Asset Allocation

Special Report

Highlights Clients frequently ask us what long-term returns they should assume when constructing strategic portfolios. In this report, we use a range of methodologies to arrive at reasonable return assumptions for bonds, equities, alternative assets, and currencies on a 10-15 year investment horizon. We conclude that global bonds are likely to return around 1.5% in nominal terms (compared to 5.3% over the past 20 years), and global equities 4.6% (compared to 6.1%). Alternative assets look rather more attractive with, for example, private equity projected to return 9% and real estate 7.1%. Nonetheless, the typical pension fund portfolio, consisting of 50% equities, 30% fixed income, and 20% alts, will be unable to achieve its return target (still typically 7% or higher). Feature Pension plan sponsors and wealth managers need realistic assumptions about the likely returns from different assets in order to construct strategic portfolios, for example when calculating the efficient frontier using a mean-variance optimizer (MVO). Using historical data is the simplest way to do this, but can be very misleading: for example, global bonds have delivered an annual nominal return of 5.3% over the past 20 years but, with bond yields currently so low, it is almost mathematically impossible for them to return anything close to that over coming years (our estimate for future returns is 1.5%). This Special Report is our attempt to produce long-run return assumptions for strategic portfolios, something that GAA clients frequently ask us for. We want to emphasize that these are reasonable assumptions, not forecasts. The value of forecasting the world economy over the next decade or more is questionable. Consider if we had carried out this exercise in 2002: how likely is it that we would have predicted the rise and fall of emerging markets, the U.S. housing crisis, and the subsequent "secular stagnation"? Our analysis, therefore, is mostly based on the philosophy that long-run historical relationships (for example, credit spreads, or the excess return of small cap stocks) are fairly constant, and that most variables (profit margins, valuation, productivity) mean revert over the long term. Our time horizon is 10-15 years. We chose this - rather than the five or seven years that is perhaps more common in such analyses - because it is closer to the investment horizon of pension funds and most individual investors. It also allows us to avoid making a call on where we are currently in the cycle, and how long the next recession and expansion will last. It is likely we are close to the peak of the current economic expansion and equity bull market (the "X" on Chart 1): choosing a shorter time horizon would mean making judgements about the timing of the cycle. Conceptually, we prefer to forecast the trend line on the chart. Chart 1Stylized Trend Versus Cyclical Movements Our assumptions are inevitably approximate. In many cases (particularly for equity returns), we use multiple methodologies and take the average result. Does it matter that the estimation error of our assumptions is likely to be large? Most academic evidence finds not.1 The reason is that, for closely correlated assets, errors in the return estimates (and therefore the optimal weights in a portfolio) will not greatly affect a portfolio's risk and return; while, for assets that are very different, errors in the estimates will not have much effect on the optimal portfolio weights. Rough estimates, therefore, are sufficient for portfolio construction purposes. In any case, using common-sense projections is better than unrealistic historical averages, and investors do need some assumptions to work with when constructing portfolios. How To Forecast Economic Growth A key input (especially when considering earnings growth, which is one factor driving equity returns) is the likely rate of economic growth in various countries and regions over our time horizon. Our simplified way of deriving this is to assume that GDP growth is a factor of (1) demographics (specifically, the growth in the population of working age), and (2) productivity growth. (We assume that capital intensity is steady.) For the demographic assumptions, we use the United Nations' median forecast of the annual growth in population aged 25-64 between 2015 and 2030 (Table 1). Productivity growth is harder to estimate. Productivity has been poor in recent years compared to history (Chart 2). There is significant uncertainty about whether this is caused by cyclical factors (the Great Recession, for example) or structural factors (the end of positive effects from the IT revolution etc.), and whether a potential new wave of technology (artificial intelligence, self-driving vehicles) will raise productivity in future. Table 1Demographic Assumptions Chart 2Productivity Growth Our approach is to assume that productivity in the U.S. will return to its 40-year average, and that productivity growth in the main European economies will be 50 bp lower than the U.S. and in Japan 80 bp lower (in line with recent averages). The estimate is harder for emerging markets, so we use two scenarios: one in which structural reforms, particularly in China, bring productivity growth back up to the average of the past 10 years, 3.5%; and a second scenario in which governments fail to reform, and therefore productivity growth continues to fall to only 1%. For inflation, we assume that central banks over the long-term largely achieve their current inflation goals. The results of our assumptions for GDP growth are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the summary of our results: the 10-15 year return assumptions for all the assets in our analysis. We also show historic returns and volatility for comparison (for the past 20 years, where data is available). Below, we describe in detail how we arrived at these numbers. Table 2GDP Growth Assumptions Table 3BCA Assumed Returns All our results are shown in nominal terms and in local currencies. While strictly speaking, it might be theoretically better to estimate real returns, in practice most investors and advisers tend to work on a nominal basis. Moreover, since we have made assumptions for inflation in each region, it is simple to translate our nominal returns into real ones. There is also a trade-off between inflation and currency movements (and interest rates). At the end of the report, we consider the impact of relative inflation rates on currency returns, allowing investors to work the returns back into their own currencies. 1. Fixed income We start from a base that is known: the return on long-term government bonds. If an investor today buys a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, his or her annual nominal return over the next 10 years will almost certainly be 2.3% (today's yield). The only uncertainties come from (1) reinvesting coupons at the future rate of interest, but the impact of this is small, and (2) the (presumably minimal) risk of a U.S. government default. Of course, investors do not own just 10-year bonds, and indeed the average duration of U.S. Treasuries is currently 5.7 years. But changes in interest rates make relatively little difference to future returns: a rise in interest rates causes a capital loss but a higher yield on rolled-over positions after bonds mature (though, admittedly, the convexity effect is greater when rates are low, as they are now). Even if interest rates were to double over the next decade, the return from U.S. Treasuries would fall only to around 1.5% and, if interest rates fell to 0%, the return would be only about 3%. Moreover, the effect diminishes over time as more bonds are redeemed at par. Empirically, we can see that there is a strong correlation between starting yield on 10-year bonds and long-term returns from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 3). Chart 3Government Bond Returns Driven By The Starting Yield For our cash assumption, we first calculate a proxy for the current cash yield using the average spread between 10-year government bonds and three-month bills over a long-run history (using data from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton which goes back to 1900 and covers a range of countries, Table 4).2 While it is true that the yield curve steepens and flatten along with the cycle, the average yield curve shape should be a good proxy for long-term future expected returns. Of course, this assumes that the term premium comes back. It may not if bonds now are a good hedge against recession risk. However, we also need to take into account that interest rates and inflation are likely to change over the next 10-15 years. We assume that both will rise to an equilibrium level over that time. Our assumption is that central banks will get close to hitting their inflation targets (in the U.S., 2% on PCE inflation, which translates into 2.5% on CPI; in Europe, "around but below 2%"; and in Japan, 2%). For the equilibrium real rate, we take BCA's current estimate (Chart 4) and assume a small rise over the next decade as some of the after-effects of the Great Recession and secular stagnation wear off: to 0.4% in the U.S., -0.1% in the euro area, and -0.2% in Japan. Table 4Historic Spread Government Bonds To Bills (1900-2016) Chart 4Current Equilibrium Real Rates Our calculation of the return from cash over the 10-15 year horizon is based on a steady rise from the current cash return to that implied by the inflation and equilibrium real rate assumptions (Table 5). Table 5Calculation Of Assumption For Cash Return For other fixed-income instruments, we make the following assumptions: Government bonds. We assume that the spread between 10-year and 7-year bonds and 3-month bills will be similar to the historical average (Chart 5), and calculate the return from the government bond index based on this and our estimate for 10-year returns, adjusted by the duration of outstanding bonds in the index: 5.7 years for the U.S., 7.1 for Europe and 8.6 for Japan. For U.S. investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, we take the average spread, default rate, and recovery rate in history (Table 6). Obviously, spreads and default rates, especially for high-yield bonds, also jump around massively over the cycle (Chart 6), but we think it is reasonable to assume in our long-term projections that they revert to the mean. Reliable data for European and Japanese credit has a short history but, over the past 10 years, spreads and default rates have been similar to the U.S., so we use the U.S. assumptions for these markets too. Chart 5Yield Curves Table 6U.S. Corporate Credit Assumptions Chart 6Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Government-related bonds and securitized bonds (MBS, ABS etc.) are an important part of the Barclay's Aggregate Bond indexes: in the U.S., for example, securitized bonds comprise 31% of the index, and government-related ones 7%; in Europe, the weights are 8% and 17% respectively. For our projections of government-related bonds, we assume historic average spreads will continue (Table 7). For securitized bonds, we assume that the historic average spread in the U.S. will continue, and will be the same in Europe and Japan (where historic data is less readily available). Inflation-linked bonds. We assume that the average real yield of the past 10 years, 0%, will continue in future (Chart 7). Table 7Spreads Over Government Bonds Chart 7Real Yield On U.S. TIPs 2. Equities There are a number of ways to think about forward equity returns, all with a high degree of uncertainty. These could be based on starting valuations (but which valuation measure to use?); related to likely earnings growth in future years (hard to forecast); or based on a reversion to the mean of valuations and profits. We decided to take a range of different measures, and average the results. In practice, the results are similar, except for emerging markets (see below for more on EM). Table 8 summarizes the equity return calculations. Table 8Equity Return Calculations AVERAGE EQUITY The thinking behind the six measures we use is as follows. Equity risk premium (ERP). The most obvious methodology: historically, over the long run equities have returned more than government bonds. But which risk premium to use? Dimson, Marsh and Staunton's work includes the excess performance of equities over bonds since 1900 for a range of countries (Table 9). We decided not to choose a different ERP for each developed region, as the historical data would suggest, since it is difficult to argue that the U.S. is likely to be riskier in future than Europe and since, for parts of this history, Japan and the U.S. were essentially emerging markets. We, therefore, take a rounded average of world ERP over the past 116 years, 3.5%. For emerging markets, we multiply this by the average beta of EM relative to global equities over the past 30 years, 1.2, to give an ERP of 4.2%. Growth model. Think of a Gordon Growth Model, which defines the return from equities as the starting dividend yield plus future earnings growth (strictly speaking, dividend growth; we are assuming that the payout ratio will stay constant). We need to make a couple of adjustments to this. First, earnings growth has historically been correlated to nominal GDP growth but has lagged it - in the U.S. by 1.5 percentage points in the period 1918-2016 - although, since 1981, earnings have grown significantly faster than GDP (Chart 8). For the future, we assume that the long-run lag returns. Second, we need to add share buybacks to the dividend yield since, in some countries, such as the U.S., for tax reasons companies prefer to buy back shares rather than increase dividends. However, we should do this on a net basis since equity holders are penalized by companies that issue new shares. In the U.S. net equity withdrawal has been 0.3% over the past 10 years, but in both Europe and Japan, annual net new equity issuance has averaged 1.6% (Chart 9). In EM, the dilution has been even more extreme, averaging 6% over the past 10 years (and much more over the past 25 years). We subtract this dilution from future returns. Table 9Equity Excess Return Over Bonds Chart 8U.S. EPS Growth Versus Nominal GDP Growth Chart 9Net Equity Issuance Growth plus reversion to the mean. This takes the Gordon Growth Model but adds to it an assumption that PE multiples and profit margins revert to the historical mean. We again use dividend yield adjusted by net equity issuance. We assume that the current trailing PE and profit margin revert to the average since 1980 (see Table 8 above for the data) over the next 10 years. In the U.S., PE and margins are currently somewhat higher than history, but this is less the case in Europe or Japan (Charts 10 and 11). Additionally, assuming that the mean reversion happens over 10 years means that the effect on annual returns is not especially large, even for the U.S. Chart 10Net Profit Margin Chart 11Trailing PE History Earnings yield (EY). The simplest of the three valuation measures we use, the assumption is that companies reward shareholders either by paying them a dividend this year, or by reinvesting retained earnings to pay dividends in future. If you assume (admittedly a rash assumption) that the future return on investment will be similar to the current return on investment, it should be immaterial how the company pays out to shareholders. Therefore, the trailing earnings yield (1/PE ratio) should be a good proxy for future returns. Empirically, the relationship between earnings yield and 10-year future returns has been quite strong (Chart 12). However, returns have been somewhat higher on average than the EY would indicate (between 1900 and 2006, 9.7% versus an average EY of 7.5%) mainly because of rising PE multiples since 1980 (Chart 13). We think it unlikely that valuations will continue to rise, and so the EY should be a reasonable guide to future returns. Chart 12Earnings Yield And 10-Year Future Returns Chart 13Trailing Price/Earnings Multiple S&P500 Shiller PE. The cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE, or Shiller PE) - the current share price divided by the 10 year average of historic inflation-adjusted earnings - has historically had a good correlation with future long-term returns (Chart 14). A regression model of this indicates that the current Shiller PE points to long-run forward returns for the U.S. of 4.9%, for Japan 3.6%, Europe 8.5% and EM 10.8%. Valuation composite. The Shiller PE has some flaws, for example in using a fixed 10-year period for earnings when the length of cycles varies. It has not necessarily mean-reverted in history (perhaps because of long-term trends in interest rates, which it doesn't take into account). It may be more reasonable, then, to use a mixture of different valuation metrics. BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator has had a good correlation with long-run future returns (Chart 15).3 A regression model of this indicator against 15-year returns currently points to returns from the U.S. of 5.2%, Europe of 4.1%, Japan 5.1% and EM 11.0%. Small-cap stocks. We take the 2.4% excess annual return of small cap stocks over large caps in the U.S. for 1926-2016, as calculated by Dimson, Marsh & Staunton. Chart 14Shiller PE Versus ##br##15-Year Equity Return Chart 15Composite Valuation Measure Versus ##br##Long-Run Future Returns Emerging Markets The return assumption for emerging market equity returns has a much higher degree of uncertainty. On our three valuation measures, EM equities look attractive: the average return expectation of the three valuation indicators points to an annual return of 9.4%. However, the growth outlook is murky: as described above, a wave of structural reform in emerging markets, especially China, would be necessary to keep productivity - and, therefore, earnings growth - up, in order for returns to be as good as the current valuation level suggests. Another worry is the degree of equity dilution: it has averaged 6% a year over the past 10 years, and is unlikely to fall much unless corporate governance improves significantly. The range of expected returns derived from our various methodologies, therefore, varies from -1% to +11% a year. Moreover, as described in the currency section below, investors should expect a depreciation in some EM currencies over the next decade, which will also eat into returns. However, due to the influence of China, where the currency is projected to appreciate almost 2% a year against the USD, the EM equity index will see an overall boost to USD-based returns due to the currency effect. 3. Alternative Assets We consider the likely future returns for nine of the 10 alternative assets that Global Asset Allocation regularly covers (we omit wine, which is hard to value on the basis of fundamental macro factors and, anyway, is owned by few institutional investors).4 Alts are harder to forecast than public securities since data is less easily available (and may be only quarterly and based on estimated values), and since some alternative assets have not existed in their current form for very long (venture capital, for example). Moreover, alternative assets tend to have non-normal returns with skewed distributions. Table 10 shows the historical returns and volatility of the nine alternative asset classes both over the longest period for which we have data, and since 1997, when we have data for all of them. Table 10Returns And Volatility For Alternative Assets We, therefore, take a more ad hoc approach, projecting each asset class differently. Generally, we assume that future returns will look similar to historical ones. Specifically, the assumptions we use are as follows. Hedge funds. We assume a return of cash + 3.5%. Hedge fund returns have trended down over time (Chart 16), as more entrants have arbitraged away alpha. We choose to use the average return over cash of the past 10 years, 3.5% (net of fees). It is unlikely that hedge funds returns will rise back anywhere close to earlier levels, for example that of the 1990s when they returned cash +14%. Chart 16Hedge Fund Historic Returns U.S. Direct real estate. We find reasonably good results (R2 = 24%) from regressing U.S. nominal GDP growth against real estate returns. The regression equation is 1.25 x nominal GDP growth + 1.9%. Conceptually, this probably represents a cap rate plus growth of capital values slightly higher than economic growth due to supply shortages in certain key locations. We project real estate to return 7.2% annually. One risk to this assumption, however, is that commercial real estate prices are already above the previous peak from 2007; high valuations may dampen future returns. U.S. REITs. We find only weak correlations with direct real estate investment, although REITs have outperformed real estate over time (perhaps because of the inbuilt leverage of REITs). Over time, REITs have become increasingly correlated with equities. We, therefore, use a regression against U.S. equity returns (R2 = 42%), with REIT returns 0.49 x equity returns + 7.7%. This indicates 10.1% annual return from REITs in the long run. U.S. Private equity (PE). In the past, returns from private equity have been 5 or 6 percentage points higher than from public equities. This is most likely due to their higher leverage, bias towards small-cap companies, and stronger shareholder control over the companies they invest in; it can also be thought of as an illiquidity premium. However, it seems likely that excess returns will be lower in future given the bigger size of the PE industry now and relatively high valuations currently. Moreover, the PE industry currently has almost USD 1 Trn in dry power (uninvested capital), a sign that investment opportunities are limited. We assume, therefore, a slightly lower premium over public equities in future of 4 ppts. This results in a total annual return of 9.5%. U.S. Venture capital (VC). Historically (using data since 1986) VC returns have been 0.6 ppts higher than for PE (probably representing a premium for greater risk and smaller size of the companies invested in). We assume 0.5 ppt higher return in future. This leads to a return assumption of 10%. U.S. Structured products. As discussed in the fixed income section above, we use the 20-year average spread over the aggregate bond index of 0.7 ppt. Total assumed return, therefore, is 3.3%. U.S. Farmland. The value of farmland has risen by an average of 4.4% a year since 1920, a period which included five agricultural cycles. We assume that the value of land will continue to rise at the same rate. We think this is a reasonable assumption since, although nominal GDP growth in the U.S. may be lower in future than in the past, global demand for food is likely to continue to grow rapidly. The total return from investment in farm land, using a regression, produces: growth of farm land value x 1.81 + 0.64% = 8.6%. Chart 17Long-Term Commodity Prices U.S. Timberland is more defensive than farmland since trees can be stored "on the stump" and don't need to be harvested each year in the way that crops do even when prices are unattractive. Historically, timberland has returned about 1 ppt less a year than farmland, and we assume that this will continue. Commodities move in long-run cycles, with a commodity super-cycle of around 10 years, in which prices rise by 3-4x, followed by a bear market of 20 or 30 years in which they fall or stagnate (Chart 17). This is driven by a build-up of excess supply, because of the capex done during the super-cycle, and often by a structural shift on the demand side too. We see no reason why this pattern should change, with China's re-engineering of its economy away from dependence on infrastructure spending likely to be a particularly important factor over the next decade. We assume that commodity prices will, over the current bear market (now about five years old), fall by the same amount and over the same number of years as the average of previous bear markets since the 19th century. This means they have 16% further to fall over 200 months, giving a return of -1% a year. 4. Currencies Most investors are unable or unwilling to fully hedge currency exposure over very long periods. So, a consideration of how returns from different countries' assets might be affected by relative currency movements over the next 10-15 years is an important element in calculating likely returns. Fortunately, for developed market currencies at least, there is a simple, and historically fairly reliable, way to make assumptions of currency movements: reversion to purchasing power parity. As shown in Chart 18, major currencies have fairly consistently reverted to their PPP over the long run. So we can forecast likely future currency movements as a combination of 1) how far away the currency is currently from PPP against the U.S. dollar, and 2) the likely change in the PPP over the period. The latter we calculate from the IMF's forecasts of relative consumer inflation between each country and the U.S. (the IMF makes this forecast only for the next five years, but we assume that the differential continues at the same rate after 2022). Table 11 shows that most major currencies are expected to rise against the U.S. dollar over the coming decade or so. Except for Australia, they are likely to have slightly lower inflation. And - again with the exception of Australia - they all look a little undervalued currently relative to the USD. Table 11Assumed Annual Change Versus U.S. Dollar Over Next 10-15 Years Unfortunately, this approach does not work for EM currencies. They have historically traded at a level consistently well below PPP. This is mainly because, while tradable goods prices tend to be driven by international prices movements and relative unit labor costs, local services prices (which cannot be arbitraged across borders) do not. Also, inflation in emerging markets has historically been much higher than in the U.S. (Chart 19), meaning that their PPP has shifted significantly lower over time. However, China's inflation is now not dissimilar to that of the U.S. (the IMF forecasts it will be only 50 basis points a year higher over the coming five years). And China has shown some tendency for the currency to move towards PPP - 20 years ago the RMB was 190% below PPP; now it is "only" 97% below. Chart 18Reversion To PPP Chart 19U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation We, therefore, take an alternative approach to estimating currency returns for EM economies. We run a regression analysis of the annual change in each country's exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar against its CPI inflation relative to the U.S. We find mostly acceptable r-squared scores (ranging from 57% for Turkey to 1% for Taiwan). For most countries, the intercept is positive (suggesting the currency is trending over time towards PPP) and the coefficient for CPI is, as expected, negative (Table 12). Table 12Calculations For EM Currency Moves A number of EM currencies, on this analysis, would be expected to depreciate against the U.S. dollar over coming years, including Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. But, weighting the countries by their weights in the MSCI ACWI index, on average the EM universe would be expected to see a currency appreciation against the U.S. dollar of around 2% a year. This is largely due to the influence of China, which has a 29% weight in the EM index. This would be a much better result than the past 10 years when, for example, the Brazilian real has depreciated by 12% a year, the Indonesian rupiah by 16% and the Turkish lira by 37%. This could be because the IMF forecasts of future inflation (4.9% for India, 4.5% for Brazil and 4.1% for Russia), are too optimistic. They are certainly much better than these countries have achieved in the past 10 years (8.0% in India, 6.2% in Brazil, and 9.2% in Russia). Conclusion Arriving at assumptions for future returns is as much an art as a science. Our analysis is based principally on the concept that the future will be similar to long-term history (but not necessarily to the history of the past 30 years, which in many ways were abnormal for financial markets with, for example, a continuous decline in interest rates and inflation). Obviously, therefore, a very different macro environment over the next 10-15 years (for example, one in which inflation spiked, or secular stagnation deepened) would produce a very different results for economic growth and interest rates. However, it will be clear from our analysis that a great deal of the long-term return for equities and bonds is derived from the valuation at the start. Given that current valuations in almost all asset classes are expensive relative to history, this implies that future portfolio returns will be poor compared to recent, and long-term, history. Based on our return assumptions, a typical global portfolio (with 50% equities, 30% bonds, and 20% alternatives) will produce a nominal return of only 4.1% a year over the next decade or so, and a similar U.S. portfolio only 4.6%. This compares to 6.3% and 7.0% over the past 20 years. For pension funds which assume an 7.5% or 8% annual return (as many in the U.S. do), or individual investors planning their retirement on the basis of, say, a 5% annual real return, that outcome would come as a nasty shock. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For the best summary of the evidence on this, please see A Practitioner's Guide To Asset Allocation, by William Kinlaw, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington, Wiley 2017. 2 Please see Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2017 by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, February 2017 3 BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator comprises, for the U.S.: market value of equities / non-financial gross value added adjusted for foreign revenues, trailing PE, Shiller PE, and price to sales. And for other regions: divided yield, market Cap/GDP, trailing PE, price to book, forward PE, price to cash flow, price to sales, and enterprise value/total assets. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Alternative Assets: More Important Than Ever", dated 11 March 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Appendix Correlation Matrix

Highlights There are a number of cracks emerging in global risk assets. Not only have U.S. junk bond prices recently posted sharp declines, but a number of economic and financial market developments within EM also warrant investors' close attention. In particular: Feature The EM manufacturing PMI has rolled over at relatively low levels, despite continued strength in advanced economies' manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Importantly, the trend in relative manufacturing PMIs heralds EM equity underperformance against DM bourses (Chart 2). Chart 1EM Manufacturing: Rolling Over Chart 2EM Stocks To Underperform DM Stocks The Shanghai Container Freight Index has relapsed in recent months. This index has been a good indicator for EM/Asian export volumes (Chart 3, top panel). That said, DRAM semiconductor prices continue to surge (Chart 3, bottom panel). DRAM prices have jumped five-fold in less than two years, justifying the massive rally in semiconductors' stock prices. It is hard to know how long and how far the ascent in DRAM prices will continue. Nevertheless, our hunch is that non-technology exports in Asia will slow down, regardless of what happens in the global technology sector. Consistently, we expect EM non-technology stocks to relapse sooner than later, even as tech stocks remain a wild card. Global and EM tech stocks rallied exponentially and appear to be in a mania phase that could make any reasonable assessment and investment strategy off-mark. Weighing the pros and cons, we continue to recommend overweighting the tech sector within the EM universe, even as the outlook for their absolute performance remains highly uncertain. Within EM tech, we favor semi stocks (Samsung and TSMC) versus internet and social media stocks. The sheer magnitude of the EM equity rally has been driven by a few names such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, Samsung and TSMC. Their combined market cap as a share of the overall MSCI EM equity index has risen to 19%. Remarkably, the equal-weighted MSCI EM stock index has massively underperformed the market cap-weighted MSCI EM equity index (Chart 4, top panel). In contrast, the same measure for DM equities has held up much better (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asian/EM Exports At Risk Chart 4A Perspective On Internal Equity Dynamics: EM And DM EM stock prices have been firm so far despite the rebound in the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 5). As the greenback continues to advance, odds are that EM share prices will dive, as occurred in 2014 and 2015. In China, the effects of triple tightening - the liquidity squeeze by the central bank, the regulatory clampdown on banks and shadow banking by the Banking Regulatory Commission, and the anti-corruption drive that is targeting the financial industry - are gaining momentum. Onshore corporate bond yields and credit spreads over government bonds have risen further since the end of the most recent Party Congress. One of the reasons why policymakers are tightening is to rein in the enormous excesses prevalent in the credit, money and property markets that have developed in recent years. Given that advanced economies have now recovered, the Chinese authorities feel more confident to tighten domestically. Finally, while less recognized by the investment community, inflationary pressures have been rising in China. Although still at 2.25%, core consumer price inflation is clearly trending up, warranting a policy response (Chart 6, top panel). This is especially true given that real deposit rates - deflated by core consumer price inflation - have plummeted into negative territory (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5U.S. Dollar Rebound = EM Pullback Chart 6China: Beware Of Rising Inflation Consistent with tightening, China's official broad money growth has decelerated to an all-time low (Chart 7, top panel). In the meantime, narrow money (M1) growth is falling rapidly. Remarkably, M1 growth has been correlated with Chinese H-share prices (Chart 7, bottom panel). We have extensively documented in past reports1 that China's money and credit impulses are good leading indicators of the mainland's business cycle. The current readings of these indicators signal considerable growth deceleration. In addition, general (central and local) government spending growth has already slowed a lot (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Broad Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart 8China: Aggregate Fiscal Spending Growth Is Also Weak The fundamentally weakest EM currencies such as the South African rand and the Turkish lira have already broken down. Some others have so far been only marginally weak. A chain, however, typically cracks at its weakest link. Hence, it makes sense that the selloff has begun with the fundamentally weakest currencies. We expect other EM currencies to follow. Currency depreciation in EM will undermine returns for foreign investors, and the latter will become marginal sellers in both EM equity markets and local currency bonds. Meanwhile, EM currency depreciation and potentially falling commodities prices will trigger credit spread widening in EM sovereign and corporate bonds. Investment Positioning Global equity portfolios should continue underweighting EM versus DM. The risk-reward profile for EM stocks' absolute performance is extremely unfavorable. We continue to recommend underweighting EM credit markets relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. Our strongest conviction shorts are a basket of the following currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. This will erode EM returns for European investors, and temporarily halt or reverse capital inflows into EM. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, India, Argentina2 and Central Europe. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions From The Road", dated September 20, 2017. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Argentina: A Genuine Bull Market", dated October 25, 2017. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear Client, Next week on November 20th instead of our regular weekly publication you will receive our flagship publication "The Bank Credit Analyst" with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on November 27th with our high-conviction trades for 2018. Kind Regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Melting medical care input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. Stay long health care insurers. Pharma and biotech stocks suffer from declining pricing power. Continue to avoid both. As a result, the S&P health care index remains in the underweight column. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities consolidated recent gains as earnings season drew to a close last week. Recent election results coupled with the revealing of the Senate tax bill raised fresh concerns, unwarranted according to our geopolitical strategists, about the likelihood of a bill passage. While such heightened fiscal policy uncertainty is disquieting, solid EPS growth on the back of synchronized global economic and capex growth should sustain the overshoot phase in stocks. Q3 EPS vaulted to a fresh all-time high (Chart 1) and, were it not for two financials sector sub-indexes - reinsurers and multi-line insurers that were severely hit by the one off hurricane catastrophes - financials EPS growth would have been nil from -7.3%, pushing the overall SPX EPS number to 9.2% from 8.1%. Chart 2 shows that the positive EPS surprise factor remained close to the recent average. Going into earnings season, Q3 EPS growth forecasts collapsed to 4.1%, but actual results ended up 400bps higher. Chart 1Earnings-Led Advance Continues Chart 2Surprise Factor In Line With Recent Average While EPS growth cannot stay in the high teens forever, settling down close to 10%/annum EPS growth rate is possible in the near run. The softness in the U.S. dollar along with the basic resource sector commodity-related comeback, synchronized global economic and capex growth and financials contributing more than sell side analysts expect to overall EPS, suggest that such profit growth is attainable in 2018. Tack on the possibility of fiscal easing and sustained lift in animal spirits (bottom panel, Chart 1), and the odds of low double-digit EPS growth increase further. Meanwhile on the monetary policy front, news of Powell's nomination to take the helm at the Fed barely budged the equity market, but some cracks are appearing in the bond market (Chart 3). Keep in mind that going back to Volcker's late-1970s nomination, Fed Chair transitions have been volatile. In fact, the market has tested the resolve of all four previous Fed leaders (Chart 4). As soon as Volcker come into power he had to deal with the early-1980s recession (and the LatAm crisis in 1982) that saw the market fall by 17% from peak to trough. When Greenspan was confirmed Chairman in August of 1987, two months into his tenure Black Monday happened and he had to step in and reiterate the Fed's function as a lender of last resort. In 2006 Bernanke took over from the Maestro, and a recession hit by the end of 2007 that morphed into the Great Recession. Finally in early-2014, Yellen become the Fed Chairwoman and in late-2015 a global manufacturing recession had taken hold resulting in a 14% drawdown in the SPX. Chart 3Watching The Bond Market Chart 4Testing Times Inevitably, the market will test the new Fed Chairman. This expansion has been long in the tooth and given BCA's 2019 recession view, this testing time is at least a year away. This week we reiterate our underweight stance in a defensive sector and highlight its key sub-components. Stick With Managed Health Care Exposure Following a two year hiatus, managed health care stocks broke out in 2017 and the juggernaut has now resumed (Chart 5). While the recent unsuccessful intra-industry M&A attempts (breakdown of both AET/HUM and ANTM/CI deals) were a mild setback, CVS's latest announcement, to take over AET and further vertically integrate, has brought euphoria back to this health care subgroup. We have added alpha to our portfolio as relative performance is up smartly, roughly 24% since our early-April 2016 overweight recommendation, begging the question: Is the time ripe to lock in impressive profits and move to the sidelines or is there more upside left? Leading profit indicators suggest that more gains are in store for the relative share price ratio. After petering out in 2016, our managed care cost proxy (comprising physician and hospital services and medical care commodity inflation) has plummeted by over 350bps from the recent peak (shown inverted, second panel, Chart 5). Given that premiums are set on a trailing cost basis, profit margins should surprise to the upside, i.e. the industry's medical loss ratio has room to fall. Not only is our medical care input cost proxy melting, but the latest employment cost index release revealed that managed health care wage inflation is also steadily decelerating (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Taken together, these two cost categories are heralding a solid industry EPS growth backdrop in the coming months (total cost proxy shown inverted, second panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Melting Costs Are A Boon To Margins... Chart 6...And EPS Importantly, health care insurers are also set to benefit from the Trump administration's push toward lowering drug prices and the proliferation of generic drugs. While drug inflation is positive for the pharma/biotech space, it is an expense incurred by managed care providers and vice versa. The upshot is that the pharmaceutical sector's pain will be the managed health care industry's gain (bottom panel, Chart 5). On the legislative front, the failed attempts to repeal and replace the ACA is positive as the newly enrolled will likely remain insured and underpin recurring industry revenues. As long as costs stay in check, the implication is ongoing earnings improvement. Tack on any relief related to a tax bill passage (the managed care index has a 47% effective tax rate or 24% higher than the overall S&P health care sector, see Table 2) and the path of least resistance is higher for profits. Table 2Tax Relief Potential Despite all of these positives, relative valuation remains muted, hovering near the neutral zone. On a forward P/E basis the S&P managed care index is trading on a par with the S&P 500 (Chart 7). If our thesis of sustained earnings outperformance materializes in the coming quarters, then a valuation re-rating phase looms. In sum, melting input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. This is a recipe for a durable valuation expansion phase. Bottom Line: While we are underweight the broad health care index, our sole overweight remains the S&P managed health care index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC. Ailing Pharma We downgraded pharma to an underweight stance on July 31 on the back of weak pricing power fundamentals, soft spending backdrop, a depreciating U.S. dollar and deteriorating industry operating metrics. The S&P pharmaceuticals index relative performance is down 5% since then as our bearish profit thesis is validated. Our dual synchronized global economic and capex growth themes bode ill for defensive pharmaceutical stocks. Nondiscretionary health care outlays jump in times of duress and underwhelm during expansions. Currently, the soaring ISM manufacturing index is signaling that pharma profits will remain under pressure in the coming months as the most cyclical parts of the economy flex their muscles (the ISM survey is shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 8). A depreciating currency is also synonymous with pharma profit ails (bottom panel, Chart 8). Historically, a soft U.S. dollar has been closely correlated with global growth, whereas greenback strength tends to slowdown the global economy. In that context, pharma exports should at least provide some top line growth relief during depreciating U.S. dollar phases. However, pharma exports are contracting at an accelerating pace (top panel, Chart 8) despite the U.S. dollar's year-to-date softness, warning that global pharma demand is sick. Importantly, the news on the pricing power front is disconcerting. Both in absolute terms and relative to overall PPI, pharma selling prices are steadily losing steam. In the context of a bloated industry workforce, the profit margin outlook darkens significantly (Chart 9). If the Trump administration also manages to clamp down on the secular growth of pharma selling price inflation, then industry margins will remain under chronic pressure. Worrisomely, were pharma prices to continue to trail overall corporate sector price inflation, as we expect, then the de-rating phase in the S&P pharmaceuticals index has a long ways to go (bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, even on the operating metric front, the news is mostly grim. Pharma industrial production is nil and our pharma productivity proxy remains muted, warning that profits will likely underwhelm. Industry retail sales growth is also flirting with the zero line and pharma inventories have resumed growing on a short-term rate of change basis across the supply channel. Pharma shipments offer the only ray of hope. But the recent acceleration in the latter may be the result of the hurricane-related catastrophes (Chart 10). Chart 8Counter Cyclical With##br## No Export Relief Chart 9Weak Pricing Power And Bloated##br## Cost Structure Weighs On Margins Chart 10Operating Metrics ##br##Are Also Feeble Netting it out, pharma profit growth is on track to continue to disappoint as the confluence of synchronized global growth, softening U.S. dollar, pricing power losses and deteriorating operating metrics are all profit headwinds. Bottom Line: We reiterate our late-July downgrade in the S&P pharma index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, AGN, LLY, ZTS, MYL, PRGO. A Few Words On Biotech Biotech stocks are another casualty of weakening pharmaceutical wholesale price inflation, and given that the industry's profits move neck-and-neck with their pharma siblings, revenue and EPS growth are bound to continue to surprise to the downside (Chart 11). We expect such profit woes will weigh on the S&P biotech index relative performance, and re-iterate our high-conviction underweight status. Chart 11Biotech Equities Hate Higher Rates Chart 12Technicals Say Sell Not only are biotech firms modestly concealed Big Pharma, i.e. they manufacture multi-billion dollar blockbuster drugs, and the Trump administration's scrutiny of drug price inflation is a profit negative, but also a rising interest rate backdrop is working against this health care sub-index. Historically, rising interest rates have been inversely correlated with biotech stocks. High flying valuations tend to gravitate back to earth when the Fed embarks on a tightening cycle. The opposite is also true. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy view remains that in the coming 12 months interest rates will be higher, moving closer to the 3% mark on the 10-year Treasury yield front. If such a selloff materializes in the bond market, then investors will abandon biotech stocks in a heartbeat (Chart 11). Chart 13Heed The EPS Growth Model Signal Meanwhile, according to empirical evidence since the mid-1990s, relative momentum in biotech stocks is nearly perfectly inversely correlated with the global credit impulse (Chart 11). This negative correlation has become more pronounced in the past decade underscoring the non-discretionary/defensive nature of large biotech outfits. In other words biotech stocks behave like counter-cyclicals similar to their pharma brethren. Given BCA's view of a recession hitting some time in 2019, we recommend investors still avoid biotech stocks. Finally, technicals are also waving a red flag. Chart 12 shows that a head-and-shoulders formation has taken root and were the neckline to give way in the coming weeks, relative performance would suffer a substantial setback. Bottom Line: Biotech stocks remain a high-conviction underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BIOTX - ABBV, AMGN, GILD, CELG, BIIB, VRTX, REGN, ALXN, INCY. Health Care Sector Implications What does all this mean for the broad S&P health care sector? Our relative profit growth model best encapsulates these forces and is signaling that profits will remain downbeat into 2018 (Chart 13). Managed health care stocks (overweight) comprise 13% of the index, while pharma (underweight) and biotech (underweight) market capitalization weights both add up to 54% of the total. As a result of our intra-sector positioning and given our neutral weightings in the remaining health care sub-indexes, we continue to recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P health care index. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P health care sector. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights A growing list of indicators is pointing to a potential slowdown to the strong global growth. However, the key deflationary anchors in the global economy - U.S. deleveraging, Europe's crisis, and Chinese excess capacity - have been mostly slayed. Any slowdown is likely to be brief and shallow, generating a buying opportunity in risk assets. In the meantime, commodity currencies, especially the AUD, could suffer. EUR/JPY is also at risk. Buy CAD/SEK. Feature Chart 1-1Global Growth Has Boomed Global growth has continued to fire on all cylinders, and global industrial activity is at its strongest in 13 years (Chart I-1). However, five weeks ago, we highlighted three yellow flags that we believe are pointing toward a period of cooling in the global economy.1 One month later, it is time to look at the data and evidences to see if these yellow flags are being followed by additional symptoms. We posit that yes, a temporary and mild slowdown will materialize. But the global economy remains fundamentally sound. Yet, this cooling of growth could have implications for commodity currencies and EM assets. The Original Worries The key original worry that we highlighted in early October was that global money growth had been decelerating, which has historically presaged a slowdown in global industrial production, global trade and commodities prices (Chart I-2). This deceleration in money growth has only deepened since, adding further saliency to our original concern. Moreover, Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are being tightened. The Chinese economy continues to hum at a healthy pace, and deflation has been vanquished as producer prices are expanding at a nearly 7% pace and core CPI continues to accelerate to its highest levels since 2010. This is giving Chinese policymakers an opportunity to tighten policy. Chinese monetary condition indices (MCI) are becoming less supportive of industrial activity and fiscal spending has decelerated. These policy moves potentially explain the recent rollover in the Keqiang index - which approximates industrial growth -- and the contraction in new capex projects (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Money Growth Points To A Pause Chart I-3China Is Tightening Policy Bottom Line: Global money growth continues to decelerate, and Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are tightening. This could create a dent in global industrial activity. The Additional Worries Some other key growth indicators are also raising the alarm bell: The average of Korean and Taiwanese exports growth decelerated sharply. After having hit a peak of 32% in September, they have now decelerated to 5%. Additionally, Swedish and Australian manufacturing PMIs have also rolled over (Chart I-4). Korean and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs are highly sensitive to global trade and the global industrial cycle. Our global growth indicator has rolled over. This indicator did forecast the rebound in industrial production in 2016 and 2017. It is now pointing toward a slowdown in global activity (Chart I-5). Likewise, our boom/bust indicator has rolled over, further highlighting the risks to global industrial production (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Key Barometers Have Turned Significantly Lower Chart I-5One Growth Indicator Slowing... Chart I-6...And Another One Too BCA's German industrial production model has turned down (Chart I-7). Germany is at the forefront of the global industrial cycle, and its own industrial production is highly geared to global trade. This is because manufacturing represents 23% of Germany's output and Germany's exports account for 38% of GDP. Furthermore, 30% of German exports are destined to EM economies, the epicenter of the global secondary sector. Thus, if German IP weakens, it will reflect an ebbing in the global industrial cycle. The global yield curve has continue to flatten in recent weeks (Chart I-8). This could be a reflection of the deceleration in global money growth. The weakness of banks across the world in recent days suggests the message from the yield curve should not be ignored. Chart I-7Manufacturing-Sensitive Germany Set To Slow Chart I-8Global Yield Curve Still Flattening Bottom Line: Beyond the slowdown in global money growth and tightening in Chinese policy, additional signs of softness have begun to emerge. Korea and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs have weakened, our global growth indicator has rolled over, our boom/bust indicator is also softening. Likewise, our German IP model is pointing south and the global yield curve is flattening. A deceleration in global activity is likely in the cards. Reading Market Tea Leaves A few market developments are likely to be reflecting some of the underlying shifts in growth pinpointed by the set of worries highlighted above. First, commodity currencies have begun to soften, which normally herald a period of softening growth (Chart I-9). What is very interesting is the context in which this currency weakness has begun to emerge: The Australian dollar has weakened despite strengthening metals prices (Chart I-10); Chart I-9The Message From Commodity Currencies Chart I-10Why Is The AUD Weak? The Canadian dollar has weakened despite Brent breaking out above US$60/bbl; The Norwegian krone has weakened against the euro despite the same rise in oil prices and despite a 12% surge in industrial production. Chart I-11Global High Yield Experiencing Weakness Second, the breadth of EM equities has rolled over and is falling below the zero line, indicating that more stocks within EM have begun weakening than appreciating, pointing toward a very narrow participation in the current rally. Third, junk bond prices have started to fall in the U.S., with the JNK ETF breaking significantly below its 200-day moving average, the first time since September 2014. EM high yield bond prices have also broken below their moving average, and have further punched below a key upward sloping trend line that had been in place since the beginning of 2016 (Chart I-11). The EM bond ETF (EMB) is also testing its 200-day moving average. The last point bears particular significance. If EM bonds continue to weaken, this will represent a significant tightening in EM financial conditions. EM financial conditions have eased since 2016, which was a key factor underpinning the improvement in global IP. If EM financial conditions begin deteriorating now, a crucial support to the global economy will dissipate. Moreover, falling EM bond prices tend to be synonymous with falling EM exchange rates. In fact, the Russian ruble, the Turkish lira, the South African rand, the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso have all been weakening since the end of the summer. This suggests outflows out of these markets have begun. As investors pull money out of these markets, liquidity conditions in these economies will tighten, which will hurt their economic activity. This could be the mechanism that catalyzes the softening in global industrial activity highlighted above. All these developments are also emerging at a time when new, untested leadership will soon take hold of the Federal Reserve. Now that U.S. President Donald Trump has selected Jay Powell to helm the Fed, he still has three seats to fill on the board. Historically, transition periods at the Fed can be associated with market volatility. This time around may not be an exception. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are weakening, market breadth in EM equities is deteriorating rapidly and junk bonds as well as various EM fixed income products are experiencing weakness. Not only do these developments tend to foreshadow ebbing global industrial activity, the weakness in EM bonds could in of itself tighten financial and liquidity conditions. The latter has been a key driver of the global industrial cycle. This represents a potentially dangerous environment. How Dangerous Exactly? Chart I-12Global Utilization Not##br## Deflationary Anymore All of this sounds very dire, but the reality is more nuanced. This softness in economic activity is unlikely to be very pronounced. As we argued last week, the three key factors that have created a strong deflationary anchor in the global economy seem to have been vanquished: U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed as banks have been cleaned up, and Chinese excess capacity has been purged.2 As a result of these developments, global capacity utilization is in a much better spot than it was in 2015 (Chart I-12). This means the deflationary impulse likely to emerge out of the dynamics described above should be much more muted than it was two years ago. Moreover, commodities markets are not as oversupplied as they once were; in fact, oil inventories are falling as the OPEC 2.0 setup is proving stable. This implies that commodities prices are unlikely to weaken as much as they did back then. This obviously corroborates the idea that the deflationary impact of this slowdown is likely to be smaller and also suggests that the impact on global capex should be more muted. Thus, since growth and inflation are likely to prove more resilient than in 2015, the impact on asset prices of the slowdown is likely to be short lived. If anything, it is likely to provide a buying opportunity in risk assets. Some markets are more out of line with fundamentals than others, which implies that they will suffer more. Below, we discuss key tactics that could be used to navigate this environment. Bottom Line: Because the U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed and because Chinese excess capacity has been curtailed, the global economy is less prone to deflationary tendencies than two years ago. This means that any growth slowdown will be shallow and brief. Thus, only in the assets most mispriced or most exposed to the risks above will there be playable moves that we will seek to exploit. The relevant currency market implications are explored below. Investment Implications The most mispriced asset in the face of this potential slowdown in global growth seems to be EM equities. EM stocks are very sensitive to the global industrial cycle and EM financial conditions. Both are set to deteriorate. Moreover, since 2008, EM stocks have traded closely with junk bonds, but currently EM equity prices seem very pricey relative to U.S. high yield bonds (Chart I-13). Weakening EM stock prices continue to be a negative for commodity currencies, as it implies a slowdown in global industrial activity. Moreover, commodity currencies remain over-owned. As Chart I-14 illustrates, speculators are very long "risky currencies" versus "safe currencies," implying that a slowdown in global growth, however minute it may be, is likely to be a negative shock for these investors. When these relative net speculative positions roll over, it tends to be associated with violent weakness in commodity currencies. Thus, the recent bout of weakness could only be the first innings. We think the AUD is the worst-placed commodity currency right now. Not only are speculators very long the Aussie, but as we have shown in recent weeks, the AUD is expensive against the USD, the NZD and the CAD. Its premium is so pronounced relative to other commodity currencies that, at current levels, valuations alone warrant shorting the AUD against the CAD or NZD. We are already short these crosses. It therefore follows that if we anticipate commodity currencies in general to weaken, AUD/USD also has downside. Chart I-15 makes this case. Australian equities relative to U.S. equities have historically led AUD/USD. Nearly half of the Australian equity market is financials, and Australian equities have been underperforming. This suggests investors continue to foresee a negative output gap in Australia both in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. - and thus a dovish Reserve Bank of Australia relative to the Fed, which hurts AUD/USD. Moreover, AUD/USD has overshot the mark implied by relative equity prices. Additionally, AUD/USD is expensive relative to interest rate differentials at both the short- and long-end of the yield curve. Chart I-13EM Stocks Offer##br## No Cushion Chart I-14Speculators In Commodity ##br##Currencies Are Not Ready Chart I-15AUD Is Most ##br##Vulnerable The euro could also experience some weakness. We have argued that as European financial conditions tighten relative to the U.S., this will hurt euro area inflation relative to the U.S., pointing to an environment where investors will likely once again price in monetary divergences in favor of the USD.3 Growth dynamics between Europe and the U.S. could also be affected by the tightening in China. As Chart I-16A and Chart 16B illustrates, tightening Chinese MCI or slowing Chinese M1 relative to M2 - which proxies a faster growth in savings deposits than checking deposits, and thus a rising marginal propensity to save tends to translate into slowing PMIs and industrial production in the euro area relative to the U.S. This is because Europe has a larger manufacturing sector and export sector as a share of GDP than the U.S. German exports, Europe's growth locomotive, are also highly geared to the Chinese industrial sector. Thus, when Chinese investment slows, Europe feels it more acutely than the U.S. With investors still very long the euro relative to the USD, a negative relative growth surprise on top of a negative relative inflation surprise will hurt EUR/USD. Chart I-16AEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (I) Chart I-16BEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (II) The picture for the yen is more complex. Falling EM assets and a temporary growth slowdown are positive for the yen. But bond yield differentials remain the key driver of USD/JPY. Since we anticipate the global growth slowdown to be shallow and brief, any weakness in U.S. bond yields will also be shallow and brief. Since we expect U.S. bond yields to regain vigor fast, and we doubt the global slowdown will affect the Fed's path much, the effect on USD/JPY will also be quick. Thus, we are keeping our cyclical long bet on USD/JPY. In fact, a positive U.S. inflation surprise is a growing risk that could cause bonds to sell off, hurting global liquidity conditions in the process. Chart I-17EUR/JPY: Ripe For A Correction Instead, we will hedge our long USD/JPY exposure by tactically shorting EUR/JPY. Japan will also suffer from a slowdown in global industrial activity, especially as 43% of its exports are shipped to emerging markets. Moreover, Japan has a very large manufacturing sector. However, Japanese yields have no downside from here. This means the deflationary impact of a global growth slowdown, however small it may be, will weigh on Japanese inflation expectations more than it will hurt nominal rates, resulting in higher Japanese real rates.4 This support for the JPY is likely to get magnified in EUR/JPY. Currently, speculators have been massive buyers of the euro against the yen, betting on growing monetary divergence between Europe and Japan. This has pushed net speculative positions in the euro versus the yen to levels historically associated with a reversal in this cross (Chart I-17). This pair is thus a coiled spring in the face of the risk that Japanese real rates rise against European ones, especially if investors begin pushing back expectations surrounding the first ECB rate hike. Investors have already given up hope of any tightening of policy in Japan in the foreseeable future, implying a very minimal chance of them pricing in any easing by the Bank of Japan in response to a temporary global growth slowdown. The last factor supporting shorting EUR/JPY is that Japan has a net international investment position of 60% of GDP, while Europe's NIIP stands at -3% of GDP. Also, Japanese investors have been aggressive buyers of European assets, especially since Emanuel Macron secured the French presidency, causing a positive reassessment of European political risk. In an environment where global volatility increases, Japanese investors are likely to retreat to their home market, accentuating EUR/JPY selling. Finally, CAD/SEK is likely to benefit in this environment as well, as Sweden is more exposed to EM conditions than Canada is. We are buying this cross this week, but we'll explore the reasoning behind it in greater detail next week. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are likely to be the main casualty of the slowdown we expect to occur over the next 3 to 6 months. The AUD seems particularly vulnerable as it is expensive and investors are still very long this currency. USD/JPY could experience some downside, but we do not anticipate the growth slowdown to be strong enough to permanently knock Treasury yields off their course toward 3%. Instead, we will short EUR/JPY to protect our gains in our long USD/JPY. CAD/SEK has upside. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Melanie Kermadjian, Senior Analyst melanie@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Best Of Possible Worlds?" dated October 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead" dated November 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "All About Credit" dated October 20, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Central Banks Behind the Curve Or Ahead of It?," dated July 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 For a more detailed discussion of the interplay between growth and the yen, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Down The Rabbit Hole" dated April 15, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed: Initial and continuing jobless claims underperformed expectations coming in at 1.901 mn and 239,000 respectively; JOLTS job openings climbed to 6.093 mn, beating expectations of 6.091 mn, and more than the previous 6.09 mn openings; Consumer credit increased to USD 20.83 bn from USD 13.14 bn, also beating expectations of USD 18 bn. The DXY enjoyed an up week, but a large spike in German Bund yields on Thursday caused the DXY to weaken. This is most likely a temporary event prompted by the unwinding of dovish ECB trades. We expect the greenback to continue its climb alongside stronger U.S. data. Report Links: It's Not My Cross To Bear - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has generally been upbeat: The German trade balance and current account improved to EUR 21.8 bn and EUR 25.4 bn, but this first and foremost reflected a 1% contraction in imports; French trade balance also improved to EUR -4.668 bn, beating expectations of EUR -4.8 bn; European retail sales increased by 3.7% on a yearly basis, and 0.7% monthly; However, German industrial production growth slowed to 3.6%. This allowed the euro to regain some of its lost value. However, we believe that euro area inflation will disappoint going forward - especially relative to the U.S. This will limit any appreciation in the euro as investors will begin pricing in a tightening of the Fed's policy relative to the ECB. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent Japanese data has surprised to the downside: Core machinery orders massively underperformed expectations, as they contracted by 8.1% on a month-on-month basis and by 3.5% on an annual basis. Moreover, bank lending yearly growth also underperformed, coming in at 2.8%, and declining from last month's reading. Moreover, the leading economic indicator came below expectations, at 106.7. It also declined from last month's number. After 2 years into the recovery from the 2015 commodity/ EM carnage, global growth seems prime for some slowdown. Indeed, many indicators like high yield and EM bond yields have started to break down. This is could be positive for the yen, given its risk-off currency status. However we prefer to not play this strength though USD/JPY. Instead we are shorting EUR/JPY, a cross which cancels the exposure to the dollar. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed Markit Services PMI outperformed expectations, coming at 55.6. It also increased from 53.6 last month. Halifax House Prices Month-on-Month growth also outperformed, coming in at 0.3%. However, the RICS Housing Price Balance underperformed expectations, coming in at 1%. The pound has been relatively flat after plunging following the "dovish" hike by the Bank of England. Overall, we see very little upside from here on for cable, as the BoE has little incentive to hike beyond what is priced into the SONIA curve, as both consumer confidence and real retail sales yearly growth are near 3-year lows. Meanwhile, the Fed will likely surprise the market by following its projected path. This will increase rate differentials between these two countries, and put downward pressure on GBP/USD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 It has been quite an uneventful week for the AUD, as it has stayed flat relative to the USD. The following data came out: TD Securities Inflation increased to 2.6% from 2.5% on a yearly basis, and 0.3% on a monthly basis; ANZ Job Advertisements increased by 1.4% in September; AiG Performance of Construction Index declined to 53.2 from 54.7; Home loans contracted b 2.3%. The RBA rate decision and statement were in line with expectations, and the AUD saw little to no movement. Governor Lowe identified several capacity issues with the economy, noting that "In underlying terms, inflation is likely to remain low for some time, reflecting the slow growth in labour costs and increased competitive pressures", and that inflation is only being boosted by tobacco and electricity. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 On Wednesday, New Zealand decided to keep its reference rate unchanged at 1.75%. The kiwi rose after the announcement, as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand brought forward their expectations for a hike from the third quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2019. Furthermore, the RNZ now expects inflation to hit the mid-point of its target range by the second quarter of 2018, nine months sooner than before. The RBNZ also toned down its rhetoric on the currency as governor Grant Spencer stated that "the exchange rate has eased since the August statement, and if sustained, will increase tradable inflation and promote more balance growth". Overall we expect the NZD to outperform the AUD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data in Canada has been positive: Ivey PMI moved up to 63.8 from 59.6, also outperforming the expected 60.2; Housing Starts increased by 222,800 annually, beating expectations of 210,000; Building permits also increased by 3.8% on a monthly basis; The most recent Business Outlook Survey report indicates that more than 40% of the surveyed businesses believe the shortage of labor has become worse, which is usually a reliable indicator of wage growth. This will allow the BoC to continue on its hiking path next year, which will mean that CAD will outperform other G10 currencies. NAFTA negotiations remain the greatest risk to the BoC view and the CAD. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.7%. It stayed constant from last month's number. Meanwhile, unemployment was unchanged from last month at 3.1%. This number was in line with expectations. After peaking in late October, EUR/CHF has depreciated slightly, mainly due to the weakness in the euro. However, betting for CHF strength still means fighting against the SNB. Inflation in Switzerland is still too tepid for the SNB to stop their interventions in currency markets. Meanwhile, real retail sales yearly growth is still in negative territory. Thus, until we see a significant improvement in economic activity in the alpine country, we are reluctant to bet against the SNB. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Registered unemployment declined from 2.5% in September to 2.4% in October However, industrial production surged to more than 12% on an annual basis Since the Norges Bank policy statement at the end of October, USD/NOK has been flat. This has been because this cross has been squeezed between two conflicting forces: On one hand, oil has gone up nearly 5% just this month. On the other hand, the rise in the dollar has counteracted any downside that rising oil prices could provide to USD/NOK. Although we continue to be bullish on oil, we are bullish on USD/NOK, as this cross is more correlated to real rate differentials than it is to oil. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was positive this week: Industrial production's monthly growth increased to 2.2% from a 1.6% contraction; the yearly measure is growing at a 4.5% pace, albeit less than the previous 7.5%; New orders are increasing at a very high 11.2% annual pace, a good forward-looking indicator for industrial production. While the Swedish economy remains robust, the SEK will see some downside against the USD and the EUR due to the Riksbank's dovishness. Also, the recent dip in EM high yield bonds could be a risk for the Swedish economy. We are therefore opening a long CAD/SEK trade. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Chart 1Fed Must Fall Behind The Curve Jerome Powell will assume the Fed Chairmanship at a critical juncture for monetary policy. Core PCE inflation is still well below the Fed's 2% target, and yet, the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is a mere 71 bps (Chart 1). Such a flat yield curve alongside such low inflation suggests that the market believes the Fed will tighten the yield curve into inversion before inflation even regains the Fed's target. That would be an unprecedented policy mistake that the new Chairman will seek to avoid at all costs. This means either inflation will soon rise, justifying the FOMC's median rate hike projections, or inflation will stay low and the Fed will be forced to take a dovish turn. Either way the Fed must "fall behind the curve" and start chasing inflation higher. The act of falling behind the inflation curve means that long-maturity TIPS breakevens are likely to widen, the yield curve will steepen and the policy back-drop will stay accommodative for spread product. We recommend positioning for all three of these outcomes. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 52 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 288 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month, and now sits at 97 bps. Two weeks ago we noted that there is simply not much room for investment grade corporate spreads to tighten.1 Looking at 12-month breakeven spreads shown as a percentile rank relative to history, we see that A-rated paper has only been more expensive than it is today 7% of the time. Baa-rated paper has been more expensive only 9% of the time (Chart 2).2 Further, we calculate that at current duration levels Baa-rated option-adjusted spreads can only tighten another 36 bps before the sector is more expensive than it has ever been. Similarly, A-rated spreads can tighten another 14 bps, Aa-rated spreads another 17 bps and Aaa-rated spreads another 7 bps. All this to say that corporate bonds are essentially a carry trade at this stage of the cycle. The important question is how much longer we can pick up the carry before a period of significant spread widening. With low inflation keeping monetary policy accommodative and accelerating profit growth putting downward pressure on leverage (bottom 2 panels), the carry trade appears safe for now (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3B Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 51 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 580 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 9 bps on the month, and currently sits at 339 bps. Based on our current forecast for default losses we calculate that, if junk spreads remain flat, high-yield excess returns will be 230 bps for the next 12 months. If spreads tighten by 100 bps we should expect excess returns of 606 bps, and if spreads widen by 100 bps we should expect excess returns of -145 bps (Chart 3). Given that the OAS for the high-yield index can only tighten another 139 bps before it reaches all-time expensive valuations, 606 bps is a fairly optimistic excess return projection. But equally, with inflation pressures still muted and monetary policy still accommodative, more than 100 bps of spread widening is also unlikely. Our base case forecast is that high-yield excess returns will be between 2% and 5% (annualized) on a 6-12 month investment horizon.3 In a recent report we noted that high-yield generally looks more attractive than investment grade after adjusting for differences in spread volatility between the two sectors.4 Specifically, we calculate that it will take 39 days of average spread tightening before B-rated bonds reach all-time expensive levels. The same calculation shows it will take 19 days for A-rated debt. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 31 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread was roughly flat on the month, as was the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). Last month we upgraded Agency MBS from underweight to neutral, noting that OAS have become significantly more attractive during the past year, particularly relative to corporate credit (Chart 4). The spread widening likely resulted from the market pricing-in the impact of the Fed's balance sheet run-off. Now that the run-off has begun, and its future pace has been well telegraphed, its impact has probably also been fully priced. While OAS is the correct measure of MBS carry because it adjusts for expected losses due to prepayments, it is the change in the nominal spread that determines capital gains and losses. With that in mind, it is difficult to see a catalyst for significantly wider nominal MBS spreads on a 6-12 month horizon. The two factors that correlate most closely with nominal MBS spreads - credit spreads and mortgage refinancings - are likely to stay depressed (bottom panel). Higher mortgage rates would obviously prevent refinancings from rising. But we showed in a recent report that even if rates move lower the coupon and age distribution of outstanding mortgages has made refi activity much less sensitive to rates than in the past.5 Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 193 bps. Sovereign bonds underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 5 bps on the month. Foreign and Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 2 bps and 9 bps, respectively. Supranationals outperformed by 4 bps. The underperformance in Sovereigns was concentrated in Mexican debt, which sold off as the White House took a hard line on NAFTA negotiations. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 62 bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 367 bps (Chart 5). Excess returns for Local Authority debt - mostly taxable municipal debt and USD-denominated Canadian provincial debt - have exceeded excess returns from Baa-rated corporate debt so far this year, despite the sector's average credit rating of Aa3/A1. In a recent report we looked at whether USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt is an attractive alternative to U.S. high-yield corporates.6 We observed that hard currency EM sovereigns and similarly rated U.S. corporate bonds offer almost exactly the same breakeven spread, and also that EM Sovereigns have been getting comparatively cheaper since early last year. Further, we observed that periods when EM Sovereigns outperform U.S. corporates tend to coincide with falling U.S. rate hike expectations, as measured by our 24-month fed funds discounter. At present, our 24-month discounter is at 74 bps, meaning the market expects less than three Fed hikes during the next two years. We anticipate a better opportunity to move into EM Sovereigns once U.S. rate hike expectations have adjusted higher. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 43 basis points in October (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Munis have outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 251 bps, year-to-date. The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio edged down in October and currently sits at 87%, still extremely tight relative to its post-crisis trading range. M/T yield ratios look much more attractive at the long-end of the curve (Chart 6), and we continue to recommend that investors extend maturity within their municipal bond allocations. Congress released its first draft of proposed tax legislation last week, and while it will certainly undergo some changes in the coming months, it appears as though it will not be very negative for municipal bondholders. Crucially, the top marginal personal tax rate remains unchanged at 39.6% and demand for munis should benefit from the removal of other deductions. A reduction of the corporate tax rate to 20% remains a risk, but that will likely be revised higher as the bill is re-written. Fundamentally, state & local government health improved sharply in Q3, with net borrowing likely falling to $157 billion from $211 billion in Q2, assuming that corporate tax revenues are unchanged (Chart 6).7 The rate of growth in state & local tax revenues now exceeds expenditures and that should put further downward pressure on borrowing in the coming quarters. However, a decline in state & local government borrowing is already reflected in historically tight M/T yield ratios. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in October alongside a sharp move higher in the expected pace of Fed rate hikes (Chart 7). The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 8 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps. The upward adjustment in rate hike expectations benefited our recommendation to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. That trade is now 13 bps in the money since it was initiated on July 10. Further, the July 2018 contract is still discounting fewer than two rate hikes between now and next July. If two more hikes are delivered by July our trade will earn an additional 5 bps. If three more hikes are delivered it will earn an additional 31 bps. In a recent report we discussed why the Fed must soon "fall behind the curve" on inflation and allow the yield curve to steepen.8 Essentially, unless the Fed starts to chase inflation higher it will soon invert the yield curve without having met its inflation goal. That would be a severe policy mistake. This means that either inflation must start to rise, or the Fed must slow its pace of rate hikes. Both scenarios lead to a steeper yield curve. We continue to position for a steeper curve via a long position in the 5-year bullet versus a short position in the 2/10 barbell. At the moment our model shows the 5-year bullet trading roughly in-line with its fair value, or alternatively that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for an unchanged 2/10 slope on a 6-month horizon.9 TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 33 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -99 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 4 bps on the month but, at 1.86%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. As was pointed out on the front page of this report, the Fed must "fall behind the curve" on inflation if it wants to avoid a policy mistake. Our expectation is that this will occur because inflation will move higher in the coming months. The 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE has already bounced off its lows (Chart 8) and pipeline measures of inflation are soaring (panels 3 & 4). However, even if inflation remains stubbornly low, we think any downside in long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates will prove fleeting. We are approaching an inflection point where if inflation does not rise the Fed will have to adopt a much more dovish policy stance. This should limit any downside in long-dated breakevens. As long as the Fed can maintain interest rates low enough for realized inflation to eventually recover to its target, then we anticipate that long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that occurs. According to our model, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently trading in-line with other financial market variables - oil, the trade-weighted dollar and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (panel 2). ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 81 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 71 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed the benchmark by 32 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 176 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 5 bps in October and, at 33 bps, it remains well below its average pre-crisis trading range. We continue to favor credit cards over auto loans within Aaa-rated ABS, despite the modest additional spread pick-up available in autos (Chart 9). The main reason is that auto loan net losses have been trending steadily higher for several years while credit card charge-offs are still depressed (panel 4). However, even the credit card space is starting to see rising delinquency rates, albeit off a low base, and banks are tightening lending standards on both auto loans and cards (bottom panel). We expect that tight labor markets and solid income growth will prevent a surge in consumer delinquencies, but these are nonetheless troubling signals that bear monitoring. From a valuation perspective, with the 33 bps OAS offered from Aaa-rated Consumer ABS now only slightly higher than the 29 bps offered by Agency Residential MBS, we advocate a neutral allocation to consumer ABS. Further increases in delinquencies could warrant an eventual downgrade, stay tuned. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 71 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 182 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened sharply in October, from 74 bps to 65 bps. At current levels it is now one standard deviation below its pre-crisis average (Chart 10). With spreads at such low levels in an environment of tightening commercial real estate (CRE) lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, we view the risk/reward trade-off in non-Agency CMBS as quite unfavorable. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 96 bps. The index OAS for Agency CMBS tightened 6 bps on the month but, at 46 bps, the sector continues to offer an attractive spread pick-up relative to other low-risk spread product. The Aaa-rated consumer ABS OAS is only 33 bps, and the OAS on conventional 30-year Agency MBS is a mere 29 bps. Such an attractive spread pick-up in a sector that benefits from Agency backing is probably worth grabbing. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.69% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.67%. The Global Manufacturing PMI increased to 53.5 in October, its highest level in six-and-a-half years. Bullish sentiment toward the dollar also edged higher, but not by enough to prevent the fair value reading from our 2-factor Treasury model from climbing. Last month's fair value reading was 2.65%. The U.S. and Eurozone PMIs continued to trend up, while the Chinese PMI held flat. The Japanese PMI ticked down from 52.9 to 52.8. Most importantly, of the 36 countries we track 34 now have PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line. The global economic recovery has become incredibly broad based, a bearish development for U.S. Treasury yields. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.33%. 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We use breakeven spreads to adjust for the changing duration of the index over time. We calculate the 12-month breakeven spread as option-adjusted spread divided by duration. We ignore the impact of convexity. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade", dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Yet Another Update", dated October 10, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade", dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 For further details on our model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of October 31st, 2017. There are no significant changes in country allocations, but minor changes are the reductions in the overweight of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland in favor of Spain and Italy, which were already overweight, and Australia which was underweight, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 73 bps in October, largely due to the underperformance (110 bps) of Level 2 model, resulting from the large underweight of Japan, which was the best performer in October. The underweight of Australia and Canada worked very well too, but not enough to offset the overweight in the euro zone countries. The strength of the USD against the euro also hurt the performance. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 247 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which have outperformed their benchmark by 599 bps. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of October 31st, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The growth component in the model has turned cautious on the global recovery. The aggregate cyclical sector overweight has been reduced to 2.5% from 8% last month. However, cyclical sectors such as energy, materials and industrials have seen an increase in overweight driven by favorable liquidity and momentum backdrop. On the other hand, financials and technology have been downgraded to underweight. Finally, as a result of the bearish outlook from the growth component, the model has turned overweight on utilities. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Highlights Emerging Market (EM) hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, has consistently outperformed the broad global bond index. However, investors should steer clear of always maintaining maximum overweights to EM given its weak volatility reduction benefits and a much higher-than normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns. Our long-term analysis suggests a structural 5% allocation offers the best risk/reward potential. The Fed is still in the early stages of rate normalization. At this point in the Fed policy cycle, where the Fed is hiking rates but monetary conditions are still stimulative, EM hard currency debt has historically performed well both on a relative and absolute basis. Looking ahead, EM returns should begin to suffer in latter half of 2018 as the Fed moves to more restrictive policy stance. While global growth will remain supportive of EM credit next year, renewed U.S. dollar strength and a re-convergence to the downside with commodity prices present considerable headwinds. Maintain an underweight stance on EM hard currency debt. Favor DM spread product due to more supportive relative growth trends and valuations. Feature Emerging market (EM) sovereign and corporate debt returns have surged in 2017, returning 9.4% and 7.5%, respectively (Chart 1). Investor interest has been renewed, with the latest IMF Financial Stability Report indicating that non-resident inflows of portfolio capital to EM countries have recovered since early 2016 and reached $205 billion for 2017 through August. Against a backdrop of above-trend global economic growth, monetary policy settings from the major central banks that are still accommodative, and some diminished risks from the world's geopolitical hotspots, the current uptrend for EM debt performance could continue. Nevertheless, we urge caution. We moved to a moderate underweight stance on EM hard currency debt back in August, while at the same time increasing our current recommended overweight to U.S. investment grade (IG) corporate debt on the other side of the trade.1 Even with synchronized global growth boosting both EM export demand and industrial commodity prices, we prefer U.S. credit exposure over EM at this point in the cycle, for several reasons: The massive flow-driven EM rally has resulted in not only outsized returns but stretched valuations, with EM debt spreads now back to post-2008-crisis low (or even through those levels for EM hard currency corporates) without any major improvement in EM fundamentals; The previously reliable correlation between EM debt and commodity prices, a long-time driver of EM performance, has broken down, bullishly, for EM - potentially another sign of flow-driven overvaluation; Growing uncertainty over the near-term China growth outlook raises risks on further gains in industrial commodity demand and EM exports; The USD will appreciate once again on the back of additional Fed interest rate hikes beyond levels currently discounted by markets, which could trigger some reversal of the sharp inflows into EM seen this year. Over a strategic horizon, however, it remains difficult to argue against owning a core structural allocation of EM hard currency debt within global fixed income portfolios, given the higher yields that are typically on offer and the fairly consistent historical outperformance over Developed Market (DM) debt. Although the benefits of EM in a portfolio context are slightly overstated given its skewed risk profile (i.e. fat negative tails) and high correlation with DM spread product, specifically U.S. high-yield corporates (Chart 2). Chart 1How Much Longer Can This Rally Last? Chart 2EM Debt Offers Little Diversification Benefits In this Special Report, we examine the long-term role of EM hard currency debt within a fixed-income portfolio, and re-iterate our case for being underweight EM debt on a cyclical basis. The Long-Run Case For Owning EM Debt: A Moderate Core Allocation Makes Sense It is not a stretch to say that EM debt has become the most important part of global bond portfolios in the 21st century. Having a significant EM allocation at the right time can make a bond manager's year, while having it at the wrong time can end a bond manager's career. But what is the "right" allocation to optimize the long-run contribution to returns in a global fixed income portfolio? To answer this question, we took a look at the historical performance of a global bond portfolio that consisted of both DM and EM debt (sovereign and corporate), looking for the combination that would maximize the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio. In our analysis, we ran calculations for two different time periods as the available index data for EM sovereign debt goes back to 1994, while EM corporate debt indices begin in 2002. For DM debt, we used a single index - the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate - as this has a long history and is a common benchmark used by global bond managers that includes both DM sovereign and corporate debt. Though the sample size of our combined global portfolio is limited due to the shorter history of the EM corporates asset class, the findings generally align with our intuition. On a standalone basis, modern portfolio theory proposes that an individual asset should be included within a portfolio if its excess return divided by its standard deviation is higher than the excess return of the portfolio divided by the portfolio's standard deviation, multiplied by the correlation between the portfolio and the asset. Though the correlation to the DM portfolio from 2004 was fairly high for both assets at over 0.6, when we applied this formula, both EM sovereign and corporate debt warranted an allocation in a standard global fixed-income portfolio. EM sovereign debt scored higher, by offering a considerably better Sharpe ratio with only a minimally higher correlation to DM fixed income. While EM hard currency debt has fairly consistently outperformed the DM benchmark on a 12-month rolling basis, investors must be careful not to simply maintain large positions at all times. Obviously, the majority of fixed-income investors have volatility constraints that impose limits on credit allocations. Additionally, apart from simple volatility measures, EM debt has a "hidden" risk profile when looking at the higher moments of return distributions. Table 1EM Debt Returns Are##BR##Negatively Skewed Both EM sovereign and corporate credit historical returns have exhibited significant negative skewness and excess kurtosis, indicating a much higher-than-normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns (Table 1). This is confirmed through Historical Value-at-Risk (VaR) analysis, where the 5% worst returns far eclipsed those of DM investment grade and government debt. Nevertheless, it is important to view EM from a holistic perspective. For example, an asset with a high standard deviation may be less desirable as a standalone investment, but can be highly beneficial if it enhances overall the returns of a portfolio while also reducing its volatility. We tested these "portfolio effects" of EM debt by creating 21 hypothetical portfolios. We began with a DM-only portfolio (consisting of the Global Aggregate index) and increased the weighting toward EM debt by one percentage point in each portfolio, with the last portfolio having a 20% weighting toward EM. The breakdown within EM was 62% corporates and 38% sovereigns based on the market capitalizations of the relevant benchmark indices. Our calculations indicate that the highest portfolio Sharpe ratio was achieved with a 5% EM debt allocation, which also happens to be the "neutral" weighting of EM debt in the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy model portfolio benchmark index (Chart 3).2 Global bond investors should hover around this weighting on EM hard currency debt, absent a high conviction view on EM. Chart 3The Optimal EM Hard Currency Debt Allocation Is 5% So while the data suggests that EM hard currency debt warrants a long-term allocation, its beneficial impact on a fixed-income portfolio is at least slightly exaggerated. Portfolio managers are typically seeking out assets that can both improve return and decrease overall volatility, thereby increasing the efficiency of their portfolios. This was not the case with EM debt. In our study, increasing the EM allocation consistently raised both returns and volatility. Chart 4EM/DM Correlations Should Decline In 2018 This lack of diversification benefit is a result of the high correlation between EM hard currency debt and DM fixed income. Currently, the correlation between EM and DM (the Global Aggregate) is 0.90, near the upper end of its range, indicating that diversification benefits over the last year were essentially non-existent (Chart 4). Nevertheless, this relationship clearly exhibits a mean reversion tendency. That EM/DM correlation in recent years has been itself correlated to global growth and monetary policy changes. As we show in Chart 4, our diffusion index of OECD Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) - the number of countries with a rising LEI relative to those with a declining LEI - does tend to lead the EM/DM correlation and is currently pointing to a lower correlation as global growth becomes a little less synchronized in 2018. The same goes for the growth rate of major central bank balance sheets which is already slowing and will decelerate even more in 2018 on the back of a diminished pace of bond buying by the ECB and the Fed runoff of maturing bonds on its balance sheet. The conclusion is this - the EM/DM correlation should decline in 2018 but, as we discuss below, we think that happens through relative underperformance of EM credit. Bottom Line: EM hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, has consistently outperformed the broad global index. However, investors should steer clear of always maintaining maximum overweights given its weak volatility reduction benefits and a much higher-than normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns. Our long-term analysis suggests a structural 5% allocation offers the best risk/reward potential. The Shorter-Run Case For Owning EM Debt: Will Macro Drivers Remain Supportive? So far in 2017, EM sovereign and corporate debt have been beneficiaries of robust global growth, a declining USD and a decoupling from a broader index of commodity prices. While we expect global growth will remain strong over the medium term, our outlook for the USD is still bullish and there is a risk that commodity prices and EM debt performance re-converge to the downside. Global growth will remain strong. Outside of a major global growth slowdown, which we currently view as a low probability event, a mass flight out of EM assets anytime soon is highly unlikely. Indicators such as the global PMI index, industrial production growth and the OECD leading economic indicator are all booming (Chart 5). Inflation will head higher on the back of rising oil prices, but the increase is likely to be gradual. Importantly, this is happening alongside global monetary conditions that remain generally accommodative, even with the Fed in a tightening cycle. Credit, both DM & EM, has historically performed well against this backdrop, as we discuss in the next section of this report. A renewed upleg in the USD bull market is already underway. The correlation between EM currencies and EM debt performance has recovered after breaking down during 2013-15 (Chart 6). Year-to-date, EM currency strength - the flipside of the weaker U.S. dollar - has been a major driver of EM relative performance. Using the IMF's measure real effective exchange rates based on unit labor costs, the U.S. dollar is fairly valued.3 Neutral valuations suggest that directional market indicators are driving currency movements. As the EM business cycle slows and the Fed ramps up its rate hikes in response to rising inflation, the USD cyclical bull market should resume. Chart 5Robust Global Growth##BR##Is Supportive For EM Chart 6Can EM Ignore Another##BR##Round Of USD Strength? The de-coupling between EM debt and commodity price movements is unsustainable. EM debt has experienced a strong rally since 2016 with only a moderate rise in commodity prices compared to past periods of EM strength. We view this decoupling to be temporary (Chart 7). Many sovereign EM issuers are commodity producers, suggesting that this divergence is unsustainable. EM sovereign and corporate debt will not be able to continue their massive rallies if commodity prices relapse. We maintain a bullish view on oil prices, but there are signals that base metal prices are at risk over the next 6-12 months. Chinese monetary authorities have tightened policy and the resulting sharp slowdown in money supply growth is a worrisome sign for Chinese demand for commodities (Chart 8).4 Chart 7EM-Commodity Divergence##BR##Is Unsustainable Chart 8China Downside Risks For##BR##Industrial Commodity Prices Bottom Line: While global growth will remain supportive of EM credit, currency weakness and a re-convergence with commodity prices present considerable headwinds. EM Debt Performance & The Fed Policy Cycle Chart 9The Fed Policy Cycle As more central banks are shifting to a tightening bias, investors are becoming increasingly concerned over policy normalization and its potential impact on credit market performance. Given the strong historical linkages between EM debt performance and Fed policy changes, the current U.S. tightening cycle looms as a major potential problem for EM assets. We have found it most useful to think about changes in Fed monetary policy and asset market performance in terms of breaking up the Fed policy into four distinct phases (Chart 9).5 These are characterized by both the level of interest rates (whether they are above or below "equilibrium") and the direction of policy changes (whether the Fed is raising or cutting rates):6 Phase 1 - the Fed is hiking while the fed funds rate is below equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are stimulative). Phase 2 - the Fed is hiking or keeping policy on hold while the fed funds rate is above equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are restrictive). Phase 3 - the Fed is cutting while the fed funds rate is above equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are restrictive). Phase 4 - the Fed is cutting rates while the fed funds rate is below equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are stimulative). For EM sovereign debt where we have index data going back to 1994, there have been four episodes of Phase 1 and three episodes of the other phases. For EM corporate debt, where the index data begins in 2002, there have been two episodes of Phases 1 and 4 and only one occurrence of Phases 2 and 3. We present the excess returns of EM debt relative to other major fixed income classes by phase in Table 2. In the limited sample, EM sovereign debt and corporate debt consistently outperformed the Global Aggregate index and most individual bond classes. However, relative to DM high-yield debt, which has the most comparable risk profile, EM sovereign bonds underperformed in Phase 1 and EM corporate debt underperformed in all phases. Table 2Relative EM Debt Performance Worsens As Fed Policy Tightens Excess returns for both EM debt classes were highest in Phase 4, where the central bank is easing while conditions are stimulative. Similar to other risk assets, EM debt also outperformed in Phase 1, where the central bank is tightening while rates are below equilibrium. This makes sense, as the early stages of monetary tightening typically occur in conjunction with stable, above-trend growth. Liquidity conditions are still stimulative in Phase 1, which provides a substantial tailwind for spread product performance. On the other end of the spectrum, EM debt excess returns were relatively low during Phase 2 and Phase 3, and even negative in the case of EM corporate debt for Phase 3. Surprisingly, EM debt has been less affected by the direction of U.S. interest rates than what we would have expected. Monetary easing in Phase 3 was not enough to substantially boost EM relative returns and tightening in Phase 1 did not derail growth or lift the USD enough for EM debt to underperform. In fact, because EM debt still offers robust excess returns during Phase 1 when the central bank is tightening, while also suffering during Phase 3 during central bank easing, we can conclude that the level of policy rates relative to equilibrium has a greater impact on returns than the direction of rates. The severity of the Global Financial Crisis and the relatively subdued pace of recovery for both growth and inflation led to one of the longest Phase 4s in history. Given the low level of starting yields, indicating a large gap to equilibrium, and the 'gradual' pace of normalization, the current Phase 1 should also last longer than it typically has. This bodes well for all credit sectors, including EM sovereign and corporate debt, if history is any guide. However, there are still reasons to be concerned about the impact of U.S. monetary policy on EM assets next year. If the Fed follows through with the interest rate hikes it is currently projecting - another 100bps in total by the end of 2018 - the funds rate will be much closer to equilibrium. If the U.S. dollar rallies alongside that Fed tightening, as we expect, overall U.S. monetary conditions could end up being much closer to a restrictive level than implied by strictly looking at our Fed Policy Cycle (which only looks at the funds rate to determine monetary conditions). Also, the equilibrium funds rate may now be lower than the levels we are assuming in the Fed Policy Cycle framework, suggesting that policy could turn restrictive more quickly in the current tightening cycle. Bottom Line: The Fed is still in the early stages of rate normalization. At this point in the Fed policy cycle, where the Fed is hiking rates but monetary conditions are still stimulative, EM hard currency debt has historically performed well both on a relative and absolute basis. Looking ahead, EM returns should begin to suffer in latter half of 2018 as the Fed moves to more restrictive policy stance. Another Reason For Caution: Our EM Corporate Health Monitor The BCA EM Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a directional indicator aimed at modeling the path of EM corporate spread movements. Financial data from 220 emerging market companies in over 30 countries is aggregated. Only firms that issue USD-denominated bonds are included, with banks and other financials also omitted in a similar fashion to the CHMs we have constructed for DM corporates. The indicator is made up of four financial ratios: profit margins, free cash flow to total debt, liquidity and leverage. Unlike the DM CHMs, the ratios are not equally weighted in the construction of the EM CHM. Profit margins and free cash flow to debt combined represent 75% of the EM CHM. The latest available reading is from Q2 2017, showing a large decrease, with the indicator now only barely in 'Improving Health' territory (Chart 10). This has occurred in tandem with EM corporate spreads narrowing to post-crisis lows, leaving EM debt at potentially overvalued levels on a fundamental basis. While this slowdown in the EM CHM is not yet a cause for concern, if this became an extended trend of financial health deterioration, the divergence with EM corporate debt performance would be unsustainable and leave EM corporates highly vulnerable to a correction. Chart 10The BCA EM Corporate Health Monitor Has Rolled Over EM Corporate Health Monitor Is Sending A 'Sell' Signal Bottom Line: Our EM Corporate Health Monitor has declined drastically and is barely in 'Improving Health' territory. This alone is not cause for concern yet, but further deterioration in our Monitor combined with additional credit spread narrowing would be a worrisome divergence. Investment Implications Emerging market debt is facing conflicting forces. While continued robust global growth and accommodative monetary policy provide a substantial tailwind for credit performance, extended valuations, the turn in the USD and a potentially worsening commodities outlook present difficult hurdles for EM to overcome. Given the mixed messages, we prefer owning cyclical credit exposure through DM corporate debt, particularly U.S. investment grade. EM debt yields have collapsed and are expensive relative to DM investment grade debt (Chart 11). Combined with a higher risk profile in EM, elevated valuations indicate that EM sovereign and corporate debt are vulnerable to larger corrections. From a return perspective, the difference in the corporate option-adjusted spreads (OAS) has been an excellent leading indicator for relative total returns (Chart 12). This differential indicates that there is considerable relative upside potential for U.S. investment grade over EM hard currency debt. Additionally, while global growth should support credit-related plays, relative growth dynamics are more supportive of U.S. investment grade because the next phase of the global growth upturn will be driven by DM countries and not EM. The difference between the manufacturing PMIs in the U.S. and EM has historically been a good directional indicator for the spread between U.S. corporate bond spreads and EM debt spreads (Chart 13). The gap between the relative manufacturing PMI readings is at a post-crisis high, and could widen further if EM economies suffer on the back of any pullback in Chinese growth in 2018. Chart 11EM Yields & Spreads Look Full Valued Chart 12Favor U.S. IG Over EM Corporates... Chart 13...Because Of Stronger U.S. Growth What are the risks to our view? Our recommended position would suffer in the event that inflation in the U.S. slows, keeping the Fed on hold and maintaining this year's USD downtrend. Also, if China were to ease up on its policy tightening, industrial commodity prices could strengthen once again. Under these scenarios, EM hard currency debt would likely outperform DM spread product. Bottom Line: Maintain moderate underweight positions in EM hard currency debt. Favor DM spread product (especially U.S. investment grade corporates) due to more supportive relative valuations and growth trends. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Global Fixed Income Strategy patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 This “EM versus IG” trade was implemented in both our Emerging Markets Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services. Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “EM: The Focus Is On Profits”, dated August 16th 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, as well as the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Lack Of Leadership”, dated August 22nd 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The weighting to EM debt in the Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio benchmark is based on market capitalizations of all the fixed income sectors we wanted to have in the benchmark, which includes non-investment grade debt like global high-yield corporates. It is reassuring to see that our benchmark weighting is also the desired weighting from a long-run portfolio optimization perspective. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Is The Dollar Expensive, And Are EM Currencies Cheap?", dated October 11th, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the joint BCA Global Asset Allocation/Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM", dated August 9th 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com & gaa.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bonds And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle", dated May 27th 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 The equilibrium policy rate is a BCA calculation based on long-run real potential GDP growth and long run inflation expectations.

Special Report

Highlights Emerging Market (EM) hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, has consistently outperformed the broad global bond index. However, investors should steer clear of always maintaining maximum overweights to EM given its weak volatility reduction benefits and a much higher-than normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns. Our long-term analysis suggests a structural 5% allocation offers the best risk/reward potential. The Fed is still in the early stages of rate normalization. At this point in the Fed policy cycle, where the Fed is hiking rates but monetary conditions are still stimulative, EM hard currency debt has historically performed well both on a relative and absolute basis. Looking ahead, EM returns should begin to suffer in latter half of 2018 as the Fed moves to more restrictive policy stance. While global growth will remain supportive of EM credit next year, renewed U.S. dollar strength and a re-convergence to the downside with commodity prices present considerable headwinds. Maintain an underweight stance on EM hard currency debt. Favor DM spread product due to more supportive relative growth trends and valuations. Feature Emerging market (EM) sovereign and corporate debt returns have surged in 2017, returning 9.4% and 7.5%, respectively (Chart 1). Investor interest has been renewed, with the latest IMF Financial Stability Report indicating that non-resident inflows of portfolio capital to EM countries have recovered since early 2016 and reached $205 billion for 2017 through August. Against a backdrop of above-trend global economic growth, monetary policy settings from the major central banks that are still accommodative, and some diminished risks from the world's geopolitical hotspots, the current uptrend for EM debt performance could continue. Nevertheless, we urge caution. We moved to a moderate underweight stance on EM hard currency debt back in August, while at the same time increasing our current recommended overweight to U.S. investment grade (IG) corporate debt on the other side of the trade.1 Even with synchronized global growth boosting both EM export demand and industrial commodity prices, we prefer U.S. credit exposure over EM at this point in the cycle, for several reasons: The massive flow-driven EM rally has resulted in not only outsized returns but stretched valuations, with EM debt spreads now back to post-2008-crisis low (or even through those levels for EM hard currency corporates) without any major improvement in EM fundamentals; The previously reliable correlation between EM debt and commodity prices, a long-time driver of EM performance, has broken down, bullishly, for EM - potentially another sign of flow-driven overvaluation; Growing uncertainty over the near-term China growth outlook raises risks on further gains in industrial commodity demand and EM exports; The USD will appreciate once again on the back of additional Fed interest rate hikes beyond levels currently discounted by markets, which could trigger some reversal of the sharp inflows into EM seen this year. Over a strategic horizon, however, it remains difficult to argue against owning a core structural allocation of EM hard currency debt within global fixed income portfolios, given the higher yields that are typically on offer and the fairly consistent historical outperformance over Developed Market (DM) debt. Although the benefits of EM in a portfolio context are slightly overstated given its skewed risk profile (i.e. fat negative tails) and high correlation with DM spread product, specifically U.S. high-yield corporates (Chart 2). Chart 1How Much Longer Can This Rally Last? Chart 2EM Debt Offers Little Diversification Benefits In this Special Report, we examine the long-term role of EM hard currency debt within a fixed-income portfolio, and re-iterate our case for being underweight EM debt on a cyclical basis. The Long-Run Case For Owning EM Debt: A Moderate Core Allocation Makes Sense It is not a stretch to say that EM debt has become the most important part of global bond portfolios in the 21st century. Having a significant EM allocation at the right time can make a bond manager's year, while having it at the wrong time can end a bond manager's career. But what is the "right" allocation to optimize the long-run contribution to returns in a global fixed income portfolio? To answer this question, we took a look at the historical performance of a global bond portfolio that consisted of both DM and EM debt (sovereign and corporate), looking for the combination that would maximize the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio. In our analysis, we ran calculations for two different time periods as the available index data for EM sovereign debt goes back to 1994, while EM corporate debt indices begin in 2002. For DM debt, we used a single index - the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate - as this has a long history and is a common benchmark used by global bond managers that includes both DM sovereign and corporate debt. Though the sample size of our combined global portfolio is limited due to the shorter history of the EM corporates asset class, the findings generally align with our intuition. On a standalone basis, modern portfolio theory proposes that an individual asset should be included within a portfolio if its excess return divided by its standard deviation is higher than the excess return of the portfolio divided by the portfolio's standard deviation, multiplied by the correlation between the portfolio and the asset. Though the correlation to the DM portfolio from 2004 was fairly high for both assets at over 0.6, when we applied this formula, both EM sovereign and corporate debt warranted an allocation in a standard global fixed-income portfolio. EM sovereign debt scored higher, by offering a considerably better Sharpe ratio with only a minimally higher correlation to DM fixed income. While EM hard currency debt has fairly consistently outperformed the DM benchmark on a 12-month rolling basis, investors must be careful not to simply maintain large positions at all times. Obviously, the majority of fixed-income investors have volatility constraints that impose limits on credit allocations. Additionally, apart from simple volatility measures, EM debt has a "hidden" risk profile when looking at the higher moments of return distributions. Table 1EM Debt Returns Are##BR##Negatively Skewed Both EM sovereign and corporate credit historical returns have exhibited significant negative skewness and excess kurtosis, indicating a much higher-than-normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns (Table 1). This is confirmed through Historical Value-at-Risk (VaR) analysis, where the 5% worst returns far eclipsed those of DM investment grade and government debt. Nevertheless, it is important to view EM from a holistic perspective. For example, an asset with a high standard deviation may be less desirable as a standalone investment, but can be highly beneficial if it enhances overall the returns of a portfolio while also reducing its volatility. We tested these "portfolio effects" of EM debt by creating 21 hypothetical portfolios. We began with a DM-only portfolio (consisting of the Global Aggregate index) and increased the weighting toward EM debt by one percentage point in each portfolio, with the last portfolio having a 20% weighting toward EM. The breakdown within EM was 62% corporates and 38% sovereigns based on the market capitalizations of the relevant benchmark indices. Our calculations indicate that the highest portfolio Sharpe ratio was achieved with a 5% EM debt allocation, which also happens to be the "neutral" weighting of EM debt in the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy model portfolio benchmark index (Chart 3).2 Global bond investors should hover around this weighting on EM hard currency debt, absent a high conviction view on EM. Chart 3The Optimal EM Hard Currency Debt Allocation Is 5% So while the data suggests that EM hard currency debt warrants a long-term allocation, its beneficial impact on a fixed-income portfolio is at least slightly exaggerated. Portfolio managers are typically seeking out assets that can both improve return and decrease overall volatility, thereby increasing the efficiency of their portfolios. This was not the case with EM debt. In our study, increasing the EM allocation consistently raised both returns and volatility. Chart 4EM/DM Correlations Should Decline In 2018 This lack of diversification benefit is a result of the high correlation between EM hard currency debt and DM fixed income. Currently, the correlation between EM and DM (the Global Aggregate) is 0.90, near the upper end of its range, indicating that diversification benefits over the last year were essentially non-existent (Chart 4). Nevertheless, this relationship clearly exhibits a mean reversion tendency. That EM/DM correlation in recent years has been itself correlated to global growth and monetary policy changes. As we show in Chart 4, our diffusion index of OECD Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) - the number of countries with a rising LEI relative to those with a declining LEI - does tend to lead the EM/DM correlation and is currently pointing to a lower correlation as global growth becomes a little less synchronized in 2018. The same goes for the growth rate of major central bank balance sheets which is already slowing and will decelerate even more in 2018 on the back of a diminished pace of bond buying by the ECB and the Fed runoff of maturing bonds on its balance sheet. The conclusion is this - the EM/DM correlation should decline in 2018 but, as we discuss below, we think that happens through relative underperformance of EM credit. Bottom Line: EM hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, has consistently outperformed the broad global index. However, investors should steer clear of always maintaining maximum overweights given its weak volatility reduction benefits and a much higher-than normal tendency of experiencing outsized, negative returns. Our long-term analysis suggests a structural 5% allocation offers the best risk/reward potential. The Shorter-Run Case For Owning EM Debt: Will Macro Drivers Remain Supportive? So far in 2017, EM sovereign and corporate debt have been beneficiaries of robust global growth, a declining USD and a decoupling from a broader index of commodity prices. While we expect global growth will remain strong over the medium term, our outlook for the USD is still bullish and there is a risk that commodity prices and EM debt performance re-converge to the downside. Global growth will remain strong. Outside of a major global growth slowdown, which we currently view as a low probability event, a mass flight out of EM assets anytime soon is highly unlikely. Indicators such as the global PMI index, industrial production growth and the OECD leading economic indicator are all booming (Chart 5). Inflation will head higher on the back of rising oil prices, but the increase is likely to be gradual. Importantly, this is happening alongside global monetary conditions that remain generally accommodative, even with the Fed in a tightening cycle. Credit, both DM & EM, has historically performed well against this backdrop, as we discuss in the next section of this report. A renewed upleg in the USD bull market is already underway. The correlation between EM currencies and EM debt performance has recovered after breaking down during 2013-15 (Chart 6). Year-to-date, EM currency strength - the flipside of the weaker U.S. dollar - has been a major driver of EM relative performance. Using the IMF's measure real effective exchange rates based on unit labor costs, the U.S. dollar is fairly valued.3 Neutral valuations suggest that directional market indicators are driving currency movements. As the EM business cycle slows and the Fed ramps up its rate hikes in response to rising inflation, the USD cyclical bull market should resume. Chart 5Robust Global Growth##BR##Is Supportive For EM Chart 6Can EM Ignore Another##BR##Round Of USD Strength? The de-coupling between EM debt and commodity price movements is unsustainable. EM debt has experienced a strong rally since 2016 with only a moderate rise in commodity prices compared to past periods of EM strength. We view this decoupling to be temporary (Chart 7). Many sovereign EM issuers are commodity producers, suggesting that this divergence is unsustainable. EM sovereign and corporate debt will not be able to continue their massive rallies if commodity prices relapse. We maintain a bullish view on oil prices, but there are signals that base metal prices are at risk over the next 6-12 months. Chinese monetary authorities have tightened policy and the resulting sharp slowdown in money supply growth is a worrisome sign for Chinese demand for commodities (Chart 8).4 Chart 7EM-Commodity Divergence##BR##Is Unsustainable Chart 8China Downside Risks For##BR##Industrial Commodity Prices Bottom Line: While global growth will remain supportive of EM credit, currency weakness and a re-convergence with commodity prices present considerable headwinds. EM Debt Performance & The Fed Policy Cycle Chart 9The Fed Policy Cycle As more central banks are shifting to a tightening bias, investors are becoming increasingly concerned over policy normalization and its potential impact on credit market performance. Given the strong historical linkages between EM debt performance and Fed policy changes, the current U.S. tightening cycle looms as a major potential problem for EM assets. We have found it most useful to think about changes in Fed monetary policy and asset market performance in terms of breaking up the Fed policy into four distinct phases (Chart 9).5 These are characterized by both the level of interest rates (whether they are above or below "equilibrium") and the direction of policy changes (whether the Fed is raising or cutting rates):6 Phase 1 - the Fed is hiking while the fed funds rate is below equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are stimulative). Phase 2 - the Fed is hiking or keeping policy on hold while the fed funds rate is above equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are restrictive). Phase 3 - the Fed is cutting while the fed funds rate is above equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are restrictive). Phase 4 - the Fed is cutting rates while the fed funds rate is below equilibrium (i.e. monetary conditions are stimulative). For EM sovereign debt where we have index data going back to 1994, there have been four episodes of Phase 1 and three episodes of the other phases. For EM corporate debt, where the index data begins in 2002, there have been two episodes of Phases 1 and 4 and only one occurrence of Phases 2 and 3. We present the excess returns of EM debt relative to other major fixed income classes by phase in Table 2. In the limited sample, EM sovereign debt and corporate debt consistently outperformed the Global Aggregate index and most individual bond classes. However, relative to DM high-yield debt, which has the most comparable risk profile, EM sovereign bonds underperformed in Phase 1 and EM corporate debt underperformed in all phases. Table 2Relative EM Debt Performance Worsens As Fed Policy Tightens Excess returns for both EM debt classes were highest in Phase 4, where the central bank is easing while conditions are stimulative. Similar to other risk assets, EM debt also outperformed in Phase 1, where the central bank is tightening while rates are below equilibrium. This makes sense, as the early stages of monetary tightening typically occur in conjunction with stable, above-trend growth. Liquidity conditions are still stimulative in Phase 1, which provides a substantial tailwind for spread product performance. On the other end of the spectrum, EM debt excess returns were relatively low during Phase 2 and Phase 3, and even negative in the case of EM corporate debt for Phase 3. Surprisingly, EM debt has been less affected by the direction of U.S. interest rates than what we would have expected. Monetary easing in Phase 3 was not enough to substantially boost EM relative returns and tightening in Phase 1 did not derail growth or lift the USD enough for EM debt to underperform. In fact, because EM debt still offers robust excess returns during Phase 1 when the central bank is tightening, while also suffering during Phase 3 during central bank easing, we can conclude that the level of policy rates relative to equilibrium has a greater impact on returns than the direction of rates. The severity of the Global Financial Crisis and the relatively subdued pace of recovery for both growth and inflation led to one of the longest Phase 4s in history. Given the low level of starting yields, indicating a large gap to equilibrium, and the 'gradual' pace of normalization, the current Phase 1 should also last longer than it typically has. This bodes well for all credit sectors, including EM sovereign and corporate debt, if history is any guide. However, there are still reasons to be concerned about the impact of U.S. monetary policy on EM assets next year. If the Fed follows through with the interest rate hikes it is currently projecting - another 100bps in total by the end of 2018 - the funds rate will be much closer to equilibrium. If the U.S. dollar rallies alongside that Fed tightening, as we expect, overall U.S. monetary conditions could end up being much closer to a restrictive level than implied by strictly looking at our Fed Policy Cycle (which only looks at the funds rate to determine monetary conditions). Also, the equilibrium funds rate may now be lower than the levels we are assuming in the Fed Policy Cycle framework, suggesting that policy could turn restrictive more quickly in the current tightening cycle. Bottom Line: The Fed is still in the early stages of rate normalization. At this point in the Fed policy cycle, where the Fed is hiking rates but monetary conditions are still stimulative, EM hard currency debt has historically performed well both on a relative and absolute basis. Looking ahead, EM returns should begin to suffer in latter half of 2018 as the Fed moves to more restrictive policy stance. Another Reason For Caution: Our EM Corporate Health Monitor The BCA EM Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a directional indicator aimed at modeling the path of EM corporate spread movements. Financial data from 220 emerging market companies in over 30 countries is aggregated. Only firms that issue USD-denominated bonds are included, with banks and other financials also omitted in a similar fashion to the CHMs we have constructed for DM corporates. The indicator is made up of four financial ratios: profit margins, free cash flow to total debt, liquidity and leverage. Unlike the DM CHMs, the ratios are not equally weighted in the construction of the EM CHM. Profit margins and free cash flow to debt combined represent 75% of the EM CHM. The latest available reading is from Q2 2017, showing a large decrease, with the indicator now only barely in 'Improving Health' territory (Chart 10). This has occurred in tandem with EM corporate spreads narrowing to post-crisis lows, leaving EM debt at potentially overvalued levels on a fundamental basis. While this slowdown in the EM CHM is not yet a cause for concern, if this became an extended trend of financial health deterioration, the divergence with EM corporate debt performance would be unsustainable and leave EM corporates highly vulnerable to a correction. Chart 10The BCA EM Corporate Health Monitor Has Rolled Over EM Corporate Health Monitor Is Sending A 'Sell' Signal Bottom Line: Our EM Corporate Health Monitor has declined drastically and is barely in 'Improving Health' territory. This alone is not cause for concern yet, but further deterioration in our Monitor combined with additional credit spread narrowing would be a worrisome divergence. Investment Implications Emerging market debt is facing conflicting forces. While continued robust global growth and accommodative monetary policy provide a substantial tailwind for credit performance, extended valuations, the turn in the USD and a potentially worsening commodities outlook present difficult hurdles for EM to overcome. Given the mixed messages, we prefer owning cyclical credit exposure through DM corporate debt, particularly U.S. investment grade. EM debt yields have collapsed and are expensive relative to DM investment grade debt (Chart 11). Combined with a higher risk profile in EM, elevated valuations indicate that EM sovereign and corporate debt are vulnerable to larger corrections. From a return perspective, the difference in the corporate option-adjusted spreads (OAS) has been an excellent leading indicator for relative total returns (Chart 12). This differential indicates that there is considerable relative upside potential for U.S. investment grade over EM hard currency debt. Additionally, while global growth should support credit-related plays, relative growth dynamics are more supportive of U.S. investment grade because the next phase of the global growth upturn will be driven by DM countries and not EM. The difference between the manufacturing PMIs in the U.S. and EM has historically been a good directional indicator for the spread between U.S. corporate bond spreads and EM debt spreads (Chart 13). The gap between the relative manufacturing PMI readings is at a post-crisis high, and could widen further if EM economies suffer on the back of any pullback in Chinese growth in 2018. Chart 11EM Yields & Spreads Look Full Valued Chart 12Favor U.S. IG Over EM Corporates... Chart 13...Because Of Stronger U.S. Growth What are the risks to our view? Our recommended position would suffer in the event that inflation in the U.S. slows, keeping the Fed on hold and maintaining this year's USD downtrend. Also, if China were to ease up on its policy tightening, industrial commodity prices could strengthen once again. Under these scenarios, EM hard currency debt would likely outperform DM spread product. Bottom Line: Maintain moderate underweight positions in EM hard currency debt. Favor DM spread product (especially U.S. investment grade corporates) due to more supportive relative valuations and growth trends. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Global Fixed Income Strategy patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 This “EM versus IG” trade was implemented in both our Emerging Markets Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services. Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “EM: The Focus Is On Profits”, dated August 16th 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, as well as the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Lack Of Leadership”, dated August 22nd 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The weighting to EM debt in the Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio benchmark is based on market capitalizations of all the fixed income sectors we wanted to have in the benchmark, which includes non-investment grade debt like global high-yield corporates. It is reassuring to see that our benchmark weighting is also the desired weighting from a long-run portfolio optimization perspective. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Is The Dollar Expensive, And Are EM Currencies Cheap?", dated October 11th, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the joint BCA Global Asset Allocation/Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM", dated August 9th 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com & gaa.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bonds And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle", dated May 27th 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 The equilibrium policy rate is a BCA calculation based on long-run real potential GDP growth and long run inflation expectations.

Dear Clients, Please note there was an error in the Recommend Asset Allocation table published on November 1, 2017. This has now been amended. We apologize for the confusion and any inconvenience it may have caused. Best Regards, Garry Evans Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation Reflation Trade Returns Recommended Allocation The market mood has shifted remarkably quickly over the past couple of months. The probability of a December Fed rate hike has moved up from 20% in early September to close to 100%, pushing the 10-year Treasury bond yield from 2.0% to 2.4% and causing the trade-weighted U.S. dollar to appreciate by 2%, and Emerging Market equities to underperform. We expect this trend to continue. Global growth continues to surprise to the upside (Chart 1). The softness in U.S. inflation this year is likely to reverse over coming quarters - an argument supported by the New York Fed's new Underlying Inflation Gauge, which indicates that sustained movements in inflation continue to trend higher (Chart 2). This makes it likely that the Fed will move ahead with its forecast three rate hikes in 2018, which the market has not yet priced in (Chart 3) - the implied probability of this is only 10%. Consequently, rates have further to rise: our fair value for the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield currently is 2.7%. And the increasing gap between U.S. and euro zone interest rates suggests that the dollar can appreciate further (Chart 4). All this supports our view that risk assets (equities and corporate credit) should outperform over the next 12 months, with developed government bonds producing a negative return, and emerging markets lagging because of rising rates and the stronger dollar (and a possible slowdown in China, as it focuses on reforming its economy and cleaning up the debt situation). Chart 1Growth Surprising To The Upside Chart 2Underlying Inflation Still Trending Up Chart 3Market Expects Fed To Move Only Slowly Chart 4Rate Gap Suggests Dollar Appreciation The key question, though, is how long this positive scenario can continue. With stock market valuations expensive (Chart 5) and investors fully invested, though not yet euphoric (Chart 6), we are clearly in late cycle. Rising rates could put a dampener on growth. Chart 5 Equities Close To Extremely Overvalued Chart 6Investors Are Fully Invested, But Cautious We find the Fed policy cycle a useful tool for thinking about probable investment returns from different assets (Chart 7). The best quadrant for risk assets is when the Fed is easing and policy is easy (with the Fed Funds Rate below the neutral rate). Currently we are in the bottom-right quadrant (Fed tightening, but not yet in the tight zone), which also has produced attractive returns for equities and credit. But once the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) moves above the neutral rate, returns from risk assets are on average poor and, historically, recession often followed quite quickly. How much longer do we have before Fed policy moves into the top-right quadrant? The Fed's own estimate of the neutral rate, in real terms, is 0.3%. The current real FFR (using core PCE inflation, 1.3%, as the deflator) is -0.17 (Chart 8). This implies that it will take only two further Fed hikes to move into the tight zone, which could happen as soon as March. This is why the outlook for inflation is critical. If, as the Fed forecasts and we also expect, core PCE inflation rises to 2%, it will be another five hikes before policy turns tight - we are unlikely to get there until early 2019. Chart 7The Fed Policy Cycle Chart 8How Far From The Tight Zone? For now, therefore, we continue to recommend an overweight on risk assets and pro-cyclical portfolio tilts. Global monetary policy remains easy and we see no indicators that suggest growth is slowing or that the risk of recession over the next 12 months is rising. The risks to this optimistic scenario (a hawkish Fed, over-eager structural reform in China, provocation from North Korea) seem limited. But we also continue to warn of the possibility of a recession in 2019 or 2020 caused, as so often, by excessive Fed tightening. We see, therefore, the possibility of our turning more defensive somewhere in mid-2018. Equities: We prefer developed over emerging market equities. Rising interest rates and an appreciating dollar will be headwinds for EM. Moreover, Xi Jinping's speech at the Communist Party Congress hinted at supply side structural reforms, overcapacity reduction, and deleveraging efforts. A renewed reform effort could dampen Chinese growth somewhat which, as in 2013-15, would negatively impact EM equities (Chart 9). Within DM, we are overweight euro zone and Japanese equities, which are higher beta, have stronger earnings momentum, and benefit from looser monetary policy. Fixed Income: We expect bonds to underperform over coming quarters, as U.S. inflation picks up and the Fed moves raises rates in line with its "dots". Corporate credit still has some attractions, provided the economic expansion continues. U.S. sub-investment grade bonds, in particular, have an attractive default-adjusted yield, as long as a strong economy keeps the default rate over the next 12 months to the historically low 2% our model suggests (Chart 10). The pick-up in inflation we expect would mean inflation-linked bonds outperform nominal bonds. Chart 9Slowing China Would Hurt EM Equities Chart 10Junk Attractive If Defaults Stay This Low Currencies: The ECB delivered a dovish tapering last month, extending its asset purchases until at least September 2018 and emphasizing that its current low interest rates will continue "well past the horizon of our net asset purchases". Given this, and the gap between U.S. and euro zone interest rates (Chart 4), we expect moderate further euro weakness over coming months. The dollar is likely to appreciate even more against the yen. There are the first tentative signs of inflation emerging in Japan (Chart 11) which, combined with the Bank of Japan sticking to its 0% 10-year JGB target and rising global interest rates, could push the yen to 120 against the dollar over coming months. Commodities: BCA's energy strategists recently revised up their crude oil forecasts on the back of strong demand, a likely extension of the OPEC agreement until at least end-2018, and possible supply disruptions in Iraq, Venezuela and other troubled regions.1 They see inventories continuing to draw down until at least 2H 2018 (Chart 12). Accordingly, they forecast $65 a barrel for Brent and $63 for WTI and flag upside risk to those projections. The outlook for industrial and precious metals, however, is less positive. A stronger dollar and a shift in the growth drivers in China will depress prices for base metals. Rising real interest rates will hurt gold, although we still like precious metals as a long-term hedge. Chart 11First Signs Of Inflation In Japan? Chart 12Oil Inventory Drawdowns Support Higher Price Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Oil Forecast Lifted As Market Tightens," dated 19 October 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Risk assets are responding well to better data and rising rates. Q3 EPS results beating lowered expectations, but growth earnings will peak soon. The conditions are in place for robust capital spending. Financial assets are adhering to the post-Hurricane playbook, with a few notable exceptions. Feature Chart 1Risk Assets Higher Despite Higher Rates Risk assets rose last week for the 6th week in a row (Chart 1). A solid start to Q3 earnings season, more legislative progress on the GOP's tax plan and a narrowing of President Trump's choice for Fed Chair (Jerome Powell, John Taylor and incumbent Janet Yellen) all added to the positive backdrop. The 4 bps rise in the 10 year Treasury yield last week (and 37 bps since early September) was not an impediment to higher equity and oil prices, and gains for small caps and high yield bonds. The positive reaction likely reflected the fact that yields rose more because of increased growth expectations than higher inflation expectations. Despite the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, Q3 GDP posted an impressive 3% gain. The composition of the Q3 readings suggests an even stronger report in Q4 (Chart 2). At 2.3%, the year-over-year change in real GDP is close to the Fed's 2017 forecast (2.4%) and above the long run forecast (1.8%). The implication for investors is that because U.S. economic growth is faster than its long-term potential, the labor market is tightening and inflation is poised to move higher. Accordingly, market odds for a Fed hike in December are near 90% and participants expect 51 bps more hikes in the next 12 months (Chart 1, panel 3). BCA's view is that U.S. economic growth is set to accelerate in the coming quarters aided by a post hurricane rebound in housing. The Fed will raise rates in December and three more times next year as inflation returns to 2% and perhaps beyond. Corporate profit growth will peak in the next few quarters, but remain supportive of higher stock prices for now. The rise in the Economic Surprise Index will continue for another few months, and provide another lift for risk assets. A surge in capital spending adds to the upbeat tone. Chart 2GDP Growth Remains Below Average, But Above Fed's Long Run Target Capital Spending Blasts Off Business capital spending is on the upswing. The robust readings in September on core durable goods orders (7.8% year-over-year) and shipments reported last week were paybacks for the Hurricane-weakened August report. Nonetheless, the impressive soundings on the three -month change in both orders and shipments were not distorted by the storms. Moreover, the durable goods report was one of the latest in a series of data points brightening capex's outlook (Chart 3). Both BCA's real and nominal capex models, driven by surging capital goods orders along with elevated ISM readings and soaring sentiment on business spending, indicate strong investment in plant and equipment in the next few quarters. CEO confidence soared to a 13-year high in Q1 according to the latest Duke University/CFO Magazine Business Outlook, but retreated modestly in Q2 and Q3 (Chart 4). Surveys by the Conference Board and Business Roundtable show a similar pattern. Notably, readings on all three surveys have climbed since Trump's election in November 2016, but then retreated as his pro-business agenda stalled. The drop in sentiment reflects the lack of legislative progress in Washington (Chart 5). The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 and Q3 is in sharp contrast with the easing of policy concerns in the Beige Book. Chart 3Bright Outlook For Capital Spending Chart 4Capital Spending Plans Upbeat Chart 5Managements Remain Upbeat The upbeat numbers in the regional Federal Reserve Banks' surveys of capital spending intentions further support rising capex spending in the next few quarters. The average readings from the New York, Philadelphia and Richmond Feds' capex survey plans are close to cycle highs, despite a modest pullback in the summer months. Moreover, the regional Feds' capex spending plans diffusion index hit an eight-year high in October (Chart 5, panel 3). Bottom Line: Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, and underweight duration. Rising capex will drive up GDP, employment and EPS in the coming quarters. Q3 Earnings Beating Lowered Expectations The Q3 earnings reporting season is off to a strong start, with both EPS and sales growth well ahead of consensus expectations as we forecast in our October 2 preview. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in profit margins is still in place. Just under 55% of companies have reported results so far, with 74% beating consensus EPS projections just above the long-term average of 55%. Furthermore, 67% have posted Q3 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the LT average of 69%. The surprise factor for Q3 stands at 5% for EPS and 2% for sales. These compare favorably with the average EPS (4.2%) and sales (1.2%) in the past five years. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, initial results imply that Q2 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016) is solid at 7% with revenue growth at 5%. Strength in earnings and revenues is broad based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016 in eight of the 11 sectors. The 7.3% year-over-year drop in the financial sector is linked to the impact of the hurricanes on the insurance and reinsurance industries. Excluding those industries, financial EPS is up 4.7% from a year ago. EPS results are particularly stout in energy (164%), technology (18%) and healthcare (7%). Those sectors likewise experienced significant sales gains (16%, 9% and 5% respectively). Corporate managements are more focused on the message in Washington than on the President (Chart 6). Trump's name was mentioned just once in the Q3 earnings calls held through October 27, matching Q2's reporting period. CEOs and CFOs have cited Trump's name at least once in each earnings season since Q2 2016. The peak in mentions occurred immediately after Trump took office in early 2017. Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q3 2017 Results* Chart 6Managements Focused On##BR##The Message Out Of DC In contrast, the words "tax" and "reform" have appeared 39 times thus far in Q3 conference calls, most often in a positive light. There were only five mentions in Q2, when there was skepticism that a tax plan would pass this year. In the Q4 2016 reporting season following the November election, tax and reform were cited 16 times. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018.1 We are encouraged by the upward trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 7). It is odd that the recent downtick in 2017 EPS is mirrored by an uptick in the 2018 figure. That said, the divergence can be explained by the impact of the hurricanes on the financial sector's earnings in 2017 and probable snapback in early 2018. Analysts expect 2019 EPS growth to slow from 2018's clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019.2 Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018 toward a level commensurate with 3 ½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 8). Accordingly, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller tailwind. This forecast excludes any positive effect on growth from tax cuts, which would be positive for EPS and the S&P 500 price index in the short term, although this would also bring forward Fed rate hikes. The entire Treasury curve has readjusted to reflect this view. Chart 7Stability In '17 & '18 EPS Estimates,##BR##But '19 Likely To Move Lower Chart 8Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon 10-Year Treasury Update BCA's view is that the 10-year Treasury yield will head higher in the coming months. However, is the move from 2.03% in early September to 2.43% last week sustainable? BCA's fair value model for the 10-year Treasury yield (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value at 2.65% (Chart 9, panel 1). Moreover, BCA's three-factor version of the model (that includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.63% (Chart 9, panel 3). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Chart 9Treasury Fair Value Models BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service will publish updated fair models after the November 1 release of October's global PMI data. The latest readings on Citi's Economic Surprise index also support BCA's stance on rates. How Long Can The Economic Surprise Index Stay Positive? The Citi Economic Surprise Index crossed into positive territory on October 2nd, remaining above zero for 20 business days, and risk assets are responding (Chart 10). Since 2010, once the Index turns positive, it continues to rise for 46 days. The implication for investors is that the economic data will continue to be remarkable for another two months. Table 2 shows that risk assets outperform as the economic surprise index rises from zero toward its zenith. Risk assets have also outperformed since the June bottom in economic surprises, matching the historical performance.3 Oil (+17%), small caps and investment grade corporates are all standouts and the gains may not be over. The track record of risk assets as the Economic Surprise Index climbs suggests that additional increases are in prospect for risk assets. On average, equities (relative to treasuries) and oil are the best performers during these intervals. Chart 10May Still Be Room To Run On Economic Surprise Table 2Risk Assets Perform Well As Economic Surprise Rises Post-Hurricane Macro Backdrop The strength of the Citi Economic Surprise Index following the hurricanes duplicates the historical trend and supports the rise in risk assets. The Index moves higher for the first month post-storm, and then remains above zero for an additional three weeks (Chart 11, panel 4). This bolsters BCA's stance that the direction of the Index will continue to lift risk assets in the next few months. Financial assets are also adhering to the post-Hurricane playbook,4 with a few notable exceptions (Chart 12). The stock-to-bond ratio moved higher and the VIX has declined since Hurricane Harvey, matching the typical post-storm performance. However, the 10-year Treasury yield, the S&P 500 and the Fed funds rate, all have bucked historical trends. The S&P 500 rose by 5.6% since late August; stocks typically drift lower in the first few months after a major storm. In addition, the 10-year Treasury yield climbed but it usually moves down in the two months following a hurricane. Post- storm, the Fed typically continues to do whatever it was doing prior to the storm. Accordingly, we expect the Fed to hike rates at its December meeting. Chart 11Major Hurricane Impact##BR##On Activity Data Chart 12Major Hurricane Impact On##BR##Financial Markets And The Fed The economic, inflation and sentiment data are also mixed. Housing data frequently lags in the wake of a storm, but both new and existing home sales moved up in the month after Harvey and Irma; housing starts declined in recent months which is counter to the historical pattern (Chart 13). Both IP and employment plunged after the storms, however, these indicators tend to rise after major weather. Initial claims for unemployment insurance were typically volatile in the six weeks since Harvey hit Texas, but have resumed their downtrend. Average hourly earnings in inflation climbed after Harvey and Irma, while consumer confidence dipped, matching history. However, the bump in gasoline prices since late August runs counter to historical precedent. Gasoline prices tend to decline after major storms (Chart 14). Chart 13Major Hurricane Impact##BR##On Housing Data Chart 14Major Hurricane Impact On##BR##Sentiment And Inflation Data Investment Conclusions: The macro backdrop remains bullish for risk assets, especially since synchronized growth has reduced fears of secular stagnation. Bond yields will rise, but won't be a headwind for stocks yet.5 Rising bond yields because of growth, without rising inflation, are bullish for risk assets, but this will change as inflation reaches 2% and inflation expectations start to rise. At that point, the Fed will be behind the curve. This will lead to faster Fed rate hikes, historically a headwind for equities. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration," April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Shelter From The Storm," September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still In The Sweet Spot" June 19, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.