Asia

Feature We spent the past two weeks visiting and exchanging views with our clients in Asia. We presented our view that the ongoing stimulus measures are beginning to bear fruit in terms of stabilizing China’s economic activity, and that we expect the economic slowdown to bottom early next year. In addition, Chinese policymakers are signaling their willingness to accelerate stimulus on both monetary and fiscal fronts, which should mitigate the downside risks and help the economy regain traction in 2020. Interestingly, our view sparked divergent responses: clients outside of China were more upbeat about the state of the Chinese economy than clients from mainland China.  While few investors we spoke to showed concerns over an imminent “hard landing” in China’s economy or systemic risk from China’s financial system, our mainland Chinese clients remain skeptical that the ongoing stimulus will be sufficient to revive the economy. They were also worried that financial regulations may be too restrictive to generate the amount of money growth needed for the economy. Another interesting observation was that while being pessimistic about the economy, our mainland Chinese investors share our assessment that Chinese domestic stocks still have some upside in the coming year. On the other hand, global investors, who are more sanguine about China’s economic recovery, prefer to wait on the sidelines before favoring Chinese investable stocks (Chart 1). Chart 1AA Tale Of Two Markets: Onshore Outperforms Global Markets... A Tale Of Two Markets: Onshore Outperforms Global Markets A Tale Of Two Markets: Onshore Outperforms Global Markets Chart 1B...While Offshore Underperforms ...While Offshore Underperforms ...While Offshore Underperforms Below we present some of the top questions that were posed by investors during our trip, along with our answers. We recap the conclusions of our view, and draw out the investment implications of the differences between the sentiments towards China’s equity markets, in the last question of the report. Q: Recent economic data suggests a weakening Chinese economy. Why do you think the economy will reach a bottom in 2020? Historically, China’s credit formation has consistently led economic activity by about three quarters (Chart 2).  Even though credit growth this year has not been as strong as in previous expansionary cycles, a turning point in the credit impulse occurred at the start of 2019. This suggests that economic activity should turn around within the next two quarters. Chart 2Expecting A Turn In Q1 2020 Expecting A Turn In Q1 2020 Expecting A Turn In Q1 2020 Chart 3Emerging Green Shoots Emerging Green Shoots Emerging Green Shoots   Furthermore, despite weakening headline economic data, some underlying components indicate promising improvements (Chart 3): Growth in infrastructure investment has ticked up modestly in the past couple months, and is set to improve further. The State Council mandated local governments to allocate the proceeds from special-purpose bond sales to infrastructure projects by the end of October. This, combined with a frontloading of next year’s local government bonds, should lend support to infrastructure spending in the coming months. After fluctuating in and out of contraction for a year, growth in auto manufacturing production picked up in August and remained positive through October. This improvement is due to less contraction in auto sales and a faster reduction in auto inventories. Moreover, electricity output surged in October, which also indicates that growth may be gaining momentum. Chart 4Trade Should Improve Into 2020 Trade Should Improve Into 2020 Trade Should Improve Into 2020 Lastly, global financial conditions have eased significantly and credit growth has picked up worldwide, which should help support global demand. Even though Sino-US trade negotiations are ongoing, our baseline view is that a “Phase One” trade deal will be inked in the next couple months. Eased trade tensions and even some rollbacks in the existing tariffs on Chinese export goods, coupled with improved global demand, should provide some tailwinds to China’s external sector (Chart 4). Q: What is your outlook on China’s economic policy for 2020? The Chinese economic growth model remains reliant on credit formation and capital investment. Therefore, the sustainability of an economic recovery depends on whether Chinese policymakers are willing to keep the stimulus wheel turning. Chart 5A Sign Of A Policy Shift A Sign Of A Policy Shift A Sign Of A Policy Shift For investors favoring China-related assets, the good news is that there has been an increasing urgency in policymakers’ tone to support economic growth since September. Capex growth from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has increasingly outpaced the private sector, which is significant:  A sustained rotation in the pace of SOE vis-à-vis private sector capex marked a turning point in the 2015-2016 cycle, when Chinese policymakers’ imperative to supporting growth outweighed their desire to continue with structural reforms (Chart 5).  We do not expect a 2016-style drastic rise in SOE capex growth next year, because the current economic slowdown is not as severe or prolonged as in 2015. Nonetheless, the rotation in capex growth is an important signal that Chinese policymakers may be more willing to stimulate the economy by again allowing the state sector to upstage the private sector. In the meantime, we expect that some pro-growth “policy adjustments” will be deployed in 2020: Chart 6Infrastructure Investment Likely To Rise Infrastructure Investment Likely To Rise Infrastructure Investment Likely To Rise Monetary policy will incrementally ease, with one to two 10-15bps loan prime rate (LPR) cuts in the next 3-6 months. At the same time, China’s central bank (PBoC) will keep bank liquidity ample and commercial banks’ funding costs relatively low, by continuing frequent liquidity injections to stabilize the interbank rate. A further cut in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is also highly likely. Keeping banks well capitalized will partially mitigate the pressure commercial banks face from falling profit margins and rising credit defaults. Accommodative monetary conditions will also support more stimulus on the fiscal front. We expect that the National People’s Congress in March 2020 will approve higher quotas on the issuing of local government bonds. Chinese state-owned commercial banks will continue to be the main buyers for local government bonds.  A portion of 2020 local government special-purpose bond issuance will be frontloaded to the remainder of 2019 and into the first months of next year. Relaxed capital requirements will likely boost local governments’ infrastructure project funding and expenditures. Our model suggests infrastructure spending should pick up from the current 3.3% year-on-year, to close to 7.5% in the second and third quarters next year (Chart 6). There are subtle signs that the government is starting to relax restrictions on the real estate sector. Land sales by local governments have increased since mid-2019, and the trend will continue into 2020 (Chart 7).  Income from land sales accounts for 70% of local government revenues, thus allowing more land sales should help fund a larger local government spending budget next year. Declining government subsidies to shantytown renovation (namely the Pledged Supplementary Lending, or PSL) have recently abated and will likely continue to improve (Chart 8). Chart 7Some Improvement To Come In The Real Estate Sector Some Improvement To Come In The Real Estate Sector Some Improvement To Come In The Real Estate Sector Chart 8Government Subsidies Will Continue Government Subsidies Will Continue Government Subsidies Will Continue   December’s Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) will set policy priorities for the following year. We think Chinese policymakers will make economic growth a top priority for 2020. Credit growth swelled in the first quarter of 2019 following the December 2018 CEWC, and we expect a surge in early 2020 as well.Due to the unusually high credit growth in January this year and the seasonal factor next year (Chinese New Year will fall in January 2020), the surge in credit growth, on a year-over-year basis, will more likely be muted until towards the end of the first quarter and into the second quarter. Investors should overweight Chinese investable stocks in the next 6-12 months, but need to watch for more positive signs to upgrade tactical stance. Beyond the second quarter, however, the outlook gets cloudier as tension from the US election heats up and President Trump may change his trade negotiation strategies with China.1 This may have implications on China’s domestic policies. But for now, our baseline view is that Chinese policymakers will incrementally accelerate the pace of economic stimulus throughout next year. Q:  Monetary policy has been accommodative for more than a year, but capex this year has fallen below market expectations compared with past cycles. How will further stimulus help to revive investment and economic growth next year? In short, our answer is this: interest rate cuts alone will not be enough to boost economic growth in China. Capex, and growth more generally, will only revive through synchronized policy support from the Chinese authorities. In a previous report2 we discussed that the lack of response to monetary easing has been due to a less effective monetary policy transmission mechanism, a reactive and reluctant central bank, and a debt-loaded corporate sector. More importantly, the “half-measured” stimulus has been preferred by Chinese authorities in this cycle, as they prioritized financial de-risking over growth and have significantly tightened financial regulations since 2016. Given the expected policy pivot to a more pro-growth stance in the coming year, the following underlines our conviction that capex should pick up in 2020.  Modern Money Theory (MMT), with Chinese characteristics:3 local governments will ramp up debt again, and this quasi-fiscal stimulus will be a key support to the economy in 2020. During the 2015-2016 cycle, aggressive interest cuts did not result in a significant uptick in credit growth. Bank lending was not the core driver for economic recovery in 2016. The economy only bottomed following an unprecedented issuance of local government bonds after mid-2015 (Chart 9).  Chinese authorities will keep a “back door” open: even though overall tight financial regulations will remain intact, we expect the PBoC to allow a more moderate contraction in shadow banking (Chart 10). This will provide smaller banks and enterprises access to tap into bank credit. Importantly, this means the government will acquiesce to local governments in providing extra funding through shadow banking. We already see local government financing vehicles (LGFV) making a comeback in recent months. Chart 9A Chinese Version Of MMT A Chinese Version Of MMT A Chinese Version Of MMT Chart 10The "Back Door" May Open Wider The "Back Door" May Open Wider The "Back Door" May Open Wider     Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will benefit from lowered financing costs through the new LPR system. As we pointed out in our previous report,4 the new LPR regime is not intended as much to expand bank credit as to help struggling SMEs survive economic hardships. This, along with tax cuts, should provide SMEs some relief from capital constraints. Q. CPI has been rising sharply and is above the government’s inflation target of 3%. Will inflation prevent the PBoC from maintaining an easy monetary policy? Chart 11PBoC Likely To Capitulate To Producer Deflation PBoC Likely To Capitulate To Producer Deflation PBoC Likely To Capitulate To Producer Deflation No. We think deflationary pressure in the industrial sector (measured by producer prices) poses a bigger threat to the economy, and that PBoC is more likely to loosen monetary policy than to tighten (Chart 11). Chart 12 shows that the recent surge in headline consumer prices has almost been entirely driven by soaring pork prices. There is compelling evidence from historical data that, unless core consumer price inflation also rises, climbing food prices alone will have a limited impact on PBoC policy (Chart 13). We think this approach is justified, as the necessity of “core feedthrough” is also what most central banks in the developed world look for when confronted with a detrimental supply shock. Chart 12Rising Pork Prices Have Driven Up Headline Inflation... Rising Pork Prices Have Driven Up Headline Inflation... Rising Pork Prices Have Driven Up Headline Inflation... Chart 13...But Won't Be Driving Up Interest Rates ...But Won't Be Driving Up Interest Rates ...But Won't Be Driving Up Interest Rates Chart 14A Wild Year For The RMB A Wild Year For The RMB A Wild Year For The RMB Core CPI has been trending downwards since February 2018, and there is no evidence to suggest that food prices will drive up core CPI inflation (Chart 13, bottom panel).  This, in combination with deflating producer prices, means that the probability of tighter monetary policy over the coming 6-9 months is extremely low. In fact, we expect, with high conviction, that the PBOC will guide the LPR lower in the coming months. Q: What is your view on the RMB for 2020? The RMB depreciated by 5% against the US dollar from its peak in February this year, mostly driven by market expectations of US tariffs imposed on Chinese export goods. Interest rate differentials, short-term capital flows, and economic fundamentals all have played much smaller roles in the RMB’s value changes (Chart 14). The depreciation in the CNY/USD this year has pushed the RMB close to two sigma below its long-term trend (Chart 15). As we expect a “Phase One” trade deal to be signed and trade tensions abating at least in the near term, the RMB will face upward pressure through the first half of 2020. The appreciation will also be supported by, although to a lesser extent, China’s improved domestic economy, rising demand for RMB-denominated assets, and a weakening US dollar (Chart 16). According to our model, the USD/CNY exchange rate can return to a 6.8-7.0 range, if a significant portion of the existing tariffs is rolled back (Chart 17).  This range seems to be within the “fair value” of the RMB, justifiable by the current China-US interest rate differential (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 15Has The RMB Gone Too Far? Has The RMB Gone Too Far? Has The RMB Gone Too Far? Chart 16Demand For RMB Assets On The Rise, Despite The Trade War Demand For RMB Assets On The Rise, Despite The Trade War Demand For RMB Assets On The Rise, Despite The Trade War However, it would not be in the PBoC’s best interests to let the RMB appreciate too rapidly, because an appreciating Chinese currency would act as a deflationary force on China’s export and manufacturing sectors.  The large differential in the China-US interest rates would allow PBoC to cut interest and/or RRR rates, to ease upward pressure on the RMB.   Chart 17Tariff Rollbacks Will Push Up RMB Tariff Rollbacks Will Push Up RMB Tariff Rollbacks Will Push Up RMB   Q: How should equity investors position themselves towards China over the coming year? We are bullish on Chinese investable stocks in the next 6 to 12 months, based on our view that the Chinese economy will bottom in the first quarter next year, policy will be incrementally more supportive, and a “Phase One” trade deal will be signed soon. In the very near term, however, we think downside risks to Chinese equities are not trivial. We remain a neutral tactical stance, but will continue to watch for the following signs before upgrading our tactical call from neutral to overweight.5 Chart 18A (top panel) shows that cyclical stocks remain very depressed relative to defensives, underscoring investors’ lack of confidence in the Chinese economy and trade negotiations. A breakout in cyclicals versus defensives would signify a major improvement in investor sentiment towards Chinese economic growth. An uptick in the relative performance of industrials and consumer staples (Chart 18A, bottom panel). The negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance between the two sectors may be a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. The relative performance trend remains off its recent low, which suggests that China’s existing policy stance has not yet turned more reflationary. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of healthcare and utility stocks (Chart 18B) would also be a bullish sign. Investable health care and utilities stocks have historically led China’s economic activity, core inflation and stock prices by 1-3 months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would signify that market participants anticipate a bottom in China’s economy. As we mentioned at the outset, we observed an interesting divergence in sentiment among our domestic versus global investors. This divergence is reflected in both the onshore and offshore stock markets; year to date, onshore A shares have outperformed global benchmarks by 5.6% (Chart 1, on page 1 of the report). Chart 18AWaiting For A Telltale Sign... Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Chart 18B...Before A Tactical Upgrade ...Before A Tactical Upgrade ...Before A Tactical Upgrade However, all of the outperformance in A shares occurred before end April, when the trade talks broke down and domestic credit expansion significantly slowed from the first quarter. Since May, the relative performance of A shares in US dollar terms has been mostly flat, reflecting the fact the markets were not expecting a significant stimulus forthcoming.  Chinese investable stocks, on the other hand, have been trading heavily on the day-to-day news surrounding the trade negotiations and have significantly underperformed both domestic A shares and global benchmarks. Therefore, our base case view of a trade truce coupled with an improved Chinese economy and more supportive policy near year, warrant a cyclical overweight stance favoring Chinese investable stocks over their domestic peers. Earnings from both onshore and offshore markets will benefit from a modest improvement in economic activity, but we think the investable market will benefit more from the trade truce and more upside growth potential. Stay tuned.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Is China Afraid Of The Big Bad Warren?" dated October 25, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, " Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 1): A Reluctant PBoC," dated July 10 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3We call it a “MMT” because China’s state-owned commercial banks own approximately 80% of local government bonds. The commercial banks are essentially backed by China’s central bank, which has a fiat currency system and can make independent monetary policy decisions. 4Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing," dated October 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated October 30, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Saudi Aramco likely will IPO 1-2% of the company next month on its local bourse; retail investors reportedly will get up to 0.5%. The IPO will value Aramco within a range estimated at less than $1 trillion to more than $2 trillion. China’s interest in Aramco goes back almost four years to when the IPO was first proffered. It reflects an economic and geopolitical calculus encompassing more than an equity claim on the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. Investing in Aramco gives it a stake in producing oil it desperately needs at home – as its imports from KSA attest – and supports its goal of filling some of the power vacuum left by the US pivot away from the Middle East (Chart of the Week). For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), stronger ties with China will ground its Asian marketing efforts, and deepen China’s stake in the unimpeded flow of its exports. With tensions in the Gulf remaining high, this is crucial. In addition to the mutuality of KSA’s and China’s interests, “patriotic participation” by Saudi investors will help push Aramco’s valuation close to $2 trillion. A post-IPO let-down – not unusual by any stretch – is likely. Feature Chart of the WeekChina’s Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge China's Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge China's Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge Dear Client, This week, BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy explore the Saudi Aramco IPO scheduled for next month and its larger implications for the global economy. In keeping with our tradition, we take a multidimensional approach – financial, economic and geopolitical – consistent with our unique analytical endowment. We trust you will find this report’s approach and analysis useful in shaping your convictions. Matt Gertken and Bob Ryan The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is in an all-out sprint to diversify its economy away from a near-total dependence on oil exports by 2030 (Chart 2). Time is short. The IPO of Saudi Aramco is the sine qua non of this effort, as it will fund the investment required to effect this transformation’s ambitious goals (Table 1, Chart 3). Investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities is attractive to China. Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Chart 2Breaking Oil Dependency... Breaking Oil Dependency... Breaking Oil Dependency... China is engaged in an all-out effort to become self-sufficient in oil and gas production, given the vulnerabilities in its hydrocarbon-supply chain.1 Chart 3...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 ...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 ...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 Local oil-industry executives doubt this is even remotely attainable, which is one reason we believe investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities via the Aramco IPO is so hugely attractive to China. It helps explain why policymakers sanctioned an investment of up to $10 billion in the IPO by various state-owned enterprises and funds.2 Given our expectation the IPO will value Aramco closer to $2 trillion than not, a 1-2% float would amount to between $20-$40 billion, meaning China – via its state-owned Silk Road Fund, Sinopec Group and China Investment Corp., et al – could account for as much as a quarter of the IPO if it prices out as we expect, and these state-owned investors pony up the full $10 billion being discussed in the press.3 Aramco’s Red Herring Released November 9, the Aramco Red Herring is as interesting for what it includes as what it leaves out.4 In the first six months of this year, Aramco production amounted to 13.2mm b/d of oil equivalent, 10.0mm b/d of which was crude oil and condensates. This was down slightly from the 13.6mm b/d of oil equivalent produced last year. The company notes that in 2016-18, it accounted for 12.5% of global crude output, and that its proved liquids reserves were “approximately five times larger than the combined proved liquids reserves of the Five Major IOCs,” or independent oil companies. Aramco’s 3.1mm b/d of refining capacity makes it the fourth largest integrated refiner in the world. In 2018, Aramco’s free cash flow amounted to almost $86 billion. Net income last year was $111 billion, more than the combined profits of the next six largest oil companies in the world (Chart 4). For its first year as a public company, Aramco has indicated it will pay an annual dividend of $75 billion. Investors will not know how that translates to a dividend yield until the actual number of shares floated is known. Chart 4Aramco Profitability Is Huge Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Chart 5Aramco Absorbs Most Of OPEC 2.0’s Production Cuts, Outside Iran, Venezuela Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China The Red Herring foresees a compound annual growth rate in demand for the Kingdom’s oil, condensate and natural-gas liquids output of 0.9% p.a. between 2015 and 2025. Demand growth is expected to level off some time around 2035. In this baseline scenario, Aramco sees itself gaining market share globally over this period. In an alternative scenario, the company notes that if there is “a more rapid transition away from fossil fuels,” which sees demand for its hydrocarbons starting to decline in the late 2020s, “the Kingdom’s share of global supply is also expected to increase through 2050.” Saudi Arabia and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, the producer coalition formed at the end of 2016 to manage global oil supply growth, following a market-share war launched by OPEC in 2014. The coalition has an agreement in place to keep 1.2mm b/d of production off the market until the end of 1Q20. The Kingdom, via Aramco, has been shouldering the lion’s share of OPEC 2.0’s production restraint, outside of Iran and Venezuela, which have seen their production and exports slide due to US sanctions (Chart 5). On Wednesday, KSA informed OPEC (the original Cartel) the IPO of Aramco would not affect its commitments under the OPEC 2.0 deal.5 The IPO Will Bring KSA And China Closer China has been keen to invest in Aramco since the IPO was first floated almost four years ago. This reflects an economic and a geopolitical calculus encompassing more than simply securing an equity claim in the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. An Aramco investment gives China a stake in producing oil it critically needs at home. China’s oil demand has been growing while its domestic production has been stagnating for the most part, despite the new-found emphasis on becoming self-sufficient. This is reflected in surging imports – totaling just over 10mm b/d in September, an 11% increase over August levels. China’s oil demand is expected to grow ~ 3.5% this year and next, averaging ~ 14.8mm b/d. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) estimates China’s oil demand will peak in 2030 at 16.5mm b/d.6 China’s vulnerability to oil imports – caused by its rising import dependency and US maritime supremacy – has prompted President Xi to order increased exploration and production domestically. The trade war and US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela – two long-time crude-oil suppliers to China – drove this point home: Imports from Iran fell 46% y/y in the January – September period to 357k b/d, while imports from Venezuela fell 15% to 306k b/d.7 For its part, KSA views China as one of its primary growth markets, as its Red Herring attests. It will be investing in additional refining capacity there and view the market as key to its petchems growth. “The Company’s strategy is to continue increasing its in-Kingdom refining capability and expand its strategically integrated downstream business in high-growth economies, such as China, India and Southeast Asia, while maintaining its current participation in material demand centers, such as the United States, and countries that rely on importing crude oil, such as Japan and South Korea.” Both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement. Net, both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement, which the IPO will foster. It is not inconceivable representatives from Chinese state-owned or –affiliated entities could sit on Aramco’s board, which would provide even “greater assurance over its crude oil and refined product supplies going forward,” as we noted in a Special Report published in November 2017.8 This is a critical concern for China, with domestic production stagnating and demand for crude oil, refined products and petchems increasing. Evolution Of China’s Middle East Role While China’s involvement in the Middle East has steadily been growing in energy, trade and investment generally, it has espoused “a vision of a multipolar order in the Middle East based on non-interference in, and partnerships with, other states – one in which the country will promote stability through ‘developmental peace’ rather than the Western notion of ‘democratic peace’,” according to a recent paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations.9 China’s growing interest in the Middle East is fundamentally supportive of the Gulf Arab reform agendas. But geopolitical risk is still elevated in this region (Chart 6), especially over the one- to three-year time frame. This is primarily due to the far-from-settled conflicts between the US and China and the US and Iran. First take the US-China conflict as it pertains to the Middle East. As China’s economy has boomed, so has its import dependency. Over the past two decades Beijing's reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil has ballooned (Chart 7). The result is a deep strategic vulnerability for China. Economic and political stability depend on sea lanes that are, from China’s perspective, implicitly threatened by the United States and its allied maritime powers. Chart 6Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Chart 7Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Hence Beijing has devoted ever greater efforts over the past two decades to building a blue-water navy charged with securing its “lifeline” running from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to China’s hungry coastal cities (Map 1). This naval development is a disruptive process, as the US, Japan, Australia and others are seeking to maintain control of the Indo-Pacific seas along with China’s rivals like India. Map 1The Belt And Road Program Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Until recently, Beijing proceeded carefully in order not to galvanize efforts to oppose its growing influence. It has only timidly begun establishing forward military bases abroad — namely in Djibouti, Africa — and its activity at key civilian ports such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, is developing only gradually. The creation of a new “maritime Silk Road” is a long, drawn-out affair. However, slowly but surely Beijing aims to lessen its vulnerability to the US at strategic chokepoints like Malacca and the Persian Gulf. The US and allies will respond — and this will generate geopolitical risk. Thus naval conflict is a persistent “Black Swan” risk. China’s chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region. Second comes the US-Iran conflict as it pertains to China. In response to US sanctions against Iran, China has had to increase its oil imports from Arab Gulf states. Beijing — inherently a continental power — is seeking overland routes of trade and investment to acquire Siberian, central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources, which cannot be interdicted by the US. Hence the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Still Limits China’s Middle East Options The BRI is the umbrella term for a process that began in the 2000s. China recycles its large current account surpluses into land and resources in the rest of Asia so as to maximize supply lines and diversify its savings away from US Treasurys (Chart 8). This is also a way for Beijing to export its industrial overcapacity, particularly in construction. This BRI process faces an important limitation in that Beijing’s current account surpluses have drastically declined (Chart 9). Even so, this decline will result in greater concentration on strategic targets. The Middle East is vital both because its energy could someday be accessed overland and because it could serve as an export market in itself. It could also become a way-station for greater trade to Europe and all of Eurasia. Chart 8China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys Chart 9China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments The instability of BRI countries delays China’s plans for regional investment, construction, transportation, and logistics. And China lacks the appetite for overseas political and military intervention necessary to shape the domestic environment in the relevant countries — especially given that the US remains the dominant power. China’s limited agency in Iraq is case in point. It is even severely limited in allied countries like Pakistan. And it has rocky relations with some of the key regional powers, such as Turkey. Chart 10 Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Yet the chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region and specifically its conflict with Iran. US foreign policy keeps Iran isolated and frequently forces China to impose sanctions. Since the Trump administration imposed “maximum pressure” on Iran, in May 2019, Beijing has drastically reduced oil imports and withdrawn from the $5 billion South Pars natural gas project (Chart 10). This was partly prompted by Washington’s use of secondary sanctions that threatened to cripple China’s leading tech companies for violating Iranian sanctions. Iran’s inability to open up to the outside world prevents China from fully executing its broader overland strategy. China is not yet capable of confronting Washington over Iran. The 2020 US election is therefore a critical juncture — the re-election of the Trump administration would likely prolong the current conflict with Iran. It is unlikely to lead to full-scale war, but that scenario cannot be fully ruled out given Trump’s lack of constraints in a second term. Whereas a new Democratic administration would almost certainly return to the Obama administration policy of détente with Iran, aimed at containing the country’s nuclear program in exchange for economic opening. Either way, Beijing faces a multi-year period in which it must prepare for US pressure on the high seas and possibly also in Iran. GCC’s Attraction To China The above considerations provide a clear reason for Beijing to deepen its relations with the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These states are increasingly attracted to China not only as an energy customer and investor but also as a provider of high-tech goods, arms, and telecom equipment that is necessary for their productivity and useful for their surveillance and repression of domestic dissent. Deepening its trade relationship with KSA via a meaningful equity position in Aramco would present the perfect opportunity for China to take a meaningful step toward establishing the yuan as a global reserve currency. If KSA and the other GCC states begin accepting yuan as payment for their oil and products, and they begin spending their yuan on Chinese-made goods and services, two-way trade could expand significantly and rapidly. The RMB doesn’t have to be fully convertible to USD or euros for that to happen. Such a yuan-trading bloc would encompass oil and refined products, natural gas and liquids, and goods and services made in the GCC and China. This bilateral trade would provide a base from which to build out the yuan as a global reserve currency. This would neither be a forced evolution nor a hurried one. It would naturally evolve, which would ensure its durability. The US may attempt to prevent China from gaining influence in this way, but that would require a concerted effort. And such an effort is not likely to develop until 2021 or 2022 at the earliest. It will depend on the US election outcome, the 2020-24 administration’s foreign policy, and US-China negotiations. Hence China’s evolving role is positive for its supply security as well as for the reform agendas of the Gulf Arab states as they attempt to shift away from oil dependency. The problem is that China cannot ultimately guarantee the stability of the Arab states while they reform. China and Europe are energy importers that require stability in the Mideast, while Russia and increasingly the US are energy producers that can take actions to destabilize the region — the US by partially withdrawing, Russia by reinserting itself. Chart 11US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East True, the US still broadly shares with China the desire for stable oil prices — but its growing energy independence gives it the ability to reduce its commitments, upset the status quo, and create power vacuums that are detrimental to stability until a new regional equilibrium is established. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have demonstrated this erratic tendency (Chart 11). Russia has gotten closer to China, but it also is regaining strategic influence in the Middle East and has an interest in keeping the region divided and unpredictable. This is advantageous for an oil exporter outside the region with direct overland access to the Chinese market, but not advantageous for China. The above situation encapsulates the Geopolitical Strategy theme of multipolarity, or great power competition. The Middle East is in transition and the US strategic deleveraging ensures there will not be a stable order in the near term. Chinese investment can increase the region’s economic diversification, productivity, and potential GDP. But China’s financial limitations, US foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and the region’s chronic instability will jeopardize those positive effects. Bottom Line: China’s influence in the Middle East is growing, particularly with the Gulf Arab states. However, this process exists within the context of competition with a number of other powers, ensuring that the Gulf Arab states still face extreme uncertainty and instability in attempting to reform. The US election is a critical juncture for US policy toward Iran and hence for the Mideast and China. While the US conflict with China will wax and wane across future administrations, the 2020 election will determine whether the US conflict with Iran gets better or worse in the next 1 – 3 years. Ultimately, we would expect the US to focus on pressuring China. But its latent strength in the Middle East is a tool for doing so. China’s growing role in the region will not ensure stability.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1High Anxiety: The Trade War and China’s Oil and Gas Supply Security, by Dr. Erica Downs, provides an excellent analysis of President Xi Jinping’s all-out drive to make China self-sufficient in oil and gas. It was published by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy November 12, 2019. The drive toward oil and gas self-sufficiency is described in local media as a war, as Dr. Downs notes: “In August 2018, (China National Petroleum Corp.) leaders met to discuss Xi’s directive and agreed to launch a ‘major offensive war’ on domestic exploration and development to enhance national energy security.” 2 Please see Chinese state firms mull up to US$10 billion investment in Saudi oil giant Aramco’s IPO published by the South China Morning Post November 7, 2019. The article also notes the Russian Direct Investment Fund also is considering taking a stake in the IPO. 3 $2.27 trillion is the upper end of a range generated by Bank of America. Please see Some banks dealing with Saudi Aramco IPO say company may be worth $1.5 trillion or even less, published by The Japan Times November 4, 2019, for additional estimates from banks involved in the deal. 4 The company’s 658-page prospectus also details business risks including terrorism, the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, and market-related financial risks. Not included is the size of the float – presumably that will be sized based on bids received – and how much of it will be allocated to individuals vs. institutions, who will be bidding for shares from November 17th to the 28th, and from the 17th to Dec. 4, respectively, when the issue is expected to price. The shares could be trading on December 11, 2019, on the Saudi stock Exchange, the Tadawul. No mention is made of a listing on an international exchange – e.g., London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, New York. 5 Please see OPEC says Saudi gave assurances Aramco IPO won’t affect commitment to group deals published November 13, 2019, by uk.reuters.com. 6 Please see Glimpses of China’s energy future, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in September 2019. The Institute summarized CNPC’s 2050 outlook to derive these estimates. 7 Please see footnote 1 above. 8 Please see ضد الواسطة , an Arabic phrase meaning “Against Wasta,” a practice that roughly translates as reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. This Special Report was published November 16, 2017, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see China’s Great Game In The Middle East, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations in October. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift

Dear Client, Over the past two weeks, I have been in Asia visiting BCA’s clients. Next week’s Report, on November 20 will be a recap of my observations from the road. This week we are sending you a Special Report on global semiconductor stock performance published by our Emerging Markets Strategy service, authored by my colleague Ellen JingYuan He.  This Special Report offers great insights on the development of 5G network industry, global demand beyond 5G smartphones, as well as investment implications derived from the research. I hope you find it interesting and insightful. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights Since early this year, global semiconductor stock prices have been front-running a demand recovery that has not yet begun. There is strong industry optimism surrounding a potential demand boost for semiconductors from the rollout of 5G networks and phones in 2020. Yet we expect actual 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments to fall considerably short of what industry observers expect, especially in the first half of the year. Global semiconductor stocks are over-hyped. Even though momentum could push them higher in the short term, we believe there will be a better entry point in the coming months. Given that Korean semiconductor stocks have lagged, we are upgrading Korean tech stocks and the KOSPI to overweight within the EM equity benchmark. Feature Global semiconductor stock prices have been rallying strongly, increasingly diverging from global semiconductor sales since early January. The former have risen to new highs, while the latter have remained in deep contraction (Chart 1). Chart 1A Puzzle: Semiconductors Stock Prices Skyrocketed When Sales Remain In A Deep Contraction Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices A Puzzle: Semiconductors Stock Prices Skyrocketed When Sales Remain In A Deep Contraction Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices A Puzzle: Semiconductors Stock Prices Skyrocketed When Sales Remain In A Deep Contraction We are puzzled by such a dramatic divergence between share prices and the industry’s top line. After all, the ongoing contraction in worldwide semiconductor sales has been broad-based across both regions and the majority of top 10 semiconductor companies (Charts 2 and 3). Chart 2A Broad-Based Contraction Across All Regions… A Broad-Based Contraction Across All Regions... A Broad-Based Contraction Across All Regions... Chart 3…And Most Top Semiconductor Companies ...And Most Top Semiconductor Companies ...And Most Top Semiconductor Companies   In our June1 report, we argued that world semiconductor sales would continue to shrink through the remainder of 2019. This view has played out, but global semiconductor share prices have surged and outperformed the global equity benchmark.  Global semiconductor stock prices have been front-running a demand recovery that has not yet begun. It seems the market has been looking beyond the current weakness. It currently expects a potential demand boost for semiconductors from 5G phones in 2020 on the back of rising hopes of a US-China trade conflict resolution. Is such hype about 5G network and corresponding shipments justified? Our research leads us to contend that global semiconductor sales will likely post only low- to middle-single-digit growth in 2020, with most of the recovery back loaded in the second half of the year. Hype over 5G phones among industry participants and investors may continue pushing semiconductor share prices higher in the near term. However, the odds are that the reality of tepid semiconductor sales growth will likely set in early next year, and semiconductor stocks will correct considerably. In short, we do not recommend chasing the rally. There will be a better entry point in the months ahead. 5G-Smartphones: The Savior Of Semiconductor Demand? Chart 4Semiconductor Sales Are Still Contracting At A Double-Digit Rate Strong Global 5G-Smartphone Shipments In 2020? Strong Global 5G-Smartphone Shipments In 2020? The primary driver behind the rally in semiconductor share prices is strong optimism among major semiconductor producers and investors about a rapid ramp-up of global 5G-smartphone adoption. In addition, the market is also holding onto a good amount of hope for a US-China trade conflict resolution, which will also facilitate the pace of global 5G deployment. Mobile phones account for the largest share (29%) of global semiconductor revenue. The industry expects strong global 5G-smartphone shipments in 2020 to spur a meaningful recovery in semiconductor demand (Chart 4). Table 1 shows a list of estimates for 2020 global 5G-smartphone shipments by major semiconductor companies, industry analysts and investors, ranging from 120 million to 225 million units, with a mean of 180 million units. Table 1Market Forecasts Of In 2020 Global 5G-Smartphone Shipments Semiconductor Stocks: Is The 5G Hype Warranted? Semiconductor Stocks: Is The 5G Hype Warranted? In particular, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest dedicated integrated circuit (IC) foundry, recently almost doubled its forecast for 5G smartphone penetration for 2020 to a mid-teen percentage from a single-digit percentage forecast made just six months ago. Given that global smartphone shipments currently stand at roughly 1.4 billion units per year, a 15% penetration rate would translate into 210 million units of 5G smartphone shipments in 2020. Meanwhile, Qualcomm, the world's largest maker of mobile application processors and baseband modems, last week predicted that 2020 global 5G smartphone shipments will range between 175 million units and 225 million units. We agree that 5G smartphone sales in 2020 will increase sharply from currently very low levels, but we also believe the penetration pace estimated by the industry is optimistic. The basis for our conclusion is as follows: Chart 5So Far, China 5G-Adoption Pace Has Been Much Slower Than Its 4G So Far, China 5G-Adoption Pace Has Been Much Slower Than Its 4G So Far, China 5G-Adoption Pace Has Been Much Slower Than Its 4G 5G-smartphone shipments in China will largely determine the pace of worldwide 5G-phone shipments. The country will be the world leader in the 5G smartphone market due to the government’s promotion of it and the advanced 5G technology held by China's largest telecom equipment producer, Huawei. China announced the debut of the 5G-era on June 6. Since then, total 5G-smartphone shipments have been only about 800,000 units through the end of September. In terms of the pace of penetration (5G-smartphone shipments as a share of total mobile phone shipments during the first three months of launch), the rate was a mere 0.3%. In comparison with the debut of the 4G-era in December 2013, shipments of 4G phones in China were significantly larger, and their adoption rate was much faster (Chart 5). During the first three months of the 4G launch, 4G phone shipments were 9.7 million units, reaching 10% of total smartphone shipments. Here are the most important reasons behind what will be a much slower penetration pace for 5G smartphones in China compared with the 4G rollout. We agree that 5G smartphone sales in 2020 will increase sharply from currently very low levels, but we also believe the penetration pace estimated by the industry is optimistic. Market saturation: The Chinese smartphone market has become much more saturated than it was six years ago when 4G was launched. Since then, there have been about 2.3 billion units of 4G smartphones sold, with 1.3 billion units sold in the past three years – nearly equaling the total Chinese population. This means the replacement need in China is low. High prices: 5G smartphones in China are currently much more expensive than 4G ones. 5G phone prices range from RMB 4000-7000 in China, while most of the 4G ones sell within the range of RMB 1000-3000. According to data from QuestMobile, a professional big data intelligence service provider in China's mobile internet market, in the first half of 2019, about 41% of smartphones were sold at RMB 1000-2000, about 30% at RMB 2000-3000, and only 10% at RMB 4000 and above. Functionality: At the moment, except for faster data download/upload speed, 5G smartphones do not offer much more functionality than 4G ones. Back in 2014, 4G phones had much more attractive features than 3G. For example, while 3G smartphones only allowed audio and picture transmission, those with 4G enabled video chatting and high-quality streaming video. In addition, for now, there are very few smartphone apps that can only be used for 5G phones. 5G Infrastructure: Presently, there is only very limited geographical coverage of 5G base stations. The number of 5G base stations is estimated to be 130 thousand units this year, only accounting for 1.6% of total base stations in China. In comparison, 65% of all Chinese base stations are 4G-enabled.  Meanwhile, to cover the same region, the number of 5G base stations needs to at least double that of 4G ones. It will take at a minimum two or three years to develop decent coverage of 5G base stations. Besides, the cost of building 5G-enabled infrastructure is much more expensive than the deployment of the 4G ones. There are two types of 5G networks: Non-standalone (NSA) and Standalone (SA). The 5G data transmission speed is significantly faster in SA mode than in NSA mode. However, the deployment cost of the SA network is much higher than the cost for NSA networks, as the latter can be built from existing 4G networks, but the former cannot. Critically, the Chinese government recently announced only SA-compatible 5G smartphones will be allowed to have access to the 5G network in China, starting January 1, 2020. This signals that the focus of future 5G network development will be centered around SA mode instead of this year’s NSA mode. Over 90% of China’s 5G network was NSA mode in 2019. Building a 5G SA network will take longer and cost more.  The market expects China to build as much as 1 million units of 5G base stations in 2020. Even if this goal is achieved, it only accounts for about 11% of total Chinese base stations. Chart 6Chinese Smartphone Sales: Still In Contraction Chinese Smartphone Sales: Still In Contraction Chinese Smartphone Sales: Still In Contraction Lack of variety of SA-compatible 5G-phone models. There are also limited options for SA-compatible 5G smartphones models. So far, even though Huawei, Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, ZTE and Samsung have all released 5G smartphones, only models from Huawei work under SA networks.2 All others only work under the NSA network. Hence, the variety of SA-compatible 5G phone models is very limited. This will likely delay sales of 5G phones in China. Many more models of SA-compatible 5G smartphones will likely be released only in the second half of next year, which may both drive down 5G smartphone prices and attract more buyers. Consumer spending slowdown: 4G smartphones can meet the needs of the majority of users, and most users have purchased a new phone within the past three years. With elevated economic uncertainty and slowing income growth, a larger proportion of people in China may decide to delay upgrading from 4G-phones to much more expensive 5G ones. This echoes a continuing decline in Chinese smartphone sales (Chart 6). Overall, from Chinese consumers’ perspective, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a nice-to-have, but not a must-have. Given all the aforementioned factors, our best guess for 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments is 40-60 million units, with a larger proportion occurring in the second half of the year.  From Chinese consumers’ perspective, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a nice-to-have, but not a must-have. As China is much more aggressive in moving to 5G network adaptation than other large economies, we share industry experts’ forecasts that China will account for 50% of total global 5G shipments. Provided our estimate for China is about 50 million units, our global forecast for 5G phone shipments in 2020 comes to about 100 million units worldwide. This is substantially lower than industry and analyst average estimates of 180 million units (see Table 1 on page 4). Notably, rising 5G smartphone sales will cannibalize some 4G-phone demand. Consequently, aggregate demand for semiconductors will not grow, but the share of high-valued-added chips in the overall product mix will rise. Bottom Line: The penetration pace of 5G smartphones will be meaningfully slower than both the semiconductor producers and analysts expect. Most likely, a meaningful recovery in global aggregate smartphone sales will not occur over the next six months. We suspect the positive impact of 5G phone sales will be felt by global semiconductor producers largely in the second half of 2020. Semiconductor Demand Beyond 5G In terms of end usage, except smartphones, the top five end uses for semiconductors are personal computers (PCs) (12%), servers (11%), diverse consumer products (12%), automotive (10%), and industrial electronics (9%). Structural PC demand is down, but sales have been more or less flat in the past three years (Chart 7). Next year, commercial demand may accelerate as enterprises work through the remainder of their Windows 10 migration. However, household demand is still facing strong competition from tablets. Overall, we expect PC demand to remain stagnant. Global server shipments sank deeper into contraction in the second quarter of this year due to a slowdown in purchasing from cloud providers and hyperscale customers. They may stay in moderate contraction over the next six months as global economic uncertainty remain elevated, which may discourage enterprises’ investment plans (Chart 8). Chart 7Structural PC Demand Is Stagnant And Will Remain So In 2020 Global PCs Sales: Deeply Saturated Structural PC Demand: Remain Stagnant In 2020 Global PCs Sales: Deeply Saturated Structural PC Demand: Remain Stagnant In 2020 Chart 8Global Server Shipments: A Moderate Contraction In 2020 Global Server Shipment: Are In Contraction Global Server Shipments: Moderate Contraction In 2020 Global Server Shipment: Are In Contraction Global Server Shipments: Moderate Contraction In 2020 Chart 9Automotive-Related Semiconductor Demand: A Moderate Growth Ahead Automotive-Related Semiconductor Demand: A Moderate Growth Ahead Automotive-Related Semiconductor Demand: A Moderate Growth Ahead Chinese auto sales – about 30% of the world total – will likely stage a rate-of-change improvement, moving from deep to mild contraction or stagnation over the next six months.3 Increasing penetration of new energy vehicles and continuing 5G deployment may still result in moderate growth in auto-related semiconductor demand (Chart 9). Semiconductor demand from diverse consumer products slightly declined in the third quarter, with robust growth in tablets, eReaders and portable navigation devices, and contraction in all other subsectors including TV sets, gaming, printers and images, cameras and set-top boxes (Chart 10). This may remain in slight contraction or stagnation over the next three to six months. Automation and 5G deployment will likely continue to increase semiconductor sales in the industrial sector (Chart 11).  Chart 10Semiconductor Demand From Consumer Products: A Slight Contraction Or Stagnation Ahead Semiconductor Stocks: Is The 5G Hype Warranted? Semiconductor Stocks: Is The 5G Hype Warranted? Chart 11Industrial Semiconductor Demand: More Upside Ahead Industrial Semiconductor Demand: More Upside Ahead Industrial Semiconductor Demand: More Upside Ahead   Chart 12Memory Prices Still Signal Sluggish Semiconductor Demand Memory Prices Still Signal Sluggish Semiconductor Demand Memory Prices Still Signal Sluggish Semiconductor Demand Overall, demand recovery has not yet begun. The lack of price recovery in DRAM prices after 18 months of declines and still-low NAND prices are also signaling sluggish semiconductor demand (Chart 12). Bottom Line: Odds are that global semiconductor demand in sectors other than smartphones will show improvement in terms of rate of change, but will still likely be flat in 2020. TSMC Sales: A Harbinger Of Industry Recovery? TSMC, the world’s biggest semiconductor company, posted a revival in sales over four consecutive months from June to September. Do TSMC sales lead global semiconductor sales? The answer is not always. TSMC sales do not always correlate well with global semiconductor sales (Chart 13). For example, TSMC sales diverged from global semiconductor sales in 2017-‘18 and 2013-‘14. So what are the reasons for strong increase in TSMC sales? First, it reflects market share rotation in the global smartphone market in favor of smartphone producers that use TSMC-fabricated chips. Chart 13TSMC Sales Do Not Always Lead Global Semiconductor Sales TSMC Sales Do Not Always Lead Global Semiconductor Sales TSMC Sales Do Not Always Lead Global Semiconductor Sales Demand from the global smartphone sector contributes to almost half of TSMC’s total revenue. Apple and Huawei are TSMC’s two top customers. The most recent report from market research firm Canalys shows that while Apple’s smartphone shipments declined 7% year-on-year last quarter, Huawei’s shipments soared 29%.4 Combined, smartphone shipments from these two companies still jumped nearly 12% year-on-year in the third quarter of the year. This has increased their market share in the global smartphone market to 31% now from 28% a year ago. Second, rising TSMC sales also reflect market share rotation in the global server market, in particular rising shipments and growing market share of servers using AMD high-performing-computing (HPC) chips instead of Intel ones. AMD’s 7nm Epyc CPU, launched this August and manufactured by TSMC, has been taking share from Intel in the global server market. This has driven the increase in TSMC’s revenue from the HPC sector.  Third, the share of value-added products (high-end chips) in TSMC’s product mix has been rising rapidly. TSMC’s share of revenue from 7nm technology jumped from 21% to 27% in the third quarter, as most of Apple’s and Huawei’s chips and all of AMD’s Epyc CPUs are 7nm-based. Back in the third quarter of 2018, TSMC’s 7nm business only accounted for 11% of its total revenue. Chart 14Both TSMC Sales And Taiwanese PMI Could Continue To Improve While Global Semiconductor Sales Remain In Contraction Both TSMC Sales And Taiwanese PMI Could Continue To Improve While Global Semiconductor Sales Remain In Contraction Both TSMC Sales And Taiwanese PMI Could Continue To Improve While Global Semiconductor Sales Remain In Contraction Finally, although internet of things (IoT) and automotive chips only account for 9% and 4% of TSMC’s total share of revenue respectively, strong growth in both segments –33% year-on-year in IoT and 20% year-on-year in automotive – indeed shows exceptional demand in these two sectors in a weakening global economic environment. As IoT and automotive development will highly rely on global 5G infrastructure development, their impact will be meaningful once the global 5G network becomes well advanced and widely installed. To conclude, while a 40% boost in TSMC’s capital spending indeed paints a positive picture on global semiconductor demand over the longer term, rising TSMC sales do not mean an imminent and strong recovery in the global semiconductor sector is in the works. Huawei is the global 5G technology leader and the major supplier in both 5G-network equipment and 5G smartphones; the company will be a major revenue contributor to TSMC. As Huawei will likely place more orders to TSMC for chip fabrication, this will likely result in further improvement in TSMC’s sales (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Rising TSMC sales do not necessarily herald an imminent and robust cyclical recovery in the global semiconductor sector.  Investment Conclusions Global semiconductor stock prices have been front running a recovery that has not yet begun. In addition, there is still uncertainty about the technology aspect of US-China trade negotiations. The US will likely continue to have Huawei and other Chinese high-tech companies on its trade-ban list – its so-called Entity List. TSMC sales do not always correlate well with global semiconductor sales. Notably, global semiconductor sales and profits are still in deep contraction, while share prices are at all-time highs (Chart 15). As a result, semiconductor stocks’ multiples have spiked to their previous highs (Chart 16). Chart 15Semiconductor Companies Profits: Still In Deep Contraction Semiconductor Companies Profits: Still In Deep Contraction Semiconductor Companies Profits: Still In Deep Contraction Chart 16Elevated Semiconductor Stocks Multiples Elevated Semiconductor Stocks Multiples Elevated Semiconductor Stocks Multiples     While it is common for share prices to rally ahead of a business cycle/profit revival, we believe a true recovery will only emerge in spring 2020, and it will initially be much more subdued than industry watchers and investors expect. In the near term, strong momentum could still push semiconductor stock prices higher. However, the reality will then set in and there will be an air pocket before a more sustainable bull market emerges.   Our US Equity Investment Strategy earlier this week downgraded S&P semiconductor equipment companies to underweight and put the S&P Semiconductors Index on a downgrade alert.5 Their newly created top-down semiconductor profit growth model warns that an earnings recovery is not yet imminent (Chart 17). For EM-dedicated equity managers, we have been neutral on Asian semiconductor sectors. We continue to recommend a market-weight allocation to Taiwan’s overall market, while we are upgrading the Korean technology sector from a neutral allocation to overweight. Korean semiconductor stocks have rallied much less than their global peers. Hence, the risk of a major relapse is lower. Given that we have been overweight non-tech Korean stocks, upgrading tech stocks to overweight means we will be overweight the KOSPI within the EM equity benchmark (Chart 18). Chart 17Semiconductor Earnings Recovery: Not Imminent Semiconductor Earnings Recovery: Not Imminent Semiconductor Earnings Recovery: Not Imminent Chart 18Upgrade Korean Tech Stocks And Overweight KOSPI Within EM Upgrade Korean Tech Stocks And Overweight KOSPI Within EM Upgrade Korean Tech Stocks And Overweight KOSPI Within EM   Meanwhile, we remain long the Bloomberg Asia-Pacific Semiconductor Index and short the S&P 500 Semiconductor Index. This trade has produced a 7% gain since its initiation on June 13, 2019. The Bloomberg Asia-Pacific Semiconductor index has 12 stocks. Samsung and TSMC account for 38% and 37% of the index, respectively. The S&P 500 Semiconductor Index has 13 stocks. Intel, Broadcom, Texas Instruments and Qualcomm are the top five constituents, together accounting for nearly 77% of the index. Although the US and China may reach a temporary trade deal, the US will continue to restrict sales of tech products and high-end semiconductors to China. As a result, these US semiconductor companies, most of which are IC designing companies, will likely experience a more subdued than expected recovery in sales. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "The Global Semiconductor Sector: Is A Cyclical Upturn Imminent?" dated June 13, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.guancha.cn/ChanJing/2019_09_21_518748.shtml http://www.cac.gov.cn/2019-10/23/c_1573361796389322.htm 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Chinese Auto Demand: Time For A  Recovery?" dated October 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.canalys.com/analysis/smartphone+analysis 5 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report "Defying Gravity," dated November 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The slowdown in global industrial activity appears to have bottomed. This, along with an apparent shared desire for a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, points toward a measured recovery in manufacturing and global trade, which will contribute to higher iron-ore and steel demand beginning in 1H20. A trade-war ceasefire, should it endure, will reduce global economic uncertainty. Along with continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks, reduced economic uncertainty will boost global growth and industrial-commodity demand generally by allowing the USD to weaken. We expect Beijing policymakers to remain focused on keeping GDP growth above 6.0% p.a. To that end, we believe a boost in infrastructure spending next year is likely, which also will be bullish for steel demand. Given China’s growing share of global steel production, we expect price differentials for high-grade iron ore – most of which comes from Brazil – to widen as steel demand increases next year. Given this view, we are initiating a strategic iron-ore spread trade at tonight’s close: Getting long December 2020 high-grade (65% Fe) futures traded on the Singapore Exchange vs. short the benchmark-grade (62% Fe) December 2020 futures traded on the CME. We recommend a 20% stop-loss on this recommendation. Feature Iron ore and steel demand will get a lift from the rebound our proprietary Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index has been forecasting for the past few months (Chart of the Week). The GIA index is designed to pick up changes in Chinese industrial activity, given its outsized influence on world industrial output, and also makes use of trade data, FX rates, and global manufacturing data. The rebound we are expecting will get a fillip from an apparent shared desire for a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, which, based on media reports, is close to being agreed. Should this ceasefire prove to be durable, it would contribute to a lowering of global economic policy uncertainty (GEPU), which, as we have shown recently, has kept the USD well bid to the detriment of industrial-commodity demand.1 Chart of the WeekBCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand BCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand BCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand While we do expect economic uncertainty to decline next year, it will remain elevated due to continued Sino-US trade tensions – even if a “phase-one” deal is agreed – ongoing hostilities in the Persian Gulf, and popular discontent with the political status quo globally. As global economic uncertainty fades, the USD broad trade-weighted index for goods (TWIBG) will fall, which will bolster EM GDP growth, and a recovery in global trade next year (Chart 2). If, as media reports suggest, this so-called “phase-one” agreement includes a relaxation – or complete removal – of tariffs by the US on Chinese imports, we would expect manufacturing activity to pick up as Chinese manufacturers spin-up capacity to meet demand. A reduction in tariffs also will lessen the deadweight loss they imposed on US households, which will support higher consumption.2 Chart 2Reduced Global Economic Uncertainty Bolsters Global Trade Volumes, EM GDP Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift That said, economic uncertainty still remains high. This uncertainty is destructive of demand and will remain a key risk factor in 2020. While we do expect economic uncertainty to decline next year, it will remain elevated due to continued Sino-US trade tensions – even if a “phase-one” deal is agreed – ongoing hostilities in the Persian Gulf, and popular discontent with the political status quo globally. China’s Steel Demand Holds Up In Trade War China accounts for more than half of global steel production and consumption, and the lion’s share of seaborne iron-ore consumption (Chart 3). This makes its steel industry critically important to the global economy, and a key barometer of industrial activity worldwide. With global industrial activity bottoming and moving higher, and the USD expected to weaken, we expect iron ore demand and steel production in China to move higher next year as domestic and global demand for steel rises. China’s apparent steel demand held up fairly well during the slowdown observed in manufacturing and in commodity demand growth globally, averaging 8% y/y growth ytd (Chart of the Week, bottom panel). It now appears to be stalling in the wake of the global manufacturing slowdown. In addition, Chinese credit stimulus remains weak, contrary to expectations. However, with global industrial activity bottoming and moving higher, and the USD expected to weaken, we expect iron ore demand and steel production in China to move higher next year as domestic and global demand for steel rises.3 Chart 3China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption Chart 4Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Greater demand for steel by the construction and real estate sectors offset lower consumption by the automobile industry in China this year, as manufacturing and trade slowed globally (Chart 4). Overall, apparent demand is still growing (Chart 5), which will continue to support iron ore imports, even though domestic production of low-grade ore picked up as steelmakers’ margins tightened earlier in the year (Chart 6). Chart 5China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown Chart 6China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout Chinese imports from Brazil have rebounded following the Brumadinho tailings dam collapse in January at Vale’s Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine, which killed close to 300 people. The collapse in margins from steel mills combined with outages to Brazil and Australia high-grade ore exports led to a rise in imports and domestic production of low-grade iron ore. High-Grade Iron Ore Favored; Policy Uncertainty Persists Our overall view for industrial commodities – iron ore, steel, base metals and crude oil – is constructive but not wildly bullish going into next year. Our oil view, for example, calls for a rally in the average price of crude oil next year of ~ 10% from current levels for Brent crude oil, the world benchmark. While we expect global monetary stimulus to offset much of the tightening of financial conditions brought on by the Fed’s rate hikes last year, and China’s de-leveraging campaign of 2017-18, elevated economic uncertainty will keep the USD better bid that it otherwise would be absent the Sino-US trade war and global economic policy uncertainty. This translates into weaker commodity demand, generally, as a strong USD raises local-currency costs for consumers and lowers local-currency production costs for producers. At the margin, both push commodity prices lower. On a relative basis, we expect the more efficient, less-polluting technology likely will be called on to meet higher steel demand – in China and globally – next year, which means higher-grade iron ore will be favored by Chinese steel mills as profitability improves. For iron ore and steel in particular, environmental considerations also are important, given the Chinese government's “Blue Skies Policy” aimed at reducing the country’s high levels of air pollution.4 This policy has led to the forced retirement of older, highly polluting steelmaking capacity, which has been replaced with newer, less-polluting technology that favors high-grade iron ore. However, the application of regulations designed to reduce pollution has been uneven, and still relies on local compliance, which has been spotty. We expect demand for high-grade ore will increase as global manufacturing and trade also recovers. On a relative basis, we expect the more efficient, less-polluting technology likely will be called on to meet higher steel demand – in China and globally – next year, which means higher-grade iron ore will be favored by Chinese steel mills as profitability improves. The restoration of high-grade exports from Brazil means this ore will be available. It is worthwhile noting that these steelmakers account for an increasing share of global capacity. For this reason, we expect demand for high-grade ore will increase as global manufacturing and trade also recovers (Chart 7). Given our view, at tonight’s close we will get long December 2020 high-grade iron-ore futures (65% Fe) traded on the Singapore Exchange vs. short benchmark-grade iron-ore futures (62% Fe) traded on the CME. Both are quoted in USD/MT and settle basis Chinese port-delivery (CFR) indexes in cash. Given the uncertain nature of the durability and depth of the ceasefire currently being negotiated by the US and China, we will keep a stop-loss on this position of 20%. Bottom Line: China’s steel demand has held up relatively well despite the global slowdown in manufacturing and trade. Given our expectation for a pick-up in global growth – in response to global monetary and fiscal stimulus and lower economic uncertainty in the wake of a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war – we expect Chinese steel demand to resume growing. This will support iron ore prices, particularly for high-grade ores. On the back of this expectation, we are recommending an iron-ore spread trade, going long high-grade futures vs. short benchmark-grade iron ore futures. Chart 7High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Bloomberg reported China is looking to invest between $5-$10 billion in the Saudi Aramco IPO through various vehicles. Such an investment would give China a deeper stake in the Kingdom’s oil industry, and a hedge to price shocks. In addition, it could open the way for deeper investment in the Saudi oil and petchems industries. For KSA, as we have argued in the past, a deepening of China’s investment and involvement in the Kingdom’s economy would diversify the states that have a vested interest in ensuring its safety.5 We will be updating our analysis of China’s pivot to the Middle East, and KSA’s pivot to Asia next week. Separately, we the last of our Brent backwardation trades – i.e., long December 2019 Brent vs. short December 2020 Brent – was closed last week with a gain of 110.8%. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices are up 6% vs. last month, supported by supply-side worries in Chile and, more recently, easing trade tensions. Cyclically, we believe copper prices are turning up – spurred by easy monetary conditions and fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction spending. Most of our key commodity-demand indicators have bottomed and are suggesting EM demand growth will move up. This supports a year-end base metal rally. Precious Metals: Neutral. A risk-on sentiment fueled by expectation the U.S. and China will sign a trade deal weighs on gold’s safe-haven demand. Prices fell 2% since last week. Additionally, U.S. 10-year bond yields shot higher – pushing gold prices lower – on Tuesday following a stronger-than-expect ISM services PMI data release. Gold-backed ETF holdings reached a new record in September at 2,855 MT (up 377 MT ytd), surpassing the December 2012 peak. A reversal in investors’ sentiment towards gold could send prices down. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported that 52% of the U.S. corn has been harvested, a 13 percentage point increase relative to last week, yet the figure came shy of analysts’ expectation and far below the 2014-2018 average of 75%. On a weekly basis, corn prices are still down 2% due to drier weather forecast. Soybean harvest did better reaching 75%, and meeting expectations. Soybean price is almost unchanged on a weekly basis, despite having edged higher earlier in the week on the back of rising expectations the US and China will agree on a ceasefire in the ongoing trade war.   Footnotes 1     We measure this uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related economic uncertainty. Newspapers from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2    We discuss deadweight losses to US households arising from the tariffs in Waiting To Get Long Copper, In China’s Steel Slipstream, published August 29, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy expects China’s business cycle likely will bottom in 1Q20 of next year, rather than in 4Q19. This aligns with our expectation. Please see China Macro And Market Review, published November 6, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4    We examined the implications of China’s “Blue Skies” policy in China's Anti-Pollution Resolve Critical To Iron Ore Markets, published April 4, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    We discuss these issues in our Special Report entitled ضد الواسطة published November 16, 2018. The Arabic title of the report translates as "Against Wasta." Wasta means reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift

Highlights Please note that we will publish a Special Report on the Asian semiconductors cycle on Monday November 11. The risk to our negative stance on EM stocks is that DM share prices will continue advancing, pulling EM equities higher. If the MSCI EM Equity Index breaks decisively above our stop buy level instituted two weeks ago, we will reverse our stance on the absolute performance of EM. Nevertheless, we assign high odds that EM share prices will underperform DM even in a global equity rally. Hence, we are not changing our underweight recommendation on EM within a global equity portfolio. In the 2012-14 period, EM stocks underperformed their DM counterparts despite the global equity rally. Feature Chart I-1China: A Tale Of Two Manufacturing PMIs China: A Tale Of Two Manufacturing PMIs China: A Tale Of Two Manufacturing PMIs In our October 24 weekly report, we instituted a buy stop on the MSCI EM Equity Index at 1,075. The index is currently flirting with this level. If EM stocks break decisively above this level, our buy stop will be triggered. Such a technical breakout will signify that this EM equity rally will likely be sustained in the medium term, and that investors should play it. What would be the rationale behind this rally? Is it the rise in China’s Caixin manufacturing PMI or an imminent trade deal between the U.S. and China? Or is it a recovery in the global business cycle? The top panel of Chart I-1 shows that China’s Caixin and NBS manufacturing PMIs have decoupled. The Caixin PMI is compiled through a survey of about 500 companies, while the NBS measure is based on about 3000 companies. Neither one appears to have a consistently better track record than the other. For this reason, to tackle the issues of excessive volatility and false signals from both measures, we prefer to look at their average. The bottom panel of Chart I-1 illustrates the average of the two. The takeaway is that China’s manufacturing PMI has indeed improved, but only modestly. Further, non-manufacturing PMI – also the average of the Caixin and the NBS figures – has dropped to 2015 lows (Chart I-2). Hence, Chinese PMIs are not sending an unequivocal message that the mainland economy is recovering. Chart I-2China: Non-Manufacturing PMI Is At Its 2015 Low China: Non-Manufacturing PMI Is At Its 2015 Low China: Non-Manufacturing PMI Is At Its 2015 Low On one hand, the business cycle in China as well as global trade and manufacturing have not yet improved. On the other, share prices often lead markets, and waiting for economic data often results in missing the turning points. In this week’s report, we present both the bullish market signals and the lack of evidence of an economic recovery in China/EM, global trade and manufacturing. Finally, we elaborate why an enduring global equity rally does not always lead to EM equity relative outperformance versus DM. Bullish Market Signals… The motive for our buy stop on the EM Equity Index is the number of bullish market signals that currently suggest the global equity rally could be sustainable, and hence playable. First, DM share prices have been trading well – equity market actions in the U.S., Europe and Japan have been characteristic of a bull market since early October. Specifically, companies that have missed analysts’ earnings estimates have seen their share prices do quite well, often rising markedly in the days following their earnings announcements. Share prices of companies that have beaten analysts’ expectations have literally surged. This is typical of a genuine bull market. Technical patterns are also positive for U.S. equities. U.S. small caps, S&P 500 high-beta stocks and FAANG share prices have all bounced from major support levels. Second, technical patterns are also positive for U.S. equities. U.S. small caps, S&P 500 high-beta stocks and FAANG share prices have all bounced from major support levels and are attempting to break out (Chart I-3). Finally, the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio has also failed to break below one of its long-term moving averages and has rebounded (Chart I-4). When a 200-day or long-term moving average holds, it often marks a major reversal. Chart I-3Bullish Patterns In U.S. Equities Bullish Patterns In U.S. Equities Bullish Patterns In U.S. Equities Chart I-4A Bull Market In U.S. Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c4 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c4   All these signals imply a bullish trajectory for U.S. and other DM share prices. At the current juncture, we are giving the benefit of the doubt to the market and ready to reverse our stance on EM performance in absolute terms when our buy stop is triggered. Apart from these technical signals and market actions, U.S. economic fundamentals remain healthy. In particular, U.S. households have decent balance sheets, their income and spending growth is quite robust, the banking system is healthy, and nationwide property markets are picking up following a soft spot early this year. Although American manufacturing and capital spending have been weak, these relapses primarily reflect negative demand from the rest of the world and business confidence deterioration due to the U.S.-China trade confrontation. The latter will be partially reversed by the forthcoming U.S.-China trade deal. Chart I-5China Not U.S. Drives EM Profits Cycles China Not U.S. Drives EM Profits Cycles China Not U.S. Drives EM Profits Cycles At the same time, there is a lack of meaningful green shoots in global trade and manufacturing (we discuss this in more detail below). Altogether, one can explain this equity rally as being driven by subsiding fears of a U.S. recession, Federal Reserve easing and the improvement on the U.S.-China trade front.  That said, our negative view on EM has not been contingent on a U.S. recession, Fed policy or the U.S.-China trade confrontation. As such, improvements on these fronts do not constitute sufficient basis for us to change our fundamental stance on EM. The empirical evidence that U.S. growth is not driving EM growth in general and EM corporate profitability in particular emanates from the following: U.S. imports and EM corporate earnings cycles have not been correlated since 2011 (Chart I-5, top panel). EM earnings-per-share cycles have instead been driven by Chinese imports since 2009 (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Hence, it is China’s domestic demand that drives broader EM profit cycles. As we elaborate below, there is little evidence of improvement in the mainland’s business cycle, its imports, and commodities prices. Bottom Line: There are numerous bullish signals from DM equity markets. The risk to our negative stance on EM is as follows: If DM share prices continue to rally, they will drag EM stocks and other risk assets higher. …But Global Growth Has Not Yet Improved Chart I-6No Clear Bullish Signal From Currency Markets bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c6 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c6 Several key financial market signals, as well as soft and hard data, are not yet indicating that a recovery is already underway in global trade and manufacturing. Nor do they point to an improvement in China/EM economies. Our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio1 has rebounded but has not yet broken above its neckline (Chart I-6, top panel). This indicator had formed a classic head-and-shoulders pattern before breaking down. The jury is still out on whether the recent rebound is a false start or the beginning of a cyclical advance. We put a lot of emphasis on this indicator because (1) it is very strongly correlated with EM share prices, (2) it captures both risk-on and risk-off periods in global financial markets, (3) it leads the global business cycle, and (4) it is agnostic to the U.S. dollar’s trend. In a similar vein, the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar has weakened but has not yet broken through key moving averages to conclude that it has definitively entered a bear market. With the exception of China’s Caixin manufacturing PMI, there are few green shoots in global manufacturing. Manufacturing PMIs in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are all still below the 50 boom-bust line (Chart I-7, top and middle panels). Meanwhile, manufacturing PMIs in the ASEAN region have plunged (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Critically, EM per-share earnings are contracting at a rate of 10% from a year ago. Notably, the leading indicators for EM corporate profits – China’s domestic orders of 5,000 industrial companies and narrow money (M1) growth – signal a tentative bottoming of EM corporate profit growth only in early 2020 (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Outside China, Asian Manufacturing PMIs Are Weak Outside China, Asian Manufacturing PMIs Are Weak Outside China, Asian Manufacturing PMIs Are Weak Chart I-8Leading Indicators For EM EPS Growth bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c8 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c8   In the majority of developing economies, corporate per-share earnings are contracting or stagnating in local currency terms (Chart I-9). Our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio has rebounded but has not yet broken above its neckline. “Hard” economic data out of EM/China and global trade remain downbeat as well. For example, Chinese construction activity and capital goods imports as well as Japanese foreign machine tool orders are all shrinking at double-digit rates from a year ago (Chart I-10, top and middle panels). Korea’s October exports contracted by 15% from a year earlier (Chart I-10, bottom panel).   Chart I-9Individual EM Country EPS In Local Currency Terms Individual EM Country EPS In Local Currency Terms Individual EM Country EPS In Local Currency Terms Chart I-10China Capex And Global Trade: Double Digit Contraction China Capex And Global Trade: Double Digit Contraction China Capex And Global Trade: Double Digit Contraction   Finally, the import sub-component of China’s NBS manufacturing PMI remains well below the 50 boom-bust line. Chinese demand is of paramount importance for industrial metals. China accounts for 50% of industrial metals demand, while the U.S. accounts for only about 7%. The very subdued bounce in commodities in general and industrial metals prices in particular, are confirming a lack of recovery in Chinese intake of raw materials (Chart I-11). EM share prices, including emerging Asian stocks, have the highest correlation with global materials stocks (Chart I-12). The rationale for this tight relationship between emerging Asian equities and commodities is that both are leveraged to the Chinese business cycle, as we discussed in our recent report, EM: Perceptions Versus Reality. It is difficult to envision EM share prices staging a cyclical bull market when commodities prices are flat to down. Chart I-11Chinese Imports PMI And Industrial Metals Chinese Imports PMI And Industrial Metals Chinese Imports PMI And Industrial Metals Chart I-12Emerging Asian Stocks And Global Materials: Moving In Tandem Emerging Asian Stocks And Global Materials: Moving In Tandem Emerging Asian Stocks And Global Materials: Moving In Tandem   Bottom Line: The key variables driving EM share prices are China’s credit and business cycles, its imports and global trade. There are few green shoots in China/EM business cycles and global trade. This is why we believe even if this global equity rally is sustained, EM equities will underperform DM ones. We elaborate on this below. Can EM Underperform DM In A Bull Market? Chart I-132012-14: EM Underperformed During Global Bull Market bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c13 bca.ems_wr_2019_11_07_s1_c13 BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team’s view on global equity allocation is as follows: Even if DM equities enter a sustainable bull market, odds are that EM stocks will underperform. This scenario will likely resemble the 2012-14 episode that was characterized by the following: DM share prices were in a strong bull market following the European credit crisis and the global markets selloff in 2011 (Chart I-13, top panel). Global trade and manufacturing bottomed in late 2012 and accelerated in 2013 (Chart I-13, third panel). Yet, this global trade and manufacturing improvement did little to support EM share prices, currencies and commodities prices. In 2012-14, EM equities were range-bound in absolute terms and significantly underperformed their DM peers (Chart I-13, second panel). In short, EM stocks were low beta relative to global stocks during that period. Besides, commodities prices were falling and EM currencies were depreciating versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-13, bottom panel). The cause of such poor EM performance was two-fold: First, the recovery in China’s business cycle and its imports was tame. Second, many EM economies were suffering from poor domestic fundamentals following the 2009-2011 credit and cheap money booms. We expect any growth improvement in China to be muted, resembling the 2012 growth stabilization rather than the 2016 recovery. The top panel of Chart I-14 illustrates that China’s manufacturing PMI oscillated between 48 and 52 in 2012-2014 when the global manufacturing cycle rebounded and DM growth improved. This occurred despite China’s large stimulus in 2012 (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-14Chinese PMI And Credit And Fiscal Stimulus Chinese PMI And Credit And Fiscal Stimulus Chinese PMI And Credit And Fiscal Stimulus In line with the subdued recovery in China’s business cycle at the time, EM corporate profits did not recover much in the 2012-2014 period (please refer to Chart I-8 on page 7). We expect EM currencies to depreciate versus the U.S. dollar even if global share prices continue rallying. This will resemble the 2012-14 scenario. Notably, EM equity underperformance versus DM escalated in the spring of 2013 during the Fed’s Taper Tantrum when EM currencies plunged and EM fixed-income markets sold off. Yet, the Fed’s Taper Tantrum was not the only reason for EM currency depreciation. As demonstrated in the bottom panel of Chart I-13 on page 10, EM ex-China currencies’ total return was strongly correlated with commodities prices. Currently, many EM countries do not suffer from the same malaises they did in 2012-14, namely, high inflation and large current account deficits. On the contrary, very low nominal growth, i.e., enduring deflationary pressures, is the foremost problem in many EM countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Brazil, Mexico and Russia. These deflationary pressures are due to very sluggish domestic demand, weak/unhealthy banking systems and falling commodities prices. This backdrop indicates that these economies are not in a position to withstand either higher global borrowing costs or lower commodities prices. Their currencies will depreciate with either higher global bond yields or falling commodities prices. Even if DM equities enter a sustainable bull market, odds are that EM stocks will underperform. Hence, a scenario of firming U.S. and European demand – which would warrant higher bond yields – amid still weak Chinese growth – which would push commodities prices lower – would be very negative for EM currencies. Chart I-15Outperformance By Euro Area And Value Stocks Does Not Always Herald EM Outperformance Outperformance By Euro Area And Value Stocks Does Not Always Herald EM Outperformance Outperformance By Euro Area And Value Stocks Does Not Always Herald EM Outperformance Chart I-16EM Vs. DM: Relative Share Prices Are Tracking Relative EPS EM Vs. DM: Relative Share Prices Are Tracking Relative EPS EM Vs. DM: Relative Share Prices Are Tracking Relative EPS Finally, EM stocks’ relative performance versus global stocks does not always coincide with the relative performance of euro area or value stocks (Chart I-15). This entails that outperformance by euro area and global value stocks does not always herald EM outperformance versus the global equity benchmark. Bottom Line: Regardless the direction of global share prices, we expect EM stocks to underperform DM equities in the next several months. Relative equity performance is driven by relative EPS trends, as illustrated in Chart I-16. The corporate earnings outlook is worse in EM than in the U.S., euro area and Japan.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, RUB, CLP, MXN & ZAR total return indices relative to average of CHF & JPY total returns.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

  Highlights While the Caixin PMI is pointing to improving economic conditions, other data series still reflect weak growth. China’s business cycle is likely to bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. The failure of Chinese stocks to significantly outperform the global benchmark and the continued underperformance of cyclical stocks underscore the near-term risks to equities if this month’s trade & manufacturing data disappoint. We continue to recommend a neutral tactical stance (0-3 months) towards Chinese equities versus global stocks, but expect them to outperform on a cyclical (6-12 month) time horizon after economic growth firmly bottoms. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, the data remains mixed: the strength in the October Caixin PMI and the September pickup in electricity production are positive signs, but other important datapoints still point to weak conditions. We continue to expect that China’s business cycle is likely to bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. We continue to expect that growth will bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Within financial markets, Chinese stocks have rallied in absolute terms over the past month in response to greatly increased odds of a trade truce between China and the US, but have failed to outperform the global benchmark. This, in combination with the continued underperformance of cyclical stocks, suggests that hard evidence of an economic improvement in China will be required before Chinese stocks begin to rise in relative terms. The risk of near-term underperformance is still present, especially if October’s hard trade and manufacturing data disappoint. We continue to recommend a neutral tactical stance (0-3 months) towards Chinese equities versus global stocks, but expect them to outperform on a cyclical (6-12 month) time horizon after economic growth firmly bottoms. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Chart 1Not Yet A Clear Change In Trend Not Yet A Clear Change In Trend Not Yet A Clear Change In Trend The Bloomberg Li Keqiang index (LKI) ticked up in September, led by an improvement in electricity production. An improvement in the LKI in lockstep with a rising Caixin manufacturing PMI (discussed below) raises the odds that the Chinese economy may be bottoming earlier than we expect, but for now only modestly so. Chinese economic data is highly volatile, and Chart 1 shows that the improvement in the LKI is very muted when shown as a 3-month moving average. In addition, a slight improvement also occurred earlier this year, but proved to be a false signal. All told, for now we continue to expect that growth will bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. Our leading indicator for the LKI was essentially flat in September on a smoothed basis, with sequential declines in M3 growth and the credit components of the indicator offsetting improvements in monetary conditions and M2. From a big picture perspective, the story of our LKI leading indicator remains unchanged: it continues to trend higher, at a much shallower pace than has been the case during previous easing cycles. The uptrend is the basis of our forecast that China’s growth will soon bottom, but the uncharacteristically shallow nature of the rise suggests that the eventual recovery will be modest. On a smoothed basis, Chinese residential floor space sold improved again in September, following a very significant rise in August. Over the past 12-18 months, we had emphasized that the double-digit pace of growth in China’s housing starts was unsustainable because it had entirely decoupled from the trend in sales (which have reliably led construction activity over the past decade). This gap disappeared over the summer due to a significant slowdown in starts, which is what we predicted would occur. However, the recent acceleration in floor space sold represents a legitimate fundamental improvement in the housing market, that for now is difficult to attribute to the recent drivers of housing demand (Chart 2).1 Still, investors should continue to watch China’s housing demand data closely over the coming few months, for further signs of a potential re-acceleration in housing construction. Investors need to see meaningful sequential improvements in China’s October trade and manufacturing data. The October improvement in China’s Caixin PMI was quite notable, as it appears to confirm the full one-point rise in the index that occurred in September and suggests that manufacturing in China’s private-sector is now durably expanding. Still, conflicting signals remain: the official PMI fell in October and remains below 50, and the significant September improvement in the Caixin PMI was not corroborated by an improvement in producer prices or nominal import growth (Chart 3). As PMIs are simply timely coincident indicators that do not generally have leading properties, investors will need to see meaningful sequential improvements in China’s October trade and manufacturing data in order to have confidence that the Caixin PMI improvement is not a false signal. Chart 2It Is Not Yet Apparent What Is Driving A Pickup In Housing Demand It Is Not Yet Apparent What Is Driving A Pickup In Housing Demand It Is Not Yet Apparent What Is Driving A Pickup In Housing Demand Chart 3If The Caixin PMI Is Not A False Signal, A Hard Data Improvement Must Occur Soon If The Caixin PMI Is Not A False Signal, A Hard Data Improvement Must Occur Soon If The Caixin PMI Is Not A False Signal, A Hard Data Improvement Must Occur Soon Chinese stocks have rallied 6-7% over the past month in absolute terms, but have modestly underperformed global equities. The rally in global stock prices has occurred largely in response to the mid-October announcement of a trade truce between China and the US. The failure of Chinese stocks to outperform during this period suggests hard evidence of an economic improvement in China will be required before Chinese stocks begin to outpace their global peers. At the regional equity level, the other notable development over the past month has been the continued outperformance of the MSCI Taiwan Index versus the global benchmark. Taiwan’s outperformance has been boosted by a rising TWD versus the dollar, but Taiwanese stocks have also outperformed in local currency terms. Taiwan province is highly exposed to global trade, and it is not surprising that equities have reacted positively to the prospect of a trade truce between the US and China. Further meaningful outperformance, however, will likely require a re-acceleration in Taiwanese exports, as export growth has merely halted its contraction (Chart 4). Within China’s investable equity market, cyclicals have underperformed defensives over the past month after having rallied significantly from late-August to mid-September (Chart 5). We noted in our October 30 Special Report that these cyclical sectors have historically been positively correlated with pro-cyclical macroeconomic and equity market variables,2 and their underperformance versus defensives is thus consistent with the failure of Chinese stocks in the aggregate to outperform global equities over the past month. In both cases, outperformance likely requires hard evidence of an upturn in China’s business cycle. Chart 4Export Growth Needs To Improve In Order To Expect Further Taiwanese Relative Outperformance Export Growth Needs To Improve In Order To Expect Further Taiwanese Relative Outperformance Export Growth Needs To Improve In Order To Expect Further Taiwanese Relative Outperformance Chart 5Cyclical Underperformance Underscores The Near-Term Risks To Chinese Vs. Global Stocks Cyclical Underperformance Underscores The Near-Term Risks To Chinese Vs. Global Stocks Cyclical Underperformance Underscores The Near-Term Risks To Chinese Vs. Global Stocks We do not take the rise in Chinese government bond yields as necessarily indicative of an imminent breakout in relative equity performance. Chart 6Chinese Relative Equity Performance Leads Bond Yields, Not The Other Way Around Chinese Relative Equity Performance Leads Bond Yields, Not The Other Way Around Chinese Relative Equity Performance Leads Bond Yields, Not The Other Way Around Chinese 10-year government bond yields have risen roughly 15bps over the past month, and are now 30bps off of their mid-August low. Many market participants view Chinese government bond yields as a leading growth barometer, but 10-year yields have actually lagged Chinese investable stock performance over the past two years (Chart 6). As such, we do not take the rise in yields as necessarily indicative of an imminent breakout in relative equity performance. Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have declined over the past month as government bond yields have been rising, continuing a pattern of negative correlation between the two that has prevailed since early-2018. A negative correlation between yields and corporate bond spreads is a normal relationship, and it suggests that spreads may narrow over the coming year if the Chinese economy bottoms in Q1, as we expect. Spreads remain elevated despite the substantial easing in monetary conditions that occurred last year, due to persistent concerns about rising onshore defaults. While we acknowledge that defaults are indeed occurring, we have argued on several occasions that the pace of defaults would have to be much faster in order for current spreads to be justified.3 We continue to recommend a long RMB-denominated position in China’s onshore corporate bond market. The RMB has appreciated over the past month in response to news of a likely trade truce between the US and China, with most of the rise having occurred versus the US dollar. USD-CNY is likely to sustainably trade below the 7 mark in a trade truce scenario, but how much further downside is possible in the near-term absent a re-acceleration in Chinese economic activity remains an open question. With the Fed very likely on hold for the next year, stronger than expected economic growth in China would likely catalyze a persistent selloff in USD-CNY barring a re-emergence of the Sino-US trade war. This, however, is not our base-case view, meaning that we expect modest post-deal strength in the RMB.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist JingS@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. 2. Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance,” dated October 30, 2019. 3. Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, “A Shaky Ladder,” dated June 13, 2018, "Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War,” dated September 19, 2018 and "2019 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year,” dated December 5, 2018. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

  The key question for asset allocators over coming months will be when (or, perhaps, whether) the global manufacturing cycle will turn up. This would trigger a move into more cyclically sensitive markets, for example euro zone equities and Emerging Market assets. It would push up commodity prices and government bond yields, and lead to a weakening of the U.S. dollar. Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Chart 1First Inklings Of A Pick-Up? First Inklings Of A Pick-Up? First Inklings Of A Pick-Up?   For now, the evidence of this turning-point remains ambiguous, and so we hesitate to pull the trigger. BCA Research's calculation of the global OECD Leading Economic Indicator bottomed earlier this year and should lead to a pick-up in manufacturing activity soon (Chart 1). However, only in EM have the manufacturing PMIs bottomed (Chart 1, panel 2) and this was due mainly to a questionably strong September PMI in China which might be reversed when the latest data-point is published on October 1. In the euro zone, the best that one can say is that the PMIs have stopped falling but they remain at a low level (41.9 in Germany, for instance). Some market-based indicators also signal a pick-up – but not yet convincingly (Chart 2). Defensive currencies such as the U.S. dollar and yen have fallen a little against cyclical currencies like the Korean won and Australian dollar. Euro zone equities have shown some strength, especially in the beaten-down auto sector. The global stock-to-bond ratio looks to be about to break out of its recent range. And copper has bounced off its lows. But these moves could turn out to be just noise rather than the beginning of a trend. Chart 2Are Markets Sniffing Out A Turn? Are Markets Sniffing Out A Turn? Are Markets Sniffing Out A Turn? Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. BCA Research's Financial Liquidity Index tends to lead both manufacturing activity and the relative performance of global stocks by around 12-18 months (Chart 3). With the dovish turn of central banks this year, the decline in long-term interest rates (the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, even after its recent rebound, is only at 1.7% compared to 3.2% a year ago), the contraction in credit spreads, and a pick-up in money supply growth especially in the U.S. (where M2 is now growing 6.5% year-on-year), it would be surprising if these looser monetary conditions do not feed through into stronger activity over coming quarters. Chart 3Financial Liquidity Propels Growth Financial Liquidity Propels Growth Financial Liquidity Propels Growth Chart 4Could Inflation Now Slow? Could Inflation Now Slow? Could Inflation Now Slow? Indeed, one can easily imagine a scenario next year where growth rebounds but inflation slows (due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth, Chart 4), allowing central banks to remain dovish for some time. This non-inflationary accelerating growth would be highly positive for risk assets and negative for the U.S. dollar. Chart 5 shows how various asset classes behaved in such an environment in the past. Chart 5How Assets Behaved Under Rising Growth/Falling Inflation Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. There are some risks to this optimistic scenario, however. Chinese growth remains sluggish with, for example, imports – the most important factor as far as the rest of the world is concerned – falling by 8.5% year-on-year in September and showing no signs of recovery (Chart 6). The acceleration of Chinese credit growth in early 2019 has petered out since the summer and points to a much flatter recovery of activity than was the case in 2016 (Chart 7). A politburo meeting in late October could lead to monetary stimulus being ramped up but, for now, investors should not assume a big reflationary impulse from China. In the developed world, the biggest risk is that the slowdown in manufacturing spills over into employment, consumption, and services. There are some signs in the U.S. that companies are delaying hiring decisions: job openings have fallen, and the employment component of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs points to a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 8). Growing CEO pessimism, presumably because of anemic earnings and the trade war, points to continuing weakness in capex and a further decline in activity indicators (Chart 9). Chart 6Chinese Growth Still Sluggish... Chinese Growth Still Sluggish... Chinese Growth Still Sluggish... Chart 7...As Credit Growth Peters Out ...As Credit Growth Peters Out ...As Credit Growth Peters Out   Chart 8Are Firms Starting To Delay Hiring? Are Firms Starting To Delay Hiring? Are Firms Starting To Delay Hiring? Chart 9CEOs Are Not Happy CEOs Are Not Happy CEOs Are Not Happy Chart 10Stocks Should Outperform Cyclically Stocks Should Outperform Cyclically Stocks Should Outperform Cyclically On balance, we still expect global growth to accelerate next year, and therefore global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months (Chart 10). But we want to have greater conviction for that view before we recommend more aggressive pro-cyclical tilts. We remain overweight equities versus bonds, but hedge the downside risk through an overweight in cash, and through tilts towards U.S. equities, and DM over EM equities. We continue to recommend hedging against the upside risk of greater Chinese stimulus and a strong rally in cyclical assets through an overweight in global Financials, Industrials, and Energy, and also through a neutral stance on Australian equities, which are a clean play on a Chinese rebound. We continue to look for the right timing to turn more positive on pure cyclical assets such as euro zone equities, and Emerging Markets. Fixed Income: A cyclical pick-up would imply that global government bond yields have further to rise (Chart 11). Our global fixed-income strategists have a short-term target for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield of 2.1% (versus 1.7% now) and -0.2% for Bunds (-0.4% now), which would take yields back to their 200-day moving averages (Chart 12).1 We continue to recommend a moderate underweight on duration, and prefer TIPS to nominal bonds, since inflation breakevens imply that the Fed will miss its inflation target by 80 basis points a year on average over the next 10 years. In an environment of accelerating economic growth, credit (both investment grade and high-yield)should outperform in both the U.S. and Europe. The most attractive points on the credit curve are BBB-rated bonds in IG, and the riskiest bonds in HY. For more risk-averse investors, agency MBS currently offer an attractive yield pickup over quality corporate credits. Chart 11Growth Will Push Up Yields Further... Growth Will Push Up Yields Further... Growth Will Push Up Yields Further... Chart 12...Initially To Their 200-Day Average ...Initially To Their 200-Day Average ...Initially To Their 200-Day Average     Equities: Any upside for U.S. equities must come from improved earnings performance. Throughout 2019, earnings have been beating overly pessimistic analysts’ forecasts and Q3 looks to be no exception, with EPS growth on track to be much stronger than the -5% year-on-year that analysts forecast going into the results season (Chart 13). Next year, nominal GDP growth of 4% and a weaker U.S. dollar should produce 7-8% EPS growth. But, with a forward PE of 17x and the Fed unlikely to boost the multiple by further rate cuts, upside is limited. In the right economic environment (as described above), euro zone and EM stocks should do much better. We are currently neutral on euro zone equities, but the recent stronger performance by European banks gives us more confidence that we may be able to move to overweight soon (Chart 14). Similarly, our EM strategists have instituted a buy stop on the MSCI EM index and say they will go overweight EM equities if the index in USD terms rises 3% from its current level.2 Chart 13Analysts Are Too Pessimistic On Earnings Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Monthly Portfolio Update: Looking For The Turning-Point Currencies: The first inklings of U.S. dollar weakness over the past month suggest that it may, too, be sniffing out the start of a cyclical rebound, since it tends to be a very counter-cyclical currency (Chart 15). Going forward, relative interest rates are also unlikely to be as bullish a force for the U.S. dollar as they have been in the past few years. For now, we are neutral on the U.S. dollar on a trade-weighted basis, but do see it depreciating against the Australian dollar and the euro over the next 12 months. The British pound has already risen to take into account the lesser probability of a no-deal Brexit, and we would not expect it to move much either way until the General Election result is clear. There are some risks to the optimistic scenario: Chinese growth remains sluggish, and there are signs that U.S. companies are delaying hiring decisions. Chart 14First Signs Of Euro Banks Recovering? First Signs Of Euro Banks Recovering? First Signs Of Euro Banks Recovering? Chart 15Recovery Would Be Dollar Bearish Recovery Would Be Dollar Bearish Recovery Would Be Dollar Bearish Commodities: Industrial metals prices have bottomed out in recent months, in line with Chinese leading indicators (Chart 16). But we will need to see greater Chinese stimulus before we become more positive. Crude oil has moved largely in a range for the past six months, with tightness in supply offset by some weakness in demand, especially from developed economies (Chart 17). With demand likely to pick up in line with the global economy, and supply still constrained by the Saudi/Russia production pact and geopolitical disturbances, our energy strategists see Brent crude averaging $66 a barrel in Q4 and $70 in 2020, versus $60 now. Chart 16Not Enough China Stimulus For Metals To Bounce Not Enough China Stimulus For Metals To Bounce Not Enough China Stimulus For Metals To Bounce Chart 17Oil Kept Down By Weak Demand Oil Kept Down By Weak Demand Oil Kept Down By Weak Demand As last year, the Global Asset Allocation service will not publish a Q1 Quarterly in mid-December. Instead, we will send clients on November 22 our annual report of the conversation between Mr and Ms X and BCA Research’s managing editors. This report will detail BCA's house views on the outlook for the macro environment and investment markets in 2020. We will publish GAA Monthly Portfolio Outlooks on the first business days of December and January.   Garry Evans Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report “Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive,” dated 29 October 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2For an explanation, please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report " EM Local Bonds: A New Normal?" dated 24 October 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.   Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)