Asia

Highlights Trump is now clearly retreating from policies that harm the economy and reduce his reelection chances. Geopolitical risks are abating for the first time since May – a boon for financial markets amid global policy stimulus. The U.S. and China are containing tensions in the short term – though we remain skeptical about a final trade agreement. The U.S. election cycle is a rising source of political risk even as global risks fall – but Warren is not a reason to turn cyclically bearish. Book gains on our long spot gold trade. Feature President Trump is staging a tactical retreat from his “maximum pressure” foreign and trade policies. As a late-cycle president with an election looming, his decision to escalate conflicts with China and Iran in May revealed a voracious risk appetite. This “war president” mentality – the idea that Trump would reconnect with his political base ahead of 2020 at the risk of undermining his own economy – led us to recommend a defensive position over the course of the summer, even though we remained cyclically bullish. Now with Trump’s backpedaling this tactical narrative is starting to turn. The shift adds policy support to the recent up-tick in critical risk-on indicators (Chart 1). While U.S.-China fears have played a much greater role than Brexit in the political tailwind behind global government bond yields (Chart 2), the collapse of Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit is also helping geopolitical risk to abate. Chart 1Risk-On Indicators Flash Green Risk-On Indicators Flash Green Risk-On Indicators Flash Green Chart 2China Political Risk To Ease (Brexit Is Nice Too) China Political Risk To Ease (Brexit Is Nice Too) China Political Risk To Ease (Brexit Is Nice Too) Unfortunately, it is too soon to sound the all-clear: The U.S. election cycle still warrants caution. As we highlighted in July, the rise of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, particularly firebrand Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, is causing jitters in the marketplace. Warren is on the cusp of displacing Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders as the second-place candidate behind former Vice President Joe Biden. Biden remains the frontrunner – which helps to support a constructive cyclical view – but the progressives have a tailwind and his status could change. Moreover, the entire primary process and U.S. election cycle will engender policy uncertainty and “black swan” risks. Trump’s pivot could come too late to save the bull market. There are still significant risks to our House View that equities will be higher in a year’s time. If a bear market and recession become a foregone conclusion, then Trump will have to return to a war footing. This means escalating the conflict with China or confronting Iran in a desperate bid to get voters to rally around the flag. This is a substantial political risk given that the odds of a recession are elevated and rising. Despite these risks, it is significant for the global macro view that President Trump is making a last ditch effort to save the business cycle while it can still be saved. This supports BCA’s House View that investors should maintain a cyclical risk-on orientation. How Do We Know Trump Is In Retreat? Here are the critical signs that Trump is downgrading his administration’s level of aggression after another summer of “fire and fury”: The U.S. and China are now officially easing tensions. Trump has delayed the October 1 tariff hike (from 25% to 30% on $250 billion worth of goods), while China has issued waivers for tariffs and promised to increase purchases of U.S. farm goods in advance of talks. Talks are resuming with the principal negotiators set to meet face-to-face after China’s National Day celebration on October 1. Critically, the two sides are reportedly picking up the nearly completed draft text of a trade agreement that was abandoned in May when divisions over compliance and tariffs resulted in a breakdown. Trump and Xi Jinping have an occasion to meet in Santiago, Chile in November, which is the best time for a signing if the talks progress well. Trump fired his hawkish National Security Adviser, John Bolton. Bolton was a supporter of the president’s “maximum pressure” foreign policy toward rivals, including China as well as Iran and North Korea. Oil prices dropped on the expectation that U.S. relations with Iran could improve, easing oil sanctions and increasing supply (Chart 3). But ultimately the signal is bullish for oil. The real significance is not Bolton himself but rather that Trump is changing tack to reduce geopolitical risks to economic growth. Whoever replaces Bolton is far less likely to be an uber-hawk (Bolton had cornered that market). A trade deal with Japan has been agreed in principle and may be signed in late September. U.S. relations with Europe are marginally improving. Trump even sent Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a trip to discuss a diplomatic “reset” with the EU’s new crop of leaders set to take power in November and December. These improvements are tentative. Trump still explicitly rejects the idea that he should court Europe to apply unified pressure on China. But his administration has agreed to a beef export deal with the EU and, as long as China talks are ongoing, he is unlikely to slap tariffs on European cars. This decision will likely be postponed beyond November 14. All of the above confirms that Trump is focused on reelection. But how can we be sure this less-hawkish policy turn will last longer than five minutes? Rising unemployment is the most deadly leading indicator of a president’s approval rating. Economic data is alarming for a sitting president. Following a drop in business sentiment and investment, consumer sentiment is now suffering (Chart 4). Manufacturing – the sector Trump was ostensibly elected to defend – has slipped into outright contraction and loans and leases are shrinking in the electorally vital Midwestern states (Chart 5). Chart 3Bolton Bolting Is Bullish For Brent Bolton Bolting Is Bullish For Brent Bolton Bolting Is Bullish For Brent Chart 4A Reason For Trump To De-Escalate A Reason For Trump To De-Escalate A Reason For Trump To De-Escalate Fortunately for Trump, the job market is showing signs of resilience, with initial unemployment claims dropping hard (Chart 6). Chart 5Another Reason For Trump To De-Escalate Another Reason For Trump To De-Escalate Another Reason For Trump To De-Escalate Chart 6Good News For Trump Good News For Trump Good News For Trump Chart 7U.S. Consumer Should Prevent Recession U.S. Consumer Should Prevent Recession U.S. Consumer Should Prevent Recession BCA does not expect a recession within the next 12 months. The American consumer remains buoyant and median family incomes are strong (Chart 7). Nevertheless, Trump cannot assume anything. The proliferation of the “R” word has a negative psychological effect on businesses and consumers that could create a negative feedback loop. It also raises the risk of an equity selloff that tightens financial conditions and exacerbates the slowdown (Chart 8). Trump’s Democratic opponents and much of the news media will amplify negative economic news. Chart 8Trump Needs To Change The Topic Trump Needs To Change The Topic Trump Needs To Change The Topic While Trump cares about the stock market, his election ultimately rests on voters, not investors. Even if recession is avoided, a rising unemployment rate would be the most deadly leading indicator of a sitting president’s approval rating (Charts 9A & 9B). It is a far more telling variable than income growth or gasoline prices, for example. Chart 9APresidential Approval... Presidential Approval... Presidential Approval... Chart 9B...Follows Unemployment ...Follows Unemployment ...Follows Unemployment As Charts 9A & 9B demonstrate, unemployment and presidential approval are not always tightly correlated. Rather, for all recent presidents, the direction of unemployment ultimately prevailed over the approval rating by the time of the election – it pulled approval up or down in the final lap of the term in office. Moreover Trump, a bull-market president, is one of the cases where the approval rating is indeed tightly correlated with unemployment, as with Bill Clinton. And he is particularly vulnerable because his approval is historically weak and the unemployment rate can hardly fall much further from today. Granting that Trump is now going to adopt a more pro-market foreign and trade policy orientation, the next question is: what will that entail? Bottom Line: Trump’s tactical policy retreat is materializing which means that geopolitical risk stemming from U.S. foreign and trade policy is declining on the margin. While Trump is unpredictable, his sensitivity to the drop in his polling and weakening economy shows he wants to be reelected. Hence policy will have to moderate. Bolton Bolts – Geopolitical Risks Abate Trump’s ousting of his National Security Adviser Bolton is an important sign of the less-hawkish shift in administration policy. The ouster itself is not surprising in the least. Trump ran for office on a relatively isolationist foreign policy of non-intervention, withdrawal from long-running wars, and eschewing regime change and foreign quagmires to focus on America’s commercial interests. By contrast Bolton is perhaps the Republican Party’s most outspoken war hawk – a neo-conservative of the Bush era who advocated regime change in North Korea and Iran. This position was always at odds with Trump’s eagerness to negotiate and strike deals with the world’s dictators in the name of trade and riches rather than war and expenses.1 Chart 10Will Xi Sell Pyongyang For Washington? Will Xi Sell Pyongyang For Washington? Will Xi Sell Pyongyang For Washington? The immediate implication is that the U.S. and Iran will reduce tensions. We will address this topic at length next week, but the gist is that Trump is much more likely to relax sanctions and hold a summit with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani now than before. This is in keeping with our view that the China trade war is a far greater geopolitical risk than the U.S.-Iran tensions post-withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear pact. However, Bolton’s firing is bullish for oil prices. Iran may still stage low-level provocations that threaten supply, but Saudi Arabia has also appointed a new energy minister in preparation for an OPEC 2.0 strategy that aims to bolster prices in the advance of the initial public offering of Aramco.2 At the same time, Trump’s softening foreign policy stance portends an improvement to the global economy. Nowhere is this clearer than with North Korea and China. Kim Jong Un has explicitly demanded Bolton’s replacement to get talks back on track – Trump has now met this demand. North Korea has also been an integral component of the U.S.-China negotiations throughout Trump’s administration. If Trump’s diplomacy succeeds with North Korea, markets will rightly conclude that U.S.-China tensions are falling. China has an interest in denuclearizing the peninsula, which ultimately entails getting rid of U.S. troops, so it has shown it can comply with U.S. sanctions (Chart 10). A third Trump-Kim summit that results in a nuclear deal of any kind would be a concrete policy win for Trump and a strategic win for China.   The North Korean threat itself is not market-relevant – war risk peaked in 2017 (Chart 11). But an official agreement would provide an “off-ramp” for U.S.-China trade tensions. It would boost trade talks enough to improve global sentiment, and it could even increase the chances that the two countries conclude a deal involving tariff rollback. A Trump-Kim agreement would provide an “off-ramp” for U.S.-China trade tensions. Bolton’s ouster could also smooth U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan – he was an outspoken hawk on this front as well. His presence encouraged fears in Beijing that the Trump administration was planning a significant upgrade in Taiwan relations. These apprehensions were already high from the moment Trump accepted President Tsai Ing-wen’s congratulations on his election in 2016. It remains to be seen whether Trump will delay an $8 billion arms sale that will be the biggest since 1992 (Chart 12) – China has threatened to sanction U.S. defense firms if it goes ahead. But postponement is more likely now than before. This would help along the trade talks. Chart 11North Korea: 'Off-Ramp' For US-China Tensions North Korea: 'Off-Ramp' For US-China Tensions North Korea: 'Off-Ramp' For US-China Tensions Chart 12Will Trump Sell Taipei For Beijing? Trump's Tactical Retreat Trump's Tactical Retreat The direction of Taiwan in the near term partly depends on the direction of Hong Kong. Bolton likely advised a hard line in defense of the mass pro-democracy protests, which Trump was inclined to neglect for the sake of the trade talks with Beijing. Unless a mainland intervention and bloody security crackdown occurs – which is still a risk, and would make it politically impossible to conclude a trade deal with China – Trump will probably continue to sideline this Special Administrative Region. The jury is still out on whether protests will escalate after China’s National Day celebration, but Bolton’s absence and Hong Kong’s concessions to the protesters (which are backed by Beijing) are both positive signs. All of these factors suggest that the odds of a U.S.-China trade deal by November 2020 should rise. But is that really the case? For now we are maintaining our view that the odds are 40% by November 2020, though the risks are to the upside. Chart 13Trump Can Partially Offset China Tariffs Trump Can Partially Offset China Tariffs Trump Can Partially Offset China Tariffs While Trump and Xi can certainly make an executive decision to agree to a deal – any deal – we maintain our high-conviction view that it will lack durability due to uncertainties regarding compliance on China’s side and faithfulness on Trump’s side. And a shallow deal may be politically untenable if markets and the economy rebound. Crucially, neither China’s economic data nor U.S. financial conditions are forcing either side to capitulate entirely. Trump’s policy retreat entails the removal of trade risks from Canada, Mexico, and Japan first and foremost, and likely the European Union. This will offer some consolation to markets even though the small increase in U.S. exports in the near-term will not offset the sharp drop in exports to China (Chart 13). Combined with a de-escalation and containment of tensions with China, and worldwide monetary and fiscal stimulus, markets will face a substantial policy improvement. This will actually reduce the incentive for a final trade deal. If financial and economic pressure intensify and the U.S. heads toward a technical correction or bear market, Trump will need to capitulate. This will require significant tariff rollback. At that point, Xi Jinping will have the opportunity to agree to a short-term deal based on China’s current concessions and nothing more (Table 1). This would demonstrate to the whole world that it does not pay to coerce China: China operates on mutual respect and win-win agreements. This would be acceptable to Xi Jinping since it would at least buy some time until the inevitable second round of the strategic conflict in 2021. But we are not at full capitulation yet. Table 1China’s Offers Thus Far In The Trade War Trump's Tactical Retreat Trump's Tactical Retreat Bottom Line: Trump’s policy retreat includes the ouster of Bolton, which deescalates geopolitical risk on several fronts. Nevertheless, none of these risks – Iran, China, North Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan – is fundamentally resolved. A U.S.-China trade agreement is not even necessary if the two political leaders are sufficiently supported by positive global macro developments. We continue to believe North Korea will lead to Trump diplomatic successes. De-escalation could lead to a breakthrough in trade talks pointing toward a deal, but it could also simply create an “off ramp” for the U.S. and China to contain tensions without having to capitulate on the trade front. Warren Still Warrants Caution While geopolitical risk has some room to abate, domestic political risk in the U.S. will pick up the slack. The entire American election cycle will trouble the markets over the coming 12 months – particularly due to the high chances of significant social unrest. Yet the greatest risks are frontloaded in the form of the Democratic Primary contest. This is because Warren will continue to do well in the early primary debates and therefore could soon morph into the biggest market risk of the entire election cycle. To be clear, her position as the frontrunner in the online betting markets is not validated by the national or state-level opinion polling. Biden remains dominant (Chart 14). If he stays firm above a 30% support rate, with double-digit leads over his nearest competitors in a range of important states, his chances of winning will rise over time and market uncertainty will fall. Chart 14Biden Still The Frontrunner In Democratic Primary Trump's Tactical Retreat Trump's Tactical Retreat While Biden’s election would be market-negative on the margin due to the outlook for tax hikes and re-regulation, Trump’s reelection is not as market-positive as some may believe since he will be unbridled in his second term and more capable of pursuing his aggressive protectionism. Ultimately, the choice between Trump and Biden is a choice between two candidates whose policies and flaws are well known and relatively digestible by markets. If Warren or Sanders come close to the Oval Office, the equity market will go through a re-rating. On the contrary, if Warren surpasses Sanders and takes the lead, uncertainty will skyrocket regardless of Trump’s advantages in the general election. This is not unlikely, as the leftward lurch within the party continues to propel the progressive candidates upward in the contest (Chart 15). If Warren or Sanders are seen as coming within one step from the Oval Office, the equity market will have to go through a re-rating. These progressive populists are proposing an onslaught of laws and regulations against banks, health insurers, oil and gas drillers, and the tech oligopoly. The agenda is inherently negative for corporate earnings in these sectors, as Peter Berezin of BCA’s Global Investment Strategy shows in a recent report.3 Chart 15Progressive Consolidation Would Increase Market Angst Trump's Tactical Retreat Trump's Tactical Retreat Chart 16Stocks Will Start To Trade On Polls Stocks Will Start To Trade On Polls Stocks Will Start To Trade On Polls Health stocks are clearly reacting to Warren’s surge in the online betting markets (Chart 16), so any convergence of the polling of real voters to these probabilities will cause a reckoning in this sector as well as in other sectors she has targeted, like financials, technology, and energy. The saving grace for now – a reason we remain cyclically bullish – is that Biden has not yet broken down in the polling. He is the least market-negative of the top three candidates, yet the most electable from the point of view of the swing state polling and electoral-college calculus. Warren is the most market-negative yet least electable of the top three. She must decisively surpass Sanders in order to create lasting volatility. Yet this will be hard to do because his electoral-college path to the presidency is clearer than Warren’s, judging by head-to-head polls with Trump, and he has the machinery and motivation to slog through the primary race for a long time – which undercuts both him and Warren versus Biden. Warren and Sanders are also less likely to lead the Democrats to victory in the senate even if they take the White House due to their lack of appeal in key senate races like Arizona and Georgia. Without a majority in the senate, their radical policy agenda will have to be left at the door. Investment Implications We are booking gains on our long spot gold trade at 16% since initiation. The thesis remains sound and we will reinitiate when appropriate.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Bolton’s tenure with Trump began with an incredible faux pas in which he advocated “the Libyan model” for the administration’s North Korean policy – prompting Trump to overrule him and reject that model. No comment could have been more inappropriate for a president trying to build trust with Kim Jong Un to sign a denuclearization deal. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was killed by enemy militias in Libya after NATO warplanes bombed his convoy – NATO’s intervention occurred despite Gaddafi’s having abandoned his nuclear weapon program in the wake of the September 1, 2001 attacks to avoid conflict with the U.S. and its allies. 2 See BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Ignore The KSA-Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash,” September 8, 016, ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 See BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Elizabeth Warren And The Markets,” September 1, 2019, gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The lingering global manufacturing recession and the substantial drop in U.S. bond yields have been behind the decoupling between both EM stocks and the S&P 500, and cyclical and defensive equities. Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to indicate either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. We review some of our long-standing themes and associated recommendations. Feature Global financial markets have become bifurcated. On one hand, numerous segments of global financial markets leveraged to global growth, including EM stocks, have already sold off (Chart I-1). On the other hand, share prices of growth companies, defensive stocks and global credit markets have remained resilient. Chart I-2 shows that a similar divergence has taken place within EM asset classes: EM share prices have plummeted while EM corporate credit excess returns have not dropped much. Chart I-1Bifurcated Equity Markets Bifurcated Equity Markets Bifurcated Equity Markets Chart I-2Bifurcated Markets In EM Bifurcated Markets In EM Bifurcated Markets In EM   How to explain this market bifurcation? Financial markets sensitive to global trade and manufacturing cycles have been mirroring worsening conditions in global trade and manufacturing. Some of the affected segments include: Global cyclical equity sectors. Emerging Asia manufacturing-related currencies (KRW, TWD and SGD) versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). EM and DM commodity currencies (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Total Return (Including Carry): KRW, TWD And SGD Vs. USD bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c3 bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c3 Chart I-4EM And DM Commodity Currencies EM And DM Commodity Currencies EM And DM Commodity Currencies   Industrial and energy commodities prices. U.S. high-beta stocks as well as U.S. small caps (Chart I-5). Chart I-5U.S. High-Beta Stocks U.S. High-Beta Stocks U.S. High-Beta Stocks DM bond yields.  Crucially, the current global trade and manufacturing downturns have taken place despite robust U.S. consumer spending. In fact, our theme for the past several years has been that a global business cycle downturn would occur despite ongoing strength in American household spending. The rationale has been that China and the rest of EM combined are large enough on their own to bring down global trade and manufacturing, irrespective of strength in U.S. consumer spending. At the current juncture, one wonders whether such a market bifurcation is justified. It is not irrational. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Corporate bonds have also done well, given the background of a falling risk-free rate. Will the current market bifurcation continue? Or will these segments in global financial markets recouple and in which direction? What To Watch China rather than the U.S. has been the epicenter of this slowdown, as we have argued repeatedly in the past. Hence, a major rally in global cyclical equities and EM risk assets all hinge on a recovery in the Chinese business cycle. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Even though Caixin’s PMI for China was slightly up in August, many other economic indicators remain downbeat: The latest hard economic data out of Asia suggest that global trade/manufacturing continues to contract. Korea’s total exports in August contracted by 12.5% from a year ago, and its shipments to China plunged by 20% (Chart I-6). The import sub-component of China’s manufacturing PMI is not showing signs of amelioration (Chart I-7). The mainland’s import recovery is very critical to a revival in global trade and manufacturing. Chart I-6Korean Exports: No Recovery Korean Exports: No Recovery Korean Exports: No Recovery Chart I-7Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chart I-8German Manufacturing Confidence German Manufacturing Confidence German Manufacturing Confidence German manufacturing IFO business expectations and current conditions both suggest that it is still early to bet on a global trade recovery (Chart I-8). Newly released August data points reveal that U.S., Taiwanese, and Swedish manufacturing new export orders continue to tumble. To gauge whether bifurcated markets will recouple and whether it will occur to the downside or the upside, investors should watch the relative performance of China-exposed markets, global cyclicals and high-beta plays – the ones that have already sold off substantially. The notion is as follows: These markets’ relative performance will likely bottom before their absolute performance recovers. If so, their relative performance will likely foretell the outlook for their absolute performance. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. In other words, they could sell off even if a global recession is avoided. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. To assess the outlook for global cyclicals and China-related plays, we are monitoring the following financial market indicators: The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. This ratio is making a new cyclical low (Chart I-9). Hence, it presently warrants a negative view on global growth, China’s industrial sector and commodities. Global cyclical equity sectors seem to be on the edge of breaking down versus defensives (Chart I-10). This ratio does not signal ameliorating global growth conditions. Chart I-9The Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c9 bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c9 Chart I-10Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-11U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 Finally, U.S. high-beta stocks continue to underperform the S&P 500 (Chart I-11). This is consistent with overall U.S. growth deceleration. Bottom Line: Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to foreshadow either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. Continue trading EM stocks and currencies on the short side, and underweighting EM risk assets versus DM. Our Investment Themes And Positions Some of our open positions often run for years because they reflect our long-standing themes. Our core theme has for some time been that a global trade/manufacturing recession will be generated by a growth relapse in China. To capitalize on this theme, we have been recommending a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys strategy since April 2017. This recommendation has produced a 25% gain since its initiation (Chart I-12). Continue betting on lower local interest rates in emerging economies where the central bank can cut rates despite currency depreciation. To implement this theme, we have been recommending receiving swap rates in Korea and Chile for the past several years. Our reluctance to recommend an outright buy on local bonds stems from our bearish view on both currencies – the Korean won and Chilean peso. In fact, we have been shorting both the KRW and the CLP against the U.S. dollar. Chart I-13 shows that swap rates in Korea and Chile have dropped substantially since our recommendations to receive rates in these countries. More rate cuts are forthcoming in these economies, and we are maintaining these positions. Chart I-12EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds Chart I-13Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile   We have been bearish on EM banks in general and Chinese banks in particular. We have expressed these themes in a number of ways: Short EM and Chinese / long U.S. bank stocks. Short EM banks / long EM consumer staples (Chart I-14). Within Chinese banks, we have been short Chinese medium and small banks / long large ones. All these strategies remain valid. In credit markets, we have been favoring U.S. corporate credit versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Ability to service debt is better among U.S. debtors than EM/Chinese borrowers. We have been playing this theme in the following ways: Underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit / overweight U.S. investment-grade corporates (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Chart I-15Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates   Underweight Asian high-yield corporate credit / overweight emerging Asian investment-grade corporates. As a bet on a deteriorating political and business climate in Hong Kong, in our Special Report on Hong Kong SAR from June 27, we reiterated the following positions: Short Hong Kong property stocks / long Singapore equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing The Mexican economy is heading into a full-blown recession. Most segments of the economy are in contraction, and leading indicators point to further downside. Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs are well below 50 (Chart II-1). Monetary policy remains too restrictive: Nominal and real interest rates are both very high and plunging narrow money (M1) growth is signaling  further downside in economic activity (Chart II-2). Chart II-1The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating Chart II-2Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth   An inverted yield curve signifies that the central bank is behind the curve and foreshadows growth contraction (Chart II-3). Fiscal policy has tightened as the government has remained committed to achieving a primary fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP in 2019 (Chart II-4, top panel). Consequently, nominal government expenditures have been curbed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The government’s fiscal stimulus has not been large and has been implemented too late. Chart II-3A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve Chart II-4Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot   Finally, business confidence is extremely low due to uncertainty over President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) policies towards the private sector. The president is attempting to revive business confidence, but it will take time. Chart II-5Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Our major theme for Mexico has been that both monetary and fiscal policies are very tight. Consequently, we have been recommending overweight positions in Mexican domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. (Chart II-5). Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Meanwhile, we have been favoring the Mexican peso relative to other EM currencies due to the fact that AMLO is not as negative for the country as was initially perceived by markets. With inflation falling and the Federal Reserve cutting rates, Banxico will ease further. Yet, it will likely cut rates slower than warranted by the economy. The longer the central bank takes to ease, the lower domestic bond yields will drop. Concerning sovereign credit, investors should remain overweight Mexico within an EM credit portfolio. Mexico’s fiscal position is healthier, and macroeconomic policies will be more prudent relative to what the market is currently pricing. We continue to believe concerns about Pemex’s financing and its impact on government debt are overblown, as we discussed in detail in our previous Special Report. In July, the government released an action plan for Pemex financing. We view this plan as marginally positive. To supplement this plan, the government can use the $14.5 billion federal budget stabilization fund to fill in financing shortfalls in the coming years. Importantly, the starting point of Mexican public debt is quite low, which will allow the government to finance Pemex in the years to come by borrowing more from markets. Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Lastly, our overweight recommendation in Mexican stocks has not played out. However, we are maintaining it for the following reasons: Chart II-6 illustrates that when Mexican domestic bond yields decline relative to EM ones (shown inverted on Chart II-6), Mexican share prices usually outperform their EM counterparts in common currency terms. Consistent with our view that Mexican local currency bonds will outperform their EM peers, we expect Mexican stocks to outpace the EM equity benchmark. The Mexican bourse’s relative performance against EM often swings with the relative performance of EM consumer staples versus the EM equity benchmark. This is due to the large share of consumer staples stocks in Mexico (34.5%) compared to that in the EM benchmark (7%). Consumer staples stocks are beginning to outpace the EM equity index, raising the odds of Mexican equity outperformance versus its EM peers (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Chart II-7Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse   We do not expect a major rally in this nation’s stock market given the negative growth outlook. Our bet is that Mexican share prices - having already deflated considerably - will drop less in dollar terms than the overall EM equity index. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Mexican sovereign credit, domestic bonds and equities relative to their respective EM benchmarks. The main risk to the Mexican peso stems from persisting selloff in EM currencies. Traders’ net long positions in the MXN are elevated posing non-trivial risk (Chart II-8). We have been long MXN versus ZAR but are taking profit today. This trade has generated a 9.7% gain since March 29, 2018. A plunging oil-gold ratio warrants a caution on this cross rate in the near term (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Chart II-9Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Coincident measures of economic activity suggest that China’s economy continued to slow in July. The August manufacturing PMIs were positive, but they more likely reflect tariff front-running activity than a genuine improvement in the export outlook. The decline in the RMB will have a positive reflationary effect for Chinese producers, but it will not likely be enough to prevent a further slowdown in activity if the export outlook continues to deteriorate (as we expect). Our investment strategy recommendations remain unchanged: underweight Chinese stocks over a tactical (i.e. 0-3 month) time horizon, but overweight cyclically (6-12 months) on the basis that policymakers will ultimately act on the need to ease further. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, coincident measures of economic activity suggest that China’s economy continued to slow in July. The August manufacturing PMIs were positive (especially the Caixin PMI), but the absence of a pickup in manufacturing outside of China suggests that the August improvement (and the recent trend in China’s export data) reflects the same kind of tariff front-running activity that has occurred on more than one occasion over the past 18 months (and which sharply unwound in late-2018 / early-2019). On the housing front, July’s update saw a narrowing in the gap between lofty housing construction and depressed sales volume, suggesting that housing-related activity is unlikely to provide a ballast to counter a weakening external demand outlook absent further policy support for the sector. Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Within financial markets, the continued decline in the RMB is the most noteworthy development, with USD-CNH having risen roughly 4.5% since we initiated our long position in mid-May. The still-controlled decline is likely to have a reflationary effect for Chinese producers, but not likely enough to prevent a further slowdown in activity if the export outlook continues to deteriorate in Q4 (as we expect). Consequently, our investment strategy recommendations remain unchanged: the near-term outlook remains bearish for China-related assets, but Chinese policymakers will be forced over the coming 3-6 months to recognize the need to ease further. Investors should remain overweight Chinese stocks over a 6-12 month horizon, but should continue to hedge RMB exposure by being long USD-CNH. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Chart 1The Chinese Economy Continues To Slow The Chinese Economy Continues To Slow The Chinese Economy Continues To Slow Based on coincident activity indicators such as the Li Keqiang index (LKI), China’s economy continued to slow in July (Chart 1). While the pace of growth remains stronger today than it did during the depths of the 2015/2016 slowdown, momentum is clearly negative and a further deceleration is likely over the coming few months. In short, Chinese growth has not yet bottomed. Our leading indicator for the LKI remains in a shallow uptrend, but slowed in July. The sequential decline occurred in nearly all of the components of the indicator; credit was particularly disappointing, with adjusted total social financing growth having decelerated nearly a half a percentage point on a YoY basis. Our indicator underscores that more easing will ultimately be needed in order to stabilize economic activity, even though we acknowledge that it will only likely arrive in piecemeal fashion until policymakers are pressured with a further significant slowdown in growth. The July housing data update was significant, as it featured a narrowing of the gap between lofty housing construction and depressed sales volume (Chart 2). While both the pace of pledged supplementary lending as well as sales volume growth marginally improved in July, floor space started decelerated to mid-single-digit territory (from 10+%). We have noted in several reports that the gap between starts and sales is unsustainable, suggesting that housing-related activity is unlikely to provide a ballast to counter a weakening external demand outlook absent further policy support. At first blush, China’s August PMIs were surprisingly positive. While the official manufacturing PMI slightly declined, the new export orders component improved as did the overall Caixin manufacturing PMI. The improvement in the latter was particularly significant, as it brought the index back into expansionary territory. However, our view of the pickup is less sanguine, and we expect it to reverse over the coming few months. August’s trade data has yet to be released, but the divergence between export and import growth in July provides a clue that the pickup in manufacturing/export sentiment is likely to be temporary. Ex-China, the global PMI has not meaningfully improved (Chart 3), which implies that the acceleration in Chinese export growth is indicative of the same kind of tariff front-running activity that has occurred on more than one occasion over the past 18 months (and which sharply unwound in late-2018 / early-2019). As a result, investors should view the near-term improvement in Chinese export-related data as a sign of an impending slowdown in trade activity, rather than an indication that the underlying trade situation is improving. Chart 2The Unsustainable Pace Of Housing Starts Is Slowing The Unsustainable Pace Of Housing Starts Is Slowing The Unsustainable Pace Of Housing Starts Is Slowing Chart 3China's August PMI Likely Reflects Tariff Front-Running China's August PMI Likely Reflects Tariff Front-Running China's August PMI Likely Reflects Tariff Front-Running Chart 4A-Shares Are Trading More Off Domestic Stimulus Odds Than Investable Stocks A-Shares Are Trading More Off Domestic Stimulus Odds Than Investable Stocks A-Shares Are Trading More Off Domestic Stimulus Odds Than Investable Stocks The most relevant high-level insight emanating from China’s equity markets continues to be the divergence in performance between investable and domestic stocks over the past three months. While investable stocks have trended lower due to the strong focus of foreign investors on the trade war, domestic stocks have moved sideways versus the global benchmark in US$ terms (Chart 4). To us, this suggests that domestic stocks are acting as a better barometer of domestic reflation than their investable peers and, for now, A-shares are acting as if reflationary efforts will just offset weak external demand. The likelihood of a further growth slowdown coupled with the reluctance of Chinese policymakers to aggressively stimulate implies that the domestic market is at risk of a near-term relapse, but global investors should watch closely for a breakout to the upside as an indication that policy is becoming considerably easier (and that investable stocks may soon follow the domestic market higher). Over the past month, sector performance within the investable equity market has mostly been along cyclical/defensive lines, with the former underperforming the latter. One notable exception is the investable consumer discretionary sector, which has risen more than 7% over the past month in absolute US$ terms, and has been rising in relative terms since the beginning of the year. Alibaba now accounts for a sizeable portion of the investable consumer discretionary sector, and its outperformance may be signaling a stable outlook for domestic consumer spending. China’s interbank and government bond market has been little changed over the past month. After having declined roughly 20 bps from late-July to early-August, Chinese government bond yields remain at a nearly 3-year low as part of ongoing investor expectations that monetary policy in China will remain easy. The PBOC’s mid-August reform of the loan prime rate (LPR) was a small step in the direction of further easing, but was not likely large enough to have a material impact on credit growth. More fiscal spending remains the most likely avenue for significant additional stimulus, but we do not expect it to materialize before economic activity slows further. Chart 5Onshore Corporate Bond Returns: Negligant Impact Of Defaults Onshore Corporate Bond Returns: Negligant Impact Of Defaults Onshore Corporate Bond Returns: Negligant Impact Of Defaults Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads fell slightly over the past month, reversing part of a modest uptrend in spreads that had begun in May. Abstracting from the day-to-day changes in spreads, the bigger story is that acute concerns over the potential for widespread corporate defaults have not led to any material impact on onshore corporate bond performance at any point over the past 18 months (which is in line with what we argued several times last year). In RMB terms the ChinaBond Corporate Bond Total Return Index has risen nearly 8% over the past year, or roughly 2.6% in unhedged US$ terms using spot exchange rates (Chart 5). While we would not advise an unhedged currency position in onshore corporate bonds at this time given our long stance towards USD-CNH, the bottom line for investors is that onshore corporate bond spreads already account for rising defaults, and probably overstate the risk. China’s controlled but very significant currency depreciation has continued over the past month, with USD-CNH having nearly reached 7.2 this week. Our earnings recession model for the MSCI China index suggests that the depreciation is likely to have a stimulative effect; holding the current pace of credit growth and the outlook for new export orders constant, the decline in the RMB has probably cut the odds of an ongoing contraction in EPS from roughly two-thirds to slightly over one-half over the past month. However, we noted above that the modest improvement in China’s manufacturing PMIs likely reflects unsustainable trade frontrunning, signaling that further stimulus will likely be required. This will have to come either through a more intense pace of credit growth, or meaningful further currency depreciation (or both). As such, investors should stay long USD-CNH for now, despite the significant rise over the past month. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights While a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence that plunges the global economy into recession cannot be excluded, it is far from our base case. Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is highly likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. The auto sector has been the main driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Go long auto stocks. As a countercyclical currency, the U.S. dollar will weaken once global growth picks up. We expect to upgrade EM and European equities later this year along with cyclical equity sectors such as industrials, energy, and materials. Financials should also benefit from steeper yield curves. We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Feature “The Democrats are trying to 'will' the Economy to be bad for purposes of the 2020 Election. Very Selfish!” – @realDonaldTrump, 19 August 2019 8:26 am “The Fake News Media is doing everything they can to crash the economy because they think that will be bad for me and my re-election” – @realDonaldTrump, 15 August 2019 9:52 am Bad Juju Chart 1Spike In Google Searches For The Word Recession A Psychological Recession? A Psychological Recession? President Trump’s remarks, made just a few days after the U.S. yield curve inverted, were no doubt meant to deflect attention away from the trade war, while providing cover for any economic weakness that might occur on his watch. But does the larger point still stand? Google searches for the word “recession” have spiked recently, even though underlying U.S. growth has remained robust (Chart 1). Could rising angst induce an actual recession? Theoretically, the answer is yes. A sudden drop in confidence can generate a self-fulfilling cycle where rising pessimism leads to less private-sector spending, higher unemployment, lower corporate profits, weaker stock prices, and ultimately, even deeper pessimism. Two things make such a vicious cycle more probable in the current environment. First, the value of risk assets is quite high in relation to GDP in many economies (Chart 2). This means that any pullback in equity prices or jump in credit spreads will have an outsized impact on financial conditions.   Chart 2The Total Market Value Of Risk Assets Is Elevated The Total Market Value Of Risk Assets Is Elevated The Total Market Value Of Risk Assets Is Elevated Chart 3Not Much Scope To Cut Rates Not Much Scope To Cut Rates Not Much Scope To Cut Rates Second, policymakers are currently more constrained in their ability to react to adverse shocks, such as an intensification of the trade war, than in the past. Interest rates in Europe and Japan are already at zero or in negative territory (Chart 3). Even in the U.S., the zero-lower bound constraint – though squishier than once believed – remains a formidable obstacle. Chart 4 shows that the Federal Reserve has cut rates by over five percentage points, on average, during past recessions. It would be impossible to cut rates by that much this time around if the U.S. economy were to experience a major downturn.   Chart 4The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound Fiscal stimulus could help buttress growth. However, both political and economic considerations are likely to limit the policy response. While China is stimulating its economy, concerns about excessively high debt levels have caused the authorities to adopt a reactive, tentative approach. Japan is set to raise the consumption tax on October 1st. Although a variety of offsetting measures will mitigate the impact on the Japanese economy, the net effect will still be a tightening of fiscal policy. Germany has mused over launching its own Green New Deal, but so far there has been a lot more talk than action. President Trump floated the idea of cutting payroll taxes, only to abandon it once it became clear that the Democrats were unwilling to go along. On The Positive Side Despite these clear risks, we are inclined to maintain our fairly sanguine 12-to-18 month global macro view. There are a number of reasons for this: First, the weakness in global manufacturing over the past 18 months has not infected the much larger service sector (Chart 5). Even in Germany, with its large manufacturing base, the service sector PMI remains above 50, and is actually higher than it was late last year. This suggests that the latest global slowdown is more akin to the 2015-16 episode than the 2007-08 or 2000-01 downturns. Chart 5AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 5BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Second, manufacturing activity should benefit from a turn in the inventory cycle over the remainder of the year. A slower pace of inventory accumulation shaved 90 basis points off of U.S. growth in the second quarter and is set to knock another 40 basis points from growth in the third quarter, according to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model. Excluding inventories, U.S. GDP growth would have been 3% in Q2 and is tracking at 2.7% in Q3 – a fairly healthy pace given the weak global backdrop (Chart 6). Chart 6The U.S. Economy Is Still Holding Up Well A Psychological Recession? A Psychological Recession? Outside the U.S., inventories are making a negative contribution to growth (Chart 7). In addition to the official data, this can be seen in the commentary accompanying the Markit manufacturing surveys, which suggest that many firms are liquidating inventories (Box 1). Falling inventory levels imply that sales are outstripping production, a state of affairs that cannot persist indefinitely. Third, and related to the point above, the automobile sector has been the key driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. This is in contrast to 2015-16, when the main culprit was declining energy capex. According to Wards, global vehicle production is down about 10% from year-ago levels, by far the biggest drop since the Great Recession (Chart 8). The drop in automobile production helps explain why the German economy has taken it on the chin recently. Chart 7Inventories Are Making A Negative Contribution To Growth Inventories Are Making A Negative Contribution To Growth Inventories Are Making A Negative Contribution To Growth Chart 8Auto Sector: The Culprit Behind The Manufacturing Slowdown Auto Sector: The Culprit Behind The Manufacturing Slowdown Auto Sector: The Culprit Behind The Manufacturing Slowdown Importantly, motor vehicle production growth has fallen more than sales growth, implying that inventory levels are coming down. Despite secular shifts in automobile ownership preferences, there is still plenty of upside to automobile usage. Per capita automobile ownership in China is only one-fifth of what it is in the United States, and one-fourth of what it is in Japan (Chart 9). This suggests that the recent drop in Chinese auto sales will be reversed. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Investors should consider going long automobile makers. Chart 10 shows that the All-Country World MSCI automobiles index is trading near its lows on both a forward P/E and price-to-book basis, and sports a juicy dividend yield of nearly 4%.1 Chart 9The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China Chart 10Auto Stocks Are A Compelling Buy A Psychological Recession? A Psychological Recession?   Fourth, our research has shown that globally, the neutral rate of interest is generally higher than widely believed. This means that monetary policy is currently stimulative, and will become even more accommodative as the Fed and a number of other central banks continue to cut rates. Remember that unemployment rates have been trending lower since the Great Recession and have continued falling even during the latest slowdown, implying that GDP growth has remained above trend (Chart 11). As diminished labor market slack causes inflation to rebound from today’s depressed levels, real policy rates will decline, leading to more spending through the economy.  Chart 11Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower The Trade War Remains The Biggest Risk The points discussed above will not matter much if the trade war spirals out of control. It is impossible to know what will happen for sure, but we can deduce the likely course of action based on the incentives that both sides face. President Trump has shown a clear tendency in recent weeks to try to de-escalate trade tensions whenever the stock market drops. This is not surprising: Despite his efforts to deflect blame for any selloff on others, he knows full well that many voters will blame him for losses in their 401(k) accounts and for slower domestic growth and rising unemployment. What about the Chinese? An increasing number of pundits have warmed up to the idea that China is more than willing to let the global economy crash if this means that Trump won’t be re-elected. If this is China’s true intention, the Chinese will resist making any deal, and could even try to escalate tensions as the U.S. election approaches. It is an intriguing thesis. However, it is not particularly plausible. U.S. goods exports to China account for 0.5% of U.S. GDP, while Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.4% of Chinese GDP. Total manufacturing value-added represents 29% of Chinese GDP, compared to 11% for the United States. There is no way that China could torpedo the U.S. economy without greatly hurting itself first. Any effort by China to undermine Trump’s re-election prospects would invite extreme retaliatory actions, including the invocation of the War Powers Act, which would make it onerous for U.S. companies to continue operating in China. Even if Trump loses the election, he could still wreak a lot of havoc on China during the time he has left in office. Moreover, as Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, has stressed, if Trump were to feel that he could not run for re-election on a strong economy, he would try to position himself as a “War President,” hoping that Americans rally around the flag. That would be a dangerous outcome for China.  Chart 12Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? In any case, it is not clear whether China would be better off with a Democrat as president. The popular betting site PredictIt currently gives Elizabeth Warren a 34% chance of winning, followed by Joe Biden with 26%, and Bernie Sanders with 15% (Chart 12). This means that two far-left candidates with protectionist leanings, who would stress environmental protection and human rights in their negotiations with China, have nearly twice as much support as the former Vice President. All this suggests that China has an incentive to de-escalate the trade war. Given that Trump also has an incentive to put the trade war on hiatus, some sort of détente between the U.S. and China, as well as between the U.S. and other players such as the EU, is more likely than not. Investment Conclusions Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is very likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. Since it might take a few more months for the data on global growth to improve, equities will remain in a choppy range in the near term, before moving higher later this year. As we discussed last week, the equity risk premium is quite high in the U.S., and even higher abroad, where valuations are generally cheaper and interest rates are lower (Chart 13).2 Chart 13AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 13BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency (Chart 14). If global growth picks up later this year, the greenback should begin to weaken. European and emerging market stocks have typically outperformed the global benchmark in an environment of rising global growth and a weakening dollar (Chart 15). We expect to upgrade EM and European equities – along with more cyclical sectors of the stock market such as industrials, materials, and energy – later this year. Chart 14The U.S. Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The U.S. Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The U.S. Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 15EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves     Thanks to the dovish shift by central banks around the world, government bond yields are unlikely to return to their 2018 highs anytime soon. Nevertheless, stronger economic growth should lift long-term yields at the margin, causing yield curves to steepen (Chart 16). Steeper yield curves will benefit beleaguered bank stocks. Chart 16Stronger Economic Growth Should Lift Long-Term Bond Yields, Causing Yield Curves To Steepen Stronger Economic Growth Should Lift Long-Term Bond Yields, Causing Yield Curves To Steepen Stronger Economic Growth Should Lift Long-Term Bond Yields, Causing Yield Curves To Steepen Finally, a word on gold: We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 Evidence of Inventory Liquidation In The Manufacturing Sector A Psychological Recession? A Psychological Recession? Footnotes 1 The top ten constituents of the MSCI ACWI Automobiles Index are Toyota (22.6%), General Motors (7.8%), Daimler (7.3%), Honda Motor (6.2%), Ford Motor (5.7%), Tesla (4.8%), Volkswagen (4.8%), BMW (3.8%), Ferrari (3.0%), Hyundai Motor (2.4%). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores A Psychological Recession? A Psychological Recession? Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades