Economic Growth
CCP officials are discussing policy options for breaking out of a deepening liquidity trap. Anything policymakers come up with will be additive to existing spending and to the multi-trillion-dollar fiscal-stimulus packages being rolled out by the EU and US. Inflationary pressures in the real economy will become embedded as increasing demand for industrial commodities meets constrained supply. Stagflation likely follows.
It is too early to know whether the drop in bond yields will offset the drag on growth from tighter lending standards. But if it does, the net effect on equity valuations could be positive. This is enough to justify a modest tactical overweight to equities, with the proviso that investors should look to reduce equity exposure later this year in advance of a mild recession in 2024.
The Bank of Japan is about to get new leadership when Kazuo Ueda takes over as governor in April. Will there be a new monetary policy to go along with the new governor? We attempt to answer that question, and what that means for global bond markets and the yen, in this Special Report.
The turmoil in US regional banks will weigh on economic growth. Arguably, it would be better for the broader stock market if growth slowed because banks became more conservative in their lending than if it slowed because the Fed had to raise rates to over 6%. In both cases, economic growth would decelerate but at least in the former scenario, the discount rate applied to earnings would not be as high.
Bank failures are another ‘canary in the coal mine’ warning that a US recession is imminent, yet stocks, bonds, and the oil price are still a long way from fully pricing it.
The growth and inflation profiles of the three central European countries are set to diverge. The outlook for Polish and Hungarian Bonds are not attractive anymore. Book profits on them. Instead, initiate a new trade: pay Polish / receive Czech 10-year swap rates.
The first legislative meeting of Xi Jinping’s third term suggests that Chinese policy is continuous and consistent with the previous ten years, which is negative for long-term productivity.
China’s labor market is polarized between high unemployment among university graduates and an acute shortage of blue-collar labor. The high jobless rate among young workers is structural and will not decline a lot even during an economic recovery. Given the structural scarcities of blue-collar workers, the authorities will be less inclined to resort to their old playbook of stimulating infrastructure, construction, and manufacturing.
The Chilean economy is entering a recession. Inflation will drop rapidly and the central bank will cut rates meaningfully in H2 2023. We continue to recommend a structural overweight across Chilean risk assets on the basis of falling inflation and local yields, record cheap valuations, and dissipated political volatility.
A run of hot January data shook up financial markets, but we think they overreacted. We remain constructive on equities and the economy in the near term.