Asia

Highlights The bull run in Vietnamese stocks is due for a pause as the weakness in overall EM markets spreads to this bourse.  Household consumption will stay constrained as new COVID-19 cases remain high and fiscal and monetary stimulus remain absent. Social distancing measures and related supply disruptions have hobbled labor-intensive manufacturing and exports thereof. Vietnam is facing saturation or stagnation in two of its major exports: electronics and phones. The country needs to find a new high value-added export sector to which to transition to maintain large trade surpluses. Vietnam’s longer-term structural outlook remains bright. The country is set to gain further global export market share due to strong productivity gains and competitive unit labor costs.  Absolute-return investors should book profits on their Vietnamese holdings for now and wait for a better entry point. Asset allocators, however, should continue to overweight this bourse in overall EM, emerging Asia or frontier market equity portfolios. Feature Vietnamese stocks have surged to new highs in absolute terms and have outperformed their frontier and emerging market peers since spring 2020 (Chart 1). Can the bull run continue into the new year? We advise caution. Vietnamese stocks may be in for a period of weakness in absolute terms. The reason is a negative outlook on EM markets: a drop in EM stock prices is typically followed by one in Vietnamese stock prices (Chart 2).   Chart 2Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Chart 1The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause   In addition, Vietnam’s exports, the mainstay of this market, are likely to face some headwinds in the months ahead. Absolute-return investors therefore would do well to book profits now and wait for a better entry point to this bourse later in the year. That said, the longer-term outlook of this economy remains bright, and that will help boost this market beyond any near-term jitters. Robust fundamentals should also ensure continued outperformance relative to overall EM stocks. We recommend that investors stay overweight Vietnam in EM and emerging Asian equity portfolios. Battered Consumption The surge in daily new cases since August last year forced Vietnam to implement stringent lockdowns and social distancing measures. A consequence of these measures was a free fall in Vietnam’s household consumption. Both retail sales and car sales plummeted to levels not seen since 2016 before recovering recently (Chart 3). This caused the economy to shrink by over 6% in real terms in the third quarter last year – the first-ever contraction in decades. Now, with the new, highly infectious Omicron variant spreading fast, the number of daily new cases and deaths remains stubbornly high – despite many of the lockdown measures still in place (Chart 4). It is therefore far from clear when normal economic activity will resume. Incidentally, 57% of Vietnamese people have been fully vaccinated so far. Chart 4Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Chart 3The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption   Notably, despite the weak economy, there has not been any meaningful policy stimulus in recent months. Fiscal policy has remained very tight. Government spending, excluding interest and principal payments, has contracted by 4.5%. The 2022 budget proposals envisage only a 2% rise in total nominal fiscal expenditure. The central bank, for its part, has also not announced any new easing measures in the recent past. Lacking fiscal and monetary support, domestic consumption and therefore overall growth will remain somewhat constrained going forward. Supply Disruptions While domestic consumption is a concern, a more investor-relevant issue in Vietnam is the pandemic’s negative impact on the country’s manufacturing/export sector. This is because, unlike household consumption, manufacturing activity and manufacturing exports have a strong bearing on the country’s stock prices. The reason is that developing market stocks in general are driven by global trade cycles. And since Vietnam’s total trade amounts to almost twice as much as the country’s GDP, the ebbs and flows in the former have an outsized impact on the domestic economy, and by extension, on the stock market (Chart 5). The surge in new cases since August created severe hindrances in the manufacturing/export sector supply chains and labor availability. In the clothing and textile industry, almost a third of the sector’s three million employees quit jobs, or stayed away from work with or without pay, as per Vietnam Textile & Apparel Association, an industry body.1The lack of labor coupled with bottlenecks in logistics have led to a sharp drop in Vietnam’s textile and garment exports (Chart 6, top panel).  Chart 6Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Chart 5Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth   Due to hobbled production, manufacturing inventories have piled up (Chart 7). It is estimated that most of this large inventory is comprised of raw materials and intermediate goods. If so, that will discourage local raw material/intermediate goods production in the months to come. Chart 7The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up In sum, it’s far from clear that a rapid revival in manufacturing production and exports is in the cards amid the ongoing Omicron surge. This will remain a headwind for Vietnamese stock prices. Exports Outlook Despite the setback in the textile sector, the country’s overall exports held up quite well last year. That’s because the slack was more than made up by the booming computer and electronics exports. This is thanks to the massive demand surge in those goods in past two years due to the global work-from-home phenomenon (Chart 6, top panel). However, going forward, odds are that global demand for these items will abate as saturation sets in. This will slow the growth rate in Vietnam’s computer and electronic exports. Incidentally, Vietnam’s single largest export items, phones and spare parts, are also showing signs of stagnation. In absolute dollar terms, they have been flattish since early 2018. Phone production volumes have remained at the same level as in 2015 (Chart 6, bottom panel). With mobile phone penetration in all major economies is already quite high, phone exports certainly cannot propel Vietnam’s exports as strongly as in the past decade. If this is the case, it can have a meaningful negative impact not only on Vietnam’s exports, but also on its trade balance, and by extension, its current account balance. The reason for this is that phones and spare parts have probably been the most value-added item among Vietnamese exports. The difference between the export revenues they earned and the import cost of the components has been much higher and has risen more sharply than in any other major export items (Chart 8, top and middle panels). This helped the country rack up rising trade surpluses. In the absence of net export revenues from phones and spare parts, Vietnam’s trade and current account balance would be deeply negative (Chart 8, bottom panel). Given that phones are no longer the sunrise sector worldwide, the country needs to find and move to some other high value-added sector to maintain its wide trade surplus. As of now, it’s not clear that this is happening. In the past two years, the number of newly approved manufacturing FDI projects have fallen to decade-low levels. The dollar value of approved manufacturing FDI projects has also fallen in tandem (Chart 9, top panel). In fact, overall FDI approvals have also fallen – suggesting actual FDI inflows might weaken in the months ahead (Chart 9, bottom panel). Chart 8Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Chart 9FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months   Until Vietnam finds a new high value-added export sector to which to transition, its stagnating phone and electronics exports mean that overall export growth is set to take a breather. Finally, one external tailwind for Vietnam since 2018 has been the trade war between the US and China. Because the two largest economies put various tariff and non-tariff barriers on each other, it allowed Vietnam to double its share of imports to the US in just three years (Chart 10). Vietnamese exports also clearly benefit when the dong weakens vis-à-vis the Chinese yuan. The fact that the Chinese authorities have allowed the yuan to be one of the strongest currencies over the past year has helped Vietnamese exports. In the future, however, decelerating growth in China may prompt the PBOC to seek a weaker yuan. If so, that could be another headwind to Vietnamese exports (Chart 11).       Chart 11The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports Chart 10Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War   In sum, Vietnamese exports could well see a period of weakness in the coming months. That is usually a harbinger of weaker Vietnamese stock prices in absolute terms (Chart 5, above). Structurally Sound Despite our near-term cautious outlook on Vietnamese stocks, we have a positive view on the country’s structural prospects. The country’s fundamentals remain robust and that will help propel this market beyond any near-term weakness: Vietnam has boosted capital spending in the past few years to reach an impressive 32% of GDP, among the highest in the developing world (Chart 12, top panel). This has helped raise the economy’s productive capacity. Consistently, Vietnam’s labor productivity gains have been superior to most developing countries (Chart 12, bottom panel). The country’s wage growth has been relatively lower than those of China and Bangladesh, its two main export competitors (Chart 13, top panel). Chart 12Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Chart 13Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Stronger productivity gains coupled with relatively muted wage growth is helping keep Vietnamese unit labor costs lower than its competitors. This is boosting its competitiveness; and not only helping grab an ever higher global market share, but also doing so at a faster clip than even China and Bangladesh (Chart 13, bottom panel). The country is also well placed to take advantage of its competitive unit labor costs. It has entered into a number of free trade agreements (FTA) with many countries and regions, the latest of which is the RCEP agreement – comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – which kicked in this January. These FTAs have eliminated export import tariffs for hundreds of items. Vietnam is likely to be a major beneficiary of these treaties in the medium to long term, given its rising competitiveness.  Given the already available infrastructure and labor and its competitive edge in manufacturing, Vietnam is also set to be the major recipient of the firms relocating away from China. This will further boost its longer-term prospects as exports will continue to generate solid income growth. Overall, real income per capita in Vietnam will continue rising at a rapid rate, outpacing that of most emerging economies. Investment Conclusions Chart 14Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not Attractive Now Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not attractive Now Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not attractive Now Since the country’s exports will likely decelerate in the coming months, its share prices will also likely correct. In addition, the ongoing sell-off in EM risk assets has further to run, as explained in our last report, EM: A Perfect Storm. This is a harbinger of weaker Vietnamese stock prices. What’s more, a sell-off in EM risk assets is often associated with a considerable decline in capital inflows into Vietnam – as was the case in 2015 and 2018. Those periods were negative for Vietnamese stocks as well.  Finally, valuations are not attractive either. Trailing P/E and P/Book ratios of Vietnamese stocks are much higher (21 and 3.6, respectively) compared to those of EM (14 and 1.9) and frontier market (15.5 and 2.3) stocks (Chart 14). Putting it all together, absolute-return investors should book profits on their Vietnam holdings and wait for a better entry point. Asset allocators, however, should continue to maintain their overweight positions on Vietnamese stocks, in EM, emerging Asia or frontier market equity portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please refer to “Vietnam garment exports hit hard by labor shortage, disrupted supply chains, and swelled freight fares” on Textile Today Bangladesh.

Highlights December’s PMI and our market-based China growth indicator improved slightly, but the underlying data send a mixed signal about the country’s business cycle and do not give a green light for cyclically overweighting Chinese stocks. Our research suggests that the odds of an earnings contraction for Chinese investable stocks over the coming year are high. In previous cycles, stocks only bottomed when the earnings adjustment process was well underway. In the next one to three months, investors may bid up Chinese stocks for their relatively cheap valuations and in expectation of further policy easing. A tactical rebound in Chinese stocks (in both the domestic and investable markets) in absolute terms is likely. However, we think it is premature to switch to an outright overweight stance on Chinese versus global stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Feature Chart 1Chinese Stocks Underperformed Global Markets In 2021 Chinese Stocks Underperformed Global Markets In 2021 Chinese Stocks Underperformed Global Markets In 2021 Chinese stocks underperformed global equities last year. In particular, Chinese investable stocks were among the worst performing major equity indices last year, ending 2021 with a 23% loss (Chart 1). Lately China’s macro policies have begun to refocus on supporting the economy, and investors have been asking whether cheaper valuations in Chinese equities warrant an overweight stance versus global stocks. We think a tactical rally in Chinese stocks is likely, as investors may bid up the market in expectation of more stimulus. The Chinese offshore market remains deeply oversold in relative terms, and further easing in policy in the coming few weeks may significantly improve global investor sentiment towards the country’s bourse. However, we maintain our view that a legitimate improvement in domestic fundamentals is needed before we recommend investors to upgrade their cyclical equity allocation to China. Mixed Signals Over the past several weeks, we focused heavily on China’s cyclical economic conditions, and whether any “green shoots” are evident from the key indicators that we track. The official PMIs and our high-frequency, market-based growth indicator both improved slightly in December, but their underlying components point to continued weakness in the old economy sectors. Hence, for now, we regard the marginal improvement in these indicators as a mixed signal rather than a green light for upgrading Chinese stocks on a cyclical basis. The official PMI manufacturing index inched up to 50.3 in December from 50.1 in November. While the proxy for domestic demand – measured by the new orders component subtracting the new export orders – ticked up slightly last month, the overall new orders subindex remains below the 50 threshold (Chart 2). In addition, both new orders and business activity in the construction PMI subindex fell sharply in December, due to sluggish infrastructure activity as well as a significant drag from the housing sector (Chart 3). Chart 2Manufacturing New Orders Remain In Contraction Manufacturing New Orders Remain In Contraction Manufacturing New Orders Remain In Contraction Chart 3Construction PMI Fell Sharply In December Construction PMI Fell Sharply In December Construction PMI Fell Sharply In December Chart 4Largely Driven By Commodity-Related Components Largely Driven By Commodity-Related Components Largely Driven By Commodity-Related Components Our market-based China growth indicator also rose slightly in December, although it remains in contraction. Chart 4 presents this growth indicator, its four asset class subcomponents, and the range between the strongest and weakest components. The chart shows that the recent rise in the indicator is not uniform. While most of the individual components have improved over the past month, a rise in metal prices and commodity-related equity and currency prices have accounted for most of the gains. As highlighted in China’s November and December PMIs, we think the improvement in the commodity component of the growth indicator reflects an easing in production-side constraints, rather than a sustained rebound in demand. Bottom Line: Data released recently point to a mixed picture regarding China’s economic fundamentals. It is premature to conclude that the current policy easing measures will suffice in reviving China’s slowing economy. The Negative Factors Impacting Cyclical Outlook There are two negative factors impacting our outlook for Chinese stocks. One is the effect of a slowing domestic economy on earnings; our model suggests that the odds of an earnings contraction over the coming year are high. The other negative factor is the ongoing regulatory and secular geopolitical risks on Chinese offshore-market stocks. Chart 5 presents the odds of a serious earnings contraction over the coming 12 months (defined as earnings growth falling below -5%). The chart shows that the model successfully warned of the three major earnings contractions over the past decade. Crucially, the odds of a major contraction did not rise above the 50% mark in 2012, when investable earnings growth decelerated significantly and fell briefly into negative territory. The current message from the model is clear: the odds of a significant earnings contraction over the coming 12 months are as high as 70%, implying that the deceleration in 12-month trailing earnings growth shown in the bottom panel of Chart 5 is likely to continue. In addition to the elevated risks of an earnings contraction, regulatory and geopolitical risks remain a major challenge for Chinese companies listed in the offshore equity markets (Chart 6). Big tech names like Alibaba, Tencent, and Meituan still face regulatory pressures from authorities. Last week, Beijing further tightened scrutiny of overseas equity sales by unveiling regulations that bar Chinese companies in sensitive industries from receiving foreign investment.  Chart 5Our Model Implies High Odds Of An Earnings Contraction Our Model Implies High Odds Of An Earnings Contraction Our Model Implies High Odds Of An Earnings Contraction Chart 6Chinese Investable Stocks Continue Facing Regulatory And Geopolitical Risks Chinese Investable Stocks Continue Facing Regulatory And Geopolitical Risks Chinese Investable Stocks Continue Facing Regulatory And Geopolitical Risks Pressures from both Chinese and US regulators will continue to push Chinese firms to depart from US stock exchanges. The disputes between the US and China, which in our US Geopolitical Strategy's view are deep and structural, will likely culminate in the months leading up to the 20th National Party Congress in China and the mid-term election in the US in the fall of 2022. It is true that the delisted Chinese firms will likely migrate to Hong Kong, and in theory should offer global investors the same returns. However, we argue that as the delisted companies fail to comply with transnational disclosure standards and financial audit regulations mandated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), global investors will demand higher risk premiums (and hence lower valuations) to own Chinese investable stocks. In the next two to three months, it is possible that investors may bid up Chinese stocks in expectation of further policy loosening. Since data on the real economic activity in the first two months of the year will not be released until March, investors will likely focus on credit, monetary, and trade data. However, we caution against moving to an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks for investors with time horizon of 6 to 12 months. While easier macro policies are certainly welcome, we remain skeptical that: a) the existing policy support is enough to revive China’s economy; and b) Chinese policymakers will provide aggressive stimulus and allow a major acceleration in credit growth for the entire year of 2022.  Bottom Line: While in the near term, investors may find Chinese stocks attractive due to cheap valuations and expectations of further stimulus, Chinese stocks face challenges both from the impact of a slowing economy on earnings growth and ongoing regulatory and geopolitical risks.  Investment Conclusions Chinese stocks in both the onshore and offshore markets have cheapened relative to global equities. However, in absolute terms Chinese stocks are not unduly cheap and their valuations are higher than in both 2015/16 and 2018/19 (Chart 7). In previous cycles, Chinese stock prices bottomed when the earnings adjustment process was well underway or near the end of the process. Chart 8 presents some perspective on when investors are likely to anticipate an eventual bottom in stock prices, if an earnings contraction does indeed occur. The chart shows the level of 12-month forward earnings for investable and domestic stocks, and circles at what point share prices bottomed during the previous cycles. Chart 8The Forward Earnings Adjustment Process Has Just Started The Forward Earnings Adjustment Process Has Just Started The Forward Earnings Adjustment Process Has Just Started Chart 7Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Cheap In Absolute Terms Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Cheap In Absolute Terms Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Cheap In Absolute Terms   The chart shows that onshore equities bottomed roughly halfway through the earnings adjustment process, whereas the investable market bottomed almost at the end of the process. The chart also shows that this adjustment process has barely begun in the current cycle, which argues against a cyclically overweight stance towards Chinese stocks.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Equity Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Image We have entered a new phase of the cycle, with central banks in most developed markets turning more hawkish (the Bank of England surprisingly hiking in December, and the Fed signaling three rate hikes for 2022). How much does this matter for equities and other risk assets? Our view is that, as long as economic growth continues to be strong (and we think it will), and provided that central banks don’t overdo the tightening (and, with inflation likely to come down this year, we think excess tightening is unlikely), the hawkish turn might temporarily raise volatility and cause the occasional correction, but it does not undermine the case for equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. We remain overweight global equities. Economic growth is likely to continue to be well above trend for the next year or two (Chart 1), driven by (1) consumers spending some of the $5 trillion of excess savings they have accumulated in the G10 economies, (2) the unprecedented wealth effect from recent stock and house price rises (Chart 2), and (3) strong capex as companies strive to increase capacity to meet the consumer demand (Chart 3). The upsurge in Covid cases in December (Chart 4) will undoubtedly slow growth temporarily. But the signs are that the now-prevalent Omicron variant is mild, and its rapid spread could help the developed world achieve “herd immunity” thanks to widespread vaccination and natural immunity, though emerging countries – especially China – may continue to struggle. Chart 1Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend Chart 2Growth Will Be Boosted By The Wealth Effect... Growth Will Be Boosted By The Wealth Effect... Growth Will Be Boosted By The Wealth Effect... Chart 3...And Capex To Increase Production ...And Capex To Increase Production ...And Capex To Increase Production With US growth very strong – the Atlanta Fed Nowcast suggests Q4 QoQ annualized real GDP growth was 7.6% – and core PCE inflation 4.1%, it is hardly surprising that the Fed wants to accelerate the rate at which it withdraws accommodation. The FOMC dots, which see three rate hikes this year and another three in 2023, are unexceptional and close to what the futures market has already been (and still is) pricing in (Chart 5). Chart 4Covid Cases Not Leading to Hospitalizations And Deaths Covid Cases Not Leading to Hospitalizations And Deaths Covid Cases Not Leading to Hospitalizations And Deaths Chart 6Fed Hikes Have Usually Caused Only A Short-Lived Selloff Fed Hikes Have Usually Caused Only A Short-Lived Selloff Fed Hikes Have Usually Caused Only A Short-Lived Selloff Chart 5The Futures Market Is In Line With The FOMC Dots The Futures Market Is In Line With The FOMC Dots The Futures Market Is In Line With The FOMC Dots         In the past, the first Fed hike in a cycle has often triggered a mild short-term sell off in stocks (the timing depending on how well the hike was flagged in advance), but the equity market digested the news rapidly, quickly resuming its upward trend as the Fed continued to tighten (Chart 6). The same was true around the tapering and end of asset purchases in 2013-17 (Chart 7). All that depends, though, on whether the Fed is rushed into further rate hikes because inflation surprises even more to the upside. Our view remains that inflation will decline this year. The high inflation prints we are seeing now are mostly the result of exceptional demand for consumer manufactured goods, which the supply side has temporarily been unable to fulfil, causing shortages. This can be seen in the very different pattern of goods and services inflation (Chart 8). As we have argued previously, the supply response is now kicking in for key inputs into manufactured goods, such as semiconductors and shipping and, with demand likely to shift to services this year as the pandemic fades, this should bring inflation down. Chart 7Tapering Didn't Much Affect Stocks Either Tapering Didn't Much Affect Stocks Either Tapering Didn't Much Affect Stocks Either Chart 8Inflation Probably Will Decline This Year Inflation Probably Will Decline This Year Inflation Probably Will Decline This Year That said, the year-on-year inflation number will continue to look scary for some time, even if month-on-month inflation settles back to its pre-pandemic level of 0.2% (Chart 9). The consensus average forecast of 3.3% core PCE inflation in 2022 is factoring in monthly inflation around this level. The risks to inflation remain to the upside, particularly if wages respond to higher prices (US wage growth is currently 4-6%, significantly lagging behind price inflation – Chart 10), causing companies to raise prices further, triggering a price-wage spiral. Chart 9Year-On-Year Inflation Will Remain High Year-On-Year Inflation Will Remain High Year-On-Year Inflation Will Remain High Chart 10Risk Of A Price-Wage Spiral? Risk Of A Price-Wage Spiral? Risk Of A Price-Wage Spiral? All this suggests a year of significant volatility and uncertainty. The US stock market has not seen a correction (a drop of more than 10%) in this cycle, and there were no drawdowns last year of more than 5% (Chart 11). This is unusual: There were six 10%-plus corrections in the 2009-2019 bull market. The US equity rally is also looking increasingly narrow, with the run-up to a record-high in December driven by just a few large-cap growth stocks (Chart 12). This – and pricey valuations – makes it vulnerable and, as a hedge to downside risks, we continue to recommend an overweight in cash (rather than government bonds, which offer very asymmetrical returns, with significant downside in the event that inflation proves to be stubborn). Chart 11Where Have All The Corrections Gone? Where Have All The Corrections Gone? Where Have All The Corrections Gone? Chart 12Stock Market Has Got Very Narrow Stock Market Has Got Very Narrow Stock Market Has Got Very Narrow The other policy focus remains China. The authorities’ recent cut of the banks’ reserve ratio and more dovish talk does suggest that they are now concerned about how weak growth has become (Chart 13). A slight loosening of monetary policy has probably caused credit growth to bottom (Chart 14). However, our China strategists argue that the easing is likely to be only moderate since policymakers want to continue with structural reforms, such as reducing debt. The next few months may resemble early 2019 when the PBOC engineered a brief injection of liquidity which lasted only a few months. Moreover, the slump in the property market has not run its course (Chart 15), and this will hamper the authorities’ ability to accelerate infrastructure spending, much of which is financed by local governments’ property sales. Even if Chinese credit growth and the property market do pick up a little, the economy – and indeed commodity prices – will not bottom for another 6-9 months (Chart 16). But, when this happens, it would be a signal to turn more risk-on and bullish on cyclical countries and sectors, such as Emerging Markets, Europe, and Value stocks. Chart 13Chinese Data Looks Very Poor Chinese Data Looks Very Poor Chinese Data Looks Very Poor Chart 14Is Credit Growth Now Bottoming? Is Credit Growth Now Bottoming? Is Credit Growth Now Bottoming? Chart 15Slump In China Property Is Not Over Slump In China Property Is Not Over Slump In China Property Is Not Over Chart 16It Will Take A While For Commodity Prices To Pick Up It Will Take A While For Commodity Prices To Pick Up It Will Take A While For Commodity Prices To Pick Up Equities: While we remain overweight equities, returns this year will be only modest. Returns in 2020 were driven by multiple expansion, and last year by strong margin expansion (Chart 17), as often happens in Years 1 and 2 of a bull market. But this year, while sales growth should remain strong, BCA Research’s US equity strategists’ model points to a small decline in margins, which are at a record high (Chart 18). The PE multiple is likely to fall further too, as it usually does when the Fed is hiking. Even with buybacks and dividends, this amounts to a total return from US equities of only about 8%. Chart 17What Can Drive Returns In 2022? What Can Drive Returns In 2022? What Can Drive Returns In 2022? Chart 18Margins Likely To Slip From Record High Margins Likely To Slip From Record High Margins Likely To Slip From Record High Chart 19Europe Is More Sensitive To China Slowing... Europe Is More Sensitive To China Slowing... Europe Is More Sensitive To China Slowing... Nonetheless, we continue to prefer the US to other developed markets. Europe is more sensitive to the slowdown in China (Chart 19) and tends to underperform when global growth is slowing and is concentrated in services. Neither is it notably cheap versus the US relative to history (Chart 20). Emerging Markets face multiple headwinds, from the slowdown in China, to rampant inflation that is forcing central banks to hike aggressively (Brazil, for example has raised rates to 9.25% from 2% since April even in the face of weak growth and continuing risks from Covid). Chart 20...And Not Particularly Cheap ...And Not Particularly Cheap ...And Not Particularly Cheap Chart 22US Treasurys Are Attractive to Europeans And Japanese US Treasurys Are Attractive to Europeans And Japanese US Treasurys Are Attractive to Europeans And Japanese Chart 21Long Rates Low Given Fed Signaling Long Rates Low Given Fed Signaling Long Rates Low Given Fed Signaling Fixed Income: Long-term rates are surprisingly low, given the hawkish pivot of the Fed and other central banks (Chart 21). One explanation Fed chair Powell has given is the attractiveness of US Treasurys, after FX hedges, to European and Japanese investors (Chart 22). He is correct about this, but the advantage will wane as the Fed raises rates (while the ECB and BOJ don’t). We continue to forecast the 10-year Treasury yield to rise to 2-2.25% by the time of the first Fed hike. We are underweight duration and expect a moderate steepening of the yield curve. TIPs look richly valued, especially at the short end. We are neutral on US TIPs, where 10-years at least represent a hedge against tail-risk inflation. Inflation-linked bonds in the euro zone are particularly unattractive now (Chart 23).     Chart 23Breakevens Already Pricing In A Lot Of Inflation Breakevens Already Pricing In A Lot Of Inflation Breakevens Already Pricing In A Lot Of Inflation Chart 24 In credit, we continue to see value in riskier high-yield bonds, where US B- and Caa-rated names are trading at breakeven spreads close to historic averages (Chart 24). Our global fixed-income strategists have also recently turned more positive on US dollar-denominated EM debt, which offers a decent spread pickup versus US corporate debt of the same credit rating and maturity (Chart 25). Currencies: Relative monetary policy between the US and Europe and Japan could mean some further upside for the dollar over the next few months (Chart 26). However, the dollar is expensive relative to fair value, long-dollar is an increasingly crowded trade and, in the second half of the year, a rebound in China would boost growth in Europe and Emerging Markets, which would be positive for commodity currencies. Bearing that in mind, we remain neutral on the USD. Chart 25...As Are Some EM Dollar Bonds ...As Are Some EM Dollar Bonds ...As Are Some EM Dollar Bonds Chart 26Dollar To Rise On More Hawkish Fed? Dollar To Rise On More Hawkish Fed? Dollar To Rise On More Hawkish Fed? Chart 28Gold Is Vulnerable To Rising Real Rates Gold Is Vulnerable To Rising Real Rates Gold Is Vulnerable To Rising Real Rates Chart 27 Commodities: Metals prices are likely to suffer further in the first half of the year, as China’s growth continues to slow. This would suggest a further decline in the equity Materials sector. Nonetheless, we continue to have a neutral on commodities as an asset class because of the positive long-term story: Demand for metals for use in alternative energy is not being met by increased supply because investor pressure is stymying capex in the mining sector (Chart 27). It makes sense to have long-term exposure to metals such as copper and lithium which are used in electric vehicles. The oil price is mostly determined currently by Saudi supply. Our energy strategists forecast Brent oil to average $78.50 in 2022 and $80 in 2023, roughly the same as the current spot price. We remain neutral on gold: The bullion is not particularly attractively valued currently and will suffer if, as we expect, real long-term rates rise (Chart 28). Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Asset Allocation 

Highlights Our three strategic themes over the long run: (1) great power rivalry (2) hypo-globalization (3) populism and nationalism. The implications are inflationary over the long run. Nations that gear up for potential conflict and expand the social safety net to appease popular discontent will consume a lot of resources. Our three key views for 2022: (1) China’s reversion to autocracy (2) America’s policy insularity (3) petro-state leverage. The implications are mostly but not entirely inflationary: China will ease policy, the US will pass more stimulus, and energy supply may suffer major disruptions. Stay long gold, neutral US dollar, short renminbi, and short Taiwanese dollar. Stay tactically long global large caps and defensives. Buy aerospace/defense and cyber-security stocks. Go long Japanese and Mexican equities – both are tied to the US in an era of great power rivalry. Feature Chart 1US Resilience US Resilience US Resilience Global investors have not yet found a substitute for the United States. Despite a bout of exuberance around cyclical non-US assets at the beginning of 2021, the year draws to a close with King Dollar rallying, US equities rising to 61% of global equity capitalization, and the US 30-year Treasury yield unfazed by inflation fears (Chart 1). American outperformance is only partly explained by its handling of the lingering Covid-19 pandemic. The US population was clearly less restricted by the virus (Chart 2). But more to the point, the US stimulated its economy by 25% of GDP over the course of the crisis, while the average across major countries was 13% of GDP. Americans are still more eager to go outdoors and the government has been less stringent in preventing them (Chart 3). Chart 2 ​​​​​ Chart 3Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown ​​​​​​ Going forward, the pandemic should decline in relevance, though it is still possible that a vaccine-resistant mutation will arise that is deadlier for younger people, causing a new round of the crisis. The rotation into assets outside the US will be cautious. Across the world, monetary and credit growth peaked and rolled over this year, after the extraordinary effusion of stimulus to offset the social lockdowns of 2020 (Chart 4). Government budget deficits started to normalize while central banks began winding down emergency lending and bond-buying. More widespread and significant policy normalization will get under way in 2022 in the face of high core inflation. Tightening will favor the US dollar, especially if global growth disappoints expectations. Chart 4Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Chart 5Global Growth Stabilization Global Growth Stabilization Global Growth Stabilization Global manufacturing activity fell off its peak, especially in China, where authorities tightened monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy aggressively to prevent asset bubbles from blowing up (Chart 5). Now China is easing policy on the margin, which should shore up activity ahead of an important Communist Party reshuffle in fall 2022. The rest of the world’s manufacturing activity is expected to continue expanding in 2022, albeit less rapidly. This trend cuts against US outperformance but still faces a range of hurdles, beginning with China. In this context, we outline three geopolitical themes for the long run as well as three key views for the coming 12 months. Our title, “The Gathering Storm,” refers to the strategic challenge that China and Russia pose to the United States, which is attempting to form a balance-of-power coalition to contain these autocratic rivals. This is the central global geopolitical dynamic in 2022 and it is ultimately inflationary. Three Strategic Themes For The Long Run The international system will remain unstable in the coming years. Global multipolarity – or the existence of multiple, competing poles of political power – is the chief destabilizing factor. This is the first of our three strategic themes that will persist next year and beyond (Table 1). Our key views for 2022, discussed below, flow from these three strategic themes. Table 1Strategic Themes For 2022 And Beyond 2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm 2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm 1. Great Power Rivalry Multipolarity – or great power rivalry – can be illustrated by the falling share of US economic clout relative to the rest of the world, including but not limited to strategic rivals like China. The US’s decline is often exaggerated but the picture is clear if one looks at the combined geopolitical influence of the US and its closest allies to that of the EU, China, and Russia (Chart 6). Chart 6 China’s rise is the most destabilizing factor because it comes with economic, military, and technological prowess that could someday rival the US for global supremacy. China’s GDP has surpassed that of the US in purchasing power terms and will do so in nominal terms in around five years (Chart 7). Chart 7 True, China’s potential growth is slowing and Chinese financial instability will be a recurring theme. But that very fact is driving Beijing to try to convert the past 40 years of economic success into broader strategic security. Chart 8America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) ​​​​​ Since China is capable of creating an alternative political order in Asia Pacific, and ultimately globally, the United States is reacting. It is penalizing China’s economy and seeking to refurbish alliances in pursuit of a containment policy. The American reaction to the loss of influence has been unpredictable, contradictory, and occasionally belligerent. New isolationist impulses have emerged among an angry populace in reaction to gratuitous wars abroad and de-industrialization. These impulses appeared in both the Obama and Trump administrations. The Biden administration is attempting to manage these impulses while also reinforcing America’s global role. The pandemic-era stimulus has enabled the US to maintain its massive trade deficit and aggressive defense spending. But US defense spending is declining relative to the US and global economy over time, encouraging rival nations to carve out spheres of influence in their own neighborhoods (Chart 8). Russia’s overall geopolitical power has declined but it punches above its weight in military affairs and energy markets, a fact which is vividly on display in Ukraine as we go to press. The result is to exacerbate differences in the trans-Atlantic alliance between the US and the European Union, particularly Germany. The EU’s attempt to act as an independent great power is another sign of multipolarity, as well as the UK’s decision to distance itself from the continent and strengthen the Anglo-American alliance. If the US and EU do not manage their differences over how to handle Russia, China, and Iran then the trans-Atlantic relationship will weaken and great power rivalry will become even more dangerous. 2. Hypo-Globalization The second strategic theme is hypo-globalization, in which the ancient process of globalization continues but falls short of its twenty-first century potential, given advances in technology and governance that should erode geographic and national boundaries. Hypo-globalization is the opposite of the “hyper-globalization” of the 1990s-2000s, when historic barriers to the free movement of people, goods, and capital seemed to collapse overnight. Chart 9From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization The volume of global trade relative to industrial production  peaked with the Great Recession in 2008-10 and has declined slowly but surely ever since (Chart 9). Many developed markets suffered the unwinding of private debt bubbles, while emerging economies suffered the unwinding of trade manufacturing. Periods of declining trade intensity – trade relative to global growth – suggest that nations are turning inward, distrustful of interdependency, and that the frictions and costs of trade are rising due to protectionism and mercantilism. Over the past two hundred years globalization intensified when a broad international peace was agreed (such as in 1815) and a leading imperial nation was capable of enforcing law and order on the seas (such as the British empire). Globalization fell back during times of “hegemonic instability,” when the peace settlement decayed while strategic and naval competition eroded the global trading system. Today a similar process is unfolding, with the 1945 peace decaying and the US facing the revival of Russia and China as regional empires capable of denying others access to their coastlines and strategic approaches (Chart 10).1 Chart 10Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Chart 11Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound No doubt global trade is rebounding amid the stimulus-fueled recovery from Covid-19. But the upside for globalization will be limited by the negative geopolitical environment (Chart 11). Today governments are not behaving as if they will embark on a new era of ever-freer movement and ever-deepening international linkages. They are increasingly fearful of each other’s strategic intentions and using fiscal resources to increase economic self-sufficiency. The result is regionalization rather than globalization. Chinese and Russian attempts to revise the world order, and the US’s attempt to contain them, encourages regionalization. For example, the trade war between the US and China is morphing into a broader competition that limits cooperation to a few select areas, despite a change of administration in the United States. The further consolidation of President Xi Jinping’s strongman rule will exacerbate this dynamic of distrust and economic divorce. Emerging Asia and emerging Europe live on the fault lines of this shift from globalization to regionalism, with various risks and opportunities. Generally we are bullish EM Asia and bearish EM Europe. 3. Populism And Nationalism A third strategic theme consists of populism and nationalism, or anti-establishment political sentiment in general. These forces will flare up in various forms across the world in 2022 and beyond. Even as unemployment declines, the rise in food and fuel inflation will make it difficult for low wage earners to make ends meet. The “misery index,” which combines unemployment and inflation, spiked during the pandemic and today stands at 10.8% in the US and 11.4% in the EMU, up from 5.2% and 8.1% before the pandemic, respectively (Chart 12). Large budget deficits and trade deficits, especially in the US and UK, feed into this inflationary environment. Most of the major developed markets have elected new governments since the pandemic, with the notable exception of France and Spain. Thus they have recapitalized their political systems and allowed voters to vent some frustration. These governments now have some time to try to mitigate inflation before the next election. Hence policy continuity is not immediately in jeopardy, which reduces uncertainty for investors. By contrast, many of the emerging economies face higher inflation, weak growth, and are either coming upon elections or have undemocratic political systems. Either way the result will be a failure to address household grievances promptly. The misery index is trending upward and governments are continually forced to provide larger budget deficits to shore up growth, fanning inflation (Chart 13). Chart 12DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place ​​​​​ Chart 13EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized ​​​​​​ Chart 14EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 Just as social and political unrest erupted after the Great Recession, notably in the so-called “Arab Spring,” so will new movements destabilize various emerging markets in the wake of Covid-19. Regime instability and failure can lead to big changes in policies, large waves of emigration, wars, and other risks that impact markets. The risks are especially high unless and until Chinese imports revive. Investors should be on the lookout for buying opportunities in emerging markets once the bad news is fully priced. National and local elections in Brazil, India, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey will serve as market catalysts, with bad news likely to precede good news (Chart 14). Bottom Line: These three themes – great power rivalry, hypo-globalization, and populism/nationalism – are inflationary in theory, though their impact will vary based on specific events. Multipolarity means that governments will boost industrial and defense spending to gear up for international competition. Hypo-globalization means countries will attempt to put growth on a more reliable domestic foundation rather than accept dependency on an unreliable international scene, thus constraining supplies from abroad. Populism and nationalism will lead to a range of unorthodox policies, such as belligerence abroad or extravagant social spending at home. Of course, the inflationary bias of these themes can be upset if they manifest in ways that harm growth and/or inflation expectations, which is possible. But the general drift will be an inflationary policy setting. Inflation may subside in 2022 only to reemerge as a risk later. Three Key Views For 2022 Within this broader context, our three key views for 2022 are as follows: 1. China’s Reversion To Autocracy As President Xi Jinping leads China further down the road of strongman rule and centralization, the country faces a historic confluence of internal and external risks. This was our top view in 2021 and the same dynamic continues in 2022. The difference is that in 2021 the risk was excessive policy tightening whereas this coming year the risk is insufficient policy easing. Chart 15China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China’s economy is witnessing a secular slowdown, a deterioration in governance, property market turmoil, and a rise in protectionism abroad. The long decline in corporate debt growth points to the structural slowdown. Animal spirits will not improve in 2022 so government spending will be necessary to try to shore up overall growth. The Politburo signaled that it will ease fiscal policy at the Central Economic Work Conference in early December, a vindication of our 2021 view. Neither the combined fiscal-and-credit impulse nor overall activity, indicated by the Li Keqiang Index, have shown the slightest uptick yet (Chart 15). Typically it takes six-to-nine months for policy easing to translate to an improvement in real economic activity. The first half of the year may still bring economic disappointments. But policymakers are adjusting to avoid a crash. Policy will grow increasingly accommodative as necessary in the first half of 2022. The key political constraint is the Communist Party’s all-important political reshuffle, the twentieth national party congress, to be held in fall 2022 (usually October). While Xi may not want the economy to surge in 2022, he cannot afford to let it go bust. The experience of previous party congresses shows that there is often a policy-driven increase in bank loans and fixed investment. Current conditions are so negative as to ensure that the government will provide at least some support, for instance by taking a “moderately proactive approach” to infrastructure investment (Chart 16). Otherwise a collapse of confidence would weaken Xi’s faction and give the opposition faction a chance to shore up its position within the Communist Party. Chart 16China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress Party congresses happen every five years but the ten-year congresses, such as in 2022, are the most important for the country’s overall political leadership. The party congresses in 1992, 2002, and 2012 were instrumental in transferring power from one leader to the next, even though the transfer of power was never formalized. Back in 2017 Xi arranged to stay in power indefinitely but now he needs to clinch the deal, lest any unforeseen threat emerge from at home or abroad. Xi’s success in converting the Communist Party from “consensus rule” to his own “personal rule” will be measurable by his success in stacking the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee with factional allies. He will also promote his faction across the Central Committee so as to shape the next generations of party leaders and leave his imprint on policy long after his departure. The government will be extremely sensitive to any hint of dissent or resistance and will move aggressively to quash it. Investors should not be surprised to see high-level sackings of public officials or private magnates and a steady stream of scandals and revelations that gain prominence in western media. The environment is also ripe for strange and unexpected incidents that reveal political differences beneath the veneer of unity in China: defections, protests, riots, terrorist acts, or foreign interference. Most incidents will be snuffed out quickly but investors should be wary of “black swans” from China in 2022. Chinese government policies will not be business friendly in 2022 aside from piecemeal fiscal easing. Everything Beijing does will be bent around securing Xi’s supremacy at all levels. Domestic politics will take precedence over economic concerns, especially over the interests of private businesses and foreign investors, as is clear when it comes to managing financial distress in the property sector. Negative regulatory surprises and arbitrary crackdowns on various industrial sectors will continue, though Beijing will do everything in its power to prevent the property bust from triggering contagion across the economic system. This will probably work, though the dam may burst after the party congress. Relations with the US and the West will remain poor, as the democracies cannot afford to endorse what they see as Xi’s power grab, the resurrection of a Maoist cult of personality, and the betrayal of past promises of cooperation and engagement. America’s midterm election politics will not be conducive to any broad thaw in US-China relations. While China will focus on domestic politics, its foreign policy actions will still prove relatively hawkish. Clashes with neighbors may be instigated by China to warn away any interference or by neighbors to try to embarrass Xi Jinping. The South and East China Seas are still ripe for territorial disputes to flare. Border conflicts with India are also possible. Taiwan remains the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. A fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis looms as China increases its military warnings to Taiwan not to attempt anything resembling independence (Chart 17A). China may use saber-rattling, economic sanctions, cyber war, disinformation, and other “gray zone” tactics to undermine the ruling party ahead of Taiwan’s midterm elections in November 2022 and presidential elections in January 2024. A full-scale invasion cannot be ruled out but is unlikely in the short run, as China still has non-military options to try to arrange a change of policy in Taiwan. Chart 17 ​​​​​​ Chart 17BMarket-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked Market-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked Market-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked China has not yet responded to the US’s deployment of a small number of troops in Taiwan or to recent diplomatic overtures or arms sales. It could stage a major show of force against Taiwan to help consolidate power at home. China also has an interest in demonstrating to US allies and partners that their populations and economies will suffer if they side with Washington in any contingency. Given China’s historic confluence of risks, it is too soon for global investors to load up on cheap Chinese equities. Volatility will remain high. Weak animal spirits, limited policy easing, high levels of policy uncertainty, regulatory risk, ongoing trade tensions, and geopolitical risks suggest that investors should remain on the sidelines, and that a large risk premium can persist throughout 2022. Our market-based geopolitical risk indicators for both China and Taiwan are still trending upwards (Chart 17B). Global investors should capitalize on China’s policy easing indirectly by investing in commodities, cyclical equity sectors, and select emerging markets. 2. America’s Policy Insularity Our second view for 2022 centers on the United States, which will focus on domestic politics and will thus react or overreact to the many global challenges it faces. The US faces the first midterm election after the chaotic and contested 2020 presidential election. Political polarization remains at historically high levels, meaning that social unrest could flare up again and major domestic terrorist incidents cannot be ruled out. So far the Biden administration has focused on the domestic scene: mitigating the pandemic and rebooting the economy. Biden’s signature “Build Back Better” bill, $1.75 trillion investment in social programs, has passed the House of Representatives but not the Senate. The spike in inflation has shaken moderate Democratic senators who are now delaying the bill. We expect it to pass, since tax hikes were dropped, but our conviction is low (65% subjective odds), as a single defection would derail the bill. The implication would be inflationary since it would mark a sizable increase in government spending at a time when the output gap is already virtually closed. Spending would likely be much larger than the Congressional Budget Office estimate, shown in Chart 18, because the bill contains various gimmicks and hard-to-implement expiration clauses. Equity markets may not sell if the bill fails, since more fiscal stimulus would put pressure on the Federal Reserve to hike rates faster. Chart 18 Chart 19 Whether the bill passes or fails, Biden’s legislative agenda will be frozen thereafter. He will have to resort to executive powers and foreign policy to lift his approval rating and court the median voter ahead of the midterm elections. Currently Democrats are lined up to lose the House and probably also the Senate, where a single seat would cost them their majority (Chart 19). The Senate is still in play so Biden will be averse to taking big risks. For the same reason, Biden’s foreign policy goal will be to stave off various bubbling crises. Restoring the Iranian nuclear deal was his priority but Russia has now forced its way to the top of the agenda by threatening a partial reinvasion of Ukraine. In this context Biden will not have room for maneuver with China. Congress will be hawkish on China ahead of the midterms, and Xi Jinping will be reviving autocracy, so Biden will not be able to improve relations much. Biden’s domestic policy could fuel inflation, while his domestic-focused foreign policy will embolden strategic rivals, which increases geopolitical risks. 3. Petro-State Leverage A surge in gasoline prices at the pump ahead of the election would be disastrous for a Democratic Party that is already in disarray over inflation (Chart 20). Biden has already demonstrated that he can coordinate an international release of strategic oil reserves this year. Oil and natural gas producers gain leverage when the global economy rebounds, commodity prices rise, and supply/demand balances tighten. The frequency of global conflicts, especially those involving petro-states, tend to rise and fall in line with oil prices (Chart 21). Chart 20Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Chart 21 Both Russia and Iran are vulnerable to social unrest at home and foreign strategic pressure abroad. Both have long-running conflicts with the US and West that are heating up for fundamental reasons, such as Russia’s fear of western influence in the former Soviet Union and Iran’s nuclear program. Both countries are demanding that the US make strategic concessions to atone for the Trump administration’s aggressive policies: selling lethal weapons to Ukraine and imposing “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran. Biden is not capable of making credible long-term agreements since he could lose office as soon as 2025 and the next president could reverse whatever he agrees. But he must try to de-escalate these conflicts or else he faces energy shortages or price shocks, which would raise the odds of stagflation ahead of the election. The path of least resistance for Biden is to lift the sanctions on Iran to prevent an escalation of the secret war in the Middle East. If this unilateral concession should convince Iran to pause its nuclear activities before achieving breakout uranium enrichment capability, then Biden would reduce the odds of a military showdown erupting across the region. Opposition Republicans would accuse him of weakness but public opinion polls show that few Americans consider Iran a major threat. The problem is that this logic held throughout 2021 and yet Biden did not ease the sanctions. Given Iran’s nuclear progress and the US’s reliance on sanctions, we see a 40% chance of a military confrontation with Iran over the coming years. With regard to Ukraine, an American failure to give concessions to Russia will probably result in a partial reinvasion of Ukraine (50% subjective odds). This in turn will force the US and EU to impose sanctions on Russia, leading to a squeeze of natural gas prices in Europe and eventually price pressures in global energy markets. If Biden grants Russia’s main demands, he will avoid a larger war or energy shock but will make the US vulnerable to future blackmail. He will also demoralize Taiwan and other US partners who lack mutual defense treaties. But he may gain Russian cooperation on Iran. If Biden gives concessions to both Russia and Iran, his party will face criticism in the midterms but it will be far less vulnerable than if an energy shock occurs. This is the path of least resistance for Biden in 2022. It means that the petro-states may lose their leverage after using it, given that risk premiums would fall on Biden’s concessions. Of course, if energy shocks happen, Europe and China will suffer more than the US, which is relatively energy independent. For this reason Brussels and Beijing will try to keep diplomacy alive as long as possible. Enforcement of US sanctions on Iran may weaken, reducing Iran’s urgency to come into compliance. Germany may prevent a hardline threat of sanctions against Russia, reducing Russia’s fear of consequences. Again, petro-states have the leverage. Therefore investors should guard against geopolitically induced energy price spikes or shocks in 2022. What if other commodity producers, such as Saudi Arabia, crank up production and sink oil prices? This could happen. Yet the Saudis prefer elevated oil prices due to the host of national challenges they face in reforming their economy. If the US eases sanctions on Iran then the Saudis may make this decision. Thus downside energy price shocks are possible too. The takeaway is energy price volatility but for the most part we see the risk as lying to the upside. Investment Takeaways Traditional geopolitical risk, which focuses on war and conflict, is measurable and has slipped since 2015, although it has not broken down from the general uptrend since 2000. We expect the secular trend to be reaffirmed and for geopolitical risk to resume its rise due to the strategic themes and key views outlined above. The correlation of geopolitical risk with financial assets is debatable – namely because some geopolitical risks push up oil and commodity prices at the expense of the dollar, while others cause a safe-haven rally into the dollar (Chart 22).  Global economic policy uncertainty is also measurable. It is in a secular uptrend since the 2008 financial crisis. Here the correlation with the US dollar and relative equity performance is stronger, which makes sense. This trend should also pick up going forward, which is at least not negative for the dollar and relative US equity performance (Chart 23). Chart 22Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable ​​​​​​ Chart 23Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets ​​​​​​ We are neutral on the US dollar versus the euro and recommend holding either versus the Chinese renminbi. We are short the currencies of emerging markets that suffer from great power rivalry, namely the Taiwanese dollar versus the US dollar, the Korean won versus the Japanese yen, the Russian ruble versus the Canadian dollar, and the Czech koruna versus the British pound.     We remain long gold as a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation. We recommend staying long global equities. Tactically we prefer large caps and defensives. Within developed markets, we favor the UK and Japan. Japan in particular will benefit from Chinese policy easing yet remains more secure from China-centered geopolitical risks than emerging Asian economies. Within emerging markets, Mexico stands to benefit from US economic strength and divorce from China. We would buy Indian equities on weakness and sell Chinese and Russian equities on strength. We remain long aerospace and defense stocks and cyber-security stocks.   -The GPS Team We Read (And Liked) … Conspiracy U: A Case Study “Crazy, worthless, stupid, made-up tales bring out the demons in susceptible, unthinking people.” Thus the author’s father, a Holocaust survivor translated from Yiddish, on conspiracy theories and the real danger they present in the world. Scott A. Shay, author and chairman of Signature Bank, whose first book was a finalist for the National Jewish Book Award, has written an intriguing new book on the topic and graciously sent it our way.2 Shay is a regular reader of BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and an astute observer of international affairs. He is also a controversialist who has written essays for several of America’s most prominent newspapers. Shay’s latest, Conspiracy U, is a bracing read that we think investors will benefit from. We say this not because of its topical focus, which is too confined, but because of its broader commentary on history, epistemology, the US higher education system – and the very timely and relevant problem of conspiracy theories, which have become a prevalent concern in twenty-first century politics and society. The author and the particular angle of the book will be controversial to some readers but this very quality makes the book well-suited to the problem of the conspiracy theory, since it is not the controversial nature of conspiracy theories but their non-falsifiability that makes them specious. As the title suggests, the book is a polemical broadside. The polemic arises from Shay’s unique set of moral, intellectual, and sociopolitical commitments. This is true of all political books but this one wears its topicality on its sleeve. The term “conspiracy” in the title refers to antisemitic, anti-Israel, and anti-Zionist conspiracy theories, particularly the denial of the Holocaust, coming from tenured academics on both the right and the left wings of American politics. The “U” in the title refers to universities, namely American universities, with a particular focus on the author’s beloved alma mater, Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois. Clearly the book is a “case study” – one could even say the prosecution of a direct and extended public criticism of Northwestern University – and the polemical perspective is grounded in Shay’s Jewish identity and personal beliefs. Equally clearly Shay makes a series of verifiable observations and arguments about conspiracy theories as a contemporary phenomenon and their presence, as well as the presence of other weak and lazy modes of thought, in “academia writ large.” This generalization of the problem is where most readers will find the value of the book. The book does not expect one to share Shay’s identity, to be a Zionist or support Zionism, or to agree with Israel’s national policies on any issue, least of all Israeli relations with Arabs and Palestinians. Shay’s approach is rigorous and clinical. He is a genuine intellectual in that he considers the gravest matters of concern from various viewpoints, including viewpoints radically different from his own, and relies on close readings of the evidence. In other words, Shay did not write the book merely to convince people that two tenured professors at Northwestern are promoting conspiracy theories. That kind of aberration is sadly to be expected and at least partially the result of the tenure system, which has advantages as well, not within the scope of the book. Rather Shay wrote it to provide a case study for how it is that conspiracy theories can manage to be adopted by those who do not realize what they are and to proliferate even in areas that should be the least hospitable – namely, public universities, which are supposed to be beacons of knowledge, science, openness, and critical thinking, but also other public institutions, including the fourth estate. Shay is meticulous with his sources and terminology. He draws on existing academic literature to set the parameters of his subject, defining conspiracy theories as “improbable hypotheses [or] intentional lies … about powerful and sinister groups conspiring to harm good people, often via a secret cabal.” The definition excludes “unwarranted criticism” and “unfair/prejudiced perspectives,” which are harmful but unavoidable. Many prejudices and false beliefs are “still falsifiable in the minds of their adherents,” which is not the case with conspiracy theories, although deep prejudices can obviously be helpful in spreading such theories. Conspiracy theories often depend on “a stunning amount of uniformity of belief and coordination of action without contingencies.” They also rely excessively on pathos, or emotion, in making their arguments, as opposed to logos (reason) and ethos (credibility, authority). Unfortunately there is no absolute, infallible distinction between conspiracy theories and other improbable theories – say, yet-to-be-confirmed theories about conspiracies that actually occurred. Conspiracy theories differ from other theories “in their relationship to facts, evidence, and logic,” which may sound obvious but is very much to the point. Again, “the key difference is the evidence and how it is evaluated.” There is no ready way to refute the fabrications, myths, and political propaganda that people believe without taking the time to assess the claims and their foundations. This requires an open mind and a grim determination to get to the bottom of rival claims about events even when they are extremely morally or politically sensitive, as is often the case with wars, political conflicts, atrocities, and genocides: Reliable historians, journalists, lawyers, and citizens must first approach the question of the cause or the identity of perpetrators and victims of an event or process with an open mind, not prejudiced to either party, and then evaluate the evidence. The diagnosis may be easy but the treatment is not – it takes time, study, and debate, and one’s interlocutors must be willing to be convinced. This problem of convincing others is critical because it is the part that is so often left out of modern political discourse. Conspiracy theories are often hateful and militant, so there is a powerful urge to censor or repress them. Openly debating with conspiracy theorists runs the risk of legitimizing or appearing to legitimize their views, providing them with a public forum, which seems to grant ethos or authority to arguments that are otherwise conspicuously lacking in it. In some countries censorship is legal, almost everywhere when violence is incited. The problem is that the act of suppression can feed the same conspiracy theories, so there is a need, in the appropriate context, to engage with and refute lies and specious arguments. Clients frequently email us to ask our view of the rise of conspiracy theories and what they entail for the global policy backdrop. We associate them with the broader breakdown in authority and decline of public trust in institutions. Shay’s book is an intervention into this topic that clients will find informative and thought-provoking, even if they disagree with the author’s staunchly pro-Israel viewpoint. It is precisely Shay’s ability to discuss and debate extremely contentious matters in a lucid and empirical manner – antisemitism, the history of Zionism, Holocaust denialism, Arab-Israeli relations, the Rwandan genocide, QAnon, the George Floyd protests, various other controversies – that enables him to defend a controversial position he holds passionately, while also demonstrating that passion alone can produce the most false and malicious arguments. As is often the case, the best parts of the book are the most personal – when Shay tells about his father’s sufferings during the Holocaust, and journey from the German concentration camps to New York City, and about Shay’s own experiences scraping enough money together to go to college at Northwestern. These sequences explain why the author felt moved to stage a public intervention against fringe ideological currents, which he shows to have gained more prominence in the university system than one might think. The book is timely, as American voters are increasingly concerned about the handling of identity, inter-group relations, history, education, and ideology in the classroom, resulting in what looks likely to become a new and ugly episode of the culture and education wars. Let us hope that Shay’s standards of intellectual freedom and moral decency prevail.   Matt Gertken, PhD Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The downshift in globalization today is even worse than it appears in Chart 10 because several countries have not yet produced the necessary post-pandemic data, artificially reducing the denominator and making the post-pandemic trade rebound appear more prominent than it is in reality. 2     Scott A. Shay, Conspiracy U: A Case Study (New York: Post Hill Press, 2021), 279 pages. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan Territory: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Territory: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Dear Clients, This is the final publication for the year, in which we recap some of the key economic developments this month. Our publishing schedule will resume on January 6, 2022. The China Investment Strategy team wishes you a very happy and safe holiday season and a prosperous New Year! Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist   Feature Recently released data show China’s economy is weakening despite easing monetary policy and power-supply constraints. Our credit impulse – measured by the year-on-year change in total social financing as a share of GDP – inched up in November (Chart 1, top panel).  Given that the indicator leads economic activity by about six to nine months, we maintain the view that China’s economy will not bottom until Q2 next year. Chinese stocks, driven by business cycle, will remain under downward pressures in the next three to six months (Chart 1, middle and bottom panels). On the policy front, the PBoC announced a 50bps cut in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate taking effect in mid-December. Last week’s Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) signaled that stabilizing the economy will be the government’s core policy objective for 2022. However, we believe that policymakers will be data dependent and will only allow an overshoot in credit growth when the slowdown in the economy gathers pace in early 2022. Thus, investors should maintain an underweight allocation to Chinese equities relative to global stocks, at least for the next three to six months, until credit growth significantly improves.   Chart 1Downside Risks Remain High For Chinese Stocks Until The Econmomy Troughs Downside Risks Remain High For Chinese Stocks Until The Econmomy Troughs Downside Risks Remain High For Chinese Stocks Until The Econmomy Troughs Chart 2Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap Chinese investable stocks, particularly internet companies, will continue to face geopolitical and regulatory headwinds in the next 12 months. Chinese tech stocks sold off this year, but they are not cheap (Chart 2). Economic weakness in the onshore market in the next three to six months may trigger more selloffs and further multiples compressions in Chinese investable stocks.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Cuts To The RRR And Relending Rates: Not Game Changers Chart 3RRR Cut Is Not A Game Changer RRR Cut Is Not A Game Changer RRR Cut Is Not A Game Changer Following the RRR cut announcement in early December, the PBoC announced a 25bps decrease in the relending rate targeting agriculture and small businesses (Chart 3). The measures sent an easing signal in response to mounting downside risks in the economy. However, their impact on credit growth will likely be limited for the following reasons: First, the PBoC indicated that the RRR cut will release around RMB1.2 trillion in liquidity to the banks. From that amount, RMB950 billion will be used to replace maturing Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) this month, which leaves only RMB250 billion for new liquidity injection. Chart 4Business Conditions For SMEs Deteriorated Faster Than For Larger Businesses Business Conditions For SMEs Deteriorated Faster Than For Larger Businesses Business Conditions For SMEs Deteriorated Faster Than For Larger Businesses Secondly, the PBoC is trying to prevent a jump in market-based rates in the next two quarters.  Demand for liquidity is usually high due to tax season by year-end plus a front-loading of local government bond (LGB) issuance. Moreover, the Chinese New Year in Q1 2022 will further boost demand for liquidity. Thirdly, the targeted relending rate drop is intended to lower the borrowing costs of small-medium enterprises (SMEs) whose profitability has been challenged by rising input costs and sluggish consumer demand (Chart 4). Loan demand from small enterprises, as shown in the PBoC survey, peaked much earlier and tumbled more rapidly than their larger peers (Chart 4, bottom panel). The rate cut has decreased the possibility of a broadly based decline in interest rates in the near-term. China’s Credit Growth May Have Bottomed, But The Rebound Is Moderate  Chart 5Below-Expectation Credit Growth In November Below-Expectation Credit Growth In November Below-Expectation Credit Growth In November China’s aggregate credit growth ticked up slightly in November. The modest advance mainly reflects an acceleration in LGB issuance. Chart 5 highlights that excluding LGB financing, China’s credit impulse remains on a downward trend. LGBs will be frontloaded in Q1 2022 before the March National People’s Congress sets the full-year quota for LGBs.  However, without a meaningful rebound in bank loan growth, the effects of LGB issuance on infrastructure investment will be limited and short-lived, as occurred in Q1 2019 (Chart 6). Shadow banking, which historically has had a tight correlation with infrastructure investment, continued to slide in November to an all-time low. Infrastructure project approval also does not show any signs of strengthening (Chart 7). Chart 6Improvement In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Limited Without An Acceleration In Loan Growth Improvement In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Limited Without An Acceleration In Loan Growth Improvement In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Limited Without An Acceleration In Loan Growth Chart 7Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Weak demand for bank loans from corporations dragged down credit growth in November as evidenced by softening growth in medium- and long-term corporate loans (Chart 8). Both corporate financing needs and investment willingness continued to wane, implying that corporate demand for bank lending may not turn around soon despite recent monetary easing (Chart 8, bottom panel). In addition, marginal easing measures in the property market have not worked their way into the sector. Bank loans to real estate developers plummeted to all-time lows last month, while trust loans contracted significantly in November, which indicates that financing conditions for real estate developers have not improved (Chart 9). Chart 8Loan Demand Remains Weak And Unlikely To Turn Around Imminently Loan Demand Remains Weak And Unlikely To Turn Around Imminently Loan Demand Remains Weak And Unlikely To Turn Around Imminently Chart 9Deepening Contraction In Trust Loans Indicates Deteriorating Financing Conditions For Real Estate Developers Deepening Contraction In Trust Loans Indicates Deteriorating Financing Conditions For Real Estate Developers Deepening Contraction In Trust Loans Indicates Deteriorating Financing Conditions For Real Estate Developers Easing Of Property Restrictions Will Marginally Benefit The Housing Market Last week’s Politburo meeting and the CEWC both proposed to promote affordable rental housing and support reasonable housing demand. Loan growth to government-subsidized social welfare housing has been decelerating since 2018 and started to contract this year (Chart 10). It will likely strengthen next year amid policy support, but from a very low level and at a modest rate. In addition, although social welfare housing loans account for around 40% of bank loans to real estate developers, they are only about 6% of developers’ total source of funding as of 2020. We expect more policy finetuning in the coming months, which may help slow the pace of deterioration in real estate developers’ financing conditions. Real estate developers’ financing from banks may bottom on the back of government’s intervention, but the improvement in total funds to developers will be gradual without mortgage rate cuts and a pickup in home sales (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the downward trend in housing completion will be sustained in the coming months (Chart 11, top panel). Chart 10Bank Loans To Social Welfare Housing Will Likely Improve Modestly Amid Policy Support Bank Loans To Social Welfare Housing Will Likely Improve Modestly Amid Policy Support Bank Loans To Social Welfare Housing Will Likely Improve Modestly Amid Policy Support Chart 11Less Funding = Reduced Completions And Investments Less Funding = Reduced Completions And Investments Less Funding = Reduced Completions And Investments Housing prices in most Tier-one and Tier-two cities continued to move down through November. Data for high-frequency floor space sold show that housing demand continued to abate last month despite a modest uptick in household mortgage loans (Chart 12). Home sales will remain depressed as buyers expect more discounts in housing prices and real estate tax reforms loom. Falling prices and constraints in developers’ financing will continue to weigh on housing starts, given the strong positive correlation between property starts and housing prices (Chart 13). Chart 12Demand For Housing In November Showed Little Signs Of Revival Demand For Housing In November Showed Little Signs Of Revival Demand For Housing In November Showed Little Signs Of Revival Chart 13Housing Starts Are Highly Correlated With Prices Housing Starts Are Highly Correlated With Prices Housing Starts Are Highly Correlated With Prices   The Rebound In November’s PMI Does Not Signal A Bottom In China’s Economy Chart 14China's PMI Rebounds Amid Supply-Side Improvement China's PMI Rebounds Amid Supply-Side Improvement China's PMI Rebounds Amid Supply-Side Improvement The NBS manufacturing PMI returned to above the 50-expansionary threshold in November, but the rise reflects a near-term supply-side improvement related to the power shortage rather than a demand-driven recovery (Chart 14). China’s overall business conditions and domestic demand are still worsening, indicating that the rebound in the manufacturing PMI may be short-lived. The production subindex jumped by three and half percentage points in November from October, reflecting re-started operation of heavy-industry enterprises that were halted amid electricity shortages in September and October. Robust global demand for China’s manufactured goods supported a strong reading in November’s new export orders subindex. However, domestic demand remains lackluster. A proxy for the new domestic orders derived from the PMI reached its lowest level since February 2020 (Chart 14, bottom panel). In addition, service PMI weakened last month. A sharp resurgence in domestic COVID cases curbed service sector activity last month. Given uncertainties surrounding the Omicron variant and China’s zero-tolerance policy towards COVID, the service sector’s recovery will likely remain below-trend into 1H 2022 (Chart 15 and 16). Chart 15Lingering COVID Effects Will Continue To Impede Service Sector Activity In 1H22 Lingering COVID Effects Will Continue To Impede Service Sector Activity In 1H22 Lingering COVID Effects Will Continue To Impede Service Sector Activity In 1H22 Chart 16Service Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged Service Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged Service Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged Inflation Passthroughs Ongoing Producer price index (PPI) inflation may have peaked. Meanwhile, the consumer price index (CPI) shows another upturn in November. Despite the peak in PPI inflation, it will likely remain above trend through at least 1H22, supported by elevated commodity and energy prices (Chart 17). Chart 17PPI May Have Peaked, But Will Remain Elevated In The Near Term PPI May Have Peaked, But Will Remain Elevated In The Near Term PPI May Have Peaked, But Will Remain Elevated In The Near Term Chart 18Ongoing Inflation Passthroughs Ongoing Inflation Passthroughs Ongoing Inflation Passthroughs A synchronized rise between PPI consumer goods and non-food CPI, and a narrower gap between PPI and CPI inflation, suggest an ongoing inflation passthrough from producers to consumers (Chart 18). Price increases in some key sectors of manufactured consumer goods sped up in November (Chart 19). However, we do not think China’s consumer price inflation will prevent policymakers from further policy easing. Consumer goods prices are lightly weighted in China’s CPI. An acceleration in inflation passthroughs in this component is unlikely to significantly push up the CPI aggregates. Headline CPI may gather steam next year if food prices rise while energy prices remain at current levels. Nonetheless, in recent years China’s monetary policymaking has been more tightly correlated with the PPI and core CPI, and not headline CPI (Chart 20). Chart 19Manufactured Consumer Goods Prices On The Rise Manufactured Consumer Goods Prices On The Rise Manufactured Consumer Goods Prices On The Rise Chart 20Monetary Policy Is Tightly Correlated With Core CPI And Not Headline CPI Monetary Policy Is Tightly Correlated With Core CPI And Not Headline CPI Monetary Policy Is Tightly Correlated With Core CPI And Not Headline CPI Surging Prices Underpin China’s Exports, While The Rebound In Imports Is Unsustainable Chart 21Surging Export Prices Underpinned Strong Growth In The Value Of China's Exports Surging Export Prices Underpinned Strong Growth In The Value Of China's Exports Surging Export Prices Underpinned Strong Growth In The Value Of China's Exports Chinese exports in volume tumbled in November, however, surging export prices underpinned the strong growth in the value of exports (Chart 21). Demand from the US drove Chinese exports this year and the moderation in volume growth was more than offset by escalating prices (Chart 22). China’s export prices have caught up with the global average (Chart 23). Chart 22Strong Demand From US Has Driven Up China's Exports Strong Demand From US Has Driven Up China's Exports Strong Demand From US Has Driven Up China's Exports Chart 23Chinese Export Prices Have Caught Up With The Global Average Chinese Export Prices Have Caught Up With The Global Average Chinese Export Prices Have Caught Up With The Global Average We expect China’s export growth to slow in the new year on the back of softer global growth and a rotation in US household consumption from goods to services  (Chart 24). However, while slowing, global economic growth is projected to remain above trend. The low level of industrial inventories will also provide support to the demand for goods, which will help to sustain strong growth in Chinese exports (Chart 25). China’s imports surprised to the upside in November, boosted by imports of commodities such as coal and crude oil. November’s acceleration in imports reflects a higher demand for primary commodities from Chinese producers, who recovered some production capacity from the power shortages in the previous few months. Chart 24US Household Spending Will Shift From Goods To Services US Household Spending Will Shift From Goods To Services US Household Spending Will Shift From Goods To Services Chart 25Inventory Restocking In The US Will Support Chinese Exports Next Year Inventory Restocking In The US Will Support Chinese Exports Next Year Inventory Restocking In The US Will Support Chinese Exports Next Year Furthermore, the increase in import prices in November outpaced the very modest uptick in the volume of imports, indicating that domestic demand remains sluggish (Chart 26). Credit growth, which normally leads import growth by about six months, only climbed moderately in November and will provide limited support to imports in the coming months (Chart 27). Chart 26Rising Import Prices Masked Weakness In China's Domestic Demand Rising Import Prices Masked Weakness In China's Domestic Demand Rising Import Prices Masked Weakness In China's Domestic Demand Chart 27Modest Rebound In Credit Impulse Will Provide Little Support To Chinese Imports Modest Rebound In Credit Impulse Will Provide Little Support To Chinese Imports Modest Rebound In Credit Impulse Will Provide Little Support To Chinese Imports Chart 28Chinese Demand For Industrial Metals Remains In Deep Contraction Chinese Demand For Industrial Metals Remains In Deep Contraction Chinese Demand For Industrial Metals Remains In Deep Contraction China’s imports of industrial metals, such as copper and steel, improved a little in November, but their year-on-year growth remains in deep contraction (Chart 28). Weakening construction activity amid a continued downtrend in China’s property market will likely reduce the demand for industrial metals. Therefore, the rebound in November’s import growth may be short-lived. The RMB Faces Headwinds In 2022 Regardless Of A Rise In FX Deposit RRR The RMB has climbed about 2% against the dollar since late July despite broad-based dollar strength. In trade-weighted terms, the RMB is at its strongest level since late 2015 (Chart 29). A rapidly appreciating RMB does not bode well for China’s industrial sector profits, and thus not at the PBoC’s best interests (Chart 30). Under this backdrop, last week the PBoC announced that it will raise the banks’ foreign exchange (FX) deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to 9% from 7%, effective December 15. This is the second increase this year aimed at easing the RMB’s pace of appreciation. The RMB fell slightly against the US dollar following the announcement last week. Chart 29The RMB Has Strengthened Despite A Strong USD The RMB Has Strengthened Despite A Strong USD The RMB Has Strengthened Despite A Strong USD Chart 30Strengthening RMB Does Not Bode Well For Corporate Profit Growth Strengthening RMB Does Not Bode Well For Corporate Profit Growth Strengthening RMB Does Not Bode Well For Corporate Profit Growth The RMB appreciation against dollar this year was mainly enhanced by China’s record current account surplus and favorable interest rate differentials between China and the US (Chart 31 and 32). Although the increase in the deposit RRR rate will force banks to hold more foreign currencies and lift the cost of RMB speculation, the RRR hike itself has little impact on altering the existing path in RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the balance of FX deposits stands at US$1 trillion as of November this year. The 200bps increase in the FX deposit reserve ratio will only freeze about US$20 billion in FX liquidity, which is negligible compared with the US$580 billion in China’s trade surplus so far this year. Chart 31Current Account Surplus Will Likely Shrink Next Year Current Account Surplus Will Likely Shrink Next Year Current Account Surplus Will Likely Shrink Next Year Chart 32Interest Rate Differentials Will Narrow Further Interest Rate Differentials Will Narrow Further Interest Rate Differentials Will Narrow Further However, looking forward the conditions favored RMB this year are at risk of reversing in 2022. China’s weaker economic fundamentals and a slower pace in trade surplus next year, as well as narrowed interest rate differentials between the US and China due to falling long-duration bond yields in China, will provide headwinds to RMB. Therefore, investors should closely follow these key factors and to be cautious to bet on continued RMB appreciation. Table 1China Macro Data Summary More Slowdown To Come Before More Easing More Slowdown To Come Before More Easing Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary More Slowdown To Come Before More Easing More Slowdown To Come Before More Easing Footnotes Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Highlights The last two years have taught us to live with Covid-19. This means global growth will remain strong in 2022. That is not reflected in a strong dollar. The RMB will be a key arbiter between a bullish and bearish dollar view. This is because a weak RMB will be deflationary for many commodity currencies, especially if it reflects weak Chinese demand. Inflation in the US will remain stronger than in other countries. The key question is what the Federal Reserve does next year. In our view, they will stay patient which will keep real interest rates in the US very low. Upside in the DXY is nearing exhaustion according to most of our technical indicators. We upgraded our near-term target to 98. Over a longer horizon, we believe the DXY will break below 90, towards 85 in the next 12-18 months. A key theme for 2022 will be central bank convergence. Either inflation proves sticky and dovish central banks turn a tad more hawkish, or inflation subsides and aggressive rate hikes priced in some G10 OIS curves are revised a tad lower. The path for bond yields will naturally be critical. Lower bond yields will initially favor defensive currencies such as the DXY, CHF and JPY. This is appropriate positioning in the near-term. Further out in 2022, as bond yields rise, the Scandinavian currencies will be winners. Portfolio flows into US equities have been a key driver of the dollar rally. This has been because of the outperformance of technology. Should this change, equity flows could switch from friend to foe for the dollar. A green technology revolution is underway and this will benefit the currencies of countries that will supply these raw materials. The AUD could be a star in 2022 and beyond. The rise in cryptocurrencies will continue to face a natural gravitational pull from policy makers.    Gold and silver will rise in 2022, but silver will outperform gold. Feature 2022 has spooky echoes of 2020. In December 2019, we were optimistic about the global growth outlook, positive on risk assets, and bearish the US dollar. That view was torpedoed in March 2020, when it became widely apparent that COVID-19 was a truly global epidemic. More specifically, the dollar DXY index (a proxy for safe-haven demand) rose to a high of 103. US Treasury yields fell to a low of 0.5%. Chart 1Covid-19 And The Dollar Covid-19 And The Dollar Covid-19 And The Dollar Today, the DXY index is sitting at 96, exactly the midpoint of the March 2020 highs and the January 2021 lows. Once again, the dollar is discounting that the new Omicron strain will be malignant – worse than the Delta variant, but not as catastrophic as the original outbreak (Chart 1). Going into 2022, we are cautiously optimistic. First, we have two years of data on the virus and are learning to live with it. This suggests the panic of March 2020 will not be repeated. Second, policymakers are likely to stay very accommodative in the face of another exogenous shock. This will especially be the case for the Fed. Our near-term target for the DXY index is 98, given that the macro landscape remains fraught with risks. This is a speculative level based on exhaustion from our technical indicators (the dollar is overbought) and valuation models (the dollar is expensive). Beyond this level, if our scenario analysis plays out as expected, we believe the DXY index will break below 90 in 2022. Omicron And The Global Growth Picture Chart 2Global Growth And The Dollar Global Growth And The Dollar Global Growth And The Dollar Our golden rule for trading the dollar is simple – sell the dollar if global growth will remain robust, and US growth will underperform its G10 counterparts. Historically, this rule has worked like clockwork. Using Bloomberg consensus growth estimates for 2022, US growth is slated to stay strong, but give way to other economies (Chart 2).  News on the Omicron variant continues to be fluid. As we go to press, Pfizer suggests a third booster dose of its vaccine results in a 25-fold increase in the antibodies that attack the virus. Additionally, a new vaccine to combat the Omicron variant will be available by March. If this proves accurate, it suggests the world population essentially has protection against this new strain. The good news is that vaccinations are ramping up around the world, especially in emerging markets. Countries like the US and the UK were the first countries to see a majority of their population vaccinated. Now many developed and emerging market countries have a higher share of their population vaccinated compared to the US (Chart 3). Chart 3ARising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Chart 3BRising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US This has resulted in a subtle shift – growth estimates for 2022 are increasingly favoring other countries relative to the US (Chart 4). Let us consider the case of Japan - just in June this year, ahead of the Olympics, only 25% of the population was vaccinated. Today, Japan has vaccinated 77% of its population and new daily infections are near record lows. While Omicron is a viable risk, the starting point for Japan is very encouraging and should open a window for a recovery in pent-up demand and a pickup in animal spirits. Chart 4ARising Growth Momentum Outside The US Rising Growth Momentum Outside The US Rising Growth Momentum Outside The US Chart I-4 This template could very much apply to other countries as well. This view is not embedded in the dollar, which continues to price in an outperformance of US growth (Chart 5). The Risks From A China Slowdown China sits at the epicenter of a bullish and bearish dollar view. If Chinese growth is bottoming, then the historical relationship between the credit impulse and pro-cyclical currencies will hold (Chart 6). This will benefit the EUR, the AUD, the CAD and even the SEK which that track the Chinese credit impulse in real time. As an expression of this view, we went long the AUD at 70 cents. Chart 5Economic Surprises Outside The US Economic Surprises Outside The Us Economic Surprises Outside The Us Chart 6Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Just as global policy makers are calibrating the risk from the Omicron variant, the Chinese authorities are also acknowledging the risk of an avalanche from a property slowdown. They have already eased monetary policy on this basis. Specific to the dollar, a key arbiter of a bullish or bearish view will be the Chinese RMB. So far, markets have judiciously separated the risk, judging that the Chinese authorities can surgically diffuse the real estate market, without broad-based repercussions in other parts of the economy (such as the export sector). Equities and corporate credit prices have collapsed in specific segments of the Chinese market but the RMB remains strong (Chart 7). Correspondingly, inflows into China remain very robust, a testament to the fact that Chinese growth (while slowing) remains well above that of many other countries (Chart 8). Chart 7The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China Chart 8Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China China contributed 20% to global GDP in 2021 and will likely contribute a bigger share in 2022, according to the IMF (Chart 9). This suggests that foreign direct investment in China will remain strong . This will occur at a time when the authorities could have diffused the risk from a property market slowdown. Chart I-9 The commodity-side of the equation will also be important to monitor, especially as it correlates strongly with developed-market commodity currencies. It is remarkable that despite the slowdown in Chinese real estate, commodity prices remain resilient (Chart 10). This has been due to adjustment on the supply side, as our colleagues in the Commodity & Energy Strategy team have been writing. Finally, China offers one of the best real rates in major economies. It also runs a current account surplus. This suggests there is natural demand and support for the RMB (Chart 11). A strong RMB limits how low developed-market commodity currencies can fall. Chart 10Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Chart 11Real Interest Rates Favor The RMB Real Interest Rates Favour The RMB Real Interest Rates Favour The RMB Inflation And The Policy Response Output gaps are closing around the world as fiscal stimulus has helped plug the gap in aggregate demand. This suggests that while inflation has been boosted by idiosyncratic factors (supply bottlenecks) that could soon be resolved, rising aggregate demand will start to pose a serious problem to the inflation mandate of many central banks. Chart 12A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally As we wrote a few weeks ago, there have been consistencies and contradictions with the market response to higher inflation. The market is now pricing in that the Fed will raise interest rates much faster, compared to earlier this year. According to the overnight index swap (OIS) curve, the Fed is now expected to lift rates at least twice by December 2022, compared to earlier this year. Meanwhile, market pricing is even more aggressive when looking at the December 2022 Eurodollar contract, relative to either the Euribor contract (European equivalent) or Tibor (Japanese equivalent) (Chart 12). The reality is that outside the ECB and the BoJ, other central banks have actually been more proactive compared to the Federal Reserve. The Bank Of Canada has ended QE and will likely raise interest rates early next year, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended QE and raised rates twice, and the Reserve Bank of Australia has already been tapering asset purchases. The Bank of England will also be ahead of the Fed in raising interest rates, according to our Global Fixed Income Strategy colleagues. This suggests that the pricing of a policy divergence between the Fed and other G10 central banks could be a miscalculation and a potential source of weakness for the dollar. Chart 13The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation Rising inflation is a global phenomenon and not specific to the US (Chart 13). So either inflation subsides and the Fed turns a tad more accommodative, or inflation proves sticky and other central banks turn a tad more hawkish to defend their policy mandates. We have two key short-term trades penned on this view – long EUR/GBP and long AUD/NZD. While the European Central Bank will lag the Bank of England (and the Fed) in raising interest rates, expectations for the path of policy are too hawkish in the UK, with 4 rate hikes priced in by the end of 2022. Similarly, hawkish expectations for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand are likely to be revised lower, relative to the Reserve Bank of Australia. As for the US, the Fed is likely to hike interest rates next year but real rates will remain very low relative to history (Chart 14A and 14B). Low real rates will curb the appeal of US Treasuries. Chart 14AReal Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Real Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Real Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Chart I-14 The Dollar And The Equity Market Chart 15The US Stock Market And The Dollar The US Stock Market And The Dollar The US Stock Market And The Dollar One of the biggest drivers of a strong dollar this year (aside from rising interest rate expectations), has been equity inflows. The greenback tends to do well when US bourses are outperforming their overseas peers (Chart 15). It is also the case that value tends to underperform growth in an environment where the dollar is rising. We discussed this topic in depth in our special report last summer. Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns. So if investors expect the pandemic winners (technology and healthcare) to keep driving the market in an Omicron setting, the US bourses that are overweight these sectors will do well. We will err on the other side of this trade for 2022. Part of that is based on our analysis of the global growth picture in the first section of this report. If growth rotates from the US to other economies, their bourses should do well as profits in these economies recover. Earnings revisions in the US have been sharply revised lower compared to other countries (Chart 16). This has usually led to a lower dollar eventually. In the case of the euro area, there has been a strong and consistent relationship between relative earnings revisions vis-à-vis the US, and the performance of the euro (Chart 17). Chart 16Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Chart 17Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies In a nutshell, should profits in cyclical sectors recover on the back of rising bond yields, strong commodity prices and a tentative bottoming in the Chinese economy, value sectors that are heavily concentrated in countries with more cyclical currencies such as Australia, Norway, Sweden, and Canada, will benefit. Ditto for their currencies. The Outlook For Petrocurrencies Chart I-18 When the pandemic first hit in 2020, oil prices (specifically the Western Texas Intermediate blend) went negative. This drop pushed the Canadian dollar towards 68 cents and USD/NOK punched above 12. This time around, the drop in oil prices (20% from the peak for the Brent blend) has been more muted. We think this sanguine market reaction is more appropiate in our view for two key reasons. First, as our colleagues in the Commodity & Energy Stategy team have highlighted, investment in the resource sector, specifically oil and gas, has been anemic in recent years. In Canada, investment in the oil and gas sector has dropped 68% since 2014 at the same time as energy companies are becoming more and more compliant vis-à-vis climate change (Chart 18). Second, if we are right, and Omicron proves to be a red herring, then transportation demand (the biggest source of oil demand) will keep recovering. In terms of currencies, our preference is to be long a petrocurrency basket relative to oil consumers. As the US is the biggest oil producer in the world (Chart 19), being long petrocurriences versus the dollar has diverged from its historical positive relationship with oil prices. Chart 20 shows that a currency basket of oil producers versus consumers has had both a strong positive correlation with oil prices and has outperformed a traditional petrocurrency basket. Chart 19The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer Chart 20Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Technical And Valuation Indicators The dollar tends to be a momentum-driven currency. Past strength begets further strength. We modelled this when we published our FX Trading Model, which showed that a momentum strategy outperformed over time (Chart 21).  The problem with momentum is that it works until it does not. Net speculative long positions in the dollar are approaching levels that have historically signaled exhaustion (Chart 22). There is a dearth of dollar bears in today’s environment. That is positive from a contrarian standpoint. Meanwhile, our capitulation index (a measure of how overbought or oversold the dollar is) is approaching peak levels. Chart 21The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency Chart 22Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Valuation is another headwind for the dollar. According to all of our in-house models, the dollar is expensive. That is the case according to both our in-house curated PPP model (Chart 23) and a simple one based on headline consumer prices (Chart 24). Chart I-23 Chart 24The Dollar is Expensive The Dollar is Expensive The Dollar is Expensive     In a broader sense, we have built an attractiveness ranking for currencies (Chart 25). This ranks G10 currencies on a swathe of measures, including their basic balances, our internal valuation models, sentiment measures, economic divergences, and external vulnerability. The ranking is in order of preference, with a lower score suggesting the currency is sitting in the top/most attractive quartile of the measures. The Norwegian krone and Swedish krona are especially attractive as 2022 plays. Chart I-25 More specifically, the Scandinavian currencies have been one of the hardest hit this year. The Norwegian krone will benefit from the reopening of economies, particularly through the rising terms-of-trade. The Swedish krona will benefit from a pickup in the industrial sector, and continued strength in global trade. The least attractive G10 currencies are the New Zealand dollar and the greenback. This is mostly due to valuation. As we have highlighted in previous reports, valuation is a poor timing tool in the short term but over a longer-term horizon, currencies tend to revert towards fair value. Where Next For EUR/USD? Our bias is that the euro has bottomed. The ECB will lag the Fed in raising interest rates, but the spread between German bund yields and US Treasuries does not justify the current level of the euro. More importantly, if European growth recovers next year, this will sustain portfolio flows into the eurozone, which are cratering (Chart 26). Our 2022 target for EUR/USD is 1.25, a level that will unwind 10.6% of the undervaluation versus the dollar. Beyond valuation,s a few key factors support the euro: As a pioneer in green energy and a pro-cyclical currency, the euro will benefit from portfolio flows into renewable energy companies, as well as foreign direct investment. A close proxy for these flows are copper prices, that have positively diverged from the performance of the euro (Chart 27). Chart 26The Euro And Portfolio Flows The Euro And Portfolio Flows The Euro And Portfolio Flows Chart 27EUR/USD And Copper EUR/USD And Copper EUR/USD And Copper ​​​​​ Inflation in the euro area is lagging the US, but is undeniably strong. As such, while the ECB will lag the Fed in tightening monetary policy, the divergence in monetary policy will not widen. Earnings revisions are moving in favor of European companies, as we have shown earlier. Historically, this has put a floor under the euro. Safe-Haven Demand: Long JPY Safe-haven currencies will perform well in the near term. We are long the yen, which is the cheapest currency according to our models and also one of the most shorted. CHF will also do well in the near term, though as we have argued, will induce more intervention from the Swiss National Bank. Chart I-28 We are long both the yen and CHF/NZD as short-term trades, but our preference is for the yen. First, Japan has one of the highest real rates in the developed world. So, outflows from JGBs are going to be curtailed. Second, the DXY and USD/JPY have a strong positive correlation, and this places the yen in a very enviable position as the dollar weakens in 2022 (Chart 28). A Final Word On Gold, Silver, And Precious Metals Chart 29Hold Some Gold Hold Some Gold Hold Some Gold Along with our commodity strategists, we remain bullish precious metals. In our view, inflation could prove stickier than most investors expect. This will depress real rates and support precious metals. Within the precious metals sphere, we particularly like silver and platinum.  Almost every major economy now has negative real interest rates. Gold (and silver) have a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates (Chart 29). Central banks are also becoming net purchasers of gold, which is bullish for demand. The true precious metals winner in 2022 could be silver. The Gold/Silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar quite closely, so a bearish view on the dollar can be expressed by being short the GSR (Chart 30). Second, gold is very expensive compared to silver (Chart 31). In general, when gold tends to make new highs (as it did in 2020), silver tends to follow suit. This means silver prices could double from current levels over the next few years, to reclaim their 2011 highs. Finally, the bullish case for platinum is the same as for silver. It has lagged both gold and palladium prices. Meanwhile, breakthroughs are being made in substituting palladium for platinum in gasoline catalytic converters. Chart 30Hold Some Silver Hold Some Silver Hold Some Silver Chart 31Stay Short The GSR Stay Short The GSR Stay Short The GSR Concluding Thoughts Our currency positions, as we enter 2022, are biased towards a lower dollar, but we also acknowledge that there are key risks to the view. Our recommendations are as follows: The DXY will could touch 98 in the near term, but will break below 90 over the next 12-18 months. An attractiveness ranking reveals the most appealing currencies are JPY, SEK, and NOK, while the least attractive are USD and NZD. Chart 32Hold Some AUD Hold Some AUD Hold Some AUD Policy convergence will be a key theme at the onset of 2022. Stay long EUR/GBP and AUD/NZD as a play on this theme. Look to buy a basket of oil producers versus consumers once volatility subsides. We went long the AUD at 70 cents. Terms of trade are likely to remain a tailwind for the Australian dollar (Chart 32). The AUD will benefit specifically in a green revolution.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com​​​​​​​ Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary