Economic Growth

Highlights Duration: Rising political tensions in the U.S. will not offset the cyclical upward momentum in global growth, which is supported by accelerating corporate profits. Bond yields are unlikely to fall much in the near term, despite significant bearish investor duration positioning. Shift back to a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance and position for bear-steepening of yield curves. Country Allocation: Downgrade U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5) in global hedged bond portfolios. Corporates: A better global growth outlook should continue to support U.S. corporate debt markets, despite tight valuations and a strong U.S. dollar. Upgrade allocations to U.S. Investment Grade to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to neutral (3 of 5), at the expense of U.S. Treasuries. Favor the higher quality tiers (i.e. above Caa) in U.S. junk. Feature Optimism reigns supreme in the markets at the moment, particularly in the U.S. where bullish investors traded in their "Make America Great Again" hats for "Dow 20,000" ballcaps last week. The string of better-than-expected economic data across the world is continuing - a fact confirmed by the latest corporate profit releases showing that an earnings recovery was already underway before Donald Trump's election victory. We have been looking for a meaningful pullback in government bond yields, and a widening of credit spreads, before returning to a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance and raising corporate allocations. That opportunity may not come to pass as economic data remains solid and leading indicators are accelerating. With no major inflation hiccups likely in the near-term to force the major central banks to rapidly shift to a more hawkish stance, and with equity markets remaining supported by accelerating earnings growth, the current "sweet spot" for risk can continue. Return expectations must be tempered, though, as much of the recent growth improvements is already reflected in bond and equity valuations. Any sign that the optimism shown in confidence surveys is not translating into improving hard economic data could trigger an equity market correction and a risk-off move to lower government bond yields and wider credit spreads. Given our view that global growth will be faster than consensus expectations in 2017, however, we think that a pro-risk overshoot phase is more likely than a risk-off correction in the near term. Any upset in equity markets would represent a medium-term opportunity to increase credit risk and reduce duration. This week, we are adapting a more pro-growth, pro-risk stance in our recommended portfolio allocations this week, making the following changes: Reduce overall portfolio duration to below-benchmark Reduce U.S. Treasury exposure to below-benchmark (2 of 5) Upgrade U.S. Investment Grade corporate exposure to above-benchmark (4 of 5) Upgrade U.S. High-Yield corporate exposure to neutral (3 of 5), favoring B- & Ba-rated names Importantly, we are maintaining our current allocations to Euro Area corporates (above-benchmark) and Emerging Market sovereign and corporate debt (neutral for both), given that we see more potential for upside surprises in the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world. Duration: Re-Establish A Cyclical Below-Benchmark Stance We moved to a neutral stance on our overall duration recommendation back on December 6th, which we viewed as a tactical profit-taking exercise on our previous successful bearish bond call dating back to last July.1 Our view at the time was that global bonds were still in a cyclical bear phase, led by rising inflation expectations and better economic growth prospects in the developed world (especially in the U.S.). Given the extreme bearish positioning in government bond markets, at a time of oversold momentum, our stated plan of attack was to look to move back to a below-benchmark stance after a meaningful pullback in yields. The likely trigger for that move was expected to be some disappointment on actual economic data, especially given the heightened growth expectations in the U.S. after Trump's electoral victory. Global economic data continues to trend in a positive direction, however, which is preventing any pullback in bond yields despite a deeply oversold market (Chart of the Week). The Citigroup Data Surprise index for the major developed economies is at the highest levels since early 2014. The Global ZEW indicator, one of our favorites, is at the highest level since mid-2015. The global leading economic indicator from the OECD is back to levels last seen in 2013, suggesting that the positive growth momentum can continue to put upward pressure on real bond yields. There are few signs of disappointment at the country level, with the Purchasing Managers Indices for all major developed markets, as well as for China, all pointing to expanding global activity (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekYields Supported By Faster Growth Yields Supported By Faster Growth Yields Supported By Faster Growth Chart 2A Broad Based Upturn A Broad Based Upturn A Broad Based Upturn It will be interesting to see if this uptrend can withstand the "bull in the China shop" approach of the new Trump administration with regards to U.S. trade policy. Already, in just the first week of his presidency, Trump has aggressively pushed to implement much of his protectionist campaign promises, like pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pushing to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement and threatening the imposition of tariffs or border taxes in an effort to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Global confidence surveys will be critical to monitor in the next month or two for any sign that Trump uncertainty is having a detrimental effect on business optimism outside the U.S. Importantly, the starting point is strong, with both consumer and business confidence measures in Europe and China rising steadily, as are net earnings revisions for global equities (Chart 3). A combination of improving economic sentiment, confirmed by stronger corporate profits, may be enough for the global economy to withstand the shifting plate tectonics of U.S. economic policy. In the U.S. itself, the GDP report released last week showed that 2016 ended on a soft note, with annualized growth of only 1.9% in the 4th quarter. However, a sector-by-sector forecast for U.S. GDP presented last month by our colleagues at BCA U.S. Bond Strategy shows that there is upside risk for most major elements of the U.S. economy (Chart 4).2 Rising consumer confidence amid a tight labor market should help boost consumption, while the large drag from inventory destocking seen last year will not be repeated in 2017. Chart 3An Improving Corporate Profit Backdrop An Improving Corporate Profit Backdrop An Improving Corporate Profit Backdrop Chart 4Upside Risks For U.S. Growth Upside Risks For U.S. Growth Upside Risks For U.S. Growth The wild cards for U.S. growth will come from all the sectors most impacted by potential policies from the Trump administration: business investment, government spending and net exports. Trump has been going full steam ahead with his protectionist leanings in his initial days in office, but how much he can quickly implement remains to be seen. For now, the U.S. dollar is not rising rapidly enough to generate much of a drag on U.S. GDP growth, unlike the 2014/15 surge in the greenback (see the bottom panel of Chart 4). More importantly, the improving trend in U.S. corporate profit growth and post-election surge in business confidence should support faster growth in U.S. capital spending, which is already showing signs of perking up a bit (Chart 5). As we discussed in a Weekly Report earlier this month, the bigger upside surprise for the U.S. economy this year will come from capital spending, not government spending, as Trump will have a much easier time passing pro-growth corporate tax cuts than getting his infrastructure spending program green-lighted quickly through the U.S. Congress.3 U.S. growth will be much faster than the Fed's current forecast of 2.1%, which will embolden the Fed to deliver on additional rate hikes later this year. The Fed will likely want to see some sign of clarity on the fiscal policy outlook before contemplating the next rate hike, and we are not expecting a rapid acceleration of U.S. inflation in the next few months that would force to Fed to act more quickly. The next rate hike will come at the June FOMC meeting, with the Fed delivering at least the 50bps of rate hikes by year-end currently discounted in the market, and possibly the full 75bps of hikes shown in the latest FOMC projections if the economy delivers faster growth in 2017, as we expect. When looking at the other major bond yields in the "Big-4" developed markets, all elements of valuation have repriced higher (Chart 6): Chart 5U.S. Corporate Profits & Confidence Are Stronger, Capex Is Next U.S. Corporate Profits & Confidence Are Stronger, Capex Is Next U.S. Corporate Profits & Confidence Are Stronger, Capex Is Next Chart 6All Yield Components Are Rising All Yield Components Are Rising All Yield Components Are Rising Central bank policy rate expectations have shifted away from cuts in the Euro Area, Japan and the U.K., with a small hike from the Bank of England now discounted in the U.K. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve; Term premiums have risen from the mid-2016 lows, but remain negative in the countries where central banks are still actively engaging in asset purchase programs; Inflation expectations are well off the 2016 lows in all markets, but with higher levels in the U.K. and U.S. We see much higher upside risks for growth and inflation, and tighter monetary policy, in the U.S. and U.K. than the Euro Area or Japan. To reflect this in our model portfolio, we are downgrading our U.S. country allocation to below-benchmark (2 of 5) this week, while maintaining our underweight in the U.K. (also 2 of 5). We are keeping the Euro Area at above-benchmark (4 of 5) and Japan at benchmark (3 of 5). Government bond yield curves should see mild steepening pressure from rising inflation expectations before central banks are forced to turn more hawkish. We are focusing our decision to reduce overall portfolio duration more at the longer end of yield curves, especially in the U.S. and U.K. (Chart 7). A large headwind to any significant move higher in bond yields remains investor positioning, with only the "active client" portion of the JP Morgan duration survey showing a flip back to a net long duration stance in recent weeks (Chart 8). A full unwind of the large short positions in government bond markets is unlikely in the absence of much weaker economic data or a big correction in equity markets. The latter is impossible to time, but nothing that we are seeing in the forward-looking data is pointing to an imminent slowing of economic growth. Thus, we are choosing to shift back to our desired strategic below-benchmark duration stance this week. Chart 7Rising Inflation = Steeper Yield Curves Rising Inflation = Steeper Yield Curves Rising Inflation = Steeper Yield Curves Chart 8Large Short Positions Still An Issue Large Short Positions Still An Issue Large Short Positions Still An Issue Bottom Line: Rising political tensions in the U.S. will not offset the cyclical upward momentum in global growth and inflation. Bond yields are unlikely to fall much in the near term, despite significant bearish investor duration positioning. Shift back to a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance and position for bear-steepening of yield curves. Downgrade U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5) in global hedged bond portfolios. Corporate Bonds: A Cyclical Upgrade In The U.S., Despite Tight Valuations Global corporate debt has enjoyed solid relative performance versus government bonds over the past several months, driven by the improvements in economic growth and earnings. Credit spreads have narrowed in response, for both Investment Grade and High-Yield. In the Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan, central bank asset purchases of corporate bonds have also helped to keep spreads tight and help support the overall positive backdrop for credit markets. High levels of corporate leverage remain an issue, especially in the U.S., but an improving profit backdrop and faster nominal GDP growth will help paper over problems associated with high company debt. In the U.S., the items in our "Corporate Checklist" are providing a generally positive signal (Chart 9): Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is starting to signal a slight improvement in corporate credit metrics after several years of deterioration; Bank lending standards are no longer tightening, according to the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey, after a brief period of more stringent standards in 2015 & 2016; Bank equities are outperforming the overall market, which in the past has been a positive signal for credit availability and corporate debt performance; Monetary conditions are still only just neutral, even with the U.S. dollar at very expensive levels. The monetary backdrop could become a concern later on in the year if Fed rate hikes lead to another period of rapid U.S. dollar appreciation. Until then, the more positive backdrop for profits will continue to boost balance sheet health, resulting in reduced equilibrium risk premiums (i.e. spreads) on corporate bonds. Already, U.S. corporate debt has priced in the better news (Chart 10). In High-Yield, the massive rally in energy-related names after the recovery in oil prices last year (top panel) has driven the spread on the Energy sub-component of the Barclays Bloomberg benchmark index back to levels last seen when oil was at $100/bbl ... even though the price of oil is still in the low $50s! Meanwhile, junk spreads ex-energy now reflect the benign macro volatility environment, as proxied by the VIX index (middle panel). Chart 9A Better Fundamental Backdrop A Better Fundamental Backdrop A Better Fundamental Backdrop Chart 10Corporate Valuations Are Not Cheap... Corporate Valuations Are Not Cheap... Corporate Valuations Are Not Cheap... In Investment Grade, spreads have also tightened alongside falling volatility, although spreads are still somewhat higher than during the previous period when the VIX was this low back in 2014 (bottom panel), suggesting that spreads could compress even further if the macro backdrop stays benign. We have maintained a generally cautious stance on U.S. corporate credit for much of the past year, given the combination of poor corporate health, contracting profits and slowly tightening monetary conditions. Now that the backdrop has changed, the case for upgrading U.S. corporates versus U.S. Treasuries is more compelling. This is especially so given the improvement in global economic growth momentum, which usually correlates with periods of positive excess returns for both Investment Grade and High-Yield versus Treasuries (Chart 11). Given our more optimistic tone on global economic growth, led by the potential for upside surprises in the U.S., this week we are upgrading our recommended stance on U.S. Investment Grade corporates to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to at-benchmark (3 of 5). Within High-Yield, we are focusing our exposure on the high-to-middle quality tiers, as both B-rated and Ba-rated spreads look far more attractive than Caa-rated debt. That can be seen in Chart 12, which shows the option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall U.S. High-Yield index and the three main credit tier buckets, divided by the 12-month trailing volatility of excess returns for each grouping. These "vol-adjusted" spreads are at the long-run median level for B-rated and Ba-rated debt, while Caa-rated bonds (which are dominated by the now-expensive debt of energy-related companies) offers poor value relative to their volatility. Chart 11...But The Growth Outlook Remains Supportive ...But The Growth Outlook Remains Supportive ...But The Growth Outlook Remains Supportive Chart 12Avoid The Lower Credit Tiers In U.S. Junk Avoid The Lower Credit Tiers In U.S. Junk Avoid The Lower Credit Tiers In U.S. Junk Differentiating within the credit tiers is important, as the overall U.S. High-Yield spread is not particularly cheap once expected default losses are taken into account (Chart 13). If U.S. economic growth surprises to the upside, as we expect, then the default outlook will look better and High-Yield spreads will look more attractive. For this reason, we would look to shift to an above-benchmark stance on any risk-off correction in global equities or corporates. With the business cycle improving, buying any dips in U.S. corporate credit markets should pay off in 2017. One final point: we have had a long-standing recommendation to overweight Euro Area Investment Grade corporate debt versus U.S. equivalents. That view was based on the underlying support for Euro Area corporates from ECB purchases, coming at a time when Euro Area balance sheets were improving in absolute terms, and relative to the U.S., as shown by our Euro Area Corporate Health Monitor (Chart 14). However, with our U.S. CHM now showing some modest improvement, and with U.S. likely to show more upside growth surprises in 2017, we are not upgrading Euro Area debt from the current above-benchmark (4 of 5) ranking, even as we boost our U.S. corporate allocation. Chart 13Expect Carry-Like Returns, Given Tight Spreads Expect Carry-Like Returns, Given Tight Spreads Expect Carry-Like Returns, Given Tight Spreads Chart 14A Bullish Case For Both U.S. and Euro Area IG A Bullish Case For Both U.S. and Euro Area IG A Bullish Case For Both U.S. and Euro Area IG Bottom Line: A better global growth outlook should continue to support U.S. corporate debt markets, despite tight valuations and a strong U.S. dollar. Upgrade allocations to U.S. Investment Grade to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to neutral (3 of 5), at the expense of U.S. Treasuries. Favor the higher quality tiers (i.e. above Caa) in U.S. junk. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Vigilantes Take A Break For The Holidays", dated December 6, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A "Post-Truth" Economic Upturn?", dated January 17, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index The Global Growth Upturn Has Legs: Reduce Duration, Upgrade Credit Exposure The Global Growth Upturn Has Legs: Reduce Duration, Upgrade Credit Exposure Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration: Treasuries are now slightly expensive relative to global growth indicators, and the global economic recovery appears sustainable. Despite lingering concerns about policy uncertainty and bearish bond positioning, we recommend shifting back to a below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product: The combination of an improving global growth back-drop and still-accommodative Fed policy will be positive for spread product. As such, we increase our allocation to investment grade corporate bonds - and spread product more generally - from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). We also upgrade high-yield bonds from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). Economy: U.S. GDP growth will be solidly above trend in 2017, driven in large part by accelerating consumer spending. Feature The divergence in economic growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world has been one of our key investment themes for much of the past two years. All else equal, the greater the divergence in growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world, the more the U.S. dollar comes under upward pressure. A strengthening dollar limits how far the Fed can lift rates and caps the upside in long-dated yields. In fact, in a report published last October titled "Dollar Watching: An Update"1 we wrote: Our continued expectation that the Fed will lift rates in December leads us to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product until a December rate hike has been fully discounted by the market. Beyond December, our investment strategy will depend largely on how the dollar responds to an upward re-rating of rate expectations. Strong dollar appreciation would likely cause us to reverse our below-benchmark duration stance and become even more cautious on spread product. Conversely, a tame dollar could mean that the sell-off in bonds and rally in spreads have further to run. With the December rate hike now in the rearview mirror, global growth divergences do not appear to be a strong headwind for bond yields. In fact, the trade-weighted dollar has flattened off since the Fed lifted rates and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has plunged even though rate hike expectations remain elevated (Chart 1). This suggests that the dollar is so far not having much of an impact on the U.S. growth outlook or the expected path of monetary policy. Digging a little deeper, it appears we are witnessing a synchronized upturn in global growth led by the manufacturing sector (Chart 2). The Global Manufacturing PMI is in a clear uptrend, while the diffusion index suggests the improvement is broad based. Similarly, our Global Leading Economic Indicator is once again expanding, while its diffusion index is holding steady above the 50% line. Chart 1Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Chart 2Synchronized Global Recovery Synchronized Global Recovery Synchronized Global Recovery Although the extremely high level of economic policy uncertainty increases the odds of a near-term selloff in risk assets and related flight-to-quality into Treasury securities, the strength of the global growth impulse and sustainability of the U.S. economic recovery (see section titled "U.S. Economy: A Healthy Consumer Leads The Way" below) means we would view any risk-off episode as an opportunity to reduce portfolio duration and increase exposure to spread product. As such, given our 6-12 month investment horizon and the inherent difficulty in forecasting near-term market riot points, this week we begin the process of shifting our portfolio in this direction. Specifically, we move from an "At Benchmark" back to a "Below Benchmark" duration stance and we also upgrade spread product from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5), while downgrading Treasuries from neutral (3 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). Within spread product we upgrade investment grade corporates from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5) and upgrade high-yield from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). We expand on the rationale for each move below. Portfolio Duration Chart 3Treasuries Now Expensive Treasuries Now Expensive Treasuries Now Expensive Two weeks ago,2 we detailed our bearish 6-12 month outlook for U.S. bonds, while also pointing to three factors that had so far prevented us from adopting a below-benchmark duration stance. The three factors were: (i) valuation, (ii) economic policy uncertainty and (iii) sentiment & positioning. Factor 1: Valuation Two weeks ago the 10-year Treasury yield was trading 9 basis points cheap on our 2-factor model based on Global PMI and bullish dollar sentiment. Since then, bullish sentiment has declined and Flash3 PMI readings from the U.S., Eurozone and Japan were all strong. If we assume that final PMIs from these regions are in line with the Flash numbers and that the PMIs from all other countries remain flat, then we calculate that the 10-year Treasury yield is actually 4 basis points expensive relative to fair value (Chart 3). In short, valuation argues even more in favor of reducing portfolio duration than it did two weeks ago. Factor 2: Uncertainty Economic policy uncertainty remains elevated and, unusually, has de-coupled from surveys of consumer and business confidence (Chart 4). Certainly, there is a risk that confidence measures relapse in the near-term if it appears as though some of the new President's promises related to tax cuts and deregulation will not be delivered. However, this risk needs to be weighed against the bond-bearish combination of protectionism and fiscal stimulus favored by the new administration, especially at a time when the economy is close to full employment. Factor 3: Sentiment & Positioning Bond sentiment and positioning remain decidedly bearish according to our Bond Sentiment Indicator and net speculative positioning in Treasury futures, although the J.P. Morgan client survey shows that clients' duration positioning is close to neutral (Chart 5). It is likely that some further capitulation of short positions is necessary before Treasury yields can move decisively higher. However, these shifts in positioning can occur very quickly and given the reading from our valuation model we feel that now is the appropriate time to reduce duration exposure. Chart 4Elevated Uncertainty Remains A Near-Term Risk... Elevated Uncertainty Remains A Near-Term Risk... Elevated Uncertainty Remains A Near-Term Risk... Chart 5...As Does Bearish Positioning ...As Does Bearish Positioning ...As Does Bearish Positioning Bottom Line: Treasuries are now slightly expensive relative to global growth indicators, and the global economic recovery appears sustainable. Despite lingering concerns about policy uncertainty and bearish bond positioning, we recommend shifting back to a below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product In last week's report,4 we explored the performance of spread product throughout the four phases of the Fed cycle (Chart 6), which are defined as follows: Chart 6Stylized Fed Cycle Dollar Watching: Another Update Dollar Watching: Another Update Phase I represents the early stage of the withdrawal of monetary stimulus. This phase begins with the first hike of a new tightening cycle and ends when the fed funds rate crosses above its equilibrium level. Phase II represents the late stage of the tightening cycle, when the Fed hikes its target rate above equilibrium in an effort to slow the economy. Phase III represents the early stage of the easing cycle. It begins with the first rate cut from the peak and lasts until the Fed cuts its target rate below equilibrium. Phase IV represents the late stage of the easing cycle. It encompasses both the period when the fed funds rate descends to its cycle trough and the subsequent adjustment period when the Fed remains on hold in an effort to kick start an economic recovery. Based on the fact that core PCE inflation remains below the Fed's target and the view that its uptrend will proceed only gradually, we concluded that we are presently in Phase I of the Fed cycle and would probably remain there for the balance of the year. Historically, spread product has performed well in Phase I of the Fed cycle, with only Phase IV producing higher average monthly excess returns. However, the Fed cycle is only part of the story. Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - a composite measure of balance sheet health for the nonfinancial corporate sector - has been in "deteriorating health" territory since late 2013. Historically, this measure has an excellent track record of flagging periods of spread widening (Chart 7). Chart 7The Corporate Health Monitor And Credit Spreads The Corporate Health Monitor And Credit Spreads The Corporate Health Monitor And Credit Spreads To augment our analysis, this week we re-examine average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds in the four phases of the Fed cycle but this time we also split each phase into periods of improving and deteriorating corporate health (Table 1). Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Given Reading From ##br##BCA Corporate Health Monitor And The Phase Of The Fed Cycle (July 1989 To Present) Dollar Watching: Another Update Dollar Watching: Another Update Table 1 shows there have been 14 months since 1989 when Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with deteriorating corporate health, according to the CHM. Conversely, Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with improving corporate health in 25 months. However, 13 of the 14 months when Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with deteriorating corporate health are the most recent 13 months. In other words, the current combination of tightening (but still-supportive) monetary policy and weak corporate balance sheets is unprecedented. The other factor we have not yet considered is valuation, as measured by the starting level of corporate spreads. In Table 2 we present average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds split by both the phase of the Fed cycle and the investment grade corporate option-adjusted spread. At present, the average option-adjusted spread for the Bloomberg Barclays investment grade corporate index is 120 bps. Table 2Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Given Previous Month Option-Adjusted Spread** ##br##And The Phase Of The Fed Cycle (July 1989 To Present) Dollar Watching: Another Update Dollar Watching: Another Update In Table 2 we observe that usually spreads are much lower in Phase I of the Fed cycle, typically between 50 bps and 100 bps, and that periods when spreads are above 100 bps generally coincide with higher excess returns. However, we must also recall that corporate health is typically still improving in Phase I of the Fed cycle, so today's higher spread levels might be justified by worse credit quality. Chart 8Value Is Stretched In Junk Value Is Stretched In Junk Value Is Stretched In Junk It goes without saying that the unusual combination of deteriorating corporate health and still-supportive Fed policy is a complicated environment for credit investors to navigate. Our view is that accommodative Fed policy will prevent material spread widening, at least until inflation breaks above the Fed's target and we shift into Phase II of the Fed cycle, but it is also probably not reasonable to expect spreads to tighten much further from current levels. We are looking for low, but positive, excess returns from spread product, consistent with the available carry. Bottom Line: The combination of an improving global growth back-drop and still-accommodative Fed policy will be positive for spread product. As such, we increase our allocation to investment grade corporate bonds - and spread product more generally - from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). We also upgrade our allocation to high-yield bonds from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). We retain only a neutral allocation to high-yield due to the longer-run risks posed by poor corporate health, and tight valuations for high-yield bonds (Chart 8). U.S. Economy: A Healthy Consumer Leads The Way U.S. GDP growth decelerated to 1.9% in Q4 from 3.5% in Q3. Growth in consumer spending slowed to 2.5% from 3.0%, while fixed investment spending picked up to 4.2% from 0.1%. The headline 1.9% GDP print also includes a -1.7% contribution from net exports and +1.0% contribution from inventories. Taking a step back from the quarterly data, we see that the growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers - a measure of growth that strips out the volatile trade and inventory components - has clearly shifted into a higher range during the past couple of years (Chart 9). Further, leading indicators for each individual component of growth all suggest that further acceleration is in store (Chart 10). Chart 9Growth Finds A Higher Gear Growth Finds A Higher Gear Growth Finds A Higher Gear Chart 10Contributions To GDP Growth Contributions To GDP Growth Contributions To GDP Growth But crucially, it is the fundamental drivers underpinning the outlook for consumer spending that lead us to believe that U.S. economic growth will maintain an above-trend pace throughout 2017. As was observed by our U.S. Investment Strategy service in a recent report,5 income growth - the main driver of consumption trends - appears poised to accelerate, driven by accelerating wage growth that is starting to kick in now that the economy has finally reached full employment (Chart 11). The boost in consumer confidence could also lead to a lower savings rate, further increasing the impact on spending (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 11Consumer Spending = Income + Confidence Consumer Spending = Income + Confidence Consumer Spending = Income + Confidence Bottom Line: A healthy consumer is the back bone of the U.S. economy, and elevated consumer demand will also lend support to corporate fixed investment and the housing market. We expect that U.S. growth will be solidly above trend in 2017. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The flash estimate is typically based on approximately 85%-90% of total PMI survey responses each month and is designed to provide an accurate advance indication of the final PMI data. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S. Consumer: The Comeback Kid", dated January 16, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Table 1Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update The Reflation Trade Continues It is wrong to think that the recent rally in risk assets is mainly due to the election of President Donald Trump. Yes, since November 8, U.S. equities have risen by 7% and global equities by 3%. But the rally began as long ago as February last year, and since then U.S. and global equities have risen by 25% and 20% respectively. A more useful narrative is that the U.S. went through a "mini-recession" in late 2015/early 2016 (as indicated by the manufacturing ISM and credit spreads, Chart 1). Since then, assets have moved as they typically do in the first year of a cyclical recovery: small caps, cyclicals and value stocks have outperformed, bond yields risen, and equity multiples expanded in anticipation of a recovery in earnings. Expectations of Trump's fiscal stimulus and deregulation merely gave that momentum an extra boost. Our view is that global economic growth is likely to continue to accelerate. With the U.S. now at full employment, wage growth should rise further (Chart 2). Trump's policies are igniting animal spirits among companies, whose capex intentions have jumped sharply (Chart 3). U.S. real GDP growth this year could be 2.5-3%, somewhat above the consensus forecast of 2.3%. Meanwhile, Europe is growing above trend, and China will continue for a while longer to see the effects from last year's massive monetary stimulus (Chart 4). Chart 1One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession Chart 2Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Chart 3Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Chart 4China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through In the short term, a correction is possible: the rally looks technically over-extended, and investors have begun to notice that in addition to "good Trump" (tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending), there is also a "bad Trump" (market unfriendly measures such as immigration control, confrontation with China, and arbitrary interference in companies' investment decisions). But, on a 12-month view, our expectations of accelerating growth and only a moderate rise in inflation imply that the "sweet spot" for risk assets will continue, and so we maintain the overweight on equities and underweight on bonds we instituted in late November. What could end the reflation trade? The main risks we see (and the reasons we don't think they are serious enough to derail the rally for now) are: Extreme moves by the new U.S. administration. The biggest risk is a confrontation with China over trade. Our view is that Trump will use the threat of recognizing Taiwan to force concessions out of China. A precedent is the way the U.S. handled its trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s (note that new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer was deputy USTR at the time). China is unlikely to accept significant currency appreciation, understanding how this caused a bubble in Japan. But it might agree to voluntary export restrictions, to increasing investment in the U.S., opening the Chinese market more to foreign companies, and to stimulating domestic consumption, as Japan did in the 1980s (Chart 5). This may even chime with how Xi Jinping wants to reform the economy, though missteps by the U.S. could force him into a nationalistic position. Fiscal policy fails. The details of tax cuts are complex: alongside lowering the headline rate of corporate tax to 15% or 20%, for example, Republicans are discussing a border-adjustment tax, one-year depreciation, and an end of the tax offset for interest payments. Infrastructure spending won't happen quickly either, not least since it is disliked by Republican fiscal hawks (who are much less averse to tax cuts). BCA's geopolitical strategists, however, believe that Trump will able to get a program of personal and corporate tax cuts through Congress by August. Economic (and earnings) growth stumble. While corporate and consumer sentiment have picked up recently, hard data has not yet. U.S. 4Q GDP growth of only 1.9%, for example, was disappointing. Earnings growth will need to recover this year to justify elevated multiples. EPS growth for the S&P500 stocks in Q4 2016 looks to have been around 4% YoY according to FactSet. Stocks might fall if earnings do not come in somewhere close to the 12% that the bottom-up consensus forecasts for 2017. Inflation risks rise, triggering the Fed and the European Central Bank to rush to tighten monetary policy. Core U.S. PCE inflation, at 1.7% YoY, is not far below the Fed's 2% target and inflation could accelerate as fiscal policy stimulates an economy where slack has already disappeared. However, it is likely to take some time for inflation expectations to rise, and over the past few months core PCE inflation has, if anything, slowed (Chart 6). We expect the Fed to raise rates three times this year (compared to market expectations of twice) but not to move faster than that. German inflation, at 1.9% YoY, is starting to get uncomfortably high too, but the ECB will probably continue to set policy with more focus on the periphery, especially Italy. Chart 5When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's Chart 6Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Equities: We prefer U.S. equities over European ones in common currency terms. This is partly because we expect further U.S. dollar appreciation. But we also remained concerned about the structural weakness in the European banking system, and by the higher volatility of eurozone equities. Moreover, European earnings will not be boosted by currency depreciation as much as will Japanese earnings, since the euro has hardly weakened on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). We continue to like Japanese equities (with a currency hedge). The Bank of Japan remains committed to an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, which should weaken the yen and boost earnings. We are underweight Emerging Market equities: structural vulnerabilities remain, and the inverse correlation with the U.S. dollar is intact. Chart 7Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Fixed Income: For now, U.S. 10-year Treasury bonds are at around fair value. But we expect the yield to rise moderately further, as growth and inflation pick up, to about 3% by year-end. Yields on eurozone government bonds will also rise, but not by as much. This means that global sovereigns could produce a YoY negative return for the first time since 1994. In the U.S. we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds: inflation expectations are still 30-40 bps below a normalized level (Chart 8). With risk assets likely to outperform, we recommend exposure to spread product, but find investment grade bonds more attractively valued than high-yield. Currencies: Short term, the dollar has probably overshot and could correct. But growth and interest rate differentials (Chart 9) suggest that the dollar will appreciate further until such time as Europe and Japan can contemplate raising rates. Additionally, if the proposal of a border-adjustment tax looks like becoming reality, the dollar could appreciate sharply: a BAT of 20% would theoretically be offset by a 25% rise in the dollar. The yen is likely to depreciate further (perhaps back to JPY125 against the dollar) as the Bank of Japan successfully maintains its target of a 0% 10-year government bond yield. The euro will fall by less, especially if the market begins to worry about ECB tapering in the face of rising inflation. Chart 8TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise Chart 9Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Commodities: The supply/demand picture for industrial metals looks roughly balanced for the year, with Chinese demand likely to remain robust, suppliers more disciplined, but the stronger dollar acting as a headwind. In the oil market, Saudi Arabia and Russia seem to be sticking to their commitment to cut supply, but U.S. shale oil producers are filling the gap, with the rig count up 23% in Q4 over the previous quarter. We continue to expect crude oil to average US$55 a barrel for the next two years. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Highlights Undue pessimism about global growth is giving way to unbridled optimism. Chinese growth has accelerated. However, there is a risk that the economy hits a speed bump later in 2017, as fiscal policy becomes less accommodative, monetary policy is tightened in an effort to curb capital outflows, and recent steps by the authorities to crack down on rampant speculation in the property sector begin to bite. The threat of a trade war will also loom large. U.S. fiscal policy will remain stimulative, but may fail to live up to expectations: There is little appetite among Republicans for increasing infrastructure spending; the multiplier effects from the proposed tax changes are likely to be small; and many GOP leaders are already chomping at the bit to take an ax to government spending. Fortunately, the U.S. economy has enough momentum to continue growing solidly above trend, even if fiscal policy disappoints. This will allow the Fed to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. Developed market equities are overbought and vulnerable to a correction, but will be higher 12 months from now. Favor Europe and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. Stay underweight EM. Feature Global Growth Is Accelerating, But Headwinds Persist The global economy is on the mend. Measures of current activity are rebounding, as are a variety of leading economic indicators (Charts 1 and 2). Chart 1Global Economy ##br##Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Chart 2Global Leading Economic ##br##Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Investors have taken notice: Market-based inflation expectations have risen, as have growth-sensitive commodity prices. Earnings growth expectations have surged, rising in the U.S. to nearly the highest level in a decade. Cyclical stocks have also bounced back, after having lagged the overall market for five years (Chart 3). We agree with the market's positive re-rating of global growth prospects, but worry that undue pessimism is starting to give way to excessive optimism. Two potential developments in particular could end up giving investors pause: A slowing of China's economy later this year. The possibility that U.S. fiscal policy will end up being less stimulative than expected. China: Living On Borrowed Time? Chinese growth has been surprising to the upside of late (Chart 4). Timely indicators such as excavator sales and railway freight traffic, which are well correlated with industrial activity, have been rising at a fast clip. Manufacturing inventory levels have come down, corporate profitability has improved, and producer price inflation has turned positive. The labor market has also picked up steam, as evidenced by the expansion in the employment subcomponents of the PMI indices. Chart 3Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Chart 4Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Looking out, however, there are reasons to worry that the economy will weaken anew. Growth in government spending slowed from a high of 25% in November 2015 to nearly zero in December (Chart 5). Recent efforts by policymakers to clamp down on rampant property speculation could also cause the economy to cool. Meanwhile, capital continues to flee the country (Chart 6). This has put the government in a no-win situation: Raising domestic interest rates could entice more people to keep their money at home, but such a step could increase debt-servicing costs and undermine the country's creaky financial system. Chart 5China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off Chart 6China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows A Problem Of Inadequate Demand There is no shortage of commentary discussing the problems that ail China. Much of the analysis, however, has focused on the country's inefficient allocation of resources and other supply-side considerations. While these are obviously important issues, they overlook what has actually been the most significant binding constraint to growth: a persistent lack of aggregate demand. It has been this deficiency of demand - the flipside of a chronic excess of savings - that has kept the economy teetering on the edge of deflation. If a country suffers from excess savings, there are only three things that it can do. First, it can try to reduce savings by increasing consumption. The Chinese government has been striving to do that by strengthening the social safety net in the hopes that this will discourage precautionary savings. However, this is a slow process which will take many years to complete. Second, it can export those excess savings abroad by running a current account surplus. This would allow the country to save more than it invests domestically through the famous S-I=CA identity. The problem here is that no one wants to have a large current account deficit with China. Certainly not Donald Trump. Third, it can channel those excess savings into domestic investment. This is what China has done by pressing its banks to extend credit to state-owned companies and local governments. Remember that debt is the conduit through which savings is transformed into investment. From this perspective, China's high debt stock is just the mirror image of its high savings rate. The problem is that China already invests too much. Chart 7 shows that capacity utilization has been trending lower over the past six years and is back down to where it was during the Great Recession. The good news is that as long as there is plenty of savings around, Chinese banks will have enough liquid deposits on hand to extend fresh credit. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that borrowers taking on this debt will be able to repay it. This has made the Chinese economy increasingly sensitive to changes in financial conditions. And that sensitivity has, in turn, made global financial markets more fragile. Chart 8 shows that global equities have sold off whenever China stresses have flared up. The risk of another such incident remains high. Chart 7China: Capacity Utilization Back ##br##To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8When China Has a Cold, ##br##Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze China Trade War: The U.S. Holds The Trump Card Chart 9China Would Suffer More ##br##From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. Adding to the pressure on China is the prospect of a trade war with the United States. Donald Trump has flip-flopped on almost every issue over the years, but he's been perfectly consistent on one: trade. Trump has always been a mercantilist at heart, and nothing that has happened since the election suggests otherwise. It is sometimes argued that the damage to the U.S. economy from a trade war with China would be so grave that Trump would not dare initiate one. This is wishful thinking. Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for only 0.6% of U.S. GDP (Chart 9). And much of America's exports to China are intermediate goods that are processed in China and then re-exported elsewhere. Blocking these exports would only hurt Chinese companies. Yes, China could threaten to dump its huge holdings of U.S. Treasurys. However, this is a hollow threat. The yield on Treasurys is largely determined by the expected path of short-term interest rates, which is controlled by the Federal Reserve. To be sure, the dollar would weaken if China started selling Treasurys. But why exactly is that a problem for the U.S.? Donald Trump wants a weaker dollar! In short, the U.S. would not lose much by provoking a trade war with China. Where does this leave us? The most likely outcome is that China blinks first and takes more concerted steps to open up its market to U.S. goods. This would hand Donald Trump a major political victory. However, the path from here to there is likely to be a very rocky one, which means that the reflation trade could suffer a temporary setback. A Trumptastic Fiscal Policy? Getting tough with China was one of Trump's key campaign promises; increasing infrastructure spending and cutting taxes was another. Unfortunately, investors may end up being disappointed both by how much fiscal stimulus is delivered and by the bang for the buck that it generates. For starters, much of Trump's proposed infrastructure program may never see the light of day. The $1 trillion ten-year program that he touted during the campaign was scaled back to $550 billion on his transition website. And even that may be too optimistic. Most Republicans in Congress have little interest in expanding public infrastructure spending. They opposed a big public works bill in 2009 when millions of construction workers were out of a job, and they will oppose one now. The public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions will also limit the universe of projects that can be considered. Most of America's infrastructure needs consist of basic maintenance, rather than the sort of marquee projects that the private sector would be keen to invest in. Granted, the definition for what counts as public infrastructure could be expanded to include such things as hotels and casinos, to cite two completely random examples. But even if one ignores the obvious governance problems that this would raise, such a step could simply crowd out private investment that would otherwise have taken place. The reason that governments invest in infrastructure to begin with is because there are certain categories of public goods that do not lend themselves well to private ownership. To purposely exclude such goods from consideration, while devoting public funds to projects that the private sector is already perfectly capable of doing, is the height of folly. Trump And Taxes House Republicans are pursuing a sweeping tax reform agenda. There is much to like about their proposal. In particular, the shift to a cash flow destination-based tax system could encourage new investment over time, while making it more difficult for firms to carry out a variety of tax-dodging strategies. However, as with many major policy initiatives, the Republican tax proposal could generate significant near-term economic dislocations. Most notably, as we discussed in detail last week, the inclusion of a border adjustment tax could lead to a sharp appreciation in the dollar.1 This would benefit foreign holders of U.S. assets, but hurt debtors with dollar-denominated loans. Such an outcome could put stress on emerging markets, potentially undermining the global reflation trade. Trump's proposed cuts to personal income taxes may not boost spending by as much as some might hope. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the top one percent of income earners will see their after-tax incomes increase by 13.5%, while those in the middle quintile of the distribution will receive an increase of only 1.8% (Table 1). Since the very rich tend to save much of their income (Chart 10), measures which boost their disposable income may not translate into a substantial increase in spending. In fact, cutting the estate tax, as Trump has proposed, could actually depress spending by reducing the incentive for older households to blow through their wealth before the Grim Reaper (and The Taxman) arrive. Table 1Trump's Proposed Tax Cuts Would Largely Favor The Rich Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Chart 10Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Spending Cuts On The Horizon? Then there is the question of whether Congressional Republicans will try to take an ax to government spending. The Hill reported last week that several senior members of Trump's transition team have proposed a plan to cut federal spending by $10.5 trillion over the next 10 years.2 The plan contains many of the same elements as the Republican Study Committee's Blueprint for a Balanced Budget, which called for $8.6 trillion in cuts over the next decade. Separately, Representative Sam Johnson of Texas, the chairman of the House Ways and Means subcommittee on Social Security, has introduced legislation seeking large cuts to pension benefits. Under his plan, workers in their mid-thirties earning $50,000 per year would see a one-third reduction in lifetime Social Security payments.3 Paul Ryan and other Congressional Republicans have also begun to argue that the goal of health care reform should be to guarantee "universal access" to high-quality medical care, rather than "universal coverage." This is a bit like arguing that the goal of transportation policy should be to ensure that everyone has access to a Bentley, provided that they can pony up $200,000 to buy one. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will acquiesce to these changes. He has repeatedly insisted that no one will lose medical coverage under his administration. However, one of his first actions in office was to loosen the mandate that requires healthy individuals to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act. Such a measure, however well intentioned, could greatly undermine the Act. If healthy people can wait until they are sick to sign up for insurance, only sick people will sign up. In order to cover their costs, insurance providers would have to raise premiums, ensuring that even fewer healthy people sign up. Such a vicious "adverse selection cycle," as economists call it, could lead to the collapse of health insurance exchanges, which currently provide coverage for 12.7 million Americans. Our guess is that Trump will ultimately put the kibosh on any plan to radically cut government spending or curtail Medicare and Social Security benefits. Say what you will of Trump, he has proven to be a skilled political operator for someone who has never been elected to public office. He knows that people were chanting "build the wall" at his rallies, not "cut my Medicare." Indeed, it is possible that Trumpcare will ultimately look a lot like Obamacare but with more generous subsidies for health care providers. Nevertheless, the path to this more benign investment outcome will be a bumpy one, suggesting that market volatility could rise in the months ahead. Investment Conclusions Chart 11DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought Markets tend to swing from one extreme to another. This time last year, investors were fixated on secular stagnation. Now they are convinced that we are on the edge of a new global economic boom. Neither position is justified. Global growth has picked up, and this should provide a tailwind to risk assets over the next 12 months. However, as this week's discussion makes clear, there are still plenty of headwinds around. This suggests that the recovery will be a halting affair, with plenty of setbacks along the way. The surge in developed market equities since the U.S. presidential election has pushed stocks deep into overbought territory (Chart 11). A correction is likely over the next few weeks. We expect global equities to fall by 5%-to-10%, paving the way for higher returns over the remainder of the year. Once that recovery begins, European and Japanese stocks will outperform their U.S. counterparts in local-currency terms. We continue to expect EM equities to lag DM. In contrast to stocks, bond yields have already moved off their highs. As we discussed in our Strategy Outlook in early January, the transition from deflation to inflation will be a protracted one.4 Nevertheless, the path of least resistance for yields is to the upside. The Fed is likely to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. This should be enough to keep the dollar bull market intact. We expect the trade-weighted dollar to rise another 5% by year-end, with the risk tilted to the upside if Congress ends up approving a border adjustment tax. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Alexander Bolton, "Trump Team Prepares Dramatic Cuts," The Hill, dated January 19, 2017. 3 Please see Stephen C. Goss memorandum to Sam Johnson, "Estimates Of The Financial Effects On Social Security Of H.R. 6489, The 'Social Security Reform Act Of 2016,' Introduced On December 8, 2016 By Representative Sam Johnson," Social Security Administration, Office Of The Chief Actuary (December 8, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation," dated January 6, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Look below the surface, and the euro area economy reveals some surprising and encouraging truths: Euro area employment is near an all-time high. Euro area inflation is little different to other major economies. The euro area excluding Germany is among the world's top-performing major economies. Stay underweight German bunds versus U.S. T-bonds. Stay long euro/pound until the trigger of Article 50. Stay long euro/yuan structurally. But underweight the Eurostoxx600 because the European equity index is a play on sectors and currencies, not on the euro area economy. Feature "There's nothing so absurd that if you repeat it often enough, people will believe it." - William James In today's post-truth world, the rigorous scrutiny and analysis of facts and data has never been so important. With that in mind, this week's report puts some of the prejudices about the euro area economy under the microscope. Look below the surface, and euro area employment, inflation and growth reveal some surprising and encouraging truths. Euro Area Employment: Near An All-Time High The percentage of the euro area population in employment is close to an all-time high (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekThe Percentage Of The Euro Area Population In Work Is Near An All-Time High The Percentage Of The Euro Area Population In Work Is Near An All-Time High The Percentage Of The Euro Area Population In Work Is Near An All-Time High How could this be when the unemployment rate stands at a structurally elevated 10%? The answer is that euro area labour participation is in a very strong uptrend (Chart I-2). As millions of formerly inactive citizens have entered the labour market, it has structurally swelled the numbers of both the employed and the unemployed. Remember that to count as unemployed, a person has to be in the labour market looking for work. Chart I-2Euro Area Labour Participation Is In A Strong Uptrend Euro Area Labour Participation Is In A Strong Uptrend Euro Area Labour Participation Is In A Strong Uptrend The euro area's strongly rising labour participation means that we must interpret the headline unemployment rate with care. Indeed, we would argue that the healthy percentage of the working age population in employment is the truer measure of labour utilisation. One counterargument is that euro area citizens have simply flooded into the registered labour force to claim generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits. This argument might be valid during downturns, but it cannot explain the 17-year uptrend since the turn of the century. Unpalatable as it might be to the euro doomsayers, we are left with a more positive explanation. Since the monetary union, many euro area countries have succeeded in bringing down structurally high inactivity levels in the working age population that was the accepted norm in previous decades. Admittedly, Italy and Greece are the laggards in this structural movement, and still have much work to do - but even they have made substantial progress in recent years (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Italy And Greece Are The Laggards, But Even They Are Making Progess Italy And Greece Are The Laggards, But Even They Are Making Progess Italy And Greece Are The Laggards, But Even They Are Making Progess Bottom Line: the structural state of euro area employment is much better than the headline unemployment rate might suggest. Euro Area Inflation: Little Different To Other Major Economies The euro area and U.S. inflation rates are almost identical when compared on an apples for apples basis. The key words here are "apples for apples". A fair comparison between inflation rates in the euro area and the U.S. must adjust for a crucial difference in the two price baskets. The euro area's Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices - excludes the consumption costs of owner-occupied housing; whereas the U.S. CPI includes it at a substantial 25% weighting. As Eurostat explains,1 "the comparison of inflation across different countries and regions can be undermined by the use of different approaches to owner-occupied housing." To compare apples with apples, a simple approach is to exclude housing costs from the U.S. CPI too. This shows that the ex-shelter inflation rates - both headline and core - are almost identical in the euro area and the U.S. (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Apples For Apples: Little Difference In ##br##Euro Area And U.S. Headline Inflation... Apples For Apples: Little Difference In Euro Area And U.S. Headline Inflation... Apples For Apples: Little Difference In Euro Area And U.S. Headline Inflation... Chart I-5...Or Core##br## Inflation ...Or Core Inflation ...Or Core Inflation A more correct approach would be to estimate the inclusion of housing costs in the euro area consumer basket, given that they represent a sizable proportion of euro area household expenditures. The proportion of homes that are owner-occupied in the euro area, 67%, is actually higher than that in the U.S., 65%. Our approach uses two steps. First, to realise that owner-occupied housing cost inflation just follows house price inflation. Second, to observe that house price inflation in the euro area is now identical to that in the U.S. (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). We infer that if owner-occupied housing were included in the euro area consumer basket, there would be no major difference in the euro area and U.S. inflation numbers. But what about inflation expectations? The market-based expectations for the euro area and U.S. 5 year inflation rate 5 years ahead - the so-called 5 year 5 year inflation swap - show that the euro area is consistently below the U.S., albeit by just 0.5% (Chart I-8). But again, this difference exists largely because the market is ignoring owner-occupied housing costs, which are not in the euro area's official inflation rate. Chart I-6House Price Inflation Is Now Identical ##br##In The Euro Area And U.S. House Price Inflation Is Now Identical In The Euro Area And U.S. House Price Inflation Is Now Identical In The Euro Area And U.S. Chart I-7Owner Occupied Housing Inflation##br## Follows House Price Inflation Owner Occupied Housing Inflation Follows House Price Inflation Owner Occupied Housing Inflation Follows House Price Inflation Chart I-8Inflation Expectations Move Together ##br##In The Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Expectations Move Together In The Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Expectations Move Together In The Euro Area And U.S. Bottom Line: The euro area is not suffering a noticeably greater deflation threat than any other major economy. Euro Area Growth: One Of The Best In Class Since the end of 2013, euro area real GDP per capita has outperformed both the U.S. and Japan. Once again, we must compare apples with apples. To adjust for the different demographics in the major economies, a fair comparison of economic performance must be on a per capita basis. But isn't the euro area's outperformance due mostly to Germany? Actually, no. Over the past three years, the star performers are Spain and the Netherlands, whose per capita real GDPs have grown by 9% and 4.5% respectively. By comparison, the U.S. clocks in at 3.5% and Japan at 3%. The ECB might argue that its extraordinary policy is responsible for this outperformance. However, the evidence does not support this thesis. The revival in the euro area economy began in early 2014, long before the ECB had even mooted its asset-purchases, TLTROs or negative interest rates. Instead, the turning-point can be traced back to December 31, 2013, the mark-to-market date for the bank asset quality review (AQR). As soon as euro area banks ended the aggressive de-levering that the stress tests forced upon them, a deeply negative credit impulse also eased. Which allowed the economy to begin a sustained recovery. Bottom Line: The euro area excluding Germany is among the world's top-performing major economies (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Euro Area Ex Germany Is Among The World's Top-Performing Major Economies The Euro Area Ex Germany Is Among The World's Top-Performing Major Economies The Euro Area Ex Germany Is Among The World's Top-Performing Major Economies The Investment Implications The proportion of the euro area working age population in employment is close to an all-time high, underlying inflation is almost identical to that in the U.S., and the euro area ex Germany is the world's best-performing major economy over the past three years. Yet the expected difference between ECB looseness and Federal Reserve tightness stands at a multi-decade extreme (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Expected Difference Between ECB Looseness And Fed Tightness Is Too Extreme The Expected Difference Between ECB Looseness And Fed Tightness Is Too Extreme The Expected Difference Between ECB Looseness And Fed Tightness Is Too Extreme Lean against this. Either go long the Eurodollar two year out interest rate future contract and short the equivalent Euribor contract. Or go long the U.S. 5-year T-bond and short the German 5-year bund.2 A further ramification comes in the currency market. The dominant recent driver of the euro has been the so-called fixed income portfolio channel. When global bond investors fled the euro area in search of higher safe nominal yields, the euro came under pressure. These outflows are abating, and indeed reversing, as investors come to realise that the ECB's radical and experimental policy-easing has peaked. Stay long euro/pound until the trigger of Article 50. Stay long euro/yuan structurally. Finally, contrary to popular perception, the state of the euro area economy does not translate into Eurostoxx600 relative performance. Major equity market indexes are a collection of multinational dollar-earning companies which happen to be quoted in a particular city - say, Frankfurt, London, or New York - in a particular currency - say, the euro, pound, or dollar. Therefore, as demonstrated in More Investment Reductionism,3 the main driver of equity market relative performance tends to be currency movements, or the relative performance of industry sectors that dominate the particular index. Based on this currency and sector logic, stay underweight Eurostoxx600 versus FTSE100, and underweight Eurostoxx600 versus S&P500.4 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Detailed Technical manual on Owner-Occupied Housing for Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, Eurostat. 2 BCA strategists differ on this position. 3 Published on November 24, 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4 BCA strategists differ on this position. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to go long Norwegian krone / Russian ruble. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Long NOK/RUB Long NOK/RUB * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights U.S. policy uncertainty has increased again early in the New Year. President Trump's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. The Trump/GOP agenda is still a moving target, but three key risks have emerged for financial markets. A border tax could see a 10% rise in the U.S. dollar. It would also be bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Position accordingly. Second, President Trump has his sights on China. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. Investors seem to be under-appreciating the risk of a trade war. Third, the plan to slash Federal government spending could completely offset the fiscal stimulus stemming from the proposed tax cuts and infrastructure spending. The good news is that the major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. There is more to the equity market rally than a "sugar high". The global profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted. As long as any U.S. protectionist policies do not derail the growth acceleration, corporate EPS in the major countries should rival (traditionally overly-optimistic) bottom-up expectations in 2017. The Fed will hike three times this year, one more than is discounted. The Bank of Japan will continue to target a 10-year JGB yield of 0%, but the ECB will begin hinting at another taper in the fall. Our bond team tactically took profits on a short-duration position, but expect to move back to below-benchmark duration before long. The U.S. policy backdrop is very fluid but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine U.S. growth (our base case), then stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Feature It has become a cliché to describe the economic and financial market outlook as "unusually uncertain". Since 2007, investors have had to deal with rolling financial crises, deleveraging, recession, deflation pressures, quantitative easing, negative interest rates, re-regulation, a collapse in oil prices and Brexit. Chart I-1Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Now, there is Donald Trump. The new President's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. Protectionism, de-regulation and tax reform are high on the agenda but details are scant, leaving investors with very little visibility. There are many policy proposals floating around that have conflicting potential effects on financial markets. Which ones will actually be pursued and how will they be prioritized? Is the U.S. prepared to fight a trade war? Is a border tax likely? Will President Trump push for a "Plaza Accord" deal with China? Even the prospect for fiscal stimulus is a moving target because the Trump Administration is reportedly considering a plan to slash Federal spending by $10 trillion over the next decade! Some have described the global equity rally as just a "sugar high" that will soon fade. No doubt, some of the potentially growth-enhancing parts of the Trump agenda have been discounted in risk assets. Given the highly uncertain policy backdrop, it would be easy to recommend that investors err on the side of caution if the U.S. and global economies were still stuck in the mud. The level of the S&P 500 appears elevated based on its relationship with the policy uncertainty index (shown inverted in Chart I-1). Nonetheless, what complicates matters is that there is more to the equity rally than simply hope. Both growth and profits are surprising to the upside in what appears to be a synchronized global upturn. If one could take U.S. policy uncertainty out of the equation, risk assets are in an economic sweet spot where the deflation threat is waning, but inflation is not enough of a threat to warrant removing the monetary punchbowl. Indeed, the Fed will proceed cautiously and official bond purchases will continue through the year in Japan and the Eurozone. We begin this month's Overview with two key protectionist policies being considered that could have important market implications. We then turn to the good news on the economic and earnings front. The conclusion is that we remain positive on risk assets and bearish bonds on a 6-12 month investment horizon. It will likely be a rough ride, but investors should use equity pullbacks to add exposure. Protectionism Risk #1 A U.S. border tax has suddenly emerged on the U.S. policy program. More formally, it is called a destination-based cash flow tax. Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference the between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred the U.S.). The mechanics are fairly complicated and we encourage interested clients to read a Special Report on the topic from BCA's Global Investment Strategy service.1 The result would be a significant increase in taxes on imported goods and a reduction in taxes paid by exporters. One benefit is that the border tax would generate a large amount of revenue for the Treasury, which could be used to offset the cost of corporate tax cuts. Another benefit is that the tax change would eliminate the use of international "transfer pricing" strategies that allow American companies to avoid paying tax. In theory, the dollar would appreciate by enough to offset the tax paid by importers and the tax advantage gained by exporters, leaving the trade balance and the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy largely unchanged. A 20% border tax, for example, would require an immediate 25% jump in the dollar to level the playing field! In reality, there are reasons to believe that the dollar's adjustment would not be fully offsetting. First, much depends on how the Fed responds. Second, some central banks would take steps to limit the dollar's ascent. To the extent that the dollar did not rise by the full amount (25% in our example), then the border tax would boost exports and curtail imports. The resulting tailwind for U.S. growth would eventually be reflected in higher inflation to the extent that the economy is already near full employment. The result is that a border tax would be bullish the dollar and bearish for bonds. Our base case is that a 20% border tax would lift the dollar by about 10% over a 12-month period, above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. The 10-year Treasury yield could reach 3% in this scenario. Subjectively, we assign a 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. It appears that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. proceeds with this new tax, suggesting that the risks to the dollar and bond yields are to the upside. This is another reason to underweight U.S. bonds relative to Bunds on a currency-hedged basis. For stocks, any growth boost from the border tax would benefit corporate profits, at least until the Fed responded with a faster pace of rate hikes. It is another story for EM equities as a shrinking U.S. trade deficit implies less demand for EM products and shrinking international dollar liquidity. A border tax could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war, souring investor sentiment towards EM stocks. Another major upleg in the U.S. dollar could also spark a financial crisis in some EM countries with current account deficits and substantial dollar-denominated debt. Protectionism Risk #2 Chart I-2Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated While President Trump wants a smaller trade deficit generally, he has his sights on China because of the elevated U.S. bilateral trade deficit (Chart I-2). His choices for Commerce Secretary, National Trade Council and U.S. Trade Representative are all China critics. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. He can order tariffs on specific goods, or even impose a surcharge on all dutiable goods, as Nixon did in 1971. Congress is unlikely to be a stumbling block. Trump's election was a signal that the U.S. populace wants protectionist policies. His electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. We expect the Trump Administration to give a largely symbolic "shot across China's bow" in the first 100 days, setting the stage for formal trade negotiations in the subsequent months. The initial shot will likely rattle markets. A calming period will follow, but this will only give a false sense of security. The U.S. is in a relatively good negotiating position because China's exports to the U.S. are much larger than U.S. exports to China. However, tensions over the "One China" policy and international access to the South China Sea will greatly complicate the trade negotiations. The bottom line is that there is little hope that U.S./China relations will proceed smoothly.2 A long position in the VIX is prudent given that the market does not appear to be adequately discounting the possibility of a trade war. Synchronized Global Growth Upturn While the U.S. policy backdrop has become more problematic for investors, the global economic and profit picture has brightened considerably. We were predicting a pickup in global growth before last November's election based on our leading indicators and the ebbing of some headwinds that had weighed on economic activity early in 2016. As expected, the manufacturing sector is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking phase. The stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging market manufacturers. The drag on global growth from capex cuts in the energy patch is moderating even though the level of capital spending will contract again in 2017. Moreover, the aggregate fiscal thrust for the advanced economies turned positive in 2016 for the first time in six years. The major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. The pick-up is confirmed by recent data on industrial production, purchasing managers' surveys and the ZEW survey (Chart I-3). The global ZEW composite has been a good indicator for world earnings revisions and the global stock-to-bond return ratio. The synchronized uptick in global coincident and leading economic data, including business and consumer confidence, suggests that there is more going on than a simple post-election euphoria. Euro Area sentiment measures hooked up at the end of 2016 and the acceleration in growth appears to be broadly based (Chart I-4). A simple model based on the PMI suggests that Eurozone growth could be as much as 2% this year, which is well above trend. Chart I-3Positive Global Indicators bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 Chart I-4Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates While Japan will not be a major contributor to overall global growth given its well-known structural economic impediments, the most recent data reveal a slight uptick in consumer confidence, business confidence and the leading economic indicator (Chart I-5). We have noted the impressive rebound in China's leading and coincident growth indicators for some time. Some indicators are consistent with real GDP growth well in excess of the 6.7% official growth figure for 2016 Q4. Both the OECD leading indicator and our proprietary GDP growth model are calling for faster growth in 2017 (Chart I-6). A potential increase in trade or even military tensions between China and the U.S. is a potential risk to this sunny picture. Nonetheless, given what we know about the underlying economy at the moment, China looks poised to deliver another year of solid growth. Chart I-5Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Chart I-6Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth In the U.S., President Trump appears to be stirring long-dormant animal spirits. CEOs are much more upbeat and several regional Fed surveys indicate a surge in investment intentions (Chart I-7). Spending on capital goods has the potential to soar given the historical relationship with the survey data shown in Chart I-8 (the caveat being that Congress will need to deliver). Even the long depressed small business sector is suddenly more optimistic. The December reading of the NFIB survey showed a spike in confidence, with capital expenditures, hiring plans and overall optimism returning to levels not seen in this expansion. Chart I-7Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Chart I-8...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending There is a good chance that a deal between the White House and Congress on tax reform will occur in the first half of 2017, including a major tax windfall for the business sector that would boost the after-tax rate of return on equity. Nonetheless, past research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles only get underway once businesses see clear evidence that consumer demand is on the upswing. In other words, consumers need to move first. On that score, a number of cyclical tailwinds have aligned for household spending. Credit scores have largely been repaired since the recession and income growth is on track to accelerate (Chart I-9). Despite a moderation in monthly payrolls, overall income growth is likely to stay perky, now that wage gains are on an upward path. And, importantly, various surveys highlight an improvement over the past year in consumer confidence about long-term job prospects. The propensity to spend rather than save is higher when households feel secure in their jobs. Chart I-10 highlights that the saving rate tends to decline when confidence is elevated. The wealth effect from previous equity and housing price gains has been a tailwind for some time but, until now, consumers have held back because it seemed to many that the recession had never ended. Chart I-9Share Of Home Mortgage Borrowers ##br##Who Recovered Pre-Delinquency Credit Score After Foreclosure February 2017 February 2017 Chart I-10Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend In other words, there are increasing signs that the scar tissue from the Great Recession is finally fading, at a time when tax cuts are on the way. We expect that U.S. real GDP growth will be in the 2½-3% range this year with risks to the upside, as long as the Trump Administration does not start a trade war that undermines confidence. Corporate Earnings Liftoff Chart I-11Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back The good news on the economy carries over to corporate earnings. The profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted (Chart I-11). Eurozone EPS "went vertical" near the end of 2016. Blended S&P 500 Q4 bottom-up estimates reveal a huge increase in EPS last year to $109 (4-quarter trailing), providing an 8.5% growth rate for 2016 as a whole. The 4-quarter trailing growth figure will likely surge again to 16% in 2017 Q1, even if the sequential EPS figure is flat. Some of the growth acceleration is technical, reflecting a particularly sharp drop in profits at the end of 2015 (which will eventually fall out of the annual growth calculation). Of course, a spike in energy earnings on the back of higher oil prices made a major contribution to the overall growth rate, but there is more to it than that. Consumer Discretionary, Financials and Health Care all posted solid earnings figures last year. Earnings momentum has also picked up in Materials, Real Estate and Utilities, although profit growth in these sectors is benefiting from favorable comparisons. Dollar strength has pushed the U.S. earnings revisions ratio slightly into negative territory, while revisions have surged into positive terrain in the other major markets (Chart I-12). The sharp upturn in our short-term EPS indicators corroborates the more upbeat earnings outlook for at least the next few months (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Chart I-13Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Our medium-term profit models also paint a constructive picture for equities. These are top-down macro models that include oil prices, exchange rates, industrial production (to capture top-line dynamics), and the difference between nominal GDP and labor compensation (to capture margin effects). Given our more optimistic economic view, the model forecasts for 2017 EPS growth have been revised higher for the global aggregate and each of the major developed markets (Chart I-14). The U.S. is tricky because of the impact of comparison effects that will add volatility to the quarterly growth profile as we move through the year. We are now calling for a 10% gain for 2017 as a whole, which is just shy of the roughly 12% increase expected by bottom-up analysts. This is impressive because actual market expectations are typically well below the perennially-optimistic bottom-up estimates. A 10% EPS growth figure might seem overly optimistic in light of the dollar appreciation that has occurred since last November. Some CEOs will no doubt guide down 2017 estimates during the current earning season. However, in terms of EPS growth, the annual change in the dollar matters more than its level. Chart I-15 shows that the year-over-year rate of change in the dollar is moderating despite the recent rise in the level. This is reflected in a diminishing dollar drag on EPS growth as estimated by our model (bottom panel in Chart I-15). We highlighted in the December 2016 monthly report that it does not require a major growth acceleration to overwhelm the negative impact of a rising dollar on earnings. Chart I-14Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Chart I-15Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS The models for Japan and the Eurozone point to 2017 EPS growth in the mid-teens. Both are roughly in line with bottom-up estimates which, if confirmed this year, would be quite bullish for stock indexes. Keep in mind that these projections do not include our base case forecast that the U.S. dollar will appreciate by another 5% this year (more if a border tax is enacted). Incorporating a 5% dollar appreciation would trim U.S. EPS growth by 1 percentage point and add the same amount to profit growth in Japan and the Eurozone. The bottom line is that we expect corporate profits to be constructive for global bourses this year. Within an overweight allocation to equities in the advanced economies, we continue to favor the European and Japanese markets versus the U.S. As we discussed in the 2017 Outlook, political risks in the Eurozone are overblown. Currency movements and relative monetary policies will work against U.S. stocks on a relative (currency hedged) basis. FOMC: Hawks Gradually Winning The Debate Fed officials are in a state of quandary over how the policies of the incoming Administration will affect the growth and inflation outlook. Nevertheless, the last FOMC Minutes confirmed that the consensus on the Committee is still shifting in a less dovish/more hawkish direction. The tone of the discussion was decidedly upbeat, especially on the manufacturing and capital spending outlook. "Most" of the meeting participants felt that the U.S. economy has reached full employment, although there is still an ongoing debate on the benefits and costs of allowing the unemployment rate to temporarily move below estimates of full employment. Running the economy "hot" for a while might draw more discouraged workers back into the workforce and thereby expand the supply side of the economy. Other members, however, highlight that past attempts by the Fed to fine tune the economy in this way have always ended in recession. Our view is that the FOMC will not follow the Bank of Japan's example and explicitly target a temporary inflation overshoot. Conversely, the Fed will not attempt to pre-emptively offset any forthcoming fiscal stimulus either (if indeed there is any net fiscal stimulus). Policymakers will watch the labor market and, especially, wage and price inflation to guide them on the appropriate pace of rate hikes. Core PCE inflation is roughly 30 basis points below target and has only edged erratically higher over the past year. The pickup in shelter inflation has been largely offset by falling core goods prices, reflecting previous dollar strength. We expect shelter inflation to soon flatten off, but goods prices will continue to contract if the dollar rises by another 5% this year. Year-ago comparison effects will also depress the annual rate of change over the next couple of months. However, the key to the underlying inflation trend will be wage pressures, which are most highly correlated with the non-shelter part of the service component. Up until recently, the structural and cyclical forces acting on wage gains were pulling in the same downward direction. Structural factors include automation and population aging; as high-paid older workers leave the workforce, the vast majority of new entrants to full-time employment do so at below-median wages, putting downward pressure on median earnings growth.3 These structural factors will not disappear anytime soon, but the cyclical forces have clearly shifted. The main measures of U.S. wage growth are all trending higher. Excess labor market slack appears to have been largely absorbed. Only the number of people working part time for economic reasons suggests that there is some residual slack remaining. To what extent will cyclical wage pressures exert upward pressure on inflation? That will depend on the ability of companies to raise prices in order to protect profit margins. Wage inflation trends do not lead, and sometimes diverge from, inflation in goods and services. Theory suggests that there is a two-way relationship between wages and prices. Sometimes inflation starts in the labor market and spills over into consumer prices (cost-push inflation), and sometimes it is the other way around (demand-pull inflation). At the moment, the corporate sector appears to have limited ability to pass on rising wage costs. Balancing off the opposing factors, we believe that core PCE inflation will grind higher and should be near the 2% target by year end. This would end the Fed's debate over whether to run the economy hot, helping to keep upward pressure on Treasury yields. Bond Bear To Return Chart I-16Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Global yields troughed a full four months before the U.S. election. As discussed above, the U.S. and global economies were showing signs of increased vigor even before Trump won the Presidency. The new President's policies reinforce the bond-bearish backdrop, especially protectionism and fiscal stimulus, at a time when the economy is already near full employment. Long-term inflation expectations imbedded in bond yields have shifted up in recent months across the major markets. Real yields have been volatile, but generally have not changed much from late last year. We remain modest bond bears over a 6-12 month horizon. Inflation and inflation expectations will continue to grind higher in the major markets and we expect the FOMC to deliver three rate hikes in 2017, one more than is discounted in the Treasury market. A rise in 10-year TIPS breakevens into a range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target (2.4%-2.5% based on history) would be a strong signal that the Fed will soon lift the 'dot plot.' ECB bond purchases will limit the increases in the real component of core European yields, but any additional weakness in the euro would result in a rise in European inflation. The ECB was able to announce a tapering of monthly purchases last year while avoiding a bond rout by extending the QE program to the end of 2017, but this will be more difficult to pull off again if inflation is on the rise and growth remains above-trend this year. We expect the ECB to provide hints in September that it will further taper its QE program early in 2018. Thus, the Eurozone bond market could take over from U.S. Treasurys as the main driver of the global bond bear market late in 2017. The Japanese economy is also performing impressively well, reducing the probability of a "helicopter drop" policy. The dollar's surge has depressed the yen and lifted inflation expectations, relieving some pressure on PM Abe to ramp up fiscal spending beyond what is already included in the supplementary budgets. In any event, the BoJ will keep the 10-year yield pinned near to zero, limiting the upside for bond yields to some extent in the other major bond markets. That said, we are neutral on JGBs, not overweight, because most of the yield curve is in negative territory. We remain overweight Bunds versus both Treasurys and JGBs on a currency-hedged basis. In terms of the duration call, our bond strategists felt in early December that the global bond selloff had progressed too far, too fast (Chart I-16). They recommended temporarily taking profits on short-duration positons and shifting to benchmark, which turned out to be excellent timing. Yields have drifted lower since then and the technicals have improved enough to warrant shifting back to below-benchmark duration. Investment Conclusions Chart I-17A Better Growth ##br##Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength Equity markets have gone into a holding pattern as investors weigh heightened U.S. policy risk against the improving profit and global macro backdrop. The latter appears to have broken the Fed policy loop that had been in place for some time. Expectations for a less dovish Fed helped to drive the dollar and Treasury yields higher late in 2016. But, rather than sparking a correction in risk assets as has been the case in recent years, stock indexes surged to new highs (Chart I-17). The difference this time is that there has been a meaningful improvement in the growth and profit outlook that has overwhelmed the negative impact of a stronger dollar and higher borrowing rates. The protectionist policies currently being considered are clearly dollar bullish, and bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Investors should be positioned accordingly. It is more complicated for stocks. The passing of a major tax reform package would no doubt buttress the budding revival in private sector animal spirits, but a nasty trade war has the potential to do the opposite. The multitude of policy proposals floating around greatly complicate asset allocation. It is a very fluid situation but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine global growth (our base case), then corporate earnings growth will be solid in 2017 and stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. We wish to be clear, though, that equities are on the expensive side in most of the main markets. This means that overweighting equities and underweighting cash and bonds in a balanced global portfolio is essentially playing an equity overshoot. It may end badly, but the overshoot is likely to persist for as long as the economic and profit upswing persists. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Our view on corporate bonds is unchanged this month. Poor value and deteriorating corporate balance sheet health make it difficult to recommend anything more than a benchmark position in the U.S. relative to Treasurys. However, investors can pick up a little spread in the Eurozone corporate bond market, where balance sheet health is better and the ECB is soaking up supply. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 26, 2017 Next Report: February 23, 2017 1 U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue for 2017. BCA Global Investment Strategy service, January 20, 2017. 2 For more information, please see: Trump, Day one: Let the Trade War Begin. BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, January 18, 2017. 3 For more information in the structural and cyclical wage pressures, please see: U.S. Wage Growth: Paid in Full? U.S. Investment Strategy Service, November 28, 2016. II. Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg? The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is a headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will be so severe this time that it will quickly derail the economic expansion. However, a number of factors make projecting interest payments complicated, such that back-of-the-envelope estimates are quite misleading. In order to provide a sense of the size of the cash-flow effect, in this Special Report we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point jump to really "move the dial". Interest rate shocks are more dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden due to the size of the JGB debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. We are not downplaying the risks posed by the rapid accumulation of debt since the Great Recession. Rather, our aim is to provide investors with a sense of the debt-service implications of a further rise in borrowing rates. Our main point is that the cash-flow effect of higher interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Investors are justifiably worried that the bond selloff will get ahead of itself, spark an economic setback and a corresponding flight out of risk assets. After all, there have been several head fakes during this recovery during which rising bond yields on the back of improving data and optimism were followed by an economic soft patch and a risk-off phase in financial markets. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. Indeed, global debt has swollen by 41½ percentage points of GDP since 2007 (Chart II-1). Households, corporations and governments tried to deleverage simultaneously to varying degrees in the major countries since the Great Recession and Financial Crisis, but few have been successful. Households in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland have managed to reduce the level of debt relative to income. U.K. and Japanese corporations are also less geared today relative to 2007. Outside of these areas, leverage has generally increased in the private and public sectors (see Chart II-2 and the Appendix Charts beginning on page 37). The astonishing pile-up of debt in China has been particularly alarming for the investment community (Chart II-3). Chart II-1Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Chart II-2Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Chart II-3China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up Governments can be excused to some extent for continuing to run fiscal deficits because automatic stabilizers require extra spending on social programs when unemployment is high. Fiscal policy was forced to at least partially offset the drain on aggregate demand from private sector deleveraging, or risk a replay of the Great Depression. More generally, history shows that it is extremely difficult for any one sector or country to deleverage when other sectors and countries are doing the same. The slow rate of nominal income growth makes the job that much harder. Borrowing Rates And The Economy There are several ways in which higher borrowing rates can affect the economy. Households will be incentivized to save rather than spend at the margin. Borrowing costs surpass hurdle rates for new investment projects, causing the business sector to trim capital spending. Uncertainty associated with rising rates might also undermine confidence for both households and firms, reinforcing the negative impact on demand. Banks, fearing a growth slowdown ahead and rising delinquencies, may tighten lending standards and thereby limit credit availability. These negative forces are normally a headwind for growth, but not something that outweighs the positive Keynesian dynamics of rising wages, profits and employment until real borrowing rates reach high levels. However, if the neutral or "equilibrium" level of interest rate is still extremely low today, then it may not require much of a rise in market rates to tip the economy over. A lot depends on confidence, which has been quite fragile in the post-Lehman world. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is another headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. For the government sector, a swelling interest burden will add to the budget deficit and may place pressure on the fiscal authorities to cut back on spending in other areas. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will quickly derail the expansion in the U.S. and potentially in other countries as the Treasury market selloff drags up yields across the global bond market. This is an argument that has circulated at the beginning of every Fed tightening cycle as far back as we can remember. Some even predict that central banks will be forced to use financial repression for an extended period to prevent the interest burden from skyrocketing and thereby short-circuiting the economic expansion. Back-of-the-envelope estimates that simply apply a 100 or 200 basis point increase in borrowing rates to the level of outstanding debt, for example, imply a shocking rise in the debt service burdens. Fed rate hikes could be analogous to the iceberg that took down the Titanic in 1912. Key Drivers Of Interest Sensitivity However, back-of-the-envelope calculations like the one described above paint an overly pessimistic picture for three reasons. First, the starting point for debt service burdens in the corporate, household and government sectors is low (Chart II-4). These burdens have generally trended down since 2007 because falling interest rates have more than offset debt accumulation, with the major exception of China.1 Second, the maturity distribution of debt means that it takes time for interest rate shifts to filter into debt servicing costs. For example, the average maturity of corporate investment-grade bond indexes in the major economies is between 3 and 12 years (Chart II-5). The average maturity of government indexes range from 7½ to 16 years. Moreover, the majority of household debt is related to fixed-rate mortgages. Even a significant portion of consumer debt is fixed for 5-years and more in some countries. Households have been extending the maturity structure of their debt in recent decades (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Chart II-4Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Chart II-5Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Third, even following the backup in yield curves since the U.S. election, current interest rates on new loans are still significantly below average rates on outstanding household loans, corporate debt and government debt. The implication is that most older loans and bonds coming due over the next few years will be rolled over at a lower rate compared to the loans and bonds being replaced. This will even be true if current yield curves shift up by 100 basis points in many cases (except for the U.S. where current yields are closer to average coupon and loan rates). In this Special Report, we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. We could not include China in this month's analysis because data limitations precluded any degree of accuracy, but the sheer size of China's debt mountain justifies continued research in this area. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates rise immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point rise in yield curves to really "move the dial" in terms of the cash-flow impact on spending. An interest rate shock of that size would be particularly dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden given the size of its debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. Consumer Sector U.S. households have worked hard at deleveraging since their net worth was devastated by the housing bust. Still, the overall debt-to-income level is elevated by historical standards. U.S. household leverage has generally trended higher since the Second World War and has been a source of angst for investors as far back as the late 1950s. Yet, we find no evidence that U.S. consumers have become more sensitive to changes in borrowing rates over the decades.2 This counter-intuitive result partially reflects the fact that consumers have partially insulated themselves from rising interest rates by adopting a greater proportion of fixed-rate debt. The bottom panel of Chart II-6 presents the two-year change in debt service payments expressed as a percent of income (i.e. the swing or the "cash flow" effect). The fact that these swings have not grown over time suggest that the cash-flow effect of changes in interest rates on debt service has not increased.3 Chart II-6U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates Another way to demonstrate this point is to compare disposable income growth with a measure of "discretionary" disposable income that subtracts debt service payments (Chart II-6, top panel). This is the amount of money left over after debt servicing to purchase goods and services. The annual rate of growth in disposable income and discretionary income are nearly identical. In other words, growth in spending power is determined almost exclusively by changes in the components of income (wages, hours and employment). Moreover, the fact that some households are net receivers of interest income provides some offset to rising interest payments for other households when rates go up. This conclusion applies to households in the other major countries as well. Charts II-7 to II-10 present projections for household interest payments as a percent of GDP under three scenarios: no change in yield curves, an immediate 100 basis point parallel shift up in the yield curve and a 300 basis point shift. Assuming an immediate increase in yields across the curve is overly blunt, but the scenarios are only meant to provide a sense of how much interest payments could rise on a medium-term horizon (say, one to five years). The exact timing is less important. Chart II-7U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-8U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-9Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-10Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Unsurprisingly, household interest payments as a fraction of GDP are flat-to-slightly lower in "no change" interest rate scenario for the major countries. The interest burden increases by roughly 1 percentage point in the 100 basis point shock, although the level remains well below the pre-Lehman peak in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone. In Japan, the interest payments ratio returns to levels last seen in the late 1990s, although this is not particularly onerous. A 300 basis point shock would see interest burdens ramp up to near, or above, the pre-Lehman peak in all economies except in the U.K. For the latter, borrowing rates would still be below the 2007 peak even if they rise by 300 basis points from current levels. This scenario would see the household interest burden surge well above 3% of GDP in Japan, a level that exceeds the entire history of the Japanese series back to the early 1990s. Also shown in the bottom panel of Chart II-7, Chart II-8, Chart II-9, Chart II-10 is the associated 2-year swing in interest expense as a percent of GDP under the three scenarios. The 2-year swing moves into positive (i.e. restrictive) territory for all economies under the 100 basis point shock, although they remain in line with previous monetary tightening cycles. It is only for the 300 basis point scenario that the cash-flow effect appears threatening in terms of consumer spending power over the next two years. Corporate Sector The starting point for interest payments and overall debt-service in the corporate sector is also quite low by historical standards, although less so in the U.S. Falling interest rates have been partially offset by the rapid accumulation of American company debt in recent years. We modeled national accounts data for non-financial corporate interest paid using the stock of corporate bonds, loans and (where relevant) commercial paper, together with the associated interest or coupon rates. The model simply sums interest payments across these types of debt to generate a grand total, after accounting for the maturity structure of the loans and debt. Chart II-11, Chart II-12, Chart II-13 and Chart II-14 present the three yield curve scenarios for corporate interest payments. The interest burden is flat-to-somewhat lower if yield curves are unchanged, as old loans and bonds continue to roll over at today's depressed levels. Even if market yields jump by 100 basis points tomorrow, the resulting interest burdens would rise roughly back to 2012-2014 levels in the U.S., Eurozone and the U.K., which would still be quite low by historical standards. The resulting two-year cash-flow effect is modest overall. The rate increase feeds into corporate interest payments somewhat more quickly in the Eurozone and Japan because of the relatively shorter average maturity of the corporate debt market, but a shock of this size does not appear threatening to either economy. Chart II-11U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-12U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-13Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-14Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection It is a different story if yields rise by 300 basis points. The interest ratio approaches previous peaks set in the 2000s in the U.S. and Eurozone. The interest ratio rises sharply for the U.K. corporate sector as well, although it stays below the 2000 peak because interest rates were even higher 17 years ago. Japanese companies would also feel significant pain as the interest ratio rises back to where it was in the late 1990s. Government Sector Government finances are not at much risk from a modest increase in bond yields either (Chart II-15). We focus on the level of the interest burden rather than the cash-flow effect for the government sector since changes in interest payments probably have less impact on governments' near-term spending plans than is the case for the private sector. Chart II-15Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection As discussed above, Treasury departments in the U.K., Eurozone and Japan have taken advantage of ultra-low borrowing rates by extending the average maturity of public debt. The average maturity of the Barclays U.K. government bond index has extended to 16 years, while it is close to 10 years in Japan and the Eurozone (Chart II-5). The U.S. Treasury has not followed suit; the Barclays U.S. index is about 7½ years in maturity. The lengthy average maturity means that index coupon rates will continue to fall for years to come if rates are unchanged in the U.K., Japan and the Eurozone, resulting in a declining interest burden. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, the interest burden is roughly flat as a percent of GDP for the U.K. and Eurozone, and rises only modestly in Japan. The limited impact reflects the fact that the starting point for current yields is well below the average coupon on the stock of government debt. In contrast, the U.S. interest burden is roughly flat in the "no change" scenario, and rises by a half percentage point by 2025 in the 100 basis point shock scenario. Keep in mind that we took the neutral assumption that the stock of government debt grows at the same pace as nominal GDP growth. This assumes that governments deal effectively with the impact of aging populations on entitlement programs in the coming years. As many studies have shown, debt levels will balloon if entitlements are not adjusted and/or taxes are not raised to cover rising health care and pension costs. We do not wish to downplay this long-term risk, but we are focused on the impact of higher interest rates on interest expense over the next five years for the purposes of this Special Report. As with the household and corporate sectors, the pain becomes much more serious in the event of a 300 basis point rise in interest rates. Interest payments rise by about 1 percentage point of GDP in the U.S. and U.K. to high levels by historically standards. It takes a decade for the full effect to unfold, although the ratios rise quickly in the early years as the short-term debt adjusts rapidly to the higher rate environment. For the Eurozone, the roughly 100 basis points rise takes the level of the interest burden back to about 2003 levels (i.e. it does not exceed the previous peak). Given Japan's extremely high government debt-to-GDP ratio, it is not surprising that a 300 basis point rise in interest rates would generate a whopping surge in the interest burden from near zero to almost 5% of GDP by the middle of the next decade. Nonetheless, this paints an overly pessimistic picture for two reasons. First, the Bank of Japan is likely to hold short-term rates close to zero for years as the authorities struggle to reach the 2% inflation target. This means that only long-term JGB yields have room to move higher in the event of a continued global bond selloff. Second, 40% of the JGB market is held by the central bank and this proportion will continue to rise until the Bank of Japan's QE program ends. Interest paid to the BoJ simply flows back to the Ministry of Finance. The net interest payments data used in our analysis are provided by the OECD. These data net out interest payments made between all arms of the government except for the central bank. The implication is that rising global bond yields in the coming years will not place the Japanese government under any fiscal strain. The same is true in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone, where the respective central banks also hold a large portion of the stock of government debt (although this conclusion does not necessarily apply to the peripheral European governments). Conclusion The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs given the sea of debt that has accumulated. As discussed in our 2017 BCA Outlook, we believe that the secular bond bull market is over but foresee only a gradual uptrend in yields in the coming years. Inflation is likely to remain subdued in the major countries and bond supply will continue to be absorbed by the ECB and Bank of Japan. The stock of government bonds available to the private sector will drop by $750 billion in 2017 for the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and the U.K. as a group. This follows a contraction of $546 billion in 2016. Forward guidance from the BoJ and ECB will also help to cap the upside for global bond yields. Still, we believe that the combination of gradually rising U.S. inflation, Fed rate hikes and the Trump fiscal stimulus plan will push Treasury yields above current forward rates in 2017. Other bond markets will outperform in local currency terms, but will suffer losses via contagion from the U.S. Despite the dizzying amount of debt accumulated since the Great Recession, it does not appear that debt service will sink the economies of the advanced economies as the Fed continues to normalize U.S. monetary policy. Debt service will rise from a low starting point and the swing in interest payments as a percent of GDP is unlikely to exceed previous cycles on a 2-year horizon for a 100 basis point rise in yields. The level of the interest payments/GDP ratio should not exceed previous peaks in most cases. The picture is much more threatening if yields were to surge by 300 basis points over the next couple of years, although this scenario would require an unexpected acceleration of inflation in the U.S. and/or the other advanced economies. We are not making the case that the buildup of debt is benign. Academic research has linked excessive leverage with slower trend economic growth and a higher risk of financial crisis. For governments, elevated debt can result in a rising risk premium that will crowd out spending in important areas, such as health and pensions, in the long run. For consumers and the corporate sector, excessive leverage could result in financial distress and a spike in defaults in the next downturn, reinforcing the contraction in output. The Bank for International Settlements agrees: "Increased household indebtedness, in and of itself, is not likely to be the source of a negative shock to the economy. Rather the primary macroeconomic implication of higher debt levels will be to amplify shocks to the economy coming from other sources, particularly those that affect household incomes, most notably rises in unemployment." 4 Debt lies at the heart of BCA's longstanding Debt Supercycle thesis. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness for monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Fed and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit upcycle. That all ended with the 2007-09 meltdown. Since then, even zero policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed countries because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. Growth headwinds finally appear to be ebbing, at least in the U.S., prompting the FOMC to begin the process of "normalizing" short-term interest rates. The U.S. economy could suffer another setback in 2017 for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, the key point of this report is that the cash-flow effect of rising interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 For China, the BIS only provides an estimate of the debt service ratio for the household and non-financial corporate sectors combined. 2 See: U.S. Consumer Titanic Meets the Fed Iceberg? The BCA U.S. Fixed Income Analyst, July 2004. 3 The absence of a rise in volatility of the cash flow effect is partly due to the decline in, and the volatility of, interest rates after the 1980s. 4 Guy Debelle, "Household Debt and the Macroeconomy," BIS Quarterly Review, March 2004. Appendix Charts Chart II-16, Chart II-17, Chart II-18, Chart II-19 Chart II-16U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector Chart II-17U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector Chart II-18Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Chart II-19Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equities have been in a holding pattern so far in 2017, consolidating the gains made at the end of last year. Our key equity indicators are mixed at the moment. The Valuation indicator continues to hover at about a half standard deviation on the expensive side. The effect of the rise in global equity indexes late last year on valuation was offset by a surge in profits. Stocks are not cheap but, at this level, valuation not a roadblock to further price gains. Our Monetary indicator deteriorated further over the past couple of months, driven by a stronger dollar and higher bond yields. A shift in this indicator below the zero line would be negative for stock markets. Sentiment is also frothy, which is bearish from a contrary perspective, although our Technical indicator is positive. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The WTP indicators have all turned higher from a low level for the Japanese, the European and the U.S. markets. This suggests that investors, after loading up on bonds last year, have "dry powder" available to buy stocks as risk tolerance improves. The U.S. WTP has risen the fastest and is closing in on the 0.95 level. Our tests show that, historically, investors would have reaped impressive gains if they had over-weighted stocks versus bonds when the WTP was rising and reached 0.95. The WTPs suggest that the U.S. market should outperform the Eurozone and Japanese markets in the near term, although for macro reasons we still believe the U.S. will lag the other two. We expect the global stock-to-bond total return ratio to rise through this year. The latest selloff has pushed U.S. Treasurys slightly into "inexpensive" territory based on our Valuation model. Bonds are still technically oversold and sentiment remains bullish, suggesting that the consolidation phase may last a little longer. Nonetheless, we expect to recommend short-duration positions again once the overbought conditions unwind. The U.S. dollar is near previous secular peaks according to our valuation measure. Nonetheless, policy divergences are likely to drive the U.S. dollar to new valuation highs before the bull market is over. Technically overbought conditions have almost unwound, clearing the way for the next leg of the dollar bull run. Commodities have been on a tear on the back of improving and synchronized growth across the major countries (and some dollar weakness very recently). The commodity price outlook is clouded by the prospect of a border tax, which could send the U.S. dollar soaring. The broad commodity market is also approaching overbought levels. The cyclical growth outlook is positive for commodity demand, although supply factors favor oil to base metals. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Global Growth: If global demand follows the recent improvements seen in economic sentiment, growth will surprise positively relatively to expectations in 2017. With global inflation also likely to continue drifting higher over the course of the year, the medium-term bearish implications for bonds are clear. Duration Technicals: Government bond markets remain technically stretched, as the bearish positioning from late 2016 is still intact. Combined with price momentum measures that have barely corrected from oversold extremes, yields are not quite ready to resume their ascent. It is too soon to reduce portfolio duration exposure to position for the higher yields that we expect this year. Canada: The Canadian economy has shown clear signs of improvement of late. This trend can continue in the first half of 2017, thus we are closing our short Canadian corporates/long Canadian provincial debt trade and entering a new position - shorting Canadian 10-year government bonds versus 10-year U.S. Treasuries. Feature Chart of the Week Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme Post-Truth: relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. - Oxford Dictionary Oxford voted that term, "post-truth", as the 2016 international word of the year. That is not a surprise, as the two dominant news stories of the past twelve months, Brexit and Trump, represented triumphs of hot emotional arguments over cold hard facts. Pessimists may argue that what we are currently seeing in the U.S. is a "post-truth" economic upturn, where confidence is soaring in expectation of the potential positive impact from Donald Trump's proposed pro-business agenda, but without a corresponding boost in actual growth. Financial markets appear to have already discounted a more rapid pace of growth, as evidenced by the surge in government bond yields in November/December and sharp outperformance of economically-sensitive asset classes like equities and high-yield (Chart of the Week). We do expect growth to deliver some upside surprises in 2017, putting additional upward pressure on government bond yields and downward pressure on credit spreads. In the meantime, however, markets need to consolidate the recent moves while the hard economic data catches up to booming sentiment. This leads us to maintain a cautious tactical investment stance, both towards duration exposure and credit allocations, while looking for more attractive levels to position for the improving global growth dynamic in 2017 by re-establishing below-benchmark duration positions and increasing corporate bond exposure. Real Growth Or Fake News? In our previous Weekly Report, we discussed how improving U.S. business confidence within the corporate sector could lead to a revival of capital spending after three years of decline.1 Not all of this is attributable to the "Trump effect", though. Global leading economic indicators were already starting to tick upward even before the U.S. election, while actual data in the major economies was surprising to the upside. This suggests that some pickup in global growth is likely in the next few quarters which would put additional upward pressure on the real component of government bond yields (Chart 2). Growth forecasts remain subdued, however, even with the recent bump in sentiment. The Bloomberg consensus expectation for real global GDP growth in 2017 is 3.2%. The International Monetary Fund is slightly more optimistic, projecting growth of 3.4% in 2017 but with only 2.3% growth in the U.S. (this is an updated forecast released yesterday, so after the U.S. election). Central bank growth forecasts at the country level are also relatively downbeat; for example, the Fed is expecting U.S. growth of only 2.1% in 2017 while the European Central Bank (ECB) is projecting Euro Area growth of 1.7%. Given the relatively high level of uncertainty over the potential effects of the incoming Trump administration's economic agenda, it is no surprise that professional forecasters are being cautious as they wait for the details to unfold. Yet while improving sentiment among consumers and businesses does not guarantee a faster pace of economic growth in the absence of rising household incomes and healthier corporate profits. However, greater confidence (i.e. "animal spirits") is often a prerequisite before a cyclical upturn can blossom, turning "post-truth" sentiment into a true recovery. Looking at the data among the major economic regions shows that, if the confidence indicators are to be believed, then global growth could deliver some upside surprises this year: United States: Consumer confidence is soaring, with the Conference Board measure reaching an 8-year high at the end of 2016. The December reading for U.S. National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) survey released last week showed a similar spike in confidence among U.S. small businesses, with capital expenditures, hiring plans and overall optimism returning to levels not seen since before the Great Recession (Chart 3). This is a similar move to the strong confidence data for corporate CEOs that we presented in last week's report. Chart 2A Cyclical Upturn In Growth & Yields A Cyclical Upturn In Growth & Yields A Cyclical Upturn In Growth & Yields Chart 3U.S. Economic Confidence Improving U.S. Economic Confidence Improving U.S. Economic Confidence Improving Euro Area: Euro Area sentiment measures, such as the European Commission confidence surveys or the widely-followed German IFO and ZEW indices, hooked upward at the end of 2016 (Chart 4). Both household and business confidence improved, underscoring how the current cyclical upturn in the Euro Area is broad-based. Japan: While Japan should not be expected to be a major contributor to overall global growth given its well-known structural economic impediments (contracting population, weak productivity, high government debt, etc), the most recent data does show a slight uptick in consumer confidence, business confidence and the Japan leading economic indicator (Chart 5). Chart 4A Solid Uptick In Euro Area Confidence A Solid Uptick In Euro Area Confidence A Solid Uptick In Euro Area Confidence Chart 5Japanese Sentiment Inching Higher Japanese Sentiment Inching Higher Japanese Sentiment Inching Higher Chart 6Upside Risks For Chinese Growth? Upside Risks For Chinese Growth? Upside Risks For Chinese Growth? China: Both consumer and business confidence have improved alongside the cyclical Chinese recovery seen in 2016, but this has not been enough to boost consensus forecasts for Chinese growth this year. Importantly, this creates the possibility of an upside growth surprise as both the OECD leading indicator for China and the proprietary GDP growth model from our colleagues at BCA China Investment Strategy are calling for faster growth in 2017 (Chart 6).2 A potential increase in trade or even military tensions between China and the U.S. is a potential risk to this sunny scenario but, given what we know now about the underlying economy, China looks poised to deliver another year of solid growth. The data does show that the improvement in economic sentiment goes beyond what is happening in the U.S. Some of that could be the spillover effect from greater optimism on the Trump-fueled U.S. economy to the rest of the world. The synchronized uptick in global leading economic indicators, however, suggests that there is more going on than a simple post-election hope that Trump can deliver faster U.S. growth. A genuine synchronized global upturn is underway, which is not "fake news" (which we expect will be the Oxford word of the year in 2017!) Bottom Line: If global demand follows the improvements seen in economic sentiment, growth will surprise positively relative to expectations. With global inflation also likely to continue drifting higher over the course of 2017, the bearish implications for bonds are clear. Bond Market Technicals Have Not Moved Much Normally, such a growing body of evidence pointing to improving global economic sentiment would be a bearish development for bond prices. Fixed income markets have already moved very rapidly, however, to discount a more optimistic outlook for growth. The rise in yields over the final two months of 2016 has left the major sovereign bond markets in a highly stretched position. This was one of the reasons we shifted our recommended duration stance from below-benchmark to neutral in early December.3 Looking at technical indicators such as the deviation of 10-year government bond yields from their 200-day moving averages, or momentum measures such as the 26-week total return for the sovereign bond indices, show that bonds remain deeply oversold in the main "G-4" markets: the U.S. (Chart 7), Germany (Chart 8), the U.K. (Chart 9) and Japan (Chart 10). Chart 7UST Technicals: Stretched UST Technicals: Stretched UST Technicals: Stretched Chart 8German Bund Technicals: Stretched German Bund Technicals: Stretched German Bund Technicals: Stretched Chart 9U.K. Gilt Technicals: Stretched U.K. Gilt Technicals: Stretched U.K. Gilt Technicals: Stretched Chart 10JGB Technicals: Stretched JGB Technicals: Stretched JGB Technicals: Stretched In the case of U.S. Treasuries, indicators of market positioning suggest that most traders have not unwound their bearish bets. The Commitment of Traders report shows that speculators currently have the largest net short position in Treasury futures in the history of the data. Meanwhile, the Market Vane index of Treasury sentiment has bounced slightly off the recent lows, but remains at generally downbeat levels (Chart 11) - and still above the levels that heralded prior peaks in yields in 2010, 2013 & 2015. Only the JPMorgan duration survey has shown a closing of net short positions for the more "active" trader base, but not for the overall set of bond investors. We will continue to monitor these positioning and momentum indicators in the weeks ahead to assess when the oversold market conditions have unwound enough to justify a shift back to a below-benchmark duration stance. For now, keep portfolio duration exposure at benchmark. Bottom Line: Government bond markets remain technically stretched, as the bearish positioning from late 2016 is still intact. Combined with price momentum measures that have barely corrected from oversold extremes, yields are not quite ready to resume their ascent. It is too soon to reduce portfolio duration exposure to position for the higher yields that we expect this year. Encouraging Signs From Canada Last October, this publication laid out a sobering view on the Canadian economy.4 Softening exports were a concern, especially in the non-commodity related sectors and even with a weaker Canadian dollar. Growth in corporate capital spending growth was still contracting, constrained by tight lending conditions. Moreover, household consumption appeared at risk, given the depressed labor force participation rate and low wage increases. This view led us to adopt: a neutral stance - but with a positive bias - on Canadian bonds versus global hedged benchmarks; a slightly more dovish view then the consensus on the next monetary policy move by the Bank of Canada (BoC), not discarding the possibility of a rate cut in 2017 and; a short position on Canadian corporates versus Canadian provincial government debt. Since then, however, the Canadian economic cycle has taken a positive turn. The euphoria surrounding Trump's economic plan for Canada's largest trading partner has definitely prompted some of the improvements. The enthusiasm towards possible pro-business American economic policies seems to have seeped into Canadian business owners' mindset as well (Chart 12). Chart 11UST Positioning Still Very Short UST Positioning Still Very Short UST Positioning Still Very Short Chart 12Trump Is Also Influencing Canada's Mood Trump Is Also Influencing Canada's Mood Trump Is Also Influencing Canada's Mood But there is more to it than that. First, employment data have firmed up. The net change in Canadian employment has been positive in each of the last five months, increasing on average by a robust 47.5k. The previously declining labor force participation rate has stabilized, posting a 65.8% reading in December versus the July low of 65.3%. Plus, more jobs have been created in the private sector versus the public sector and in more stable "regular" employment rather than self-employment (Chart 13). Second, the business sector's mood has brightened. According to the BoC's Winter Business Outlook Survey, sales expectations, investment plans and employment intentions are all recovering.5 More striking, firms' pricing power has jumped higher; prices of products and services sold are expected to increase substantially in the next twelve months (Chart 14, top panel). Better pricing power should help Canadian corporate profits, going forward. Chart 13Employment Firming up Employment Firming up Employment Firming up Chart 14A Business Cycle Reversal? A Business Cycle Reversal? A Business Cycle Reversal? Chart 15Exports Perking Up Exports Perking Up Exports Perking Up This, combined with better credit conditions, could potentially turn the Canadian economic cycle around. Real capital expenditure has been the big missing ingredient to a healthy economic expansion in the last few years. This is about to change as the BoC's Senior Loan Officer survey shows that Canadian bank lending conditions re-entered "easing" territory in Q4 2016 (Chart 14, bottom panel).6 Looser credit conditions usually lead to faster loan growth and stronger investment spending. Third, better sentiment globally, and especially in the U.S., has lifted demand for Canadian products, with growth for both commodity and non-commodity-related exports showing improvement in the last quarter of 2016. While higher commodity prices have certainly boosted commodity-related exports, improving U.S. consumer confidence suggests that Canadian goods exports numbers will perk up in the coming months (Chart 15). Fourth, Canadian housing prices could still grind higher for a while longer and a broad retrenchment in the construction sector might be avoided again in 2017. Granted, the backdrop remains quite risky given high prices and soaring household debt levels. According to the BoC, about 15% of high loan-to-income mortgages issued in 2016 would have been ineligible under the new regulatory framework for allowable mortgage lending.7 Hence, the construction sector will face some headwinds going forward as some new mortgage loans will be harder to come by, on the margin. However, it is not a given either that housing affordability (or lack thereof) has reached peak levels yet (Chart 16).8 Lately, the housing market has held up relatively well, despite the regulatory tightening measures put in place to reduce the systemic risks from overvalued Canadian real estate. New house prices grew at a 3% year-over-year rate in December - the fastest pace in four years - while housing starts have averaged 198k in the last twelve months, surpassing the levels seen during the previous three years. In sum, the Canadian economy has performed better than we previously expected. As such, we remain open to the idea that it could continue in that vein over at least the first half of 2017. That said, our optimism remains guarded. The health of the Canadian non-financial, non-energy corporate sector has been deteriorating over the last two years, limiting the potential for the kind of revival of animal spirits that we are seeing in the U.S. Plus, the cyclical data for Alberta - Canada's fourth most important province - remains moribund. A more robust expansion in that province would be necessary to solidify our conviction level towards the strength of the overall economy. Chart 16Not That Unaffordable Not That Unaffordable Not That Unaffordable Chart 17No Inflation On The Horizon No Inflation On The Horizon No Inflation On The Horizon Canada remains fragile; consumer indebtedness levels are elevated by international standards. Accordingly, this economy remains a hiccup away from disappointing in the event of an external shock. A global equity market correction, softer oil prices, a reversal in the latest Chinese reflationary push, a Trump geopolitical blunder and/or a move toward more trade protectionism in the U.S. (especially concerning NAFTA9) could negatively impact Canada at any moment - and in a much bigger fashion compared to most other developed economies. As such, the BoC will be prudent and probably stay on hold in 2017. Inflationary pressures are simply not strong enough to justify turning hawkish. Unemployment at 6.9% remains close to half a percentage point away from full employment levels.10 Our Canadian weekly earnings diffusion index is pointing to lower wage pressures, as well (Chart 17). The 30% probability of a rate hike by year-end currently discounted in the OIS market could easily be priced out if inflation remains subdued. Nonetheless, we have to acknowledge the improving backdrop in our portfolio recommendations: we are choosing to close our trade, shorting Canadian corporates versus Canadian provincial debt, at a loss of -53bps. The defensive characteristics of that trade, which also incurs negative carry, now appear less appealing, especially considering the global "risk on" environment currently in place. For now, we are maintaining our neutral stance on Canadian bonds in our global model portfolio, with Canada unlikely to see the same degree of upside inflation pressures that we expect in the other developed economies. However, we are opening a tactical trade, shorting Canadian government bonds versus U.S. Treasuries at the 10-year maturity. From a historical stand point, Canadian yields are very low compared to the U.S., offering an interesting entry point. In addition, the Canada-U.S. employment ratio and the price ratio of Brent oil to lumber - which have been broadly correlated to the Canada-U.S. spread over the years - are both hooking up, pointing to a wider Canada-U.S. spread and representing an interesting macro signal (Chart 18). U.S. inflation prospects add to this trade's attractiveness. Our colleagues at BCA U.S. Investment Strategy recently made a compelling case for U.S. inflation not being a major threat in 2017 after assessing the prospects for the main components of U.S. core PCE inflation (shelter, core goods and core services).11 Core PCE should converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot beyond that is not the base case (Chart 19). That could allow Canadian bonds yields to catch up to higher U.S. yields, especially if the oversold conditions in the U.S. Treasury market described earlier persist. Chart 18Go Short Canadian Bonds Versus U.S. Treasuries Go Short Canadian Bonds Versus U.S. Treasuries Go Short Canadian Bonds Versus U.S. Treasuries Chart 19Only A Mild Uptrend Is Likely In 2017 Only A Mild Uptrend Is Likely In 2017 Only A Mild Uptrend Is Likely In 2017 Bottom Line: The Canadian economy has shown clear signs of improvement of late. This trend can continue in the first half of 2017, thus we are closing our short Canadian corporates/long Canadian provincial debt trade and entering a new position - shorting Canadian 10-year government bonds versus 10-year U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017", dated January 10, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard", dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Vigilantes Take A Break For The Holidays", dated December 6, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Bear Phase Continues", dated October 11, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2017/01/bos-winter-2016-17/ 6 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/slos-winter2016.pdf 7 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/12/fsr-december-2016/ 8 A description of the Bank of Canada Housing Affordability Index can be found at http://credit.bankofcanada.ca/financialindicators/hai 9 NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) is a treaty between Canada, the United States, and Mexico aimed at removing trade barriers and encouraging economic activity. 10 NAIRU stands at 6.5% 11 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation In 2017: An Idle Threat", dated January 9, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A "Post-Truth" Economic Upturn? A "Post-Truth" Economic Upturn? Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Barring major external disruption, Chinese GDP growth will likely continue to accelerate into the first half of 2017. The overall policy stance will stay accommodative to safeguard against potentially negative shocks from abroad. Trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will inevitably increase, the degree of which matters greatly for how the Chinese economy as well as the global economy perform in the medium to long term. The dollar trend will continue to dictate the USD/RMB cross rate in the near term. The PBoC will continue to intervene heavily to prevent excessive currency weakness. Shorting the CNH/USD is not much different from a direct bet on the dollar index. Aggressive directional bet on Chinese shares is not warranted in the near term. Strategically favor Chinese equities over their global peers. Feature China has rung into 2017 with strengthening growth momentum that has been building in recent months, but the New Year clearly brings new challenges. China is on the receiving end of two major external uncertainties - namely, the anti-globalization backlash from the U.S. under President-elect Donald Trump and the outlook for the U.S. dollar, both of which are completely beyond its control. 2017 will also be a highly charged year in Chinese politics, as the ruling Communist Party prepares for a generational leadership reshuffle. This means the Chinese leadership will be more sensitive to perceived "provocations" from abroad, making political risk between the U.S. and China even less predictable. The Chinese authorities will remain highly vigilant about economic and financial stability. Meanwhile, the government will continue to mobilize the public sector and fiscal resources to support the economy, as external uncertainties mount. Domestic Demand Should Remain Buoyant Most of the recent data releases coming out of China have surprised to the upside, and the regained strength appears rather broad-based (Chart 1). Some indicators that are highly sensitive to industrial activity such as transportation freight, electricity generation and construction machine sales have rebounded sharply, partly due to last year's low base. Meanwhile, the consumer sector has remained buoyant, with strong expansion in durable goods sales such as cars and air conditioners. Looking forward, we expect the economy to continue to improve, at least in the next two quarters. Leading indicators are still strengthening. The latest PMI figures, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, have continued to climb, and remain above the boom-bust threshold. The labor market is on the mend. The employment component of the PMIs has been rising in recent months, indicating increased hiring as the economy picks up (Chart 2). This could lead to a self-feeding virtuous cycle where an improving labor market leads to rising income growth and strengthening aggregate demand, which further boosts overall business activity and the labor market. Chart 1Broad-Based Recovery Broad-Based Recovery Broad-Based Recovery Chart 2Labor Market On The Mend Labor Market On The Mend Labor Market On The Mend The corporate sector is recovering. Inventories are exceptionally low, setting the stage for inventory restocking, which could further boost production (Chart 3). Profit growth among both private and state-owned enterprises has continued to accelerate. Rising profits are easing financial stress, particularly for debt-laden, asset-heavy sectors. This is also reflected in banks' asset quality; banks' non-performing loan accumulation has slowed sharply of late (Chart 4). In addition, recovery in the corporate sector should also bode well for investment, which is still subdued. The housing crackdown since early October has once again set the stage for negative surprises. Home sales have already begun to slow, and the government appears determined to check housing demand. A key difference between now and previous rounds of housing crackdowns is that developers have been quite cautious throughout the current cycle1: confidence has been downbeat, and housing starts have remained quite weak. Consequently, housing inventories have been quickly depleted nationwide. The demand crackdown has dashed hopes for a housing-led growth recovery, but low inventories and sluggish housing construction has also reduced the risk of another housing-led investment bust, which has typically followed previous housing tightening campaigns. Chart 3Inventory Restocking Will ##br##Further Boost Production Inventory Restocking Will Further Boost Production Inventory Restocking Will Further Boost Production Chart 4Corporate Sector Recovery ##br## Also Helps Banks Corporate Sector Recovery Also Helps Banks Corporate Sector Recovery Also Helps Banks Our model shows that Chinese GDP growth likely accelerated notably in the final quarter of the year, and the momentum will probably carry forward into the first half of 2017, assuming no major external disruption (Chart 5). The inauguration of Donald Trump next week marks the biggest uncertainty for China's growth outlook in recent history due to his well-publicized anti-globalization stance, especially his proposed harsh anti-China trade policies. Chart 5Growth Should Continue To Improve Growth Should Continue To Improve Growth Should Continue To Improve The Trump Wildcard Speculation on President-elect Trump's forthcoming China policies run amok, ranging from pragmatic deal-making, simmering frictions and tit-for-tat retaliation, to the inevitability of a full-fledged trade war and even to a geo-strategic alliance with Russia against China. It is impossible to tell at the moment where reality will eventually end up, but what is clear is that trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will inevitably increase, the degree of which matters greatly for how the Chinese economy as well as the global economy perform in the medium to long term. Low-profile trade tensions and punitive barriers will prove damaging to specific sectors and industries, but should not have a major macro impact. Chinese products that are likely to be subject to American punitive tariffs are some heavy industries such as metals. The usual suspects that may fall victim to Chinese retaliation are American transportation equipment and agricultural products - two main American export items to China. At the macro level, however, China's export sector performance should improve on a cyclical basis, especially if "Trumponomics" successfully lifts U.S. economic growth this year (Chart 6). As one of the major beneficiaries of globalization, China stands to suffer if the broad globalization trend reverses. The saving grace is that exports as a share of the Chinese economy have already almost halved to below 20%, a level comparable to the early 2000s before China joined the World Trade Organization (Chart 7). In other words, China's "globalization dividends" have already diminished to some extent. Moreover, Chinese exports depend more on the U.S. market than the other way around. Therefore, it is in China's best interests to avoid an escalation of trade frictions with the U.S., simply because it has more to lose.2 Nonetheless, it goes without saying that no country gains in a trade war, and the world risks a deep economic recession if the two largest economies engage in an all-out trade battle. Geo-strategic containment of some kind further darkens the outlook for both China and the world. A "cold war" between China and the U.S. would mark a drastic break from the global environment of the past four decades that allowed China to focus solely on economic development. One can only hope that a "clash of the titans" will not drag the world into a self-destructive downward spiral. Chart 6Trumponomics Should Also ##br##Help Chinese Exports Trumponomics Should Also Help Chinese Exports Trumponomics Should Also Help Chinese Exports Chart 7Globalization Dividends ##br## Have Already Diminished Globalization Dividends Have Already Diminished Globalization Dividends Have Already Diminished In short, it is too early to evaluate the impact of America's new trade policy on China's growth outlook. We suspect the near-term impact should be limited, as it is unlikely that trade tensions will immediately erupt once Trump takes office. Nonetheless, the situation needs to be monitored closely going forward. Policy: Fiscal Takes The Helm We expect the Chinese authorities will further downplay the significance of the annual GDP growth target as a binding policy constraint. Growth recovery and improvement in labor market conditions reduce the need for further pump-priming, but the overall policy stance will stay accommodative to safeguard against potentially negative shocks from abroad. On the monetary policy front, the case for further interest rate cuts has diminished (Chart 8). The People's Bank of China (PBoC) recently reiterated that its monetary stance will stay decisively "neutral." In our view, this means the PBoC will continue to fine-tune interbank liquidity, but any symbolic policy move in either direction can be ruled out, unless the economic situation takes a sudden turn. In contrast, fiscal policy will be more stimulative. The annual budget deficit will likely be further increased in the March session of the People's Congress. Moreover, some high-profile investment plans have been released in recent weeks, meaning policy-led investment spending will remain elevated going forward. The country aims to invest RMB 2 trillion, or US$290 billion, in tourism between 2016 and 2020. This would translate into annual growth of more than 14% in direct investment in the industry. China's National Energy Administration (NEA) plans to invest RMB 2.5 trillion (US$360 billion) to develop the nation's energy sector over the next five years, with a focus on renewable resources. Installed renewable power capacity including wind, hydro, solar and nuclear is expected to contribute to about half of new electricity generation in five years, which will boost growth and reduce pollution. The government continues to promote private-public partnerships (PPPs) to build infrastructure. The published PPP proposals so far amount to a whopping RMB 12.5 trillion, with a heavy concentration on the transportation network and urban development (Chart 9). Chart 8Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Chart 9Fiscal Takes The Helm China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard It is worth noting that recent growth improvement has been accompanied by a notable slowdown in fiscal spending, leaving room for reacceleration going forward (Chart 10). In short, fiscal spending and policy-led investment will remain the key tools for the Chinese government to stabilize the economy. Chart 10Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Chart 11Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? The RMB: Which Way Will The Wind Blow? Since the New Year, offshore RMB (CNH) liquidity has tightened dramatically, which has led to a massive surge in the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) of the RMB and a sharp rebound in the CNH/USD cross rate. This is widely viewed as a successful short squeeze engineered by the PBoC to punish speculators. It is certainly true that the authorities "allowed" offshore RMB liquidity to dry up, but the sharp spike in the HIBOR rate also closely resembles a classic emerging market currency crisis: speculative attacks on the exchange rate forces the monetary authorities to dramatically jack up interest rates to maintain exchange rate stability - a textbook example of the "Impossible Trinity" thesis at work. In China's case, however, the offshore HIBOR rate bears no relevance on the funding cost of the Chinese corporate sector. As such, the PBoC couldn't care less about periodic tightening in CNH liquidity, as it has no consequence on the domestic economy. This bodes poorly for the internationalization of the RMB, but is a low-cost tool for the PBoC to maintain control over the exchange rate. Two observations can be made from this episode: It is unlikely that the PBoC will completely give up control over the RMB exchange rate, especially in this politically charged year. Sharp depreciation in the RMB/USD may be viewed as a sign of systemic financial risk and economic weakness, a taboo ahead of the Party Congress later this year. Since the New Year, the Chinese authorities have further tightened capital account controls to restrict capital outflows - a reflection of the PBoC's determination to maintain exchange rate stability. There is now an almost universal consensus that the U.S. dollar will strengthen further this year, and that the RMB will decline. It is of course foolish to blindly bet against consensus, but it also means shorting the CNH/USD has already become a very crowded trade. The sharp rebound of the CNH/USD a few days ago is a classic example of a market stampede where investors rush to a narrow exit when conditions change. All this has made the risk-return profile of shorting the RMB against the dollar unfavorable, as the PBoC, with its formidable resources, could unexpectedly hit back at any time. Indeed, the performance of the CNH/USD cross rate has closely tracked the broad U.S. dollar index over the past two years, a situation unlikely to change going forward (Chart 11). The bottom line is that the dollar trend will continue to dictate the USD/RMB cross rate in the near term. The PBoC will continue to intervene heavily to prevent excessive currency weakness. For investors, shorting the CNH/USD is not much different from a direct bet on the dollar index. What To Do With Chinese Stocks? Chart 12Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese stocks will likely range-bound in the near term. The downside is limited by accommodative policy, stable/improving growth and depressed valuation, especially for H shares (Chart 12). The upside is capped by the ongoing macro concerns and brewing tension with the incoming U.S. administration. Chinese shares may also be vulnerable if the more frothy global bourses correct. Therefore, aggressive directional bet is not warranted in the near term. From a big picture point of view, however, we remain convinced that market concerns on China's macro conditions are overdone, and Chinese equities have been unduly punished. Investors with longer-term horizons should hold H shares. Strategically we favor Chinese equities over their global peers. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010," dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture," dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The U.S. dollar will likely overshoot. This is negative for EM. China by and large has a choice between two potential roadmaps: (1) short-term pain / long-term gain and (2) growth stagnation with mini-cycles around it. Regardless of which scenario transpires - so far the second scenario has been in effect - the medium-term outlook is downbeat. Given we are already advanced in this mini-cycle, the risk-reward for China plays in financial markets is negative. Feature Chart I-1Equity Investors Are ##br##Bullish With Minimum Hedges Equity Investors Are Bullish With Minimum Hedges Equity Investors Are Bullish With Minimum Hedges The U.S. dollar is overbought, but the primary trend remains up. A confluence of cyclical and structural economic forces, along with geopolitical and political risks, argue for further upside in the greenback. As the dollar grinds higher, emerging markets (EM) will suffer. EM stocks, currencies, and credit markets will not only underperform their developed market (DM) peers, but also relapse in absolute terms in the months ahead. Additional U.S. dollar strength and ongoing complacency in the U.S. equity market (Chart I-1) means that the 6-12 month outlook for global equity markets is poor. While momentum can carry DM markets higher in the very near term, EM share prices have already topped out, and the path of the least resistance is down. Dollar appreciation will be brought on by both global/EM and U.S. dynamics. Global Factors Supporting The U.S. Dollar The following global factors support the greenback's strength: Global demand for U.S. dollars is rising faster than the supply of U.S. dollars. We computed two measures of U.S. dollar liquidity. Measure 1 is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for foreign official and international accounts. Measure 2 is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreign residents (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Chart I-2AU.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 2) U.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 1) U.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 1) Chart I-2BU.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 1) U.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 2) U.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 2) Notably, the U.S. monetary base and the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by foreign official and international accounts are contracting, while the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreigners has stalled (Chart I-3). The monetary base shrinkage manifests the rise in reverse repos by the Fed, i.e., the Fed is siphoning in the banks' excess reserves (Chart I-3, bottom panel). The weakness in foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is largely due to the selling of U.S. securities by EM central banks to provide U.S. dollars in order to meet strong dollar demand locally. China is the largest contributor to the surge in U.S. dollar demand as the depletion of its international reserves has been enormous. In short, the drop in U.S. dollar liquidity does not mean that U.S. dollar supply is shrinking. Instead, it implies that the demand for U.S. dollars is accelerating relative to its supply. When the pace of demand growth outpaces that of supply, the price of that commodity, good/service, or asset, rises. This will be the case for the greenback - it will appreciate further. Importantly, the RMB will remain under downward pressure, which will drag down other Asian currencies. China's unaccounted net capital outflows - measured by the balance of payment's net errors and omissions - have swelled to a record level of US$ 205 billion, or 2% of GDP (Chart I-4). Furthermore, the PBoC has been conducting full-out "reverse" sterilization of its U.S. dollar sales. By selling U.S. dollars to defend the RMB, the PBoC initially shrunk local currency liquidity. To preclude onshore interbank interest rates from spiking, the mainland monetary authorities have simultaneously re-injected RMB into the system via outright lending to banks and open-market operations (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Chart I-4China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows Chart I-5The PBoC: The PBoC: "Reverse" Sterilization The PBoC: "Reverse" Sterilization By doing so, they have kept interest rates low, but the supply of high-powered money has been restored. It is reasonable to expect such RMB liquidity injections to continue. This, in turn, will allow commercial banks to continue creating money/credit/deposits out of thin air. As such, the mushrooming supply of yuan will weigh on the currency's value. We discussed these issues in detail in our November 23, 2016 Special Report, titled China: Money Creation Redux and RMB.1 U.S. dollar borrowing costs are rising: Not only have U.S. bond yields spiked but the LIBOR rate has also continued its unrelenting uptrend, especially when compared to the EURIBOR (Chart I-6). Higher borrowing costs and expectations for further U.S. dollar strength will make non-American debtors with U.S. dollar liabilities reluctant to keep their short dollar exposure. They will try to either repay U.S. dollar debt or hedge it. This will ultimately increase the demand for U.S. dollars in the months ahead. Importantly, EM countries (outside of China) have US$ 5 trillion of foreign currency debt outstanding. Thus, higher U.S. borrowing costs will raise the demand for U.S. dollars as debtors rush to repay or hedge their U.S. dollar liabilities. We published an extensive review of EM foreign currency debt on January 4 in our Weekly Report titled EM: Overview of External Debt.2 This report provides information about various categories of borrowers (government, nonfinancial companies and financials), types of debt (loans versus bonds) and debt maturity (short- versus long-term) for each individual developing economy. The report also ranks countries according to their foreign debt burdens and short-term funding pressures. This report can be accessed by clicking on the link on page 19. The yield differential between EM local bonds and U.S. Treasurys has narrowed (Chart I-7), as U.S. bond yields have risen more than duration-adjusted EM domestic bond yields. Such a compression in the spread has reduced the attractiveness of EM local bonds. As U.S. bond yields resume their ascent, odds are that inflows into EM local bonds will diminish, and EM bonds will sell off. Chart I-8 illustrates that the J.P. Morgan EMLI EM currency total return index (including carry) has failed to break above an important technical resistance. When such a technical profile transpires, it is often followed by a major breakdown. Chart I-6Rising LIBOR Will Hurt Debtors ##br##With U.S. Dollar Liabilities Rising LIBOR Will Hurt Debtors With U.S. Dollar Liabilities Rising LIBOR Will Hurt Debtors With U.S. Dollar Liabilities Chart I-7The EM-U.S. Bond Yield ##br##Gap Has Narrowed The EM-U.S. Bond Yield Gap Has Narrowed The EM-U.S. Bond Yield Gap Has Narrowed Chart I-8EM Currency Return With ##br##Carry: More Downside EM Currency Return With Carry: More Downside EM Currency Return With Carry: More Downside Trade protectionism is bound to rise. The proposed U.S. Border-Adjusted Corporate Tax and any potential U.S. import tariffs will lead many exporter countries to devalue their currencies substantially to offset the loss in exporter revenues in local- currency terms. For example, Chart I-9 shows that U.S. import prices from China have been deflating in U.S. dollar terms but have risen a lot in RMB terms. The latter is what matters to producers. Hence, China and many other exporters to the U.S. will seek to devalue their currencies further to offset import tariffs and the resulting drop in US. dollar revenues from their sales in America. Finally, the outlook for foreign capital inflows (both FDI and equity flows) into EM remains very poor. EM growth is weak and will remain so. The growth acceleration in advanced economies will not help EM economies much for reasons we discussed at length in our December 14, 2016 Weekly Report.3 Remarkably, the worsening trend in relative manufacturing PMIs between EM and DM suggests EM growth and share prices will continue to underperform DM (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Deflation In U.S. Dollars, Rising In RMB Terms Deflation In U.S. Dollars, Rising In RMB Terms Deflation In U.S. Dollars, Rising In RMB Terms Chart I-10EM Will Continue Underperforming DM EM Will Continue Underperforming DM EM Will Continue Underperforming DM Bottom Line: The current confluence of global economic forces and rising trade protectionism in the U.S. will propel the U.S. dollar higher. Domestic Underpinnings Of The U.S. Dollar Rising U.S. interest rate expectations will extend the U.S. dollar rally: The U.S. labor market is tight, and wage growth is accelerating (Chart I-11). This is what the Federal Reserve has been waiting for years, and the central bank will now gradually but steadily ramp up its hawkishness. This will push up U.S. interest rate expectations and prop up the dollar. The exchange rate appreciation will cool off the manufacturing sector at a time when the rest of the economy will be robust. In brief, a strong dollar will be needed to avoid overheating in the U.S. economy. While an overshoot in the dollar will certainly have a deflationary impact on the U.S. economy, especially its manufacturing sector, the negative impact will be somewhat offset because of potential trade protectionist measures introduced by the U.S. authorities. Remarkably, U.S. interest rates are still too low. In particular, 10-year TIPS yields are a mere 0.5%, and long-term bond yields are low relative to wage growth (Chart I-12). Chart I-11U.S. Labor Market Is Tight U.S. Labor Market Is Tight U.S. Labor Market Is Tight Chart I-12U.S. Bond Yields Are Low U.S. Bond Yields Are Low U.S. Bond Yields Are Low U.S. credit growth is strong and the real estate market is vibrant. There is no reason for U.S. interest rates to stay at emergency low levels that have prevailed since the Lehman crisis. Notably, potential fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration warrants higher interest rates to avoid boom-bust cycles. The Fed will tighten policy sooner rather than later, as policymakers know that policy works with time lags and they will not wait for the economic impact of fiscal spending to works its way through the economy. We believe the 50 basis points hikes over the next 12 months currently priced into the U.S. fixed income market are too low, and interest rate expectations will climb by about 50 basis points in the months ahead. Finally, the U.S. dollar has not yet overshot. It is only modestly above its fair value, according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Typically, bull and bear markets do not end at fair value; financial markets tend to over- and under-shoot. We believe the U.S. dollar is primed to overshoot before this current bull run peters out. Bottom Line: Robust U.S. growth and tight labor market conditions put the U.S. in a unique global position to tolerate a stronger currency, for a while. We continue recommending short positions in a basket of the following EM currencies: KRW, IDR, MYR, TRY, ZAR, BRL, CLP and COP. We are also short the RMB via 12-month NDFs. China: Growth Revival And Hard Choices Ahead China's growth has revived, spurred by another round of credit and fiscal stimulus. However, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team maintains that the latest improvement in growth will prove unsustainable and vulnerabilities abound. In particular: Despite improving economic data, the Chinese equity indexes have fared extremely poorly. China's MSCI Investable index was essentially flat during 2016, and domestic A-shares were down 20% in the U.S. dollar terms. This compares with 9.5%, 5.7% and 8.5% gains in the S&P 500, global, and EM share prices in U.S. dollar terms, respectively, over the course of 2016. The relative performance of the Chinese MSCI Investable index to the global stock index has rolled over after failing to break above its technical resistance (Chart I-13, top panel). The same is true for share prices in absolute terms (Chart I-13, bottom panel). These chart profiles hint that Chinese stocks have failed to enter a bull market, and downside is material. How do we explain the divergence between weak Chinese share prices and the rally in commodities prices and commodities stocks globally? Chart I-14 demonstrates that apart from the 2014-'15 bubble run in Chinese equities, the latter's relative performance versus global stocks has been a good forward-looking indicator for industrial metals prices. Chart I-13Chinese Stocks Have ##br##Failed To Break Out Chinese Stocks Have Failed To Break Out Chinese Stocks Have Failed To Break Out Chart I-14Underperformance Of Chinese ##br##Stocks Bodes Ill For Commodities Underperformance Of Chinese Stocks Bodes Ill For Commodities Underperformance Of Chinese Stocks Bodes Ill For Commodities Based on this chart and our qualitative analysis, our bias is to argue that the poor performance of Chinese share prices signals lingering downside risks in Chinese growth, and an associated drop in commodities prices and commodities related equities. Besides, the rally in both oil and metals can largely be explained by investor buying rather than by the real economy demand exceeding supply. Chart I-15 shows that net long positions of non-commercial traders (investors) in oil and copper are overextended. In addition, OECD oil product inventories continue their unrelenting uptrend, suggesting that supply is still exceeding consumption (Chart I-16). Following property market restrictions, China's home purchases have dived (Chart I-17). This will depress construction activity, which will weigh on demand for industrial goods/equipment and commodities over course of 2017. Chart I-15Traders Are Very Long Oil And Copper Traders Are Very Long Oil And Copper Traders Are Very Long Oil And Copper Chart I-16Global Oil Inventories Continue Rising Global Oil Inventories Continue Rising Global Oil Inventories Continue Rising Chart I-17China: Home Sales Have Plummeted China: Home Sales Have Plummeted China: Home Sales Have Plummeted Onshore bond yields, including corporate bond yields, have spiked, and the PBoC has allowed the repo rate for non-bank financial organizations to rise. This will, at a minimum, dampen non-bank (shadow) credit growth. Given that non-bank credit (entrusted loan, trusted loan, bank acceptance bill and net corporate bond issuance) accounts for 30% of total outstanding claims on companies and households, a deceleration in non-bank (shadow) credit will have a non-trivial impact on growth. Finally, there are considerable geopolitical and political risks in and around China. Many investors have become sanguine about China-related political risks, assuming the authorities will guarantee growth remains robust going into the fall 2017 Party Congress, which will decide on the leadership transition. However, a drop in perceived China-linked risks could be a sign of the calm before the storm. First off, the Chinese government might strive for economic stability ahead of this fall's Party Congress, but political volatility ahead of that time cannot be ruled out. It is an open secret that President Xi Jinping's aggressive consolidation of power and "non-collegial" decision-making has created opposition within the Communist party. The opposition cannot wait past the Party Congress when President Xi further strengthens his grip on power. The opposition, if it is able, will likely attempt to strike preemptively in order to prevent a further consolidation of power by President Xi. While it is impossible to know details or forecast the dynamics of the Communist Party's internal discourse, investors should not be complacent. Second, China will retaliate in some form against U.S. trade protectionist measures. It is difficult to know how this trade standoff between the U.S. and China will unfold, but our sense is that risks are underpriced in global financial markets. U.S.-China trade disputes could evolve into broader geopolitical tensions in Asia. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has written about geopolitical risks in Asia at great length.4 In short, political and geopolitical risks abound in and around China. Remarkably, in recent years financial markets have been more preoccupied by political rather than economic developments. Examples include Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia, Russia, the Philippines, Mexico, and South Africa. In these countries, financial markets have been much more sensitive to political changes than economic fundamentals. This may be the case in China too. Growth could stay firm for a while, but the markets will sell off based on heightened political and geopolitical volatility and tensions. Apart from the above-mentioned downside risks, China's growth model is facing two major ways forward from a big-picture perspective: 1. Short-Term Pain / Long-Term Gain: If the authorities were to allow market forces to prevail, the state should withdraw meaningfully from the credit allocation process. In that case, credit markets will bring discipline to both debtors and creditors - in effect, an emerging perception of potential losses rather government-led bailouts will make creditors less willing to lend, and debtors less willing to borrow and expand. The result will be a considerable dampening in credit origination. In this scenario, it is very likely that credit growth slows from 12% currently to the level of potential nominal GDP growth of 7-8% or lower (Chart I-18), leading to a classic credit-driven economic downtrend (Chart I-19). In that case, cyclical growth will undershoot. Chart I-18China: Credit Is Outpacing GDP ##br##Growth By Wide Margin China: Credit Is Outpacing GDP Growth By Wide Margin China: Credit Is Outpacing GDP Growth By Wide Margin Capitalist-Style Credit-Driven Downtrend The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options However, potential GDP growth (the red line in Chart I-19) - which has been falling in recent years - will stabilize and probably improve. The reason being that by allowing market forces to prevail in credit allocation and corporate restructuring/reorganization, China will ultimately improve its capital allocation and productivity. In brief, potential GDP growth - which equals productivity growth plus labor force growth - will stop falling and, in fact, could improve as productivity growth ameliorates. 2. No Short-Term Pain But Long-Term Stagnation: It is essential to differentiate cyclical growth drivers from structural ones. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, structural growth will tumble and China will embark on a path of economic stagnation. As we have argued in past reports,5 banks in any country can originate unlimited amounts of credit/money/deposits if and when the central bank accommodates them, and shareholders and regulators do not object. China has been following this model over the past several years. Yet, this model does not bring about lasting prosperity. On the contrary, it leads to economic stagnation. China would be no different in this scenario, though the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart I-20. Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options A rising role of state and government officials in capital allocation and business decision-making guarantees suboptimal capital allocation, resulting in poor efficiency and declining productivity growth. Since China's labor force growth is projected to be flat-to-negative (Chart I-21), the sole source of potential GDP growth going forward will be productivity growth. If the authorities do not allow market forces to play a larger role in resource allocation, including credit, the former will contract. The bullish camp on China argues that the authorities have a firm grip and control over the economy, and that they will never allow it to slow by injecting an unlimited amount of credit and fiscal stimulus. While this may be true, policymakers can do that, it is not a reason to be bullish. Quite the opposite: it is a reason to be structurally bearish on Chinese growth. Unrelenting credit and fiscal stimulus, and a resurging role of government in resource allocation, corporate restructuring, and increasingly in business decision-making, means the economy is moving back toward its socialist bend. In socialist economies, productivity growth is weak or sometimes negative. China's success over the past 30 years was based on a move towards private enterprise, entrepreneurism, and transition toward a more market-based model, and not on government credit injections. As China refuses to give greater say to market forces, and state officials and bureaucrats gets even more involved in credit and resource allocation to prevent genuine deleveraging and bankruptcies, economic efficiency and productivity will suffer. If we assume China's productivity is now about 6% (which is already a very high number) (Chart I-22), and if the country embarks down this path, odds are that productivity growth might drop by 100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1%. Given that labor force growth will be zero, if not contracting, in five years' time, potential GDP will drop to 1% or so, as shown in Chart I-20 on page 14. Hence, this path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. Chart I-21China: Labor Force Is Projected To Contract China: Labor Force Is Projected To Contract China: Labor Force Is Projected To Contract Chart I-22Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-recovery cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably the first mini-cycle. How can investors invest in this scenario? The mini-cycles depicted in Chart I-20 on page 14 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. Besides, financial market swings for China-related plays will differ from the economy's growth mini-cycles because markets can be driven by factors other than growth like politics, geopolitics, credit events, and other global variables such as the U.S. dollar and bond yields. In short, this analysis explains why we have been and remain bearish on China-related financial markets despite the stimulus that has been injected about a year ago. Investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Without that, investors cannot make money. Bottom Line: China by and large has two potential roadmaps going forward: (1) Short-term pain / long-term gain and (2) growth stagnation with mini-cycles around it. Regardless of which scenario transpires - so far, the second scenario has been in effect - the medium-term outlook is negative. Given that we are already advanced in the mini-cycle, the risk-reward for China plays in financial markets is negative. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, link available on page 19. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM: Overview Of External Debt," dated January 4, 2017, link available on page 19. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Key EM Issues Going Into 2017," dated December 14, 2016, link available on page 19. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, links available on page 19. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Will inflation return in Europe & Japan? Can Trumponomics successfully boost U.S. economic growth? Will global market volatility remain this low? Can China avert a crisis and still be the engine of global growth? Feature With a New Year now upon us, fixed income investors are trying to determine what the next move is for global bond yields after the rapid rise at the end of 2016. While much has been made of the impact of the 2016 U.S. election result on the global bond rout, many other important factors will drive fixed income markets this year (Chart of the Week). In our first Weekly Report of the New Year, we present our list of the most important questions for global bond markets in 2017. Chart 1The Big Questions For 2017 The Big Questions For 2017 The Big Questions For 2017 Chart 2Taper Tantrum 2.0? Taper Tantrum 2.0? Taper Tantrum 2.0? Will Inflation Return In Europe & Japan? Extremely low inflation in the Euro Area and Japan over the past few years has forced both the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) to pursue exceptionally accommodative monetary policies like negative interest rates and large scale quantitative easing (QE) programs - the latter acting to depress bond term premia among the major developed markets. Much of this decline in headline inflation in both regions was due to the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices and the previous strength in both the euro and yen (Chart 2), but core inflation and wage growth have also been subdued. If headline inflation were to move higher in either Europe or Japan, it could call into question the central banks' commitment to continue hyper-easy monetary stimulus programs. This could raise the threat of another "taper tantrum" in developed bond markets later in 2017. The recovery in global energy prices in 2016, combined with significant currency depreciations related to ECB/BoJ QE, have boosted the annual growth in the local currency price of oil to 72% in the Euro Area and 63% in Japan. Already, headline inflation measures have begun to move higher in response and, judging by past relationships, a move up to 2% headline inflation in both regions by year-end is possible. In Chart 3 & Chart 4, we present simulations for headline inflation in both the Euro Area and Japan assuming the only changes come from movements in oil prices, the euro and the yen. We show two scenarios where the Brent oil price rises to $65/bbl (the high end of the range expected by our commodity strategists in 2017) and $75/bbl (an extreme scenario). In both simulations, the euro and yen continue to weaken versus the U.S. dollar until mid-2017 before recovering to near current levels by year-end. Chart 3Euro Area Inflation Simulation Euro Area Inflation Simulation Euro Area Inflation Simulation Chart 4Japan Inflation Simulation Japan Inflation Simulation Japan Inflation Simulation Our simulations show that headline inflation in both the Euro Area and Japan could rise to at least the 2% level, and perhaps even higher, if oil prices continue to climb and both the yen and Euro weaken towards 125 and parity versus the U.S. dollar, respectively. Given our views on the likely path of interest rates in the U.S. - higher, as the Fed continues hiking rates - the U.S. dollar is likely to strengthen more in 2017. The oil price moves incorporated in our simulations are somewhat more bullish than our base case expectation, but not extraordinarily so. If there are any upside surprises to global growth this year, oil prices could show surprising strength given the production cutbacks occurring in many of the major oil exporting nations. Higher inflation would be welcome by both the ECB and BoJ, especially if it were accompanied by a rise in inflation expectations. Both central banks have acknowledged the role played by low realized inflation in recent years in depressing expected inflation, but the latter could move up surprisingly fast if the markets believe that either central bank will be slow to respond to the rise in realized inflation. That seems like more of a risk in Japan, where the BoJ is aiming for an overshoot of its 2% inflation target and is promising to keep the Japanese government bond (JGB) curve at current levels until that point is reached. The ECB would be much more likely to make the decision to begin tapering their bond purchases if Euro Area inflation approaches 2%. We see this as the biggest potential threat to global bond markets in 2017 - even more than the expected Fed rate hikes, which are already largely priced into the U.S. yield curve. The ECB was able to successfully kick the tapering can down the road last month by choosing to extend its QE program to the end of 2017, but a decision to defer tapering again will be much harder to make if Euro Area inflation is closer to 2%. If the ECB were to announce a taper later in 2017, this would be very damaging for the long ends of yield curves in the developed markets as bond term premia would begin to normalize - perhaps very rapidly. There is more room for adjustment for term premia in core Euro Area government bonds relative to U.S. Treasuries. An ECB taper announcement, or even just expectations of it, would mark the peak in the spread between U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds which is now at the highest levels in a quarter century. Given the busy upcoming election calendar in the Euro Area, the ECB will not want to even mention the word "taper" until later in the year. Until then, owning inflation protection in Europe, and Japan as well, is the best way to position for upside surprises in inflation in those regions. Bottom Line: Rising inflation in the Euro Area and Japan in 2017 will prompt a rethink of the hyper-easy monetary policies of both the ECB and BoJ, but only the former is likely to consider a taper of its bond purchase program this year. That decision would push global bond yields higher via wider term premia and cause Euro Area government bond markets to underperform U.S. Treasuries, but not until later in the year. Can Trumponomics Successfully Boost U.S. Economic Growth? After a long and divisive U.S. election campaign, the curtain is about to officially be raised on the Trump era on January 20. In anticipation of a more pro-growth agenda from the new president, investors have already bid up the valuations of assets sensitive to U.S. economic growth, like equities and corporate bonds, while also driving up both U.S. Treasury yields and the U.S. dollar. Chart 5Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Time To Spruce Up U.S. Infrastructure Markets are now discounting a fairly rosy scenario for a solid "Trump bump" to U.S. economic growth in 2017. This is to be expected, given that the president-elect won the White House on a platform full of promises to, among other things, boost government infrastructure spending, cut corporate taxes, tear down excess regulations on U.S. companies and adopt a more protectionist U.S. trade policy. In terms of a direct impact to U.S. GDP growth, there are three obvious places where the economic plan of Candidate Trump could turn into stronger growth this year for President Trump: government fixed investment, net exports and private capital expenditure. Trump's infrastructure plans have received much of the attention from those bullish on U.S. growth in 2017; unsurprising given the proposed size of the proposals ($550 billion). This stimulus would appear to be a source of low-hanging fruit to boost U.S. economic growth, as years of underinvestment has left America with an aging government infrastructure in need of an upgrade (Chart 5). Yet the boost to growth from government investment spending has historically not been large, adding between 0.25% and 0.5%, at most, over the past 40 years (bottom panel). Trump's proposed figure of $550 billion would fit right in with that experience, as it would represent 0.3% of the current $18.6 trillion U.S. economy. That assumes that all the proposed infrastructure spending occurs in a single year. Given the usual long lead times for big government infrastructure projects, and the discussions between the White House and the U.S. Congress over the scope and funding of any major government spending initiative, it is highly unlikely that the direct effect of more infrastructure spending will provide much of a boost to U.S. growth in 2017. That impact is more likely to be seen in 2018. A boost to growth from trade is also possible given Trump's fiery protectionist election rhetoric and his decision to nominate China hawks for major cabinet positions. It is unclear if Trump is willing to risk entering a trade war with China (or even Mexico) by raising import tariffs soon after taking office. It is even more uncertain if this will provide much of an immediate lift to U.S. net exports, if tariffs merely raise the cost of imports without any material substitution to domestically produced goods and services. Even if it did, trade has rarely contributed positively to real U.S. GDP growth outside of recessions since 1960. That leaves private fixed investment as the biggest potential source of new growth in the U.S. in 2017. Trump is proposing a cut in the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35% to 15%, while the Republican plan already set out by House Speaker Paul Ryan is calling for a cut to 25%. Both sides also are in favor of a lower "repatriation tax" on corporate profits held abroad, at a rate of 10-15%. So with all parts of the U.S. government in agreement, a move to cut corporate taxes appears to be a near certainty. In the past, efforts to initiate comprehensive tax reform have been not been done quickly in Washington. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy, however, believe that a deal between the White House and Congress could happen in the first half of 2017. The details of the other major policy initiatives that Trump wants done early in his first term - repealing and replacing Obamacare, and the infrastructure spending program - will be much harder to iron out than a tax cut on which both Trump and the Republican Congress agree. Doing the tax reform first will be the easier choice for a new president.1 Cutting corporate taxes seems like a move that should help boost U.S. private investment spending, as it would raise the after-tax return on capital. However, investment spending has already been underperforming relative to after-tax cash flows since the 2008 Financial Crisis, and the effective tax rate paid by the U.S. corporate sector is already much lower than the 35% marginal tax rate (Chart 6). Something else besides tax levels has been weighing on U.S. corporate sentiment with regards to capital spending intentions. It may be that the burden of excess government regulations, which has soared during the years of the Obama administration (bottom panel), has dampened animal spirits in the U.S. corporate sector. On that front, Trump's proposals to slash regulations - none bigger than repealing Obamacare - could help boost business confidence and fuel an upturn in capital spending. Chart 6A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden A Regulatory Burden, Not A Tax Burden Chart 7Making Corporate America Happy Again Making Corporate America Happy Again Making Corporate America Happy Again Some rebound in capex was likely to occur, Trump or no Trump, given the recent improvement in U.S. corporate profits (Chart 7, top panel). This is especially true in the Energy sector which generated the biggest drag on U.S. corporate investment spending after the collapse in oil prices in 2014/15. Since the election, however, there has been a noticeable improvement in confidence within the "C-suite" for American companies. The Duke University/CFO Magazine measure of optimism on the U.S. economy hit the highest level in over a decade (middle panel), while the Conference Board index of CEO optimism soared to the highest level in three years, at the end of 2016. Executive confidence at those levels would be consistent with a pace of capital spending that could add up to 1 full percentage point to U.S. real GDP growth, based on past relationships - (bottom panel). For both of these surveys, executives cited a more positive outlook on future growth after the U.S. election as a major reason for the increase in optimism. In sum, the biggest potential lift to U.S. economic growth in 2017 from Trumponomics will come from business investment and not government spending or exports, and likely by enough to boost overall U.S. GDP growth to an above-trend pace that will prompt the Fed to deliver at least 2-3 rate hikes by year-end. Bottom Line: A major boost to U.S. economic growth from government investment spending and net exports is unlikely in 2017. A pickup in corporate investment, however, seems far more likely given the boost to longer-term business confidence seen after the U.S. elections, coming at a time of improving global economic growth. Will Market Volatility Stay This Low? Given all the uncertainties over the latter half of 2016, from Brexit to Trump to Italy, it is surprising how low market volatility has been. Measures of implied volatility like the VIX index for U.S. equities have remained incredibly subdued, while even the uptick in MOVE index has been relatively modest considering the year-end carnage in the Treasury market (Chart 8). The fact that global risk assets can remain so relatively well-behaved, even after a surprising U.S election result and a Fed rate hike that has boosted the U.S. dollar, is a sign that the "Fed Policy Loop" - where a more hawkish U.S. monetary stance causes an unwanted surge in the U.S. dollar and a selloff in equity and credit markets - has been broken. As we discussed in our 2017 Outlook report, the Fed Policy Loop framework would not apply in an environment where non-U.S. economic growth was improving, as is the currently the case.2 This may be the most obvious explanation for why market volatilities are low, with developed market equities hitting cyclical highs and corporate credit spreads staying at cyclical lows. In other words, volatility is low because growth is accelerating and global central banks (most notably, the Fed) are not slamming on the brakes. Chart 8The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? The Death Of The Fed Policy Loop? Chart 9U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 U.S. Dollar Strength Will Persist In 2017 The strength of the U.S. dollar has been a function of the widening real interest rate differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Chart 9), which is likely to continue this year as the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes while U.S. inflation grinds slowly higher. We do not expect the Fed to be forced to shift to a more aggressive pace of tightening than currently implied by the FOMC forecasts. On the margin, this will help keep market volatility at subdued levels. A predictable Fed slowly tightening into an improving economy is not overly problematic for financial markets. That logic would be turned upside down if non-U.S. growth were to begin to slow sharply (not our base case) or if there were some non-U.S. source of uncertainty that could make markets jittery. Last year, political surprises ended up being the biggest shock for financial markets. Given the busy upcoming election schedule in Europe (Table 1), there is concern that a similar story could play out in 2017. Table 1Europe In 2017 Will Be A Headline Risk 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 The shock of Brexit and Trump have investors asking "where will the next populist uprising be?" France seems like the most obvious possibility, with the well-known right-wing (and anti-EU) populist Marine Le Pen running in this year's presidential election. French government debt has already priced in some modestly higher risk premium in recent months (Chart 10). Even in the bastion of stability, Germany, the rise of anti-immigration parties has some forecasting a difficult re-election campaign for Chancellor Angela Merkel later in the year. Our geopolitical strategists have long argued that there is not enough support for populist, anti-EU, anti-immigration parties in either Germany, France or the Netherlands (who also have an election this year) to win an election.3 The recent polling data strongly supports that view, with Le Pen's popularity on the decline for the past three years and with Merkel's popularity holding steady over the past year (Chart 11) - even as horrific terror incidents committed by "foreigners" have occurred on both French and German soil. Chart 10Not Worried About European Populism... Not Worried About European Populism... Not Worried About European Populism... Chart 11...For Good Reasons ...For Good Reasons ...For Good Reasons BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic, believes that Italy remains the greatest political risk in Europe in 2017, with elections possible as early as the spring. With the Senate reforms defeated in the December referendum, the country needs to re-write its already complicated electoral laws. This will likely take time, pushing the potential election date to late spring or early summer. If an early election is not called, a new vote must be held by the expiry of the government's mandate in May 2018. Chart 12Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Italy Is The Biggest Political Risk In Europ Chart 13A Managed Renminbi Depreciation A Managed Renminbi Depreciation A Managed Renminbi Depreciation Given the lower support for the euro in Italy than the rest of the Euro Area (Chart 12), and given the strong showing in the polls for the anti-establishment, anti-EU Five Star Movement led by Beppe Grillo, an early Italian election could be the biggest potential political shock for markets in 2017. This likely will not be enough to cause a major flare-up of global market volatility, but it does suggest that investors should remain underweight Italian government debt. Bottom Line: Improving global growth will continue to support low market volatility during 2017, even with the Fed remaining in a tightening cycle. European political risk should not be a Brexit/Trump-type source of concern for investors outside of Italy. Can China Avert A Crisis And Still Be The Engine Of Global Growth? This is a question that we may be asking every year for the next decade, given China's high debt levels and decelerating potential economic growth. Periodic episodes of uncertainty over Chinese currency policy are always a threat to trigger capital outflows, as has occurred over the past year and half (Chart 13). The Chinese authorities have chosen to allow currency depreciation versus the U.S. dollar to help manage the pace of that outflow, particularly during the past year when interest rate differentials have moved in a more dollar-positive direction. With over US$3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves at the government's disposal, the odds remain low that a true economic crisis can unfold in China. Additional renminbi weakness versus the U.S. dollar is likely in 2017, but the recent actions to sharply raise offshore renminbi interest rates is an indication that Chinese authorities will not tolerate a rapidly weakening currency. The incoming Trump administration is obviously an unforecastable wild card here, and China could respond to a new trade war with the U.S. by allowing a more rapid pace of currency weakness versus the dollar. Having said that - if China-U.S. relations don't boil over, then the underlying story for China will be one of improving economic growth in 2017. The underlying growth indicators in our "China Checklist" unveiled late last year (Table 2) continue to improve (Chart 14), and we continue to see China as being a positive contributor to the global economic cycle in 2017 (Donald Trump and his band of China hawks notwithstanding). This is important, as the global upturn seen in 2016 began in China early in the year. This fed through into many other countries either directly via exports to China or indirectly through an improvement in the pricing power for commodity exporters that benefitted from faster Chinese demand. Table 2The GFIS China Checklist 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017 Chart 14Chinese Growth Still Improving Chinese Growth Still Improving Chinese Growth Still Improving Bottom Line: China will likely remain a positive driver of the global economic upturn in 2017, with the biggest risk coming from increased tensions with the incoming Trump administration, not accelerating domestic capital outflows. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency", dated November 20th 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "How To Think About Global Bond Investing In 2017", dated December 20th 2016, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "5 Themes For 2017", dated December 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns