Developed Countries

Highlights EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, as well as global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodity prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. The odds of a near-term US dollar rebound are rising. This will likely produce a setback in EM currencies, fixed-income markets and equities. However, such a setback will likely prove to be a buying opportunity. Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the asset prices. Feature Chart I-1Unusual Divergences EM risk assets have done well in absolute terms but have underperformed their DM counterparts.  This is unusual given the substantial weakness in the US dollar and the rally in commodities prices since April (Chart I-1). Until early this year, many commentators had argued that monetary policies of DM central banks were the principal drivers of EM financial markets. Given the zero interest rates and money printing that is prevalent in DM, the underperformance of EM equities and currencies is especially intriguing. Is this underperformance an aberration or is it fundamentally justified? What really drives EM performance? Back To Basics As we have argued over the years, EM risk assets and currencies are primarily driven by their domestic fundamentals, rather than by the actions and policies of the US Federal Reserve or the ECB. The critical determinant of EM stocks’ absolute as well as relative performance versus DM equities has been corporate profits. Chart I-2 illustrates that relative equity performance and relative EPS between EM and the US move in tandem, both in common and, critically, local currency terms. Similarly, the main reason why EM share prices in absolute terms have failed to deliver positive returns over the past 10 years is that their profits have been stagnant over the same period, even prior to the pandemic (Chart I-3). Interestingly, fluctuations in EM EPS resemble those of Korea’s exports. This reflects the importance of global growth in shaping EM profit trends. Chart I-2Corporate Profits Drive EM Absolute And Relative Performance Chart I-3EM EPS Has Been Flat For 10 Years   The key drivers of EM risk assets and currencies have been and remain: 1. EM domestic fundamentals that can be encapsulated by a potential risk-adjusted return on capital. The latter is impacted by both cyclical and structural growth trajectories, as well as by the quality and composition of growth. Risks to growth can be gauged based on factors such as (but not limited to): productivity, wages, inflation, fiscal and balance of payment positions, the global economic and financial environment, and the health of the banking system. In EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan), the fundamentals remain challenging: The business cycle recovery is slower in these economies than it is in China and advanced economies. Fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in many advanced countries, while the pandemic situation has been worse. Their banking systems were already fragile before the pandemic, and have lately been hit by defaults stemming from the unprecedented recession. These governments have less room than in DM and China, to stimulate fiscally and bail out debtors and banks. Banks in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) will continue struggling for some time, and their ability to finance a new expansion cycle will, for now, remain constrained (Chart I-4). A restructuring of non-performing loans and a recapitalization of banks will be required to kick-start a new credit cycle in many of these economies. 2. Global growth, especially relating to China’s business cycle and commodities. The recovery in China since April, along with rising commodities prices have been positive for EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). Given the substantial stimulus injected into the Chinese economy, its recovery will continue well into next year (Chart I-5). As a result, higher commodities prices will benefit resource producing economies by supporting their balance of payments and enhancing income growth. Chart I-4EM ex-China: Limited Bank Support For Growth Chart I-5China's Stimulus Entails More Upside In Commodity Prices   3. Global financial market themes: a search for yield and leadership of new economy stocks. Global investment themes have an important bearing on EM financial markets. For example, in recent years, the increased market cap of new economy and semiconductor stocks – due to an exponential rise in their share prices – has amplified their importance for the aggregate EM equity index. The largest six mega cap stocks in the EM benchmark are new economy and semiconductor companies, and make up about 25% of the EM MSCI market cap. The six FAANGM stocks presently account for about 25% of the S&P 500. Hence, the concentration risk in EM is as high as it is in the US. Consequently, the trajectory of new economy and semiconductor stocks globally will be essential to the performance of the EM equity index. On August 20, we published an in-depth Special Report assessing near-term and structural outlooks for global semiconductor stocks. With new economy and semiconductor share prices going parabolic worldwide, we are witnessing a full-fledged mania, as we discussed in our July 16 report. The equal-weighted US FAANGM stock index has risen by 24-fold in nominal and 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, since January 1, 2010 (Chart I-6). Chart I-6History Of Manias Of Past Decades In brief, with respect to magnitude and duration, the bull market in FAANGM is on par with the bubbles of previous decades (Chart I-6). Those bubbles culminated in bear markets, where prices fell by at least 50% after topping out. Chart I-7EM ex-TMT Stocks: Absolute And Relative Performance We do not know when the FAANGM rally will end. Timing a reversal in a powerful bull market is impossible. Also, we are not certain about the magnitude of such a potential drawdown. Nevertheless, our message is that the risk-reward tradeoff of chasing FAANGM at this stage is very unattractive. Excluding technology, media and telecommunication (TMT) – as most growth stocks are a part of TMT– EM equities remain in a bear market (Chart I-7, top panel). In relative terms, EM ex-TMT stocks have massively underperformed their global peers (Chart I-7, bottom panel).  Even with a larger weighting of mega-cap growth TMT stocks than the overall DM equity index, the aggregate EM equity index has underperformed the overall DM index. Bottom Line: EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, and global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. What About The Dollar? The high correlation of the trade-weighted US dollar and EM equities is due to the following: (1) the greenback has been a countercyclical currency; and (2) the US dollar’s exchange rate against EM currencies reflects relative fundamentals in the US versus EM economies. When a global business cycle accelerates, the broad trade-weighted US dollar weakens. If this growth acceleration is led by China and other emerging economies, the greenback depreciates considerably versus EM currencies. The opposite is also true. In other words, the US dollar exchange rate’s strong negative correlation to EM equities is primarily due to the fact that the greenback’s exchange rates against EM currencies reflect both the global business cycle as well as EM growth and fundamentals. Chart I-8Divergence Between DM And EM Currencies In recent months, the greenback has: (1) depreciated due to the global economic recovery; (2) tumbled versus DM currencies due to the still raging pandemic and the socio-political instability in the US as well as the Fed’s commitment to staying behind the inflation curve in the years to come; and (3) not fallen much against EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) currencies because their fundamentals have been poor, as discussed above. Bottom Line: Exchange rates in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) have failed to appreciate versus the dollar despite the latter’s plunge versus other DM currencies (Chart I-8). The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodities prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. Flows And Cash On The Sidelines Chart I-9Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization What about capital flows? Aren’t they essential in driving EM financial markets? Of course, they are important. However, we view flows as resulting from and determined by fundamentals. Over the medium and long term, we assume that capital flows to regions where the return on capital is high or rising. Thus, we see ourselves as responsible for directing investors to those areas that we have identified as providing a high or rising return on capital (and cautioning investors when the opposite is true). The presumption is that beyond short-term volatility, investment flows will gravitate to countries/sectors/asset classes with high or rising returns on capital, just as they will abandon areas of low or falling returns on capital. In brief, fundamentals drive flows and flows determine asset price performance. Isn’t sizable cash on the sidelines a reason to be bullish? Yes, there is substantial cash on the sidelines. Along with zero short-term rates, this has been the potent force leading investors to purchase equities, credit and other risk assets since late March. Below we examine the case of the US, but this has also been true in many markets around the world. The top panel of Chart I-9 demonstrates that US institutional and retail money market funds – a measure of cash on the sidelines - presently stand at $4.2 trillion, having increased by $900 billion since March. Yet, the Fed and US commercial banks have increased their debt securities holdings by $2.9 trillion since March.   Furthermore, the Fed and US commercial banks hold $10.6 trillion of debt securities (Chart I-9, middle panel) – amounting to 18% of the aggregate equity and US dollar fixed-income market value (Chart I-9, bottom panel). These securities, held by the Fed and US commercial banks, are not available to non-bank investors. Chart I-10Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Is Still Elevated Excluding debt securities owned by the Fed and commercial banks, we reckon that cash on the sidelines is equal to 8.4% of the value of equities and US dollar debt securities available to non-bank investors (Chart I-10). This is a relatively high cash ratio. Unprecedented purchases by the Fed and US commercial banks have not only removed a considerable chuck of debt securities from the market; they have also created money “out of thin air”. When central or commercial banks acquire a security from, or lend to, a non-bank entity, they are creating new money “out of thin air”. No one needs to save for the central bank and commercial banks to lend to or purchase a security from a non-bank. In short, savings versus spending decisions by economic agents (non-banks) do not affect the stock of money supply. We have deliberated on these topics at length in past reports. In sum, the Fed’s large purchases of debt securities amount to a de facto monetization of public and private debt. These operations have both reduced the amount of securities available to investors and boosted the latter’s cash balances. Hence, the Fed has boosted asset prices not only indirectly, by lowering short-term interest rates, but also directly, by printing new money and shrinking the amount of securities available to investors. We have in recent months argued that global risk assets are overpriced relative to fundamentals. However, investors have continued to deploy cash in asset markets, pushing prices higher. Given the zero money market interest rates and the still elevated cash balances, one can envision a scenario in which cash continues to be deployed in asset markets, pushing valuations to bubble levels across all risk assets. Pressure on investors to deploy their cash amid rising asset prices implies that only a major negative shock might be able to reverse this rally. There have been plenty of reasons to be cautious, including escalating US-China geopolitical tensions, the increasing odds of a contested US presidential election and, hence, elevated political uncertainty, the possibility of a US fiscal cliff, and a potential second wave of the pandemic. However, investors have so far shrugged off all of these and continue to allocate capital to risk assets. Bottom Line: Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the price of risk assets. This would also mean that the role of momentum investing and psychology may increase. Investment Strategy Currencies: The US dollar has become oversold and could stage a rebound in the near term. The euro has risen to its technical resistance (Chart I-11). The EM currency index (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has failed to break above its 200-day moving average (Chart I-12, top panel).  The emerging Asian trade-weighted currency index (ADXY) has rebounded to the upper boundary of its falling channel (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11A Short-Term Resistance For Euro/USD Chart I-12EM Currencies Have Not Entered A Bull Market   Such technical profiles suggest that EM currencies have not yet entered a bull market despite the greenback’s considerable depreciation against DM currencies. This is a reflection of the poor fundamentals of EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). In short, the odds of a US dollar rebound are rising. This could dent commodities prices and weigh on EM currencies. We continue recommending shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the euro, CHF and JPY. The downside in these DM currencies versus the greenback is limited. The euro could drop to 1.15, but not much below that level. Our basket of EM currencies to short includes: BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, PHP, KRW and IDR. Chart I-13EM Local Currency Bonds: Looking For A Better Entry Point Fixed-Income Markets: We have been neutral on EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets (USD bonds) since April 23 and June 4, respectively. The strategy is to wait for a correction in these markets before going long. The rebound in the US dollar and correction in commodities will provide a better entry point for these fixed-income markets (Chart I-13). Equities: On July 30, we recommended shifting the EM equity allocation within a global equity portfolio from underweight to neutral. In the near term, EM share prices will likely continue underperforming their DM counterparts. A bounce in the US dollar, rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as the continuation of a FAANGM-driven mania in US equities will result in EM equity underperformance versus DM. However, in the medium- to long-term, the balance of risks no longer justifies an underweight allocation. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Achieving 2 percent inflation, whether as a point-target or as an average over time, will continue to be a mission impossible. As central banks continue to push the monetary policy pedal to the metal, it will underpin the valuation of equities and other risk-assets. So long as bond yields do not spike, stock market sell offs will be short-lived rather than an outright bear market. Within bonds, steer towards those where the monetary policy toolbox is not fully depleted, namely US T-bonds. Within currencies, steer towards those where the monetary policy toolbox is already depleted, namely the Swiss franc and the yen. Inflationary fiscal policy, by spiking bond yields, risks collapsing the valuation underpinning of $450 trillion of global risk-assets and catalysing a deflationary bear market. Fractal trade: Euro strength is vulnerable. Feature Chart of the WeekUltra-Low Bond Yields Do Not Create Consumer Price Inflation, They Create Asset Price Inflation Five years ago, we published a Special Report, Mission Impossible: 2% Inflation. We predicted that 2 percent inflation would remain elusive. Or that in the rare economies that it did appear, it would be runaway, rather than a sedate 2 percent. Either way, the 2 percent inflation point-target that had become a quasi-religious commandment for the world’s central banks would be a ‘mission impossible’.1  Our August 2015 report was heterodox and provocative. Some people pushed back, arguing that the all-powerful central banks could pick and hit whatever inflation target they desired. Yet five years on, we have been vindicated. Last week, the Federal Reserve finally threw in the towel on the 2 percent inflation point-target (Chart I-2). Chart I-2"Forecasts For 2 Percent Inflation Were Never Realised On A Sustained Basis" “Over the years, forecasts from FOMC participants and private-sector analysts routinely showed a return to 2 percent inflation, but these forecasts were never realised on a sustained basis… (hence) our new statement indicates that we will seek to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time…”2   We suspect that, just like the Fed, European central banks will soon move their goal posts. Nevertheless, today we are doubling down on our August 2015 prediction. Achieving 2 percent inflation, whether as a point-target or as an average over time, will continue to be a mission impossible (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Mission Impossible: 2 Percent Inflation Price Stability Is A State, Not A Number The current school of central bankers have misunderstood price stability. They have defined it as an over-precise inflation rate: two point zero. Yet most people feel price stability imprecisely and intuitively. A recent IFO paper points out that households’ inflation perceptions are “more in line with the imperfect information view prevailing in social psychology than with the rational actor view assumed in mainstream economics.”3 The human brain cannot distinguish between very low rates of inflation or deflation, a range we just perceive as ‘price stability’. In Real-Feel Inflation: Quantitative Estimation of Inflation Perceptions, Michael Ashton confirms that “it would be challenging for a consumer to distinguish 1 percent inflation from 2 percent inflation – that fine of a gradation in perception would be extremely unusual to find.”4 The human brain cannot distinguish between very low rates of inflation or deflation. As the entire range of ultra-low inflation just feels like one state of price stability, it is impossible for central banks to fine-tune our inflation expectations within that range. Therefore, our behaviour in terms of wage demands and willingness to borrow also stays unchanged. And if our behaviour is unchanged, what is the transmission mechanism to 2 percent inflation – or for that matter, any arbitrarily chosen inflation rate? Hence, inflation targeting can ‘phase-shift’ an economy between the states of price instability and price stability. Most notably, its inception in the 1990s ultimately phase-shifted many advanced economies into the state of price stability (Chart I-4). But once in either state, inflation targeting cannot fine-tune inflation to a desired number such as 2 percent, 4 percent, or 10 percent. Chart I-4Inflation Targeting Phase-Shifted Advanced Economies Into Price Stability A recent NBER paper Inflation Expectations As A Policy Tool? points out that in advanced economies, “the inattention of households and firms to inflation is likely a reflection of policy-makers’ success in stabilizing inflation around a low level for decades. This price stability has reduced the benefit to being informed about aggregate inflation, leading many to rely on readily available price signals.”5  The ultimate proof is that even market-based inflation expectations just track realised inflation. Central Banks Have Gone Backwards In his must-read What’s Wrong With The 2 Percent Inflation Target, the late and great Paul Volcker argued that price stability is “that state in which expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business or household decisions. It is ill-advised to define that state with a point target, such as 2 percent, as false precision can lead to dangerous policies.”6 The irony, and tragedy, is that both the Fed and the ECB have gone backwards. Their original definitions of price stability were more correct than their more recent iterations. False precision can lead to dangerous policies. At the Federal Reserve’s July 1996 policy meeting, Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that if the aim of inflation targeting was a truly stable price level, it entailed an inflation target of 0-1 percent. But one of the persons present was not so sure. The dissenter was a Fed governor called Janet L. Yellen. She countered that if inflation ended up at 0-1 percent, the zero-bound of interest rates would prevent “real interest rates becoming negative on the rare occasions when required to counter a recession”, an argument that Jay Powell repeated last week. “Expected inflation feeds directly into the general level of interest rates… so if inflation expectations fall below our 2 percent objective, interest rates would decline in tandem. In turn, we would have less scope to cut interest rates to boost employment during an economic downturn.” Meanwhile in Europe, the ECB’s original inflation target of below 2 percent was close to Greenspan’s proposal of 0-1 percent. But in 2003 the ECB changed its inflation target to its current “below but close to 2 percent.” The reason, according to Mario Draghi: “The founding fathers of the ECB thought about the rebalancing of the different members. To rebalance these disequilibria, since the countries do not have the exchange rate, they must readjust their prices. This readjustment is much harder if you have zero inflation than if you have 2 percent.” Hence, the Fed, ECB and other central banks are targeting inflation at an arbitrary 2 percent to always allow some leeway for negative real rates. The central bank argument can be summarised as: we desperately need you to expect 2 percent inflation. Because otherwise, we won’t be able to help you by cutting real interest rates in a downturn. Yet this argument is facile, as it takes no account of the true science of inflation expectation formation (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). And it is dangerous, as it takes no account of the financial and economic risks of pushing the monetary policy pedal to the metal. Chart I-5Inflation Expectations Just Track Realised Inflation Chart I-6Inflation Expectations Just Track Realised Inflation Beware The Twists In The Inflation Story Now we come to a couple of twists in the story. When bond yields become ultra-low, their impact on consumer price inflation breaks down – because the economy is already in the state of price stability – but the impact on stock market inflation increases exponentially (Chart of the Week). We refer readers to previous reports in which we have detailed this dynamic.7 The good twist is that as central banks continue to push the monetary policy pedal to the metal, it will underpin the valuation of equities and other risk-assets. So long as bond yields do not spike, stock market sell offs will be short-lived rather than an outright bear market. Remarkably, this has held true even this year in the worst economic downturn since the Depression. The current school of central bankers have misunderstood price stability. Within bonds, steer towards those where the monetary policy toolbox is not fully depleted, namely US T-bonds (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Conversely, within currencies, steer towards those where the monetary policy toolbox is already depleted, namely the Swiss franc and the yen. Chart I-7Steer Towards Bonds Where Monetary Policy Is Not Fully Depleted... Chart I-8...Namely US ##br##T-Bonds Finally, given that any economy can ultimately phase-shift to price instability, when should we worry about inflation in advanced economies? Not yet. To expand the broad money supply, somebody must borrow and spend money. If policymakers really want to create rampant inflation, that somebody is the government. It must borrow and spend money at will, with the central bank creating the money. In other words, the central bank loses its independence and government spending goes vertical. So far, we are not remotely close to this situation because government spending has barely replaced the lost incomes and livelihoods of the pandemic. Indeed, things could get worse once the current income replacement schemes end. Yet, in theory at least, government spending could ultimately go vertical. This would lead to the final bad twist. As bond yields spiked in response, the entire valuation support of global risk-assets would collapse, catalysing a devastating bear market. Given that the $450 trillion worth of global risk-assets (including real estate) is five times the size of the $90 trillion global economy, we reach an important conclusion. The road to inflation, if ever taken, goes via deflation. Fractal Trading System* This week we note that the recent strength in EUR/USD is vulnerable to a countertrend pullback. However, as we are already exposed to this via the correlated position in long USD/PLN, there is no new trade. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 59 percent. Chart I-9EUR/USD When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report ‘Mission Impossible: 2% Inflation’, dated August 20, 2015, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see New Economic Challenges and the Fed's Monetary Policy Review, August 27, 2020 available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20200827a.htm 3 Please see Households’ Inflation Perceptions and Expectations: Survey Evidence from New Zealand, IFO Working Paper, February 2018 available at https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/wp-2018-255-hayo-neumeier-inflation-perceptions-expectations.pdf 4 Please see Real-Feel Inflation: Quantitative Estimation of Inflation Perceptions by Michael Ashton, National Association for Business Economics available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/be.2011.35.pdf 5 Please see Inflation Expectations As A Policy Tool? NBER, May 28th, 2018 available at http://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f117592.pdf 6 Please see https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-24/what-s-wrong-with-the-2-percent-inflation-target 7 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report ‘Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance’, dated October 25, 2018, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Neutral - Downgrade Alert Bank stocks fail to catch a break. Following the recent Fed stress results and the resulting dividend cuts, banks have continued to trail both the broad equity market and their early cyclical peers: consumer discretionary stocks. Worryingly, on all three income generation fronts, dark clouds are gathering for banks, the nervous system of the US economy. While the initial knee jerk reaction of corporates was to tap their existing credit lines in order to fight the pandemic that caused an exponential rise in C&I loan growth, going forward a steep reversal is looming (middle & bottom panels). Bankers are tightening lending standards at the fastest pace in a decade despite ZIRP, weighing heavily on relative share prices (top panel). On the price of credit front, the Fed’s recent perching of the fed funds rate on the zero line for as far as the eye can see all but guarantees a tough pricing power environment for banks. The latest FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile revealed that the banking industry broke the 3 handle on net interest margins coming in at 2.81%, the lowest level since the history of the data dating back to 1984. Finally, with regard to credit quality, a double digit unemployment rate, along with commercial real estate ails will propel non-performing loans, which are extremely lagging by nature. While credit quality deterioration is late to show up, it wreaks immediate havoc on bank income statements as loan loss provisions. Aggressive provisioning will likely continue at least until the end of the year. Bottom Line: Stay neutral the S&P banks index, but it is now on downgrade alert.