Emerging Markets

Executive Summary Long-Term Contracts Needed To Increase LNG Supply EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels The EU will have to reverse course and execute long-term contracts with natural gas producers, LNG shippers and pipeline operators to incentivize production of supplies needed to contain energy prices. Long-term contracting will offer the EU an opportunity to address political and economic fragmentation risks via joint taxation policies.  This would transform state-level risks via-a-vis energy and military security into joint-and-several obligations. The G7’s plan to cap Russian oil prices will be DOA.  The most oil import-dependent EM economies – China and India – will find deeply discounted crude irresistible. Hydrocarbon producers and refiners will increase investments in carbon-capture and storage technology, to maintain their new-found advantage as secure energy sources.  Additional subsidies and funding for this technology will be forthcoming. Bottom Line: The hard realities of military conflict and a lack of investment in production and refining will force governments to incentivize substantial investments in hydrocarbons – particularly natural gas and LNG infrastructure – to address global energy scarcity during a time of war.  We remain long oil and gas exposures via the COMT ETF, and long equity refining and services exposures via the CRAK and IEZ ETFs.  We will re-establish our producer-oriented XOP ETF position if prompt Brent futures trade down to $105/bbl in the front month.  We also remain tactically long Brent and eurozone natgas futures and options. Feature The G7 last opined on liquified natural gas (LNG) supply in May, and as was the case this week, it left even casual observers uncertain as to what it is seeking to achieve: It advocated for a halt to further investments in fossil-fuel projects and, at the same time, called for higher LNG supplies to be provided for the EU states.1  The EU faces daunting energy security and supply constraints.2 A deepening energy scarcity will, we expect, push the EU into recession later this year, as natural-gas rationing is invoked to ensure there are sufficient supplies to meet human needs this winter.  Natgas scarcity will force the EU to reverse course on its renewable-energy transition in the medium term and prioritize fossil-fuel investments, in our view.  Long-term contracting with LNG suppliers will be required to incentivize needed investment in production and transportation to replace Russian gas imports.  Such contracting is a necessity for hydrocarbon producers, given governments’ continued calls for no additional fossil-fuel investment.  Quicksilver shifts in policy are a continuing source of uncertainty for investors and energy-supply firms. Over time, the EU will have to replace close to 7 Tcf/yr of Russian gas imports (Chart 1, middle panel).  This will propel the EU into the ranks of the world’s largest LNG importers (Chart 2).  Chart 1EU Needs To Replace ~ 7 Tcf/yr Of LNG EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels Chart 2EU Will Become A World-Class LNG Importer EU Will Become A World-Class LNG Importer EU Will Become A World-Class LNG Importer Chart 3Long-Term Contracts Needed To Increase LNG Supply EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels EU Will Reverse Course On Fossil Fuels Given the length of contracts typically executed with LNG exporters – in excess of 20-plus years – EU governments will be compelled to allow firms and member states to sign long-term contracts for these supplies.  EU governments also will be required to begin planning for and developing LNG importing infrastructure, as these supplies become available over the next 3-5 years. In the meantime, LNG prices will remain under pressure as competition heats up globally ahead of the coming winter (Chart 3). G7 Price-Cap Scheme Will Be DOA The G7’s scheme to impose a price cap on Russian oil exports will be DOA as soon as details are presented.  This is because the world’s largest oil import-dependent economies – China and India – not only have long trading histories with Russia, but they also operate their own oil-transport fleets that can circumvent insurance-related obstacles imposed by the US and the UK.  China and India already find discounted Russian oil irresistible, and are unlikely to acquiesce to US demands for a price cap.  China imports 75% of its 15.5mm b/d of oil consumption, while India imports ~ 85% of the 5mm b/d of oil it consumes.  Even if oil importers taking Russia's exports going to the EU were to sign on to a price-cap scheme, Russia could always unilaterally cut its oil and condensate production by 20-30% and force Brent prices sharply higher for remaining contract holders. This would almost surely lead to higher prices – above $140/bbl, based on our earlier estimates – and raise Russia’s net export proceeds in the process, since the G7 does not want all of Russia's oil taken off the market.3 Government Interventions Exacerbate Scarcity Governments of states with contestable elections increasingly are intervening – or attempting to do so – in global energy markets and imposing often-contradictory policies that nominally favor consumers at the expense of energy producers.  This almost always is counter-productive: Price caps intended to soften the blow of higher-cost electricity and hydrocarbons discourages the necessary conservation of scarce resources.  So-called windfall profits taxes discourage the investment required to address supply scarcity.  Higher demand and lower supply does not lead to lower prices.  Even grander schemes – e.g., the monopsony cartels floated by G7 member states like the US and EU, along with China – almost surely would reduce the profitability of developing and marketing new energy supplies, which also would exacerbate scarcity of supply by discouraging investment. These quick ad hoc fixes work at cross purposes in solving the problem of global energy scarcity.  While they are in keeping with a penchant of governments to demonstrate they are addressing voters’ concerns, such policies mistake a quick response for long-term solutions. Investment Implications The EU will, in our opinion, be forced to reverse course and sign long-term LNG supply contracts to replace Russian natural gas imports.  This will not derail its renewable-energy transition strategy, but it will significantly delay it.  We remain long oil and gas exposures via the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and long equity refining and services exposures via the CRAK and IEZ ETFs.  We will re-establish our producer-focused XOP ETF position if Brent trades down to $105/bbl in the front month.  We also remain tactically long Brent and eurozone natgas futures and options (see p. 7 below). Housekeeping Notes We were stopped out of our long S&P GSCI position with a gain of 64%.  We are getting long again at the close. We also were stopped out of our long 4Q22 $120/bbl Brent calls with a 16% return. Separately, there will be no Commodity Round-Up in this week’s publication.  We are broadcasting our Commodity Round-Up today at 9 a.m. EDT.    Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see The G7 wants to dump natural gas … but not yet published by politico.com 27 May 2022.  The report notes, “The G7 called for an end to international investments in fossil fuels by the end of this year and slammed private finance for continuing to back dirty energy — but left a big out for EU countries desperate to replace Russian gas.  ‘We acknowledge that investment in [the liquefied natural gas] sector is necessary in response to the current crisis, in a manner consistent with our climate objectives and without creating lock-in effects,’ the ministers said.” 2     Please see One Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy, published 26 May 2022.  This report delves into the EU’s post-Cold War foreign policy.  For three decades, EU foreign policy largely was set by Germany, the organization's most powerful economy.  Successive generations of German politicians championed the idea that the West could bring the former Soviet Union – and later Russia – into the modern world of global trade through Ostpolitik, which had, at its core, a belief in the power of trade to effect political and economic change.  This policy is kaput. 3    Please see Higher Gasoline, Diesel Prices Ahead, which we published 2 June 2022.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse. In a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. Across the last six recessions, the median collapse in the oil price was -60 percent, with the best case being -30 percent, and the worst case being -75 percent. Hence, in the coming recession, the oil price is likely headed to $55, with the best case being $85, and the worst case being $30. Investors should short oil, or short oil versus copper. Equity investors should underweight the oil sector versus basic resources and/or industrials and/or banks, and underweight oil-heavy equity markets such as Norway. Fractal trading watchlist: Oil versus industrials, and oil versus banks. Oil Didn’t Get The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Memo Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Bottom Line: There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse, and this time will be no different. Feature We have just witnessed a rare star-alignment. The near-perfect line up of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn in the heavens is a spectacular sight for the early birds who can star gaze through clear skies. And it is a rare event, which last happened in 2004. But investors have just witnessed an even rarer star-alignment. The ‘everything sell-off’ in stocks, bonds, inflation-protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold during the second quarter has happened in only one other calendar quarter out of almost 200. Making it a ‘1 in a 100’ event, which last happened way back in 1981 (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ In 2022… Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Chart I-2...Last Happened In 1981 ...Last Happened In 1981 ...Last Happened In 1981 As we detailed in our previous reports Markets Echo 1981 When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession and More On 2022-23 = 1981-82 And The Danger Ahead, a once-in-a-generation conjugation connects the ‘1 in a 100’ everything sell-offs in 1981 and 2022. The conjugation is inflation fears, exacerbated by a major war between commodity producing neighbours, and countered by aggressive rate hikes, morph into recession fears. The 1981-82 episode is an excellent blueprint for market action through 2022-23. This makes the 1981-82 episode an excellent blueprint for market action through 2022-23, and we refer readers to the previous reports for the implications for stocks, bonds, equity sectors, and currencies. Oil Didn’t Get The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Memo But one major investment didn’t get the ‘everything sell-off’ memo. That major investment is crude oil. Even within the commodity space, oil is the outlier. In the second quarter, industrial commodity prices have collapsed: copper, -20 percent; iron ore -25 percent; tin, -40 percent; and lumber, -40 percent. Yet the crude oil price is up, +7 percent, and the obvious explanation is the Russia/Ukraine war (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo The Russia/Ukraine war is an important part of the 2022/1981 once-in-a-generation conjugation. In 1981, just as now, the full-scale invasion-led war between two major commodity producing neighbours – Iraq and Iran – disrupted commodity supplies, and thereby added fuel to an already red-hot inflationary fire. When Russia invaded Ukraine earlier this year, the oil price surged by 25 percent. Remarkably, when Iraq invaded Iran in late 1980, the oil price also surged by 25 percent. But by mid-1981, with the global economy slowing, the oil price had given back those gains. Then, as the economy entered recession in early 1982, the oil price slumped to 15 percent below its pre-war level. If 2022-23 follows this blueprint, it would imply the oil price falling to $85/barrel (Chart I-4). Chart I-4If Oil Follows The 1981-82 Blueprint, It Will Tumble To $85 If Oil Follows The 1981-82 Blueprint, It Will Tumble To $85 If Oil Follows The 1981-82 Blueprint, It Will Tumble To $85 There Has Never Been A Recession In Which The Oil Price Did Not Collapse Everybody knows the narrative for the oil price surge this year. In what is putatively a very tight market, the embargo of Russian oil has removed enough supply to put significant upward pressure on the price. The trouble with this story is that Russian oil will find a buyer, even if it requires a discount. Moreover, with the major buyers being China and India, it will be politically and physically impossible to police secondary sanctions. The bottom line is that Russian oil will find its way into the market. There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse. But the bigger problem will come from the demand side of the equation when the global economy enters, or even just flirts with, a recession. Put simply, because of massive demand destruction, there has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse (Chart I-5 - Chart I-10). Chart I-5In The Early 80s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -30 Percent In The Early 80s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -30 Percent In The Early 80s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -30 Percent Chart I-6In The Early 90s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent In The Early 90s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent In The Early 90s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent Chart I-7In The 2000 Dot Com Bust, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-55 Percent In The 2000 Dot Com Bust, Oil Collapsed By -55 Percent In The 2000 Dot Com Bust, Oil Collapsed By -55 Percent Chart I-8In The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent In The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent In The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent Chart I-9In The 2015 EM Recession, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-60 Percent In The 2015 EM Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent In The 2015 EM Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent Chart I-10In The 2020 Pandemic, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-75 Percent In The 2020 Pandemic, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent In The 2020 Pandemic, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent Furthermore, as we explained in Oil Is The Accessory To The Murder, a preceding surge in the oil price is a remarkably consistent ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back’, tipping an already fragile economy over the brink into recession. Meaning that the oil price ends up in a symmetrical undershoot to its preceding overshoot. The result being a massive drawdown in the oil price in every modern era recession or sharp slowdown. Specifically: Early 80s recession: -30 percent Early 90s recession: -60 percent 2000 dot com bust: -55 percent 2008 global financial crisis: -75 percent 2015 EM recession: -60 percent 2020 pandemic: -75 percent What about the 1970s episode – isn’t this the counterexample in which the oil price remained stubbornly high despite a recession? No, even in the 1974 recession, the oil price fell by -25 percent.  Moreover, the commonly cited explanation for the elevated nominal price of oil through the 70s is a misreading of history. The popular narrative blames OPEC supply cutbacks related to geopolitical events – especially the US support for Israel in the Arab-Israel war of October 1973.  As neat and popular as this narrative is, it ignores the real culprit: the collapse in August 1971 of the Bretton Woods ‘pseudo gold standard’, which severed the fixed link between the US dollar and quantities of commodities. To maintain the real value of oil, OPEC countries were raising the price of crude oil just to play catch up. Meaning that while geopolitical events may have influenced the precise timing and magnitude of price hikes, OPEC countries were just ‘staying even’ with the collapsing real value of the US dollar, in which oil was priced. In terms of gold, in which oil was effectively priced before 1971, the oil price was no higher in 1980 than in 1971! (Chart I-11) Chart I-11Priced In Gold, The Oil Price Was No Higher In 1980 Than in 1971! Priced In Gold, The Oil Price Was No Higher In 1980 Than in 1971! Priced In Gold, The Oil Price Was No Higher In 1980 Than in 1971! Shorting Oil And Oil Plays Will Be Very Rewarding For Patient Investors The four most dangerous words in investment are ‘this time is different’. Today, the oil bulls insist that this time really is different because of an unprecedented structural underinvestment in fossil fuel extraction. Leaving the precariously tight oil market vulnerable to the slightest uptick in demand, or downtick in supply. Maybe. But to reiterate, in a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. In this important regard, this time will not be different. Taking the median drawdown of the last six recessions of 60 percent, and applying it to the post-invasion peak of $130, it implies that, in the coming recession, oil will plunge to $55. In a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. Of course, this is the average of a range of recession outcomes, with the best case being $85 and the worst case being $30. Still, this means that patient investors who short oil can look forward to substantial gains. Alternatively, those who want a hedged position should short oil versus copper – especially as oil versus copper is now at the top of its 25-year trading channel (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Oil Versus Copper Is At The Top Of Its 25-Year Trading Channel Oil Versus Copper Is At The Top Of Its 25-Year Trading Channel Oil Versus Copper Is At The Top Of Its 25-Year Trading Channel Equity investors should underweight the oil sector versus basic resources (Chart I-13) and/or versus industrials and/or versus banks, and underweight oil-heavy stock markets such as Norway (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Underweight Oil Versus Basic Resources Underweight Oil Versus Basic Resources Underweight Oil Versus Basic Resources Chart I-14Underweight Oil-Heavy Stock Markets Such As Norway Underweight Oil-Heavy Stock Markets Such As Norway Underweight Oil-Heavy Stock Markets Such As Norway Suffice to say, these are all correlated trades. They will all work, or they will all not work. But to repeat, this time is never different. Fractal Trading Watchlist Confirming the fundamental arguments to underweight oil plays, the spectacular recent outperformance of oil equities versus both industrials and banks has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structures that has reliably signalled previous turning points (Chart I-15). Chart I-15The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Industrials Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Industrials Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Industrials Is Exhausted We are adding oil versus banks to our watchlist, with this week’s recommendation being to underweight oil versus industrials, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss of 10 percent, with a maximum holding period of 6 months. Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Chart 1BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point   Chart 2Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 3CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point CNY/USD Has Reversed CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 4US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 5CAD/SEK Is Vulnerable To Reversal CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 6Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 7The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 8The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 9FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 10Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Is Ending Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Chart 11The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 12The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 13Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Chart 14German Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal AT REVERSAL AT REVERSAL Chart 15Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal AT REVERSAL AT REVERSAL Chart 16The Strong Downtrend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 17The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 18A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 19Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 20Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 21Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 22Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Ended Fractal Trading Watch List Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 23USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 24The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 25A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 26GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point GBP/USD At A Turning Point GBP/USD At A Turning Point Chart 27US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Fractal Trading Watch List Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 28The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Fractal Trading Watch List Fractal Trading Watch List Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Why Oil Is Headed To $55 Why Oil Is Headed To $55 Why Oil Is Headed To $55 Why Oil Is Headed To $55 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary High food and fertilizer prices are at risk of morphing into a full-blown food crisis in several developing countries. Some countries were plagued by severe food insecurity even before the Ukraine war broke out. The Ukraine war has upended two crucial aspects of food security: availability of food grains as well as the availability of fertilizers. A few Middle Eastern and African countries, who are dependent on both imported cereals and crude oil, are experiencing the greatest difficulty. The stock-to-use ratio of food grains is alarmingly low in several countries. Some of them also have high twin deficits (i.e., fiscal and current account deficits) – indicating that governments there would be hard-pressed to provide necessary relief. Several Countries Need To Import Over 90% Of Their Cereal Consumption Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Bottom Line: All aspects considered, we reckon Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to be the most at risk of experiencing a food crisis, and consequent socio-political upheaval. Feature Food prices have surged in most parts of the world. In some developing countries however, food inflation is threatening to morph into a food crisis. In the year ahead, high food and fertilizer prices could accentuate food insecurity in several poorer countries − with major socio-political ramifications. In this report, we identify the nations most at risk, especially among countries included in the MSCI Emerging and Frontier Equity Indexes. Our research indicates that Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are the most vulnerable to a food crisis, and consequent socio-political upheaval. Food Inflation: In The Stratosphere In a few countries such as Lebanon and Venezuela, food inflation is at a mind-boggling 370% and 200%, respectively. It is abnormally high in many other developing countries as well – including Turkey (92%), Argentina (64%), Iran (49%), Sri Lanka (45%), Ghana (30%), and Egypt (28%). In several other countries such as Colombia, Nigeria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan, food prices are rising at about 20% or more. That is also the case in war-torn Ukraine and Russia (Chart 1). Chart 1Food Inflation Has Become Extremely Painful In Some Countries Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? In a few countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, currency depreciation could explain part of the rise in food prices. Chart 2Food Prices Began To Surge Well Before The Ukraine Crisis Food Prices Began To Surge Well Before The Ukraine Crisis Food Prices Began To Surge Well Before The Ukraine Crisis That said, given that only a minor share of all food consumed is imported by these countries, the sharp rise in overall food prices cannot be explained away by currency depreciation alone. Rather, it points to genuine price pressures in domestically grown food. That is also the case in all other countries where food inflation is higher than currency depreciation. Notably, in many of these countries, food inflation was quite high even before the Ukraine war broke out. Indeed, global food grain prices had begun to surge in mid-2020 – well before Russia’s invasion began (Chart 2). And yet, the onset of the Ukraine war and the resulting sanctions and logistics bottlenecks have worsened the situation dramatically. Even though food prices have eased marginally in the past couple of weeks, they are still extremely elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels. More worryingly, many countries are now at risk of experiencing a full-blown food crisis.  Pre-existing Food Insecurity Some developing countries are more susceptible to a food crisis than others. This is because they were already plagued by food insecurity even before the Ukraine war broke out. The x-axis of Chart 3 shows the extent of “severe food insecurity”1 in various developing nations, as per the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Peru stand out in this respect among the countries included in the MSCI EM & Frontier market equity indexes: as high as 18 to 26% of the total population in these countries experienced severe food insecurity between 2018 and 2020. Chart 3Countries With Pre-Existing Food Insecurity Are More At Risk Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Notably, these countries also happen to have high fiscal deficits; and in some cases, high public debt (Chart 3, y-axis). This leaves their governments with less room to provide necessary relief should an acute food crisis hit their population. Not surprisingly, some of the countries plagued by severe food insecurity are highly dependent on grain imports to meet their domestic demand. The x-axis of Chart 4 shows the cereal import dependency of various countries as a percentage of their cereal intake. Most middle eastern countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman need to import nearly all of their cereal consumptions, as per FAO data. That said, what sets the truly vulnerable cereal importers apart from the rest is that some of them do not have much export earnings to pay for their rising food import bills. For instance, in Lebanon, food imports alone cost two-thirds of its total goods export revenues before the pandemic, according to FAO. For Egypt, Jordan and Kenya, food imports used up over 40% of their export earnings (Chart 4, y-axis). Chart 4Several Countries Need To Import Over 90% Of Their Cereal Consumption Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? These figures must have gone up further as food prices have risen significantly in the past two years. If high food prices persist, the balance of payments of these countries will deteriorate further. That, in turn, will negatively affect their currencies and general inflation.  High Oil Prices Adding To The Woes Many oil and gas producers in the Middle East and Africa are also large net importers of food. Current high crude prices, however, are helping them to foot their food bills. But countries who need to import both food and oil and gas are facing a double whammy. Chart 5 shows that several food importers are indeed large net importers of oil and gas too. On this parameter, Lebanon, Pakistan, Jordan and Kenya appear to be facing the most acute pain − their annual food plus net oil import bills are very high, ranging from 60 to 120% of their goods export revenues. Needless to say, if both food and oil prices remain elevated, these nations could face major socio-economic upheavals. Chart 5Countries Which Need To Import Both Food And Fuel Are The Most Distressed Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Chart 6Industrial Metals And Ore Producers Will Face More Pain Going Forward Industrial Metals And Ore Producers Will Face More Pain Going Forward Industrial Metals And Ore Producers Will Face More Pain Going Forward On a separate note, many producers of industrial metals/raw materials such as Chile and Peru may also soon experience more difficulties. The reason is that industrial metal prices have recently rolled over relative to food prices (Chart 6). Going forward, slowing global growth will likely push down industrial metal prices further, robbing these nations of a major source of income. Falling income amid high food prices would hurt the population even more, as the former will also limit the authorities’ ability to provide relief. The Implications Of The Ukraine War Could Linger The Ukraine war has upended the two most crucial aspects of food security: availability of food grains and fertilizers. Notably, the exportable surplus of food and fertilizers in the world are concentrated in only a handful of countries. Russia and Ukraine are key among them. In the case of wheat, 28% of global exports (in volume terms) in 2021 came from Russia (18%) and Ukraine (10%),  as per the FAO. In the case of barley, their share was 24%, and for corn (maize) 12%. Chart 7Grain Prices Have Surged Across The Board Grain Prices Have Surged Across The Board Grain Prices Have Surged Across The Board These two countries are dominant in some oilseed exports as well. Ukraine (37%) and Russia (26%) together held about two-thirds of the global sunflower oil export market share. In the case of rapeseed, Ukraine had about 20% of global export share. Much of these supplies now face severe logistical hurdles. That, in turn, has pushed up grain and edible oil prices globally, hurting all countries whether they are dependent on food imports or not (Chart 7). That said, the countries who are heavily dependent on Russian and Ukrainian supplies are particularly hit hard. Chart 8 shows the import dependency of some countries on Russian and Ukrainian wheat. Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt will have to urgently find alternative suppliers as a very large share of their imports now face uncertainty. The same can be said about Eritrea, Somalia and some former Soviet republics.    In the case of fertilizers, Russia was the largest supplier of nitrogen-based fertilizers2 (the kind that is most heavily used) at 17% of global exports in 2021. The country was also the second largest exporter of potassium-based fertilizer (23%), and the third largest in phosphorus-based fertilizers (16%). Ukraine, however, has not been a big exporter of fertilizers. Just like in the case of wheat, several countries had been highly dependent on Russian fertilizers. Among EM countries, Peru procured 42% of its fertilizer needs from Russia last year. Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia each imported about 22% from Russia. That figure was substantially higher for some other developing countries such as Ghana (37%), Cameroon (47%), and Honduras (50%) (Chart 9). Given the numerous sanctions imposed on a multitude of Russian entities, shipments of Russian fertilizers are now at risk. As such, all these countries need to find substitute suppliers urgently.  Chart 8Russia And Ukraine Supplied Over 80% Of Wheat Imports For Many Countries Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Chart 9Russia Supplied Over 40% Of Fertilizer Imports For Many Countries Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises?   Notably, it’s not just the logistics/availability issues that fertilizer users must contend with. Prices of fertilizers have also surged by a massive 200 to 300% compared to pre-pandemic levels. The reason for that is sky-high natural gas prices, which is the primary feedstock of (nitrogen-based) fertilizers (Chart 10). Chart 10High Natural Gas Prices Will Keep Fertilizers Expensive High Natural Gas Prices Will Keep Fertilizers Expensive High Natural Gas Prices Will Keep Fertilizers Expensive Since Russia is also a major natural gas producer, the current situation does not bode well for the fertilizer price relief outlook. New western sanctions on Russia and countermeasures by Russia are continuing relentlessly. As such, one can expect that natural gas prices will likely stay elevated for the foreseeable future. That will keep fertilizers expensive. Meanwhile, the scarcity and/or high prices of fertilizers would force farmers in many poor countries to curtail their fertilizer use during the ongoing / upcoming crop season. That in turn would imperil their domestic food production, accentuating overall food scarcity. Where Do Countries’ Food Stocks Stand Now? Chart 11 shows various developing countries’ combined stockpile of food grains (wheat, corn and soybean) relative to their yearly usage (i.e., the stock-to-use ratio). Chart 11The Stock Of Foodgrains Is Precariously Low In Many Countries Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Among the countries who have high cereal import dependency (and, who are not oil producers), the stock-to-use ratio is particularly low for Lebanon, Jordan, Chile, Peru, and Egypt. Since some of the countries with low food stock-to-use ratio are also dependent on imported food and fertilizers, they are even more susceptible to an outright food shortage this year. Lebanon, Egypt and Peru are three such countries among MSCI included ones. If various countries’ stock-to-use figures are juxtaposed with their twin deficits, their wherewithal to provide necessary relief should their food stocks become inadequate can be demonstrated. Chart 12 shows that several countries with a low food stock-to-use ratio are also plagued by high twin deficits, and therefore low capacity to provide relief. Examples are Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Nigeria and Venezuela. Chart 12Some Countries With Low Food Stock Have A Low Capacity To Provide Relief Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Are Developing Countries Heading Into Food Crises? Food Price Shock: Is It Inflationary Or Deflationary? High food prices can sometimes lead to higher general inflation. The starting point of that is usually household inflation expectations: facing higher grocery prices every day, consumer expectations of future prices become unmoored. That said, whether the higher inflation ‘expectations’ will evolve into higher ‘realized’ inflation depends on households’ (labor) power to negotiate wages. If they are successful to gain higher wages, core inflation also begins to rise in tandem with food inflation, which might eventually lead to a wage-inflation spiral. In most developing nations, however, that does not look to be the case. Wages are rising sharply in only a handful of countries. Moreover, since a very high share of consumer spending in developing countries is accorded to food (25% to 55%), higher food bills are eating substantially into households’ real discretionary spending. That does not bode well for (non-food) corporate earnings. In addition, the central banks in many developing economies are raising interest rates in response to high inflation. All these will likely push many developing economies on the brink of a recession.   Investment Conclusions Currently, most emerging and frontier market nations are facing a deteriorating growth outlook – thanks to tight fiscal and tightening monetary policies domestically, a very strong US dollar, rising global interest rates, and a subpar Chinese recovery. High food and/or fuel prices are additional ‘taxes’ on their economies, and especially for the import-dependent ones. As a result, their growth will be stymied further. The consequence could well be socio-political volatility. Incidentally, the last time global food prices witnessed a major surge (about 40%) was back in 2010. That was soon followed by social upheavals in much of the Middle East (known as the ‘Arab Spring’) and elsewhere in the developing world. In the present episode, food prices have risen by 70% in two years. As mentioned, some of the countries facing food and fertilizer scarcity are also plagued by low grains stocks (relative to requirement) and have weak fiscal and external accounts. Considering all the aspects, we reckon that Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are most-at-risk of slipping into a food crisis this year and beyond. Incidentally, the Emerging Markets Strategy team holds a bearish view on the near-term performances of EM stocks and bonds. Investors should stay underweight EM relative to global equities and bonds. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Sebastian Rodriguez Research Associate sebastian.rodriguez@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Severe food insecurity refers to missing meals and/or reduced food intake because of financial constraints 2     The three main type of chemical fertilizers are nitrogen-based (urea and ammonia), potassium-based (potash), and phosphorus-based (phosphates).

Executive Summary Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Major geopolitical shocks tend to coincide with bear markets, so the market is getting closer to pricing this year’s bad news. But investors are not out of the woods yet. Russia is cutting off Europe’s natural gas supply ahead of this winter in retaliation to Europe’s oil embargo. Europe is sliding toward recession. China is reverting to autocratic rule and suffering a cyclical and structural downshift in growth rates. Only after Xi Jinping consolidates power will the ruling party focus exclusively on economic stabilization. The US can afford to take risks with Russia, opening up the possibility of a direct confrontation between the two giants before the US midterm election. A new strategic equilibrium is not yet at hand. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 18.3% Bottom Line: Maintain a defensive posture in the third quarter but look for opportunities to buy oversold assets with long-term macro and policy tailwinds. Feature 2022 is a year of geopolitics and supply shocks. Global investors should remain defensive at least until the Chinese national party congress and US midterm election have passed. More fundamentally, an equilibrium must be established between Russia and NATO and between the US and Iran. Until then supply shocks will destroy demand. Checking Up On Our Three Key Views For 2022 Our three key views for the year are broadly on track: 1.  China’s Reversion To Autocracy: For ten years now, the fall in Chinese potential economic growth has coincided with a rise in neo-Maoist autocracy and foreign policy assertiveness, leading to capital flight, international tensions, and depressed animal spirits (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyWill China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Rising incomes provided legitimacy for the Communist Party over the past four decades. Less rapidly rising incomes – and extreme disparities in standards of living – undermine the party and force it to find other sources of public support. Fighting pollution and expanding the social safety net are positives for political stability and potentially for economic productivity. But converting the political system from single-party rule to single-person rule is negative for productivity. Mercantilist trade policy and nationalist security policy are also negative. China’s political crackdown, struggle with Covid-19, waning exports, and deflating property market have led to an abrupt slowdown this year. The government is responding by easing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, though so far with limited effect (Chart 2). Economic policy will not be decisive in the third quarter unless a crash forces the administration to stimulate aggressively. Chart 1China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism ​​​​​​ Chart 2Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far ​​​​​ Chart 3Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Once General Secretary Xi Jinping secures another five-to-ten years in power at the twentieth national party congress this fall, he will be able to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. ease policy further and focus exclusively on securing the economic recovery in 2023. But policy uncertainty will remain high until then. The party may have to crack down anew to ensure Xi’s power consolidation goes according to plan. China is highly vulnerable to social unrest for both structural and cyclical reasons. The US would jump to slap sanctions on China for human rights abuses. Hence the nascent recovery in Chinese domestic and offshore equities can easily be interrupted until the political reshuffle is over (Chart 3). If China’s economy stabilizes and a recession is avoided, investors will pile into the rally, but over the long run they will still be vulnerable to stranded capital due to Chinese autocracy and US-China cold war. If the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee are stacked with members of Xi’s faction, as one should expect, then the reduction in policy uncertainty will only be temporary. Autocracy will lead to unpredictable and draconian policy measures – and it cannot solve the problem of a shrinking and overly indebted population. If the Communist Party changes course and stacks the Politburo with Xi’s factional rivals, to prevent China from going down the Maoist, Stalinist, and Putinist route, then global financial markets will cheer. But that outcome is unlikely. Hawkish foreign policy means that China will continue to increase its military threats against Taiwan, while not yet invading outright. Beijing has tightened its grip over Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong since 2008; Taiwan and the South China Sea are the only critical buffer areas that remain to be subjugated. Taiwan’s midterm elections, US midterms, and China’s party congress will keep uncertainty elevated. Taiwan has underperformed global and emerging market equities as the semiconductor boom and shortage has declined (Chart 4). Hong Kong is vulnerable to another outbreak of social unrest and government repression. Quality of life has deteriorated for the native population. Democracy activists are disaffected and prone to radicalization. Singapore will continue to benefit at Hong Kong’s expense (Chart 5). Chart 4Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked ​​​​​​ Chart 5Hong Kong Faces More Troubles Hong Kong Faces More Troubles Hong Kong Faces More Troubles ​​​​​​ Chart 6Japan Undercuts China Japan Undercuts China Japan Undercuts China China and Japan are likely to engage in clashes in the East China Sea. Beijing’s military modernization, nuclear weapons expansion, and technological development pose a threat to Japanese security. The gradual encirclement of Taiwan jeopardizes Japan’s vital sea lines of communication. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is well positioned to lead the Liberal Democratic Party into the upper house election on July 10 – he does not need to trigger a diplomatic showdown but he would not suffer from it. Meanwhile China is hungry for foreign distractions and unhappy that Japan is reviving its military and depreciating its currency (Chart 6). A Sino-Japanese crisis cannot be ruled out, especially if the Biden administration looks as if it will lose its nerve in containing China. Financial markets would react negatively, depending on the magnitude of the crisis. North Korea is going back to testing ballistic missiles and likely nuclear weapons. It is expanding its doctrine for the use of such weapons. It could take advantage of China’s and America’s domestic politics to stage aggressive provocations. South Korea, which has a hawkish new president who lacks parliamentary support, is strengthening its deterrence with the United States. These efforts could provoke a negative response from the North. Financial markets will only temporarily react to North Korean provocations unless they are serious enough to elicit military threats from Japan or the United States. China would be happy to offer negotiations to distract the Biden administration from Xi’s power grab. South Korean equities will benefit on a relative basis as China adds more stimulus. 2.  America’s Policy Insularity: President Biden’s net approval rating, at -15%, is now worse than President Trump’s in 2018, when the Republicans suffered a beating in midterm elections (Chart 7). Biden is now fighting inflation to try to salvage the elections for his party. That means US foreign policy will be domestically focused and erratic in the third quarter. Aside from “letting” the Federal Reserve hike rates, Biden’s executive options are limited. Pausing the federal gasoline tax requires congressional approval, and yet if he unilaterally orders tax collectors to stand down, the result will be a $10 billion tax cut – a drop in the bucket. Biden is considering waiving some of former President Trump’s tariffs on China, which he can do on his own. But doing so will hurt his standing in Rust Belt swing states without reducing inflation enough to get a payoff at the voting booth – after all, import prices are growing slower from China than elsewhere (Chart 8). He would also give Xi Jinping a last-minute victory over America that would silence Xi’s critics and cement his dictatorship at the critical hour. Chart 7Democrats Face Shellacking In Midterm Elections Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning ​​​​​​ Chart 8Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much ​​​​​​ Chart 9Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Biden is offering to lift sanctions on Iran, which would free up 1.3 million barrels of oil per day. But Iran is not being forced to freeze its nuclear program by weak oil prices or Russian and Chinese pressure – quite the opposite. If Biden eases sanctions anyway, prices at the pump may not fall enough to win votes. Hence Biden is traveling to Saudi Arabia to make amends with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. OPEC’s interest lies in producing enough oil to prevent a global recession, not in flooding the market on Biden’s whims to rescue the Democratic Party. Saudi and Emirati production may come but it may not come early in the third quarter. Lifting sanctions on Venezuela is a joke and Libya recently collapsed again (Chart 9). Even in dealing with Russia the Biden administration will exhibit an insular perspective. The US is not immediately threatened, like Europe, so it can afford to take risks, such as selling Ukraine advanced and long-range weapons and providing intelligence used to sink Russian ships. If Russia reacts negatively, a direct US-Russia confrontation will generate a rally around the flag that would help the Democrats, as it did under President John F. Kennedy in 1962 – one of the rare years in which the ruling party minimized its midterm election losses (Chart 10). The Cuban Missile Crisis counted more with voters than the earlier stock market slide. 3.  Petro-States’ Geopolitical Leverage: Oil-producing states have immense geopolitical leverage this year thanks to the commodity cycle. Russia will not be forced to conclude its assault on Ukraine until global energy prices collapse, as occurred in 2014. In fact Russia’s leverage over Europe will be greatly reduced in the coming years since Europe is diversifying away from Russian energy exports. Hence Moscow is cutting natural gas flows to Europe today while it still can (Chart 11). Chart 10Biden Can Afford To Take Risks With Russia Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning ​​​​​​ Chart 11Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas ​​​​​​ Chart 12EU/China Slowdown Will Weigh On World Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Russia’s objective is to inflict a recession and cause changes in either policy or government in Europe. This will make it easier to conclude a favorable ceasefire in Ukraine. More importantly it will increase the odds that the EU’s 27 members, having suffered the cost of their coal and oil embargo, will fail to agree to a natural gas embargo by 2027 as they intend. Italy, for example, faces an election by June 2023, which could come earlier. The national unity coalition was formed to distribute the EU’s pandemic recovery funds. Now those funds are drying up, the economy is sliding toward recession, and the coalition is cracking. The most popular party is an anti-establishment right-wing party, the Brothers of Italy, which is waiting in the wings and can ally with the populist League, which has some sympathies with Russia. A recession could very easily produce a change in government and a more pragmatic approach to Moscow. The Italian economy is getting squeezed by energy prices and rising interest rates at the same time and cannot withstand the combination very long. A European recession or near-recession will cause further downgrades to global growth, especially when considering the knock-on effects in China, where the slowdown is more pronounced than is likely reported. The US economy is more robust but it will have to be very robust indeed to withstand a recession in Europe and growth recession in China (Chart 12). Russia does not have to retaliate against Finland and Sweden joining NATO until Turkey clears the path for them to join, which may not be until just before the Turkish general election due in June 2023. But imposing a recession on Europe is already retaliation – maybe a government change will produce a new veto against NATO enlargement. Russian retaliation against Lithuania for blocking 50% of its shipments to the Kaliningrad exclave is also forthcoming – unless Lithuania effectively stops enforcing the EU’s sanctions on Russian resources. Russia cannot wage a full-scale attack on the Baltic states without triggering direct hostilities with NATO since they are members of NATO. But it can retaliate in other ways. In a negative scenario Moscow could stage a small “accidental” attack against Lithuania to test NATO. But that would force Biden to uphold his pledge to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. Biden would probably do so by staging a proportionate military response or coordinating with an ally to do it. The target would be the Russian origin of attack or comparable assets in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Ukraine, Belarus, or elsewhere. The result would be a dangerous escalation. Russia could also opt for cyber-attacks or economic warfare – such as squeezing Europe’s natural gas supply further. Ultimately Russia can afford to take greater risks than the US over Kaliningrad, other territories, and its periphery more broadly. That is the difference between Kennedy and Biden – the confrontation is not over Cuba. Russia is also likely to take a page out of Josef Stalin’s playbook and open a new front – not so much in Nicaragua as in the Middle East and North Africa. The US betrayal of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran opens the opportunity for Russia to strengthen cooperation with Iran, stir up the Iranians’ courage, sell them weapons, and generate a security crisis in the Middle East. The US military would be distracted keeping peace in the Persian Gulf while the Europeans would lose their long-term energy alternative to Russia – and energy prices would rise. The Iranians – who also have leverage during a time of high oil prices – are not inclined to freeze their nuclear program. That would be to trade their long-term regime survival for economic benefits that the next American president can revoke unilaterally. Bottom Line: Xi Jinping is converting China back into an autocracy, the Biden administration lacks options and is willing to have a showdown with Russia, and the Putin administration is trying to inflict a European recession and political upheaval. Stay defensive. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s As for our long-term themes, the following points are relevant after what we have learned in the second quarter: 1.  Great Power Rivalry: The war in Ukraine has reminded investors of the primacy of national security. In an anarchic international system, if a single great nation pursues power to the neglect of its neighbors’ interests, then its neighbors need to pursue power to defend themselves. Before long every nation is out for itself. At least until a new equilibrium is established. For example, Russia’s decision to neutralize Ukraine by force is driving Germany to abandon its formerly liberal policy of energy cooperation in order to reduce Russia’s energy revenues and avoid feeding its military ambitions. Russia in turn is reducing natural gas exports to weaken Europe’s economy this winter. Germany will re-arm, Finland and Sweden will eventually join NATO, and Russia will underscore its red line against NATO bases or forces in Finland and Sweden. If this red line is violated then a larger war could ensue. Chart 13China Will Shift To Russian Energy China Will Shift To Russian Energy China Will Shift To Russian Energy Until Russia and NATO come to a new understanding, neither Europe nor Russia can be secure. Meanwhile China cannot reject Russia’s turn to the east. China believes it may need to use force to prevent Taiwan independence at some point, so it must prepare for the US and its allies to treat it the same way that they have treated Russia. It must secure energy supply from Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East via land routes that the US navy cannot blockade (Chart 13). Beijing must also diversify away from the US dollar, lest the Treasury Department freeze its foreign exchange reserves like it did Russia’s. Global investors will see diversification as a sign of China’s exit from the international order and preparation for conflict, which is negative for its economic future. However, the Russo-Chinese alliance presents a historic threat to the US’s security, coming close to the geopolitical nightmare of a unified Eurasia. The US is bound to oppose this development, whether coherently or not, and whether alone or in concert with its allies. After all, the US cannot offer credible security guarantees to negotiate a détente with China or Iran because its domestic divisions are so extreme that its foreign policy can change overnight. Other powers cannot be sure that the US will not suffer a radical domestic policy change or revolution that leads to belligerent foreign policy. Insecurity will drive the US and China apart rather than bringing them together. For example, Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine will encourage Chinese strategists to go back to the drawing board to adjust their plans for military contingencies in Taiwan. But the American lesson from Ukraine is to increase deterrence in Taiwan. That will provoke China and encourage the belief that China cannot wait forever to resolve the Taiwan problem. Until there is a strategic understanding between Russia and NATO, and the US and China, the world will remain in a painful and dangerous transitional phase – a multipolar disequilibrium. Chart 14Hypo-Globalization: Globalizing Less Than Potential Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning 2.  Hypo-Globalization: If national security rises to the fore, then economics becomes a tool of state power. Mercantilism becomes the basis of globalization rather than free market liberalism. Hypo-globalization is the result. The term is fitting because the trade intensity of global growth is not yet in a total free fall (i.e. de-globalization) but merely dropping off from its peaks during the phase of “hyper-globalization” in the 1990s and early 2000s (Chart 14). Hypo-globalization is probably a structural rather than cyclical phenomenon. The EU cannot re-engage with Russia and ease sanctions without rehabilitating Russia’s economy and hence its military capacity – which could enable Russia to attack Europe again. The US and China can try to re-engage but they will fail. Russo-Chinese alliance ensures that the US would be enriching not one but both of its greatest strategic rivals if it reopened its doors to Chinese technology acquisition and intellectual property theft. Iran will see its security in alliance with Russia and China. China has an incentive to develop Iran’s economy so as not to depend solely on Russia and Central Asia. Russia has an incentive to develop Iran’s military capacity so as to deprive Europe of an energy alternative. Both Russia and China wish to deprive the US of strategic hegemony in the Middle East. By contrast the US and EU cannot offer ironclad security guarantees to Iran because of its nuclear ambitions and America’s occasional belligerence. Thus the world can see expanding Russian and Chinese economic integration with Eurasia, and expanding American and European integration with various regions, but it cannot see further European integration with Russia or American integration with China. And ultimately Europe and China will be forced to sever links (Chart 15). Globalization will not cease – it is a multi-millennial trend – but it will slow down. It will be subordinated to national security and mercantilist economic theory. 3.  Populism/Nationalism: In theory, domestic instability can cause introversion or extroversion. But in practice we are seeing extroversion, which is dangerous for global stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Global Economic Disintegration Global Economic Disintegration Global Economic Disintegration ​​​​​​ Chart 16Internal Sources Of Nationalism Internal Sources Of Nationalism Internal Sources Of Nationalism ​​​​​​ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine derived from domestic Russian instability – and instability across the former Soviet space, including Belarus, which the Kremlin feared could suffer a color revolution after the rigged election and mass protests of 2020-21. The reason the northern European countries are rapidly revising their national defense and foreign policies to counter Russia is because they perceive that the threat to their security is driven by factors within the former Soviet sphere that they cannot easily remove. These factors will get worse as a result of the Ukraine war. Russian aggression still poses the risk of spilling out of Ukraine’s borders. China’s Maoist nostalgia and return to autocratic government is also about nationalism. The end of the rapid growth phase of industrialization is giving way to the Asian scourge: debt-deflation. The Communist Party is trying to orchestrate a great leap forward into the next phase of development. But in case that leap fails like the last one, Beijing is promoting “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and blaming the rest of the world for excluding and containing China. Taiwan, unfortunately, is the last relic of China’s past humiliation at the hands of western imperialists. China will also seek to control the strategic approach to Taiwan, i.e. the South China Sea. China’s claim that the Taiwan Strait is sovereign sea, not international waters, will force the American navy to assert freedom of passage. American efforts to upgrade Taiwan relations and increase deterrence will be perceived as neo-imperialism. The United States, for its part, could also see nationalism convert into international aggression. The US is veering on the brink of a miniature civil war as nationalist forces in the interior of the country struggle with the political establishment in the coastal states. Polarization has abated since 2020, as stagflation has discredited the Democrats. But it is now likely to rebound, making congressional gridlock all but inevitable. A Republican-controlled House will find a reason to impeach President Biden in 2023-24, in hopes of undermining his party and reclaiming the presidency. Another hotly contested election is possible, or worse, a full-blown constitutional crisis. American institutions proved impervious to the attempt of former President Trump and his followers to disrupt the certification of the Electoral College vote. However, security forces will be much more aggressive against rebellions of whatever stripe in future, which could lead to episodes in which social unrest is aggravated by police repression. If the GOP retakes the White House – especially if it is a second-term Trump presidency with a vendetta against political enemies and nothing to lose – then the US will return to aggressive foreign policy, whether directed at China or Iran or both. In short, polarization has contaminated foreign policy such that the most powerful country in the world cannot lead with a steady hand. Over the long run polarization will decline in the face of common foreign enemies but for now the trend vitiates global stability. Chart 17Germany And Japan Rearming Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning It goes without saying that nationalism is also an active force in Iran, where 83-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is attempting to ensure the survival of his regime in the face of youthful social unrest and an unclear succession process. If Khamenei takes advantage of the commodity cycle, and American and Israeli disarray, he can make a mad dash for the bomb and try to achieve regime security. But if he does so then nationalism will betray him, since Israel and/or the US are willing to conduct air strikes to uphold the red line against nuclear weaponization. If any more proof of global nationalism is needed, look no further than Germany and Japan, the principal aggressors of World War II. Their pacifist foreign policies have served as the linchpins of the post-war international order. Now they are both pursuing rearmament and a more proactive foreign policy (Chart 17). Nationalism may be very nascent in Germany but it has clearly made a comeback in Japan, which exacerbates China’s fears of containment. The rise of nationalism in India is widely known and reinforces the trend. Bottom Line: Great power rivalry is intensifying because of Russia’s conflict with the West and China’s inability to reject Russia. Hypo-globalization is the result since EU-Russia and US-China economic integration cannot easily be mended in the context of great power struggle. Domestic instability in Russia, China, and the US is leading to nationalism and aggressive foreign policy, as leaders find themselves unwilling or unable to stabilize domestic politics through productive economic pursuits. Investment Takeaways BCA has shifted its House View to a neutral asset allocation stance on equities relative to bonds (Chart 18). Chart 18BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds Geopolitical Strategy remains defensively positioned, favoring defensive markets and sectors, albeit with some exceptions that reflect our long-term views. Tactically stay long US 10-year Treasuries, large caps versus small caps, and defensives versus cyclicals. Stay long Mexico and short the UAE (Chart 19). Strategically stay long gold, US equities relative to global, and aerospace/defense sectors (Chart 20). Among currencies favor the USD, EUR, JPY, and GBP. Chart 19Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 20Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades ​​​​​​ Chart 21Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan ​​​​​ Chart 22Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks ​​​​​ Chart 23Overweight ASEAN Overweight ASEAN Overweight ASEAN Go long US semiconductors and semi equipment versus Taiwan broad market (Chart 21). While we correctly called the peak in Taiwanese stocks relative to global and EM equities, our long Korea / short Taiwan trade was the wrong way to articulate this view and remains deeply in the red. Similarly our attempt to double down on Indian tech versus Chinese tech was ill-timed. China eased tech regulations sooner than we expected. However, the long-term profile of the trade is still attractive and Chinese tech will still suffer from excessive government and foreign interference (Chart 22). Go long Singapore over Hong Kong, as Asian financial leadership continues to rotate (see Chart 5 above). Stay long ASEAN among emerging markets. We will also put Malaysia on upgrade watch, given recent Malaysian equity outperformance on the back of Chinese stimulus and growing western interest in alternatives to China (Chart 23).     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

    Executive Summary At our monthly view meeting on Monday, BCA strategists voted to change the House View to a neutral asset allocation stance on equities, with a slight plurality favoring an outright underweight. The view of the Global Investment Strategy service is somewhat more constructive, as I think it is still more likely than not that the US will avoid a recession; and that if a recession does occur, it will be a fairly mild one. Nevertheless, the risks to my view have increased. I now estimate 40% odds of a recession during the next 12 months, up from 20% a month ago. In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising Bottom Line: With the S&P 500 down 27% in real terms from its highs at the time of the meeting, the view of the Global Investment Strategy service is that a modest overweight is appropriate. However, investors should refrain from adding to equity positions until more clarity emerges about the path for inflation and growth. Heading For Recession? Every month, BCA strategists hold a view meeting to discuss the most important issues driving the macroeconomy and financial markets. This month’s meeting, which was held yesterday, was especially pertinent as it comes on the heels of a substantial decline in global equities. The key issue that we grappled with was whether the Fed could achieve a proverbial soft landing or whether the US and the rest of the global economy were spiraling towards recession (if it wasn’t already there). I began the meeting by showing one of my favorite charts, a deceptively simple chart of the US unemployment rate (Chart 1). The chart makes three things clear: 1) The US unemployment rate is rarely stable; It is almost always either rising or falling; 2) Once it starts rising, it keeps rising. In fact, the US has never averted a recession when the 3-month average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than a third of a percentage point; and 3) As a mean-reverting series, the unemployment rate is most likely to start rising when it is very low. Chart 1In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising In The Past, When Unemployment Has Started Rising In The US, It Has Kept On Rising Taken at face value, the chart paints a damning picture about the economic outlook. The US unemployment rate is near a record low, which means that it has nowhere to go but up. And once the unemployment rate starts going up, history suggests that a recession is inevitable. Five Caveats Despite this ominous implication, I did highlight five caveats. First, the observation that even a modest increase in the unemployment rate invariably heralds a recession is based on a limited sample of business cycles from the US. Across the G10, soft landings have occurred, Canada being one example (Chart 2). Second, unlike the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio is still 1.1 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, and 4.6 percentage points below where it was in April 2000. A similar, though less pronounced, pattern holds if one focuses only on the 25-to-54 age cohort (Chart 3). Chart 2G10 Economies Sometimes Manage To Avoid A Recession Amid Rising Unemployment G10 Economies Sometimes Manage To Avoid A Recession Amid Rising Unemployment G10 Economies Sometimes Manage To Avoid A Recession Amid Rising Unemployment Chart 3The Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels   While the number of people not working either because they are worried about the pandemic, or because they are still burning through their stimulus checks, has been trending lower, it is still fairly high in absolute terms (Chart 4). As my colleague Doug Peta discussed in his latest report, one can envision a scenario where job growth remains positive, but the unemployment rate nonetheless edges higher as more workers rejoin the labor force. Chart 4ALabor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (I) Labor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (I) Labor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (I) Chart 4BLabor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (II) Labor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (II) Labor Supply Should Increase As Covid Fears Continue To Abate And More Workers Burn Through Their Stimulus Savings (II)     Third, the job vacancy rate is extremely high today – much higher than a pre-pandemic “Beveridge Curve” would have predicted (Chart 5). This provides the labor market with a wide moat against an increase in firings. As Fed governor Christopher Waller has emphasized, the main effect of the Federal Reserve’s efforts to cool labor demand could be to push down vacancies rather than to push up unemployment. Fourth, as we have highlighted in past research, the Phillips curve is kinked at very low levels of unemployment (Chart 6). This means that a decline in unemployment from high to moderate levels may do little to spur inflation, but once the unemployment rate falls below its full employment level, then watch out! Chart 5The Fed Hopes That Its Tightening Policy Will Bring Down Job Openings More Than It Pushes Up The Unemployment Rate The Fed Hopes That Its Tightening Policy Will Bring Down Job Openings More Than It Pushes Up The Unemployment Rate The Fed Hopes That Its Tightening Policy Will Bring Down Job Openings More Than It Pushes Up The Unemployment Rate Chart 6The Phillips Curve Is Kinked At Very Low Levels Of Unemployment Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question   The converse is also true, however. If a small decrease in unemployment can trigger a large increase in inflation, then a small increase in unemployment can trigger a large decrease in inflation, provided that long-term inflation expectations remain reasonably well anchored in the meantime. In other words, it is possible that the so-called “sacrifice ratio” — the amount of output that has to be sacrificed to reduce inflation — may be quite low. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, there is a lot of variation from one recession to the next in how much unemployment rises. In general, the greater the financial and economic imbalances going into a recession, the deeper it tends to be. US household balance sheets are in reasonably good shape these days. Households are sitting on $2.2 trillion in excess savings (Chart 7). Yes, most of those savings belong to relatively well-off households. But as Chart 8 illustrates, even rich people spend well over half of their income. Chart 7Households Have Only Just Begun To Draw Down Their Accumulated Savings Households Have Only Just Begun To Draw Down Their Accumulated Savings Households Have Only Just Begun To Draw Down Their Accumulated Savings Chart 8Even The Rich Spend The Majority Of Their Income Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question     The ratio of household debt-to-disposable income in the US is down by a third since its peak in 2008. Despite falling equity prices, the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income is still up nearly 50 percentage points since the end of 2019, mainly because home prices have risen (Chart 9). As is likely to be the case in many other countries, home prices in the US will level off and quite possibly decline over the next few years. In and of itself, that may not be such a bad outcome for equity markets since lower real estate prices will cool aggregate demand, thus lowering inflation without the need for much higher interest rates. The danger, of course, is that we could see a replay of the GFC. This risk cannot be ignored but is probably quite small. The quality of mortgage lending has been very strong over the past 15 years. Moreover, unlike in 2007, when there was a large glut of homes, the homeowner vacancy rate today is at a record low. Tepid homebuilding has pushed the average age of the US residential capital stock to 31 years, the highest since 1948 (Chart 10). Chart 9The US Household Debt Burden Has Come Down Significantly Since 2008, While Net Worth Is Still Higher Than Before The Pandemic The US Household Debt Burden Has Come Down Significantly Since 2008, While Net Worth Is Still Higher Than Before The Pandemic The US Household Debt Burden Has Come Down Significantly Since 2008, While Net Worth Is Still Higher Than Before The Pandemic Chart 10Tight Supply Conditions In The Housing Market Argue Against A Repeat Of The GFC Tight Supply Conditions In The Housing Market Argue Against A Repeat Of The GFC Tight Supply Conditions In The Housing Market Argue Against A Repeat Of The GFC   A Bleaker Picture Outside The US The situation is admittedly dicier outside the US. Putin’s despotic regime continues to wage war on Ukraine. While European natural gas prices are still well below their March peak, they have recently surged as Russia has begun to throttle natural gas exports (Chart 11). The euro area manufacturing PMI clocked in a respectable 54.6 in May but is likely to drop over the coming months as higher energy prices restrain production. The only saving grace is that fiscal policy in Europe has turned more expansionary. The IMF’s April projection foresaw the structural primary budget balance easing from a surplus of 1.2% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 to a deficit of 1.2% of GDP between 2022 and 2027, the biggest swing among the major economies (Chart 12). Even the IMF’s numbers probably underestimate the fiscal easing that will transpire considering the need for Europe to invest more in energy independence and defense. Chart 11The European Economy Is Threatened By Rising Gas Prices The European Economy Is Threatened By Rising Gas Prices The European Economy Is Threatened By Rising Gas Prices Chart 12Euro Area Fiscal Policy Is Expected To Be More Expansionary In The Years To Come Than Before The Pandemic Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question   The Chinese economy continues to suffer from the “triple threat” of renewed Covid lockdowns, a shift of global demand away from manufactured goods towards services, and a floundering property market. We expect the Chinese property market to ultimately succumb to the same fate that befell Japan 30 years ago. Chart 13Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Unlike Japanese stocks in the early 1990s, however, Chinese stocks are trading at fairly beaten down valuations – 10.9-times earnings and 1.4-times book for the investable index (Chart 13). With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year and the population jaded by lockdowns, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash and loosen the reins on regulation will intensify. A Scenario Analysis For The S&P 500 Corralling all these moving parts is no easy matter. We would put the odds of a US recession over the next 12 months at 40%. This is double what we would have said a month ago when we tactically upgraded stocks after the S&P 500 fell below the 4,000 mark. The May CPI report was clearly a shocker, both to the Fed and the markets. The median dot in the June Summary of Economic Projections sees the Fed funds rate rising to 3.8% next year, smack dab in the middle of our once highly out-of-consensus estimate of 3.5%-to-4% for the neutral rate of interest. With interest rates potentially moving into restrictive territory next year, equity investors are right to be concerned. Yet, as noted above, if a recession does occur, it is likely to be a fairly mild one. At the time of the BCA monthly view meeting, the S&P 500 was already down 23% in nominal terms and 27% in real terms from its peak in early January. We assume that the S&P 500 will fall a further 10% in real terms over the next 12 months in a “mild recession” scenario (30% odds) and by 25% in a “deep recession” scenario (10% odds). Conversely, we assume that the S&P 500 will be 20% higher in 12 months’ time in a “no recession” scenario (60% odds). Note that even in a “no recession” scenario, the real value of the S&P 500 would still be down 12% in June 2023 from its all-time high. On a probability-weighted basis, the expected 12-month real return across all three scenarios works out to 6.5%, or 8% with dividends (Table 1). That is enough to justify a modest overweight in my view – but given the risks, just barely. Investors focused on capital preservation should consider a more conservative stance. Table 1S&P 500 Drawdowns Depending On Whether The US Will Enter A Recession And How Severe It Will Be Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Most of my colleagues were more cautious than me, as they generally thought that the odds of a recession were greater than 50%. They voted to shift the BCA house view to a neutral asset allocation stance on equities, with a slight plurality favoring an outright underweight (10 for underweight; 9 for neutral; and 6 for overweight). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question