Developed Countries

Highlights Higher OPEC 2.0 production in 2H20 – likely beginning in 3Q20 – will be required to keep Brent prices below $50/bbl going into the US presidential elections, which arguably is the primary driver of prices in the 2020 post-COVID-19 recovery. Larger-than-expected OPEC 2.0 production cuts announced this month will force deeper inventory draws beginning in 3Q20. The re-opening of global economies and promising vaccine developments notwithstanding, we continue to expect an 8mm b/d hit to oil consumption this year, followed by an 8mm b/d recovery in demand next year. Brent prices likely will trade slightly higher than we forecast last month – $40/bbl this year, on average, vs. a $39/bbl forecast last month, and $68/bbl next year, $3/bbl above April’s forecast.  We expect WTI to trade $2 - $4/bbl below Brent (Chart of the Week). Two-way price risk is high: The likelihood demand will surprise to the upside cannot be ignored, but it could collapse with a second COVID-19 wave forcing lockdowns again.  On the supply side, the hurricane season is off to an early start in the US, with the first tropical storm, Arthur, named this week. Feature Chart of the WeekOil-Price Recovery In 2H20, 2021 Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Delivers Massive Production Cuts Political considerations – i.e., keeping crude oil prices below $50/bbl so as not to spike gasoline prices going into the US presidential elections – will drive the evolution of crude oil prices. The big driver of oil prices over the short term is what we know with the least uncertainty. Right now, that’s what's happening on the supply side over the next couple of months. Slightly further out – as November approaches, to be precise – the political economy of oil once again will dominate fundamentals. Political considerations – i.e., keeping crude oil prices below $50/bbl so as not to spike gasoline prices going into the US presidential elections – will drive the evolution of crude oil prices. That is why, we believe, the massive voluntary cuts announced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its Gulf allies earlier this month – amounting to ~ 1.2mm b/d of cuts in addition to those agreed by OPEC 2.0 in April – are so important: The global inventory overhang produced by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the short-lived market-share war launched by Russia in March, has to be unwound as quickly as possible, before the US presidential elections kick into high gear. Holding to the schedule agreed in April would drain inventories, but not fast enough by September to prevent further distress for OPEC 2.0 member states as the year winds down.1 By then, additional cuts would be highly problematic, given US President Donald Trump almost surely will be demanding higher OPEC production to keep gasoline prices down as voters go to the polls in November. KSA announced plans to reduce production by ~ 4.5mm b/d vs. its April level of 12mm b/d starting in June, taking its output to ~ 7.5mm b/d. This cut is 1mm b/d more than what it agreed to last month to balance the oil market. The UAE and Kuwait also voluntarily added cuts of 100k and 80k b/d, respectively, to their agreed quotas. Production cuts by OPEC 2.0 as a whole – led by KSA and Russia – begun in May and extending at least to the end of June will amount to ~ 9mm b/d, or close to 9% of global production (Chart 2). Chart 3US Shale-Oil Output Cuts... Outside of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts, we expect US shale-oil output to fall sharply – down ~ 2mm b/d this year from its peak in December, 2019 (Chart 3). The shale-oil supply destruction will lead total US production down by 600k b/d y/y in 2020 (Chart 4). US production losses will account for the largest share of non-OPEC production losses globally. Along with losses from Canada, Brazil and Norway in the wake of the COVID-19 demand destruction, we expect global oil production to fall 12mm b/d y/y by the end of June. Chart 4... Lead US Production Sharply Lower Demand Could Come Back Stronger For the year as a whole, we are leaving our expected demand loss at 8mm b/d, with most of that loss occurring in 1H20. That said, demand could revive sooner than expected, if the anecdotal reports of stronger-than-expected recovery in China prove out – the level of demand there is believed to be close to 13mm b/d in May, after falling to ~ 11.25mm b/d in February and March.2 Kayrros, the oil-inventory tracking service, noted its satellite imagery indicates, “Oil demand losses appear far lower than the prevailing view in April. Measured crude oil builds are wholly inconsistent with prevailing views of a collapse in oil demand of nearly Biblical proportions.” Furthermore, “By early May, there were clear signs of robust recovery in Asian crude demand as well as earlier-stage recovery in US end-user product demand. In addition, steep, swift supply cuts helped rebalance the market, leading to surprisingly deep inventory draws. But demand had never plunged as low as widely believed in the first place.”3 Our estimate of oil-demand destruction is less than that of the major data-reporting agencies. If this performance is repeated globally in EM economies – the historical growth engine of commodity demand – markets could tighten faster than we expect (Chart 5). Our estimate of oil-demand destruction is less than that of the major data-reporting agencies. In their May updates, EIA expects 2020 demand to fall 8.1mm b/d y/y in 2020, vs. 5.2mm b/d last month; OPEC sees demand falling 9.1mm b/d y/y, vs. 6.9mm b/d last month; and the IEA has it at 8.6mm b/d y/y, vs. 9.3mm b/d last month. Chart 5EM Demand Could Revive Quickly Chart 6Massive Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Will Boost Aggregate Demand Globally By next year, we expect global demand will rise 8mm b/d y/y, driven by the massive monetary and fiscal stimulus that will continue to boost aggregate demand higher (Chart 6). In 2H20, we see demand recovering as flowing supplies fall (Chart 7), forcing onshore inventories to draw sharply in 2H20 and into 2021 (Chart 8), as well as floating storage (Chart 9). In addition, This will flatten the forward Brent and WTI curves in 2H20, and backwardate them next year, as storage draws continue (Chart 10). Chart 7Oil Supply Falls, Demand Rises ... Chart 8... Onshore Inventories Draw More Than Expected Chart 9Expect Floating Storage To Empty Rapidly Chart 10Falling Storage Levels Will Push Forward Curves Into Backwardation Political Economy Drives Price Evolution The risk of higher gasoline prices as crude marches higher this summer is a risk President Trump already has shown he will not countenance. Following the massive production cuts being implemented this month and next by OPEC 2.0 and the large involuntary output losses outside the coalition, there is a risk prices could rise rapidly in 2H20. The fairly high likelihood demand surprises to the upside in 2H20 cannot be ignored, which would further fuel a price spike. This is a combustible political mix. The risk of higher gasoline prices as crude marches higher this summer is a risk President Trump already has shown he will not countenance, particularly not as an election looms. With this in mind, we iterated on the production required to keep Brent prices below $50/bbl in 2020 in our modeling, consistent with our view of the political economy considerations US elections impose (Table 1). Any additional volumes needed to keep Brent below $50/bbl can be returned to market fairly quickly out of OPEC 2.0 spare capacity. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) OPEC 2.0’s production cuts have sharply increased the group’s spare capacity to ~ 6.5mm b/d – 5.5mm b/d in OPEC and close to 1mm b/d in Russia and its allies – which means these states will be capable of modulating production quickly and with fairly high precision. The Return Of OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline The budgets of the OPEC 2.0 states have endured massive hits, which can only be repaired by higher oil-export revenues, given their dependence oil sales. After the US elections, OPEC 2.0 production discipline will have to be revived, given the massive fiscal constraints these states are facing. The budgets of the OPEC 2.0 states have endured massive hits, which can only be repaired by higher oil-export revenues, given their dependence oil sales. KSA will want to manage the rate at which prices increase, so that prices rise while global markets are awash in fiscal and monetary stimulus. We believe Russia will acquiesce on this point – i.e., it will not reprise its role as a price dove arguing for lower prices against KSA’s desire for higher prices – given the damage done to its economy from the price collapse in 1H20. That said, taking inventories from historically high levels back down to their 2010-14 average levels – the storage target pursued by OPEC 2.0 prior to the COVID-19-induced price collapse – likely will keep price volatility elevated (Chart 11). An upside demand surprise while production is being aggressively curtailed could sharply raise prices. Indeed, in our modeling of 2021 prices, we again iterated on production to keep Brent prices below $80/bbl, which we believe is the level both KSA and Russia can agree on for the short term. We also believe that the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus sloshing through EM and DM economies will make such prices bearable, provided they are not the result of a supply-side shock. Chart 11Oil Price Volatility Will Remain Elevated The level of uncertainty in the oil markets remains extraordinarily high. Bottom Line: Our price forecasts are premised on a resumption in global growth in 2H20 that lifts crude oil demand, and sharper-than-expected voluntary and involuntary production cuts taking supply significantly lower over the balance of the year and into next year. As the volatility chart above shows, however, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets remains extraordinarily high: A demand surprise to the upside cannot be ignored, but it also could collapse again with a second COVID-19 wave forcing another round of lockdowns. On the supply side, Tropical Storm Arthur launched the hurricane season weeks ahead of schedule. This elevates supply risk in the US Gulf until the end of November, when the season ends. We expect 2020 Brent prices to average $40/bbl and 2021 prices to average $68/bbl. WTI will trade $2-$4/bbl lower. Two-way risk – upside and downside – abounds.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight OPEC's May Monthly Oil Market Report noted Iraq failed to raise crude oil output in April amid the market-share war instigated by Russia’s refusal to back additional production cuts at OPEC 2.0’s March meeting. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE managed to move their production up by 2.2mm b/d, 2.2mm b/d, and 330k, respectively. In our global oil balances, we assume Iraq will increase production along with core-OPEC 2.0 countries to balance oil markets once demand rebounds later this year. However, its declining production last month could signal Iraq’s ability to increase production is limited and that it will struggle to meet its increasing quota in 4Q20 and 2021. Base Metals: Neutral China’s policy-driven economic recovery continues. Last week’s data release provided evidence of a rebound in the manufacturing, infrastructure, and construction sectors (Chart 12). This will continue to support base metals – primarily copper and aluminum. Precious Metals: Neutral Chairman Powell’s comment that there is “no limit” to what the Fed can do with its emergency lending facilities supports our view that US real rates will remain depressed as inflation expectations move up ahead of nominal rates. Gold and silver are up 2% and 14% since last Tuesday. We believe silver slightly below its equilibrium price vs. gold and industrial metals (Chart 13). Silver could continue to temporarily outpace gold as it moves to equilibrium. Ags/Softs:  Underweight US corn planting for the 2020/2021 season is approaching the finish line, with 80% of the crop in the ground so far, as reported by the USDA on Monday. Although this figure was up 13 percentage points since last week, it didn’t meet analysts’ expectations of 82% to 84%, which provided support for corn prices. Furthermore, this week’s sharp rebound in oil prices also was positive for corn, which gained ¢2/bu since the beginning of the week. Chart 12Chinese Investment Tailwind for Base Metals Chart 13Silver Could Temporarily Outpace Gold   Footnotes 1    Please see US Storage Tightens, Pushing WTI Lower, our forecast published last month on April 16, 2020, which discussed the production cuts agreed by OPEC 2.0 in April.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2    Please see Oil highest since March as Chinese demand reaches 13 MMbpd published May 18, 2020, by worldoil.com. 3    Please see Reassessing the Oil Demand Impact of COVID-19 published by Kayrros on medium.com May 19, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights EM QE programs will ensure that EM local currency bond yields will drop further. However, the impact of these EM QE programs on EM currencies is ambiguous. Continue receiving long-term swap rates in a number of EM economies. QE programs globally constitute public debt monetization. A stronger money supply does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason to expect a rise in inflation rates. However, DM and EM QE programs could fuel financial market manias. Feature Chart I-1Broad Money Is Booming In DM And Accelerating In EM In this report we discuss the various quantitative easing programs (QEs) that have begun to surface in emerging economies. This is a new phenomenon that will likely mark a major precedent for EM central banks. Over time, these programs will likely become more prominent tools in EM. Understanding these unorthodox monetary policy easing measures in EM and DM is of paramount importance to investors. We use a Q&A format to discuss and elaborate on this topic. Question: What has forced the authorities to launch QE programs in EM and what forms have they taken? Answer: QE programs in developing countries are in their infancy. Several governments launched them in haste in the month of March in response to the recession and panic selloff that was occurring across global financial markets. These programs will be shaped by different forces and take different forms over time. Generally, QE programs are implemented in order to: (1) halt the abrupt deleveraging among local commercial banks amid the COVID-19 crisis (2) ensure credit continues to flow to the real economy (companies and households) (3) bring down long-term interest rates and prevent large government borrowings from crowding out the private sector. In addition to slashing policy rates, many EM central banks (CBs) are implementing one or more of the following initiatives to achieve these objectives: I.  Providing unlimited liquidity to commercial banks through various facilities II.  Buying government bonds III. Conducting direct purchases of local currency corporate bonds and, in some cases, mortgage-backed securities IV. Direct lending to non-banks such as mutual funds and enterprises V. Expanding the range of public and private sector securities that can be used as collateral when lending to banks The second, third and fourth types of operations can be considered forms of QE to the extent that they fall beyond the scope of customary CB operations. The latest QEs qualify as public debt monetization. This is also true for the QEs in advanced economies. Table I-1 provides information about various central bank policies across mainstream EM countries. Details are still limited regarding the technicalities, quantity and timelines of some of these measures. Table I-1Quantitative Easing Policies Annouced By Emerging Economies Question: Do these QEs represent a public debt and fiscal deficit monetization? Answer: Yes, monetary and fiscal policies are being coordinated and these QEs qualify as public debt monetization. This is also true for the QEs in advanced economies. These QE policies have been designed to ensure that the cost of government borrowing does not rise amid the surge in public sector borrowing requirements. Especially at a time when foreign investors were abandoning EM financial markets. Governments have deployed large fiscal stimulus packages to offset the devastating economic impact of COVID-19 induced shutdowns. Coupled with a collapse in fiscal revenues, this has resulted in a widening of fiscal deficits and large borrowing requirements. Chart I-2EM QEs Are Intended To Drive Down Local Bond Yields EM local currency government bond yields spiked in March (Chart I-2). This prompted CBs in many EMs to announce government bond purchasing programs in order to bring down government bond yields. Government bond yields influence other interest rates such as those for consumer and business loans. Higher borrowing costs amid a deep recession would have been lethal for corporate and household debtors. Additionally, it would have materially damaged public debt dynamics. To bring down government bond yields and ensure that policy rate cuts translate into lower borrowing costs across the entire yield curve, CBs have begun purchasing government bonds in the following developing countries: Brazil, South Africa, Poland, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. Government bond yields in many EMs have declined since mid-March (Chart I-2). That could be at least partially attributed to EM CBs’ QE programs. CB purchases of government bonds in either primary or secondary markets, qualify as public debt monetization. Question: How are QEs different from conventional CB operations and what makes them so unique as to warrant investor attention? Answer: There are three things that distinguish these QE initiatives from traditional CB operations: First, CBs do not typically lend to non-banks. They do not lend to or purchase credit instruments issued by non-banks. Hence, by purchasing corporate bonds and issuing loans to non-banks, CBs have entered into unchartered territory. This is also true for the Federal Reserve and CBs in other advanced economies. Second, by buying government bonds CBs are conducting an outright monetization of public debts and fiscal deficits. This is true for central banks in both EM and DM. Outside QEs, monetary authorities typically set the short-term interest rate and provide enough liquidity to the banking system to keep short-term interbank rates on par with policy rates. Chart I-3Fed’s Ownership Of Treasurys Prior to the launch of QE programs, CB operations with long-term government bonds were limited in scope and often technical in nature. For example, the Fed’s ownership of US Treasury securities rose by only 40% from $550 billion in 2002 to $775 billion in 2006. By comparison, it has doubled from $2 trillion to $4 trillion since September 2019 (Chart I-3). When CBs buy government bonds en masse, as they are currently doing in many countries, we are no longer talking about open market operations, but rather the monetization of public debt. Third, by launching QEs, CBs affect long-term interest rates. When financial markets are malfunctioning, which results in unjustifiably elevated long-term interest rates and cost of capital, QEs become essential to ensure the monetary policy transmission channel is operating effectively.  Nevertheless, as we have seen in the cases of the ECB and Bank of Japan, the use of QEs can become addictive. Once CBs have deployed QEs, they have a hard time abandoning them. When the financial systems and markets get accustomed to zero or negative nominal interest rates and to a constant overflow of CB liquidity, the termination of QEs will be disruptive and painful. Consequently, there is a risk that both DM and EM CBs will end up overdoing it with QEs - suppress long-term interest rates too much, for too long and for no justifiable reason. This will in turn lead to misallocations of capital, asset bubbles and other distortions in financial markets and real economies. If the velocity of money recovers to its pre-pandemic levels amid the massive expansion of money supply, inflation will rise even if real output returns to its potential pace. Question: Is it fair to say that QEs lead only to an increase in commercial banks’ excess reserves at the CB, and that they have no real impact on the money supply? In other words, if commercial banks do not lend, is it true that the money supply will not expand and, thereby, QEs will never lead to higher rates of inflation?  Answer: Not really. QEs have a much more nuanced impact on the money supply. Moreover, the relationship between the money supply and the inflation rate is not straightforward. We will consider several examples, dissecting the impact of QEs on both excess reserves (ER) and the money supply. But first, let us recall that the broad money supply is the sum of both the cash in circulation and all types of deposits in commercial banks, including demand, time and savings deposits. Commercial banks’ ER at CBs are not included in either the narrow or broad definitions of money supply. Case 1: When a central bank purchases securities from or lends to a bank, ER rise although no deposit is created, so the money supply does not change.  Case 2: When a central bank purchases securities from or lends money to non-banks, this transaction creates both an ER and a new deposit in commercial banks, meaning that the money supply does increase. Case 3: When a commercial bank buys securities from or lends to non-banks, ER do not change while a new deposit is created “out of thin air”, so that the money supply rises. Conversely, when a bank sells a security to a non-bank, or a non-bank repays a loan, the money supply (i.e. the amount of deposits in the banking system) shrinks. To sum up, QEs lead to a larger money supply when CBs purchase assets from or lend to non-banks. When CBs purchase assets from banks, no new money (deposits) are created. Importantly, the money supply also expands when commercial banks buy securities from or lend to non-banks. Chart I-4A and I-4B reveal that QEs in the US, the UK, Japan and the euro area, over the past 10 or so, years have created a lot of ER but little money supply. Chart I-4AExcess Reserves Have Expanded More Than Broad Money In US, Japan… Chart I-4B… Euro Area And UK   In China, the broad money supply has been exploding since 2009. The commercial banks have, on their own, generated an enormous increase in the money supply “out of thin air”, by making loans to and buying securities from non-banks, even though there has been much less ER creation from the PBoC (Chart I-5). The top panel of Chart I-6 illustrates the remarkable evolution of broad money supply in China versus the US, the euro area and Japan. In the chart, broad money supply in these four economies is plotted along the same scale, since January 2009, when QEs began in DM and the credit boom commenced in China. Even though ERs have expanded much more in the US, the euro area and Japan (Chart I-6, bottom panel), broad money growth in China outstripped all other economies by a large margin (Chart I-6, top panel). Chart I-5Excess Reserves Have Expanded Less Than Broad Money In China Chart I-6Broad Money And Excess Reserves: China Versus DM     As we discussed in our previous reports on money, credit and savings, money supply growth is not at all contingent on savings in an economy. Rather, outside of QEs money in all countries is primarily created by the commercial banks when they lend to or purchase assets from non-banks. Still, the nature of QE is now changing in the US. Chart I-7 reveals that the broad money supply is booming faster than it ever has, since World War II. As the Fed lends directly to businesses and purchases corporate bonds that are largely held by non-banks, the money supply will explode in the US, alongside a surge in ER. Chart I-7US Money Growth: The Sky Is The Limit Chart I-8April Datapoints Suggest Notable EM Money Growth Acceleration Similar trends will occur in EM and other DM (Chart I-8): as their CBs buy securities from non-banks, they will simultaneously create both ER and new deposits at commercial banks (money supply). Question: Does this potential explosion in money supply globally – and in the US in particular – imply that there is an imminent risk of an inflation outbreak in the real economy? Answer: A stronger money supply does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason to expect a rise in inflation rates. Inflation (rising prices of goods and services) also depends on the velocity of money and the productive capacity of an economy. Nominal GDP = Velocity of Money x Money Supply In turn, Nominal GDP = Output Volume x Prices Hence, Output Volume x Prices = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Finally, Prices = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / Output Volume. Therefore, inflation is contingent not only on the money supply but also on the velocity of money and the output volume. The money supply will continue surging in the US and will boom in the rest of the world as other CBs also deploy QEs (Chart I-7 and I-8). However, the surge in money supply has so far been offset by a lower velocity of money (Chart I-9Aand I-9B). The velocity of money reflects the willingness of consumers and businesses to spend their money. Chart I-9AVelocity Of Money Dropped In March Chart I-9BVelocity Of Money Dropped In March If the velocity of money recovers to its pre-pandemic levels amid the massive expansion of money supply, inflation will rise. In a nutshell, money growth will be booming worldwide due to QEs but the velocity of money, or the willingness to spend, will be the critical factor in determining inflation dynamics in the months and years to come. Question: Will the current excessive creation of money leak into asset prices and produce asset bubbles? Answer: It could. As we discussed in our January report titled, A Primer On Liquidity, an abundant money supply is conducive to higher asset prices and bubbles, but it is not a sufficient condition. Investors should be willing to allocate money to financial assets in order for the latter to appreciate. For example, since the beginning of this year, global risk assets have gone through an enormous roller-coaster ride. Through mid-February, risk assets were buoyant and the oft-cited rationale for the rally was plentiful liquidity. Then, from mid-February on through late March, we witnessed historic liquidity crunches across all financial markets, including US Treasurys. It is crucial to note that neither ER in the global banking system, nor global narrow and broad money slowed down during that period (Chart I-1 on page 1 and Charts I-4A and I-4B on page 6). Investors were simply liquidating financial assets and raising their cash level. Since late March, risk assets have been rallying as investors have felt more comfortable taking on more risk. Overall, whether ballooning money supply flows into financial assets or not is contingent on the willingness of all types of investors to deploy their deposits into financial markets. Just as price inflation in the real economy is dependent on the willingness of consumers and businesses to spend their money on goods and services, financial asset price appreciation is contingent on the animal spirit of all investors and their inclination to take on more risk. Whether ballooning money supply flows into financial assets or not is contingent on the willingness of all types of investors to deploy their deposits into financial markets. Question: How does the stock of US dollars (the broad money supply) compare with the value of US-denominated securities available to investors? Has the Fed’s purchases of securities not shrunk the amount of publicly-traded securities available to investors? Answer: Yes, indeed, they have. One of the distortions that the Fed’s and other CBs' QEs created has been the shrinkage of publicly-traded bonds and stocks. This has certainly lifted asset prices to levels they would have otherwise not reached. Chart I-10 plots the ratio of the US broad money supply-to-the market value of all US dollar-denominated securities. The US broad money supply represents all US dollars in the world – in cash and in electronic bank deposits. The denominator is the market capitalization of US denominated stocks and all types of bonds held by non-bank investors. It is calculated as the sum of the following: US equity market capitalization (the Wilshire 5000); the market cap values of all US-dollar bonds, including government, corporate, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and commercial mortgage backed securities (the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index); and the market cap value of US dollar-denominated bonds issued by EM governments and corporations; minus the Fed’s and US commercial banks’ holdings of all types of securities. Chart I-10The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization The higher this ratio, the more US dollar deposits, or liquidity, is available per one dollar of market value of outstanding securities – excluding those held by the Fed and US commercial banks. Based on the past 25 years, this ratio is somewhat elevated meaning that liquidity is relatively abundant. However, as argued above, animal spirits among investors are as important in driving financial asset prices as the amount of money supply. Question: What will happen to exchange rates in general, and to EM currencies in particular, given that almost every country in the world is expanding its money supply, simultaneously? Answer: There is no stable correlation between the relative money supply of two individual economies and their bi-lateral exchange rate. In addition, this is the first time that QEs are being deployed in both DM and EM countries at the same time. Therefore, there is no easy and straightforward answer to this question. Chart I-11EM Currencies: A Bounce Or Beginning Of A Cyclical Rally? We recommend using the following framework to think about EM exchange rates versus the US dollar, at the moment: 1. EM currencies in aggregate will continue to be driven by global growth, as they have been historically. Chart I-11 illustrates that the EM ex-China currency index correlates with industrial commodity prices. The basis for this correlation is that they are both driven by the global business cycle. So far, the advance in both EM exchange rates and industrial commodities has been tame. It is still not clear if this is merely a rebound from very oversold levels or rather the beginning of a cyclical rally. 2. The rampant expansion of US money supply will eventually lead to the greenback’s depreciation. However, for the US dollar to depreciate against EM currencies, the following two conditions should be satisfied: US imports should expand, meaning that the US should send dollars to the rest of the world by buying goods and services. This has not yet happened though, as domestic demand in America has plunged and any demand recovery in the next three to six months will be tame and muted. US investors should channel US dollars to EM to purchase EM financial assets. 3. From an individual EM perspective, there are several scenarios to consider: If a country’s QE: materially boosts its real growth, its currency will rally in spite of ongoing domestic QE; fails to meaningfully boost growth, its exchange rate will weaken; produces a rapid rise in inflation, its currency will depreciate; is used to finance unsustainable public debt dynamics, its currency will depreciate. As we have written in the recent reports, this could very well be the case in Brazil and South Africa. Investment Conclusions We expect EM local yields to fall further. For absolute-return investors we continue to recommend receiving swap rates in Korea, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, Colombia and Mexico. Our country allocation for EM local currency bond portfolios is always presented at the end of our reports on page 15. We continue shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, PHP, IDR and KRW. However, if the strength in EM currencies persists in the near term, we will close our short positions. Continue underweighting EM equities and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Within the EM credit space, favor sovereign to corporate credit. On that issue, please refer to our April 22, Special Report on EM foreign currency debt. For dedicated EM equity managers, we recommend overweighting Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, central Europe, Mexico and Peru. Our underweights are Indonesia, India, the Philippines, the UAE, South Africa and Brazil. Please refer to our Open Position Table on page 14. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Underweight The S&P communications equipment index has given up its gains over the course of 2020. We remain bearish as the macro outlook still spells trouble and this positioning is in line with our newly formed view of preferring defensive tech (software & services) and avoiding aggressive tech (hardware & equipment). On the international front, “king dollar” has yet to fully filter through the system as foreign executives are reluctant to spend on big ticket items (CNY/USD shown advanced, top panel). On the domestic front, the industry has been aggressively ramping up headcount to the point that its wage bill is now expanding at the fastest pace this cycle. This rising labor cost backdrop will likely cap the share price ratio (wage bill shown inverted & advanced, middle panel) At the same time, CEOs are not ready to take the capex route as highlighted by the most recent CEO confidence survey (bottom panel). Importantly, the downtick in capex intentions came amidst a healthy rebound in almost every other “future conditions” sub-component of the survey. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV.

Highlights German bunds and Swiss bonds are no longer haven assets. The haven assets are the Swiss franc, Japanese yen, and US T-bonds. Gold is less effective as a haven asset. During this year’s coronavirus crash, the gold price fell by -7 percent. As such, our haven asset of choice for a further demand shock would be the 30-year T-bond, whose price rose by 10 percent during the crash. Technology and healthcare are the two sectors most likely to contain haven equities. Fractal trade: long Polish zloty versus euro. German Bunds And Swiss Bonds Are No Longer Haven Assets Chart of the WeekGold Is Tracking The US 30-Year T-Bond Price... But The T-Bond Is The Better Haven Asset European investors have been left defenceless. German bunds and Swiss bonds used to be the safest of haven assets. You used to be able to bet your bottom dollar – or euro or Swiss franc for that matter – that the bond prices would rally during a demand shock. Not in 2020. When the global economy and stock markets collapsed from mid-February through mid-March, the DAX slumped by -39 percent. Yet the German 10-year bund price, rather than rallying, fell by -2 percent, while the Swiss 10-year bond price fell by -4 percent.1  The lower limit to bond yields is around -1 percent. The reason is that German and Swiss bond yields are close to the practical lower limit to yields, which we believe is around -1 percent (Chart I-2). This means that German and Swiss bond prices cannot rise much, though they can theoretically fall a lot. Chart I-2German And Swiss Bond Yields Are Near Their Practical Lower Bound The behaviour of German bunds and Swiss bonds during the current crisis contrasts with previous episodes of market stress when their yields were unconstrained by the -1 percent lower limit. During the heat of the euro debt crisis in 2011, the 10-year bund price rallied by 12 percent. Likewise, during the frenzy of the global financial crisis in 2008, the 10-year bund price rallied by 7 percent (Chart I-3 - Chart I-5). Chart I-3German And Swiss Bonds Protected Investors During The 2008 Crash Chart I-4German And Swiss Bonds Protected Investors During The 2011 Crash Chart I-5German And Swiss Bonds Did Not Protect Investors During The 2020 Crash The defencelessness of European investors can also be illustrated via a ‘balanced’ 25:75 portfolio containing the DAX and 10-year German bund. The balanced portfolio theory is that a large weighting to bonds should counterbalance a sharp sell-off in equities, thereby protecting the overall portfolio. The theory worked well… until now. In this year’s coronavirus crisis, the 25:75 DAX/bund portfolio suffered a loss of -13 percent. This is substantially worse than the loss of -2 percent during the euro debt crisis in 2011, and the loss of -7 percent during the global financial crisis in 2008 (Chart I-6 - Chart I-8). Chart I-6A 25:75 DAX:Bund Portfolio Lost 7 Percent During The 2008 Crash Chart I-7A 25:75 DAX:Bund Portfolio Lost 2 Percent During The 2011 Crash Chart I-8A 25:75 DAX:Bund Portfolio Lost 13 Percent During The 2020 Crash What Are The Haven Assets? The lower limit to the policy interest rate – and therefore bond yields – is around -1 percent, because -1 percent counterbalances the storage costs of holding physical cash or other stores of value. If banks passed a deeply negative policy rate to their depositors, the depositors would flee into other stores of value. But if banks did not pass a deeply negative policy rate to their depositors, it would wipe out the banks’ net interest (profit) margin. Either way, a deeply negative policy rate would destroy the banking system. German and Swiss bond prices cannot rise much. German and Swiss bond yields are close to the -1 percent lower limit, meaning that the bond prices are close to their upper limit. Begging the question: what are the haven assets whose prices will rise and protect long-only investors when economic demand slumps? We can think of three. The Swiss franc. The Japanese yen (Chart I-9). US T-bonds. Chart I-9The Swiss Franc And Japanese Yen Are Haven Assets During the coronavirus crash, the 10-year T-bond price rallied by 4 percent while the 30-year T-bond price rallied by 10 percent (Chart I-10). Compared with German bund and Swiss bond yields, US T-bond yields were – and still are – further from the -1 percent lower limit. The good news is that long-dated T-bonds can still protect investors during a demand shock, although be warned that the extent of protection diminishes as yields get closer to the lower limit. Chart I-10Long-Dated US T-Bonds Are Haven Assets What about gold? As gold has a zero yield, it becomes relatively more attractive to own as the yield on other haven assets declines and turns negative. In fact, through the last three years, the gold price has been nothing more than a proxy for the US 30-year T-bond price (Chart of the Week). But gold is an inferior haven asset. During the coronavirus crash, the gold price fell by -7 percent, meaning it did not offer the protection that T-bonds offered. As such, our haven asset of choice for a further demand shock would not be gold. It would be the 30-year T-bond. What Are The Haven Equities? Many investors still use (root mean squared) volatility as a metric of investment risk. There’s a big problem with this. Volatility treats price upside the same as price downside. This is unrealistic. Nobody minds the price upside, they only care about the downside! Hence, a truer metric of risk is the potential for short-term losses versus gains. This truer measure of risk is known as negative asymmetry, or negative skew. In the twilight zone of ultra-low bond yields, bond prices take on this unattractive negative skew. As German bunds and Swiss bonds have taught us this year, bond prices can suffer losses, but they cannot offer gains. This means that bonds become riskier investments relative to other long-duration investments such as equities whose own negative skew remains relatively stable. The upshot is that the prospective return offered by equities must collapse. This is because both components of the equity return – the bond yield plus the equity risk premium – shrink simultaneously.  Equity valuations rise as an exponential function of inverted bond yields. Given that valuation is just the inverse of prospective return, the effect is that equity valuations rise as an exponential function of inverted bond yields. Chart I-11 illustrates this exponentiality by showing that technology equity multiples have tightly tracked the inverted bond yield plotted on a logarithmic scale. Chart I-11Technology Valuations Are Exponentially Sensitive To The (Inverted) Bond Yield Unfortunately, not all equities will benefit from this powerful dynamic. Equities must meet two crucial conditions to justify this exponential re-rating. One condition is that their sales and profits must be relatively resilient in the face of the current coronavirus induced demand shock. And they should not be at risk of a structural discontinuity, as is likely for say airlines, leisure and many other old-fashioned cyclicals. A second condition is that their cashflows must be weighted further into the future, so that their ‘net present values’ are much more geared to the decline in bond yields. Equities that meet these two conditions are likely to benefit the most from the ongoing era of ultra-low bond yields. And the two equity sectors that appear the biggest beneficiaries are technology and healthcare. In the coronavirus world, these two sectors will likely contain the haven equities. Stay structurally overweight technology and healthcare. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to go long the Polish zloty versus the euro. The profit-target and symmetrical stop-loss are set at 2 percent. Most of the other open trades are flat, though long Australian 30-year bonds versus US 30-year T-bonds and Euro area personal products versus healthcare are comfortably in profit.  The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 61 percent. Chart I-12PLN/EUR When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 From February 19 through March 18, 2020. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

The US dollar is a key macro variable that we are closely monitoring and as we highlighted last week,1 the Fed is indirectly aiming at jawboning the greenback to reflate global growth and SPX sales, of which roughly 40% come from international markets.US dollar-based liquidity is one of the most important determinants/drivers of global growth. The longer US dollar liquidity gets replenished, the more upward pressure it will put on SPX momentum and SPX EPS (see chart). Sloshing US dollar-based liquidity will serve as a much needed catalyst for a global growth recovery. Bottom Line: We remain constructive on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical 9-12 months time horizon. Please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report for more details. 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bottomless Punchbowl” dated May 11, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.  

Special Report

Highlights Fed/BoE NIRP: It is too soon for either the Fed or Bank of England to consider a move to a negative interest rate policy (NIRP), even with US and UK money markets flirting with pricing in that outcome. Lessons from “NIRP 1.0”: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields. NIRP 2.0?: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP. Feature Chart 1NIRP 2.0 Would Trigger A Surge Of Negative Yielding Bonds Within a 20-month window in 2014-16, the central banks of Japan, Sweden, the euro area, Switzerland and Denmark all cut policy interest rates to below 0% - where they remain to this day. Fast forward to 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic and deep worldwide recession that has already forced major developed market central banks to cut rates close to 0%, there is now increased speculation that the negative interest rate policy (NIRP) club might soon get a few new members. The Federal Reserve has been front and center in that group. Fed funds futures contracts had recently priced in slightly negative rates in 2021, despite Fed Chair Jerome Powell repeatedly saying that a sub-0% funds rate was not in the Fed’s plans. The Bank of England (BoE) has also seen markets inch toward pricing in negative rates, although BoE officials have been more open to the idea of negative rates as a viable policy choice. Even the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has suggested that negative rates may be needed there soon. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. Already, there is $11 trillion of negative yielding debt within the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate index, representing 20% of the total (Chart 1) If there is a shift to negative rates in the potential “NIRP 2.0” group of major developed economies with policy rates now near 0% – a list that includes the US, the UK, Canada and Australia – then the amount of negative yielding debt worldwide will soar to new highs. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. In this report, we take a look at the conditions that led the NIRP 1.0 countries to shift to negative rates in the middle of the last decade, to see if any similarities exist in non-NIRP countries today. We conclude that the conditions are not yet in place for a shift to sub-0% policy rates in the US, the UK, Canada or Australia – all countries where central banks still have other policy tools available to provide stimulus before resorting to negative rates. How Negative Interest Rates Can “Work” To Revive Growth Broadly speaking, central banks around the world have had difficulty meeting their inflation targets since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The main reason for this has been sub-par economic growth, much of which is structural due to aging demographics and weak productivity. Since central bankers must stick to their legislated inflation targeting mandates, they are forced to cut rates when economic growth and inflation are too low. If real economic growth remains weak for structural reasons, then central banks can enter into a cycle of continually cutting rates all the way to zero, or even below zero, in order to try and prevent low inflation from becoming entrenched into longer-term inflation expectations. If growth and inflation continue to languish even after policy rates have reached 0%, then other tools must be used to ease monetary conditions to try and stimulate economies. These typically involve driving down longer-term borrowing rates (bond yields) through dovish forward guidance on future monetary policy, bond purchases through quantitative easing (QE) and, if those don’t work, moving to negative policy interest rates. A nice summary indicator to identify this intertwined dynamic of real economic growth and inflation is to look at the trend growth rate of nominal GDP. Chart 2 shows the policy interest rates three-year annualized trend of nominal GDP growth for the NIRP 1.0 countries, dating back to before the 2008 crisis. Japan stands out as the weakest of the group, with trend nominal growth contracting during and after the 2009 recession, while struggling to reach even +2% since then. The euro area, Sweden and Switzerland all enjoyed +5% nominal growth prior to 2008, before a plunge to the 1-2% range during and after the recession. After that, the three countries had varying degrees of economic success. Between 2016 and 2019, Sweden saw trend nominal growth between 4-5%, while the euro area struggled to achieve even +3% nominal growth and Switzerland maintained a Japan-like pace. Chart 2Fewer Tools Left For NIRP 1.0 Countries To Boost Growth Chart 3NIRP 2.0 Candidates Can Still Expand QE First The European Central Bank (ECB), Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Sweden’s Riksbank all cut policy rates aggressively in 2008/09, helping spur a recovery in nominal growth. The central banks had to keep rates lower for longer because of structurally weak growth, leaving far less capacity to ease aggressively in response to the growth downturn a few years later. Eventually, the ECB, SNB, BoJ and Riksbank all went to negative rates between June 2014 and February 2016. The BoJ and SNB, facing persistent headwinds from strengthening currencies, also resorted to aggressive balance sheet expansion to provide additional monetary stimulus – trends that have continued to this day, with both central banks having balance sheets equal to around 120% of GDP. The experience of these four NIRP 1.0 countries showed that the move to negative rates was a process that began in the 2008 financial crisis. Central banks there were unable to raise rates much, if at all, after the recession, leaving little ammunition to fight the varying growth slowdowns suffered between 2012 and 2016. Eventually, rates had to be cut below 0% which, combined with QE, helped generate lower bond yields, weaker currencies and, eventually, a pickup in growth and inflation. Looking at the NIRP 2.0 candidate countries, nominal GDP growth has also struggled since the financial crisis, unable to stay much above 3-4% in the US, Canada and the UK. Only Australia has seen trend growth reach peaks closer to 5-6% (Chart 3). The Fed, BoE, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Bank of Canada (BoC) all also cut rates aggressively in 2008/09, with the Fed and BoE doing QE buying of domestic bonds. Rates were left at low levels after the crisis in the US and UK, with only the RBA and, to a lesser extent, the BoC hiking rates after the recession ended. When growth slowed again in these countries during the 2014-16 period, the RBA and BoC did lower policy rates, but negative rates were avoided by all four central banks. Today, nominal growth rates have collapsed because of the COVID-19 lockdowns that have shuttered much of the world economy. Central banks that have had any remaining capacity to cut policy rates back to 0% have done so, yet this recession has already become so deep that additional declines in rates may be necessary to stabilize unemployment and inflation. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. One way to see the problem that monetary policymakers are now facing is by looking at Taylor Rule estimates of appropriate interest rate levels (Charts 4 and 5). Given the rapid surge in global unemployment rates to levels that, in some cases, have not been seen since the Great Depression (Chart 6), alongside decelerating inflation, Taylor Rule implied policy rates are now deeply negative in the US (-5.6%), Canada (-2.9%) and euro area (-1.7%).1 Taylor Rules show that moderately negative rates are also needed in Sweden (-0.5%), Switzerland (-0.2%) and Japan (-0.2%). Only in Australia (+1.3%) and the UK (+0.3%) is the Taylor Rule indicating that negative rates are not currently required. Chart 4Taylor Rule Says More Rate Cuts Needed Here … Chart 5… But Rates Are Appropriate Here Chart 6The Main Reason Why Taylor Rule Implied Policy Rates Have Plunged Among the potential NIRP 2.0 candidates, the negative rate option has been avoided and aggressive QE balance sheet expansion has been pursued by all of them – including the BoC and RBA who avoided asset purchase programs in 2008/09. Balance sheet expansion can be an adequate substitute for policy interest rate cuts by helping drive down longer-term bond yields and borrowing rates, which helps spur credit demand and, eventually, economic growth. Yet the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. How negative rates worked for the NIRP 1.0 countries For the ECB (Chart 7), BoJ (Chart 8), Riksbank (Chart 9) and SNB, the path from negative policy rates in 2014-16 to, eventually, faster economic growth and inflation followed a similar process: Chart 7The Euro Area's Negative Rates Experience Chart 8Japan's Negative Rates Experience Chart 9Sweden's Negative Rates Experience Moving to negative policy rates resulted in a sharp decline in nominal government bond yields The fall in yields helped trigger currency depreciation Nominal yields fell faster than inflation expectations, allowing real bond yields to turn negative Credit growth eventually began to pick up in response to the decline in real borrowing costs Inflation bottomed out and started to move higher. In Japan, the euro area and Sweden, this process played out fairly rapidly with credit growth and inflation bottoming within 6-12 months of the move to negative rates. Only in Switzerland (Chart 10), where the SNB gave up on currency intervention in January 2015, was the process delayed, as the surge in the currency triggered a move into deeper deflation and higher real bond yields. It took a little more than a year for the deflationary impact of the franc’s surge to fade, allowing real bond yields to decline and credit growth and inflation to bottom out and recover. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks.  Of course, we are talking about the pure economic effect of negative rates as a monetary policy tool. There are side effects of having negative nominal interest rates and deeply negative real bond yields, like surging asset values (especially for real assets like housing). Bank profitability is also negatively impacted by the sharp fall in longer-term bond yields that hurts net interest margins, even with higher lending volumes and reduced non-performing loans. Chart 10Switzerland's Negative Rates Experience Chart 11Negative Rates Are Good For Real Assets This can be seen in Charts 11 & 12, which compare the performance of real house prices and bank equities (relative to the domestic equity market) in the years leading up to, and following, the move to negative rates in 2014-16 for the NIRP 1.0 countries. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks. Chart 12Negative Rates Are Bad For Bank Stocks Nonetheless, the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries suggests that the potential NIRP 2.0 countries could see similar benefits on growth and inflation – but not before other policy options are exhausted first. Bottom Line: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields and helping spur credit growth and, eventually, some inflation. Depreciating currencies had a big role to play in generating those outcomes. Negative Rates Are Not Necessary (Yet) In The NIRP 2.0 Countries As discussed earlier, the sharp surge in unemployment because of the COVID-19 global recession means that negative interest rates may now be “appropriate” in the US and Canada, based on Taylor Rules. Negative rates are not needed in the UK and Australia, however, although policy rates need to stay very low in both countries. A similar divergence can be seen in inflation. Headline CPI inflation rates were already under severe downward pressure from the recent collapse in oil prices. The surge in spare economic capacity opened up by the current recession can only exacerbate the disinflation trend. However, the drop in inflation has been more acute in the US and Canada relative to the UK and Australia, suggesting a greater need for the Fed and BoC to be even more stimulative than the BoE or RBA (Chart 13). A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response. There is one area where the Fed stands alone in this group. The relentless strength of the US dollar, even as the Fed’s rate cuts have taken much of the attractive carry out of the greenback, hurts US export competitiveness in a demand-deficient recessionary global economy. The strong dollar also acts as a dampening influence on US inflation. A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response (Chart 14). This would mirror the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries prior to the move to negative rates, where unwanted currency strength crippled both economic growth and inflation. Chart 13The Threat Of Deflation Could Trigger NIRP Chart 14Could More USD Strength Drag The Fed Into NIRP? For now, the Fed has many other policy options open before negative rates would be seriously considered. The reach of its QE programs could be expanded even further, even including equity purchases. The existing bond QE could be combined with a specific yield target (i.e. yield curve control) for shorter-maturity US Treasuries, helping anchor US yields at low levels for longer. Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. The need for such extreme policies is not yet necessary, though, both in the US and the other NIRP 2.0 candidate countries. Bank lending is expanding at a double-digit pace in the US, and still at a decent 5-7% pace in the UK, Canada and Australia, even in the midst of a sharp recession (Chart 15). This may only be due to the numerous loan guarantees provided by governments as part of fiscal stimulus responses, or it may be related to companies running down credit lines to maintain liquidity. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries, though, suggests that credit growth must be far weaker than this to require negative policy rates to push down longer-term borrowing costs. Chart 15These Already Look Very "NIRP-ish" Chart 16Too Soon For Global NIRP, Maintain Neutral Global Duration Exposure Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. In terms of investment implications, we continue to recommend an overall neutral stance on global duration exposure, as we see little immediate impetus for yields to move lower because of reduced expectations of future interest rates or inflation (Chart 16). We will continue to watch currency levels and credit growth as a sign that policymakers may need to shift their tone in the coming months. Bottom Line: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Footnotes 1 Our specification of the Taylor Rule uses unemployment rates relative to full employment (NAIRU) levels as the measure of spare capacity in the economies. For the neutral real interest rate, we use the New York Fed’s estimate of r-star for the US, Canada, the euro area and the UK; while using the OECD’s estimate of potential GDP growth as the neutral real rate measure for countries where we have no r-star estimate (Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia).