Asia

Highlights Few emerging market peers have a track record of democracy like India does. Russia and others have long histories of political instability and one-man rule. Several large EMs have experienced stints of military rule in the post-WWII era. While India’s democratic credentials are real, these should not be exaggerated. India’s political system suffers from some structural and cyclical vulnerabilities. These imperfections deserve attention today, more than ever, given that India trades at a record premium to peers. From a strategic perspective, we remain Buyers of India. India’s democratic traditions will lend political stability as the country’s economic heft grows. However, on a time horizon, we recommend paring exposure to Indian assets. A loaded state election calendar awaits in 2022, which will be followed by crucial state elections in 2023 and general elections in 2024. While we expect the incumbent political party to retain power in 2024, history suggests that the road to general elections is paved with policy risks. Policymakers tend to shift attention from market friendly-reform to voter-friendly policies as these key state elections approach. Additionally, geopolitical risks for India are ascendant as dangerous transitions are underway to India’s west and east too. Feature Chart 1 Investors regard India as being exceptionally well-off on political parameters. It is viewed by many as the blue-eyed boy of emerging market democracies. And for good reason. Despite its massive population and very low per capita incomes, India has remained a functional democracy for over seventy years. Democratic political regimes are a relatively new trend. The number of democracies began exceeding the number autocracies in the world only very recently in 2002 (Chart 1). India was one of the earliest adopters of this trend compared to emerging market peers. Its democratic traditions are so well-entrenched now that they are comparable to those of some of the most developed economies of the world (Chart 2). To add to these democratic credentials, every government at the national level in India has completed its full five-year term since 1999, thereby offering stability. Investors greatly value the political stability that India offers. While political stability is only one factor that investors consider, India has traded at a 28% premium relative to democracies and a 67% premium to non-democracies like Russia and China over the last decade (Chart 3). Chart 2 ​​​​ Chart 3 ​​​​​​ In this report we highlight that while India’s democratic credentials are real, these should not be exaggerated. The political system in India is solid but far from perfect. It suffers from both structural and cyclical vulnerabilities. These imperfections deserve attention today more than ever, given that India trades at a record premium to peers (Chart 3). Also, a closer look at India’s political system is warranted given that both geopolitical and macroeconomic risks for India are ascendant. With India, the devil always lies in the details. India is the largest democracy of the world but is also one of the few large democracies that follows a first-past-the-post (FPTP) method of determining election winners and has no effective limit on the number of political parties that can contest elections. Most democracies, either combine an FPTP system with natural or legislative limit on the number of competing political parties (such as in the case of UK and US) or rely on a non-FPTP system, with specific vote thresholds to enter Parliament. The combination of an FPTP system along with a system that allows multiple small political parties to exist entails challenges and makes the system vulnerable to some structural policy problems that are often overlooked. These include: A Tendency To Go All-In: An FPTP system means that at an election, the contestant with the highest number of votes is declared the winner even if the victory margin is very low. For instance, the narrowest victory margin recorded at an Indian constituency-level election is a mere 9 votes! Such a system where the winner takes all, irrespective of the victory margin, creates perverse incentives for contesting candidates to go all-in on populism ahead of elections. Indian elections have thus seen candidates offer everything from food and free laptops, to free alcohol and hard cash, in a bid to woo voters in the run up to elections. Too Many Players Can Spoil The Election: An FPTP system alongside a multi-party system can lead to very high degrees of political competition. While competition is usually a virtue, very high levels of political competition tend to fragment the electorate. Owing to these reasons, political competition in India tends to be very high in general. For instance, the last two general elections in India saw 15 candidates contest from each constituency on average. This compares to an average number of contestants from each constituency being 5 for UK or 6 for Canada. The problem with this fragmentation is that the victorious politician may lack a strong popular mandate. Smaller Indian states bear the brunt of this problem. The smaller the state, the cost of the pre-election campaign is lower, so the number of contestants shoots up in smaller regions (Chart 4). Chart 4 Rent-Seeking Becomes A Necessity: Such a system which combines FPTP and no major entry barriers for contestants arguably encourages rent-seeking behavior, which election winners frequently display. Populist spending promised by candidates to lure voters ahead of elections can be very high, especially when political competition is stiff. Winners then are keen to recover this “sunk cost” and to create a war chest for the next election. This prompts the rent-seeking that often becomes a necessity for candidates who run expensive election campaigns. To conclude, few emerging market peers have a sustained track record of democracy like India does. Russia and others have long histories of both political instability and one-man rule. Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia have all experienced stints of military rule and revolutions in the post-WWII era. Whilst India’s political stability credentials are solid, the existence of high degrees of political competition alongside high degrees of social complexity will spawn both structural and cyclical policy risks in India. Navigating India’s Political Peculiarities It is heuristically convenient to assume that policy risks in India are uniform across time. However, in this report, we highlight that policy risks for India hardly tend to be the same through the five-year term of a political party in charge at the national level. The five-year term of any central government in India is paved with cyclical policy risks. The good news is that there is a method to the madness. We present a simple method to identify a “pattern” to the cyclical policy risks: We break down India’s general election cycle into a five-year sequence. Year 1 is defined as the year after a general election takes place (such as 2020) and Year 5 is defined as the year in which a general election takes place (such as 2019 or 2024). (See the Appendix for a quick overview of India’s political system.) Given that India has 28 states and a state government’s term lasts five years, about six state elections are held each year. After identifying this five-year sequence, we then identify specific states that become due for state elections during this five-year period. Such a characterization of India’s election cycle shows how the five-year period from one election to the other is hardly the same. In fact, it becomes clear how policy risks tend to be definitively elevated in the years leading up to a general election. Year 3 in such a framework sees elections in some of India’s largest states (size), India’s politically most sensitive states (sensitivity), and India’s socially most complex states (complexity). 2022 will mark the beginning of Year 3 of the current five-year cycle and will see: Size: The most loaded state election schedule which will affect more than a quarter of India’s population (Chart 5). Sensitivity: Elections take place in most of India’s northern region (Chart 6), which is a key constituency for the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Chart 5 ​​​​​​ Chart 6 ​​​​​​ Complexity: Elections take place in some of the most socially conflict-prone states such as say Manipur (Chart 7). Year 3 of India’s cycle is also worth bracing for as it typically sees the policy machinery’s attention shift away from big-ticket reform to populism. This is probably because Year 4 sees some of the poorest states in India undergo elections (Chart 8) and then Year 5 sees a general election. Chart 7 ​​​​​​ Chart 8 ​​​​​​ What becomes clear now is that India is set to enter the business-end of its five-year election cycle in 2022. So, what specific policy changes should investors expect? The Road To Elections … Is Paved With Policy Risks Irrespective of the political party in power at the centre, populism as a theme tends to become more defined in the two years leading to a general election in India. For instance, history suggests that government spending in the two years leading up to a general election tends to be higher than in the previous three years (Chart 9). The last time this theme did not play out was in the run up to the elections of 2014 when in fact the incumbent i.e., the Indian National Congress (INC) lost elections to the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Distinct from the fiscal support to the economy that tends to rise in the run up to elections, it is notable that even money supply growth, inflation to an extent and even the pace of Rupee depreciation tends to be faster in India in the years leading up to a general election (Chart 10). Chart 9 ​​​​​​ Chart 10 The run up to Year 3 and Year 4 of India’s election cycle also tends to see the announcement of voter-friendly policies that may not necessarily be market-friendly. Examples of this phenomenon include: Record Increase In Revenue Spends Ahead Of 1999 General Elections: In 1998 the-then Finance Minister oversaw a whopping 20% year-on-year increase in revenue expenditure. This is almost double the average growth rate of 13% seen in this metric over the last 25 years. Farm-loan Waiver Ahead of 2009 General Elections: In 2008 i.e., the year before the general elections of 2009, the Indian National Congress (INC)-led central government announced its decision to write off farm loans of about $15 billion (in inflation-adjusted terms today). Demonetization Decision Ahead Of 2017 Uttar Pradesh State Elections: The BJP-led central government announced its decision to demonetize 86% of currency in circulation in November 2016 in a bid to prove the government’s commitment to crackdown on black money. GST Rate Cuts Ahead Of 2017 Gujarat State Elections: The Goods and Services Tax (GST) council announced a cut in the GST rate for over 150 items in November 2017. This was ahead of Gujarat state elections that were due in December 2017. Such decisions are known to work with voters. The incumbent political party that announced these policy decisions, in each of the three cases cited above, won the elections that they subsequently contested. Just last week, the Indian Government decided to repeal farm sector reform related laws which it had announced a year ago. It is not entirely coincidental that this pro-voter decision has been announced just a few months ahead of critical state elections due in 2022. Key State Elections To Watch In 2022 Chart 11 State elections are due in seven states in India in 2022. State elections due in 2022 will have an indelible impact on India’s policy outlook for 2022 because the BJP is the incumbent party in most of these states and BJP’s popularity has suffered because of the pandemic (Chart 11). The government’s decision last week to roll back farm sector reform is a great example of this phenomenon. Of all the state elections due in 2022, the two key elections that will have the biggest bearing on the 2024 general elections will be the elections in Uttar Pradesh in February 2022 and in Gujarat in December 2022. BJP’s popularity in these states should be closely watched to get a better sense of the 2024 general election outcome. The BJP won about 80% of the cumulative seats these two states offer at the 2019 general elections. At the last state elections held in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, the BJP stormed into power in the state, winning 77% of seats. BJP’s entry into power there was symbolic as the road to New Delhi is said to pass through this state (Chart 12). Gujarat on the other hand has been a BJP stronghold and PM Modi began his political innings as the chief minister of this state. Despite being in power in Gujarat for over two decades, the BJP managed to retain power in this state at the last elections held in 2017 (Chart 13). Chart 12 ​​​​​​ Chart 13 ​​​​​​ Accurate pre-poll data for these states will be available only closer to election day. Our early on-ground checks suggest that the BJP is set to almost certainly retain power in Uttar Pradesh in 2022. However, the BJP runs the risk of losing some vote share in Gujarat owing to the anti-incumbency effect it faces and owing to the rise of parties like the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in the state of Gujarat. Another tool that can be used to estimate the likely result of these two key state elections is the economic growth momentum in these states. State election results from 2021 suggest that this macro variable matters a great deal. While it is not the only variable that matters, the incumbent lost elections in large states in 2021 when growth decelerated excessively (Chart 14). For instance, in 2021, Tamil Nadu saw its GDP growth decelerate significantly but West Bengal saw its GDP growth decelerate by a lesser extent. Notably, the incumbent was displaced out of power in Tamil Nadu but managed to retain power in West Bengal possibly because of several factors including a lesser slowdown in economic growth (Chart 14). If GDP growth were to affect election outcomes in 2022 as well then, the incumbent i.e., the BJP, will comfortably retain power in Uttar Pradesh but may have to deal with the risk of losing some vote share in Gujarat. This is because economic growth accelerated in Uttar Pradesh over the last five years before the pandemic. GDP growth rates remained high in Gujarat but the pace of acceleration was weaker (Chart 15). Chart 14 ​​​​​​ Chart 15 ​​​​​​ However, from the perspective of the general elections of 2024, BJP’s position in these two states remains fairly strong, and this is true even if it experiences minor setbacks in the upcoming state elections. National parties like the BJP tend to enjoy greater fervor amongst voters in general elections as opposed to state elections. It hence would take an earthquake defeat in these state elections to alter this assumption – an outcome which appears unlikely at this stage. The takeaway from the above is that investors must brace for the BJP pursuing populist policies over the next two years. In fact, we are increasingly convinced that the BJP government’s budget for FY23 (due to be announced on 1 February 2022) will see a marked increase in transfer payments for farmers in specific or low-income groups in general. The announcement of a brand-new program aimed at lifting incomes of India’s lowest economic strata cannot be ruled out. But from the perspective of the 2024 elections, the BJP appears well-placed to retain power. Investors will face negative policy turbulence in the short run but should maintain a base case of policy continuity over the long run. Investment Conclusions If You Are Playing A Long Game, Then Hold: From a strategic perspective, we remain Buyers of India. India’s democratic traditions will lend political stability as the country’s economic heft grows. Its democratic credentials will also yield geopolitical advantages as America aims to create an axis of democracies to contain autocratic regimes. It is notable that the US’s most recent alliance-formation efforts - such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal - involve some of the oldest democracies of the world. As India sheds its historical stance of neutrality, in favor of closer alignment with the US against China, its democratic credentials will help India deepen its engagement with geopolitically powerful democracies. If You Are Playing A Short Game, Then Fold: The Indian market appears priced for perfection today. We recommend paring exposure to Indian assets on a tactical time horizon. Historically India’s premium relative to emerging markets has shown some correlation with the BJP’s popularity (Chart 16). However, India’s premium relative to EMs has shot through the roof over the last year and hence even if BJP wins the Uttar Pradesh elections (our base case), then it is unclear if that victory will drive another bout of price-to-earnings re-rating for India. Moreover, as outlined, the road to state elections in 2022 will be paved with policy risks as the government prioritizes populism ahead of pro-market reform. Chart 16 The BJP has managed to expand its influence in India over the last decade (Chart 17). But a unique problem now confronts Indian policymakers: while stock markets in India have risen almost vertically, wage inflation has collapsed (Chart 18). Additionally, India has administered a weak post-pandemic fiscal stimulus (Chart 19). We reckon that this fiscal restraint will be tested in the run up to key elections in 2022-23. Chart 17 ​​​​​​ Chart 18 ​​​​​​ Chart 19 Unlike in developed economies, where fiscal stimulus is seen as pro-market because it suggests policymaking is improving and deflationary risks will be dispelled, fiscal stimulus can be market-negative in the context of an EM like India. Increases in populist spending can end up adding to existent inflationary pressures and hence can drive bond yields higher. Stock market earnings too may not end up getting a major boost on the back of increase in transfer payments to low-income groups. This is because the share of market cap accounted for by sectors which directly benefit from pro-poor spending, like Consumer Staples, has been drifting lower on Indian bourses from 10.8% in 2013 to 8.9% today. As we have been highlighting, distinct from policy risks that confront India on a tactical horizon, geopolitical risks confronting India are elevated too. Dangerous transitions are underway to India’s west (involving Pakistan and Afghanistan) as well as east (involving China). While China’s woes drive EM investors to India, any clashes with neighbors will create much better entry points into Indian stocks.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Appendix: An Overview Of India’s Political System India follows a parliamentary model of democracy with a federal structure where the government at the centre as well as state level is elected for a period of five years. The central government of India is formed through general elections that are held every five years. Power is held by a political party (or a coalition of parties) that can secure and maintain a simple majority in the Lower House (or Lok Sabha) through this five-year term. India also constitutes 28 states, each with its own legislative assembly. Each state government is formed through a state election held every five years. Much like at the centre, power is held by a political party that can maintain a simple majority at the legislative assembly for this five-year term.  

Dear Client, Next week, we will be sending you BCA Research’s Annual Outlook, featuring long-time BCA client Mr. X, who visits towards the end of each year to discuss the economic, financial and commodity market outlook for the year ahead. All the best, Bob Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist  Highlights Local politics in Chile and Peru will become critical to the global energy transition, particularly as regards the supply side of the most critical metal for this transition: copper. Chile's runoff elections next month will pit a former congressman portrayed as a hard-right candidate against a protest leader-turned-legislator in a battle for the presidency of a country that accounts for ~ 30% of global copper mining output. In Peru, which accounts for just over 10% of global copper production, the left-of-center administration indicated it will mediate talks to close two gold and silver mines, despite protests from its corporate owners. Tightly balanced supply-demand fundamentals will keep inventories of refined copper extremely low, which will slow the early-stage global transition to renewable power generation until these stocks can be replenished (Chart of the Week).  Chinese copper smelters reportedly are collaborating to move refined metal to LME-approved warehouses to restock depleted inventories.  While this could reduce backwardations in futures markets, it has not overly depressed flat-price levels, which are within ~ 7% of all-time highs of $4.78/lb ($10,533/MT) put up in May. Fundamentally, base metals – especially copper and aluminum – will remain tight, which supports our long positions in the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF. Feature Despite a marked deceleration of growth in China brought on by fuel and power shortages, and a strong USD creating tighter financial conditions globally, copper prices – and base metals generally – remain well supported, even as speculative interest, for the most part, has waned this year (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekTight Copper Inventories Support Prices, Backwardation Tight Copper Inventories Support Prices, Backwardation Tight Copper Inventories Support Prices, Backwardation Chart 2Specs Back The Truck Up For Copper Spec Interest Wanes Specs Back The Truck Up For Copper Spec Interest Wanes Specs Back The Truck Up For Copper Spec Interest Wanes   Copper and the other metals are well bid because of tight fundamentals – the level of demand has been and remains above the level of supply globally (Chart3). This will continue to exert pressure on inventories and force a re-shuffling of stocks globally – likely from China bonded warehouses to the LME (Chart 4). The London Metal Exchange (LME) was forced to take extraordinary measures to maintain orderly markets and has prompted Chinese smelters to collaborate on shifting material to LME sheds in Asia.1 However, much more refined copper will have to be shipped to these sheds to keep markets from launching into another steep backwardation on the LME similar to last month's $1,100/MT first-to-third-month spread last month – an indication of desperation on the buy side. Chart 3Low Copper Stocks Will Persist Low Copper Stocks Will Persist Low Copper Stocks Will Persist That said, if the only thing that improves LME stocks is a re-shuffle from existing inventories, the net position of the world will largely remain unchanged over time. Demand will be met with inventory draw-downs, but supply will not have increased, which, at the end of the day, means markets will continue to tighten. Chart 4Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten Chile, Peru Politics Become Fundamental Geopolitics always is at the heart of commodity markets: Who's in power and the agendas being pursued matter so much, because, in many cases, unrefined exports of raw commodities sustain governments and important elements of economies in many states. This is becoming clear in Chile and Peru, two states with contestable elections, where the outcomes can profoundly affect the supply side of global fundamentals. Earlier this year, it looked like Chile's presidential and congressional elections would favor left-of-center candidates who did not campaign on market-oriented policies. National elections this past weekend resulted in a run-off that will be held 19 December, as neither the left- nor right-of-center candidates polled an absolute majority. Right-of-center candidates also polled unexpectedly well in congressional elections. This likely translates into something resembling the divided government in the US, which means neither side will be able to get all it wants through the legislature. In the lead-up to the Constitutional re-write expected following elections, the agendas of the left and right are markedly opposed. On the left, greater government involvement in the resources sector has been part of the campaigning, while on the right increased private investment in the stated-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, is advocated. Both sides also disagree on changes in taxes and royalties, which obviously is of great concern to investors and copper-market participants.2 Chile also is a world-class supplier of lithium, zinc, gold, silver and lead, so it's not just copper markets following developments there with concern. In Peru, the country's newly sworn-in prime minister said she is willing to broker talks on shutting down gold and silver mines in communities where residents have been protesting as soon as possible. This drew a heated reply from mining interests immediately. Peru is the second largest copper miner in the world behind Chile, and the treatment of the owner of the disputed gold and silver mines, Hochschild Mining, is being followed closely. Base and precious metals markets are being forced to factor in a new set of political dynamics, as local political tensions spill into the supply side, causing overall political uncertainty in critical mining states to increase. This will restrain investment, which bodes ill for the global renewable- energy transition. Copper Defies Stronger USD  Despite a stronger-than-expected USD this year – boosted most recently by the re-appointment of Jay Powell as Fed Chair and the elevation of Lael Brainard as Vice Chair – copper and base metals have held up well.3 Generally, a strong dollar is bearish for base metals prices (Chart 5), and copper especially (Chart 6). A stronger USD tightens global financial conditions, which, not unexpectedly, is bearish for copper; however, as Chart 7 shows, this effect also has been overcome by the tight copper fundamentals globally.4 We remain bearish the USD going into next year, in line with our colleagues at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy. Massive fiscal stimulus in the US in particular, along with continued monetary accommodation from the Fed to fund the deficits this will produce, is expected to weaken the dollar and boost trade. Chart 5Base Metals Defy Strong USD Base Metals Defy Strong USD Base Metals Defy Strong USD Chart 6Copper Defies USD Strength, Boosted By Cyclicals Performance Copper Defies USD Strength, Boosted By Cyclicals Performance Copper Defies USD Strength, Boosted By Cyclicals Performance Chart 7Copper Overcomes Tighter Global Financial Conditions Copper Overcomes Tighter Global Financial Conditions Copper Overcomes Tighter Global Financial Conditions In a recent simulation, we show a 10% fall in the USD and a 5% pick-up in EM imports, along with continued strong performance from cyclicals would lift copper prices to $5.30/lb on the CME Comex by year-end 2022, in our estimation (Chart 8). Chart 8Weaker USD, Stronger EM Imports, Cyclical Strength Would Booster Copper. Weaker USD, Stronger EM Imports, Cyclical Strength Would Booster Copper. Weaker USD, Stronger EM Imports, Cyclical Strength Would Booster Copper. Investment Implications Base metals markets, particularly copper, have withstood tightening financial conditions brought on by a strong USD, a sharp slowdown in Chinese growth brought on by an energy shortage and rising interest rates. This is largely due to extremely tight supply-demand fundamentals, which continue to keep global inventories under pressure. Copper, metals generally, and precious metals also will get a lift from local political tensions spilling into the supply side of markets as overall political uncertainty in critical mining states restrains investment. We remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, anticipating higher copper prices and a return to steeper backwardation.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Oil markets looked right through the announcement the US will tap its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for 50mm barrels beginning next month, rallying 3.3% to $82.31/bbl by Tuesday's close following the announcement (Chart 9). Under a Congressionally mandated release, the 18mm barrels already authorized had been factored into market balances. The incremental 32mm barrels of crude oil being supplied to the market will be released to successful bidders between 16Dec21 and 30Apr22. These volumes will be repaid during US fiscal years 2022-24, with a volumetric premium added to the initial volume lifted by the successful bidders, which will be specified in the terms of the crude-oil loan. The US fiscal year begins on 1 October. The longer it takes to return the crude oil back to the SPR, the higher the premium volume of crude oil will be required, per the SPR's terms and conditions. The Biden administration succeeded in persuading the governments of China, India, Japan, South Korea and the UK to release unspecified volumes from their SPRs as well. Although volume commitments and release dates were not included in the press release from the White House some 20mm to 30mm barrels reportedly could be supplied from these SPRs. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold prices fell violently, and the US dollar rose following Jay Powell’s re-nomination to Fed chair (Chart 10). Markets assume the Fed will stay the course on its current monetary policy, as opposed to loosening further, which would have lifted gold prices on the back of higher inflation expectations. We believe interest rate hikes will not be brought forward unless inflation expectations become unhinged. In the short run, however, high fuel prices and logistical bottlenecks will continue to feed into higher inflation, implying the Fed will remain behind the curve. Both Powell and Lael Brainard, who was nominated as vice chair of the Fed, stressed vigilance against inflation. In his statement following Biden's decision to re-appoint him as Fed Chair, Powell noted: "Today, the economy is expanding at its fastest pace in many years, carrying the promise of a return to maximum employment. … We know that high inflation takes a toll on families, especially those less able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation. We will use our tools both to support the economy and a strong labor market, and to prevent higher inflation from becoming entrenched." Brainard's remarks struck a similar tone. Chart 9 Brent Prices Are Going Up... Brent Prices Are Going Up... Chart 10 ...As Well As Gold Prices ...As Well As Gold Prices   Footnotes 1     Please see Column: All eyes on China as LME copper spreads collapse: Andy Home, published by reuters.com 18 November 2021. 2     Please see Chile elections may impact a third of the world’s copper supply, published by mining.com on November 19, 2021.  3    Please see Precious Metals commentary in the Commodity Round-Up section. 4    The model shown in Chart 7 also includes iron ore and steel traded in China as explanatory variables.  It is noteworthy that copper prices remain resilient to a collapse in iron ore prices brought on by forced closures in China of steel mills to conserve coal and natural gas supplies for human-needs use going into what is expected to be a colder-than-normal winter on the back of a second La Niña in the Northern Hemisphere.  Please see our report published 30 September entitled La Niña And The Energy Transition for additional discussion.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations

Highlights Indonesian domestic demand is struggling to recover in the face of a very tight policy settings. Exceptionally high real borrowing costs continue to hurt non-financial sectors. This will hurt banks too as credit is stymied and NPLs rise. Equity investors should fade the rebound and stay underweight Indonesia in an EM equity portfolio. Indonesia’s external accounts will deteriorate, as the Chinese slowdown weighs on resource prices. Softening commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. Domestic bond investors should tactically downgrade Indonesia from neutral to underweight within an EM bond portfolio. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia. Feature Chart 1Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived After years of underperformance, Indonesian stocks have rebounded in absolute terms and inched up relative to the EM benchmark (Chart 1). Could this be the beginning of a sustainable outperformance? Our research indicates that the answer is no. The Indonesian economy is still struggling. Domestic demand remains lackluster, hamstrung as it is by very high real interest rates and a tight fiscal stance. A flexing export sector, the sole source of strength so far, is set to dissipate as well. Weaker exports will weigh on the nation's financial markets. A budding softness in EM financial markets – emanating from a slowing China and rising US bond yields – will be yet another headwind for Indonesian assets over the next several months. Investors therefore should fade the current rebound and remain underweight this bourse in EM equity portfolios. EM domestic bond portfolios should consider downgrading this market from neutral to underweight relative to its EM peers. Currency investors may consider shorting the rupiah versus the US dollar. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia in an EM US dollar bond portfolio. Straightjacketed The main drag to Indonesia’s economic recovery is coming from prohibitively high interest rates in the country. Real borrowing costs for the private sector, of the order of 10% (Chart 2, top panel), are extremely restrictive for any economy to handle, let alone one trying to recover from a debilitating recession. The real rates in Indonesia are also much higher than anywhere else in Asia – for both the private sector as well as for the government (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates Chart 3Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder The fiscal stance does not appear to be very supportive either. The government is planning to rein in the fiscal deficit next year to 4.8% of GDP from an expected 5.7% this year. The IMF projects that the cyclically- adjusted fiscal thrust in 2022 will be a negative 0.8% of potential GDP, and a further negative 1.5% in 2023 (Chart 3). The consequence of such restrictive settings is that domestic consumption and consumer confidence are languishing well below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4). Consistently, loan demand is also very weak. Bank credit for both consumption and production purposes (both working capital and term loans) have barely risen after having shrunk outright last year (Chart 5). Chart 4Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Chart 5All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak Chart 6Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Weak domestic demand is reinforcing deflationary forces. Inflation has been undershooting the lower band of the central bank target for almost two years now. Core and trimmed mean CPI measures have been averaging below 1% over the past year. Headline CPI is below the lower target band despite high oil and food prices (Chart 6, top panel). At the same time, nominal wages are barely rising (Chart 6, bottom panel). Hence, household income growth is subdued, which is sapping consumer demand. Notably, the very high real interest rates in Indonesia today are an outcome of monetary policy falling behind the disinflation curve. In the 2000s, the country’s consumer price inflation would often flare up to double digits, and the central bank used to keep interest rates consistently high. Over the past 10 years or so, however, inflationary pressures have gradually given way to deflationary forces. Even though the central bank has reduced its policy rate, it has not reduced it sufficiently enough to offset the drop in inflation. As a result, real interest rates have risen. Banks, on their part, also refused to fully pass along the rate cuts accorded by the central bank. As such, banks’ lending rates to the private sector, in both nominal and real terms, remained much higher compared to their peers elsewhere in Asia (Chart 2, above).  Part of the reason why the central bank has fallen behind the disinflation curve has to do with the exchange rate stability and Indonesia’s dependence on foreign debt capital inflows. The country needs to offer high real rates to continue to attract enough foreign capital so that it can finance the current account deficit. As long as the central bank has rupiah stability (as a means for price stability) as its mandate, it will not reduce real interest rates. Incidentally, a bill to include economic growth and employment within the central bank’s mandate was submitted to Parliament earlier this year. Discussion over the bill, however, has been delayed. This means that elevated real interest rates will prevail for now in Indonesia, hampering economic growth. Fading Bright Spot Chart 7The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes In contrast to domestic demand, Indonesia’s exports did phenomenally well over the past few quarters. That said, there are signs that those heady days are coming to an end: The main reason exports did so well is that commodity prices went vertically up. Export volumes, on the other hand, stayed quite low. This is also evident in the case of coal and palm oil – Indonesia’s two main export items (Chart 7). Since it’s not the volume that drove up the export revenues, the latter is vulnerable to the whims of global commodity prices – of which Indonesia is a price-taker. And commodity prices, in general, have already begun to soften. China is by far the largest destination for Indonesian exports (22% of total), and demand in the Middle Kingdom has been among main reasons behind the recent surge in Indonesian exports. Yet, the fact that China’s credit and money impulses have turned negative is a major concern for Indonesian exports going forward. If history is of any guide, negative impulses will cause a contraction in Indonesian exports over the next year or so (Chart 8). Odds are therefore that the country’s trade surplus will roll over and the current account balance will slip back to a deficit (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Chart 9Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Chart 10A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah Meanwhile, Indonesia’s financial account is struggling to stay in surplus as capital inflows have dwindled significantly over the past couple of years (Chart 9, middle panel). FDI inflows are also showing few signs of revival (Chart 9, bottom panel). This indicates that Indonesia’s envisioned reforms, under the ‘Omnibus bill’, are yet to gain much traction and produce meaningful improvements in the economy’s structural backdrop. All in all, the outlook for the country’s external accounts is much less sanguine in the months ahead. That will not bode well for the rupiah, which has benefitted from robust external accounts so far. A material drop in Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has never been positive for the Indonesian currency. In the months ahead, therefore, the path of least resistance for the rupiah appears to be down (Chart 10, top panel). The link is via commodity prices (Chart 10, bottom panel). Notably, most capital inflows into Indonesia are in the form of debt capital inflows. Equity inflows are paltry. The reason is straightforward: foreign bond investors like the extremely high real rates that the country has been offering, whereas the equity investors do not. Yet, in the past couple of years, even debt capital inflows have subsided (Chart 9, middle panel). Should foreign investors turn nervous about the rupiah outlook due to falling commodity prices and/or rising US interest rates, those debt inflows would further subside. Deteriorating capital inflows would cause further weakness in the rupiah in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Domestic Bonds Chart 11Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian local currency bonds have significantly outperformed their EM counterparts over the past several months (Chart 11, top panel). We have been positive on Indonesian domestic bonds. Going forward, however, the nation’s local bonds will find it difficult to rally in absolute terms and will likely underperform their EM peers. One reason for this is that, given Indonesian yields are already close to post-pandemic lows, it will be harder for them to fall much more. The relative performance of domestic bonds versus their EM peers will also be beset by a vulnerable rupiah – as explained above. The bottom panel of Chart 11 shows that periods of a weaker rupiah are usually associated with Indonesia underperforming overall EM domestic bonds. This is because foreign investors (who hold 21% of Indonesian local bonds) usually head for the exit once the rupiah begins to depreciate. Finally, as was explained in our report last week, various EM assets classes are in for a period of volatility – prompted by a deepening slowdown in China and rising US bond yields. Periods of EM stress do not augur well for Indonesian local bonds’ relative performance vis-à-vis their EM brethren. This is because the relative yield differential of Indonesia with that of EM widens in such periods – as occurred during the 2013 taper tantrum, the 2015 EM slowdown, and the 2020 pandemic (Chart 11, bottom panel). Since another EM risk-off period is around the corner, investors will be well advised to book profits on Indonesian domestic bonds’ recent outperformance and tactically downgrade this market to underweight in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Sovereign Credit Unlike the case of local currency bonds, Indonesia's sovereign credit has metamorphosed into a defensive market over the past several years. Investors now consider Indonesian sovereign credit to be among the safest within EM. This is an upshot of low public debt, including very low foreign currency public indebtedness, and years of orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. Chart 12Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods In previous risk-off periods (such as the GFC in 2008 and the taper tantrum in 2013), Indonesian sovereign credit would typically underperform their EM counterparts. Yet, in more recent episodes (such as the EM slowdown in 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020), Indonesian sovereign credit massively outperformed the EM benchmark. These recent instances suggest that during the oncoming risk-off period investors should stay overweight Indonesian sovereign credit in an EM basket.  Notably, the regime change in Indonesia’s sovereign credit characteristics has led to its relative performance (versus overall EM) being decoupled from the rupiah (Chart 12). While the rupiah remains a cyclical currency, the significant improvement in sovereign creditworthiness has turned Indonesian credit markets into a defensive play within EM. Therefore, a weakness in the rupiah in the months ahead will not jeopardize its relative performance. Share Prices Chart 13Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling The Indonesian equity market is structurally beset by an uneven playing field, where the country’s banking sector has benefitted at the expense of all others. This is a consequence of banks maintaining high real lending rates as well as very wide net interest rate margins for far too long. The outcome is evident in financial and non-financial sectors’ diverging performance over the past decade (Chart 13). Given that the bull market in bank stocks has been contingent on banks’ net interest margins (NIM), any reduction therein will hurt bank stocks (Chart 14). At the same time, maintaining current lending rates and net interest margins will continue to hurt non-financial sectors (i.e., borrowers). In other words, for non-financial sectors to benefit, it will have to come at the expense of banking sector. Since banks and the rest of the stock market have very similar weights in this bourse, this dynamic will make it hard for this market to rally overall in a sustainable manner. Notably, bank stocks have failed to breach their pre-pandemic highs. This is despite net interest margins being quite elevated. The reason is that high real borrowing costs in a weak economy not only discourage credit off-take, but also threaten to raise NPLs further. Indonesian bank stocks are quite expensive as well: their ‘price/book value’ ratio is 2.6 while that of their EM counterparts is 1.1. As such, they will be hard pressed to have another sustainable rally. The other half of Indonesian equity markets, non-financials, are expectedly doing worse in the face of persistently high borrowing costs. So are the small cap stocks – where non-financial firms make up 85% of the market cap (Chart 13, bottom two panels). Notably, since Indonesia is a commodity producer, Indonesian stock prices usually do well during periods of rising commodity prices. Yet, headwinds emanating from weak domestic demand prevented Indonesia from benefitting much from high commodity prices this past year (Chart 15). Going forward, with the dissipating commodity tailwind, the Indonesian market will likely falter anew. Chart 14Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart 15Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Furthermore, a period of overall EM volatility is also a negative for Indonesian stocks’ absolute and relative performances. Investment Conclusions An impending relapse in commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. In view of the likely weakness in the rupiah, dedicated EM local currency bond portfolios should pare back their exposure to Indonesia and tactically downgrade this market from neutral to underweight. Expected softness in domestic demand in the face of high real rates, faltering commodity prices and an impending volatility in EM assets - all entail that investors should stay underweight this bourse in an EM equity portfolio.   Finally, given the new defensive stature of Indonesian sovereign credit, asset allocators should stay overweight Indonesia in dedicated EM US dollar bond portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Highlights The euro has entered a period of acute stress. Some of the EUR/USD’s plunge reflects the dollar’s broad-based strength. The dollar is supported by the market’s pricing of the Fed and China’s economic weakness. The euro also suffers from idiosyncratic forces. Investors appreciate better now that the Eurozone’s inflation is much narrower than that of the US. They are adjusting their ECB pricing accordingly. Europe’s growth prospects are also hurt by a renewed wave of lockdowns and China’s property woes. The revival of the European natural gas surge is the coup de grâce that is hurting the Euro. Nonetheless, euro sentiment is extremely depressed, which suggests that the euro already discounts many of these negatives. Consequently, we are adhering to our long EUR/USD trade implemented four weeks ago, but we will not re-open it if the stop-loss is triggered. Feature Four weeks ago, we tentatively recommended buying the euro, acknowledging that this view was fraught with near-term risks. However, the recent collapse in the euro forces us to revisit this stance. 2022 will be a better year for EUR/USD; nevertheless, the next three months could result in pronounced weakness in the currency, and the odds have increased that this pair might retest the pandemic lows. We are sticking with our long EUR/USD bet for now, as we have a floor under the position, the result of our stop at 1.1175. If this stop is reached, we will wait before reinstating a long euro position. What’s Going Well With The USD? The first element of the euro’s weakness is the generalized strength in the USD. The dollar is rallying against all the components of the DXY, which is pushing the USD’s Advanced/Decline line up (Chart 1). Moreover, as BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy team recently highlighted, the dollar is breaking out above its three-year moving average, which constitutes an important technical signal.  The dollar strength is multi-faceted and reflects both domestic and international factors. On the domestic front, markets are responding to growing inflationary forces and signs of economic vigor to price in a more aggressive Fed outlook than two months ago (Chart 2), especially following the implementation of the Fed’s tapering program this month. Chart 1The Dollar Is Strong The Dollar Is Strong The Dollar Is Strong Chart 2More Hikes Prices In More Hikes Prices In More Hikes Prices In The inflation picture is of prime concern to investors. As Chart 3highlights, US core CPI is at a 30-year high and median inflation measures are also strengthening. Most concerning, inflationary pressures are broadening beyond energy and goods, with shelter prices accelerating anew (Chart 3, bottom panel). The labor market is also gearing up to move toward full employment conditions. The quits rate is near a record high, which corroborates the impression among households that jobs are easy to secure (Chart 4). Moreover, wages among low-skill employees are strengthening, which indicates that the labor market is tight (Chart 4, bottom panel). Granted, this is happening in a context in which the labor force participation rate is low, especially for women, and could rise anew, which would alleviate the labor market’s tightness. However, this process will likely entail higher wages first. Chart 3Broadening US Inflation Broadening US Inflation Broadening US Inflation Chart 4Getting To Maximum Employment? Getting To Maximum Employment? Getting To Maximum Employment? Economic data is also firming up, despite rises in COVID cases in many states. For example, nominal retail sales were robust in October, even if inflation contributed to their strength. Moreover, both the New York Fed’s Empire State Manufacturing Survey and the Philly Fed’s Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey highlighted an acceleration in activity (Chart 5). As a result, the Atlanta Fed’s Q4 GDPNow Forecast has rebounded to 8.2%, which would represent a marked improvement from the 2.2% quarterly annualized rate recorded in Q3. Whether or not this is an error, market participants may continue to use this economic backdrop to price in additional hikes by the Fed and feed the dollar rally. The international backdrop also helps the USD. The main positive comes from China. BCA’s emerging market strategists highlight that the weakness in the Chinese credit impulse is often a harbinger of dollar strength (Chart 6). The US economy is less exposed to manufacturing and trade than the economies of Europe, Australia, and EM, which means that it is less impacted by Chinese growth slowdowns than other parts of the world. This explains why the dollar loves a slowing Chinese economy. Chart 5A Pick Up In US Growth A Pick Up In US Growth A Pick Up In US Growth Chart 6The Dollar Loves A Weaker China The Dollar Loves A Weaker China The Dollar Loves A Weaker China China’s economic problems have once again become more relevant to market participants, as recent prints have been weak. Following the fall of Chinese GDP growth to 4.9% in the third quarter, new releases have shown that house prices are contracting and property investment is decelerating. These data sets are feeding the dollar rally. The dollar’s strength will beget further dollar appreciation. We have often highlighted that the dollar is the premier momentum currency within the G-10, along with the yen (Chart 7). Today, the most reliable momentum indicator for the greenback, the crossover of the 20-day MA above the 200-day one, continues to send a very supportive signal, which the economic backdrop reinforces (Chart 8). Moreover, historically, the dollar’s trading in the first few weeks of January often echoes the trend of the previous year. Hence, we may witness a continued blow off until February 2022. Chart 7 Chart 8Positive Momentum Signal For The Dollar Positive Momentum Signal For The Dollar Positive Momentum Signal For The Dollar Bottom Line: The dollar is breaking out on a broad basis. Not only is the US economy inviting investors to reprice the Fed’s expected policy path, but the economic weakness in China is also contributing to the rally. Technically, the dollar’s pro-momentum attribute accentuates the risk that this breakout morphs into a melt-up until February 2022, especially if US equities continue to outperform the rest of world and attract flows into the USD. The Euro’s Specific Problems Chart 9Europe Doesn't Have The US Inflation Problem Europe Doesn't Have The US Inflation Problem Europe Doesn't Have The US Inflation Problem The spectacular collapse in EUR/USD goes beyond the strength in the dollar, because crucial catalysts are also pushing the euro lower. First, investors are increasingly differentiating between the Eurozone and the US inflation picture. We have often made the case that European inflation is much more limited than that of the US. For example, the dynamics in the trimmed-mean inflation and the CPI adjusted for VAT highlights that lack of broad inflation in Europe (Chart 9). Moreover, recent ECB’s communications have made it eminently clear that it is in no rush to raise rates. As a result, investors have been curtailing the number of ECB hikes priced in for 2022 compared to early November. Second, European economic activity is unable to catch a break. The recent uptick of COVID-19 cases in Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria is prompting local governments to impose renewed lockdowns of various scales, as worries emerge that hospital capacity will suffer as it did last winter (Chart 10). We doubt these lockdowns will last as long or will be as severe from a pan-European perspective, but, for now, they are weighing on investor sentiment and contributing to the euro-bearish widening in US-German 2-year yield differentials (Chart 11). Chart 10A New Wave A New Wave A New Wave Chart 11Rate Differentials Hurt The Euro Rate Differentials Hurt The Euro Rate Differentials Hurt The Euro   Third, the Chinese economy continues to act as a drag on Europe. China’s real estate activity is slowing, as credit spreads and share prices of property developers remain distressed (Chart 12). It is of concern that the Chinese and EM credit market stresses are broadening beyond this sector, which indicates a tightening in financial conditions for a large swath of the Eurozone’s important trading partners. Moreover, Europe’s machinery exports are particularly exposed to the Chinese construction sector. Under these circumstances, the wave of weakness in Chinese construction activity could herald additional problems for EUR/USD, since they amount to a weakening in Euro Area growth relative to the US (Chart 13). Chart 12Downside To Chinese Construction Activity Downside To Chinese Construction Activity Downside To Chinese Construction Activity Chart 13Slowing Chinese Construction Is A Threat to EUR/USD Slowing Chinese Construction Is A Threat to EUR/USD Slowing Chinese Construction Is A Threat to EUR/USD Fourth, equity outflows out of the Eurozone into the US are likely to continue as long as China suffers. BCA’s Emerging Market strategists anticipate the deterioration in China’s stock-to-bond ratio (SBR) to last, because this economy is weakening. Over the past five years, a deteriorating Chinese SBR has coexisted with a deepening underperformance of European equities relative to those of the US (Chart 14). Over this timeframe, equity flows have played a significant role in the EUR/USD exchange rate determination; thus, the weaker Chinese SBR also correlates well with a softer euro (Chart 14, bottom panel). Finally, the renewed energy crisis is particularly painful for the euro. German regulators indicated that they will temporarily suspend the approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which prompted European natural gas prices to surge anew. As Chart 15 shows, this proved to be the coup de grâce for the euro. The response of the euro to higher natural gas prices is rational. Surging natural gas prices are a growth shock for the region, yet they are unlikely to prompt a tightening in policy by the ECB, because they only push headline inflation, not the core measure. In fact, they could widen the dichotomy between underlying and headline inflation, because rising energy costs sap other spending categories. In other words, rising energy prices point to a stagflationary outcome this winter in Europe, which is poison for the euro. Chart 14More European Equity Outflows? More European Equity Outflows? More European Equity Outflows? Chart 15The Nat-Gas Coup De Grace The Nat-Gas Coup De Grace The Nat-Gas Coup De Grace Bottom Line: The weakness of the euro reflects more than the strength in the USD. The narrower nature of European inflation prevents a hawkish repricing of the ECB to take place, while renewed lockdowns are hurting growth sentiment. Moreover, the travails of China’s property sector are harming European economic activity, while also inviting equity outflows. Finally, the recent revival of the natural gas price surge is once again raising the specter of stagflation this winter in Europe, which is a dreadful scenario for the euro. What To Do? Our long EUR/USD bet initiated four weeks ago has a stop loss at 1.1175. Due to the bullish dollar forces and bearish euro factors described in this report, we will not re-open the trade if the stop-loss is triggered. Its activation would indicate that the bear-trend in the euro is gathering steam. When coupled with the momentum nature of the dollar and the euro’s anti-dollar behavior imparted by EUR/USD’s great market liquidity, this combination could easily push EUR/USD to 1.08 or lower by January 2022. We are not closing the trade either. While the list of euro-negative forces is long, sentiment toward EUR/USD is now quite lopsided, which suggests that a significant proportion of the euro bearish factors are already discounted. One-month, three-month, and six-month risk reversals in EUR/USD have fallen close to their Q2 2020 levels. Moreover, investors now hold large short positions in EUR/USD, especially compared to their large long bets on the DXY (Chart 16); meanwhile, the Euro Capitulation Index is now depressed relative to that of the dollar (Chart 16, bottom panel). Finally, the most important signal comes from our Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM), which is an augmented interest-rate parity model that accounts for global risk aversion and the currency’s trend. The ITTM is now trading at 1 sigma, a level that has historically been followed by a positive return six months later 75% of the time since 2002 (Chart 17). Chart 16Negative Euro Sentiment Negative Euro Sentiment Negative Euro Sentiment Chart 17Much Pessimism Is In The Price Much Pessimism Is In The Price Much Pessimism Is In The Price Chart 18Peak US Inflation? Peak US Inflation? Peak US Inflation? Finally, the US is likely experiencing peak inflationary pressures right now. If inflation rolls over in the near future, investors will breathe a collective sigh of relief, and they will not price in more rate hikes. The decline in DRAM prices and the recent ebb in shipping costs, with the Baltic Dry down 57% from its peak and the WCI Composite Container Freight Benchmark 12% below its September apex, suggest that the most severe supply bottlenecks are passing while energy indexes are also softening (Chart 18). In this context, the best strategy remains to keep the trade open and to follow the discipline imposed by the stop loss.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? Cyclical Recommendations What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? Structural Recommendations What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? What’s Going Wrong With The Euro? Closed Trades Image   Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Dear Client, There will be no report next week as we will be working on our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which will be published the following week. In the meantime, please keep an eye out for BCA Research’s Annual Outlook, featuring long-time BCA client Mr. X, who visits towards the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Highlights Inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, will follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows.  While inflation will fall in the first half of next year as goods prices stabilize, an overheated labor market will cause inflation to re-accelerate into 2023. The Fed will be slow to respond to high inflation, implying that monetary policy will remain accommodative next year. This should help propel stocks to new highs. Chinese stimulus will offset much of the drag from a weaker domestic property market. The dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t bet against the greenback in the near term. Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon. A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging market stocks. The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle. From Ice To Fire In past reports, we have contended that inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, would follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows.  We are currently near the top of those two steps. The pandemic ushered in a major re-allocation of spending from services to goods (Chart 1). US inflation should dip over the next 6-to-9 months as the demand for goods decelerates and supply-chain disruptions abate. Chart 1The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods CHart 2Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains The respite from inflation will not last long, however. The labor market is heating up. So far, most of the wage growth has been at the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 2). Wage growth will broaden over the course of 2022, setting the scene for a price-wage spiral in 2023. We doubt that either fiscal or monetary policy will tighten fast enough to prevent such a spiral from emerging. As a result, US inflation will surprise meaningfully on the upside. Our view has no shortage of detractors. In this week’s report, we address the main counterarguments in a Q&A format:   Q: What makes you think that service spending will rebound fast enough to offset the drag from weaker goods consumption? Chart 3Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year A: There is still a lot of pent-up demand for goods. Try calling any auto dealership. You will hear the same thing: “We have nothing in stock now, but if you put in an order today, you might get a vehicle in 3-to-6 months.” Thus, durable goods sales are unlikely to weaken quickly. And with inventories near record low levels, firms will need to produce more than they sell (Chart 3). Inventory restocking will support GDP growth. As for services, real spending in the US grew by 7.9% in the third quarter, an impressive feat considering that this coincided with the Delta-variant wave. Service growth will stay strong in the fourth quarter. The ISM non-manufacturing index jumped to a record high of 66.7 in October, up from 61.9 in September. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is tracking real PCE growth of 9.2% in Q4. Goldman’s Current Activity Indicator has hooked up (Chart 4). Chart 4 Q: Aren’t you worried that spending on services might stall next year? A: Not really. Chart 5 shows the percentage change in real spending for various types of services from January 2020 to September 2021, the last month of available data. Chart 5 Chart 6 The greatest decline in spending occurred in those sectors that were most directly affected by the pandemic. Notably, spending on movie theaters, amusement parks, and live entertainment in September was still down 46% on a seasonally-adjusted basis compared to last January. Hotel spending was down 22%. Spending on public transport was down 26%. Only spending on restaurants was back to normal. The number of Covid cases has once again started to trend higher in the US, so that path to normalization will take time (Chart 6). Nevertheless, with vaccination rates still edging up and new antiviral drugs set to hit the market, it is reasonable to assume that many of the hardest-hit service categories will recover next year.   Q: What about medical services? Some have speculated that the shift to telemedicine will require much lower spending down the road. A: It is true that spending on outpatient services in September was $43 billon below pre-pandemic levels. However, over two-fifths of that shortfall was in dental services, which are not amenable to telemedicine. Spending on dental services was down 16% from its January 2020 levels, compared to 6% for physician services. A more plausible theory is that many people are still worried about venturing to the doctor’s or dentist’s office. In addition, a lot of elective procedures were canceled or postponed due to the pandemic. Clearing that backlog will lift medical spending next year. Chart 7The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High In any case, the cost of a telemedicine appointment is typically no different from an in-person one. And, to the extent that telemedicine does become more widespread, this could encourage more people to seek medical assistance. Lastly, even if spending on certain services does not fully recover after the pandemic, this will probably simply result in a permanent increase in spending on goods. The only way that overall consumer spending will falter is if the savings rate rises, which seems unlikely to us. Q: Why do you say that? The savings rate has been very high throughout the pandemic. A: The savings rate did spike during the pandemic, but that was mainly because fewer services were available, and because households were getting transfer payments from the government. Now that these payments have ended, the savings rate has dropped to 7.5%, roughly where it was prior to the pandemic. There is good reason to think the savings rate will keep falling next year. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, most of which reside in bank deposits (Chart 7). As they run down those savings, consumption will rise in relation to income. The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 8). Banks are eager to make consumer loans (Chart 9). Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 10). As we discussed three weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Chart 8APost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Chart 8BPost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Post-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare   Chart 9Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Chart 10A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth   Q: Household wealth could fall as the Fed starts tapering and eventually raising rates. Wouldn’t that cool the economy? A: The taper is a fait accompli, and markets are already pricing in rate hikes starting in the second half of next year. If the Fed were to signal its intention to raise rates more quickly than what has been priced in, then home prices and stocks could certainly weaken. We do not think the Fed will pivot in a more hawkish direction before the end of next year, however. The Fed’s estimate of the neutral rate is only 2.5%, a big step down from its estimate of 4.25% in 2012. The market’s view is broadly in line with the Fed’s (Chart 11).  Despite the upward move in realized inflation, long-term inflation expectations remain in check – expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey has increased from 2.3% in late 2019 to 2.9%, bringing it back to where it was between 2010 and 2015. The 5-year/ 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 12). Chart 11The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation Chart 12Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed   Q: What about fiscal policy? Isn’t it set to tighten sharply next year? A: The US budget deficit will decline next year. However, this will happen against the backdrop of strong private demand growth. Moreover, budget deficits are likely to remain elevated in the post-pandemic period. This week, President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill into law, containing $550 billion in new spending. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect Congress to pass a $1.5-to-$2 trillion social spending bill using the reconciliation process. All in all, the IMF foresees the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit averaging 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 13). Chart 13 Chart 14While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend   It should also be noted that government spending on goods and services has been quite weak over the past two years (Chart 14). The budget deficit surged because transfer payments exploded. Unlike direct government spending, which is set to accelerate over the next few years, households saved a large share of transfer payments. Thus, the fiscal multiplier will increase next year, even as the budget deficit shrinks.   Q: We have focused a lot on demand, but what about supply? There are over 4 million fewer Americans employed today than before the pandemic and yet the job openings rate is near a record high. Chart 15Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid A: Some people who left the workforce will regain employment. According to the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, there are still 2.5 million people not working because they are afraid of catching or transmitting the virus (Chart 15). That said, some workers may remain sidelined for a while longer. The very same survey also revealed that about 8 million of the 100 million workers currently subject to vaccine mandates say that “they will definitely not get the vaccine.” In addition, about 3.6 million workers have retired since the start of the pandemic, about 1.2 million more than one would have expected based on pre-existing demographic trends. Most of these retirees will not work again. Lifestyle choices may keep others from seeking employment. Female labor participation has declined much more during the pandemic and than it did during the Great Recession (Chart 16). While many mothers will re-enter the labor force now that schools have reopened, some may simply choose to stay at home. Chart 16 The bottom line is that the pandemic has reduced labor supply at a time when labor demand remains very strong. This is likely to exacerbate the labor shortage.   Q: Any chance that higher productivity will offset some of the damage to the supply side of the economy from decreased labor participation? A: US labor productivity did increase sharply during the initial stages of the pandemic. However, that appears to have been largely driven by composition effects in which low-skilled, poorly-paid service workers lost their jobs. As these low-skilled workers have returned to the labor force, productivity growth has dropped. The absolute level of productivity declined by 5.0% at an annualized rate in the third quarter, leading to an 8.3% increase in labor costs. It is telling that productivity growth has been extremely weak outside the US (Chart 17). This gives weight to the view that the pandemic-induced changes in business practices have not contributed to higher productivity, at least so far. It is also noteworthy that a recent study of 10,000 skilled professionals at a major IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%, mainly because people ended up working longer. Increased investment spending should eventually boost productivity. Core capital goods orders, which lead corporate capex, are up 18% since the start of the pandemic (Chart 18). However, the near-term impact of increased investment spending will be to boost aggregate demand, stoking inflation in the process. Chart 17 Chart 18US Capex Should Pick Up US Capex Should Pick Up US Capex Should Pick Up   Q: We have spoken a lot about the US, but the world’s second biggest economy, China, is facing a massive deflationary shock from the implosion of its real estate market. Could that deflationary impulse potentially cancel out the inflationary impulse from an overheated US economy? A: You are quite correct that inflation has risen the most in the US. While inflation has picked up in Europe, this mainly reflects base effects (Chart 19). Inflation in China has fallen since the start of the pandemic despite booming exports. There are striking demographic parallels between China today and Japan in the early 1990s. The bursting of Japan’s property bubble corresponded with a peak in the country’s working-age population (Chart 20). China’s working-age population has also peaked and is set to decline by more than 40% over the remainder of the century. Chart 19The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader Chart 20Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan That said, there are important differences between the two nations. In 1990, Japan was a rich economy; output-per-hour was nearly 70% of US levels. China is still a middle-income economy; output-per-hour is only 20% of US levels (Chart 21). China has the ability to outgrow some of its problems in a way that Japan did not. In addition, Chinese policymakers have learned from some of Japan’s mistakes. They have been trying to curb the economy’s dependence on property development; real estate development investment has fallen from 12% of GDP in 2014 to less than 10% of GDP (Chart 22). China is still building too many new homes, but unlike Japan in the 1990s, the government is likely to pursue stimulus measures to compensate for a shrinking property sector. This should keep the economy from entering a deflationary slump. Chart 21 Chart 22Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China   Q: Let’s bring this back to markets. What is the main investment takeaway from your view? A: The main takeaway is that investors should remain bullish on stocks and other risk assets for the next 12 months but be prepared to turn more cautious in 2023. The neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than generally assumed. This means that monetary policy is currently more accommodative than widely believed, which is good for stocks. Unfortunately, it also means that a policy error is likely: The Fed will keep rates too low for too long, causing the economy to overheat. Chart 23Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise This overheating will not be evident over the next six months. As we noted at the outset of this report, the US economy is currently at the top of the proverbial two steps in our projected “two steps up, one step down” trajectory for inflation. The cresting in durable goods inflation will provide a temporary respite from inflationary worries, even as the underlying long-term driver of higher inflation – an increasingly tight labor market – gains traction. Strong consumer demand and persistent labor shortages will incentivize companies to invest in new capacity and automate production. This will benefit industrial stocks and select tech names. Rising bond yields will also boost bank shares (Chart 23). A country’s current account balance is simply the difference between what it saves and what it invests. With savings on the downswing and investment on the upswing, the US will find it increasingly difficult to finance its burgeoning trade deficit. The US dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t necessarily bet against the greenback in the near term (Chart 24). Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon (Chart 25). Chart 24 Chart 25Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade   Chart 26A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging markets (Chart 26). The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Remain neutral on the US dollar. A breakout of the dollar would cause a shift in strategy. Russia’s conflict with the West is heating up now that Germany has delayed the certification of the Nord Stream II pipeline. As long as the focus remains on the pipeline, the crisis will dissipate sometime in the middle of next year. But there is an equal chance of a massive escalation of strategic tensions. Our GeoRisk Indicators will keep rising in Europe, negatively affecting investor risk appetite. Stick with DM Europe over EM Europe stocks. If the dollar does not break out, South Korea and Australia offer cyclical opportunities. Turkish and Brazilian equities will not be able to bounce back sustainably in the midst of chaotic election cycles and deep structural problems. Rallies are to be faded.  Feature We were struck this week by JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon’s claim that his business will “not swayed by geopolitical winds.”1  If he had said “political winds” we might have agreed. It is often the case that business executives need to turn up their collars against the ever-changing, noisy, and acrimonious political environment. However, we take issue with his specific formulation. Geopolitical winds cannot shrugged off so easily – or they are not truly geopolitical. Geopolitics is not primarily about individual world leaders or topical issues. It is primarily about things that are very hard and slow to change: geography, demography, economic structure, military and technological capabilities, and national interests. This is the importance of having a geopolitically informed approach to macroeconomics and financial markets: investment is about preserving and growing wealth over the long run despite the whirlwind of changes affecting politicians, parties, and local political tactics.  In this month’s GeoRisk Update we update our market-based, quantitative geopolitical risk indicators with a special focus on how financial markets are responding to the interplay of near-term and cyclical political risks with structural and tectonic pressures underlying a select group of economies and political systems. Is King Dollar Breaking Out? Chart 1King Dollar Breaking Out? King Dollar Breaking Out? King Dollar Breaking Out? Our first observation is that the US dollar is on the verge of breaking out and rallying (Chart 1). This potential rally is observable in trade-weighted terms and especially relative to the euro, which has slumped sharply since November 5th. Our view on the dollar remains neutral but we are watching this rally closely. This year was supposed to be a year in which global growth recovered from the pandemic on the back of vaccination campaigns, leading the counter-cyclical dollar to drop off. The DXY bounce early in the year peaked on April 2nd but then began anew after hitting a major resistance level at 90. The United States is still the preponderant power within the international system. The USD remains the world’s leading currency by transactions and reserves. The pandemic, social unrest, and contested election of 2020 served as a “stress test” that the American system survived, whether judging by the innovation of vaccines, the restoration of order, or the preservation of the constitutional transfer of power. Meanwhile Europe faces several new hurdles that have weighed on the euro. These include the negative ramifications of the slowdown in Asia, energy supply shortages, a new wave of COVID-19 cases, and the partial reimposition of social restrictions. Moreover the Federal Reserve is likely to hike interest rates faster and higher than the European Central Bank over the coming years. Potential growth is higher in the US than Europe and the US growth is supercharged by fiscal stimulus whereas Europe’s stimulus is more limited. Of course, the US’s orgy of monetary and fiscal stimulus and ballooning trade deficits raise risks for the dollar. Global growth is expected to rotate to other parts of the world over the coming 12 months as vaccination spreads. There is still a chance that the dollar’s bounce is a counter-trend bounce and that the dollar will relapse next year. Hence our neutral view. Yet from a geopolitical perspective, the US population and economy are larger, more dynamic, more innovative, safer, and more secure than those of the European Union. The US still exhibits an ability to avoid the reckoning that is overdue from a macroeconomic perspective.  Russia-West Conflict Resumes In our third quarter outlook we argued that European geopolitical risk had hit a bottom, after coming off the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-15, and that geopolitical risk would begin to rise over the long term for this region. Our reasoning was that the markets had fully priced the Europeans’ decision to band together in the face of risks to the EU’s and EMU’s integrity. What markets would need to price going forward would be greater risks to Europe’s stability from a chaotic external environment that Europe lacked the willingness or ability to control: conflict with Russia, immigration, terrorism, and the slowdown in Asia. In particular we argued that Russia’s secular conflict with the West would resume. US-Russia relations would not improve despite presidential summits. The Nord Stream II pipeline would become a lightning rod for conflict, as its operation was more likely to be halted than the consensus held. (German regulators paused the approval process this week, raising the potential for certification to be delayed past the expected March-May months of 2022.) Most importantly we argued that the Russian strategy of political and military aggression in its near-abroad would continue since Russia would continue to feel threatened by domestic instability at home and Western attempts to improve economic integration and security coordination with former Soviet Union countries.  Chart 2Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further Putin Showdown With West To Escalate Further For this reason we recommended that investors eschew Russian equities despite a major rally in commodity prices. Any rally would be undercut by the slowing economy in Asia or geopolitical conflicts that frightened investors away from Russian companies, or both. Today the market is in the process of pricing the impact on Russian equities from commodity prices coming off the boil. But politics may also have something to do with the selloff in Russian equities (Chart 2). The selloff can continue given still-negative hard economic data from Asia and the escalation of tensions around Russia’s strategically sensitive borders: Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, and the Black Sea. The equity risk premium will remain elevated for eastern European markets as a result of the latest materialization of country risk and geopolitical risk – the long running trend of outperformance by developed Europe has been confirmed on a technical resistance level (Chart 3). Our mistake was closing our recommendation to buy European natural gas prices too early this year. Chart 3Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown Favor DM Europe Amid Russia Showdown In early 2021, our market-based geopolitical risk indicator for Russia slumped, implying that global investors expected a positive diplomatic “reset” between the US and Russia. We advised clients to ignore this signal and argued that Russian geopolitical risk would take back off again. We said the same thing when the indicator slumped again in the second half of the year and now it is clear the indicator will move sharply higher (Chart 4). The point is that geopolitics keeps interfering with investors’ desire to resuscitate Russian equities based on macro and fundamental factors: cheap valuations, commodity price rises, some local improvements in competitiveness, and the search for yield.   Chart 4Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russian GeoRisk Indicator - Risks Not Yet Priced Russia may or may not stage a new military incursion into Ukraine – the odds are 50/50, given that Russia has invaded already and has the raw capability in place on Ukraine’s borders. The intention of an incursion would be to push Russian control across the entire southern border of Ukraine to Odessa, bringing a larger swathe of the Black Sea coast under Moscow’s control in pursuit of Russia’s historic quest for warm water ports. The limitations on Russia are obvious. It would undertake new military and fiscal burdens of occupation, push the US and EU closer together, provoke a stronger NATO defense alliance, and invite further economic sanctions. Yet similar tradeoffs did not prevent Russia from taking surprise military action in Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014. After the past 13 years the US and EU are still uncoordinated and indecisive. The US is still internally divided. With energy prices high, domestic political support low, and Russia’s long-term strategic situation bleak, Moscow may believe that the time is right to expand its buffer territory further into Ukraine. We cannot rule out such an outcome, now or over the next few years. If Russia attacks, global risk assets will suffer a meaningful pullback. It will not be a bear market unless the conflict spills out beyond Ukraine to affect major economies. We have not taken a second Ukraine invasion as our base case because Russia is focused primarily on getting the Nord Stream pipeline certified. A broader war would prevent that from happening. Military threats after Nord Stream is certified will be more worrisome.  A less belligerent but still aggressive move would be for Russia to militarize the Belarussian border amid the conflict with the EU over Belarus’s funneling of Middle Eastern migrants into the EU via Poland and Lithuania. A closer integration of Russia’s and Belarus’s economies and militaries would fit with Russia’s grand strategy, improve Russia’s military posture in eastern Europe, and escalate fears of eventual war in Poland and the Baltic states. The West would wring its hands and announce more sanctions but may not have a higher caliber response as such a move would not involve hostilities or the violation of mutual defense treaties. This outcome would be negative but also digested fairly quickly by financial markets. Our European GeoRisk Indicators (see Appendix) are likely to respond to the new Russia crisis, in keeping with our view that European geopolitical risk will rise in the 2020s: German risk has dropped off since the election but will now revive at least until Nord Stream II is certified. If Russia re-invades Ukraine it will rise, as it did in 2014.  French risk was already heating up due to the presidential election beginning April 10 (first round) but now may heat up more. Not that Russia poses a direct threat to France but more that broader regional insecurities would hurt sentiment. The election itself is not a major risk to investors, though terrorist attacks could tick up. President Macron has an incentive to be hawkish on a range of issues over the next half year. The UK is in the midst of the Russia conflict. Its defense cooperation with Ukraine and naval activity in the Black Sea, such as port calls in Georgia, have prompted Russia’s military threats – including a threat to bomb a Royal Navy vessel earlier this year. Not to mention ongoing complications around Brexit. The Russian situation is by far the most significant factor. Spain is at a further remove from Russia but its risks are rising due to domestic political polarization and the rising likelihood of a breakdown in the ruling government. Bottom Line: We still favor these countries’ equities to those of eastern Europe but our risk indicators will rise, suggesting that geopolitical incidents could cause a setback for some or all of these markets in absolute terms. A pickup in Asian growth would be beneficial for developed European assets so we are cyclically constructive. We remain neutral on the USD-EUR though a buying opportunity may present itself if and when the Nord Stream II pipeline is certified.  Korea: Nobody’s Heard From Kim In A While Chart 5Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Korea GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Geopolitical risk has risen in South Korea due to COVID-19 and its aftershocks, including supply kinks, shortages, and policy tightening by the giant to the West (Chart 5). South Korea’s geopolitical risk indicator is still very high but not because of North Korea. Our Dear Leader Kim Jong Un has not been overly provocative, although he has restarted the cycle of provocations during the Biden administration. Yet South Korean geopolitical risk has skyrocketed. The problem is that investors have lost a lot of appetite for South Korea in a global environment in which demographics are languishing, globalization is retreating, a regional cold war is developing, and debt levels are high. Domestic politics have become more redistributive without accompanying reforms to improve competitiveness or reform corporate conglomerates. The revival of the South Korean conservatives ahead of elections in 2022 suggests political risk will remain elevated. Of course, North Korea could still move the dial. A massive provocation, say something on the scale of the surprise naval attack on the Chonan in the wake of the global financial crisis in spring of 2010, could push up the risk indicator higher and increase volatility for the Korean won and equities. Kim could take such an action to insist that President Biden pay heed to him, like President Trump did, or at least not ignore him, in a context in which Biden is doing just that due to far more pressing concerns. Biden would be forced to reestablish a credible threat.  Still, North Korea is not the major factor today. Not compared to the economic and financial instability in the region. At the same time, if global growth surprises pick up and the dollar does not break out, Korea will be a beneficiary. We have taken a constructive cyclical view, although our specific long Korea trade has not worked out this year. Korean equities depreciated by 11.2% in USD terms year-to-date, compared to 0.3% for the rest of EM. Structurally, Korea cannot overcome the negative demographic and economic factors mentioned above. Geopolitically it remains a “shrimp between two whales” and will fail to reconcile its economic interests with its defense alliance with the United States.   Australia: Wait On The Dollar Chart 6Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian GeoRisk Indicator Still Elevated Australian geopolitical risk has not fallen back much from this year’s highs, according to our quant indicator (Chart 6). Global shortages and a miniature trade war were the culprits of this year’s spike. The advantage for Australia is that commodity prices and metals look to remain in high demand as the world economy fully mends. Various nations are implementing large public investment programs, especially re-gearing their energy sectors to focus more on renewables. The reassertion of the US security alliance is positive for Australia but geopolitical risk is rising on a secular basis regardless.   Cyclically we would look positively toward Australian stocks. Yet they have risen by 4.3% in common currency terms this year so far, compared to the developed market-ex-US average of 11.0%. Moreover the Aussie’s latest moves confirm that the US dollar is on the verge of breaking out which would be negative for this bourse. Structurally Australia will go through a painful economic transition but it will be motivated to do so by the new regional cold war and threats to national security. The US alliance is a geopolitical positive.   Turkey And Brazil The greenback’s rally could be sustainable not only because of the divergence of US from Asian and global growth but also because of the humiliating domestic political environment of most prominent emerging markets. Chart 7Emerging Market Bull Trap Emerging Market Bull Trap Emerging Market Bull Trap We booked gains our “short” trade of the currencies of EM “strongmen,” such as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Turkey’s Recep Erdogan, earlier this year. But we noted that we still hold a negative view on these economies and currencies. This is especially true today as contentious elections approach in both countries in 2022 and 2023 respectively (Chart 7). Turkey is trapped into an inflation spiral of its own design, which enervates the economy, as our Emerging Markets Strategy has shown. It is also trapped in a geopolitical stance in which it has repeatedly raised the stakes in simultaneous clashes with Russia, the US, Europe, Israel, the Arab states, Libya, and Iran. Russia’s maneuvers in the Black Sea are fundamentally threatening to Turkey, so while Erdogan has maintained a balance with Russia for several years, Russian aggression could upset that balance. Turkey has backed off from some recent confrontations with the West lately but there is not yet a trend of improvement. The COVID-19 crisis gave Erdogan a badly needed bump in polls, unlike other EM peers. But this simply reinforces the market’s overrating of his odds of being re-elected. In reality the odds of a contested election or an election upset are fairly high. New lows in the lira show that the market is reacting to the whole negative complex of issues around Turkey. But the full weight of the government’s mismanaging of economic policy to stay in power and stay geopolitically relevant has not yet been felt. The election is still 19 months away. A narrow outcome, for or against Erdogan and his party, would make things worse, not better. Brazil’s domestic political and geopolitical risks are more manageable than Turkey’s. But it faces a tumultuous election in which institutional flaws and failures will be on full display. Investors will try to front-run the election believing that former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will restore the good old days. But we discourage that approach. We see at least two massive hurdles for the market: first, Brazil has to pass its constitutional stress test; second, the next administration needs to be forced into difficult decisions to preserve growth and debt management. These will come at the expense of either growth or the currency, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. We still prefer Mexican stocks. Geopolitically, Turkey will struggle with Russia’s insecurity and aggression, Europe’s use of economic coercion, and Middle Eastern instability. Brazil does not have these external problems, although social stability will always be fragile. Investment Takeaways The dollar is acting as if it may break out in a major rally. Our view has been neutral but our generally reflationary perspective on the global economy is being challenged. Russia’s conflict with the West will escalate, not de-escalate, in the wake of Germany’s decision to delay the certification of the Nord Stream II pipeline. Russia has greater leverage now than usual because of energy shortages. A re-invasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. But the pipeline is Russia’s immediate focus. Investors have seen conflict in Ukraine so they will be desensitized quickly unless the conflict spreads into new geographies or spills out to affect major economies. The same goes for trouble on Belarus’s borders. Stick with long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Opportunities may emerge to become more bullish on the euro and European equities if and when the Nord Stream II situation looks to be resolved and Asian risks to global growth are allayed. If the dollar does not break out, South Korea and Australia are cyclical beneficiaries. Whereas “strongman” regimes will remain volatile and the source of bull traps, especially Turkey.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  “JP Morgan chief becomes first Wall Street boss to visit during pandemic,” Financial Times, November 15, 2021, ft.com. Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions Image Section II: Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar