Corporate

Special Report

Highlights Investment Grade: Investors should overweight investment grade corporate bonds relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities, with a particular focus on bonds that are eligible for the Fed’s purchase programs. High-Yield: Caution is still warranted in the high-yield market. At current levels, spreads do not adequately compensate investors for the coming default cycle. We would recommend buying high-yield if the average index spread rises to a range of 1075 bps – 1290 bps. Fed Purchases: Fed corporate bond purchases will cause investment grade spreads to tighten, particularly out to the 5-year maturity point. However, the program won’t stop the coming onslaught of ratings downgrades. High-Yield Sectors: The Energy, Transportation, Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclical and Consumer Noncyclical sectors are all highly exposed to the looming default cycle. Financials and Utilities look like the best places to hide out. Feature Chart 1Will The Fed's Corporate QE Mark The Top In Spreads? The COVID pandemic and associated recession have already caused turmoil in financial markets and prompted a policy response from the Federal Reserve that is unprecedented in its aggressiveness. US investment grade and high-yield corporate spreads widened 280 bps and 764 bps, respectively, to start the year. Then, they tightened by 78 bps and 179 bps, respectively, after the Fed announced it is stepping into the corporate bond market for the first time (Chart 1). Clearly, this is a challenging time for corporate bond investors. But sifting through all the noise, we think there are three key questions to stay focused on: How will the Federal Reserve’s support for the corporate bond market impact spreads? At what level do spreads fully discount the looming default cycle? What sectors within the corporate bond market are most/least at risk of experiencing large-scale defaults? What Can The Fed Hope To Accomplish By Buying Corporate Debt? As part of its package of monetary policy stimulus measures to combat the US COVID-19 recession, the Fed has undertaken a dramatic new step to try and lower borrowing costs for US businesses – the outright buying of US investment grade corporate bonds. The main details of these new programs are as follows: The Fed will purchase investment grade corporate bonds, loans and related exchange-traded funds (ETFs) as part of these programs. Bonds can be purchased in the primary (newly-issued) and secondary markets. The purchases will not be held on the Fed’s balance sheet. Instead, two off-balance sheet Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), one for primary market purchases and one for secondary market purchases, will buy the bonds. Both SPVs are initially funded by the US Treasury and will be levered up via loans from the Fed. The primary market SPV will buy newly-issued bonds with credit ratings as low as BBB- and maturities of four years or less.  Eligible issuers are US businesses with material operations in the United States; that list of companies may be expanded in the future. Eligible issuers do not include companies that are expected to receive direct financial assistance from the US government (i.e. no buying of bonds from companies getting bailout funds). The secondary market SPV will buy bonds with maturities of up to five years and credit ratings as low as BBB-, with a buying limit of 10% of the entire stock of eligible debt of any single company. This secondary market SPV will also buy investment grade bond ETFs, up to 20% of the outstanding shares of any single ETF. Through the primary market facility, any eligible company can “borrow” from the Fed, through bond purchases or direct loans, an amount greater than its maximum outstanding debt (bonds plus loans) on any day over the past twelve months. Specifically: 140% of all debt for AAA-rated issuers, 130% for AA-rated issuers, 120% for A-rated issuers and 110% for BBB-rated issuers. Since those percentages are all greater than 100, this effectively means that the Fed will allow eligible companies to potentially roll over their entire stocks of debt through this program, plus some net new borrowing. With the primary market facility, issuers can even defer interest payments on the funds borrowed from the Fed for up to six months, with the interest payments added to the final repayment amount (any company choosing this option cannot do share buybacks or make dividend payments). These programs are set to run until September 30 of this year, with an option to extend as needed. The Fed’s new initiatives represent a new step for the central bank, providing direct lending to any company that needs it. The Fed had to do this through off-balance-sheet SPVs, since direct buying of corporates is not permitted under the Federal Reserve Act. With this structure, it is technically the US Treasury department that bears the initial credit risk through its seed funding of each SPV. The BoJ was the first of the major central banks to start buying corporate bonds. This structure is different than the recent corporate bond QE programs of the European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), where the credit risk was directly taken onto the central bank balance sheets. But from an investment perspective, the difference in structure between the Fed’s corporate bond buying program and that of other central banks is nothing more than a technicality. It is still worthwhile to see if any lessons can be learned from these other countries.     The Corporate Bond Buying Experience Of Other Central Banks The BoJ was the first of the major central banks to start buying corporate bonds, in a program that began in February 2009 and continued until October 2012. The program initially involved only the purchase of very high-quality corporate debt (rated A or higher) and only for maturities up to one year. The pool of eligible bonds was later increased to allow for lower credit quality (rated BBB or higher) and longer maturities (up to three years). The BoJ ended up buying a total of 3.2 trillion yen (US$30 billion) of bonds during that program, representing nearly 50% of total Japanese investment grade nonfinancial debt (Chart 2). Credit spreads tightened modestly over the life of the program, particularly for the shorter maturity debt that the BoJ was directly buying.1 Research from the BoJ concluded that the corporate bond buying did improve liquidity for the bonds that were eligible for the program, although there was no discernable pickup in overall Japanese corporate bond issuance.2 The BoE started its Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) in August 2016, as part of a package of stimulus measures to cushion the economic blow from the UK’s stunning vote to leave the European Union. The CBPS bought £10bn of UK nonfinancial investment grade corporate bonds over a period of 18 months, with ratings as low as BBB-. This was a relatively modest share of all eligible nonfinancial bonds (4.7%), but UK credit spreads did tighten over the life of the program (Chart 3). The BoE’s own research has determined that the spread tightening was due to lower downgrade/default risk premiums, and that the program triggered a surge in investment grade issuance in the weeks and months following its launch.3 Chart 2The BoJ's Corporate Bond Buying Experience Chart 3The BoE's Corporate Bond Buying Experience The ECB announced its Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP) in March 2016, with the actual bond purchases beginning three months later. This was an expansion of the ECB’s overall Asset Purchase Program that had previously been focused on government debt. Like the BoJ and BoE programs, only nonfinancial debt of domestic euro area companies rated BBB- or higher was eligible. The ECB did buy bonds across a wide maturity spectrum of 1-30 years. The ECB’s purchases in the first 18 months of the CSPP were sizeable, between €60-80bn per month, reaching a cumulative total of nearly 20% of the stock of eligible bonds (Chart 4). This not only drove credit spreads tighter for bonds in the CSPP, but also pushed spreads lower for bonds that were not directly purchased by the ECB, like bank debt. The ECB described this as evidence of a strong “portfolio balance effect”, where investors who sold their bonds to the central bank ended up redeploying the proceeds into other parts of the euro area corporate bond market.4  One major difference between the ECB CSPP and the BoJ and BoE programs was that the ECB could conduct the necessary purchases in the primary market, if necessary. This represented a major new source of funding for smaller euro area companies that did not previously issue corporate bonds, preferring to get most of their debt financing through bank loans. As evidence of this, the year-over-year growth rate of euro area corporate bond issuance soared from 2.5% to 10% in the first year of the CSPP (Chart 5). Chart 4The ECB's Corporate Bond ##br##Buying Experience Chart 5ECB Primary Market Buying Spurred A Boom In Issuance Investment Conclusions Applying these lessons to the US, the first conclusion we reach is that Fed corporate bond purchases will tighten spreads for eligible securities. In this case, eligible securities include all investment grade rated US corporate bonds with maturities less than five years. In effect, the Fed’s primary market facility could be thought of as adding an agency backing to these eligible bonds since the Fed has effectively guaranteed that this debt can be rolled over and that bond investors will be made whole. It’s noteworthy that last week saw a record amount of new investment grade corporate bond issuance as firms rushed to take advantage of the program.    Second, we should see some positive knock-on effects on spreads of ineligible investment grade securities, i.e. investment grade corporate bonds with maturities greater than five years. The impact will not be as large as for eligible securities, but since many of the same issuers operate at both ends of the curve, long-maturity spreads will benefit at the margin from any reduction in interest expense for the issuer. Third, any trickle-down effects to high-yield spreads will be much smaller. No high-yield issuers can benefit from the program, and while the Fed could eventually open up its facilities to include high-yield debt, we wouldn’t count on it. We suspect the moral hazard of “bailing out the junk bond market” would simply be a step too far for the Federal Reserve. We should see some positive knock-on effects on spreads of ineligible securities. In sum, we would advocate an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporate bonds today – especially on securities eligible for the Fed’s programs. We do not recommend a similar overweight stance on US high-yield, where spreads will continue to fluctuate based on the fundamental default outlook (see section titled “Assessing The Value In High-Yield” below). Can The Fed Re-Steepen US Credit Spread Curves And Prevent Ratings Downgrades? Prior to the Fed’s announcement of the new programs, the US investment grade corporate spread curve had become inverted, with shorter maturity spreads exceeding longer maturity ones. This has historically been a harbinger of increased investment grade downgrades and high-yield defaults (Chart 6). With the Fed’s new programs focusing on bonds with maturities of up to five years, the Fed’s buying can potentially lead to a re-steepening of the investment grade spread curve by driving down shorter maturity spreads. Chart 6Inverted US Credit Spread Curves Are Flashing An Ominous Message Already, the investment grade spread curve has begun to disinvert in the first week of the Fed’s programs (Chart 7). At the same time, the bond rating agencies are moving aggressively to adjust credit opinions in light of the US recession. Already, downgrades from Moody’s and S&P are outpacing upgrades by a 3-1 ratio year-to-date – a pace not seen since the depths of the financial crisis, according to Bloomberg.5  Chart 7The Fed's New Programs Are Already Helping Disinvert Investment Grade Spread Curves The Fed’s actions should be successful at re-steepening the investment grade credit curve. However, we doubt that they will have much impact on ratings decisions. While the Fed can reduce borrowing costs and prevent default by rolling over maturing debt for investment grade issuers, this has a relatively minor impact on corporate balance sheet health. In fact, the Fed's programs will only improve balance sheet health for firms that just roll over existing debt loads and don’t take on any new debt. Any firm that takes on new debt during this period will come out of the crisis with more leverage than when it entered. All else equal, that should warrant a downgrade. Bottom Line: Fed corporate bond purchases will cause investment grade spreads to tighten, particularly out to the 5-year maturity point. However, the program won’t stop the coming onslaught of ratings downgrades. Assessing The Value In High-Yield What Kind Of Default Cycle Is Already “In The Price”? High-yield debt may not benefit from the Fed’s corporate bond-buying programs. But, as in every other cycle, there will come a time when spreads discount the full extent of future default losses. At that point it will be appropriate to increase allocations to the sector. Our Default-Adjusted Spread will guide us as we make that determination. Our Default-Adjusted Spread is the excess spread available in the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index after subtracting realized default losses. Specifically, we calculate the Default-Adjusted Spread as: Index OAS – [Default Rate x (1 – Recovery Rate)] The default and recovery rates apply to the 12-month period that follows the index spread reading. For example, the Default-Adjusted Spread for January 2019 uses the index OAS from January 2019 and default losses incurred between February 2019 and January 2020. Table 1 shows that there is a strong link between the Default-Adjusted Spread and excess High-Yield returns relative to duration-matched Treasuries. Specifically, we see that losses are a near certainty if the Default-Adjusted Spread is negative and that return prospects are poor for spreads below 150 bps. A Default-Adjusted Spread above its historical average of 250 bps is an obvious buying opportunity, while a spread above 400 bps virtually guarantees strong returns. Table 1The Default-Adjusted Spread & High-Yield Excess Returns This helps clarify the task at hand. We must make an assumption about what the default and recovery rates will be for the next 12 months, then apply those assumptions to the current index spread. The resulting Default-Adjusted Spread will tell us if High-Yield bonds are worth a look. Table 2 shows the Default-Adjusted Spread that results from different combinations of default and recovery rates.6 For example, a 10% default rate and 35% recovery rate together imply a Default-Adjusted Spread of 271 bps, suggesting an attractive buying opportunity. Table 2Default-Adjusted Spread (BPs) Given Different Assumptions For Default And Recovery Rates What Sort Of Default Cycle Should We Expect? To answer this question we turn to Table 3. Table 3 lists periods since the mid-1980s when the default rate rose above 4%, along with several factors that influence the level of default losses: The magnitude of the economic downturn, proxied by the worst year-over-year real GDP growth reading recorded during that timeframe. The duration of the economic downturn, measured as the number of quarters from the peak to trough in real GDP. Nonfinancial corporate leverage – measured as total debt divided by book value of equity – at the cycle peak. Table 3A Brief History Of Default Cycles Alongside these determining factors, the table also shows the peak 12-month default rate seen during the cycle and the recovery rate that occurred alongside it. First, we notice a strong relationship between the magnitude of the economic shock and the peak default rate. Meanwhile, corporate leverage does a better job explaining the recovery rate. Notice that recoveries were greater in 2008 than in 2001, despite 2008’s larger economic shock. Turning to the current situation, our base case assumption is that we will see severe economic contraction in Q1 and Q2 of this year followed by some recovery in the third and fourth quarters. All told, 2020 annual GDP growth could be close to the -3.9% seen in 2008, though the duration of the peak-to-trough economic shock will be only two quarters instead of six.7 Based on the historical comparables listed in Table 3, this sort of economic shock could generate a peak default rate somewhere between 11% and 13%. As for recoveries, nonfinancial corporate leverage is currently higher than during any of the prior episodes in our study. It follows that the recovery rate will be very low, perhaps on the order of 20%-25%. Turning back to Table 2, we see that our default and recovery rate assumptions imply a Default-Adjusted Spread somewhere between -119 bps and +96 bps. This is too low to be considered a buying opportunity. A Default-Adjusted Spread above its historical average of 250 bps is an obvious buying opportunity, while a spread above 400 bps virtually guarantees strong returns. Table 4 flips this analysis around and shows the option-adjusted-spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index that would generate a Default-Adjusted Spread of 250 bps based on different assumptions for the default and recovery rates. Recall that we consider a Default-Adjusted Spread of 250 bps or above as a buying opportunity. Using the aforementioned default and recovery rate assumptions, we would see a buying opportunity in high-yield if the average index spread rose to a range of 1075 bps – 1290 bps, or above. As of Friday’s close, the index option-adjusted spread was 921 bps. Table 4High-Yield Index Spread (BPs) That Would Imply A Buying Opportunity* In Different Default Loss Scenarios Bottom Line: High-yield spreads do not discount the full extent of the looming default cycle and will not benefit from the Fed’s asset purchase programs. Investors should stay cautious on high-yield for now and look to increase allocations when the average index spread moves into a range of 1075 bps to 1290 bps. Which High-Yield Sectors Are Most Exposed? Even during a period of large-scale defaults, sector and firm selection are vital in the high-yield bond market. In fact, you could argue that sector selection becomes even more important during a default cycle, as some sectors bear the brunt of default losses while others skate through relatively unscathed. To wit, Chart 8plots the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate alongside a diffusion index that shows the percentage of 30 high-yield industry groups – as defined by Moody’s Investors Service – that have a trailing 12-month default rate above 4%. Even at the peaks of the default cycles during the last two recessions, only 47% and 63% of industry groups experienced significant default waves. Chart 8Sector Selection Is Vital In A Default Cycle To help identify which sectors are most at risk during the current default cycle, we consider how the 10 main high-yield industry groups, as defined by Bloomberg Barclays, stack up on three crucial credit metrics: The share of firms rated Caa Growth in par value of debt outstanding since the last recession Change in the median firm’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio since the last recession8 Charts A1-A10 in the Appendix show how the three credit metrics for each industry group have evolved over time. In the remainder of this report we compare the sectors against each other across each of the above three dimensions. Note that Box 1 provides a legend for the sector name abbreviations used in Charts 9, 10 and 11. Box 1Sector Abbreviations Chart 9OAS Versus Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Chart 10OAS Versus Debt Growth   Chart 11OAS Versus Net Debt-To-EBITDA Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Even during a large default cycle the bulk of default losses will be borne by firms rated Caa and below. In Chart 9, we see that if we ignore the outlying Technology, Transportation and Energy sectors, there is a fairly linear relationship between credit spreads and the share of firms rated Caa in each sector. Transportation and Energy currently trade at very wide spreads because those sectors’ revenues are heavily impacted by the current crisis. Technology spreads remain low because, despite the high percentage of Caa-rated debt, the sector has one of the lower net debt-to-EBITDA ratios (see Chart A6). All in all, Chart 9 suggests that Capital Goods, Communications, Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Noncyclicals all carry a large proportion of low-rated debt. In contrast, Financials and Utilities appear much safer. Debt Growth Another good way to assess which sectors are most likely to experience defaults is to look at which sectors added the most debt during the economic recovery (Chart 10). On that note, the rapid levering-up of the Energy sector clearly sticks out. Beyond that, Capital Goods, Consumer Noncyclicals and Technology also added significant amounts of debt during the recovery. In contrast, the Utilities sector actually reduced its debt load. Change In Net Debt-to-EBITDA Finally, it’s important to note that simply adding debt does not necessarily put a sector at greater risk of default if earnings are rising even more quickly. For this reason we also look at recent trends in net debt-to-EBITDA (Chart 11). Here, we see that wide spreads in Energy and Transportation are justified by large increases in net debt-to-EBITDA. Conversely, Financials and Communications have seen improvement. Bottom Line: Based on a survey of three important credit metrics: The Energy, Transportation, Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclical and Consumer Noncyclical sectors are all highly exposed to the looming default cycle. In contrast, Financials and Utilities look like the best places to hide out. Appendix Chart A1Basic Industry Credit Metrics Chart A2Capital Goods Credit Metrics Chart A3Consumer Cyclical Credit Metrics Chart A4Consumer Non-Cyclical Credit Metrics Chart A5Energy Credit Metrics Chart A6Technology Credit Metrics Chart A7Transportation Credit Metrics Chart A8Communications Credit Metrics Chart A9Utilities Credit Metrics Chart A10Financial Institutions Credit Metrics     Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes  1 The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan created a lot of short-term credit spread volatility, but even then, shorter-maturity bonds saw less spread widening than the overall index. 2 https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/18-E-04.pdf 3  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2017/q3/corporate-bond-purchase-scheme-design-operation-and-impact 4 The ECB described this effect in a 2018 report that can be accessed here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb/ebart201803_02.en.pdf 5  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-26/s-p-moody-s-cut-credit-grades-at-fastest-pace-since-2008-crisis 6 Calculations are based on the index spread as of market close on Friday March 27. 7 For more details on BCA’s assessment of the economic outlook please see Global Investment Strategy Second Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook, “World War V”, dated March 27, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 8 Median net debt-to-EBITDA is calculated from our bottom-up sample of high-yield firms that consists of all the firms in the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index for which data are available. Data are retrieved on a quarterly basis and the sample is adjusted once per year based on changes in the composition of the Barclays indexes. As of Q2 2019, this sample includes 354 companies.

Dear client, Next Monday instead of sending you a Weekly Report we will be hosting a live webcast at 10am EST, addressing the recent market moves and discussing the US equity market outlook.  Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy The passing of the mega fiscal package, turning equity market internals, the collapse in net earnings revisions all underscore that we may have already seen the recessionary equity market lows. Investors with higher risk tolerance and a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon will be handsomely rewarded. Firming operating metrics, the defensive nature of tech services at a time when macro data are about to nosedive, compel us to boost the S&P data processing index to overweight. Grim macro data, the rising threat of a debt deflation spiral, poor operating metrics and lofty valuations, all warn that the path of least resistance is lower for REITs. Recent Changes Boost the S&P data processing index to overweight today. Last week we obeyed our rolling stops in our cyclically underweight position in the S&P homebuilders index and cyclically overweight positions in the S&P hypermarkets and S&P household products indexes for gains of 41%, 26% and 5%, respectively.1 Feature The SPX had a streak of three green days last week as congress finally passed a $2tn fiscal easing bill. In fact the last time the S&P 500 had two consecutive green days was right before its February 19 peak. Our view remains that the risk/reward tradeoff for owning equities is favorable for investors with higher risk tolerance and a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon, as we highlighted last Monday in our “20 reasons to start buying equities” part of our Weekly Report.2 As a reminder, during the Great Recession, equities troughed 20 days after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 took effect on February 17, 2009. Thus if history rhymes, an equity market bottom is likely near if not already behind us.  Does this mean the SPX has definitively troughed? Not necessarily, but our playbook/roadmap calls for a retest and hold of the recent lows as we have been highlighting in recent research.3 Keep in mind that S&P 500 futures (ES) have fallen over 36% from peak to trough. This is similar to the median fall during recession bear markets dating back to the Great Depression. Most importantly, comparing the two most recent iterations is instructive in attempting to figure out what is baked in the cake. Namely, in the 9/11 catalyzed recession and subprime mortgage collapse catalyzed recession, EPS got halved. Similarly, equities fell 50% from their respective peaks. If we use that assumption – i.e. a recessionary equity bear market fall predicts the eventual profit drubbing – then what the ES futures clocking in at 2174 discounted is that trailing EPS will fall from $162 to $104 and forward EPS from $177 to $113 (Chart 1). Chart 1Joined At The Hip While we have no real visibility on EPS, our sense is that we will not fall further than what was already discounted in the broad market. If we are offside and a GFC or Great Depression ensues, then profits will get halved to $81 and the SPX will fall to 1700. Another simple way of looking at the EPS drawdown is by considering $162 as trend EPS. Then for every month that the economy is shut down roughly $13.5 get shaved off EPS. Thus, triangulating both approaches, a $104 EPS level has discounted a shutdown lasting 4 months and 10 days. This is a tall order and we would lean against such extreme pessimism. Meanwhile, analysts are scrambling to cut estimates the world over. Not only SPX net earnings revisions (NER) are at the lowest point since the GFC, but so is the emerging market NER ratio. The Eurozone and Japan are following close behind (Chart 2). Once again the speed of this downward adjustment suggests that a lot of bad news is already priced in now depressed NER. Chart 2Bad News Is Priced In Chart 3Market Internals Ticking Higher Moreover, equity market internals underscore that we may have already seen the recessionary equity market lows. Chart 3 shows that hypersensitive small caps have been outperforming their large cap peers of late, chip stocks are sniffing out a reflationary impulse and even emerging markets are besting the SPX. Finally, the best China proxy out there, the Aussie dollar, corroborates the bullish signal from all these indicators and suggests that this mini “risk-on” phase can last a while longer (third panel, Chart 3). Nevertheless, the spike in the TED spread (Treasury-EuroDollar spread, gauging default risk on interbank loans) was quite unnerving last week. While we have shown in the past that equity volatility and credit risk are joined at the hip, this parabolic move in the, up to very recently calm, TED spread disquieted us. We will keep on monitoring it closely as the coronavirus pandemic continues to unfold (Chart 4). Chart 4Disquieting Another significant risk that this crisis has exposed is the massive non-financial business debt uptake that has taken root during the ten-year expansion (top panel, Chart 5). We deem investors will be more mindful of debt saddled companies going forward, despite the government’s sizable looming bailout of select severely affected industries from the coronavirus pandemic. Stock market reported data also corroborate the national accounts’ debt deterioration data (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 5Watch The Debt Burden… The yield curve has already forewarned that a significant default cycle is looming (Chart 6) and this time is not different. Chart 6…A Default Cycle Looms Importantly, both the equity and bond markets have been sending these debt distress signals for quite some time now (Chart 7). Chart 7Distress Signals Sent A long Time Ago What interest us most from a US equity sector perspective is identifying weak spots that may come under intense pressure in the coming weeks as the economy remains shut down likely until Easter Sunday. Chart 8 shows the current level of net debt-to-EBITDA for the overall non-financial equity market, and the 10 GICS1 sectors (we use telecom services instead of communications services and exclude financials). In more detail, the bar represents the 25 year range of net debt-to EBITDA and the vertical line the current reading for each sector (Appendix 1 below showcases the net debt-to-EBITDA time series for the GICS1 sectors). Chart 8Mind The… Chart 9 goes a step further and juxtaposes EV/EBITDA with net debt-to EBITDA on a two dimensional map. Real estate and utilities clearly stand out as the most debt burdened sectors, with a pricey valuation (For completion purposes Appendix 2 below delves deeper into sectors and shows net debt-to-EBITDA for the GICS2 sectors). Chart 9…Outliers Frequent US Equity Strategy readers know that we believe the excesses this cycle have been in the commercial real estate (CRE) segment of the economy, where prices are one standard deviation above the previous peak and cap rates have collapsed to all-time lows fueled by an unprecedented credit binge (Chart 10). This week we reiterate our underweight stance in the S&P real estate sector and boost a defensive tech services index to an overweight stance. Chart 10CRE: The Epitome This Cycle’s Excesses Reality Bites We continue to recommend investors avoid the S&P real estate sector. For investors seeking defensive protection we would recommend hiding in the S&P health care sector instead, as we highlighted in our mid-March report.4 Chart 11 shows a disturbing breakdown in the inverse correlation between the relative share price ratio and the 10-year Treasury yield. While it makes intuitive sense that this fixed income proxy sector (i.e. high dividend yielding) should move in the opposite direction of the competing risk free yielding asset, at times of tumult this correlation reverts to positive (top panel, Chart 11). In other words, fear grips investors and they frantically shed REITs despite the fact that interest rates collapse. Why? Because these are highly illiquid assets that these REITs are holding and investors demand the “return of” their capital instead of a “return on” their capital when volatility and credit risk soar in tandem (see TED spread, Chart 4). While CRE prices remain extended and vulnerable to a deflationary shock (bottom panel, Chart 11), there is no real price discovery currently as no landlord would dare put any properties for sale in this market starved for liquidity. With the exception of distressed sales, we deem that the “mark to model” mantra will make a comeback, eerily reminiscent of the GFC. Using an example of how all this may play out in the near-term is instructive. As the economy remains shut down, a tenant may forego a rent payment to a landlord and if the landlord is levered and starved of cash, he/she in turn may miss a debt payment to the outfit that holds his mortgage, typically a bank. Chart 11BreakdownAt first sight this may not seem as a big problem on a micro level as the bank may have enough liquidity to withstand a delinquent borrower’s no/late payment. If, however, the bank is itself scrambling for cash, it will foreclose and then put this asset for sale in order to recover some capital. This will put downward pressure on the underlying asset’s price that all borrowing was based upon and a debt deflation spiral ensues (Chart 12). Chart 12Debt Deflation Warning The biggest problem however arises from the bond market. If these deflating assets are all in a CLO or concentrated in a select REIT, then our current financial system setup is not really equipped to handle a failure/delay of payment. This is especially true if some bond holders have hedged their bets and bought CDS on these bonds and demand payment as a “default clause” will in practice get triggered.  The longer the economy remains shut down, the higher the credit, counterparty and default risks will rise. Therefore, given that the real estate sector has an extremely high reading on a net debt-to-EBITDA basis (Chart 8), we are concerned about the profit prospects of this niche sector in the coming months. Moreover, the economy is in recession and the recent Markit services PMI is a precursor of grim data to follow. Historically, REITs move in the opposite direction to the PMI services survey and the current message is to expect a catch down phase in the former (Chart 13). Adding insult to injury, the supply response especially on the multi-family construction side is perturbing. In fact, multi-family housing starts have gone parabolic hitting 619K recently, the highest reading since 1986! Such a jump in supply is deflationary and will weigh on the relative share price ratio (multi-family starts shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Tiiimber Finally, lofty valuations warn that if our bearish thesis pans out in the coming months, there is no cushion left to absorb a significant profit shock that likely looms (Chart 14). Chart 14No Valuation Cushion In sum, grim macro data, the rising threat of a debt deflation spiral, poor operating metrics and lofty valuations, all warn that the path of least resistance is lower for REITs.   Bottom Line: Shy away from the S&P real estate sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RLST – CCI, AMT,  PLD, EQIX, DLR, PSA, SBAC, AVB, EQR, FRT, SPG, WELL, ARE, CBRE, O, BXP, ESS, EXR, DRE, PEAK, HST, MAA, UDR, VTR, WY, AIV, IRM, PEG, VNO, SLG. Boost Data Processing To Overweight We have been offside on the data processing tech sub-index and today we are booking losses of 39% and boosting exposure to overweight. Data processing stocks are a services-based defensive tech index that typically thrive in deflationary and recessionary environments, according to empirical evidence (Chart 15). We are currently in recession, thus a deflationary impulse will grip the economy and investors will flock to defensive tech stocks when growth is scarce. Tack on the spike in the greenback, and the disinflationary backdrop further boosts the allure of these tech services stocks (third panel, Chart 15). Beyond the recessionary related tailwinds, data processing stocks should also enjoy firming relative demand. While the two bellwether stocks, V and MA, will suffer from the decrease in consumption that requires physical visits and from select services outlays that are severely affected by the coronavirus, online spending by households and corporations should at least serve as a partial offset. Chart 15Time To Buy Defensive Tech Chart 16What’s not To Like? Already, industry pricing power gains have been accelerating at a time when overall inflation has been tame. This will boost revenues – and given high operating leverage and high and rising profit margins – that will flow straight through to profits (Chart 16). While relative profit growth and sales estimates may appear uncharacteristically high and unrealistic to attain, this is what usually transpires in recessions: sell side analysts trim SPX profit and revenue forecasts more aggressively than they do for the defensive data processing index (Chart 17). In fact, given that we are still in the early stages of recession, we expect a further surge in relative EPS and sales estimates in the coming months. Chart 17Seeking Growth When Growth Is Scarce Chart 18Risk: Lofty Valuations However, there is a key risk to our bullish stance in this tech service index: valuations. Relative valuations are still pricey despite the recent fall from three standard deviations above the historical mean to half that, according to our relative valuation indicator. Technicals have also corrected from an extremely overbought reading, but a cleansing washout has yet to occur (Chart 18). Netting it all out, firming operating metrics and the defensive nature of tech services at a time when macro data are about to nosedive, compel us to boost the S&P data processing index to overweight.   Bottom Line: Boost the S&P data processing index to overweight today from previously underweight for a loss of 39% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5DPOS – ADP, V, MA, PYPL, FIS, FISV, GPN, PAYX, FLT, BR, JKHY, WU, ADS.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1 Chart A1Appendix A1 Chart A2Appendix A2   Appendix 2 Chart A3Chart A4 Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Housekeeping” dated March 26, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Darkest Hour Is Just Before The Dawn” dated March 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Gravitational Pull” dated March 12, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Inflection Point” dated March 16, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth May 10, 2018 Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA  Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights The global economy is in the midst of a painful recession. Monetary and fiscal authorities are responding forcefully to the crisis, but the lengths of the lockouts and quarantines remain a major source of downside risk to the economy. Investors should favor stocks over bonds during the next year. The short-term outlook remains fraught with danger, so avoid aggressive bets. Central banks can tackle the global liquidity crunch, thus spreads will narrow and the dollar will weaken. The long-term impact of COVID-19 will be inflationary. Feature “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”    Franklin Delano Roosevelt  1932 A violent global recession is underway. Last month, we wrote that a deep economic slump would be unavoidable if COVID-19 cases could not be controlled within two to three weeks.1 Since then, the number of new, recorded COVID-19 cases has mounted every day and fear prevails. Consumers are not spending; firms will face a cash crunch and/or bankruptcy, and employment will be slashed. The next few quarters could result in some of the worst GDP prints since the Great Depression. Risk assets have moved to discount this dire scenario. The global stock-to-bond ratio has collapsed by 47% since its peak on January 17th and stands at the 1st decile of it post-1980 distribution. 10-year US bond yields temporarily fell below 0.4%. The dollar has rallied against every currency and even gold traded below $1500 an ounce. Brent crude trades below $30/bbl. In this context, investors must assess if risk asset prices have declined enough to compensate for the economic hazards created by the COVID-19 pandemic. If the massive amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus announced can turn around the economy in the second half of the year, then stocks and risk assets are attractive. Otherwise, they are still not cheap enough and cash remains king. We think it is a good time to begin to parsimoniously deploy capital into risk assets. A Global Recession And An Extraordinary Response The global economy has suffered its worst shock since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), but policymakers are deploying every tool available. In our base case, GDP will contract more quickly for two quarters than it did during the GFC, and then will recover smartly. It is hard to pinpoint exactly how quickly global GDP will contract in the next six months, but key indicators point to a grim outcome. Chart I-1Global Growth Is Plunging China’s economy was at the forefront of the COVID-19 pandemic and its trajectory provides a glimpse into what the rest of the world should anticipate. In February, Chinese retail sales contracted by 20.5% annually and industrial production plunged by 13.5%. The German ZEW survey for March paints an equally bleak picture. The growth expectations component for the Eurozone and Germany fell to its lowest level since the GFC. The same indicator, but computed as an average of US, European and Asian subcomponents is also collapsing at an alarming pace (Chart I-1). The European flash PMI for March also points to a deep slowdown, with the services PMI plunging to 28.4, an all-time low. The performance of EM carry trades flashes a somber warning for our Global Industrial Production Nowcast (Chart I-2). Carry trade returns are imploding because global liquidity is incapable of meeting the demand for precautionary money by economic agents. This lack of liquidity is inflicting enormous damage on worldwide growth. Live trackers for US and global economic activity are also melting down. Traffic in some of the US’s largest cities is a fraction of last year's (Chart I-3). Globally, restaurant bookings have dried up and fewer airlines are flying compared to 2008. Initial jobless claims in the US have surged to 3.28 million, rapidly and decisively overtaking the weaknesses seen during the GFC. Chart I-2The Liquidation Of Carry Trade Is A Bad Omen Chart I-3Live Trackers Are In Free Fall   Despite the dismal situation, some positive developments are emerging. It has been demonstrated that quarantines contain the spread of the virus. On March 18th, Wuhan recorded no new COVID-19 cases. Moreover, 10 days after its January 24th quarantine began, new cases started to fall off quickly (Chart I-4) in the city. If the recent softening in new cases in Italy’s Lombardy region continues, it will illustrate that democratic regimes can also reduce the pace of infection. Chart I-4Quarantines Do Work Most importantly, policymakers around the world have shown their willingness to do “whatever it takes.” Governments are easing fiscal policy with abandon. Germany’s state bank KfW is setting aside EUR550 billion to support the economy. France will spend EUR45 billion and has earmarked EUR300 billion in small business loan guarantees. Spain announced EUR200 billion to protect domestic activity. The White House just passed a stimulus package of $2 trillion, and Canada follows suit with a CAD82 billion relief bill. (Table I-1). As A. Walter and J. Chwieroth showed, the growing financial wealth of the middle class is forcing governments to always provide large bailouts after financial crises and recessions. Otherwise, their political parties suffer extreme repudiation from power.2 Table I-1Massive Stimulus In Response To Pandemic Central bankers have also become extreme reflators. Nearly every central bank in advanced economies has cut interest rates to zero or into negative territory. Most importantly, central banks have become lenders of last resort. The US Federal Reserve has announced it will engage in unlimited asset purchases; it has reopened various facilities to provide liquidity to the market and is using the US Department of the Treasury to lend directly to the private sector. Among its many measures, the European Central Bank is scrapping artificial limits on its bond purchases that were its capital keys and has offered a EUR750 billion bond purchase program. The ECB is also looking to open its OMT program. Other central banks are injecting cash directly into their domestic markets (Table I-2). The list and size of actions will expand until the markets are satiated with enough liquidity. Table I-2The Central Banks Still Had Some Options When Crisis Hit The impact of these policy measures is threefold. First, the actions are designed to alleviate the global economy’s cash crunch. Secondly, they aim to support growth directly. The private sector needs direct backing to survive the lack of cash inflows that will develop in the coming weeks. If fiscal and monetary authorities can plug that hole, then spending will not have to collapse as deeply nor for as long as would otherwise be the case. Finally, it is imperative that policymakers boost confidence and ease financial conditions to allow “animal spirits” to stabilize. If risk-taking continues to tailspin, then spending will never recover and the demand for cash will only grow, creating the worst liquidity trap since the Great Depression. Policymakers around the world have shown their willingness to do “whatever it takes.” The economy will continue to weaken in the second half of 2020 if quarantines remain in place beyond the summer. Not being epidemiologists, we are not equipped to make this call with any degree of certainty. Much depends on the evolution of the disease and the political decisions taken. We do not yet know if the population will be willing to endure the economic pain of a depression, or if political pressures will rise to force isolation on those over age 60 and those suffering dangerous comorbidities who are at higher risk, and allow everyone else to return to work and school.3 Investment Implications Part 1: Bonds and Stocks Chart I-5The Stock-To-Bond Ratio Has Capitulated While the short-term outlook remains murky for asset markets, investors with a 12-month or longer investment horizon should begin to move capital into equities at the expense of bonds. Beyond the relative technical and valuation backdrops (Chart I-5), the outlook for fiscal and monetary policy favors this allocation decision. US Treasury yields have dropped from 1.9% at the turn of the year to as low as 0.31% on March 9th. According to the bond market, inflation will average less than 1% during the coming 10 years. The OIS curve is pricing in a fed funds rate of only 68 basis points in five years. In response to this extreme pricing, Treasury bonds are exceptionally expensive (Chart I-6). Moreover, using BCA Research’s Golden Rule of Treasury Investing, there is little scope for yields to fall any lower. The Golden Rule states that the return of Treasury bonds is directly linked to the Fed's rate surprises. If over the next year the Fed cuts interest rates more than is currently priced into the OIS curve, then bond yields will fall in the next 12 months (Chart I-7). Given that the fed funds rate is already at its lower limit, the Fed will not be able to deliver such a dovish surprise and yields will have limited downside. Chart I-6Bonds Are Furiously Expensive Chart I-7The Fed Cannot Pull Another Dovish Surprise Out Of Its Hat   The bond market is also vulnerable from a technical perspective. Our Composite Technical Indicator is as overbought today as it was in December 2008 (Chart I-8). Thus, bond prices are vulnerable to good news. Economic activity will be weak for many months, but the recent policy announcements will boost global fiscal deficits by more than $3 trillion in the next 12 to 18 months. Such a large supply of paper is bearish for bonds, especially when they are very expensive. Moreover, global central banks are engaging in large-scale quantitative easing (QE). Globally, monetary authorities have already announced the equivalent of at least $1.9 trillion in asset purchases. The GFC experience showed that QE programs put upward pressure on Treasury yields (Chart I-9). This time will not be different given the combination of QE, supply disruptions caused by quarantines and large fiscal stimulus. Chart I-8A Dire Combination For Bonds Chart I-9QE Pushes Yields Up     Equities offer the opposite risk/reward ratio to bonds. Technical indicators are consistent with maximum pessimism toward equities and imply that most of the selloff is behind us, at least for the time being. The Complacency-Anxiety Indicator developed by BCA Research’s US Equity Strategy service points to widespread pessimism among investors,4 an intuition confirmed by our Sentiment indicator (Chart I-10). Moreover, our Equity Capitulation Index is as depressed as in March 2009. Investors with a 12-month or longer investment horizon should begin to move capital into equities at the expense of bonds. Despite the magnitude of the shock hitting the global economy, equities will rally if they become cheap enough and monetary conditions are accommodative enough. The BCA Valuation indicator has collapsed to “undervalued” territory and our Monetary Indicator has never been more supportive of equities (both variables are shown on page 2 of Section III). The gap between these two indicators is at its lowest level since Q1 2009 or 1982, two points that marked the end of bear markets (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Equities Have Capitulated Chart I-11Supportive Combined Valuation And Monetary Backdrop For Equities   Equity multiples also offer some insight into the risk/reward ratio for stocks. The S&P 500 has collapsed by 34% since its February 19th peak and trades at 13 times forward earnings. True, analysts will revise their forecasts, but the market also only trades at 14 times trailing earnings, which cannot be downgraded. Most importantly, investors are extremely gloomy about expected growth when multiples and risk-free rates are so subdued. Risk assets cannot stabilize durably as long as the demand for dollar liquidity is not satiated. Table I-3Evaluating Where The Floor Lies We can use a simple discounted cash flow model to extract the expected growth rate of long-term earnings embedded in the S&P 500. To do so, we assume that the ERP is 300 basis points, close to the long-term outperformance of stocks versus bonds. At current multiples and 10-year yields, investors are pricing in a long-term growth rate of -2% annually for earnings (Table I-3). In comparison, investors were more pessimistic in 1974, 2008 and 2011 when they anticipated long-term earnings contractions of -2.5% annually. If we assume that the long-term growth of expected earnings will fall to that depth, then we can estimate trailing P/E multiples will be under different risk-free rates. If yields fall to zero, then the P/E would be 17.7 or a price level of 2,692; however, if they rise to 1.5%, then the P/E would decline to 13.9 or a price level of 2,115 (Table I-3). Chart I-12Expected Earnings Growth And Interest Rates Are Co-Integrated This method suggests that 2200 is the S&P 500’s likely floor. Risk-free rates and the expected growth rate of long-term earnings are correlated series because the anticipated evolution of economic activity drives both real interest rates and earnings (Chart I-12). Thus, it is unlikely that yields will climb if expected earnings growth falls. Instead, if the expected growth rate of long-term earnings drops to -2.5%, then yields should stand between 1% and 0.5%, implying equilibrium trailing P/Es of 15 to 16.3 times, or prices levels of 2,278 to 2,468. P/E will only fall much further if the dollar scramble lasts longer. As investors seek cash and liquidate all assets, the process can push anticipated growth rates lower while pulling bond yields higher (see next section).   Investment Implications Part 2: The Uncontrolled Liquidity Crunch Is Still An Immediate Risk Risk assets cannot stabilize durably as long as the demand for dollar liquidity is not satiated. The large programs announced around the world seem to be calming this liquidity crunch. However, the situation is fluid and the crunch can come back at a moment's notice. Despite the magnitude of the shock hitting the global economy, equities will rally if they become cheap enough and monetary conditions are accommodative enough. Credit spreads blew up as investors priced in the inevitable increase in defaults that accompanies recessions (Chart I-13). Junk spreads moved to as high as 1100 basis points, their highest level since 2009. If we assume that next year, US EBITDA contracts by its average post-war magnitude (a timid assumption), then the interest coverage ratio will deteriorate to readings not seen since the S&L crisis, which will force default rates higher (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Defaults Will Rise Chart I-14Corporate Fundamentals Will Deteriorate     The anticipated contraction in cash flows creates another more pernicious and dangerous consequence: an insatiable demand for dollar liquidity by the private sector. Companies are worried they may not generate the necessary cash flows to service their debt. This is especially worrisome for foreign borrowers who have loans in US dollars. The BIS estimates that foreign currency debt denominated in USDs stands at $12 trillion. Meanwhile, these foreign borrowers are hoarding dollars. The risk aversion of US-based companies is accentuating the dollar crunch. US companies have pulled on their credit lines en masse. US commercial banks must provide this cash to their clients. However, US banks must still meet liquidity requirements imposed by the Basel III rules. As a result, the banks are also hoarding as much cash as possible in the form of excess reserves and curtailed their capital market lending, especially in the repo market. Repos are the lifeblood of capital markets and without repos, market liquidity (the ability to sell and buy securities) quickly deteriorates. This chain of events has caused a sharp widening in Treasury bid-ask spreads, LIBOR-OIS spreads and commercial paper-T-Bill spreads, and has fueled weaknesses in mortgage and municipal bond markets (Chart I-15). The evaporation of the repo market accentuates the foreign liquidity crunch. Without functioning repo markets, dollar funding in offshore markets becomes more onerous, as highlighted by the widening in global cross-currency basis swap spreads (Chart I-16). Borrowers are buying dollars at any cost. This has led to the surge in the dollar from March 9th, which forced the collapse of risky currencies such as the NOK, the BRL or the MXN, but also of safe-haven currencies such as the JPY and the CHF. Chart I-15Symptoms Of A Liquidity Crunch Chart I-16Offshore Funding Pressures Point To A Dollar Shortage   The strength in the dollar is problematic. As a symptom of the liquidity crunch, it accompanies forced selling of assets by investors seeking to acquire cash. Moreover, the USD is a funding currency, hence a strong dollar also tightens the global cost of capital for all foreign borrowers who have tapped into US capital markets. For US firms, it also accentuates deflationary pressures and the resulting lower price of goods sold increases the risk of bankruptcies. Thus, a strong dollar would feed the weakness in asset prices and further widen credit spreads. Moreover, because the liquidity crunch hurts growth and can concurrently push yields higher, it could pull P/Es below 15 and drive equity prices far below our 2,200 floor. On the positive side, central banks worldwide are keenly aware of the danger created by the liquidity crunch. The Fed has started and restarted a long list of liquidity facilities (Table I-2). Its unlimited QE program also addresses the dollar shortage directly by expanding the supply of money. Crucially, the Fed has re-opened dollar swap lines with other central banks, including emerging markets such as Korea, Singapore, Mexico and Brazil. Even the ECB and the Bank of England are relaxing liquidity ratios for their banks, which at the margin will alleviate the supply of liquidity in their domestic economies. The Fed will likely follow its European counterparts, which could play a large role in alleviating the global dollar shortage. Investors seeking to assess if the supply of liquidity is large enough should pay close attention to gold prices. The global, large-scale fiscal stimulus programs will also address the dollar liquidity crisis. When investors judge there is sufficient fiscal stimulus to put a floor under global economic activity, the markets will take a more sanguine view of the risk of default. If large enough, government spending will support corporate cash flows and, therefore, limit corporate bankruptcies. Consequently, demand for liquidity will also decline and mass asset liquidations will ebb. Chart I-17Gold Is The Ultimate Liquidity Gauge Investors seeking to assess if the supply of liquidity is large enough should look for some key market signals. We pay close attention to gold prices; after March 9th they fell despite the global spike in risk aversion due to gold's extreme sensitivity to global liquidity conditions. Both today and in the fall of 2008, gold prices fell when illiquidity grew. Our gold fair-value model shows that the precious metal is extremely sensitive to inflation expectations and real bond yields (Chart I-17). As illiquidity grows and the dollar appreciates, inflation breakevens collapse and real yields spike. Thus, the recent gold rebound suggests that the Fed and other major central banks have expanded the supply of liquidity sufficiently to meet demand, the price of money will fall (real interest rates) and inflation expectations will rebound. Monitor whether gold can remain well bid. Investment Implications Part 3: FX And Commodity Markets Chart I-18China's Stimulus Will Once Again Be Paramount China’s stimulus will be a key driver of the FX market in the post-liquidity-crunch world. Historically, because Chinese reflation has lifted the global manufacturing cycle, it possesses a large influence on the dollar’s trend (Chart I-18). We believe that China’s stimulus will be comparable to the one implemented in 2008 and will boost global growth. Moreover, the interest rate advantage of the US has declined and global macro volatility will not remain at current extremes for an extended time. These three factors (Chinese stimulus, lower interest rate differentials and declining volatility) will weigh on the USD in the coming 18 months (Chart I-18, bottom panel). EM currencies and the AUD will benefit most from the dollar depreciation later this year. In the short term, these currencies remain exposed to any flare up in the liquidity crunch and can cheapen further. But, as Chart I-19 highlights, investing in those currencies will likely generate long-term excess returns because they have cheapened significantly. Commodities, too, are becoming attractive at current valuations. Industrial metals such as copper will benefit greatly from China’s stimulus. A rising Chinese credit and fiscal impulse lifts the price of base metals because it pushes up Chinese infrastructure spending as well as residential and capex investment (Chart I-20). Moreover, a lower dollar and accommodative global monetary policy will further boost the appeal of industrial metals. Chart I-19EM FX Is Cheap Chart I-20China Will Drive Metal Prices Higher China’s stimulus will be a key driver of the FX market in the post-liquidity-crunch world. The oil outlook is particularly unclear as both demand and supply factors are in flux. At $27/bbl, Brent is cheap enough to compensate investors for the decline in demand that will emerge between now and the end of the second quarter. However, the market-share war between Saudi Arabia and Russia layers on the problem of supply risk. Saudi Aramco is set to increase production to 12.3 million barrels by April and Saudi’s GCC allies have announced they are increasing output as well. According to BCA Research’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service, the oil market is already oversupplied by 1.6 million barrels per day, a number that will expand if the KSA and its allies fulfill their production pledges. If this situation persists, oil will lag behind industrial metals when global risk aversion recedes. Nonetheless, our commodity strategists believe that the collapse in oil prices is more painful for Russia than for KSA. We believe there will be a compromise between OPEC and Russia in the coming weeks that will push supply lower.5 Additionally, the Texas Railroad Commission is preparing to impose limitations on Texas oil production, which has not been done since the 1970s. Such a decision would magnify any rebound in oil prices. Thinking Long-Term: The Return Of Stagflation? The COVID-19 outbreak will likely be viewed as an epoch-defining moment. The policy response to the outbreak will be far reaching and the disease will change the way firms manage supply chains for decades to come. There will be a substantial pullback in globalization. COVID-19 has generated an inflationary shock in the medium term. Chart I-21War Spending Is Always Inflationary COVID-19 has generated an inflationary shock in the medium term. Governments have suddenly abandoned their preferences for fiscal rectitude. The US deficit will reach a peacetime record of 15% of GDP. These are war-like spending measures. In history, gold standard or not, wars were the main reason for inflationary outbreaks as they involved massive budgetary expansions (Chart I-21). The large monetary easing accompanying the current fiscal expansion will only add to this inflationary impulse. Many of the proposals discussed by governments involve funneling cash directly to households, while central banks buy bonds issued by the same government. This is very close to helicopter money. These policies will increase the velocity of money, which is structurally inflationary (Chart I-22). Naysayers may point to the lack of inflation created by QE programs in the direct aftermath of the GFC. However, at that time, households and commercial banks were much sicker. Today, capital ratios in the US and the Eurozone are 60% and 33% higher than in 2007, respectively (Chart I-23). Thus, banks are much more likely to add to money creation instead of retracting from it as they did in the last cycle. Chart I-22If Velocity Rises, So Will Inflation Chart I-23Banks Are Much Healthier Than In 2008   Chart I-24Financial Assets Have No Inflation Cushion Markets are not ready for higher inflation. The 5-year/5-year forward CPI swaps in the US and the euro area stand at only 1.6% and 0.7%, respectively. Household long-term inflation expectations are also at all-time lows (Chart I-24). Therefore, an increase in inflation will have a deep impact on asset prices. The first implication is that gold prices have probably begun a new structural bull market. Inflation will surprise on the upside and keep real interest rates lower. Both these factors are highly bullish for the yellow metal. Additionally, easy fiscal policy and money printing will devalue currencies versus hard assets, which will benefit all precious metals, including gold. EM central banks have recently been diversifying aggressively in gold, which will add another impetuous to its rally. The second implication is that the stock-to-bond ratio has structural upside. Equities are not a perfect inflation hedge, but their profits can rise when selling prices accelerate. However, bonds display rock bottom real yields, inflation protection and term premia. Moreover, their low-running yields are below the dividend yields of equities, which has also boosted bond duration to record levels. Therefore, bonds offer even less protection against higher inflation. Hence, the stock-to-bond ratio will probably follow the historical experience of the 20th century structural bull market and inflect higher (Chart I-25). However, this outperformance will not stem from the superior performance of stocks in real terms; rather, it will emerge from a very poor performance by bonds. Chart I-25The Stock-To-Bond Ratio Will Follow The 20th Century Road Map Thirdly, the structural relative bear market in EM equities will likely end soon. EM equities will enjoy strong real asset prices and EM assets have much more appealing valuations than DM stocks. This is an imbedded inflation protection. The world is witnessing a fiscal and monetary push that will result in lower productivity growth and profit margins, along with feared inflation. The next decade could increasingly look like the stagflationary 1970s. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 26, 2020 Next Report: April 30, 2020   II. Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to the only available real time estimate of the real neutral rate of interest: the Laubach & Williams (“LW”) “R-star” estimate. With this apparent visualization of secular stagnation as a guide, many investors have concluded that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative last year and that recent Fed rate cuts will be of limited benefit to economic activity even once economic recovery takes hold unless inflation meaningfully accelerates (thus pushing real rates lower for any given nominal Fed funds rate). This report revisits the “LW” R-star estimate in detail, and demonstrates why the estimation is almost certainly wrong, at least over the past two decades. We also outline an inferential approach that investors can use to monitor where the neutral rate is in real time and whether it is rising or falling. The core conclusion for investors is that US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. While bond yields may not rise significantly in the near-term, investors should avoid dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about yields as they may rise meaningfully over a cyclical and secular horizon once a post-COVID-19 expansion takes hold. Over the past several weeks financial markets have moved rapidly to price in a global recession stemming from the COVID-19 outbreak. As financial market participants began to turn to policy makers for support, eyes focused first on the Federal Reserve, and then fiscal authorities. Earlier this week, the ECB joined the party and announced aggressive further measures of its own. When responding to the Fed’s return to the lower bound and its other recent monetary policy decisions, many market participants have expressed the view that the Fed is largely impotent to deal with a global pandemic. There are three elements to this view. The first is that interest rate cuts are ill equipped to stimulate domestic demand if quarantine measures or other forms of “social distancing” are in effect. The second element is that the Fed has only been capable of delivering a fraction of the reduction in interest rates compared to what has occurred in response to previous contractions. The third aspect of this view is that because the neutral rate of interest is so much lower now than it was in the past, Fed rate cuts will not be as stimulative as they were before. Chart II-1Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative Last Year, According To The LW R-star Estimate While we at least partly agree with the first and second elements of this view, we feel strongly that the third is flawed. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013,6 and have gravitated to the only available real time estimate of the neutral rate of interest: the Laubach & Williams (“LW”) “R-star” estimate. This time series, which is regularly updated by the New York Fed,7 suggests that the real fed funds rate reached neutral territory in the first quarter of 2019 (Chart II-1). With this apparent visualization of secular stagnation as a guide, many investors have concluded that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative last year and that recent Fed rate cuts will be of limited benefit to economic activity even beyond the near term unless inflation meaningfully accelerates (thus pushing real rates lower for any given nominal Fed funds rate). In this Special Report we revisit the “LW” R-star estimate in detail, and demonstrate why the estimation is almost certainly wrong, at least over the past two decades. Our analysis does not reveal a precise alternative estimate of the neutral rate, although we do provide some inferential perspective on how investors may be able to monitor where the neutral rate is in real time and whether it is rising or falling. However, the core insight emanating from our report, particularly for US fixed income investors, is that US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. While bond yields may not rise significantly in the near-term, this underscores that they have the potential to rise meaningfully over a cyclical and secular horizon once economic activity recovers. As such, we caution fixed-income investors against dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about bond yields, as their potential to rise may be larger than many investors currently expect. Demystifying The LW R-star Estimate The LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest has gained credibility for three reasons. First, as noted above, the evolution of the series fits with the secular stagnation narrative re-popularized by Larry Summers. Second, the series is essentially sponsored by the Federal Reserve even if it is not officially part of the Fed’s forecasting framework, as its two creators are long-time Fed employees (Thomas Laubach is a director of the Fed’s Board of Governors, and John Williams is the current President of the New York Fed). But, in our view, there is a third important reason that global investors have accepted the LW R-star estimate of the neutral rate of interest: the methodology used to generate the estimate is extremely technically complex, and thus is difficult for most investors to penetrate. Much of the technical complexity of the LW estimate is centered around the use of a statistical procedure called a Kalman filter (“KF”). Simply described, the KF is an algorithm that tries to estimate an unobservable variable based on 1) an idea of how the unobservable variable might relate to an observable variable (the “measurement equation”), and 2) an idea of how the unobservable variable might change through time (the “transition equation”). Through a repeated process of simulating the unobserved variable based on a set of assumptions, the KF is able to compare predicted results to actual results on an observation-by-observation basis, and use that information to generate ever more reliable future estimates of the unobserved variable (Chart II-2). Chart II-2A Very Simplified Overview Of The Kalman Filter Algorithm We acknowledge that a full technical treatment of the Kalman Filter as it relates to the LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest is beyond the scope of this report, and we provide a more technical overview in Box II-1. But what emerges from a detailed analysis of the model is that the Kalman Filter jointly estimates R-star, potential GDP growth, potential GDP, and the variable “z”, the determinants of R-star that are not explained by potential GDP growth. As we will highlight in the next section, this joint estimation of these four variables is a crucial aspect of the model, because a valid estimate of R-star necessitates a valid estimate of the remaining variables. BOX II-1 A Technical Overview Of The Laubach & Williams R-star Model Chart Box II-1 shows that there are three sets of formulas involved in the LW estimation: the “law of motion” for the neutral rate of interest, two measurement equations, and three transition equations. The law of motion for the neutral rate is fairly simple: R-star is a function of trend real GDP growth, as well as “other factors” represented by the variable “z”. Laubach & Williams note that z “captures factors such as households’ rate of time preference”. The measurement equations are also fairly straightforward. First, the (unobservable) output gap is a function of lagged values of itself as well as the lagged real Fed funds rate gap (relative to the unobservable neutral rate). Second, inflation is a function of lagged values of itself, past values of the output gap, relative core import prices, and lagged relative imported oil prices (the latter two variables are included to capture potential supply shocks to inflation). Note that this second measurement equation is required for the model to work, as it relates the unobservable output gap to observable inflation. As presented in Chart II-2, the three transition equations are present to simulate how the unobservable variables might move through time. Potential growth and potential output are a random walk, and “z” from the law of motion follows either a random walk or an autoregressive process. Chart Box II-1The Laubach & Williams R-star Model Debunking The LW R-star Estimate Before criticizing the LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest, it is important for us to note that we have the utmost respect for the Federal Reserve and its research methods. We fully acknowledge that the LW R-star estimation is rooted in solid economic theory, and we have identified no technical errors in the setup of the LW model. Nevertheless, valid analytical efforts sometimes lead to problematic real-world results, and there are two key reasons to believe that the Kalman filter in the LW model is almost certainly misspecifying R-star, at least in terms of its estimate over the past two decades. The first reason relates to the sensitivity of the model to the interval of estimation (the period over which R-star is estimated). Chart II-3 presents the range of quarterly estimates of R-star since 2005, along with the difference between the high and low end of the range in the second panel. The chart shows that while previous estimates of R-star have generally been stable for values ranging between the early-1980s and 2006/2007, pre-1980 estimates have varied quite substantially and we have seen material revisions to the estimates over the past decade. Q1 2018 serves as an excellent example: in that quarter R-star was estimated to be 0.14%; today, the Q1 2018 R-star estimate sits at 0.92%. Chart II-3Since 2005, There Has Been Some Instability In The LW R-star Estimates However, Table II-1 and Chart II-4 highlight the real instability of the Kalman filter estimation by demonstrating the effect of varying the starting point of the model (please see Box II-2 for a brief description of how our estimation of R-star using the LW approach differs slightly from the original procedure). Laubach & Williams originally estimated R-star beginning in Q1 1961; Table II-1 shows what happens to today’s estimate of R-star simply by incrementally varying the starting point of the model from Q1 1958 to Q4 1979. Table II-1Alternative Current LW Estimates Of R-star By Model Starting Point Chart II-4Alternative Starting Points Produce Wildly Different Estimates Of R-star Today BOX II-2 The Laubach & Williams R-star Model With Simplified Inflation Expectations To proxy inflation expectations in their model, Laubach & Williams use a “forecast of the four-quarter-ahead percentage change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy (“core PCE prices”) generated from a univariate AR(3) of inflation estimated over the prior 40 quarters”. The authors note that a simplified measure of expectations, a 4-quarter moving average of quarterly annualized core inflation, does not materially alter their results. For the sake of parsimony we use this simplified measure in our analysis. We find that the effect shifts the current estimate of R-star only slightly (+10 basis points), and that the historical differences between our version of the 1961 estimation and the official series are indeed minor. The table highlights that the model fails to even generate a result in a majority of the cases (only 39 out of 88 of the model runs were error-free). In addition, Chart II-4 shows that of the successful estimates of R-star using the LW procedure and alternate starting dates of the model, the estimate of R-star today varies from -2% (in one case) to +2%. Excluding the one extremely negative outlier results in an effective estimate range of 0% to 2%, but the key point for investors is that this range is massive and underscores that the original model’s estimate of R-star today is heavily and unduly influenced by the interval of estimation. Investors should also note that of all of the alternative estimates of R-star today shown in Chart II-4, the estimate using the original interval is very much on the low end of the distribution. The second (and most important) reason to believe that the LW estimate is misspecifying R-star is that the output gap estimate generated by the model is almost certainly invalid, at least over the past two decades. Chart II-5presents the LW output gap estimate alongside an average of the CBO, OECD, and IMF estimates of the gap; panel 1 shows the official current LW output gap estimate, whereas panel 2 shows the range of output gap estimates that are generated using the different estimation intervals highlighted in Table II-1 and Chart II-4. Chart II-5The LW Output Gap Estimates, Upon Which R-star Depends, Have Been Wrong For Two Decades Given that the Kalman filter in the LW model jointly determines R-star and the output gap (by way of estimating potential output via estimating potential GDP growth) and that these estimates are dependent on each other, Chart II-5 highlights that in order to believe the LW R-star estimate investors must believe three things: That the US economy was chronically below potential in the late-1990s when the unemployment rate was below 5%, real GDP growth averaged nearly 5%, and the equity market was booming, That output exceeded potential in 2004/2005 by a magnitude not seen since the late-1970s / early-1980s despite an average unemployment rate, That the 2008/2009 US recession was not particularly noteworthy in terms of its deviation from potential output, and that the economy had returned to potential output by 2010/2011 when the unemployment rate was in the range of 8-9%. Chart II-6The US Economy Was Definitely Not At Full Employment In 2010 While we do not believe any of these three statements, the third is especially unlikely. Chart II-6 highlights that the economic expansion from 2009 – 2020 was the weakest on record in the post-war era in terms of average annual real per capita GDP growth. To us, this is a clear symptom of a chronic deficiency in aggregate demand, and that it is essentially unreasonable to argue that the economy was operating at full employment prior to 2014/2015. This means that the Kalman filter is generating incorrect and unreliable estimates of the output gap, which means in turn that the filter’s estimation of R-star is almost assuredly wrong. How Can Investors Tell What The Neutral Rate Is? An Inferential Approach Table II-2 presents the sensitivity of the original Q1 1961 LW estimate of R-star to a series of counterfactual scenarios for inflation, real GDP growth, nominal interest rates, and import and oil prices since mid-2009. While these scenarios do not in any way improve the validity of the LW R-star estimate, they do help clarify the theoretical basis of the model and they help reveal how investors may infer whether the neutral rate of interest is higher or lower than prevailing market rates, and whether it is rising or falling. Table II-2Sensitivity Of Current LW R-star Estimate To Counterfactual Scenarios (2009 - Present) Chart II-7Core Import Price Growth Has Been Weak On Average During This Expansion Table II-2 highlights that today’s estimate of R-star using the original LW approach is mostly sensitive to our counterfactual scenarios for growth and interest rates, but not inflation or oil prices. Shifting down import price growth also has a meaningful effect on R-star, but since core import price growth has been particularly weak over the past several years (Chart II-7), it seems unreasonable to suggest that they have been abnormally high and thus “explain” a low R-star estimate today. Table II-2 essentially highlights that the entire question of the neutral rate of interest over the past decade, and the core contradiction that led to the re-emergence of the secular stagnation thesis, can effectively be boiled down to the following simple question: “Why hasn’t US economic growth been stronger this cycle, given that interest rates have been so low?” Based on the (hopefully uncontroversial) view that interest rates influence economic activity and that economic activity influences inflation, we propose the following checklist for investors to ask themselves in order to not only determine the answer to this important question, but to help identify whether R-star in any given country is likely higher or lower than existing policy rates at any given point in time. Are interest rates above or below the prevailing level of economic growth? Are interest rates rising or falling, and how intensely? Are there identifiable non-monetary shocks (positive or negative) that appear to be influencing economic activity? Is private sector credit growth keeping pace with economic growth? Are debt service burdens in the economy high or low? The first question reflects the most basic view of R-star, which is that the real neutral rate of interest should be equal to, or at least closely related to, the potential growth rate of the economy, ceteris paribus. Questions 2 through 5 attempt to determine whether ceteris paribus holds. In terms of how the answers to these questions relate to identifying the neutral rate, consider two economies, “Economy A” and “Economy B” (Chart II-8). Economy A has broadly stable or slightly rising interest rates that are well below prevailing rates of economic growth (questions 1 & 2), no obvious beneficial shocks to domestic demand from fiscal policy or other factors (question 3), and strong private sector credit growth that is perhaps above or strongly above the current pace of GDP growth (question 4). Chart II-8'Economy A', Versus 'Economy B' Inferentially, it would seem that interest rates in this hypothetical economy are below R-star today. Question 5 is in our list because the more that active private sector leveraging occurs (thus pushing up debt burdens), the more that we would expect R-star in the future to fall. This is because debt payments as a share of income cannot rise forever, and we would expect that the capacity of economy A’s central bank to raise interest rates in the future are negatively related to economy A’s private sector debt service burden today. Now, imagine another economy (“Economy B”) with interest rates well below average rates of economic growth, an interest rate trend that is flat-to-down, no identifiable non-monetary policy shocks that are restricting aggregate demand, persistently sluggish credit growth, and high private sector debt service burdens in the past. If economy B is growing (even sluggishly) and not in the middle of a recession, it would seem that prevailing interest rates are below R-star, but not significantly so. In this scenario it would seem reasonable to conclude that R-star in economy B has fallen non-trivially below its potential growth rate, and that interest rate increases are likely to move monetary policy into restrictive territory earlier than otherwise would be the case. Is The United States “Economy B”? From the perspective of some investors, our description of economy B above perfectly captures the experience of the US over the past decade: an extremely low Fed funds rate, sluggish to weak growth and inflation, all the result of a huge build-up in leverage and debt service burdens during the last economic cycle. We do not doubt that R-star fell in the US for some period of time during the global financial crisis and in the early phase of the economic recovery. But we doubt that it is as low today as the secular stagnation narrative would imply, in large part because it ignores several important aspects concerning questions 2 through 5 noted above. Chart II-9Fiscal Austerity Has Been A Serious Non-Monetary Shock To Aggregate Demand Non-monetary shocks to the US and global economies: Over the past 12 years, there have been at least five deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies that have contributed to the disconnect between growth and interest rates: 1) a prolonged period of US household deleveraging from 2008-2014, 2) the euro area sovereign debt crisis, 3) fiscal austerity in the US, UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 (Chart II-9), 4) the US dollar / oil price shock of 2014, and 5) the recent trade war between the US and China. Several of these shocks have been policy-driven, and in the case of austerity the negative consequences of that policy has led to a lasting change in thinking among fiscal authorities (outside of Japan) that is unlikely to reverse in the near-future. Chart II-10Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Private sector credit growth: Chart II-10 highlights the extent of household deleveraging noted above by showing the growth in total household liabilities over the past decade alongside income growth. Panel 2 shows the leveraging trend of firms, as represented by the nonfinancial corporate sector debt-to-GDP ratio. Chart II-10 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it is now growing again and has largely closed the gap with income growth. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector has clearly leveraged itself over the course of the expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. While it is true that firms have largely leveraged themselves to buy back stock instead of significantly increasing capital expenditures, in our view this reflects the fact that US consumer demand was impaired for several years due to deleveraging. We doubt that firms would have altered their capital structures to this degree if they did not view interest rates as extremely low. Debt service burdens: Chart II-11 highlights that US household debt service burdens were at very elevated levels prior to the financial crisis, suggesting that the neutral rate did fall for some time following the recession. But today, the debt burden facing households is the lowest it has been in the past 40 years due to both rate reductions and deleveraging, arguing against the view that household debt levels will structurally weigh on interest rates in the years to come. Chart II-12 shows that the picture is different for nonfinancial corporations, as the substantial leveraging noted above has indeed raised debt service burdens for firms. However, the nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio remains 400 basis points below early-2000 levels when excess corporate sector liabilities had a clear impact on the economy, suggesting that the Fed’s capacity to raise interest rates still exists following the onset of economic recovery if corporate sector credit growth does not rise sharply relative to GDP over the coming 6-12 months. Chart II-11The Debt Burden Facing US Households Is At A Record Low Chart II-12Businesses Have Levered Up Their Balance Sheets, But There Is Still Room For Rates To Rise   The intensity of recent interest rate changes: Finally, many investors have pointed to sluggish housing activity over the past three years as evidence of a low neutral rate. However, Chart II-13 highlights that the rise in the 30-year US mortgage rate from late-2016 to late-2018 was one of the largest two-year changes in US history, and Chart II-14 shows that the growth in household mortgage credit did not fall below its trend during this period until Q4 2018, when the US stock market fell 20% from its high in response to the economic consequences of the US/China trade war. Chart II-14 also shows that mortgage credit growth responded sharply to a recent reduction in interest rates. All in all, Charts II-13 & II-14 cast doubt on the notion that the level of mortgage rates over the past three years reached restrictive territory. Chart II-13Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late-2016 To Late-2018 Chart II-14A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   Investment Conclusions In the face of a global pandemic and an attendant global recession this year, the idea of eventual Fed rate hikes and the notion that the US economy will be able to tolerate them likely seems preposterous to many investors. We agree that over the coming 6-12 months US Treasury yields are unlikely to rise; even at current levels of the 10-year Treasury yield, we are reluctant to call a trough. Chart II-15US 10-Year Treasurys Are Mostly Priced For A Repeat Of The Past Decade However, Chart II-15highlights that over a long-term time horizon, the bond market is now essentially priced for a repeat of the ten-year path of the Fed funds rate following the global financial crisis. While some investors will view this as a reasonable expectation in the face of what they see as a persistent and unexplainable gap between growth and interest rates over the past decade, we think this gap is explainable and we highly doubt that a pandemic with minimal mortality risk to the working age population and the young will cause the US economy to be afflicted with active consumer deleveraging lasting 4 to 6-years, substantial and wide-ranging fiscal austerity, persistently rising trade tariffs, and sharply lower oil prices. So while we agree that the US economy will be substantially cyclically affected by COVID-19, US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. As such, we caution fixed-income investors against dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about bond yields, as their potential to rise following the upcoming recession may be larger than many investors currently believe.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com III. Indicators And Reference Charts Last month, we continued to strike a cautious tactical tone. Valuations were not depressed enough to compensate investors for the lack of clarity around the path of COVID-19. In other words, there was not enough of a risk premium imbedded in asset prices if COVID-19 cases were to spread around the world. Now that COVID-19 has spread around the planet, asset valuations have adjusted massively. The BCA Valuation Indicator for the S&P 500 is now in undervalued territory, thanks to both lower prices and interest rates. Meanwhile, the BCA Monetary Indicator has never been more accommodative than it is today. Together, these two indicators suggest that twelve months from now, equities will stand at higher levels than they do today. Tactically, equities have most probably found their floor. Both our Composite Sentiment Indicator and the VIX are consistent with a capitulation. Anecdotal evidences also point to a capitulation by retail investors. Additionally, Our RPI indicator is finally starting to try to turn up. Nonetheless, equities will likely re-test their Monday March 23rd floor as the length of US and global quarantines that are so damaging to growth (but for now, necessary) remain uncertain. The cleanest way to express a positive 12-month outlook on equities is to bet on a rise in the stock-to-bond ratio. 10-year Treasurys are as expensive as they were in late 2008 and early 1986, two periods followed by rapid rises in yields. Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicators is 2.5 sigma overbought. The yield curve is steepening anew, which confirms the intuition that yields will experience significant upside over the coming 12 months. On a longer-term basis, inflation expectations are too low to compensate investors for the inflation risk created by a larger monetary and fiscal expansion than the one witnessed in 2008. That being said, EM sovereigns are getting attractive for long-term investors.  Following the surge in the dollar that accompanied the liquidity crunch that surrounded the COVID-19 panic, the dollar is now trading at its most expensive level since 1985. The large liquidity injections by the Fed should cap the dollar for now, but the greenback will need more clarity on the end of global quarantines before it can fall decisively. Nonetheless, it will depreciate significantly once the global economy rebounds due to the powerful reflationary impulse building up around the world. Finally, commodity prices are retesting their 2008 lows. They are not as oversold as they were then, but this is good sign as the advance/decline line of our Continuous Commodity Index continues to trend higher. Thus, if as we expect, the dollar’s surge is ending, commodities are likely to be in the process of finding a floor right now. Once investors become more optimistic about the outlook for global growth, commodities will likely rebound sharply, maybe even more so than stocks. Therefore, it is a good time to begin accumulating metals, energy and equities as well as FX linked to natural resources prices. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "March 2020," dated February 27, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2  Chwieroth, Jeffrey M., Walter, Andrew, The Wealth Effect: How the Great Expectations of the Middle Class Have Changed the Politics of Banking Crises, 2019. 3  A relaxation of social-distancing measures would likely mean that large-scale gatherings are still prohibited, and life would not return to normal for a long time. 4  Please see US Equity Strategy "The Darkest Hour Is Just Before The Dawn," dated March 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5  Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy "KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War," dated March 19, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 6  "IMF Fourteenth Annual Research Conference in Honor of Stanley Fischer," Washington DC, November 8, 2013. 7  "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest," Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Special Report

Dear Client, Next week we will be publishing a joint Special Report on the Chinese infrastructure investment outlook with our Emerging Markets Strategy service, authored by my colleague Ellen JingYuan He. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Feature Chart I-1Chinese Non-Financial Corporations Are Heavily Indebted There are fears that the two-month hiatus in China’s business activities due to the COVID-19 epidemic has sparked acute cash shortages among Chinese companies. In turn, this has increased the danger that the highly leveraged Chinese corporate sector may be pushed into widespread insolvency (Chart I-1). The number of bankruptcies will undoubtedly climb, but small and micro firms are most at risk versus larger companies that have deeper cash reserves and easier access to financing. Our analysis shows that, before the outbreak hit China in January, companies listed in China’s onshore and offshore equity markets exhibited relatively healthy financial statements with adequate operating cash flows to cover debt obligations. This increases the probability that Chinese listed companies will survive the economic and financial shocks from the epidemic, and that their stock prices will rebound along with the expectations of a recovery in the Chinese economy. Chart I-2Both Chinese Economy And Corporate Profits Are Largely Driven By Domestic Demand It also appears that China’s domestic economy is relatively insulated from the global financial market turmoil and impending global recession. China’s corporate profit outlook is dominated by domestic economic conditions rather than external demands. This view is also reflected in the relative performance of Chinese onshore and offshore stocks (Chart I-2). Moreover, the charts in the Appendix illustrate that corporate financial ratios in almost all sectors of China’s onshore and offshore equity markets have somewhat improved from the previous economic down cycle that began in 2014. This underscores our view that if reflationary measures overcompensate for the economic slowdown, as in the 2015/2016 easing cycle, then Chinese stocks will likely rally in absolute terms, as well as outperform global benchmarks. We selected three categories of financial ratios to monitor profitability, leverage and operating cash flow conditions of Chinese domestic and investable listed non-financial companies (Table I-1).1 The financial data in our exercise are from Refinitiv Datastream Worldscope. Its corresponding stock price indexes for China’s overall market and sectors most closely resemble the MSCI China Index and the MSCI China Onshore index. Table I-1 It is also noted that the Chinese investable index, excluding financial companies, is dominated by large technology companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu.2 These tech companies generally have more adequate cash flows and lower debt ratios than the more capital intensive sectors such as industrial and energy. The analysis we present in this report on non-financial companies in the offshore market, therefore, is not indicative of China’s overall corporate financial health. Rather, our findings are indicative of how investors should view the listed companies and their sector performance within China’s investable market. Several observations from our analysis of the listed companies’ financial ratios are noteworthy: Chinese non-financial corporations are highly leveraged, and have not de-levered much despite the financial deleverage campaign that began in late 2017. Contrary to the belief that Chinese corporates’ financial health is significantly weaker than that in developed economies, the leverage ratio, profit margins, and debt-servicing ability among Chinese domestic and investable non-financial companies are actually in the range of their global peers (Chart I-3). Yet, Chinese companies trade at substantial discounts to global benchmarks. This is particularly evident in the offshore market, whereas domestic Chinese stocks were priced at a discount until the recent global market selloffs (Chart I-4). This underpins our view that, when China’s economy and corporate profits recover, Chinese stocks should outperform their global benchmarks on a cyclical time horizon. Importantly, with a stronger aggregate corporate financial health and a large price discount. Chinese investable non-financial stocks have more upside potential than their domestic counterparts. Chart I-3Financial Health Among Listed Chinese Companies Comparable With DMs Chart I-4Chinese Investable Stock Prices Remain Deeply Discounted Relative To Global Benchmarks   Utilities, machinery, industrials and construction materials are among the sectors with the lowest cash flow-to-interest expense ratios, in both China’s domestic and investable markets. In particular, machinery, industrials and construction materials are pro-cyclical sectors and their profit growth is positively correlated with economic growth. Their low profitability and high leverage contribute to their poor cash flows. Those sectors have been severely impacted by the stoppages in manufacturing and construction activities due to the COVID-19 epidemic in China, making them vulnerable to cash shortages. However, there is a low risk of a broad-based default among these firms, because state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate these sectors in the Chinese equity market. The stock performance in these sectors is also extremely sensitive to shifts in China’s monetary and policy stance, and thus should benefit from the recent loosening in monetary conditions and the push for a substantial increase in infrastructure investment this year. Chart I-5Small Property Developers In China Are Much More Vulnerable To Cash Shortages Than Large Ones The leverage ratio in the real estate sector has doubled in the past 10 years. The sector’s cash flow-to-total liabilities ratio has also declined sharply since 2017, when the authorities tightened lending standards to property developers. However, the sector’s aggregate cash flow situation is still an improvement from its lowest point in 2014, in both China’s domestic and investable markets. The countrywide lockdowns in January and February will undoubtedly have severe impacts on Chinese property developers’ cash flows. But the real estate sector is perhaps the best example in exhibiting a pronounced divergence in cash flow conditions between larger and smaller firms. Chart I-5 shows that, while the median ratio of cash-to-total liabilities tuned negative among 76 domestic listed real estate developers, the average ratio from total companies in the same sector suggests that the cash situation has actually improved since mid-2018. This divergence indicates that larger developers have more solid financial fundamentals and easier access to liquidity compared with their smaller counterparts, even before the lockdowns. We expect the divergence in cash flow conditions to widen in the coming months, and smaller property developers will face intensifying pressure to consolidate. China’s domestic healthcare companies have a much better cash balance than the investable healthcare sector, which has the lowest ratio of cash-to-interest expenses among all sectors. The poor cash flow conditions in investable healthcare companies are due to high leverage and low profitability, as well as high operating costs and R&D expenses. Chinese domestic healthcare sector has outperformed the broad market since the epidemic broke out in January. While we think the overall Chinese investable stocks have more upside than their domestic peers, domestic healthcare companies’ lower leverage ratio, stronger cash flows, and much higher profit margin make the sector a better bet than investable healthcare stocks on a cyclical time horizon (Chart I-6).  Chart I-6Domestic Healthcare Sector Likely To Continue Outperforming The Broad Market Chart I-7Energy Stocks Will Remain Depressed Until Oil Prices Rebound Historically, there has been a strong positive correlation between the energy sector’s profitability, cash flow conditions, stock performance and crude oil prices (Chart I-7). In the past two years, the sector’s leverage ratio has risen, profit margins have thinned and the cash flow situation has sharply deteriorated to the same level as in 2014 when oil prices collapsed. The ongoing oil price rout will generate powerful deflationary forces in the energy sector and will likely further deteriorate energy firms’ profitability and cash flow. While we stay long cyclical stocks versus defensives on both a 0-3 month and a 6-12 month view, we recommend a cautious stance towards energy stocks until the evolving oil price war situation is clarified.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Appendix Overall Markets Excluding Financials Consumer Discretionary Sector Consumer Staples Sector Real Estate Sector Automobile Sector Machinery Sector Industrials Sector Construction Materials Sector Telecommunications Sector Technology Sector Healthcare Sector Energy Sector   Utilities Sector   Footnotes 1    We exclude banks and financial institutions from this analysis, due to discrepancy in Chinese banks’ accounting measures from those of non-financial corporations’. 2   Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and JD together account for nearly 40% of the non-financial market cap in Chinese investable index. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights For stock markets, the best inoculation against Covid-19 is ultra-low bond yields. Our tactical underweight to equities versus bonds achieved its 5 percent profit target and is now closed. We are now awaiting the fractal signal to go tactically overweight (Chart of the Week). Price to sales is a much better predictor of 10-year returns than is price to earnings, especially when profit margins are stretched as they are now. New long-term recommendation: overweight Swedish equities versus bonds. Germany and Switzerland also offer attractive excess 10-year equity returns over bonds. Fractal trade: the 130 percent outperformance of palladium versus nickel in just six months is now technically stretched. Chart of the WeekStocks Are Approaching Oversold – Stay Tuned For Stock Markets, The Best Inoculation Against Covid-19 Is Ultra-Low Bond Yields A global slowdown, exacerbated by the Covid-19 virus contagion, is dominating the news and financial headlines. There are worries that the stock market is still in denial and has a long way to fall – rather like Wile E. Coyote suspended in disbelief as he runs over the cliff-edge. In fact, some of the most economically sensitive equity sectors have already fallen a long way. For example, the oil and gas sector is down by 20 percent (Chart 2). Chart I-2Economically Sensitive Sectors And Bond Yields Have Plunged Meanwhile, bond yields have plunged to new lows, and in some cases all-time lows. Hence, we are pleased to report that our tactical underweight to equities versus 10-year bonds, initiated on January 9, has achieved its 5 percent profit target and is now closed.1 We are now awaiting the fractal signal to go tactically overweight. Bond yields have plunged to new lows. Having said that, when the world economy is set to grind to a halt in the first quarter, and halfway to a recession, is a 5 percent underperformance of equities versus bonds enough? There is certainly scope for some further downside, but for investors with a multi-year horizon, equities still win the ugly contest versus bonds. Where bond yields are approaching the lower limit to their yields – around -1 percent – it means they are approaching the upper limit to their prices. Hence, bonds become a ‘lose-lose’ proposition. Bond prices cannot rise much further, even in an economic slump, but they can fall a lot if sentiment suddenly recovers. As the riskiness of bonds rises relative to equities, the prospective return that investors will accept from equities rapidly collapses to the ultra-low level of bond yields. And as valuation is just the inverse of prospective return, this underpins and justifies an exponentially higher valuation of equities. How can we best gauge the prospective (long-term) returns that equities now offer? To answer this question, we need to take a Japanese lesson. A Japanese Lesson: Price To Sales Is The Best Predictor Of Prospective Return A great advantage of being a European investor is that the difficult investment questions have already been asked and answered by our friends in Japan – so we just need to take some Japanese lessons. One of the most important lessons is that the Japanese stock market’s price to sales multiple has a near-perfect predictive record for Japanese 10-year returns since the 1980s.2 For world equities, market capitalisation to GDP (which broadly equates to price to sales at a world level) also has a near-perfect predictive record for 10-year returns since the late 1990s.3 The corollary lesson is that the price to earnings multiple – either based on 12-month trailing or 12-month forward earnings – is not such a good predictor of prospective return. Price to earnings wrongly pinpointed Japan’s highest valuation in 1994 rather than at the peak of the bubble in 1989. Moreover, since 2000, price to earnings has suggested that Japan’s stock market is cheaper than it truly is, and grossly overestimated prospective returns. Price to earnings made the same mistake for world equities in the mid-noughties, understating valuations and thereby overestimating prospective returns. The trouble with price to earnings is that it takes no account of the likely evolution of profit margins – treating a stock market multiple of, say, 30 on a high profit margin the same as 30 on a low profit margin. The problem is that when the market is trading at 30 on a low margin it has the capacity for higher profit growth through margin expansion – and thereby a higher prospective return – than when it is trading at 30 on a high margin (Chart 3). Chart I-3Price To Earnings Takes No Account Of Changing Profit Margins It follows that a high price to earnings on a low profit margin makes the market appear more expensive than it truly is, and thereby underestimates prospective returns. In 1994, Japan appeared to be more expensive than at the peak of the bubble in 1989 because profit margins halved through 1989-94. The trouble with price to earnings is that it takes no account of the likely evolution of profit margins. Conversely, a low price to earnings on a high profit margin makes the market appear less expensive that it truly is, and thereby overestimates prospective returns (Chart 4 and Chart 5). Chart I-4Price To Sales Has An Excellent Predictive Record In Japan… Chart I-5…Whereas Price To Earnings Has Made Many Mistakes   In the mid-noughties, Japan appeared to be less expensive than it truly was because profit margins surged through 2001-07. The same was true for world equities. Hence, price to earnings grossly overestimated the prospective long-term return in 2007 (Chart 6). Chart I-6Profit Margins Are At Generational Highs Price to sales avoids the mistakes of price to earnings by removing profit margins from the equation. Put another way, it is like using price to earnings with a constant long-term profit margin. This tends to be more prudent – especially today when margins are close to generational highs and facing several threats in the coming years. One threat to profit margins comes from a growing populist backlash against record high corporate profitability, especially in the most profitable sectors. The threat manifests through populist politicians or parties which vow to rein in runaway profitability through higher taxes and/or regulation and/or nationalisation. Think Bernie Sanders. A second threat comes from environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG). Think carbon taxes. A third threat comes the possible break-up of the pseudo-monopoly tech behemoths, killing both their pricing power and market penetration. Think antitrust suit against Google or Facebook. Admittedly, this is likely to be a US focussed threat, but the impact on stock markets would be felt worldwide. Given these threats, long-term investors should assume some pressure on profit margins from today’s generational highs. Accordingly, just as in 2007, price to sales is likely to be a much better predictor of prospective returns than is price to earnings (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Chart I-7At A World Level, Market Cap To GDP Has An Excellent Predictive Record… Chart I-8…Whereas Price To Earnings Was Very Wrong In 2007 Sweden Is An Attractive Long-Term Opportunity Price to sales predicts that stock markets, on average, are set to deliver feeble single-digit total nominal returns over the coming decade. Nevertheless, with bond yields even closer to zero, and the riskiness of bonds much higher at ultra-low yields, equities still beat bonds in the ugly contest of long-term prospective returns. In fact, in those countries where bond yields are approaching their lower limit of around -1 percent – meaning bond prices are approaching their upper limit – equities win the contest more handsomely. On this basis, the stock markets in Germany and Switzerland offer attractive excess 10-year returns over their bond markets. But the most attractive long-term opportunity is Sweden. Based on its price to sales multiple, Sweden’s stock market is set to deliver around 6 percent a year over the coming decade (Chart 9). Chart I-9Sweden’s Stock Market Is Set To Deliver 6 Percent A Year Given that Sweden’s 10-year bond yield is negative, Sweden’s stock market takes the honour of offering one of the world’s highest excess 10-year returns over its bond market (Chart 10). Chart I-10Sweden’s Stock Market Has The Highest Excess Return Over Bonds Accordingly, we are adding Sweden to our existing structural overweight to equities versus long-dated bonds in Germany, in a 50:50 combination. Fractal Trading System* As discussed, we are pleased to report that underweight S&P 500 versus the 10-year T-bond achieved its 5 percent profit target and is now closed. Elsewhere, the palladium price has surged. In just six months, palladium has outperformed nickel by 130 percent, making its 130-day fractal structure extremely fragile. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short palladium versus nickel, setting a profit target of 32 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 60 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Our expression of this was underweight S&P 500 versus US 10-year T-bond. 2 Prospective returns are nominal total (capital plus income) 10-year returns, shown as an annualised rate. 3 Price/sales per share = (price*number of shares)/(sales per share * number of shares) = market capitalisation/total sales. At a global level, total sales broadly equal GDP, so price/sales per share = market capitalisation/GDP. But note that this does not apply at a regional or country level because sales can originate from outside the domestic economy.. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights In the past week, it is becoming evident that the Chinese leadership is willing to abandon its financial de-risking agenda in exchange for a rapid economic recovery. Monetary conditions are already more accommodative than during the last easing cycle in 2015/2016. The recently announced policy initiatives on infrastructure, housing, and automobile sectors also resemble policy supports that led to a V-shaped economic recovery in 2016. As manufacturers in regions other than Hubei are returning to work and their production capacity continues to rise, the outbreak-induced economic shock may be smaller than investors currently fear. Hence, the odds are rising that the upcoming “insurance stimulus” may end up overshooting the short-term economic shock. As such, we maintain a constructive view on Chinese stocks over the next 6-12 months. Feature A surge in the number of COVID-19 infections outside of China (including South Korea, Japan, Iran, and Italy) risks delaying a global economic recovery, and has cast doubt on the outlook for the global economy beyond Q1 (Chart 1). Chart 1Pandemic Threats Expanding Globally Despite the sharp uptick in global investor concern, our constructive view on Chinese stocks remains unchanged for the next 6-12 months. Our view on Chinese risk assets is based on a simple arithmetic framework that we described last year when the trade war tensions between the US and China were escalating. In short, when gauging the net impact of an economic shock, investors should determine which of the following two scenarios is most likely: Scenario 1 (Bearish): Stimulus – Shock ≤ 0 Scenario 2 (Bullish): Stimulus – Shock > 0 While this framework is quite simplistic, the point is to underscore that economic shocks are almost always met with a policy response, and the goal is to determine whether this response is sufficient enough to offset the impact of the shock. If the Chinese leadership underestimates the severity of the shock and undershoots on the stimulus, this would be bearish for Chinese stocks (Scenario 1). In the current situation, however, even if the near-term economic outlook is deeply negative, investors should maintain a bullish cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) outlook for China-related assets as long as the impact of China’s reflationary efforts more than offsets the negative shock to aggregate demand (Scenario 2). Major Stimulus Around The Corner? It is becoming evident that the Chinese policymakers, when dealing with an unprecedented public health crisis, are returning to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. In fact, the odds are rising that the magnitude of the upcoming stimulus may resemble that of 2015/2016, and has an increasing possibility to overshoot in the next 6-12 months. In the past week, there has been a clear shift of policy focus from “financial de-risking” to “mitigating the economic damage from shocks at all costs”, as indicated by high-profile policy announcements. In an unprecedented large-scale teleconference on February 23,1 President Xi stated that China will not lower its economic growth target for this year, and that fiscal policy will be “more proactive” while monetary policy was upgraded from “prudent” to “flexible and moderate". Chart 2PBoC Looks Set For Massive Stimulus Xi also pledged to “introduce new policy measures in a timely manner”. China’s central bank, the PBoC, issued a statement signaling further cuts ahead in the bank reserve requirement ratio rate and interest rate.2 The PBoC has already aggressively eased monetary conditions in the past two weeks, and both the central bank policy and average lending rates are now lower than they were during the last massive easing cycle in 2015/2016 (Chart 2).  Other policy initiatives also suggest the Chinese authorities are stepping up coordinated efforts to boost the economy, beyond short-term and targeted financial support. The stimulative measures now span from infrastructure to housing and automobile sectors, the exact “three prongs” that supported a V-shaped economic recovery in 2016.3 This is in sharp contrast with last year, when Chinese policymakers largely resisted resorting to large-scale stimulus, despite immense pressure from the US-China trade war and tariff impositions.4 The ongoing COVID-19 epidemic seems to have forced China to return to its old economic playbook, as the Xi administration is clearly unwilling to tolerate economic hardships driven by an endogenous crisis. The ongoing epidemic seems to have forced China to return to its old economic playbook, as the Xi administration is clearly unwilling to tolerate economic hardships driven by an endogenous crisis. As we predicted in November last year,5 China was to frontload additional fiscal stimulus in Q1 this year to secure an economic recovery, which started to bud in Q4 last year. The increase in January’s credit numbers confirms our projection: local government bond issuance picked up significantly from last year while the contraction in shadow bank lending continued to ease, signaling a less restrictive policy bias on both the monetary and fiscal fronts (Chart 3).  Chart 3Stronger Fiscal Support Likely To Soon Follow The exact economic and monetary expansion growth targets will be officially set at the National People’s Congress meeting, which has been postponed from its usual schedule on March 5. Compared with the 6.1% real GDP growth achieved in 2019, we now think a growth target of 5.6% would be conservative for this year. According to an estimate by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy,6 China’s real GDP growth in Q1 could slow to 3.5% on a year-over-year basis. To achieve 5.6% growth, China would need at least 6.3% average real growth (year-over-year) for the next three quarters, 0.3 percentage points higher than in the second half of 2019. The growth in credit expansion, infrastructure spending and government expenditures will need to significantly outpace last year in the next 6-12 months. Bottom Line: The government appears to be willing to abandon its financial de-risking agenda to secure economic recovery. There is an increasing possibility that the stimulus may overshoot the economic shock this year. China’s Economic Engine Warms Up There are increasing signs that the scale of the upcoming stimulus may match that of the 2015/2016 cycle. The likely magnitude of the shock, on the other hand, might be smaller than investors fear as the evidence is mounting that production is returning to normality in China. Despite a lack of employees and raw materials, industrial activity in regions outside of Hubei is resuming. Chart 4…Small Companies Are Not Far Behind A survey of China’s 500 top manufacturers by China Enterprise Confederation7 indicated that most of the 342 respondents had resumed production as of February 20. They also reported that more than half of their employees had returned to work and the average capacity utilization rate had reached nearly 60% (Table 1). Furthermore, the China Association of Small and Medium Enterprises8 survey of 6,422 small businesses showed that as of February 14, more than half of the companies have resumed operations (Chart 4). By February 21, the daily coal consumption in China’s six largest power plants has reached 62% of the consumption from the same period last year (adjusted for Lunar Year calendar), 14 percentage points higher than February 10 - the first day officially scheduled for people to return to work.9 Table 1Large Manufacturers Have Reached More Than Half Of Their Production Capacity… The resurgence in the number of new infections has not slowed those regions down from reopening businesses, particularly along the manufacturing belt in China’s coastal regions (Chart 5). China’s leadership has repeatedly urged local governments to relax aggressive containment measures to allow production to resume. Unless the number of new cases in China picks up again, we expect business operations in regions outside of Hubei to continue re-opening in the coming weeks. Chart 580% Of China’s Coastal Regions Are Back To Work Most manufacturers in regions other than Hubei are returning to work and are running at about half of last year’s production capacity. Bottom Line: The aggressive containment measures seem to be effective inside China. Most manufacturers in regions other than Hubei are returning to work and are running at about half of last year’s production capacity. We expect the rate to improve. This will mitigate the impact of the virus outbreak on the Chinese economy.  “Scenario 2” Implies An Upturn In The Corporate Earnings Cycle The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on China’s economy may be smaller than investors currently fear. The country is also in a better economic condition than in 2015/2016. If the Chinese leadership believes an “insurance stimulus” is warranted and allows credit growth in 2020 to reach near 28% of GDP, as in 2015-2016, then the stimulus will more than offset the outbreak-induced economic shock from Q1 and lead to a meaningful rise in this year’s corporate earnings (Chart 6): China’s households and corporates are actually more willing to spend now than in 2015-2016. We agree that China’s households and companies are both highly leveraged, and re-leveraging may further diminish their debt-servicing ability and willingness to invest or spend. Debt as a share of Chinese household disposable income has climbed by 33 percentage points compared with five years ago (Chart 7). The increase in debt load makes Chinese households particularly vulnerable to income reductions. But this supports our view that policymakers will make every reflationary effort to avoid massive layoffs. Additionally, the willingness to spend among Chinese households is not less than during the down cycle in 2015-2016 (Chart 7 bottom panel). Chart 6A 2015/2016-Style Stimulus Will Likely Triumph Over Short-Term Economic Shocks Chart 7Chinese Households Are More Indebted, But Are Also More Willing To Spend Than In 2015/2016 The debt-to-GDP ratio and debt-servicing cost-to-income ratio in China’s non-financial private sector have trended sideways in the past five years (Chart 8). The corporate cash flow situation is only slightly worse than in 2015 (Chart 9). The virus outbreak and drastic containment measures will temporarily weaken the corporates’ cash positions, but this negative situation can be partially offset by tax, fee and interest relief measures.10 Chart 8Chinese Corporates Are In Fact Not More Indebted Than In 2015/2016... Chart 9...And Their Cash Flow Situation Is Only Slightly Worse   Furthermore, China’s non-financial corporates’ marginal propensity to spend is actually higher than in 2015-2016 (Chart 10). This may be due to the more accommodative monetary backdrop than in 2015-2016. If Chinese authorities are to significantly step up their reflationary efforts, the easy monetary policy stance may be here to stay throughout 2020. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the mild deflation in China’s PPI growth was already turning slightly positive on the heels of an improving economy. The historical relationship between China’s producer prices and industrial profits suggests that profit growth for both China’s onshore and offshore markets is highly linked to fluctuations in producer prices (Chart 11). An ultra-easy monetary policy, a weak RMB, and a more forceful boost to domestic demand will provide strong reflationary support to producer prices and industrial profits. Chart 10Chinese Corporates' Willingness To Spend Also Higher Than In 2015/2016 Chart 11A 2015/2016-Style Reflation Will Likely Lead To A Strong Rebound In Corporate Profits   Bottom Line: Despite a short-term economic shock, China’s economy is at a better starting point than in 2015-2016. If monetary and fiscal easing in 2020 reaches the same magnitude as five years ago, then the economy and corporate profits will likely begin to respond to the stimulus. Investment Conclusions The clear sign of policy shift to shoring up the economy suggests that, our Scenario 2 is the most likely outcome. The fiscal and monetary easing initiatives seem to resemble those of 2015/2016. The short-term outbreak-induced economic shock, on the other hand, looks to be smaller than the market anticipates. Manufacturers in China continue to resume production in regions outside of Hubei, a trend we believe will go on unless there is a significant threat that the virus will break out again in these Chinese regions. This supports our constructive view on China-related assets over a 6-12 month time horizon. The fiscal and monetary easing initiatives seem to resemble those of 2015/2016, and will likely overshoot the short-term economic shock. There is a risk to our constructive view, though, that the more forceful policy response from the Chinese leadership may imply a greater than anticipated short-term economic shock from the outbreak. This would challenge our bullish stance on Chinese stocks in the next three months. Substantially weaker economic data in Q1 would likely trigger a selloff in Chinese risk assets, both onshore and offshore. However, a severe short-term economic shock, followed by a burst of stimulus, would create strong investment opportunities. If the scale of Chinese policymakers’ reflationary measures ramps up significantly in the coming months, they will likely overshoot the short-term economic shock. Another reflationary cycle would certainly have a positive impact on global investors’ sentiment and Chinese financial assets. Stay tuned.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202002/23/content_WS5e5286cdc6d0… 2   http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3975864/index.html 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2): Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?," dated July 24, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports "Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 1): A Reluctant PBoC," dated July 10, 2019, "Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2): Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?," dated July 24, 2019, "Don’t Bottom-Fish Chinese Assets (Yet)," dated August 14, 2019 and "Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing," dated October 9, 2019. available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Questions From The Road: Timing The Turn," dated November 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 6   Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus," dated February 21, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 7   http://www.cec-ceda.org.cn/view_sy.php?id=42633 8   http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202002/18/t20200218_34298844.shtml 9   http://www.21jingji.com/2020/2-21/wOMDEzNzhfMTUzNjAwOA.html 10  China has announced targeted measures to defer or lower taxes and administrative fees. It will also provide interest rate subsidies to affected businesses. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Boeing’s 737 MAX grounding, China’s looming slowdown on the back of the coronavirus epidemic and weak industry operating metrics, all warrant a downgrade alert in the US aerospace index. Red hot demand for defense capital goods, defense industrial production that is firing on all cylinders, enticing industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets, all suggest that it still pays to be long the pureplay defense index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities remained untethered last week, and floated skyward to fresh all-time highs. The second panel of Chart 1 shows that from a technical perspective the SPX has returned close to the early-2018 blow-off top level, when the deviation from its 200-day moving average reached a zenith. Similarly, drilling beneath the surface the percentage of S&P 500 groups trading above their 50-day and 200-day moving averages in absolute terms is also running high (third panel, Chart 1). Investor complacency reigns supreme. The coronavirus scare lasted a few days and despite AAPL’s recent warning, which is likely the tip of the iceberg and other companies are slated to issue Q1 profit warnings, investors are ignoring all the bad news and piling into equities in general and teflon-tech stocks in particular. Keep in mind that 12-month forward profit growth remains positively correlated with the 10-year US treasury yield. The former crested in early 2020, predating the coronavirus epidemic (bottom panel, Chart 1). The end result is a new multiple expansion phase with the S&P 500 forward P/E clearing the 19 handle. Chart 1Dizzying Heights Such complacency transcends the equity market and spills over to the junk bond market. The hunt for yield remains intact and the Barclays US total return high yield index is following up the path of the SPX. Momentum is also tracking closely the broad equity market (top & middle panels, Chart 2). Nevertheless, we remain cautious. Last week we highlighted that the “tenuous trio” cannot go up indefinitely and a simultaneous rise in all three asset classes (stock prices, bond prices and the US dollar) typically portends an equity market crack.1 The big risk is that a surging greenback will short-circuit EPS growth and our worst case EPS scenario of -1% profit growth in calendar 2020 as we highlighted in mid-January will materialize.2 Worrisomely, while the S&P 500 made fresh all-time highs last week, the DXY came close to breaking above par, the VIX stayed stubbornly glued near 15 and gold bullion eclipsed $1,600/oz (third & bottom panels, Chart 2). Something has got to give. Meanwhile, Chart 3 updates our Corporate Pricing Power Indicator (CPPI) that recently came out of the deflation zone. This tick up in the CPPI coupled with still softening wage inflation have pushed our S&P 500 profit margin proxy slightly higher but still below the zero line, signaling that the margin contraction phase will likely run its course this year (bottom panel, Chart 3). Chart 2Spiking Greenback And Bullion Signal Trouble Chart 3Modest Profit Margin Improvement Drilling beneath the surface, our CPPI remains soft and vulnerable to a deflationary shock if the coronavirus epidemic severely wounds the global economy. As a reminder, we calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power A bit less than half of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices by more than 1%, and 35% are outright deflating. Worrisomely, 60% of the sectors we cover fail to raise prices at a faster clip than overall inflation. With regard to pricing power trends, roughly half of the industries we cover are either flat or in a downtrend (Table 2). Gold bullion remains on top of our table climbing at a 22%/annum rate despite the greenbacks recent rise, and only five additional commodity-related industries made it to the top thirty (Table 2). Most of the commodity complex is deflating courtesy of the appreciating US dollar, and the recent coronavirus epidemic will definitely sustain the downward pressure on commodity inflation as demand will likely suffer a major setback. Importantly, defensive sectors still occupy half of the top ten spots, similar to our last update in October 2019. On the flip side, four of the bottom eight industries are commodity related, a trend we expect to pick up steam in the coming quarters. This week we update our views on the two industrials sub-groups that are moving in opposite directions. Put The Aerospace Index On Downgrade Watch We are compelled to put the pureplay aerospace subgroup (currently rated neutral) on downgrade alert. A little over four years ago, we split the aerospace & defense coverage into pureplay aerospace and pureplay defense, as the profit drivers of these two industries started to steeply diverge. True, the yet to be completed UTX acquisition of RTN will re-complicate matters, but we will continue to cover these two groups independently. From a technical perspective, a head and shoulders pattern has likely formed, warning that the next leg down will be a rather painful one, especially if support at current levels gives way (top panel, Chart 4). Boeing (BA) dominates the pureplay aerospace subgroup and sustained delays to recertify the 737 MAX have weighed heavily on share prices. While the FAA and other country air safety regulators may give the green light for flights to resume for Boeing’s workhorse commercial jetliner, consumers may be reluctant to board this plane given all the negative publicity. This remains a big risk to BA and thus to the aerospace index. Chart 4Prior To Coronavirus Epidemic… On the macro front, prior to the coronavirus epidemic, the global PMI was on the path to recovery with a plethora of countries climbing above the boom/bust line (middle & bottom panels, Chart 4). In China specifically, Bloomberg’s story count of China slowdown has returned to the historical lower band of this time series, at a time when BCA’s Chinese credit & fiscal easing impulses were ticking higher (second & third panels, Chart 5). Tack on the ongoing Chinese monetary easing, and factors were falling into place for a robust recovery in demand for US aerospace products (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 6 shows why China is so important to this industry. Not only is future commercial aircraft demand growth centered round China, but also China at the recent peak accounted for 15% of total US aerospace exports. In fact, aerospace exports to China tripled since the GFC. Chart 5…Macro Data Were Firming Chart 6China Matters Most To Aerospace Unfortunately, the coronavirus epidemic changes all the China-related calculus and will further dampen demand for aerospace products, at least in the near-term. Granted, US aerospace sales are already nosediving and so are operating profits. Industry new orders are in a freefall of late courtesy of the 737 MAX grounding and halt in production (second & third panels, Chart 7). As a result, profit margins have collapsed probing the Great Recession lows (bottom panel, Chart 7). Similarly, aerospace shipments have taken it to the chin and inventories are sky high, whereas backlogs are contracting, albeit mildly (top, middle and fourth panels, Chart 8). Worrisomely, aerospace industrial production ground to a halt last month, with the resource utilization rate gaping down a whopping 560bps on a month-over-month basis (second & bottom panels, Chart 8). Boeing’s production ails will likely remain in place for the next three months, and sustain the downward pressure on output growth and capacity utilization. All of this suggests that profits are in for a rough ride. Chart 7737 MAX Ills… Chart 8…Weighing Heavily Executives’ knee-jerk reaction has been to tap credit lines in order to fend off this profit contraction phase, which has pushed the industry’s leverage to the stratosphere. In fact, the aerospace industry’s 3.5x net debt-to-EBITDA reading is the highest since the history of the data set, even higher than the aftermath of the 9/11 induced recession Chart 9). Finally, valuations have skyrocketed, rising to over three standard deviations above the past four decade mean. In marked contrast, relative technicals are washed out, probing two decade lows (Chart 10). Chart 9Rapid B/S Degradation Chart 10Overvalued, But Oversold In sum, Boeing’s 737 MAX grounding, China’s looming slowdown on the back of the coronavirus epidemic and weak industry operating metrics, all warrant a downgrade alert in the US aerospace index. Bottom Line: We are awaiting a bounce before downgrading the US aerospace index to a below benchmark allocation. It is now on our downgrade watch list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the pureplay US aerospace index are: BA, UTX, TDG, TDY, TXT, HEI, SPR, HEI.A. Defense Rules Unlike their aerospace brethren, pureplay defense stocks are on fire on multiple fronts, and we reiterate our cyclical and secular (ten-year time horizon) overweight recommendations.3 Defense industrial production (IP) surpassed the end of the Cold War highs and is now in uncharted territory. On a year-over-year rate of change basis IP is running over 7% or fifteen percentage points higher than aerospace IP (Chart 11). This is a remarkable feat as overall IP is contracting and the US is still fighting off a manufacturing recession. Meanwhile, relative defense performance is in a V-shaped recovery, whereas relative aerospace performance is moving down along the right side of a lambda formation (top panel, Chart 11). As we mentioned above, M&A activity is also boosting takeover premia and the reduction of defense stock supply is bullish for stock prices (Chart 12). Chart 11Defense Is The Mirror Image Of Aerospace Chart 12Supportive M&A Upbeat defense outlays underpin relative share prices. Given that a global arms race is ongoing, demand for weapons will remain robust for the duration of this decade according to SIPRI’s estimates (Chart 13). Importantly, defense capital goods new orders are flirting with all-time highs, industry backlogs are not far behind and defense related exports are running red hot (Chart 14). Chart 13Insatiable… Chart 14…Demand… Besides the global rearmament, a global space race along with the real threat of cyberattacks – especially on governments – underscores that defense companies are well positioned to benefit from these two additional sources of revenues for years to come. This firm demand backdrop is reflected in near double digit sales growth outshining the broad market by a factor of 2:1. The last time defense sales were growing so briskly was during the Iraqi war in the early 2000s (Chart 15). However, one key difference between now and 2002 is margins. Back then profit margins were falling in the aftermath of the 9/11 induced recession. Fast forward to today and profit margins have doubled even eclipsing non-financial corporate sector margins (Chart 15). Given the industry’s high operating leverage, robust top line growth will flow straight to the bottom line and sustain the earnings-led relative share price outperformance phase. Keep in mind that not only are non-financial corporate sector profits contracting, but the sell-side community also expects defense EPS to continue to deflate in the coming twelve months (fourth & bottom panels, Chart 15). This represents a low bar for the defense industry to surpass. Defense stocks also have a fortress of a balance sheet: the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio runs below the broad market and the interest coverage ratio trounces the overall market. Tack on a soaring return-on-equity, and there is a long runway ahead for pureplay defense stocks (Chart 16). Chart 15…Underpins Operating Metrics Finally on the relative valuation front, while defense stocks trade at a massive premium to the broad market on a P/B basis, they are changing hands at a discount on both an EV/EBITDA and P/E basis. Defense stocks also command a higher dividend yield compared with the non-financial corporate sector (Chart 17). If our thesis continues to pan out, we deem that defense stocks will grow into their pricey P/B valuations, similar to what happened during the MAD doctrine era of the 1960s.4 Chart 16Fortress Of A B/S Chart 17Far From Overvalued On Most Ratios Netting it all out, red hot demand for defense capital goods, defense industrial production that is firing on all cylinders, enticing industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets, all suggest that it still pays to be long the pureplay defense index. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the pureplay defense index both on a cyclical and secular time horizon. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: LMT, RTN, NOC, GD, HII, AJRD, BWXT, CW, MRCY.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Will The Fed Save The Day, Again?” dated February 18, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Three EPS Scenarios”, dated January 13, 2020, available atuses.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade” dated December 16, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Brothers In Arms” dated October 31, 2016, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth May 10, 2018 Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA  Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights Why did S&P 500 profit margins fall in 2019?: Compensation gains, trade tensions and spotty growth were the most likely culprits, though the absence of standardized disclosure hinders full attribution. Was it a one-off, or the beginning of a trend?: We believe that profit margins have likely peaked, though we expect that they will contract only modestly this year. The outcome of the election could have a significant margin impact going forward. The coronavirus outbreak may be worsening around Wuhan, but it does not appear to be metastasizing elsewhere: Our China strategists foresee an extended lockdown of Hubei province, but expect that the rest of the Chinese economy will be able to overcome it. They are cautiously optimistic about the prospects for containment. Sustainability What a difference a year makes. Last President’s Day, the S&P 500 was more than 5% below its September 2018 peak (18% below its current level), amidst widespread fears that the Fed may have tightened into a recession. The month-long government shutdown was an embarrassing own goal, and trade tensions loomed as a threat to corporate earnings and global growth. It would take another two months before the S&P 500 fully recovered, only to have the yield curve invert soon thereafter. The coronavirus epidemic (COVID-19) has the curve flirting with inversion again, but stocks have shrugged off the growth risks. They continue to scale the wall of worry as self-appointed bubble spotters’ blood pressure soars, leaving them sputtering like Judge Smails or the bank official overseeing Charles Foster Kane’s trust. While we acknowledge that COVID-19 and Bernie Sanders’ post-Iowa-and-New Hampshire position at the head of the Democratic pack could yet become problematic for markets and the economy, our take aligns much more closely with Fed Chair Powell’s House testimony last week. “There’s nothing about this expansion that is unstable or unsustainable.” COVID-19 Update Chart 1What Happens In Hubei Our China Investment Strategy colleagues were encouraged by the latest Chinese data on the outbreak. Although they foresee that Wuhan, and quite possibly all of Hubei province, will be shut down through the end of March, they do not think the action will thwart China’s nascent growth recovery. In their estimation, domestic companies will be able to reroute their supply chains with minimal disruption. If the equity market avoids a virus-related plunge, as they expect, the economy may dodge the deleterious impact on confidence that might otherwise emerge. Our sanguine China outlook encountered some resistance from clients, who have been surprised at how swiftly markets seemed to put the outbreak aside, and skeptical of official reports that seemed a little too good to be true. We suggested that they employ a trust-but-verify approach similar to ours. We are taking official data as given, while using other countries’ data as a reasonableness check. We are monitoring the magnitude of PRC policy efforts to mitigate the virus’ drag and remaining vigilant for any signs of global supply chain disruptions. Bottom Line: Our China strategists were heartened by official reports indicating that the coronavirus has been mostly contained in Hubei province (Chart 1), but are actively seeking out other evidence for corroboration before concluding that the worst is over. Making Sense Of Declining Profit Margins As we showed last week, S&P 500 profit margins narrowed across 2019, with 2% EPS growth lagging 5% growth in per-share revenue. Margins do not remain fixed over time, but the contraction represented a notable shift after several years of steady margin expansion. Even when EPS declined on a year-over-year basis for four straight quarters across 2015 and 2016, margins mainly held their own as revenues, which contracted year-over-year for six consecutive quarters, had it worse (Chart 2). Chart 2Fun While It Lasted We primarily attribute last year’s decline to gains in labor’s share of income. Although average hourly earnings growth decelerated from 2018 to 2019, real unit labor cost growth flipped from negative to positive. Tariffs also likely detracted from income, as domestic businesses were surely not able to pass through all of their increased cost of goods sold to their customers against a backdrop of persistently low inflation and limited pricing power. Decelerating US and global growth was also a drag (Chart 3). Chart 3Growth Decelerated Everywhere In 2019 Have Profit Margins Peaked? Excepting meaningful structural changes, profit margins are a mean-reverting series. Following steady margin expansion over three business cycle expansions spanning nearly three decades, mean reversion is an unappealing prospect for equity investors (Chart 4). Unless corporate tax rates are raised, though, the mean going forward will be higher than the mean established when federal taxation was more onerous. Additionally, an in-depth Bank Credit Analyst study argued that profit margins have not grown as much as it would appear to the naked eye,1 but they are elevated, and their future direction will influence prospective equity returns. Chart 4Margins Have Thrived In The Last Three Expansions A definitive analysis of S&P 500 margins would compile detailed revenue and expense data for each constituent in the index, but compiling the bottom-up data would repeatedly bump up against inconsistent disclosure conventions across companies and industries. For now, we will have to content ourselves with what we can glean from top-down analysis. Margins shrank in 2019 because of rising real unit labor costs, increased tariffs and global growth deceleration. Employee compensation is far and away the single biggest expense item for businesses as a whole. Changes in compensation are therefore the most consistently critical driver of changes in margins. Other key factors include: overall economic growth, growth relative to capacity, globalization, competitive intensity, and growth of the capital stock. GDP Growth Over time, growth in a company’s revenues should converge with the weighted average of economic growth in the countries in which it operates. The sensitivity of any given company’s net income to changes in sales revenue depends on its operating leverage, but any company with at least some fixed costs will see its margins expand as sales rise. We expect that US GDP growth will moderate going forward, given that hoped-for increases in economic capacity do not appear to have offset the growth overhang from the stimulus package’s increased deficits.2 For the current year, however, we expect that an acceleration in non-US growth may largely offset moderating US growth for the aggregate S&P 500. (Chart 5) Chart 5Sales Growth Feeds Operating Leverage The Output Gap The degree of excess capacity in the economy is most easily proxied by the output gap, the difference between the economy’s actual output and its long-run potential output, which is a function of productivity and labor force growth. Pricing power is directly related to the output gap; it’s weak when the gap is negative, and robust when the gap is positive. Excess capacity is the enemy of profits, and margins benefit when it is worked off, even if positive output gaps can’t persist indefinitely (Chart 6). With the economy continuing to grow at close to its estimated trend rate, the output gap isn’t likely to have an impact this year. Globalization allows US companies to tap lower-cost inputs in the developing world. Chart 6Excess Capacity Erodes Pricing Power Globalization Globalization has been a major force promoting margin expansion over the last 20 to 30 years, granting US-domiciled businesses access to the developing world’s lower-cost inputs. Outsourcing saves money and global supply chains have significantly reduced product costs. Tariffs and other trade barriers are an obstacle to outsourcing, and it is our in-house geopolitical strategists’ view that the US will continue to backtrack from globalization no matter which party captures the White House in November. Changes in the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP provide a simple proxy for changes in the intensity of globalization (Chart 7). Chart 7More Open Borders = Higher Margins Competitiveness Margins are directly related to the intensity of globalization, but they are inversely related to the intensity of competition, which is itself inversely related to the degree of industry concentration. The laissez-faire approach to anti-trust enforcement which has generally prevailed since the Reagan administration has promoted concentration. Businesses gain pricing power as their industries move along the spectrum from perfect competition toward monopoly, just as they gain increasing power to set wages as individual labor markets move toward monopsony. Pressure for federal action to reverse the four-decade trend toward concentration will rise if the Democrats win the White House, especially as our Geopolitical Strategy service holds that the party that takes the presidency will also take the Senate. Productivity Changes in margins are directly related to the pace of productivity gains. Workers are able to do more in a given period of time when they’re endowed with more and/or better tools, and investment provides those tools. Increases in the size of the capital stock lead to productivity gains. The NFIB survey suggests that small businesses are poised to increase capital expenditures, and the capex intentions components of the regional Fed manufacturing surveys have begun pointing in that direction as well, but investment has consistently disappointed since the crisis (Chart 8), and productivity growth has been tepid for an extended period of time as a result. Chart 8Investment Pays Off In Higher Margins Unit Labor Costs Rising labor costs by themselves do not necessarily mean that margins will contract. If output increases more than rising wages, margins will expand. We therefore watch unit labor costs, which measure output-adjusted changes in compensation. Growth in real unit labor costs is our preferred measure for their additional insight into profitability, given that changes in the overall price level are a solid proxy for changes in sales prices. When real unit labor costs are falling, corporate margins are likely expanding as revenue gains can be expected to outpace employees’ compensation per unit of output. Given the especially tight labor market, we expect real unit labor costs to continue to rise, chipping away at profit margins (Chart 9). Chart 9Persistently Negative Real Unit Labor Costs Have Boosted Margins Taxes, Interest Rates And The Dollar The biggest driver of after-tax margins in recent years has been the 40% reduction in the top marginal federal corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21% beginning in 2018. We expect no material corporate tax changes if the president wins re-election, while we would expect that an incoming Democratic administration, fortified by House and Senate majorities, would prioritize increasing corporate tax revenues. We expect a modest rise in interest rates over the year, which is unlikely to materially impact firms’ interest expense. We expect that the dollar will weaken in 2020, as incremental growth in the rest of the world exceeds incremental growth in the US, providing the S&P 500 with a modest margin tailwind. Bottom Line: On balance, we expect that the S&P 500 will face modest margin headwinds in 2020. If the Democrats assume control of the White House and both houses of Congress next January, downward pressure on margins could intensify. Investment Implications Falling margins against a backdrop of tepid revenue growth suggest that 2020 S&P 500 earnings growth will be nothing to write home about. Stocks will have to get an assist from multiple expansion if they are to continue producing double-digit annual returns. We do not think multiple expansion is much of a stretch – it would be consistent with the latter stages of previous bull markets – but equities do not need to generate double-digit returns to top the prospective returns on offer from Treasuries, credit-sensitive fixed income or cash. As long as the margin compression unfolds slowly, equities will merit at least an equal-weight allocation in balanced portfolios as will spread product in dedicated fixed income portfolios. Corporate profit margins would quickly feel the burn in a Sanders administration. We expect that profit margins will compress slowly, as it remains our base case (albeit with limited conviction) that the president will win re-election. Under a Democratic regime, however, corporate tax rates would likely rise, anti-trust enforcement would likely unwind some of the buildup in industry concentration, and organized labor would gain a more sympathetic ear in Washington. If Bernie Sanders were to win the presidency instead of one of the Democratic moderates, margin compression would likely unfold much more rapidly (and multiples would be at immediate risk, to boot). The upcoming election is thus approaching something of a binary outcome for equities. We still see monetary policy as the swing factor for the ongoing expansion, and financial market returns, and we therefore remain constructive on the economy and risk assets. The election could upend that framework, however, passing the baton from the Fed to elected officials. We will be tracking the primary and general election ups and downs closely.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the October 2012 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Are US Corporate Profit Margins Really All That High?" available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2 The economic case for the stimulus package rested on the expectation that it would promote investment in the capital stock that would not otherwise occur (via immediate expensing of investments and repatriation of capital held overseas) and facilitate labor force participation. A capex burst that followed its passage quickly fizzled, and we are of the opinion that the minor provisions intended to expand labor force participation have had little effect.

Highlights Provided that the coronavirus outbreak is contained, global growth should accelerate over the course of 2020. Stocks usually rise when the economy is strengthening. But could this time be different? We explore five scenarios in which the stock market could decouple from the economy: 1) The economy holds up, but stretched valuations bring down equities, especially high-flying growth stocks; 2) Bond yields rise in response to faster growth, hurting equities in the process; 3) A strong US economy lifts the value of the dollar, denting multinational profits and tightening financial conditions abroad; 4) Faster wage growth cuts into corporate profits; and 5) Redistributionist politicians seek to shift income from capital to labor. We are not too concerned about the first four scenarios, but we do worry about the fifth, especially now that betting markets are giving Bernie Sanders a nearly 50% chance of becoming the Democratic nominee. Matters should be clearer by mid-March, by which time more than 60% of Democratic delegates will have been awarded. If Bernie Sanders does emerge as the nominee at that point, we will consider trimming back our bullish cyclical bias towards stocks. Coronavirus: A Break In The Clouds? Chart 1Coronavirus Remains Mostly Contained To China Investors continue to grapple with two distinct narratives about how the coronavirus outbreak is unfolding. On the pessimistic side, some contend that the true number of infections in China is much higher than the Chinese authorities are disclosing. How else, they ask, can one explain why the government has taken the extreme step of imposing some form of quarantine on 400 million of its own people? More optimistic observers argue that the Chinese government is simply being proactive. While the number of cases in Hubei province spiked yesterday, this was due to a loosening in the definition for what constitutes a confirmed infection. Whereas previously a positive laboratory test was required, now a positive imaging-based clinical examination will suffice. Under the new definition, the number of newly confirmed cases fell from 6,528 on February 11th to 4,273 on February 12th. Under the old definition, newly diagnosed cases peaked on February 2nd (Chart 1). The revised definition adopted in Hubei brought the mortality rate in the province down to 2.7%. The mortality rate observed in the rest of China is 0.5%. The share of all cases in China originating in Hubei also rose to 81%. Even before the rule change, the share of cases diagnosed in Hubei had risen from 52% on January 26th to 75% on February 11th. This suggests progress in limiting the outbreak to the province. Critically, the number of cases in the rest of the world remains low. In the US, a total of 13 cases have been confirmed as of February 12th, just two more than the 11 reported on February 2nd. The Exception To The Rule? Provided that the coronavirus outbreak is contained, global growth should bounce back forcefully in the second quarter. If that were to occur, history suggests that equities will continue to rally, while bond prices will fall (Chart 2). But could history fail to repeat itself? In this week’s report, we explore five scenarios in which that may happen. Scenario 1: Stretched valuations bring down equities, especially high-flying growth stocks Stocks have moved up considerably since their December 2018 lows. This suggests that investors have become more confident about the economic outlook. Nevertheless, while most investors may no longer be worried about an imminent recession, they do not foresee a sharp acceleration in global growth either. This is evidenced by the fact that cyclical stocks have generally underperformed defensives (Chart 3). Oil prices have also languished, while copper prices are back near a 2.5-year low (Chart 4). Chart 2Stocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 3Cyclicals Have Failed To Outperform Defensives   At the broad index level, global equities trade at 16.7-times forward earnings. Conceptually, the inverse of the PE ratio – the earnings yield – should serve as a reasonable guide for the total real return that equities will deliver over the long haul.1 At 6%, the global earnings yield still points to decent returns for global stocks. Relative to bonds, the case for owning stocks is even more compelling. The equity risk premium, which one can compute as the earnings yield minus the real bond yield, remains well above its historic average (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Prices Have Taken It On The Chin Chart 5Relative Valuations Favor Equities   That said, there are pockets where valuations have gotten stretched. US equities trade at 19.5-times forward earnings compared to 14.1-times in the rest of the world. Growth stocks, in particular, have gotten very expensive (Chart 6). The five largest stocks in the S&P 500 (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook) now account for 18% of the index, the same share that the top five stocks (Microsoft, Cisco, GE, Intel, and Exxon) commanded in 2000. The big risk for stocks is that wages go up not because the overall size of the economic pie is growing, but because policies are implemented that shift a bigger share of the pie from capital to labor. Despite the similarities between today and the dotcom era, there are a few critical differences – most of which make us less worried about the current state of affairs. First, while tech valuations are currently stretched, they are not in bubble territory. The NASDAQ Composite trades at 30-times trailing earnings. At its peak in March 2000, the tech-heavy index traded at more than 70-times earnings (Chart 7). Chart 6Growth Stocks Have Become Expensive Relative To Value Stocks Chart 7Not Yet Partying Like 1999   Second, IPO activity has also been more muted today than during the dotcom boom (Chart 8). Only 110 companies went public last year, with the gain on the first day of trading averaging 24%. In 1999, 476 companies went public. The average first day gain was 71%. Meanwhile, companies continue to buy up their shares. The buyback yield stands at 3%, twice as high as in the late 1990s. Third, there is no capex overhang like in the late 1990s (Chart 9). This reduces the odds of a 2001-recession scenario where falling equity prices prompted companies to pare back capital expenditures, leading to rising unemployment and even lower equity prices. Chart 8IPO Activity Is Muted Today Compared To The Late 1990s Chart 9No Capex Boom This Time   Scenario 2: Bond yields rise in response to faster growth, hurting equities in the process The period between November 2018 and September 2019 was an odd one for the stock-to-bond correlation. If one looks at daily data, stocks did best when bond yields were rising. Yet, for the period as a whole, stocks finished higher while bond yields finished lower (Chart 10). Chart 10Daily Changes: S&P 500 Vs. 10-Year Treasury Yield How can one explain this seeming paradox? The answer is that the underlying trend in bond yields was squarely to the downside last year. While yields did rise modestly on days when equities rallied, yields fell sharply on days when equities swooned. If one zooms out, one sees the underlying trend, whereas if one zooms in, one only sees the wiggles around the trend. Bond yields trended lower last year because the Fed and most other central banks were delivering one dose of dovish medicine after another. This year, however, the Fed is on hold, and while a few central banks may still cut rates, global monetary policy is unlikely to become much looser. This means that bond yields are likely to drift higher if economic growth surprises on the upside. Will rising bond yields sabotage the stock market? We do not think so. Stocks crashed in late 2018 because investors became convinced that US monetary policy had turned restrictive after the Fed had raised rates by a cumulative 200 basis points over the prior two years. The fact that the Laubach-Williams model, one of the most widely followed models of the neutral rate, showed that real rates had moved above their equilibrium level did not help sentiment (Chart 11). Chart 11The Fed Will Keep Policy Easy For The Time Being Chart 12Stocks Do Well When Earnings And Growth Surprise On The Upside Today, real rates are about 100 basis points below the Laubach-Williams estimate. This will not change anytime soon, given that the Fed is likely to remain on hold at least until the end of the year. So long as rates stay put, monetary policy will remain accommodative, allowing the economy to grow at a solid pace. Granted, rising long-term bond yields will reduce the present value of future cash flows, thus potentially hurting stocks. However, as we discussed three weeks ago, the discount rate is not the only thing that affects equity valuations.2 The expected growth rate of earnings matters too. As Chart 12 shows, global equity returns are highly sensitive to earning revisions. While earnings may disappoint in the first quarter due to the economic damage from the coronavirus, they should bounce back during the remainder of this year. This should pave the way for higher equity prices. Scenario 3: A strong US economy lifts the value of the dollar, denting multinational profits and tightening financial conditions abroad The US is a fairly closed economy. Imports and exports account for only 14.6% and 11.7% of GDP, respectively. In contrast, the US stock market is very exposed to the rest of the world. S&P 500 companies derive over 40% of their sales from abroad. As such, changes in the value of the dollar tend to have a bigger impact on Wall Street than on Main Street. Estimating the degree to which a stronger dollar reduces S&P 500 profits is no easy task. Direct estimates that measure the currency translation effect on overseas profits from a stronger dollar tend to yield fairly modest results, typically showing that a 10% appreciation in the trade-weighted dollar reduces S&P 500 profits by about 2%. These estimates, however, generally do not take into account feedback loops between a strengthening dollar and global financial conditions (Chart 13). According to the Bank of International Settlements, $12 trillion of dollar-denominated debt has been issued outside the US. A stronger dollar makes it more challenging to service this debt, which can put a significant strain on borrowers. As a result, a vicious cycle can erupt where a stronger dollar leads to tighter financial conditions, which in turn lead to weaker global growth and an even stronger dollar. Chart 13A Strong US Dollar Could Tighten Global Financial Conditions, Leading To Lower Equity Prices, Especially In EM Such an outcome cannot be dismissed, especially if the spread of the coronavirus fuels significant foreign inflows into the safe-haven US Treasury market. Nevertheless, we continue to see it as a low-probability event given the tailwinds to global growth, including the lagged effects of last year’s decline in bond yields, an improvement in the global manufacturing inventory cycle, diminished Brexit and trade war risks, and ongoing policy stimulus out of China. In fact, one can more easily envision the opposite outcome – a virtuous cycle of dollar weakness, leading to easier global financial conditions, stronger growth, and ultimately, an even weaker dollar (Chart 14). In such an environment, earnings growth is likely to accelerate (Chart 15). Chart 14The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 15The Virtuous Cycle Of Dollar Easing     Scenario 4: Faster wage growth cuts into corporate profits Labor compensation is the largest expense for most companies. Thus, it stands to reason that faster wage growth could depress earnings, and by extension, share prices. Although this is possible conceptually, in practice, it happens less often than one might guess. Chart 16 shows that rising wage growth is positively correlated with earnings. The bottom panel of the chart explains why: Wages tend to rise most quickly when sales are growing rapidly. Strong demand growth adds to revenues, while allowing companies to spread fixed costs over a large amount of output. The resulting improvement in “operating leverage” helps buffer profit margins from higher wages. Scenario 5: Redistributionist politicians seek to shift income from capital to labor As long as wages are rising against a backdrop of fast sales growth, equities will fare well. The big risk for stocks is that wages go up not because the overall size of the economic pie is growing, but because policies are implemented that shift a bigger share of the pie from capital to labor. Bernie Sanders has promised to do just that. The S&P 500 has tended to increase when Sanders’ perceived chances of winning the Democrat nomination have risen (Chart 17). Investors have apparently concluded that Trump would clobber Sanders in a presidential race. Hence, the better Sanders performs in the primaries, the more likely Trump is to be re-elected. Chart 16Stocks Tend To Do Best When Wage Growth Is Rising Chart 17The Sanders Effect On Stocks   Is this really a safe assumption? We are not so sure. Sanders has still beaten Trump in 49 of the last 54 head-to-head polls tracked by Realclearpolitics over the past 12 months. Sanders tends to appeal to white working class voters – the same demographic that propelled Trump into office. Sanders is also benefiting from a secular leftward shift in voter attitudes on economic issues. According to a recent Gallup poll, 47% of Americans believe that governments should do more to solve problems, up from 36% in 2010. Almost 40% of Americans have a positive view on socialism (Chart 18). Today’s youth in particular is enamored with left-wing ideology (Chart 19). Chart 18The US Is Moving To The Left Chart 19Woke Millennials Cozying Up To Socialism It’s not just the Democratic voters who are trending left. Some prominent Republicans are having second thoughts too. Tucker Carlson is probably the best leading indicator for where the Republican Party is heading. His attacks on “woke capitalism” have become a staple of his popular evening show.3 It is not surprising why many Republicans are having a change of heart. For decades, the Republican Party has been a cheap date for corporate interests: It has given businesses what they want – lower taxes, less regulation, etc. – without asking for much in return (aside from campaign contributions, of course). This has allowed corporations to focus on appealing to left-wing interests by taking increasingly strident positions on a variety of social issues. The fact that some of these positions – such as support for open-border immigration policies – are a boon for profits has only increased their appeal. The risk for corporations is that they end up with no real political support. If the Democrats move further to the left, “soak the rich” policies will become popular no matter how much virtue signaling corporate leaders deliver. Likewise, if Republicans abandon big businesses, today’s fat profit margins will become a thing of the past. When The Music Ends The current market climate resembles a Parisian ball on the eve of the French Revolution. The music is still playing, but the discontent among the commoners outside is growing. The question is when will this discontent boil over? Trump’s victory in 2016 represented a shot across the bow of the political establishment. Fortunately for corporate interests, aside from his protectionist impulses, Trump has been on their side. Bernie Sanders would not be so friendly. Matters should be clearer by mid-March. Super Tuesday takes place on March 3rd. By March 17th, more than 60% of Democratic delegates will have been awarded. If Bernie Sanders emerges as the likely nominee at that point, we will consider trimming back our bullish cyclical 12-month bias towards stocks. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019. 2  Please see Global investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Yields: How High Is Too High?” dated January 17, 2020. 3  Ian Schwartz, “Tucker Carlson: Elizabeth Warren's "Economic Patriotism" Plan "Sounds Like Donald Trump At His Best," realclearpolitics, June 6, 2019. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

What matters for stocks, aside from interest rates, is EPS growth. On that front, the Street continues to expect 10% profit growth for calendar 2020 which is a tall order according to our “Three EPS Scenarios” analysis in mid-January, warning that the SPX is still 8% overvalued as per our base case EPS and multiple scenario. The tech sector sits atop the contribution to earnings growth table and leads its peers by a wide margin. Health care and financials occupy the second and third spots. While these rankings are more or less in line with the sector profit and market cap weights, what stands out is the delta between the market cap and earnings weights (see Table). According to this valuation proxy, tech, consumer discretionary and real estate sectors are the most expensive, while financials, health care, and energy are the cheapest. Bottom Line: We remain underweight real estate and consumer discretionary, neutral on tech and overweight all three most undervalued sectors: financials, health care and energy. For more details, please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report.