. Yet, this RMB 2.6 trillion financing will only offset the shortfall in infrastructure financing from plunging land transfer revenue.  In brief, there is little new stimulus for infrastructure beyond what has been approved in the budget plan from early this year.   Economic Headwinds Chart 5China's Reopening Rebound Economic activity in China has rebounded following the reopening of the economy. Chart 5 illustrates that high-frequency data, such as car sales, house sales, commercial truck cargo, and steel production have all recently improved. We expect the one-off renormalization of economic activity following the lockdowns in April and May to give way to more subdued growth. The reason is that the mainland economy is facing several major headwinds: The real estate market is unlikely to recover meaningfully given the “three red lines” policy has not been eased, and many of property market excesses have not been purged. Hence, the question remains whether the Chinese economy can stage a robust recovery without the participation of the property market. We doubt it can because of the vital role that real estate has played in the economy in the past 20 years as the result of its large share in GDP and its impact on consumer and business sentiment. Since 2008, there has been no business cycle recovery in China without the property market firing on all cylinders (Chart 6). Chart 6All Economic Recoveries Were Accompanied By A Revival In The Property Market Chart 7China: The Willingness To Spend And Invest Is Very Low Rolling lockdowns will likely persist. This will weigh on household and private business confidence. Diminishing confidence will undermine the willingness to spend, invest, and hire. Our marginal propensity to spend indicators for households & enterprises remain very depressed (Chart 7). Low propensity to spend entails that the multiplier effect of fiscal and credit stimulus will be lower in this cycle than in the previous ones. Not only is the credit and fiscal impulse smaller than in the previous cycles but also the multiplier will be lower. This will hinder the recovery in domestic demand. Finally, Chinese exports are set to contract in H2 2022 because of shrinking demand for consumer goods (ex-autos) in the US and Europe as well as mainstream EM. Bottom Line: After the one-off rebound in economic activity following the lockdowns in April and May, the business cycle recovery will be more U shaped rather than V shaped. Investment Conclusions For absolute-return investors, neither A-shares nor investable stocks offer an attractive risk-reward profile.   Within the A-share market, our strongest conviction is to overweight interest rate-sensitive sectors like consumer staples, utilities, and healthcare. Consumer discretionary stocks should also be a slight overweight now.   We continue to recommend a neutral allocation to Chinese A-shares and an underweight allocation to investable stocks within a global equity portfolio. Relative to the EM equity benchmark, investors should continue to overweight A-shares and remain neutral on investable Chinese stocks.   Maintain the long A-shares / short offshore investable stocks position.   The yuan, like all other emerging Asian currencies, is still facing near-term downside risk versus the US dollar. Chinese onshore government bond yields will likely drop further.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Executive Summary Global risk assets are oversold, and investor sentiment is downbeat. In this context, a technical equity rebound cannot be ruled out. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. The Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. An equity rally and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more resolute to continue hiking interest rates. There are many similarities between dynamics that prevailed in US tech stocks and in previous bubbles. While it is not our baseline view, the odds of a protracted bear market are nontrivial. Resource prices and commodity plays have more downside. The History Of Financial Bubbles: Is This Time Different? Bottom Line: The decline in commodity prices and the relentless US dollar rally will ensure that EM currencies, bonds and stocks continue to sell off even if the US equity market rebounds in the near term. Feature Among the most frequently discussed topics in recent client calls are the upside and downside risks to our baseline view. We elaborate on these risks in this report. To recap, our baseline view is as follows: EM and DM stocks have another 15% downside in USD terms, the US dollar will continue overshooting and commodity prices will fall. Global yields are topping out, and the US yield curve will soon invert. Hence, defensive positioning for absolute-return investors is still warranted, and global equity and fixed-income portfolios should continue to underweight EM. The rationale is that US and EU demand for goods ex-autos, and hence global trade, is about to contract while the Fed is straightjacketed by high and broad-based inflation. China’s economy will be struggling to recover. In EM ex-China, domestic demand will relapse. Chart 1Will The S&P 500's Technical Support Hold? If one believes that the US equity bull market that began in 2009 is still alive (i.e. the March 2020 selloff is a short-lived red herring), odds are that the S&P 500 drawdown is over. The reasoning is that the S&P 500 is already down 23% from its 2021 peak, on par with the selloffs that occurred in 2011, 2015-16 and 2018 (Chart 1). However, if one believes that the structural bull market is over, the magnitude of the current equity selloff is likely to exceed the ones in 2011, 2015-16 and 2018. Hence, a bearish stance is still warranted. As we argue below, after a 12-year bull run, the excesses in the US equity market in general, and US tech stocks in particular, have become extreme. There are many signs of a bubble, or at least of a major top. Even though we risk overstaying in our negative view, our bias is that the global equity market rout is not yet over. A Bullish Scenario A (hypothetical) bullish case would look something like this: Weakening global and US growth and falling commodity prices bring down US inflation and Treasury yields. As US bond yields drop further, the S&P 500 rallies given their negative correlation of the past 18 months or so. As US inflation declines rapidly, the Fed makes a dovish pivot, reinforcing the risk asset rally and reversing the US dollar’s uptrend. Finally, Chinese stimulus produces a robust business cycle recovery in China that propels commodity prices higher and lifts the rest of EM out of the abyss. Chart 2Keep An Eye On Rising US Trimmed-Mean Inflation In our opinion, this scenario has no more than a 25% chance of playing out. Even if there are apparent signs of a US/global slowdown, elevated US core inflation and accelerating wages and unit labor costs would keep the Fed from dialing down its hawkishness Critically, even though US core PCE inflation has rolled over and will likely decline further, its trimmed-mean PCE inflation is rising (Chart 2). The latter means that inflation is broadening even as some volatile items like food, energy and used-auto prices deflate. As we have written extensively, wages and inflation are lagging variables. Despite the ongoing slowdown in the US economy, it will take many months before the underlying core inflation rate drops below 3%. We maintain that the Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. An equity rally and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more resolute to hike interest rates. The basis is that even if core inflation falls in the coming months, it would still be well above the Fed’s target of 2%. Notably, the Fed has recently communicated that its commitment to bring down inflation to 2% is unconditional. Chart 3The Anatomy Of The US Equity Bear Market In 2000-2002 This policy stance represents a major departure from the past several decades when the Fed was very sensitive to any tightening in financial conditions and often eased preemptively. In short, with inflation still well above its target, the Fed will, for now, err on the side of hawkishness if financial conditions ease. Importantly, US corporate profits will likely contract even if US real GDP does not shrink. As US corporate top-line growth slows and unit labor costs accelerate, profit margins will shrink. For example, the 2001-2002 recession was very mild – consumer spending did not contract at all, and housing boomed (Chart 3, top two panels). Yet, the S&P 500 operating earnings dropped by 30%, and the S&P 500 fell by 50% (Chart 3, bottom two panels). In brief, a devastating bear market does not necessarily require a hard landing. Concerning China, the recovery will likely be U-shaped rather than V-shaped with risks skewed to the downside. Finally, contracting global trade and falling commodity prices will continue, which are negative for EM currencies and assets. Notably, industry data from Taiwan’s manufacturing PMI suggest that the slowdown in the Asian and global economies is widespread. Taiwan’s substantial trade linkages with mainland China signify that the slowdown is not limited to the US and the EU but includes China too. Taiwanese PMI export orders of both semiconductor and basic material producers have plunged to 40 and 30, respectively (Chart 4). Barring a quick turnaround, global semiconductor and basic materials stocks have more downside. Even as US Treasury yields drop, the dollar will continue firming versus EM currencies, including those of Emerging Asian countries. In such a scenario, EM stocks and bonds will weaken further (Chart 5).  Chart 4A Broad-Based Contraction In Global Trade Is In The Cards Chart 5A Free Fall In EM Ex-China Stocks And Currencies   Bottom Line: The S&P 500 is oversold, and investor sentiment is downbeat. In this context, a technical equity rebound can occur at any moment. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. A Bearish Case: Are US TMT Stocks A Bubble? What is a more bearish scenario than our baseline case? The bursting of bubbles or the unwinding of excesses would entail a more protracted and devastating bear market than the 15% drop in global share prices we currently expect. We can identify two major excesses in the global economy and financial system: In US TMT (Technology, Media & Entertainment and Internet & Catalog Retail) stocks and private equity In Chinese real estate. We have written extensively about property market excesses in China. Below we discuss the recent sharp selloff in commodities, which is partially linked to Chinese property construction. We also present the case for major excesses in US stocks. Chart 6 illustrates the history of bubbles of the past several decades: The Nifty-fifty (involving the 50 US large-cap stocks) bubble occurred in the 1960s and burst in the 1970s (not shown in the chart). The commodity bubble took place in the 1970s and burst in the 1980s. Japanese equity and property prices rose exponentially in the 1980s and deflated in the 1990s. The Nasdaq bubble occurred in the 1990s and was shattered in the early 2000s. Commodities/EM/China were the leaders of the 2000s, and they were devastated in the 2010s. We use iron ore in this chart because its price surged the most in the 2000s. FAANGM stocks, the Nasdaq 100 index and private equity were by far the biggest beneficiaries of the 2010s. No one can be certain about bubbles in real time because there are always superior fundamentals or persuasive stories that justify exponential price appreciation. That said, there are a lot of similarities between dynamics prevailing in US tech and private equity and in previous bubbles: In the past decade, FAANGM stocks, the Nasdaq 100 index and private equity companies registered gains comparable to the bubbles of the previous 60 years. Furthermore, as Chart 6 illustrates, the equal-weighted FAANGM index in inflation-adjusted terms rose 30-fold, much more than the bubbles of the previous decades. The Nasdaq 100 index and share prices of Blackstone, the largest private equity company, have risen by nearly 10-fold in real (inflation-adjusted terms) between 2010 and the end of 2021. Chart 6The History Of Financial Bubbles: Is This Time Different? The final phase of bubbles is often characterized by growing retail investor participation. This is exactly what happened with US tech/new economy stocks. Chart 7US TMT Stocks: Exponential Growth Rarely Ends Well Toward the end of the decade, not only retail but also institutional capital stampedes into the winners of the decade. This played out with US large-cap tech stocks as well as in private equity and private debt spaces. Inflows into private equity and private debt have been enormous. As a result of these inflows into US large-cap stocks, the market cap share of US TMT stocks as a percentage of total US market cap has surpassed 40%, its peak in 2000 (Chart 7). Bubbles often thrive during periods of low interest rates and crash when the cost of capital rises. This is exactly what has been happening in global financial markets since early 2019. The parameters of the overall US equity market were also excessive prior to this bear market. As of last year, the S&P 500 stock prices in real (inflation-adjusted) terms became as elevated relative to their long-term time trend as they were in the late 1960s and the late 1990s − the peaks of previous secular bull markets (Chart 8, top panel).   Chart 8The S&P 500 and Operating Profits: A Long-Term Perspective Chart 9Equity Issuance Marks Market Tops The S&P 500’s operating earnings in real terms have surpassed two standard deviations above its time trend (Chart 8, bottom panel). Some sort of mean reversion to its long-term trend is in the cards. US corporate profits have benefited from fiscal/monetary stimulus, low labor costs and pricing power. All of these are now working against profits.   Finally, new share issuance in the US mushroomed in 2021, another sign of a major top (Chart 9). Bottom Line: We are not entirely convinced that US TMT stocks are a bubble waiting to burst. Yet, the odds of this happening are nontrivial. This time might not be different. A Word On Commodities The selloff in the commodity space has been broad-based. Odds are that it will continue for the following reasons: A global business cycle downtrend is always bearish for commodity prices. In fact, oil prices are often lagging and are typically the last shoe to drop during global slowdowns. US sales of gasoline have started to contract. Besides, Saudi Arabia will likely increase its oil output and shipments following President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom next week. Chart 10Investors Have Been Long Commodity Futures As we have argued in recent months, China’s demand for commodities was contracting and, in our opinion, the rally in resource prices over the past 12 months was supported by investment demand for commodities, i.e., financial inflows into the commodity space. Many portfolios have bought commodities as an inflation hedge. When a hedge becomes a consensus trade and crowded, it stops being a hedge. Chart 10 demonstrates that net long positions in 17 commodities have been very elevated. The speed at which liquidation is taking place corroborates our thesis that it is investors not producers or consumers who have been caught being long commodities. China’s business cycle recovery will be U-shaped at best. Domestic orders point to weaker import volumes in the months ahead (Chart 11, top panel). ​​​​​​​Corporate loan demand has plunged suggesting that liquidity provisions by the PBoC might fail to produce a meaningful recovery in credit growth (Chart 11, bottom panel). Finally, technicals bode ill for commodity prices. As Chart 12 illustrates, copper prices and global material stocks have probably formed medium-term tops, and risks are skewed to the downside.  Chart 11China: The Economy Is Struggling To Gain Traction Chart 12A Major Top In Commodity Prices?   Bottom Line: Commodity prices and their plays have more downside. Investment Strategy The decline in commodity prices and the relentless US dollar rally will ensure that EM currencies, bonds and stocks continue to sell off even if the US equity market rebounds in the near term driven by lower Treasury yields. Global equity and fixed-income portfolios should continue underweighting EM. We also continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, PHP and IDR; as well as HUF vs. CZK, and KRW vs. JPY. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Caught In Risk-Off Selling Weak Chinese and European economies are suppressing copper demand and helping to temper prices in a market that remains fundamentally tight. Weaker US GDP growth could put the three largest economies in the world in or close to recession in 2H22/1H23, which would contribute to demand-side weakness in copper markets. The odds manufacturing and base-metals refining will be curtailed in Europe are rising. Although a strike in Norway has been averted by government intervention, maintenance on Russia’s Nord Stream 1 pipeline scheduled to begin next week likely will serve as a pretext for longer and deeper natgas supply cuts to the EU. Bottom Line: Despite fundamental tightness in global copper markets, prices are being restrained by fears weaker Chinese and European economic performance will lead to a global recession. Early reads of US GDP pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 stoke these fears. Heightened economic policy uncertainty globally exacerbates them. We remain fundamentally bullish copper and will re-establish our long SPDR S&P Metals & Mining ETF (XME) – down ~ 40% from its highs in April – at tonight’s close. In addition, we went long the XOP oil and gas ETF at Tuesday’s close, after prompt Brent breached the buy-trigger we set last week of $105/bbl during this week’s crude-oil sell-off.   Feature   Lower GDP growth expectations in China and the EU – along with a wobbly US economy being flagged by an Atlanta Fed GDPNow forecast pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 – are stoking fears of a global manufacturing and industrial recession. This prompted a rout in industrial commodities – base metals and oil – this week, which still has markets on edge. This slow-down in the world’s three largest economies – accounting for almost 50% of global GDP expressed in purchasing-power terms – is the only thing keeping the level of global copper demand close to supply at present (Chart 1).1 At least for the time being, this is keeping the threat of sharply higher copper prices, which would be more in line with the low levels of supplies and inventories globally, at bay (Chart 2). As of the week ended May 27th, global copper stocks stood at just above 562k tons, which is ~ 31% lower y/y. Chart 1World’s Biggest Economies Slowing Chart 2Copper Prices Disconnect From Fundamentals   Uncertainty Weakens Copper Prices Energy and metals markets remain extremely tight on a fundamental supply-demand basis.2 The sharp sell-off this week in oil and metals prices is, in our view, evidence industrial-commodity prices have decoupled from fundamentals.  This makes traders – hedgers and speculators – extremely risk-averse, which reduces liquidity and increases volatility. On the back of these concerns, markets exhibit the sort of volatility associated with economic collapse, despite still-strong underlying fundamentals. Chart 3Rising Global Policy Uncertainty Volatility is on the rise due to increasing economic uncertainty in these markets. This makes it extremely difficult to assign probabilities to different price outcomes (i.e., true uncertainty). The BBD Global Economic Policy Uncertainty is approaching levels seen during the early pandemic (Chart 3).  We put this rising uncertainty down to poor policy and communication from central banks and governments; a pig’s breakfast of energy policy globally that increasingly adds nothing but confusion to markets; and a muddled public-health policy in China, which produces random shut-downs in global supply chains as covid infections randomly crop up in important port cities.  Lastly, the East and West are moving toward a new Cold War, which already is having profound effects on all markets, trade flows and capital availability in the short- and medium-term. This keeps markets on edge and forces them to parse every geopolitical development that hits the tape.3 Re-forging supply chains, re-building basic industrial infrastructure as the West moves away from outsourcing to China and other EM states will be costly and volatile, especially as embargoes and sanctions increase between these blocs.    This political and economic evolution will require increased investment in base metals production and exploration, along with similar commitments to oil and gas. Low and volatile prices will not support this, as they disincentivize investment, and set markets up for continued shortage and scarcity going forward. In the metals markets, years of underinvestment by major mining companies will keep copper supplies and inventories tight going forward (Chart 4). This will hinder and delay the global renewable-energy transition, which cannot be realized without higher base-metals supplies.  Chart 4Structural Underinvestment In Mining Fundamentally Bullish Copper Recession Fears Haunt Metals Globally … The proximate causes of the persistent weakening of copper prices is the demand destruction arising from the lockdown in China, and an increasing concern over the economic prospects of the EU as it prepares for a possible shut-off of Russian natgas exports. Should Russian supplies be cut off, the EU will be pushed into recession as natural-gas rationing – and the attendant prioritization of human needs going into winter – will constrict economic activity, particularly in manufacturing.  This leaves two of the three largest economies in the world either in recession or not growing at all. Added to this is the fear of a wobbly US economy, which has been slowed by higher energy prices and the Fed’s hawkish tightening of monetary policy. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast for 2Q22 estimates a 2.1% contraction in US GDP. This would be the second consecutive quarter of negative growth and would meet a widely held rule-of-thumb indicator or recession.4  In our modelling, we estimate the income elasticity of copper demand in DM economies like the EU and US (1.39) and EM-ex-China (0.87) states is higher than that of China (0.37). This means that a 1% contraction in p.a. Chinese real GDP would translate to a 0.37% p.a. fall in copper demand, all else equal. A contraction of real incomes – i.e., real GDP – in the EU and EM-ex-China will cause a larger relative adjustment in copper demand than in China, even though the level of copper demand in China is far greater in absolute terms (Chart 5).  A recession in the EU will reduce import demand for China’s manufactured output in these markets (Chart 6). As China’s trade volumes fall, Chinese manufacturing PMIs will contract. Similarly, exports to China from the EU will weaken as manufacturing weakens and real GDP moves lower. We believe this will put more pressure on the Chinese government to provide fiscal and monetary stimulus to counter such a downdraft.  Chart 5Copper Demand Sensitive to Real GDP (Income) Chart 6Trade Channel Effects Follow GDP Weakness … But China Worries Dominate The Chinese economy is showing signs of further slowing.5 Weakness in credit levels, infrastructure investment, manufacturing, the property sector, and exports all indicate the covid-policy lockdowns, high commodity prices, and parsimonious credit and fiscal policies have produced a dramatic slowing in economic activity. In our modelling, we find evidence that each of these components exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with Chinese copper inventories, which in turn exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with COMEX copper prices.  Roughly 10 days after the initial Shanghai lockdown, copper prices went into contango (Chart 7). This occurred despite continuous declines in Chinese copper inventories during the lockdown months (Chart 8). Such anomalous behavior – i.e., as inventories fall markets become more backwardated – makes it difficult to connect prices and supply-demand-inventory fundamentals. Chart 7Copper In Contango For Most Of China’s Lockdown Chart 8Chinese Copper Inventories Continue To Draw In Lockdown BCA’s China Investment Strategy expects a muted 2H22 recovery for the Chinese economy. Rolling lockdowns due to China’s COVID policy will reduce the potency of fiscal and monetary stimulus. The stop-start nature of economic activity will stymie growth in disposable income and job creation, which in turn will translate to weaker aggregate demand. The knock-on effect of weaker business activity due to the lockdown earlier this year has been a higher propensity to save by households (Chart 9). Household surveys conducted by the PBoC show that, since 2017, household savings have been increasing, suggesting a precautionary sentiment (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Economic Slowdown Reduced Credit Demand Chart 10Rising Precautionary Savings... Chart 11...Will Impact Domestic Property Market We do not expect the property market to recover in a manner similar to what occurred following China’s re-opening after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Depressed household purchasing power will keep housing demand subdued, while the “three red lines” policy, which limits the amount property developers can borrow, will keep supply low (Chart 11).6 Housing accounts for ~ 30% of copper consumption in China, which means weak property markets will remain a drag on copper demand. Investment Implications Continued weakness in China’s economy and a potentially deep recession in the EU will continue to restrain demand for copper globally. In addition, with the US economy looking wobbly, the third global pillar of economic strength also will be weakening going into 2H22. These fundamental demand-side effects will lower pressure on tight copper inventories and keep prices subdued, in our view. This does not, however, signal an all-clear for copper supply or inventory tightness. Weaker demand is the only thing keeping prices from rising sharply, given the tight supply and inventory position of global copper markets. On the supply side, governance issues in copper-rich Latin American states, which are in the process of revising their social contracts with copper producers and consumers, will increase mining costs for companies, disincentivizing long-term and large-scale investments in new mines.7 These costs ultimately will be borne by consumers as supply shortages mount and the need to increase capex grows. Ultimately, this will feed into longer-term inflation and inflation expectations. Chart 12Caught In Risk-Off Selling We remain long-term bullish copper, as fundamentals remain tight and will get tighter. That said, over the short term, aggregate-demand weakness in the three major economic pillars in the world makes us leery of getting long copper futures, particularly as prompt COMEX prices test support (Chart 12).  Persistently weak copper prices will disincentivize the needed investment in new supply the world will need to effect a transition to renewable energy in coming decades. For this reason, we are comfortable re-establishing our long XME metals and mining ETF at tonight’s close, as copper prices are down 40% from their April highs. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodity Round-Up Energy: Bullish. A strike by Norwegian energy-sector workers that would have hit the natural gas market in Europe particularly hard was averted earlier this week.8 This still leaves the EU and UK (Europe) at risk of additional losses of Russian natgas exports beginning next week when Nord Stream 1 (NS1) maintenance is due to start. These threats have pushed Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) natural gas prices up close to 93% since 1 June, and close to 400% y/y as of Tuesday. For the first five months of this year, Europe’s been importing just under 15 Bcf/d of LNG, with ~ 8.5 Bcf/d of those volumes coming from the US, based on EIA data. The EIA expects US LNG exports to average ~ 11.9 Bcf/d this year and 12 Bcf/d in 2023. Europe accounted for just under 75% of US exports in January – April of this year, and we expect that to continue going forward. The IEA expects Russia to supply 25% of EU demand this year, the lowest in 20 years. Last year, Russian imports covered ~ 40% (~ 7 TCF) of EU demand. Base Metals: Zinc stocks are depleted but prices are dropping on recession fears (Chart 13). Smelting operations were hit last year following the power-supply crunches in China and Europe. While China has recovered its energy security, Europe, which accounts for ~15% of global refined zinc supply, has not. Reduced natgas supply from Russia will make the smelting shortage in Europe even more acute, especially if power and fuel rationing occur. In April, China was a net exporter of zinc for the first time since 2014, as low demand in the state and low European zinc supply incentivized Chinese smelters to ship metal to the West despite high outbound tariffs. Precious Metals: Markets switched from inflation to growth fears, as central banks, notably the Fed began hiking interest rates aggressively to curb inflation. Investors have been flocking to the USD, which hit a 20-year high on recession fears this week (Chart 14). This has happened at the expense of the yellow metal, which, since breaking through the USD 1800/oz mark last week, has continued to drop, hitting an 8-month low as of yesterday's close. Chart 13Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Chart 14   Footnotes 1     Please see China, US and EU are the largest economies in the world, which was published by Eurostat 19 May 2020. 2     For additional discussion of oil-market fundamentals, please see Recession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices, which covers our expectation for global oil balances and prices. It was published 16 June 2022. 3    Please see Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy 30 July 2021. See also Commodities' Watershed Moment, which we published 22 March 2022.  4    Please see GDPNow, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 1 July 2022. 5    Please see Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning, published by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy 24 June 2022. This report notes, “China’s political crackdown, struggle with Covid-19, waning exports, and deflating property market have led to an abrupt slowdown this year. The government is responding by easing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, though so far with limited effect … . Economic policy will not be decisive in the third quarter unless a crash forces the administration to stimulate aggressively.” 6    In August 2020, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the People’s Bank of China proposed to implement a policy which kept a ceiling on companies’ asset to liability ratio at 70%, net debt to equity ratio at 100%, and cash to short-term borrowings ratio at 1. Developers whose liabilities are within these requirements may increase their liabilities by less than 15%. These were known as the “three red lines.” Per that policy, if one or more of these ceilings are surpassed, maximum liabilities growth is capped at a lower percentage. 7     Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published 25 November 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also Chile sticks to plan for new mining profit tax up to 32% linked to copper price, published by reuters.com via mining.com 1 July 2022. 8    Please see Norway’s government halts oil and gas strike published by ft.com 5 July 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trades Closed In 2022

Executive Summary Buying a home is now more expensive than renting in many parts of the world. In the US and UK, disappearing homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers will weigh on home prices over the next 6-12 months. Falling employment and falling house prices risk becoming a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that turns a mild recession into a severe recession. To stop such a vicious cycle running out of control, policymakers will eventually bring down mortgage rates. For this reason, on a time horizon of 6-12 months, overweight bonds. A collapse in Chinese property development and construction activity will have negative long-term implications for commodities, emerging Asia, and developing countries that produce raw materials. Structurally underweight. On the other hand, stay structurally overweight the China 30-year government bond. Fractal trading watchlist: US Biotech versus Utilities. Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting! Bottom Line: The decade-long global housing boom is over. Feature For the first time since 2018, the number of Brits wanting to buy a home is less than the number of Brits wanting to sell their home. The balance of homebuyers versus homes for sale is the main driver of any housing market. When multiple homebuyers are competing for a home for sale, the subsequent bidding war puts upward pressure on house prices. But when, multiple homes for sale are competing for a homebuyer, the subsequent discounting war puts downward pressure on house prices. The balance of homebuyers versus homes for sale is the main driver of any housing market. This makes the number of homebuyers versus homes for sale the best leading indicator of house prices. The recent collapse of this leading indicator in the UK warns that UK house prices are likely to soften through the remainder of 2022 and into 2023 (Chart I-1). Chart I-1With Fewer UK Homebuyers Than UK Home-Sellers, UK House Prices Are Set To Drop Homebuyers Are Disappearing While Home-Sellers Are Flooding The Market Disappearing homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers is also evident in the US. According to Realtor.com: “Weary US homebuyers face not only sky-high home prices but also rising mortgage rates, and that financial double whammy is hitting homebuyers hard: Compared with just a year ago, the cost of financing 80 percent of a typical home rose 57.6 percent, amounting to an extra $745 per month.” Compared with just a year ago, the cost of financing 80 percent of a typical US home rose 57.6 percent, amounting to an extra $745 per month. Unsurprisingly, US mortgage applications for home purchase have recently plunged by a third (Chart I-2) and homebuyer demand has declined by 16 percent since last June.1 Meanwhile, the inventory of homes actively for sale on a typical day in June has increased by 19 percent, the largest increase in the data history. Chart I-2With The Cost Of Financing A US Home Purchase Surging, Mortgage Applications Have Collapsed The flood of new homes on the market means that the dwindling pool of homebuyers will have more negotiating leverage on the asking price (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). This will balance the highly lopsided negotiating dynamics in the raging seller’s market of the past two years. The shape of things to come can be seen in Austin, Texas, which was one of the hottest markets during the early pandemic real estate frenzy. Chart I-3US Homebuyers Are Disappearing... Chart I-4...While US Home-Sellers Are Flooding The Market “Prices are definitely starting to go down again… last Friday, an Austin home was listed at $825,000. The next day, at the open house, no one came. A few months ago, there would have been 20 or more buyers showing up. The sellers didn’t want to test the market, so on Sunday, they dropped it to $790,000. It sold for $760,000.” Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting The nub of the problem for homebuyers is that the mortgage rate is higher than the rental yield. In simple terms, buying a home is now more expensive than renting (Chart I-5). The housing bulls counter that the high mortgage rate will force rental yields to adjust upwards by rents going up, but this argument is flawed. Chart I-5Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting! The most important driver of rent inflation is the unemployment rate (inversely). Because, to put it bluntly, you need a steady job to pay the rent! Today, the Federal Reserve’s inflation problem, in a nutshell, is that rent inflation is too high even versus the tight jobs market (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Fed Needs To Push Up Unemployment To Pull Down Rent Inflation Although the Fed cannot say this explicitly, its mechanism to bring down inflation is to push up unemployment, and thereby to pull down rent inflation, which constitutes almost half of the core inflation basket. In this case, the rental yield (rent divided by house price) would adjust upwards by the denominator – house prices – going down. The most important driver of rent inflation is the unemployment rate (inversely). Yet the housing bulls also argue that the housing boom is the result of a structural undersupply of homes. They claim that as this structural undersupply persists, it will underpin house prices. But this ‘housing shortage’ narrative is another myth, which we can debunk with two simple observations. Through the past decade, home prices have risen simultaneously and exponentially everywhere in the world. Now ask yourself, is it plausible that there could be a structural undersupply of homes everywhere in the world at the precisely the same time? If this doesn’t debunk the housing shortage narrative, then try this second observation. Through the past decade, gross rents have tracked nominal GDP. Theory says that gross rents should track nominal GDP, because the quality of the housing stock improves broadly in line with GDP, and therefore so too should rents. If there really was a structural undersupply of housing, then gross rents would be structurally outperforming nominal GDP. But that hasn’t happened in any major economy (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Rents Have Tracked GDP, So There Is No 'Structural Undersupply' Of Homes As an aside, if rents track GDP, then why do they constitute almost half of the core inflation basket?  The answer is that the rents included in inflation are ‘hedonically adjusted’, meaning that are supposedly deflated for quality improvements – though there is always a niggling doubt whether the statisticians do this adjustment correctly! Pulling all of this together, the synchronized global housing boom of the past decade was not the result of a structural undersupply. Instead, it was the result of a valuation boom – meaning, plummeting rental yields, which in turn were the result of plummeting mortgage rates, which in turn were the result of plummeting bond yields. But now that mortgage rates are much higher than rental yields, this ‘virtuous’ cycle risks turning vicious. Falling employment and falling house prices risk becoming a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that turns a mild recession into a severe recession. To stop such a vicious cycle running out of control, policymakers will eventually have no other choice than to bring down mortgage rates. For this reason, on a time horizon of 6-12 months, overweight bonds. But The Prize For The Biggest Housing Boom Goes To… China The housing booms in the UK, US and other Western economies, extreme as they are, are small fry compared to the housing boom in China. Chinese real estate, now worth $100 trillion, is by far the largest asset-class in the world. And Chinese rental yields, at around 1 percent, are well below the yield on cash. Begging the question, how can Chinese real estate valuations be in such stratospheric territory, with a yield even less than that on ‘risk-free’ cash? The simple answer is that investors have been led to believe that Chinese real estate is a risk-free investment! Without a social safety net and with limited places to park their money, Chinese savers have for years been encouraged to buy homes, in the widespread belief that property is the safest investment, whose price is only supposed to go up (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Chinese Real Estate Is Perceived To Be A 'Risk Free' Investment With the bulk of Chinese households’ wealth in property acting as a perceived economic safety net, even a 10 percent decline in house prices would constitute a major shock to the household sector’s hopes and expectations of what property is. In turn, the ensuing ‘negative wealth effect’ would be catastrophic for household spending in the world’s second largest economy. Therefore, in contrast to the US housing debacle in 2008, the Chinese government will ensure that its property market adjustment does not come from a collapse in home prices. Rather, it will come from a collapse in property development and construction activity, combined with keeping interest rates structurally low. This will have negative long-term implications for commodities, emerging Asia, and developing countries that produce raw materials. Structurally underweight. On the other hand, Chinese bonds are an excellent investment for those investors who can accept the capital control risks. Stay structurally overweight the China 30-year government bond. Fractal Trading Watchlist Biotech and Utilities are both defensive sectors, based on the insensitivity of theirs profits to economic fluctuations. But whereas Biotech is ‘long duration’, Utilities is ‘shorter duration’. Over the coming months, as the economy falters and bond yields back down, long duration defensives, such as Biotech, are likely to be the winners. This is supported by the recent underperformance reaching the point of fractal fragility that has indicated previous major turning points (Chart I-9). The recommended trade is long US Biotech versus Utilities, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 20 percent. This replaces our long US Biotech versus Tech position, which achieved its 17.5 percent profit target, and is now closed. Chart I-9Biotech Is Set To Be A Big Winner Chart 1CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 2US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 3CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 4Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 5The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 6The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 7FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 8Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Chart 9The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 10The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 11Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Chart 12AT REVERSAL Chart 13AT REVERSAL Chart 14The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 15The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 16A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 17Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 18Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 19Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 20Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 21The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 22The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 24GBP/USD At A Turning Point Chart 25Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 26Fractal Trading Watch List Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Realtor.com gauge homebuyer demand by so-called ‘pending listings’, the number of listings that are at various stages of the selling process that are not yet sold. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Special Report

Executive Summary Rebounding Chinese Auto Sales China’s stimulus for auto purchases and an easing global auto chip shortage will lead to about a 10% recovery in domestic auto sales in 2022H2 from a year ago. Next year, we expect Chinese auto sales to grow only modestly (under 5%).  The share of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in auto sales is rising rapidly in China, crowding out internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) at a fast rate. China is becoming more competitive in global auto manufacturing given its edge in NEV battery technologies and autonomous driving. Production of NEVs and the installation of NEV charging poles will expand rapidly. Yet, given the still-high valuation of these stocks, we will look to buy into these sectors at a better price entry point. Bottom Line: Chinese onshore and offshore automobile stock prices have risen sharply in the past couple of months on the expectation of improving car sales. Our bias is that the rally has been too fast and gone too far. Investors should wait for a pullback before they buy. Feature Chinese total auto sales contracted by 12% year on year in the first five months of this year due to a deep 24% contraction in non-NEV sales. In stark contrast, Chinese NEV sales have more than doubled during the same period. However, the 1-million-unit increase in NEV sales failed to counteract the 2.4-million-unit loss in non-NEV demand. This raises two questions. Why have NEV sales skyrocketed at a time when non-NEV sales have tanked? Will Chinese auto sales recover in 2022H2 and 2023? If so, then how strongly will the recovery be? The answer to the first question lies in a major auto chip allocation strategy that many Chinese auto producers adopted last year. Under limited semiconductor supplies, auto producers in China prioritized the use of chips in their production of NEV models – which have higher profit margins –over traditional vehicles. The greater availability of NEVs than ICEVs has meant an increase in sales of the former and a deep contraction in the latter in 2022H1. Chart 1Chinese Auto Sales: A Recovery Ahead? For the second question, we believe that China’s stimulus package to boost auto sales and an easing global auto chip shortage will lead to about a 10% recovery in auto sales in 2022H2 from a year ago. On the other hand, growth in 2023 will be very modest (under 5%). Accordingly, the daily data of Chinese retail auto sales have already shown a strong rebound in the total sales of NEVs and ICEVs in the last three weeks of June (Chart 1). Auto Sales In China: A Gradual Recovery     China’s auto sales are set to have a gradual recovery in 2022H2. We expect auto sales to reach 26.2-26.8 million units by the end of this year, with NEV and non-NEVs rising to 5-5.3 million units and 21.2-21.5 million units, respectively1 (Chart 2). The reasons for our positive estimates include policy stimulus, improving technological advancement of NEVs, as well as an easing in the global auto chip shortage. First, the government has issued a flurry of policies since late May attempting to boost domestic auto demand. As Chart 1 shows, these policies have proved effective, at least for now. In previous episodes of stimulus aimed at boosting auto sales in 2009-2010, 2016-2017, and 2019-2021, authorities had implemented similar supportive measures. While the stimulus worked well in the first two episodes, it was not effective in 2019-2021 (Chart 3).   Chart 2Auto Demand In China: A Gradual And Moderate Rebound Chart 3Policy Stimulus Will Help Lift Chinese Auto Demand Box 1 shows our summary of those auto stimulus and a comparison of these episodes. Of all these policies, we believe that a sales tax reduction2 on certain vehicles has proved to be the most effective policy as it directly reduced the prices of these vehicles. In 2022H2, this policy will mainly benefit ICEVs sales as NEVs will continue to enjoy a full exemption from the 10% vehicle purchase tax. The government is also considering an extension of the exemption for NEVs to the end of next year.  Box 1China’s Stimulus Package For The Domestic Auto Industry​​​​​​​ This year’s stimulus is more comparable to the 2009 and 2016 episodes as they share the same reduction in the sales tax rate from 10% to 5%. The main difference is that this time the policy targets cars with 2-liter engines or smaller, while back in 2009 and 2016 this policy only applied to vehicles with capacity no bigger than 1.6-liters. This means a larger range of vehicles will benefit from the reduction. In short, the current policy will allow an additional 23% share of total vehicles sold to benefit from the stimulus. Please note that for the period of 2019-2021 there was no sales tax reduction. This may be one of the reasons for the lack of recovery in vehicle sales in this episode; Chinese auto sales contracted in both 2019 and 2020. Second, Chinese NEVs buyers have been enjoying government subsidies, albeit on a sliding scale since 2019. The amount of subsidy has been dropping by 10%, 20% and 30% in 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively (Table 1). We expect NEV sales to rise as the subsidy is set to expire by the end of this year. This may induce some buyers to buy NEVs before the subsidy ends. Table 1Government Subsidy For NEV Purchase in China Chart 4NEVs Become More Appealing To Chinese Consumers In addition, NEVs are becoming increasingly appealing for auto buyers. This is due to longer travel mileage per battery charge, constant improvement in NEV related technologies, and an expanded charging/battery swap framework (Chart 4). Further, in comparison to traditional ICEVs, NEVs have become increasingly more equipped with functions such as autonomous driving, intelligent interconnection, and other software application-based services. NEVs will also become more integrated with intelligent and interactive networks. All these features will make NEVs more attractive to automobile buyers as well.  According to the McKinsey China Auto Consumer Insights 2021 report, Chinese consumers are more interested than ever in smart vehicle technologies, and they are willing to pay a premium for innovative features. 80% of consumers report that autonomous driving will be a key factor in their decision-making when they buy their next car. Meanwhile, 69% of consumers consider that over-the-air update technology (OTA) is an important feature, and 62% of those are willing to pay for it. Chart 5NEV Sales In China Are Not Very Sensitive To Gasoline Prices Rising oil and gasoline prices have also encouraged NEV sales in the past six-to-nine months. But we believe high fuel prices are relatively less important factors to NEV demand in China than in the US and EU. For example, in 2020H2, when oil prices were only around US$40-50 and domestic gasoline price were low, Chinese NEV sales still rose strongly during the same period (Chart 5). Third, the deep contraction in non-NEV sales in China in 2021 was partially caused by the global auto chip shortage. Global semiconductor chip shortages are likely to continue easing in 2022H2 as demand-supply gaps decrease across most components. Demand for consumer electronics is set to contract in the US and the EU in the next six-to-nine months. Hence, some capacity for PC and smartphone chips could be used to produce auto chips in the months ahead. Bottom Line: Government initiatives to boost auto sales, improving technological advancement of NEVs, and an easing of the global auto chip shortage will lift Chinese auto sales to some extent. Structural Auto Demand: A New Normal? Auto sales peaked in 2017 and are since down by 13%. Even if auto sales registered a modest recovery as we expect in 2022 and 2023, they will still be about 6% below their 2017 peak. The reasons why we do not expect a brisk auto sales recovery are as follows: Household (HH) income growth is very weak and the unemployment rate has been rising (Chart 6). HHs have considerable debt (Chart 7). With house prices not rising, and potentially deflating, HH willingness to take on more debt has declined. Chart 6Falling HH Income Growth And Rising Unemployment Chart 7HH Debt Burden Is Already High​​​​​​ Wage/income growth has downshifted and narrowed its gap with interest rates on consumer loans. The cost HH debt has therefore risen relative to their income growth, making consumers less willing to take on more debt.   Reflecting downbeat consumer sentiment, the HH marginal propensity to consume has fallen to very low levels and has not shown signs of improvement (Chart 8). With the mediocre structural auto demand outlook in China, NEV sales will rapidly gain market share from non-NEVs (Chart 9). NEVs currently account for about 18% of total auto sales in China, still much lower than the country’s goal of 40% in 2030. Chart 8HH Willingness To Spend Is Low Chinese Consumers: Falling Willingness To Consume Chart 9Accelerating NEV Penetration In China Last week the EU passed a plan of a 2035 phase-out of new fossil fuel car sales. This is also a trend for China. Chinese auto makers such as Changan, BAIC Motor and Haima have already announced that they will stop ICEV production in 2025. Chart 10Decelerating Growth In Chinese Oil Demand Declining ICEV sales will lead to lower growth of these vehicles on the road (Chart 10). Consequently, gasoline and diesel demand growth from passenger and commercial autos will be decelerating in China in the coming years. Bottom Line: Passenger car demand in China will be settled in low single digit growth rates. The market share of NEVs will rise very fast at the expense of ICEVs. In turn, falling ICEV sales will result in slower growth in domestic petroleum demand.  China: Increasing Competitiveness Chart 11Increasing Competitiveness Of Chinese Auto Manufacturers China has become increasingly competitive in global auto manufacturing. This is a strong tailwind for the country’s auto exports. In fact, the country’s net exports of autos have been rising (Chart 11). China is the world’s largest auto producer and consumer, accounting for 32.5% and 32% of global auto production and sales, respectively. The country is also the world’s largest NEV producer. Chart 12China: The World’s Leading And Largest EV Battery Producer ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​The battery is the most important component of an NEV, and its technological progress holds the key to the speed of NEV penetration. China is the world leader in this battery technology. China’s CATL is currently the world's largest battery manufacturer, with a market share of 32.5%. CATL ranked first in the world for five consecutive years from 2017 to 2021. In addition, four out of the top ten global EV battery players are Chinese companies, with a total market share of 44%, up from 41% last year (Chart 12). Moreover, in late June, CATL launched its cell-to-pack (CTP 3.0) battery. With a record-breaking volume utilization efficiency of 72% and an energy density of up to 255 Wh/kg, it achieves the highest integration level worldwide so far, capable of delivering a range of over 1,000 km on a single charge. The CTP 3.0 batteries are expected to be mass produced and come onto the market in 2023. The development of charging/battery-swapping infrastructure will continue to be faster in China than in other countries/regions due to the country’s competitive advantage in NEV production, including batteries, as well as related policy support. For example, the number of total public & private charging poles rose at a compound annual growth rate of 50% in the past five years. This allows China to collect more NEV charging-related data, which could be used to improve the country’s NEV manufacturing process, charging pole production, and the country’s charging infrastructure development. This will help reduce the charging anxiety of Chinese NEV users. In terms of autonomous driving, five Chinese companies have been included in the world’s 10 best autonomous driving companies based on their technological edge, according to the global autonomous driving report released by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). In addition to test drives in the US, major Chinese NEV makers have also carried out test drives in China with long distances and more complicated driving conditions. For example, as of mid-March, Baidu Apollo’s autonomous driving has already exceeded 25 million kilometers. In comparison, the total test distance of autonomous driving of all autonomous driving test cars in California were only 6.4 million kilometers. Chart 13China: Faster NEV Penetration Versus Other Countries At 13.4%, the share of NEVs in total auto sales in China was high last year compared with other countries (Chart 13). The ratio has already risen to 21% in the first five months of this year. Bottom Line: China will become more competitive in global auto manufacturing given its edge in NEV battery technologies and autonomous driving. Investment Implications Chinese onshore and offshore automobile stock prices have risen sharply in the past couple of months, expecting improving car sales in the short-to-medium term (Chart 14). Our bias is that the rally has been too fast and gone too far. Investors should wait for a pullback before they buy. A shakeout in broader Chinese offshore and onshore stocks is likely due to the following (Chart 15): Chart 14Chinese Automobile Stock Prices: A Lot Of Good News Already Priced In... Chart 15...A Pullback Is Due Chart 16Look To Buy Chinese NEV-related Stocks China’s economy is still facing downward pressure due to a faltering property market, sluggish household income growth and consumption, falling export demand, as well as heightened risks of further COVID-induced lockdowns. Global equities have probably not completed their downtrend. It will be hard for Chinese stocks to continue rallying if global share prices continue to fall. That said, we have a bullish bias towards Chinese NEV producers. China’s NEV sector enjoys tailwinds from structurally strong demand and its technological edge, especially in batteries. Hence, we will look to buy Chinese NEV and battery stocks at a better price entry point (Chart 16).   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) predicted Chinese auto sales to rise to 27.5 million units for the full year. We are a little bit less optimistic on that front. 2     The State Council of China is enacting 60-billion-yuan (US$9 billion) worth of tax cuts between June and December. The purchase tax on certain passenger vehicles will be reduced by half to 5% of the sticker price. The tax cuts target cars with 2-liter engines or smaller, priced at 300,000 yuan (US$ 44,800) or less. Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations