India

HighlightsUpgrade odds of Russia invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. The US and allies are transferring arms to Ukraine while seeking alternate energy supply for Europe.Of the 75% war risk, we give 10% odds to Russia conquering all of Ukraine, as discussed in our “Five Black Swans For 2022.” Russia’s limited war aims worked in 2014 and President Putin tends to take calculated military risks. Full-scale invasion would force the West to unify.The remaining 25% goes to diplomatic resolution. It appears that the US is not offering Russia sufficient security guarantees. Ukrainian leaders do not have a domestic mandate to surrender and have not done so for eight years. Russia cannot accept the  status quo now that it has made armed demands for big change.Our third key view for 2022 – that oil producing states have geopolitical leverage – is vividly on display.Tactically stay defensive. But cyclically stay invested. Book 10% gain on long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Book a 8.6% gain on long CAD-RUB.FeatureUkraine’s economy is small but investors rightly worry that an expansion of the still simmering 2014 war there will cause Europe’s energy supply to tighten, pushing up prices and dragging on European demand. Russia would cut off natural gas to Ukraine, which would cut off 6.6% of Europe’s natural gas imports, 18% of Germany’s, 77% of Hungary’s, and 38% of Italy’s (Chart 1). Chart 1Ukraine Hinges On Germany If Europe retaliates against Russia with crippling sanctions, Russia and Belarus could conceivably cut off another 20% of Europe’s imports and 60% of Germany’s imports. The Czech Republic, Finland, and Hungary get almost 100% of their natural gas from Ukraine and Russia, while Finland, Poland, and Hungary get more than half of their oil from Russia. In other words, Europe will try to avoid war and try to limit sanctions so that Russia does not further reduce supply.Yet Russia, if waging war, will prefer to receive revenues from Europe, as long as Europe is still buying. Thus Russia will keep its military aims limited so that Germany and other countries have a basis for watering down sanctions to keep the energy flowing and avoid a recession. The US has already committed to sweeping sanctions against Russia and is much more likely to follow through (though President Biden also wants to avoid an energy shock ahead of midterm elections).Energy consumption amounts to only 2% of European GDP, though it could rise to 5% in the event of a shock, as our European Investment Strategist Mathieu Savary has shown. This number would not be far from the 7% reached in 2008, which coincided with financial crisis and recession. All of Europe will suffer from high prices, not only those that import via Ukraine, and Europe’s supply squeeze would push up global prices as well. So the risk of a recession in Europe will rise if the energy squeeze worsens, even if a recession is ultimately avoided.Whatever Russia ends up doing with its military, it may start off with shock and awe. Europe might see its first major war since World War II. Global investors will react very negatively, at least until they can be assured that the conflict will remain contained in Ukraine. According to our market-based quantitative indicators of Russian geopolitical risk, there is still complacency – the ruble has not fallen as far as one would expect based on key macro variables (Chart 2). Chart 2Russia Geopolitical Risk: Two Quantitative Indicators  Chart 3Russian Market Reaction Amid Ukraine Crisis Investors will sell European – especially eastern European – equities and currencies even more rapidly if a war breaks out (Chart 3). It is too soon to buy the dip. What is needed is a Russian decision and then clarity on the scope of the western reaction. Even then, developed Europe and non-European emerging markets will be more attractive.Looking at global equities: How did the market respond to previous Russian invasions?Few conclusions can be drawn from Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, given Georgia’s lack of systemic importance and the simultaneous global financial crisis (Chart 4). Stocks underperformed bonds and cyclicals underperformed defensives, but value caught a bid relative to growth.Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 occurred in a different macroeconomic context but saw stocks flat relative to bonds, cyclicals fall relative to defensives (except energy stocks), and small caps roll over relative to large caps (Chart 5). Value stocks, however, outperformed growth stocks. Chart 4Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Georgia​​​​​  Chart 5Market Reaction To Russian Invasion Of Crimea​​​​​  Chart 6Ukraine Crisis And Energy: 2022 Versus 2014 However, in today’s context, these cyclical trends are looking stretched, so a temporary pullback from these trends should be expected. Value stocks, especially energy stocks, have skyrocketed relative to growth and defensives and are likely to pull back in a global risk-off move (Chart 6). Tactically we recommend American over European assets, defensives over cyclicals, large caps over small caps, and safe-haven assets like gold and the Japanese yen.Washington Offers “No Change” To MoscowWhy is a diplomatic solution less likely than before?The US offered no concessions to Russia in its formal written response to Russia’s demands on January 26. “No change, and there will be no change” in longstanding policies, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.1 The relevant policies are not about NATO membership – Ukraine is never going to join NATO – but rather about the US and NATO making Ukraine a de facto member by providing arms and defense cooperation. Russia obviously sees a US-armed Ukraine as a threat to its national security.One of the few realistic demands of Russia’s – that the US and NATO stop providing arms – has been flung back in Russia’s face. Blinken pointed out in his press conference that the US has given more defense aid to Ukraine in the past year than in any previous year. He said the US will continue to provide arms while pursuing diplomacy, including five MI-17 helicopters on the way. He also noted that the US has authorized allies to transfer American-origin arms to Ukraine.2The importance of the defense cooperation is not the quality of the arms being transferred (so far) but the long-term potential for the US to turn Ukraine into Russia’s Taiwan, i.e. a foreign-backed military enemy on its doorstep. The costs of inaction today could be checkmate from Russia’s long-term strategic point of view. Russia has warned for 14 years that it saw Ukraine as a red line and yet the US and NATO have increased defense cooperation. It is a moot point whether the US provides arms because it does not empathize with Russia’s security interests or because it believes Russia will attack Ukraine regardless.A diplomatic solution could still come from the US, if more information comes to light, or from Ukraine itself, under French and German pressure. Ukraine could make promises to respect Russia’s national security interests and implement the Minsk Protocols it was forced into after Russia seized Crimea in 2014.3If Ukraine surrenders, Russia can claim victory and reduce the threat of war, at least temporarily. But it would not eliminate the long-term risk of war since Ukraine’s government may not be willing or able to implement any such agreement. Ukraine views the Minsk agreement as a Russian imposition and it has rejected key parts of it (such as federalization and granting rights and privileges to Russian separatists in Donbass) for eight years already.4The joint statement from Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany on January 26 reaffirms the ceasefire in the Donbass.5 It is unlikely that Russia can walk away with this ceasefire alone, having made fundamental demands regarding Russia’s long-term security and the European order. It is more likely that any Ukrainian violation of the ceasefire will now offer a pretext for Russia to respond with military force.Russia’s military advantage is immediate whereas diplomatic attempts by Ukraine to buy time could help it stage a more formidable defense against Russia in future, given ongoing US and NATO defense cooperation. This is why the continuation of arms transfers is the signal. Russia is incentivized to take action sooner rather than later now that the western willingness and urgency to provide arms has increased.Putin has succeeded with his “small war” and “hybrid war” strategy thus far. Russian forex and gold reserves at $630 billion (38% of GDP), gradual diversification away from the dollar (16% of forex reserves), low short-term external debt (5% of GDP), an alternative bank communication system, a special economic relationship with China, a Eurasian Economic Union that can help circumvent sanctions, all provide Russia with some buffer against US sanctions.GeoRisk Indicators: Europe Chart 7European GeoRisk Indicator Amid Ukraine Crisis In our Q3 2021 outlook, we argued that European political risk had bottomed due to Russia. Our geopolitical risk indicators show that financial markets tend to price European political risks in line with the USD-EUR exchange rate. The dollar rallied in 2021 and has since fallen back but a war and energy squeeze in Europe should help the dollar stay resilient, as should Federal Reserve rate hikes (Chart 7).If Russia attacks, the Ukrainians will fall back and then mount an insurgency. This will make the war more difficult than its planners initially believe. It will also raise the risk that war will spill over. Neighbors that provide economic aid – not to mention military aid – will eventually make themselves vulnerable to Russian attack, either to destroy commerce or cut insurgency supply lines.NATO will fortify its borders with troops but then tensions will grow on those borders, reducing security and raising uncertainty in the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Ukraine could become a war zone like Libya or Syria except that this time the US and Russia would truly be fighting a proxy war against each other.Other European Risks Pale In ComparisonWe will monitor the French election in case the Ukraine conflict causes dynamics to shift against President Emmanuel Macron. Most likely Macron’s diplomatic flourishes, combined with France’s insulation from Russia and Ukraine, will benefit him at the ballot box.In the UK, Prime Minister Boris Johnson faces a leadership challenge. He will probably survive but the Conservative Party faces a serious challenge over the coming years. Labour’s comeback will build ahead of the next election, given that the pandemic has dealt a powerful blow against the Tories, who have been in power since 2010 and are therefore becoming stale. Labour has gotten over the Jeremy Corbyn problem.What matters is whether the UK rejoins the EU, whether Scotland leaves the UK, and whether the next government has a strong majority with which to lead. So far there have not been major changes on these issues:The Tories still have a 75-seat majority through 2024.Support for Scottish independence is stuck at 45% where it has been since 2014.Polling is still evenly divided on Brexit. Labour taking power is a prerequisite to any reunion with the EU, Labour does not want to campaign on re-opening the Brexit issue. While Labour will want to run against inflation, and win back the middle class, rather than for the EU.Thus political risk will be flat, not returning to Brexit highs anytime soon, which is marginally good news for pound sterling over a cyclical horizon (Chart 8). Chart 8UK GeoRisk Indicator And Boris Johnson's Troubles India Enters Populist Phase Of Election Cycle2022 will mark the beginning of India’s election season in full earnest, even though general elections are not due until 2024. This is because within the five-year election cycle spanning from 2019-2024, this year will see elections in some of India’s largest states (Chart 9).More importantly 2022 will see elections take place in most of India’s northern region (Chart 10), which is a key constituency for the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Chart 9India: Major State Elections This Year​​​​​  Chart 10North India In Focus With State Elections​​​​​ Of all the state elections due this year, the most critical will be those in Uttar Pradesh, where voting will begin on February 10, 2022. Final results will be declared a month later on March 10, 2022.Uttar Pradesh Will Disappoint BJPAt the last state elections held in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, BJP stormed into power with one of the strongest mandates ever seen in this sprawling and heterogenous state. The BJP boosted its seat share to an extraordinary 77%, leaving competitors far behind (Chart 11). Chart 11Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) Stormed Into Power In Uttar Pradesh (UP) In 2017 Cut to 2022, the BJP appears likely to cross the 50% majority threshold but will cede seat share to a regional party called the Samajwadi Party (SP).What will drive this reduction in seats? The reduction will be driven by a degree of anti-incumbency sentiment and some adverse socio-political arithmetic. In a state where voting is still driven to a large extent by identity politics, it is worth recalling that the BJP was able to win the 2017 elections by pulling votes from three distinct communities:BJP’s core constituency of upper caste Hindus.A subset of Other Backward Classes (OBCs).A subset of a community belonging historically to one of the lowest social levels in India called Dalits.This winning formula of 2017 may not work in 2022 as the BJP faces resentment from parts of each of these three communities as well as from farmers (who were against farm law reforms that the BJP tried to pass).There is a chance that these groups may flock to the regional Samajwadi Party in 2022. The latter is in a position of strength as it is expected to retain support from its core constituency of Muslims and upper-caste OBCs too.Yet the risk is to the downside for the ruling party. Modi and the BJP have suffered a hit to their popular support from the global pandemic and recession, like other world leaders.Reading The Tea Leaves For 2024The pro-Modi wave that began in 2014, and gained steam in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, became a tsunami by 2019, causing the BJP to win a decisive 56% of seats in the national assembly. So, if the BJP loses seats in Uttar Pradesh this year, what will be the implications for the general elections of 2024?In a base case scenario, the Modi-led BJP appears set to emerge as the single largest party in the 2024 elections (albeit with a lower seat share than the 62 of 80 seats that the BJP managed in 2019). As the BJP administration ages, it is expected to lose a degree of seat share in its core constituency of north India. But these losses should be partially offset by gains in regions like east India where the BJP continues to make inroads. Also, national parties tend to attract higher vote share at general elections as compared to state elections, and this is true for the BJP. Most likely the pandemic will have fallen away by 2024 and the economy will be expanding.However, a lot can change in two years, and a major disappointment at Uttar Pradesh would sound alarm bells. By 2024, the BJP will have been in power for ten years. So it is not a foregone conclusion that the BJP will win a single-party majority for a third time, even if it does remain the biggest party.Regional parties like the Samajwadi Party (from Uttar Pradesh), Trinamool Congress (from West Bengal), Shiv Sena (from Maharashtra) and Aam Aadmi Party (from New Delhi) are small but rising and may incrementally eat into the BJP’s national seat share.Policy Implications For 2022 Chart 12India’s Fiscal Report Card May Worsen With Populism India’s central government will unveil its budget for FY23 on Feb 1, 2022 in the Indian parliament. We expect the government to announce a fiscal deficit of 6.6% of GDP which will be marginally lower than the FY22 target of 6.8% of GDP. However, with key elections around the corner, we allocate a high probability to the government announcing a big-bang pro-farmer or pro-poor scheme from this pulpit. This high focus on populism and inadequate focus on capital expenditure could lead markets to question India’s fiscal well-being at a time when its debt levels are high (Chart 12).Distinct from policy risks in the short run, geopolitical risks confronting India are elevated too. India’s relationship with China continues to fester. Sino-Indian frictions could easily take a turn for the worst in 2022 as India enters the business end of its five-year election cycle on one hand and China’s all-important 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP) is due in the fall of 2022. China could take advantage of US distraction in Ukraine to flex its muscles in Asia. A geopolitical showdown with China would likely only cause a temporary drop in Indian equities, but taken with other factors, now is not the time to buy.Bottom Line: We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India.GeoRisk Indicators: Rest Of WorldNeutral China: China’s performance relative to emerging markets may be starting to bottom but we do not recommend buying it. Domestic political risk is still rising according to our indicator and we expect it to keep rising (Chart 13). Negative political surprises will occur in the lead up to the twentieth national party congress and the March 2023 implementation of the “Common Prosperity” plan. Any Russian conflict will distract the US and enable General Secretary Xi Jinping to cement his second ten-year term in office – and China’s reversion to autocracy – with minimal foreign opposition. The US’s conflict with China is one reason Russia believes it has a window of opportunity. Chart 13CHINA GEORISK INDICATOR Short Taiwan: Taiwan’s geopolitical risk has paused far short of previous peaks as the country’s currency and stock market benefit from the ongoing semiconductor shortage. But a peak may be starting to form in relative equity performance (Chart 14). We doubt that China will see any Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 as an opportunity to invade Taiwan, although economic sanctions and cyber-attacks are an option that we fully anticipate. Invading Taiwan is far more difficult militarily than invading Ukraine and China is less ready than Russia for such an operation. However, China might be able to exploit a Russian attack as soon as 2024. Chart 14TAIWAN TERRITORY GEORISK INDICATOR Long South Korea: South Korea’s presidential election is approaching on March 9 and this event combined with North Korea’s new cycle of missile provocations will keep political risk elevated (Chart 15). The conservative People Power party has pulled ahead in opinion polling and the incumbent Democratic Party has been weakened by the pandemic. But the race is still fairly tight and a viable third party candidate could make a comeback. China’s policy easing should eventually benefit South Korea. Chart 15SOUTH KOREA GEORISK INDICATOR Long Australia: Australia’s federal election must be held by May 21 and anti-incumbency feeling has taken hold, with the Liberal-National coalition collapsing in opinion polls relative to the Australian Labor Party. Australia still faces shockwaves from the pandemic and China’s secular slowdown, reversion to autocracy, and conflict with the US, especially if the US gets distracted in Europe. Political risk is high and rising (Chart 16). However, Australia benefits from rising commodity prices and we favor developed markets outside the United States. Chart 16AUSTRALIA GEORISK INDICATOR Long Canada: Canada’s recapitalized its political system with last year’s general election and political risk is subsiding (Chart 17). Canada benefits from rising oil and commodity prices and close proximity to the hyper-stimulated US economy. Chart 17CANADA GEORISK INDICATOR Neutral Turkey: Turkey is one of our perennial candidates for a “black swan” event as the country’s political stability continues to suffer under strongman rule, unorthodox monetary and fiscal policy, military adventures in North Africa and Syria, and now a Russian bid to dominate the Black Sea. Elections looming in 2023 will provoke turmoil as the Erdogan administration is extremely vulnerable and yet has many ways to try to cling to power (Chart 18). Chart 18TURKEY GEORISK INDICATOR Neutral Brazil: Brazilian political risk is subsiding as the market expects former President Lula da Silva to return to power in this October’s presidential election and replace current populist President Jair Bolsonaro. Relative equity performance always appears as if it has bottomed only to inch lower in the next selloff. China’s policy easing is a boon for Brazil but China is not providing massive stimulus, the election will be tumultuous, and even a Lula victory will need to see a market riot to ensure that structural reforms are pursued (Chart 19). Chart 19BRAZIL GEORISK INDICATOR Long South Africa: South Africa still faces elevated political risk despite the conclusion of the 2021 municipal elections. However, the ruling African National Congress, which is pursuing an anti-corruption drive, is likely to stay in power, lending policy continuity. Equities have bottomed and are rebounding relative to emerging markets (Chart 20). The danger is that structural reforms will slip ahead of the spring 2024 election. Chart 20SOUTH AFRICA GEORISK INDICATOR Investment TakeawaysTactically stay long gold, defensives over cyclicals, large caps over small caps, Japanese industrials versus German, GBP-CZK, and JPY-KRW.Book a 10% gain on long DM Europe / short EM Europe. Book a 8.6% gain on long CAD-RUB.   Matt Gertken Vice PresidentGeopolitical Strategymattg@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFAEditor/Strategistritika.mankar@bcaresearch.comFootnotes1      For Blinken’s press conference on the US formal response to Russia, see US Department of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability," January 26, 2022, state.gov.2     For Ukraine’s criticism that Germany should offer pillows in addition to helmets, see Humeyra Pamuk and Dmitry Antonov, "U.S. responds to Russia security demands as Ukraine tensions mount," Reuters, January 26, 2022, reuters.com. For the US’s $2.5 billion in defense aid to Ukraine since 2014, see Elias Yousif, "U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine," January 26, 2022, stimson.org. For purpose and significance, see Samuel Charap and Scott Boston, "U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?" Rand Blog, rand.org.3     Michael Kofman, "Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West," War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022, warontherocks.com.4     In 2021 the US apparently moved to embrace the Minsk Protocols for the first time, but since then it has not joined the talks. See National Security Adviser Jack Sullivan, "White House Daily Briefing," December 7, 2021, c-span.org. 5             Élysée, "Declaration of the advisors to the N4 Heads of States and Governments," January 26, 2022, elysee.fr. See also "Russia, Ukraine agree to uphold cease-fire in Normandy talks," DW, January 26, 2022, dw.com.Geopolitical CalendarStrategic ThemesOpen Tactical Positions (0-6 Months)Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights Indian stocks need more time to digest and consolidate the significant gains from earlier this year. However, the country’s medium and long-term growth outlook remains positive. Indian firms’ profit margins will likely settle at a higher level than usual. That will also put a floor on its equity multiples. With an imminent topline recovery, the main driver of Indian stocks next year will be profits, in contrast with multiple expansions during the last year and a half. India is beginning a cyclical expansion with a cheap rupee. Stay neutral Indian stocks in an EM equity basket for now. Investors should overweight India in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Feature Chart 1Indian Stocks Are Overbought We tactically downgraded Indian stocks from overweight to neutral in EM and emerging Asian equity portfolios in early October this year. This call has worked out well so far as India’s absolute and relative share prices seem to have peaked. The primary reason for our tactical “neutral” call on Indian equities was this market’s vertical rise earlier this year, both in absolute and relative terms. Similar spikes – in terms of magnitude and duration back in 2007 and in 2014 – were followed by a period of underperformance (Chart 1). Yet, we recommended downgrading to only a neutral allocation. The reason is that the country’s cyclical outlook remains constructive, and the profit expansion cycle has further to run. That forbade us from turning too bearish on this bourse. A neutral stance on India also makes sense for the next several months as this bourse digests and consolidates its previous gains. In this report, we detail the various nuances of our analysis. Meanwhile, the Indian currency is cheap versus the greenback and will likely be one of the best performing currencies in the EM world over the next year. A positive currency outlook also makes Indian government bonds attractive for foreign investors, as Indian bonds also offer a high yield amid a benign domestic inflation backdrop. Dedicated EM domestic bond portfolios should stay overweight India. Equity Multiple Compression Ahead? Chart 2India's Profit Margin Expansion Has Led To Its Equity Re-Rating An upshot to the steep equity rally earlier this year has been India’s stretched valuations. That made many investors question the sustainability of the outperformance. A pertinent question, therefore, is how overvalued have Indian stocks become? And how much multiple compression can investors expect in this bourse? Before we answer this question, it’s useful to understand what drove the cyclical re-rating of Indian markets in the first place. The solid black line in Chart 2 shows the gross profit margins of all Indian listed non-financial firms. They have risen substantially since spring 2020 to reach decade-high levels. Margin expansions of this magnitude are indicative of material efficiency gains; and are usually rewarded with an equity re-rating. This is indeed what happened since spring 2020: stock multiples rose following the expanding margins. The same can be said if we only consider the major non-financial corporations’ EBITDA margins (Chart 2, bottom panel). If one looks at the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE) instead, we see a very similar thing: the CAPE ratio has also risen in line with rising profit margins (Chart 3). Chart 3Profit Margins Have A Bearing On Equity Valuations Charts 2 and 3 show that the positive correlations between profit margins and stock multiples held steady over past several cycles. Hence, it will be reasonable to expect that should Indian firms hold on to wide margins, they will not suffer a significant de-rating going forward. Can Margins Stay Wide? Chart 4Indian Firms' Borrowing Costs Will Likely Stay Low Before we delve into the question of whether margins can stay wide, we need to understand what caused such a margin expansion in the first place. That cause is cost cutting: wage bills have gone down as businesses slashed employees. Data from Oxford economics show that there had been 9% fewer workers in India as of September 2021 compared to March 2020, just before the pandemic. Interest expense has also gone down – both relative to sales and profits (Chart 4) – as interest rates were cut aggressively. In our view, the latest rollover in profit margins will likely be temporary and limited. It is probably due to hiring back of some employees. Beyond a near-term limited drop in margins, the more relevant question to ask is, can Indian corporations maintain high margins? Our bias is that, to a large extent, they can. The main reason is that firms’ costs are slated to stay under control: Chart 5Indian Companies Do Not Face Any Wage Pressures Wage expectations are low. Going forward, as millions of new job seekers and workers temporarily discouraged by the pandemic enter the job market, wages have little chance of much of an increase. The top panel of Chart 5 shows salary expectations from an industrial survey by RBI. Both the assessment for the current quarter and expectations for the next quarter have been a net negative for a while. Rural wages are also similarly timid (Chart 5, bottom panel). Notably, companies’ hiring back of employees is slow. It seems they prefer to substitute labor by capital by investing in new machines and equipment. This will boost productivity and cap wages. Overall, high productivity growth will keep companies’ profit margins wide and excess labor will suppress wages. Higher margins and low inflation are bullish for the stock market. Critically, headline inflation is within the central bank target bands, and our model shows that it will likely remain as such (Chart 6, top panel). Core inflation is also likely to stay flattish (Chart 6, bottom panel). This means the odds are that the central bank will not raise rates anytime soon. Flattish inflation and policy rates mean firms’ borrowing costs, in both nominal and real terms, are slated to stay approximately as low as they are now. Low real borrowing costs are usually a tailwind for stocks (Chart 7). Chart 7Low Borrowing Costs Are Bullish For Stocks     All put together, Indian companies will likely see their costs largely under control. That, in turn, should keep profit margins wider than usual. Wide profit margins should limit multiple compression. Can The Topline Rise Further? Wider margins will boost total profits if and once the topline (revenues) recovers. So, the next question is, how much topline recovery is in the cards? Chart 8Indian Economy Is In A Rapid Expansion Mode There are already signs that sales will likely accelerate in the months to come: PMI indexes for both the manufacturing and services sectors have recovered strongly since the Delta variant-induced lockdowns in spring. They are now hovering around a very high level of close to 60. This indicates that the economy is in a rapid expansion mode (Chart 8). The Industrial Outlook survey (conducted by the RBI) shows that the order books for the September quarter was already at a decade-high level. The expectation for the next few quarters is even more elevated – indicating strong momentum (Chart 9, top panel). In other surveys, such as the PMI and Business Expectation survey (from Dun & Bradstreet), we see similar strong order books (Chart 9, bottom panel). While orders are strong, inventory of finished goods is low. Not surprisingly, businesses are expecting very high-capacity utilization in the next few quarters (Chart 10, top two panels). Chart 9Firms' Order Books Are Quite Robust Chart 10Low Inventories Mean Stronger Economic Activity Ahead They are expecting to hire more people. Companies also believe consumer demand will revive which will enable wider profit margins. In sum, firms are optimistic about accelerating economic activity (Chart 10, bottom two panels). Chart 11A Positive Bank Credit Impulse Is Bullish For Industrial Activity This, in turn, is encouraging them to make capital investments. Finally, the commercial banks’ credit impulse has also turned positive. Rising bank credit impulses usually signal stronger industrial production (Chart 11). To summarize, chances are that firms’ top lines are set to rise materially. Coupled with high margins, this will translate into strong profit acceleration in the next several quarters. Put differently, over the past year and a half, Indian firms witnessed rising margins. Going forward, they will likely see rising profits. Higher profits, in turn, will propel Indian share prices cyclically beyond any short-term consolidation. A Sustainable Expansion? In a notable departure from most developed countries, India’s recovery from the pandemic-induced recession has been more capex-led, rather than consumption-led (Chart 12). One reason for that is the Indian government did not supplement the lost household incomes during the lockdowns nearly as much as developed countries did. That, in turn, kept household demand low. And it also contributed to keeping inflation in check – even though India’s supply side was also paralyzed due to strict lockdown measures. On the other hand, firms’ profits soared owing to rigorous cost-cutting. Higher profits in turn have encouraged firms to expand their production capacity. Companies are ramping up capital spending as they expect sales to accelerate in the future (Chart 13). Chart 12A Capex-Led Recovery Will Prolong The Economic Expansion Chart 13Strong Profits Are Encouraging Firms To Ramp Up Capital Spending Notably, the combination of curtailed household demand and robust capital expenditure has set India’s inflation dynamics apart from many other countries in Latin America and EMEA. While India’s inflation remains largely contained, countries in those regions are witnessing accelerating inflation.  Also, over a cyclical horizon, a capex-led expansion is very crucial for India as this will determine the duration and magnitude of the cycle. Strong investment expenditures do not only boost firms’ competitiveness and profitability, but they also help keep inflationary pressures at bay. Lower inflation for a longer period means the central bank need not raise rates as soon and/or as much as otherwise would be the case. That in turn allows the economic and profit expansion to continue for longer. An extended period of expansion is also positive for multiples as investors extrapolate profit growth over many years ahead. India’s current dynamics are a case in point. Given the country is facing no imminent interest rate hikes, stock multiples can stay higher for longer. This is because multiple de-rating commences only after meaningful rate hikes have already been accorded (Chart 14). Since that is quite far off, valuations are not facing any immediate and considerable headwinds. Finally, India is beginning the new cycle with a rather inexpensive currency. Chart 15 shows that the rupee is currently cheaper by about 10% than what would be its “fair value” vis-à-vis the US dollar. The fair value has been derived from a regression analysis of the exchange rate on the relative manufacturing producer prices of India and the US. Chart 14It Takes Several Rate Hikes Before It Hurts Stock Multiples Chart 15India's Cyclical Expansion Has A Tailwind From Cheap Currency   Investment Conclusions Equities: Given the vertical rise earlier this year, Indian stocks would likely need a few more months to digest previous gains and consolidate. Hence, even though the country’s cyclical outlook remains constructive, we recommend that dedicated EM and Asian equity portfolios stay neutral on this market for now. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines and wait for a better entry point. Currency and Bonds: The rupee is cheap and could be one of the best performers within the EM world over a cyclical horizon. Indian government bonds also offer a good value with a rather high yield (6.4% for 10-year securities) amid a benign inflation outlook. A positive rupee outlook also makes Indian bonds more appealing for foreign investors. Investors should stay overweight India in an EM local currency bond portfolio. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Highlights Few emerging market peers have a track record of democracy like India does. Russia and others have long histories of political instability and one-man rule. Several large EMs have experienced stints of military rule in the post-WWII era. While India’s democratic credentials are real, these should not be exaggerated. India’s political system suffers from some structural and cyclical vulnerabilities. These imperfections deserve attention today, more than ever, given that India trades at a record premium to peers. From a strategic perspective, we remain Buyers of India. India’s democratic traditions will lend political stability as the country’s economic heft grows. However, on a time horizon, we recommend paring exposure to Indian assets. A loaded state election calendar awaits in 2022, which will be followed by crucial state elections in 2023 and general elections in 2024. While we expect the incumbent political party to retain power in 2024, history suggests that the road to general elections is paved with policy risks. Policymakers tend to shift attention from market friendly-reform to voter-friendly policies as these key state elections approach. Additionally, geopolitical risks for India are ascendant as dangerous transitions are underway to India’s west and east too. Feature Investors regard India as being exceptionally well-off on political parameters. It is viewed by many as the blue-eyed boy of emerging market democracies. And for good reason. Despite its massive population and very low per capita incomes, India has remained a functional democracy for over seventy years. Democratic political regimes are a relatively new trend. The number of democracies began exceeding the number autocracies in the world only very recently in 2002 (Chart 1). India was one of the earliest adopters of this trend compared to emerging market peers. Its democratic traditions are so well-entrenched now that they are comparable to those of some of the most developed economies of the world (Chart 2). To add to these democratic credentials, every government at the national level in India has completed its full five-year term since 1999, thereby offering stability. Investors greatly value the political stability that India offers. While political stability is only one factor that investors consider, India has traded at a 28% premium relative to democracies and a 67% premium to non-democracies like Russia and China over the last decade (Chart 3). ​​​​ ​​​​​​ In this report we highlight that while India’s democratic credentials are real, these should not be exaggerated. The political system in India is solid but far from perfect. It suffers from both structural and cyclical vulnerabilities. These imperfections deserve attention today more than ever, given that India trades at a record premium to peers (Chart 3). Also, a closer look at India’s political system is warranted given that both geopolitical and macroeconomic risks for India are ascendant. With India, the devil always lies in the details. India is the largest democracy of the world but is also one of the few large democracies that follows a first-past-the-post (FPTP) method of determining election winners and has no effective limit on the number of political parties that can contest elections. Most democracies, either combine an FPTP system with natural or legislative limit on the number of competing political parties (such as in the case of UK and US) or rely on a non-FPTP system, with specific vote thresholds to enter Parliament. The combination of an FPTP system along with a system that allows multiple small political parties to exist entails challenges and makes the system vulnerable to some structural policy problems that are often overlooked. These include: A Tendency To Go All-In: An FPTP system means that at an election, the contestant with the highest number of votes is declared the winner even if the victory margin is very low. For instance, the narrowest victory margin recorded at an Indian constituency-level election is a mere 9 votes! Such a system where the winner takes all, irrespective of the victory margin, creates perverse incentives for contesting candidates to go all-in on populism ahead of elections. Indian elections have thus seen candidates offer everything from food and free laptops, to free alcohol and hard cash, in a bid to woo voters in the run up to elections. Too Many Players Can Spoil The Election: An FPTP system alongside a multi-party system can lead to very high degrees of political competition. While competition is usually a virtue, very high levels of political competition tend to fragment the electorate. Owing to these reasons, political competition in India tends to be very high in general. For instance, the last two general elections in India saw 15 candidates contest from each constituency on average. This compares to an average number of contestants from each constituency being 5 for UK or 6 for Canada. The problem with this fragmentation is that the victorious politician may lack a strong popular mandate. Smaller Indian states bear the brunt of this problem. The smaller the state, the cost of the pre-election campaign is lower, so the number of contestants shoots up in smaller regions (Chart 4). Rent-Seeking Becomes A Necessity: Such a system which combines FPTP and no major entry barriers for contestants arguably encourages rent-seeking behavior, which election winners frequently display. Populist spending promised by candidates to lure voters ahead of elections can be very high, especially when political competition is stiff. Winners then are keen to recover this “sunk cost” and to create a war chest for the next election. This prompts the rent-seeking that often becomes a necessity for candidates who run expensive election campaigns. To conclude, few emerging market peers have a sustained track record of democracy like India does. Russia and others have long histories of both political instability and one-man rule. Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia have all experienced stints of military rule and revolutions in the post-WWII era. Whilst India’s political stability credentials are solid, the existence of high degrees of political competition alongside high degrees of social complexity will spawn both structural and cyclical policy risks in India. Navigating India’s Political Peculiarities It is heuristically convenient to assume that policy risks in India are uniform across time. However, in this report, we highlight that policy risks for India hardly tend to be the same through the five-year term of a political party in charge at the national level. The five-year term of any central government in India is paved with cyclical policy risks. The good news is that there is a method to the madness. We present a simple method to identify a “pattern” to the cyclical policy risks: We break down India’s general election cycle into a five-year sequence. Year 1 is defined as the year after a general election takes place (such as 2020) and Year 5 is defined as the year in which a general election takes place (such as 2019 or 2024). (See the Appendix for a quick overview of India’s political system.) Given that India has 28 states and a state government’s term lasts five years, about six state elections are held each year. After identifying this five-year sequence, we then identify specific states that become due for state elections during this five-year period. Such a characterization of India’s election cycle shows how the five-year period from one election to the other is hardly the same. In fact, it becomes clear how policy risks tend to be definitively elevated in the years leading up to a general election. Year 3 in such a framework sees elections in some of India’s largest states (size), India’s politically most sensitive states (sensitivity), and India’s socially most complex states (complexity). 2022 will mark the beginning of Year 3 of the current five-year cycle and will see: Size: The most loaded state election schedule which will affect more than a quarter of India’s population (Chart 5). Sensitivity: Elections take place in most of India’s northern region (Chart 6), which is a key constituency for the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ Complexity: Elections take place in some of the most socially conflict-prone states such as say Manipur (Chart 7). Year 3 of India’s cycle is also worth bracing for as it typically sees the policy machinery’s attention shift away from big-ticket reform to populism. This is probably because Year 4 sees some of the poorest states in India undergo elections (Chart 8) and then Year 5 sees a general election. ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ What becomes clear now is that India is set to enter the business-end of its five-year election cycle in 2022. So, what specific policy changes should investors expect? The Road To Elections … Is Paved With Policy Risks Irrespective of the political party in power at the centre, populism as a theme tends to become more defined in the two years leading to a general election in India. For instance, history suggests that government spending in the two years leading up to a general election tends to be higher than in the previous three years (Chart 9). The last time this theme did not play out was in the run up to the elections of 2014 when in fact the incumbent i.e., the Indian National Congress (INC) lost elections to the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Distinct from the fiscal support to the economy that tends to rise in the run up to elections, it is notable that even money supply growth, inflation to an extent and even the pace of Rupee depreciation tends to be faster in India in the years leading up to a general election (Chart 10). ​​​​​​ The run up to Year 3 and Year 4 of India’s election cycle also tends to see the announcement of voter-friendly policies that may not necessarily be market-friendly. Examples of this phenomenon include: Record Increase In Revenue Spends Ahead Of 1999 General Elections: In 1998 the-then Finance Minister oversaw a whopping 20% year-on-year increase in revenue expenditure. This is almost double the average growth rate of 13% seen in this metric over the last 25 years. Farm-loan Waiver Ahead of 2009 General Elections: In 2008 i.e., the year before the general elections of 2009, the Indian National Congress (INC)-led central government announced its decision to write off farm loans of about $15 billion (in inflation-adjusted terms today). Demonetization Decision Ahead Of 2017 Uttar Pradesh State Elections: The BJP-led central government announced its decision to demonetize 86% of currency in circulation in November 2016 in a bid to prove the government’s commitment to crackdown on black money. GST Rate Cuts Ahead Of 2017 Gujarat State Elections: The Goods and Services Tax (GST) council announced a cut in the GST rate for over 150 items in November 2017. This was ahead of Gujarat state elections that were due in December 2017. Such decisions are known to work with voters. The incumbent political party that announced these policy decisions, in each of the three cases cited above, won the elections that they subsequently contested. Just last week, the Indian Government decided to repeal farm sector reform related laws which it had announced a year ago. It is not entirely coincidental that this pro-voter decision has been announced just a few months ahead of critical state elections due in 2022. Key State Elections To Watch In 2022 State elections are due in seven states in India in 2022. State elections due in 2022 will have an indelible impact on India’s policy outlook for 2022 because the BJP is the incumbent party in most of these states and BJP’s popularity has suffered because of the pandemic (Chart 11). The government’s decision last week to roll back farm sector reform is a great example of this phenomenon. Of all the state elections due in 2022, the two key elections that will have the biggest bearing on the 2024 general elections will be the elections in Uttar Pradesh in February 2022 and in Gujarat in December 2022. BJP’s popularity in these states should be closely watched to get a better sense of the 2024 general election outcome. The BJP won about 80% of the cumulative seats these two states offer at the 2019 general elections. At the last state elections held in Uttar Pradesh in 2017, the BJP stormed into power in the state, winning 77% of seats. BJP’s entry into power there was symbolic as the road to New Delhi is said to pass through this state (Chart 12). Gujarat on the other hand has been a BJP stronghold and PM Modi began his political innings as the chief minister of this state. Despite being in power in Gujarat for over two decades, the BJP managed to retain power in this state at the last elections held in 2017 (Chart 13). ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ Accurate pre-poll data for these states will be available only closer to election day. Our early on-ground checks suggest that the BJP is set to almost certainly retain power in Uttar Pradesh in 2022. However, the BJP runs the risk of losing some vote share in Gujarat owing to the anti-incumbency effect it faces and owing to the rise of parties like the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in the state of Gujarat. Another tool that can be used to estimate the likely result of these two key state elections is the economic growth momentum in these states. State election results from 2021 suggest that this macro variable matters a great deal. While it is not the only variable that matters, the incumbent lost elections in large states in 2021 when growth decelerated excessively (Chart 14). For instance, in 2021, Tamil Nadu saw its GDP growth decelerate significantly but West Bengal saw its GDP growth decelerate by a lesser extent. Notably, the incumbent was displaced out of power in Tamil Nadu but managed to retain power in West Bengal possibly because of several factors including a lesser slowdown in economic growth (Chart 14). If GDP growth were to affect election outcomes in 2022 as well then, the incumbent i.e., the BJP, will comfortably retain power in Uttar Pradesh but may have to deal with the risk of losing some vote share in Gujarat. This is because economic growth accelerated in Uttar Pradesh over the last five years before the pandemic. GDP growth rates remained high in Gujarat but the pace of acceleration was weaker (Chart 15). ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ However, from the perspective of the general elections of 2024, BJP’s position in these two states remains fairly strong, and this is true even if it experiences minor setbacks in the upcoming state elections. National parties like the BJP tend to enjoy greater fervor amongst voters in general elections as opposed to state elections. It hence would take an earthquake defeat in these state elections to alter this assumption – an outcome which appears unlikely at this stage. The takeaway from the above is that investors must brace for the BJP pursuing populist policies over the next two years. In fact, we are increasingly convinced that the BJP government’s budget for FY23 (due to be announced on 1 February 2022) will see a marked increase in transfer payments for farmers in specific or low-income groups in general. The announcement of a brand-new program aimed at lifting incomes of India’s lowest economic strata cannot be ruled out. But from the perspective of the 2024 elections, the BJP appears well-placed to retain power. Investors will face negative policy turbulence in the short run but should maintain a base case of policy continuity over the long run. Investment Conclusions If You Are Playing A Long Game, Then Hold: From a strategic perspective, we remain Buyers of India. India’s democratic traditions will lend political stability as the country’s economic heft grows. Its democratic credentials will also yield geopolitical advantages as America aims to create an axis of democracies to contain autocratic regimes. It is notable that the US’s most recent alliance-formation efforts - such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal - involve some of the oldest democracies of the world. As India sheds its historical stance of neutrality, in favor of closer alignment with the US against China, its democratic credentials will help India deepen its engagement with geopolitically powerful democracies. If You Are Playing A Short Game, Then Fold: The Indian market appears priced for perfection today. We recommend paring exposure to Indian assets on a tactical time horizon. Historically India’s premium relative to emerging markets has shown some correlation with the BJP’s popularity (Chart 16). However, India’s premium relative to EMs has shot through the roof over the last year and hence even if BJP wins the Uttar Pradesh elections (our base case), then it is unclear if that victory will drive another bout of price-to-earnings re-rating for India. Moreover, as outlined, the road to state elections in 2022 will be paved with policy risks as the government prioritizes populism ahead of pro-market reform. The BJP has managed to expand its influence in India over the last decade (Chart 17). But a unique problem now confronts Indian policymakers: while stock markets in India have risen almost vertically, wage inflation has collapsed (Chart 18). Additionally, India has administered a weak post-pandemic fiscal stimulus (Chart 19). We reckon that this fiscal restraint will be tested in the run up to key elections in 2022-23. ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ Unlike in developed economies, where fiscal stimulus is seen as pro-market because it suggests policymaking is improving and deflationary risks will be dispelled, fiscal stimulus can be market-negative in the context of an EM like India. Increases in populist spending can end up adding to existent inflationary pressures and hence can drive bond yields higher. Stock market earnings too may not end up getting a major boost on the back of increase in transfer payments to low-income groups. This is because the share of market cap accounted for by sectors which directly benefit from pro-poor spending, like Consumer Staples, has been drifting lower on Indian bourses from 10.8% in 2013 to 8.9% today. As we have been highlighting, distinct from policy risks that confront India on a tactical horizon, geopolitical risks confronting India are elevated too. Dangerous transitions are underway to India’s west (involving Pakistan and Afghanistan) as well as east (involving China). While China’s woes drive EM investors to India, any clashes with neighbors will create much better entry points into Indian stocks.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Appendix: An Overview Of India’s Political System India follows a parliamentary model of democracy with a federal structure where the government at the centre as well as state level is elected for a period of five years. The central government of India is formed through general elections that are held every five years. Power is held by a political party (or a coalition of parties) that can secure and maintain a simple majority in the Lower House (or Lok Sabha) through this five-year term. India also constitutes 28 states, each with its own legislative assembly. Each state government is formed through a state election held every five years. Much like at the centre, power is held by a political party that can maintain a simple majority at the legislative assembly for this five-year term.  

Highlights Short-term inflation risk will escalate further if politics causes new supply disruptions. Long-term inflation risk is significant as well. There is a distinct risk of a geopolitical crisis in the Middle East that would push up energy prices: the US’s unfinished business with Iran. The primary disinflationary risk is China’s property sector distress. However, Beijing will strive to maintain stability prior to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. South Asian geopolitical risks are rising. The Indo-Pakistani ceasefire is likely to break down, while Afghani terrorism will rebound. Book gains on our emerging market currency short targeting “strongman” regimes. Feature Investors are underrating the risk of a global oil shock. This was our geopolitical takeaway from the BCA Conference this year. Investors are focused on the risk of inflation and stagflation, always with reference to the 1970s. The sharp increase in energy prices due to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are universally cited as aggravating factors of stagflation at that time. But these events are also given as critical differences between the situation in the 1970s and today. Unfortunately, there could be similarities. From a strictly geopolitical perspective, the risk of a conflict in the Middle East is significant both in the near term and over the coming year or so. The risk stems from the US’s unfinished business with Iran. More broadly, any supply disruption would have an outsized impact as global energy inventories decline. OPEC’s spare capacity at present can cover a 5 million barrel shock (Chart 1). In this week’s report we also provide tactical updates on China, Russia, and India. Geopolitics And The 1970s Inflation Chart 2Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Fundamentally the stagflation of the 1970s occurred because global policymakers engendered a spiral of higher wages and higher prices. The wage-price spiral was exacerbated by a falling dollar, after President Nixon abandoned the gold standard, and a commodity price surge (Chart 2). Monetary policy clearly played a role. It was too easy for too long, with broad money supply consistently rising relative to nominal GDP (Chart 3). Central banks including the Federal Reserve were focused exclusively on employment. Policymakers saw the primary risk to the institution’s credibility as recession and unemployment, not inflation. Fear of the Great Depression lurked under the surface. Fiscal policy also played a role. The size of the US budget deficit at this time is often exaggerated but there is no question that they were growing and contributed to the bout of inflation and spike in bond yields (Chart 4). The reason was not only President Johnson’s large social spending program, known as the “Great Society.” It was also Johnson’s war – the Vietnam war. Chart 3Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s On top of this heady mix of inflationary variables came geopolitics. The Yom Kippur war in 1973 prompted Arab states to impose an embargo on Israel’s supporters in the West. The Arab embargo cut off 8% of global oil demand at the time. Oil prices skyrocketed, precipitating a deep recession (Chart 5). Chart 4Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending The embargo came to a halt in spring of 1974 after Israeli forces withdrew to the east of the Suez Canal. The oil shock exacerbated the underlying inflationary wave that continued throughout the decade. The Iranian revolution triggered another oil shock in 1979, bringing the rise in general prices to their peak in the early 1980s, at which point policymakers intervened decisively. Chart 5Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution There is an analogy with today’s global policy mix. Fear of the Great Recession and deflation rules within policymaking circles, albeit less so among the general public. The Fed and the European Central Bank have adjusted their strategies to pursue an average inflation target and “maximum employment.” Chart 6Wage-Price Spiral Today?​​​​​​ The Biden administration is reviving big government with a framework agreement of around $1.2 trillion in new deficit spending on infrastructure, green energy, and social programs likely to pass Congress before year’s end. In short, the macro and policy backdrop are changing in a way that is reminiscent of the 1970s despite various structural differences between the two periods. It is too early to declare that a wage-price spiral has developed but core inflation is rising and investors are right to be concerned about the direction and potential for inflation surprises down the road (Chart 6). These trends would not be nearly as concerning if they were not occurring in the context of a shift in public opinion in favor of government versus markets, labor versus capital, onshoring versus offshoring, and protectionism versus free trade. Investors should note that the last policy sea change (in the opposite direction) lasted roughly 30-40 years. The global savings glut – shown here as the combined current account balances of the world’s major economies – has begun to decline, implying that a major deflationary force might be subsiding. Asian exporters apparently have substantial pricing power, as witnessed by rising export prices, although they have yet to break above the secular downtrend of the post-2008 period (Chart 7). Chart 7Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary A commodity price surge is also underway, of course, though it is so far manageable. The US and EU economies are less energy-intensive than in the 1970s and there is considerable buffer between today’s high prices and an economic recession (Chart 8). Chart 8Wage-Price Spiral Today? The problem is that there is a diminishing margin of safety. Furthermore, a crisis in the Middle East is not far-fetched, as there is a concrete and distinct reason for worrying about one: the US’s unresolved collision course with Iran. A crisis in the Persian Gulf would greatly exacerbate today’s energy shortages. Iran: The Risk Of An Oil Shock Iran now says it will rejoin diplomatic talks over its nuclear program in late November. This development was expected, and is important, but it masks the urgent and dangerous trajectory of events that could blow up any day now. It is emphatically not an “all clear” sign for geopolitical risk in the Persian Gulf. The US is hinting, merely hinting, that it is willing to use military force to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The Iranians doubt US appetite for war and have every reason to think that nuclear status will guarantee them regime survival. Thus the Iranians are incentivized to use diplomacy as a screen while pursuing nuclear weaponization – unless the US and Israel make a convincing display of military strength to force Iran back to genuine diplomacy. A convincing display is hard to do. A secret war is taking place, of sabotage and cyber-attacks. On October 26 a cyber-attack disrupted Iranian gas stations. But even attacks on nuclear scientists and facilities have not dissuaded the Iranians from making progress on their nuclear program yet. Iran does not want to be attacked but it knows that a ground invasion is virtually impossible and air strikes alone have a poor record of winning wars. The Iranians have achieved 60% highly enriched uranium and are expected to achieve nuclear breakout capacity – the ability to make a nuclear device – sometime between now and December (Table 1). The IAEA no longer has any visibility in Iran. The regime’s verified production of uranium metal can only be used for the construction of a warhead. Recent technical progress may be irreversible, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.1 If that is true then the upcoming round of diplomatic negotiations is already doomed. Table 1Iran’s Compliance With Nuclear Deal And Time Until Breakout (Oct 2021) American policymakers seem overconfident in the face of this clear nuclear proliferation risk. This is strange given that North Korea successfully manipulated them over the past three decades and now has an arsenal of 40-50 nuclear weapons. The consensus goes as follows: Regime instability: Americans emphasize that the Iranian regime is unstable, lacks genuine support, and faces a large and restive youth population. This is all true. Indeed Iran is one of the most likely candidates for major regime instability in the wake of the COVID-19 shock. Chart 9AIran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ...​​​​​​ Chart 9B... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising However, popular protest has not had any effect on the regime over the past 12 years. Today the economy is improving and illicit oil revenues are rising (Chart 9). A new nationalist government is in charge that has far greater support than the discredited reformist faction that failed on both the economic and foreign policy fronts (Chart 10). The sophisticated idea that achieving nuclear breakout will somehow weaken the regime is wishful thinking.  If it provokes US and/or Israeli air strikes, it will most likely see the people rally around the flag and convince the next generation to adopt the revolutionary cause.2 If it does not provoke a war, then the regime’s strategic wisdom will be confirmed. American military and economic superiority: Americans tend to think that Iran will back down in the face of the US’s and Israel’s overwhelming military and economic superiority. It is true that a massive show of force – combined with the sale of specialized weaponry to Israel to enable a successful strike against extremely hardened nuclear facilities – could force Iran to pause its nuclear quest and go back to negotiations. Yet the US’s awesome display of military power in both Iraq and Afghanistan ended in ignominy and have not deterred Iran, just next door, after 20 years. Nor have American economic sanctions, including “maximum pressure” sanctions since 2019. The US is starkly divided, very few people view Iran as a major threat, and there is an aversion to wars in the Middle East (Chart 11). The Iranians could be forgiven for doubting that the US has the appetite to enforce its demands. ​​​​​​ ​​​​​​ In short the US is attempting to turn its strategic focus to China and Asia Pacific, which creates a power vacuum in the Middle East that Iran may attempt to fill. Meanwhile global supply and demand balances for energy are tight, with shortages popping up around the world, giving Iran greater leverage. From an investment point of view, a crisis is likely in the near term regardless of what happens afterwards. A crisis is necessary to force the US and Iran to return to a durable nuclear deal like in 2015. Otherwise Iran will reach nuclear breakout and an even bigger crisis will erupt, potentially forcing the US and Israel (or Israel alone) to take military action. Diplomatic efforts will need to have some quick and substantial victories in the coming months to convince us that the countries have moved off their collision course. A conflict with Iran will not necessarily go to the extreme of Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz and cutting off 21% of the world’s oil and 26% of liquefied natural gas (Chart 12). If that happens a global recession is unavoidable. It would more likely involve lesser conflicts, at least initially, such as “Tanker War 2.0” in the Persian Gulf.3 Or it could involve a flare-up of the ongoing proxy war by missile and drone strikes, such as with the Abqaiq attack in 2019 that knocked 5.7 million barrels per day offline overnight. The impact on oil markets will depend on the nature and magnitude of the event. What are the odds of a military conflict? In past reports we have demonstrated that there is a 40% chance of conflict with Iran. The country’s nuclear program is at a critical juncture. The longer the world goes without a diplomatic track to defuse tensions, the more investors should brace for negative surprises. Bottom Line: There is a clear and present danger of a geopolitical oil shock. The implication is that oil and LNG prices could spike in the coming zero-to-12 months. The implication would be a dramatic “up then down” movement in global energy prices. Inflation expectations should benefit from simmering tensions but a full-blown war would cause an extreme price spike and global recession. China: The Return Of The Authoritative Person Another reason that today’s inflation risk could last longer than expected is that China’s government is likely to backpedal from overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy. If this is true then China will secure its economic recovery, the global recovery will continue, commodity prices will stay elevated, and the inflation expectations and bond yields will recover. If it is not true then investors will start talking about disinflation and deflation again soon. We are not bullish on Chinese assets – far from it. We see China entering a property-induced debt-deflation crisis over the long run. But over the 2021-22 period we have argued that China would pull back from the brink of overtightening. Our GeoRisk Indicator for China highlights how policy risk remains elevated (see Appendix). So far our assessment appears largely accurate. The government has quietly intervened to prevent the troubled developer Evergrande from suffering a Lehman-style collapse. The long-delayed imposition of a nationwide property tax is once again being diluted into a few regional trial balloons. Alibaba founder Jack Ma, whom the government disappeared last year, has reappeared in public view, which implies that Beijing recognizes that its crackdown on Big Tech could cause long-term damage to innovation. At this critical juncture, a mysterious “authoritative” commentator has returned to the scene after five years of silence. Widely believed to be Vice Premier Liu He, a Politburo member and Xi Jinping confidante on economic affairs, the authoritative person argues in a recent editorial that China will stick with its current economic policies.4 However, the message was not entirely hawkish. Table 2 highlights the key arguments – China is not oblivious to the risk of a policy mistake. Table 2Messages From China’s ‘Authoritative Person’ On Economic Policy (2021) Readers will recall that a similar “authoritative Person” first appeared in the People’s Daily in May 2016. At that time, the Chinese government had just relented in the face of economic instability and stimulated the economy. It saw a 3.5% of GDP increase in fiscal spending and a 10.0% of GDP increase in the credit impulse from the trough in 2015 to the peak in 2016. The authoritative person was explaining that the intention to reform would persist despite the relapse into debt-fueled growth. So one must wonder today whether the authoritative person is emerging because Beijing is sticking to its guns (consensus view) or rather because it is gradually being forced to relax policy by the manifest risk of financial instability. To be fair, a recent announcement on government special purpose bonds does not indicate major fiscal easing. If local governments accelerate their issuance of new special purpose bonds to meet their quota for the year then they are still not dramatically increasing the fiscal support for the economy. But this announcement could protect against downside growth risks. The first quarter of 2022 will be the true test of whether China will remain hawkish. Going forward there are two significant dangers as we see it. The first is that policymakers prove ideological rather than pragmatic. An autocratic government could get so wrapped up in its populist campaign to restrain high housing costs that it refuses to slacken policies enough and causes a crash. The second danger is that inflation stays higher for longer, preventing authorities from easing policy even when they know they need to do so to stabilize growth. The second danger is the bigger of the two risks. As for the first risk, ideology will take a backseat to necessity. Xi Jinping needs to secure key promotions for his faction in the top positions of the Communist Party at the twentieth national party congress in 2022. He cannot be sure to succeed if the economy is in free fall. A self-induced crash would be a very peculiar way of trying to solidify one’s stature as leader for life at the critical hour. Similarly China cannot maintain a long-term great power competition with the United States if it deliberately triggers property deflation and financial turmoil. It can and will continue modernizing and upgrading its military, e.g. developing hypersonic missiles, even if it faces financial turmoil. But it will have a much greater chance of neutralizing US regional allies and creating a regional buffer space if its economic growth is stable. Ultimately China cannot prevent financial instability, economic distress, and political risk from rising in the coming years. There will be a reckoning for its vast imbalances, as with all countries. It could be that this reckoning will upset the Xi administration’s best-laid plans for 2022. But before that happens we expect policy to ease. A policy mistake today would mean that very negative economic outcomes will arrive precisely in time to affect sociopolitical stability ahead of the party congress next fall. We will keep betting against that. Bottom Line: China’s “authoritative” media commentator shows that policymakers are not as hawkish as the consensus holds. The main takeaway is that policymakers will adjust the intensity of their reform efforts to maintain stability. This is standard Chinese policymaking and it is more important than usual ahead of the political rotation in 2022. Otherwise global inflation risk will quickly give way to deflation risk as defaults among China’s property developers spread and morph into broader financial and economic instability. Indo-Pakistani Ceasefire: A Breakdown Is Nigh India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along the line of control in February 2021. While the agreement has held up so far, a breakdown is probably around the corner. It was never likely to last for long. Over the short run, the ceasefire made sense for both countries: COVID-19 Risks: The first wave of the pandemic had abated but COVID-19-related risks loomed large. India had administered less than 15 million vaccine doses back then and Pakistan only 100,000. Dangerous Transitions Were Underway: With America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in the works, Pakistan was fully focused on its western border. India was pre-occupied with its eastern front, where skirmishes with Chinese troops forced it to redirect some of its military focus. As we now head towards the end of 2021, these constraints are no longer binding. COVID-19 Risks Under Control: The vaccination campaign in India and Pakistan has gathered pace. More than 50% of India’s population and 30% of Pakistan’s have been given at least one dose. Pakistan’s Ducks Are Lined-up In Afghanistan: America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been completed. Afghanistan is under Taliban’s control and Pakistan has a better hold over the affairs of its western neighbor. One constraint remains: India and China remain embroiled in border disputes. Conciliatory talks between their military commanders broke down a fortnight ago. Winter makes it nearly impossible to undertake significant operations in the Himalayas but a failure of coordination today could set up a conflict either immediately or in the spring. While India may see greater value in maintaining the ceasefire than Pakistan, India has elections due in key northern states in 2022. India’s northern states harbor even less favorable views of Pakistan than the rest of India. Hence any small event could trigger a disproportionate response from India. Bottom Line: While it is impossible to predict the timing, a breakdown in the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire may materialize in 2022 or sooner. Depending on the exact nature of any conflict, a geopolitically induced selloff in Indian equities could create a much-needed consolidation of this year’s rally and ultimately a buying opportunity. Russia, Global Terrorism, And Great Power Relations Part of Putin’s strategy of rebuilding the Russian empire involves ensuring that Russia has a seat at the table for every major negotiation in Eurasia. Now that the US has withdrawn forces from Afghanistan, Russia is pursuing a greater role there. Most recently Russia hosted delegations from China, Pakistan, India, and the Taliban. India too is planning to host a national security advisor-level conference next month to discuss the Afghanistan situation. Do these conferences matter for global investors? Not directly. But regional developments can give insight into the strategies of the great powers in a world that is witnessing a secular rise in geopolitical risk. China, Russia, and India have skin in the game when it comes to Afghanistan’s future. This is because all three powers have much to lose if Afghanistan becomes a large-scale incubator for terrorists who can infiltrate Russia through Central Asia, China through Xinjiang, or India through Pakistan. Hence all three regional powers will be constrained to stay involved in the affairs of Afghanistan. Terrorism-related risks in South Asia have been capped over the last decade due to the American war (Chart 13). The US withdrawal will lead to the activation of latent terrorist activity. This poses risks specifically for India, which has a history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. And yet, while China and Russia saw the Afghan vacuum coming and have been engaging with Taliban from the get-go, India only recently began engaging with Taliban. The evolution of Afghanistan under the Taliban will also influence the risk of terrorism for the rest of the world. In the wake of the global pandemic and recession, social misery and regime failures in areas with large youth populations will continue to combine with modern communications technology to create a revival of terrorist threats (Chart 14). American officials recently warned of the potential for transnational attacks based in Afghanistan to strike the homeland within six months. That risk may be exaggerated today but it is real over the long run, especially as US intelligence turns its strategic focus toward states and away from non-state actors. India, Europe, and other targets are probably even more vulnerable than the United States. If Russia and China succeed in shaping the new Afghanistan’s leadership then the focus of militant proxies will be directed elsewhere. Beyond terrorism, if Russia and China coordinate closely over Afghanistan then India may be left in the cold. This would reinforce recent trends in which a tightening Russo-Chinese partnership hastens India’s shift away from neutrality and toward favoring the US and the West in strategic matters. If these trends continue to the point of alliance formation, then they increase the risk that any conflicts between two powers will implicate others. Bottom Line: Afghanistan is now a regional barometer of multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, the exclusivity of Russo-Chinese cooperation, and India’s strategic isolation or alignment with the West. Investment Takeaways It is too soon to play down inflation risks. We share the BCA House View that they will subside next year as pandemic effects wane. But we also see clear near-term risks to this view. In the short run (zero to 12 months), a distinct risk of a Middle Eastern geopolitical crisis looms. A gradual escalation of tensions is inflationary whereas a sharp spike in conflict would push energy prices into punitive territory and kill global demand. Over the next 12 months, China’s economic and financial instability will also elicit policy easing or fiscal stimulus as necessary to preserve stability, as highlighted by the regime’s mouthpiece. Obviously stimulus will not be utilized if the economic recovery is stable, given elevated producer prices. In a future report we will show that Russia is willing and able to manipulate natural gas prices to increase its bargaining leverage over Europe. This dynamic, combined with the risk of cold winter weather exacerbating shortages, suggests that the worst is not yet over. Geopolitical conflict with Russia will resume over the long run. Stay long gold as a hedge against both inflation and geopolitical crises involving Iran, Taiwan/China, and Russia. Maintain “value” plays as a cheap hedge against inflation. Book a profit of 2.5% on our short trade for currencies of emerging market “strongmen,” Turkey, Brazil, and the Philippines. Our view is still negative on these economies. Stay long cyber-security stocks. Over the long run, inflation risk must be monitored. We expect significant inflation risk to persist as a result of a generational change in global policy in favor of government and labor over business and capital. But the US is maintaining easy immigration policy and boosting productivity-enhancing investments. Meanwhile China’s secular slowdown is disinflationary. The dollar may remain resilient in the face of persistently high geopolitical risk. The jury is still out.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, "Iran’s Recent, Irreversible Nuclear Advances," Institute for Science and International Security, September 22, 2021, isis-online.org. 2     Ray Takeyh, "The Bomb Will Backfire On Iran," Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 3     See Aaron Stein and Afshon Ostovar, "Tanker War 2.0: Iranian Strategy In The Gulf," Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 10, 2021, fpri.org. 4     "Ten Questions About China’s Economy," Xinhua, October 24, 2021, news.cn.     Section II: Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia United Kingdom Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Australia South Africa Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights As US and China’s grand strategies collide, expect major and minor geopolitical earthquakes whose epicenter will now lie in South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin. Another tectonic change will drive South Asia’s emergence as a new geopolitical battle ground - South Asia is now heavily weaponized. All key players operating in this theater are nuclear powers. South Asia’s democratic traditions are well-known but notable institutional and social fault lines exist. These could trigger major geopolitical events in Afghanistan, Pakistan and in pockets of India too. We are bullish on India strategically but bearish tactically. Dangerous transitions are underway to India’s east and west. Within India, key elections are approaching, and it is possible that growth may disappoint. For reasons of geopolitics, we are strategically bullish on Bangladesh but strategically bearish on Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We are booking gains of 9% on our long rare earths basket and 1% on our long GBP-CZK trade. Feature Over the 1900s, East Asia and the Middle East emerged as two key geopolitical focal points on the world map. Global hegemons flexed their muscles and clashed in these two theaters. Meanwhile South Asia was a geopolitical backstage at best. The majority of South Asia was a British colony until the second half of the twentieth century. After WWII it struggled with the difficulties of independence and mostly missed out on the prosperity of East Asia and the Pacific. But will the twenty-first century be any different? Absolutely so. We expect the current century to be marked by major and minor geopolitical earthquakes in which South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin will play a major part. This seismic change is likely to be the result of several tectonic forces: Population: A quarter of the world’s people live in South Asia today and this share will keep growing for the next four decades. India will be the most populous country in the world by 2027 and will account for about a fifth of global population. Supply: China’s growth model has left it heavily dependent on imports of raw materials from abroad. It is clashing with the West over markets and supply chains. Beijing is building supply lines overland while developing a navy to try to secure its maritime interests. These interests increasingly overlap with India’s, creating economic competition and security concerns over vital sea lines of communication. Access: Whilst the Himalayas and Tibetan plateau have historically prevented China from expanding its influence in South Asia, China’s alliance with Pakistan is strengthening. Physical channels like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and other linkages under the Belt and Road Initiative, now provide China a foot in the South Asian door like never before (Map 1). Weapons: The second half of the twentieth century saw China, India, and Pakistan acquire nuclear arms. Consequently, South Asia today is one of the most weaponized geographies globally (Map 1). Map 1South Asia To Emerge As A Key Geopolitical Theater In The 21st Century With the South Asian economy ever developing, and US-China confrontation here to stay, we expect China to make its presence felt in South Asia over the coming decades. The US’s recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the failure of democratization in Myanmar, are but two symptoms of a grand strategic change by which China seeks to prevent US encirclement and Indo-American cooperation develops to counter China. Throw in the abiding interests of all these powers in the Middle East and it becomes clear that South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin writ large will become increasingly important over the coming decades. The Lay Of The Land - India Is The Center Of Gravity Chart 1South Asia Managed Rare Feat Of ‘Steady’ Growth South Asia stands out amongst developing regions of the world for its large and young population. In recent decades, South Asia has also managed to grow its economy steadily, surpassing Sub-Saharan Africa and rivaling the Middle East (Chart 1). While South Asia’s growth rates have not been as miraculous as East Asia post World War II, its growth engine has managed to hum slowly but surely. India and Bangladesh have been the star performers on the economic growth front (Chart 2). Despite decent growth rates, the South Asian region is characterized by very low per capita incomes due to large population. On per capita incomes, Sri Lanka leads whilst Pakistan finds itself at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 3). Chart 2India And Bangladesh Have Been Star Performers Chart 3Per Capita Incomes In South Asia Have Grown, But Remain Low Chart 4India Accounts For About 80% Of South Asia’s GDP South Asia constitutes eight nations. However only four are material from an investment perspective: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. India is the center of gravity as it offers the most liquid scrips and accounts for 80% of the region’s GDP (Chart 4). In addition: India accounts for 101 of the 110 companies from South Asia listed on MSCI’s equity indices. MSCI India’s market capitalization is about $1 trillion. In fact, India’s equity market could soon become larger than that of the UK and join the world’s top-five club.1 The combined market cap of MSCI Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan amounts to only about $6 billion. Liquidity is a constraint that investors must contend with whilst investing in these three countries in South Asia. Pakistan is the home of 220 million – set to grow to 300 million by 2040. It lags its neighbors on economic growth and governance but has nuclear weapons and a 650,000-strong military. Bottom Line: India is the center of gravity for the regional economy and financial markets in South Asia. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are small but are developing. Pakistan is the laggard, but is militarily strong, which raises political and geopolitical risks. South Asia: Major Consumer, Minor Producer Chart 5Manufacturing Capabilities Of South Asian Economies Are Weak South Asia’s defining economic characteristic is that it is a major consumer. This feature contrasts with the region’s East Asian cousins, which worked up economic miracles based on their manufacturing capabilities. South Asia’s appetite to consume is partly driven by population and partly driven by the fact that this region’s economies have an unusually underdeveloped manufacturing base (Chart 5). It’s no surprise that all countries in South Asia (with the sole exception of Afghanistan) are set to have a current account deficit over the next five years (Charts 6A and 6B). Chart 6ASouth Asian Economies Tend To Be Net Importers Chart 6BSouth Asian Economies Tend To Be Net Importers India is set to become the third largest global importer of goods and services (after the US and UK) over the next five years. Its rise as a large client state of the world will be both a blessing and a curse, as increased business leverage will coincide with geopolitical insecurity. Structurally, Sino-Indian tensions are rising and growing bilateral trade will not be enough to prevent them. Meanwhile dependency on the volatile Middle East is a geopolitical vulnerability. Either way, India and its region become more important to the rest of the world over time. Whilst the structure of South Asia’s economy is relatively rudimentary, it is worth noting that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka present an exception. Bangladesh has embarked on a path of manufacturing-oriented development via labor-intensive production. Sri Lanka has a well-developed services sector (Chart 7). In particular: Bangladesh: Within South Asia, Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector stands out as being better developed than regional peers. More than 95% of Bangladesh’s exports are manufactured goods –a level that is comparable to China (Chart 8). China’s share in the global apparel and footwear market has been systematically declining and Bangladesh is one of the countries that has benefited most from this shift. Bangladesh’s share in global apparel and footwear exports to the US as well as EU has been rising steadily and today stands at 4.5% and 13% respectively.2 Chart 7Bangladesh’s And Sri Lanka’s Economies Are Relatively Modern Chart 8Bangladesh Has The Most Developed Exports Franchise In South Asia Sri Lanka: Whilst Sri Lanka social complexities are lower and per capita incomes are higher as compared to peers in South Asia, its transition from a long civil war to a focus on economic development recently suffered a body blow, first owing to terrorist attacks in 2019 and then owing to the pandemic. The economic predicament was then worsened by its government’s hasty transition to organic farming which hit domestic food production. Geopolitically it is worth noting that China is one of the largest lenders to Sri Lanka. Whilst Sri Lanka’s central bank may be able to convince markets of the nation’s ability to meet debt obligations for now, its foreign exchange reserves position remains precarious and public debt levels remain high. Sri Lanka’s vulnerable finances are likely to only increase Sri Lanka’s reliance on capital-rich China. Despite Democracy, South Asia Has Political Tinderboxes Another factor that sets South Asia apart from developing regions like Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia is the region’s democratic moorings. India and Sri Lanka lead the region on this front, although the last decade may have seen minor setbacks to the quality of democracy in both countries (Chart 9). Pockets of South Asia are socially and politically unstable, characterized by religious or communal strife, terrorist activity, and even the occasional coup d'état. Risk Of Social Conflict Most Elevated In Pakistan And Afghanistan India’s demographic dividend is real, but its benefits should not be overstated. For instance, India’s northern region is a demographic tinderbox. It is younger than the rest of the country, yet per capita incomes are lower, youth underemployment is higher, and society is more heterogeneous. The rise of nationalism in India is an important consequence and could engender potential social unrest. Chart 9India’s Democracy Strongest, But May Have Had Some Setbacks Chart 10South Asia Is Young And Will Age Slowly   Chart 11Social Complexities Are High In Afghanistan & Pakistan A similar problem confronts South Asia as a whole. Pakistan and Afghanistan are younger than India by a wide margin (Chart 10). But both countries are economically backward and have either poor or non-existent democratic traditions. Lots of poor youths and inadequate political valves to release social tensions make for an explosive combination. These countries are highly vulnerable to social conflict that could cause political instability at home or across the region via terrorism (Chart 11). The Gatsby Effect Most Prominent In Pakistan While various regions struggle with inequality, South Asia has less of a problem that way (Chart 12). However South Asia is characterized by very low levels of social mobility as compared to peer regions. This can partially be attributed to two centuries of colonial rule as well as to endemic traditions of social stratification. Chart 12Gatsby Effect: Social Mobility Is Lowest In Pakistan Within South Asia it is worth noting that social mobility is the lowest in Pakistan and highest in Sri Lanka. Chart 13Military’s Influence Most Elevated In Pakistan And Nepal Too Military Influential In Pakistan (And Nepal) Events that transpired over January 2020 in the US showed that even the oldest constitutional democracy in the world is not immune to a breakdown of civil-military relations. South Asia has seen the occasional coup d'état, one reason for the political tinderboxes highlighted above. Obviously, Myanmar is the worst – it saw its nascent democratization snuffed out just last year. But other countries in the region could also struggle to maintain civilian order in the coming decades. The military’s influence is outsized in Pakistan as well as Nepal (Chart 13). India maintains high levels of defense spending but has a strong tradition of civilian control (Chart 14). Chart 14Pakistan’s Military Budget Is Most Generous, India A Close Second South Asia: A New Global Battle Ground Historically global hegemons have sought to assert their dominance by staking claim over coastal regions in Europe and Asia. Over the past two centuries Asia has emerged as a geopolitical theater second only to Europe. Naval and coastal conflicts have emerged from the rise of Japan (the Russo-Japanese War) and the Cold War (the Korean War & the Vietnam War). Today the rise of China is the destabilizing factor. The “frozen conflicts” of the Cold War are thawing in Taiwan, South Korea, and elsewhere. China is pursuing territorial disputes around its entire periphery, including notably in the East and South China Seas but also South Asia. Meanwhile the US, fearful of China, is struggling to strike a deal with Iran and shift its focus from the Middle East to reviving its Pacific strategic presence. A budding US-China competition is creating conditions for a new cold war or a series of “proxy battles” in Asia. Over the next few decades, we expect disputes to continue. But the focal points are likely to cover South Asia too. In specific, landlocked regions in South Asia are likely to see rising tensions in the twenty-first century (Map 2). Also as mentioned above, China’s naval expansion and the US’s attempt to form a “quadrilateral” alliance with India, Japan, and Australia will generate tensions and potentially conflict. European allies are also becoming more active in Asia as a result of US alliances as well as owing to Europe’s independent need for secure supply lines. Map 2China’s Interest In Landlocked Regions Of South Asia Is Rising While border clashes between India and China will ebb and flow, Indo-Chinese confrontations along India’s eastern border will become a structural theme. Arguably, Sino-Indian rivalries pre-date the twenty-first century. But in a world in which the Asian giants are increasingly economically and technologically developed, Sino-Indian confrontations are likely to persist and result in major geopolitical events. Consider: China is adopting nationalism and an assertive foreign policy to cope with rising socioeconomic pressures on the Communist Party as potential GDP growth slows. China is developing a navy as well as a stronger alliance with Pakistan, which includes greater lines of communication. North India is a key constituency for the political party in power in India today (i.e., the Bhartiya Janata Party or BJP) and this geography harbors especially unfavorable views of Pakistan (Chart 15). Thus, there is a risk that the India of today could respond far more decisively or aggressively to threats or even minor disputes. More broadly, nationalism is rising in India as well as China. India is shedding its historical stance of neutrality and aligning with the US, which fuels China’s distrust (Chart 16). Chart 15Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India Chart 16India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance Turning attention to India’s western border, clashes between India and Pakistan relating to landlocked areas in Kashmir will also be a recurring theme. Whilst India currently has a ceasefire agreement in place with Pakistan, peace between the two countries cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because: Kashmir: Core problems between the two countries, like India’s control over Kashmir and Pakistan’s use of militant proxies, remain unaddressed. India’s unexpected decision in 2019 to abrogate article 370 of the Indian constitution has reinforced Pakistan’s attention on Kashmir. Sino-Pak Alliance: Pakistan accounted for 38% of China’s arms exports over 2016-20. Pakistan accounts for the lion’s share of Chinese investments made in South Asia (Chart 17). Sino-India rivalries will spill into the Indo-Pak relationship (and vice versa). Revival Of Taliban: The US withdrawal from Afghanistan has revived Taliban rule in that country. Taliban’s rise will resuscitate a range of dormant terrorist movements in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. India has a long history of being targeted. South Asia today is very different from what it looked like for most of the post-WWII era: it is heavily weaponized. India, Pakistan, and China became nuclear powers in the second half of the twentieth century and have been steadily building their nuclear stockpiles ever since (Chart 18). North Korea’s growing arsenal is theoretically able to target India, while Iran (more friendly toward India) may also obtain nuclear weapons. Chart 17China And Pakistan: Joined At The Hip? Chart 18South Asia: The New Epicenter For Nuclear Activity While nuclear arms create a powerful incentive for nations to avoid total war, they can also create unmitigated fear and uncertainty during incidents of major strategic tension. This is especially true when countries have not yet worked out a mode of living with each other, as with the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War. Investment Takeaways For investors with an investment horizon exceeding 12 months, we highlight that India presents a long-term buying opportunity for two key reasons: China’s Internal And External Troubles Will Benefit India: As long as US and China do not reengage in a major way, global corporations will fall under pressure to diversify from China and the US will pursue closer relations with India. China faces an array of challenges across its periphery, whereas India need only focus on the South Asian sphere. India Is Rising As A Global Consumer: As long as a major Middle East war and oil shock is avoided (not a negligible risk), India should see more benefits than costs from its growing importance as a client of the world. However, over the next 12 months we worry that India is priced for perfection. India currently trades at a punchy premium relative to emerging markets (Table 1) at a time of when both geopolitical and macroeconomic headwinds are at play. In particular: Table 1We Are Bearish On India Tactically, But Bullish On India & Bangladesh Strategically Major Transitions Are Dangerous: Recent developments in South Asia have added to geopolitical risks for India. The assumption of power by Taliban in Afghanistan will activate latent terrorist forces that could target India. Pakistan’s chronic instability combined with the change of power in Afghanistan could set off an escalation in Indo-Pakistani tensions, sooner rather than later. On India’s eastern front, China’s need to distract its population from a souring economy could trigger a clash between China and India. Down south, China’s rising influence over crisis-hit Sri Lanka is notable and could potentially engender security risks for India. Chart 19Politics Can Trump Economics In Run Up To General Elections Growth Slowing, Elections Approaching: We worry that India’s growth engine may throw up a downside surprise over the next 12 months owing to poor jobs growth and poor investment growth. History suggests that politics often trumps economics in the run up to general elections (Chart 19). Hence there is a real risk that policy decisions will be voter-friendly but not market-friendly over 2022. As both India and Pakistan are gearing up for elections in the coming years, major military showdown or saber rattling should not be ruled out. Both countries may engineer a rally around the flag effect to bump up their pandemic-battered approval. Tension with China may escalate as Xi Jinping extends his term in power next year and seeks to enforce red lines in China’s eastern and western borders. Globally what are the key geopolitical factors that could lead to India’s underperformance in the short run? We highlight a checklist here: China Stimulates: The near-term clash between markets and policymakers in China should eventually give way to meaningful fiscal stimulus by Chinese authorities. This buoys China as well as emerging markets that depend on China for their growth. However, even if China flounders, India may not continue to outperform. The correlation between MSCI India and China equities has been positive. Fed Tightens Quickly: A faster-than-expected taper and tightening guidance could cause those emerging markets that are richly priced like India to correct. A Crisis Over Iran’s Nuclear Program: If the US is unable to return to diplomacy, tensions in the Middle East will rise and stoke oil prices. This will affect India adversely, given global price pressures and India’s high dependence on oil imports. Conversely, if these developments fail to materialize then that would lower our conviction regarding India’s underperformance in the short run. In summary, we are bullish India strategically but bearish tactically. As regards the three other investable markets in South Asia: We are bearish on Pakistan and Sri Lanka on a strategic time horizon. Whilst both nations’ rising alignment with China could be an advantage ceteris paribus, ironically their deteriorating finances are driving their proximity to capital-rich China (Chart 20). To boot, Sri Lanka’s ability to pay its way out of its economic crisis on its own steam is worsening. This is evident from its rising debt to GDP ratio (Chart 21). Chart 20Pakistan And Sri Lanka Running Low On Reserves Pakistan faces elevated risks of internal social conflict, must deal with a rapidly changing external environment, has a weak democracy and an unusually influential military. Sri Lanka’s social risks are low, but its economic crisis appears likely to persist. The fact that both markets have been characterized by a high degree of volatility in earnings in the recent past implies that even a cyclical “Buy” case for either of these markets is fraught with risks (Table 1). The outlook for Bangladesh is better. Exports account for 15% of GDP and the US and Europe account for around 70% of its exports. Strong fiscal stimulus in these developed markets should augur well for this frontier market. Additionally, Bangladesh is characterized by moderate social risks, reasonably strong democracy scores and low levels of influence from the military. Its healthy public finances (Chart 21) and the fact that it shares no border with China creates the potential to leverage a symbiotic relationship with China. Chart 21Sri Lanka’s Debt Now Exceeds Its GDP But there is a catch. Bangladesh as a market has a low market cap and hence offers low levels of liquidity (Table 1). We thus urge investors to avoid making cyclical investment calls on this South Asian market. However, from a long-term perspective we highlight our strategic bullish view on Bangladesh given supportive geopolitical factors. Watch out for an upcoming report from our Emerging Markets Strategy team, that will delve into the macroeconomic aspects of Bangladesh.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Abhishek Vishnoi and Swetha Gopinath, "India's stock market on track to overtake UK in terms of m-cap: Report" Business Standard, October 2021. 2 Arianna Rossi, Christian Viegelahn, and David Williams, "The post-COVID-19 garment industry in Asia" Research Brief, International Labour Organization, July 2021. Open Trades & Positions

Highlights Indian stock outperformance versus its EM peers has gone vertical. This is unsustainable, and a period of indigestion is likely. We are booking profits on our overweight position and downgrading this market to neutral within overall EM and emerging Asian equity portfolios. That said, India’s medium- and long-term growth and profit outlook remain positive. There are indications that the ongoing expansion could be sustainable as it’s shaping up to be capex-led rather than consumption-led. Feature Chart 1Indian Stock Outperformance Has Gone Vertical We are recommending equity investors book profits on their overweight position in Indian stocks and downgrade this market to a neutral allocation in EM and emerging Asia equity portfolios. This call is tactical in nature – to protect profits – and does not portend a medium- and long-term bearish view on the country. India’s cyclical macro-outlook remains positive, and the profit cycle has further to run. That said, both absolute and relative return investors will likely get a better entry point in the months ahead. A Vertical Rise There are several reasons for our recommendation to book profits: In recent months Indian stocks have gone up vertically both in absolute and relative terms (Chart 1). If history is any guide, this is unsustainable. Back in 2007 and in 2014, this bourse experienced similar surges in relative performance – in terms of duration and magnitude – which were then followed by periods of underperformance. Granted, those were towards the end of a business cycle, as opposed to the beginning of a new cycle as is now the case. Nevertheless, this can still result in a period of indigestion. Incidentally, the steep outperformance versus EM is not simply due to the meltdown in Chinese TMT stocks. Even if we exclude all EM TMT stocks from our calculations, India’s equity outperformance profile remains relatively unchanged (Chart 2). Relative valuations have also become stretched. The cyclically adjusted P/E ratios of Indian stocks vis-à-vis those of the EM and emerging Asia have risen to a level not seen since the early 1990s. This calls for caution (Chart 3). Chart 2Indian Stock Outperformance Is Not Just Due To Chinese TMT Stock Meltdown Chart 3India's Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Versus EM Is At All-Time Highs   Net foreign equity inflows, which were extremely high earlier this year, and which contributed greatly to the rally in Indian equities, have since slowed down to a trickle (Chart 4). It seems that the rally of the last couple of months has been due to local retail investors. If so, retail investors typically go with momentum and might be quick to sell if the market corrects. Finally, energy prices have risen materially over recent months. Given that India is a large net oil importer, rising oil prices have always been bearish for Indian stocks’ relative performance. Yet, so far in this cycle, India has been able to escape the negative ramifications. Now, with oil at over $80 a barrel and still rising, the old negative correlations will likely be back (Chart 5). This will not bode well for Indian markets. Chart 4Foreign Net Equity Inflows To India Have Slowed Down To A Trickle Chart 5Rising Crude Oil Price Are Usually A Headwind For India's Relative Stock Performance   Yet, The Profit Cycle May Have Further To Run Indian firms’ profits have recovered rather strongly. Chart 6 shows that gross profits (EBITDA) of non-financial firms have surged above their pre-pandemic levels. This is also the case even when it is measured in US dollar terms. What is also important to note is that most of this surge has come from a material improvement in profit margins – as opposed to sales. The bottom panel of Chart 6 shows that the top line (sales) of the non-financial firms are yet to surpass the pre-pandemic levels, in stark contrast to profits. The upshot is that the non-financial firms’ margins, both gross and net, have risen to their respective decade-high levels (Chart 7, top panel). Chart 6India's Corporate Profits Have Surged Despite Sluggish Sales Chart 7Lower Costs Have Led To Booming Gross And Net Margins For Indian Firms   We get the same picture if we look at a much wider range of companies: all listed non-financial firms in India. The bottom panel of Chart 7 shows the margin profiles of over 2600 Indian firms compiled by the RBI,1 and it gives a very similar message. Margin expansion of this order is indicative of material efficiency gains – in this case, primarily, cost reduction. If firms can largely hold on to these gains – maintain wide profit margins, once and when sales accelerate – corporate earnings will be turbo-charged. We are biased to believe that the corporate sector will likely be able to sustain its improved margins: One of the major costs of any firm – wages – will likely stay low. The top panel of Chart 8 shows measures of salary expectations from an industrial survey from RBI. Both the assessment for the current quarter and the expectation for the next quarter has been a net negative for some time. In future, wages are not expected to rise much either as millions of new jobseekers will routinely enter the job market every year. In fact, the massive, but likely temporary, contraction in the labor force in 2020 – caused by the COVID-19 pandemic – means that over the next couple of years there will likely be a spike in the number of job seekers. This is because many of last year’s temporarily discouraged workers will return to the job market, in addition to the regular inflows of new job seekers. The wage picture is not much different in the rural hinterlands. The bottom panel of Chart 8 shows that rural wages, for both agricultural and non-agricultural workers, have stopped rising even in nominal terms. In fact, rural wage growth has been quite mediocre over the past several years. If wage pressures stay low, it will also help keep general inflation under control. Indeed, India’s inflation outlook remains benign. Both core and headline inflation are headed lower as projected by our respective inflation models (Chart 9). We elaborated on India’s inflation outlook in greater detail in our last report on India: Can Inflation Upset The Indian Applecart? Chart 8Firms' Costs Will Likely Stay Low As Wage Pressures Are Muted... Chart 9... And A Benign Inflation Outlook Will Keep Borrowing Costs Low   A benign inflation outlook entails that interest rates are unlikely to rise much. Therefore, firms are going to benefit on both accounts: low wage bills and low interest costs. If costs stay low, margins can stay wide. If margins remain wide, with the top line recovery, profits will accelerate further. This is why we think the profit cycle is not yet over, even though we are recommending a tactical downgrade on Indian equities to protect profits. A Capex-Led Expansion? Chart 10Surging Profits Have Helped Kickstart A New Capex Cycle In India A massive profit surge early in the recovery has major positive externalities. High profits usually beget strong capex. And a capex-led expansion is extremely important for India, as this will be a crucial factor in determining the sustainability and magnitude of this cycle. The indications so far are positive: Strong profits have indeed helped kickstart capital spending in India (Chart 10). Profits that stay robust – as we expect them to – should entice further capital spending. Other corroborative data also indicate a new capex cycle. Despite the pandemic-related disruptions, net FDI inflows into India have surged to near all-time highs. Imports of capital goods are also strong and rising. Strong capex does more than boost firm competitiveness and profits in the long run. It also helps alleviate structural inflationary pressures in an economy – something that could be a major positive for India. Notably, the long-term trajectory of India’s real capex relative to consumption had been up. Even over the past year or so, the country’s real capital spending has been growing at a rate superior to that of consumption. This will help keep inflationary pressures at bay. Finally, given the sobering wage outlook, it’s difficult to imagine any imminent consumption rush. Putting it all together, it appears that the coming cyclical expansion will likely be capex-led. Investment Conclusions Equities: Dedicated EM and Asian equity portfolio managers should book profits on their overweight position in India and downgrade this market from overweight to neutral. Initially, we recommended overweighting Indian equities on February 3rd. Then, we tactically downgraded this market to neutral due to the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic, but re-instated our overweight on Indian stocks on June 23. Over these two periods of our overweight, this bourse has outperformed the EM benchmark by 21.4%. We recommend absolute return investors also book profits and stay on the sidelines for now to wait for a better entry point. Currency and Bonds: The rupee is cheap and will likely be one of the best performers in the EM world over the cyclical horizon. Indian government bonds also offer good value with a rather high yield (6.26% for 10-year securities) amid a benign inflation outlook. A positive currency outlook enhances the appeal of Indian bonds for foreign investors. Please refer to our recent report The Rupee Has A Tailwind; And Bonds Offer Good Value for a detailed discussion on the rupee and local currency government bonds. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  The Reserve Bank of India, the central bank.

Highlights The US Climate Prediction Center gives ~ 70% odds another La Niña will form in the August – October interval and will continue through winter 2021-22. This will be a second-year La Niña if it forms, and will raise the odds of a repeat of last winter's cold weather in the Northern Hemisphere.1 Europe's natural-gas inventory build ahead of the coming winter remains erratic, particularly as Russian flows via Ukraine to the EU have been reduced this year. Russia's Nord Stream 2 could be online by November, but inventories will still be low. China, Japan, South Korea and India  – the four top LNG consumers in Asia  – took in 155 Bcf of the fuel in June. A colder-than-normal winter would boost demand. Higher prices are likely in Europe and Asia (Chart of the Week). US storage levels will be lower going into winter, as power generation demand remains stout, and the lingering effects from Hurricane Ida reduce supplies available for inventory injections. Despite spot prices trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu – we are going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. Feature Last winter's La Niña was a doozy. It brought extreme cold to Asia, North America and Europe, which pulled natural gas storage levels sharply lower and drove prices sharply higher as the Chart of the Week shows. Natgas storage in the US and Europe will be tight going into this winter (Chart 2). Europe's La Niña lingered a while into Spring, keeping temps low and space-heating demand high, which delayed the start of re-building inventory for the coming winter.  In the US, cold temps in the Midwest hampered production, boosted demand and caused inventory to draw hard. Chart of the WeekA Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices Chart 2Europe, US Gas Stocks Will Be Tight This Winter Summer in the US also produced strong natgas demand, particularly out West, as power generators eschewed coal in favor of gas to meet stronger air-conditioning demand. This is partly due to the closing of coal-fired units, leaving more of the load to be picked up by gas-fired generation (Chart 3). The EIA estimates natgas consumption in July was up ~ 4 Bcf/d to just under 76 Bcf/d. Hurricane Ida took ~ 1 bcf/d of demand out of the market, which was less than the ~ 2 Bcf/d hit to US Gulf supply resulting from the storm.  As a result, prices were pushed higher at the margin. Chart 3Generators Prefer Gas To Coal US natgas exports (pipeline and LNG) also were strong, at 18.2 Bcf/d in July (Chart 4). We expect US LNG exports, in particular, to resume growth as the world recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 5). This strong demand and exports, coupled with slightly lower supply from the Lower 48 states – estimated at ~ 98 Bcf/d by the EIA for July (Chart 6) – pushed prices up by 18% from June to July, "the largest month-on-month percentage change for June to July since 2012, when the price increased 20.3%" according to the EIA. Chart 4US Natgas Exports Remain Strong Chart 5US LNG Exports Will Resume Growth Chart 6US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering Elsewhere in the Americas, Brazil has been a strong bid for US LNG – accounting for 32.3 Bcf of demand in  June – as hydroelectric generation flags due to the prolonged drought in the country. In Asia, demand for LNG remains strong, with the four top consumers – China, Japan, South Korea, and India – taking in 155 Bcf in June, according to the EIA. Gas Infrastructure Ex-US Remains Challenged A combination of extreme cold weather in Northeast Asia, and a lack of gas storage infrastructure in Asia generally, along with shipping constraints and supply issues at LNG export facilities, led to the Asian natural gas price spike in mid-January.2 Very cold weather in Northeast Asia, drove up LNG demand during the winter months. In China, LNG imports for the month of January rose by ~ 53% y-o-y (Chart 7).3 The increase in imports from Asia coincided with issues at major export plants in Australia, Norway and Qatar during that period. Chart 7China's US LNG Exports Surged Last Winter, And Remain Stout Over The Summer Substantially higher JKM (Japan-Korea Marker) prices incentivized US exporters to divert LNG cargoes from Europe to Asia last winter. The longer roundtrip times to deliver LNG from the US to Asia – instead of Europe – resulted in a reduction of shipping capacity, which ended up compounding market tightness in Europe. Europe dealt with the switch by drawing ~ 18 bcm more from their storage vs. the previous year, across the November to January period. Countries in Asia - most notably Japan – however, do not have robust natural gas storage facilities, further contributing to price volatility, especially in extreme weather events. These storage constraints remain in place going into the coming winter. In addition, there is a high probability the global weather pattern responsible for the cold spells around the globe that triggered price spikes in key markets globally – i.e., a second La Niña event – will return. A Second-Year La Niña  Event The price spikes and logistical challenges of last winter were the result of atmospheric circulation anomalies that were bolstered by a La Niña event that began in mid-2020.4 The La Niña is characterized by colder sea-surface temperatures that develops over the Pacific equator, which displaces atmospheric and wind circulation and leads to colder temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere (Map 1). Map 1La Niña Raises The Odds Of Colder Temps The IEA notes last winter started off without any exceptional deviations from an average early winter, but as the new year opened "natural gas markets experienced severe supply-demand tensions in the opening weeks of 2021, with extremely cold temperature episodes sending spot prices to record levels."5 In its most recent ENSO update, the US Climate Prediction Center raised the odds of another La Niña event for this winter to 70% this month. If similar conditions to those of the 2020-21 winter emerge, US and European inventories could be stretched even thinner than last year, as space-heating demand competes with industrial and commercial demand resulting from the economic recovery. Global Natgas Supplies Will Stay Tight JKM prices and TTF (Dutch Title Transfer Facility) prices are likely to remain elevated going into winter, as seen in the Chart of the Week. Fundamentals have kept markets tight so far. Uncertain Russian supply to Europe will raise the price of the European gas index (TTF). This, along with strong Asian demand, particularly from China, will keep JKM prices high (Chart 8). The global economic recovery is the main short-term driver of higher natgas demand, with China leading the way. For the longer-term, natural gas is considered as the ideal transition fuel to green energy, as it emits less carbon than other fossil fuels. For this reason, demand is expected to grow by 3.4% per annum until 2035, and reach peak consumption later than other fossil fuels, according to McKinsey.6 Chart 8BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices Spillovers from the European natural gas market impact Asian markets, as was demonstrated last winter. Russian supply to Europe – where inventories are at their lowest level in a decade – has dropped over the last few months. This could either be the result of Russia's attempts to support its case for finishing Nord Stream 2 and getting it running as soon as possible, or because it is physically unable to supply natural gas.7 A fire at a condensate plant in Siberia at the beginning of August supports the latter conjecture. The reduced supply from Russia, comes at a time when EU carbon permit prices have been consistently breaking records, making the cost of natural gas competitive compared to more heavy carbon emitting fossil fuels – e.g., coal and oil – despite record breaking prices. With Europe beginning the winter season with significantly lower stock levels vs. previous years, TTF prices will remain volatile. This, and strong demand from China, will support JKM prices. Investment Implications Natural gas prices are elevated, with spot NYMEX futures trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu. Our analysis indicates prices are justifiably high, and could – with the slightest unexpected news – move sharply higher. Because natgas is, at the end of the day, a weather market, we favor low-cost/low-risk exposures. In the current market, we recommend going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. This is the trade we recommended on 8 April 2021, at a lower level, which was stopped out on 12 August 2021 with a gain of 188%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Earlier this week, Saudi Aramco lowered its official selling price (OSP) by more than was expected – lowering its premium to the regional benchmark to $1.30/bbl from $1.70/bbl – in what media reports based on interviews with oil traders suggest is an attempt to win back customers electing not to take volumes under long-term contracts. This is a marginal adjustment by Aramco, but still significant, as it shows the company will continue to defend its market share. Pricing to Northwest Europe and the US markets is unchanged. Aramco's majority shareholder, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is the putative leader of OPEC 2.0 (aka, OPEC+) along with Russia. The producer coalition is in the process of returning 400k b/d to the market every month until it has restored the 5.8mm b/d of production it took off the market to support prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $70/bbl in 2H21, $73/bbl in 2022 and $80/bbl in 2023. Base Metals: Bullish Political uncertainty in Guinea caused aluminum prices to rise to more than a 10-year high this week (Chart 9). A coup in the world’s second largest exporter of bauxite – the main ore source for aluminum – began on Sunday, rattling aluminum markets. While iron ore prices rebounded primarily on the record value of Chinese imports in August, the coup in Guinea – which has the highest level of iron ore reserves – could have also raised questions about supply certainty. This will contribute to iron-ore price volatility. However, we do not believe the coup will impact the supply of commodities as much as markets are factoring, as coup leaders in commodity-exporting countries typically want to keep their source of income intact and functioning. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold settled at a one-month high last Friday, when the US Bureau of Labor Statistics released the August jobs report. The rise in payrolls data was well below analysts’ estimates, and was the lowest gain in seven months. The yellow metal rose on this news as the weak employment data eased fears about Fed tapering, and refocused markets on COVID-19 and the delta variant. Since then, however, the yellow metal has not been able to consolidate gains. After falling to a more than one-month low on Friday, the US dollar rose on Tuesday, weighing on gold prices (Chart 10). Chart 9 Chart 10       Footnotes 1      Please see the US Climate Prediction Center's ENSO: Recent Evolution, Current Status and Predictions report published on September 6, 2021. 2     Please see Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure? Published by Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 3     Since China LNG import data were reported as a combined January and February value in 2020, we halved the combined value to get the January 2020 amount. 4     Please see The 2020/21 Extremely Cold Winter in China Influenced by the Synergistic Effect of La Niña and Warm Arctic by Zheng, F., and Coauthors (2021), published in Advances in Atmospheric Sciences. 5     Please see the IEA's Gas Market Report, Q2-2021 published in April 2021. 6     Please see Global gas outlook to 2050 | McKinsey on February 26, 2021. 7     Please see ICIS Analyst View: Gazprom’s inability to supply or unwillingness to deliver? published on August 13, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades