Fixed Income
Highlights The main driving force behind EM risk assets this year has been downshifting U.S. interest rates and a weak U.S. dollar. These factors have more than offset the relapse in commodity prices and the deteriorating growth outlook for China/EM. Going forward, odds favor a rise in U.S. interest rates and a stronger dollar. If this scenario materializes, the EM rally will reverse. Meanwhile, China's liquidity conditions have tightened, warranting a meaningful slowdown in money/credit and economic growth. Altogether, the outlook for EM risk assets is extremely poor, and we reiterate our defensive strategy. In Argentina, we continue favoring local currency bonds and sovereign credit, especially relative to their EM counterparts. Feature What Has Not Worked In This Rally Financial market actions of late have been rife with contradictions, and momentum trades have been prevalent. In the past few months we have been highlighting that EM risk assets - stocks, currencies and bonds - have decoupled from most of their historically reliable indicators such as commodities prices, China's money and credit impulses and China/EM manufacturing PMI.1 This week we highlight several additional indicators and variables that EM risk assets have diverged from. Chinese H shares - the index that does not contain internet/social media stocks - have decoupled from the Chinese yield curve (Chart I-1). The mainstream press have been focused on inversion in the 10/5-year Chinese yield curve, but we do not find it to be a particularly credible or useful indicator for the economy. Our preference is the 5-year to 3-month yield curve to gauge the cyclical growth outlook. Chart I-1China's Yield Curve Heralds Lower Share Prices Not only has the yield curve been flattening, but it has also recently inverted, suggesting an impending downturn in China's business cycle (Chart I-2). Chart I-2China's Yield Curve Inversion Points To A Growth Slump In China, commercial banks' excess reserves at the People's Bank of China (PBoC) have begun shrinking since early this year, reflecting the PBoC's liquidity tightening (Chart I-3, top panel). Banks' excess reserves are the ultimate liquidity constraint on banks' ability to originate new credit/money and expand their balance sheets. Meanwhile, Chinese commercial banks are stretched and overextended, as illustrated by the record-high ratios of both M2 and commercial banks' assets-to-excess reserves (Chart I-3, bottom panel). These are true measures of the money multiplier, and they have surged to very high levels. Besides, financial/bank regulators are clamping down on speculative activities among banks and other financial intermediaries, and are also forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets. Faced with dwindling liquidity (excess reserves), rising interest rates and a regulatory clampdown, banks will slow down credit / money origination. Slower credit growth will cause a considerable slump in capital spending, and overall economic growth will downshift. On a similar note, interest rates lead money/credit growth in China, as evidenced in Chart I-4. Chart I-3China: Dwindling Excess Reserves ##br##Will Cause A Credit Slowdown Chart I-4China: Interest Rates ##br##And Money Growth The considerable - about 200 basis points - rise in Chinese money market and corporate bond yields since November heralds a deceleration in money/credit growth. Historically, interest rates affect money/credit growth and ultimately economic activity with a time lag. There is no reason why this relationship will not hold in China this time around. Given that Chinese companies are overleveraged, credit growth is likely to be more sensitive to rising than falling interest rates. Hence, the lingering credit excesses in China make rising interest rates more dangerous. Industrial commodities prices have reacted to liquidity tightening in China sensibly by falling since early this year (Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B). Chart I-5AWidespread Decline In Commodities Prices (II) Chart I-5BWidespread Decline In Commodities Prices (I) The weakness in commodities prices since early this year is especially noteworthy because it has occurred at a time of U.S. dollar weakness and dissipating Federal Reserve tightening concerns. When and as the U.S. dollar gains ground again, the selloff in commodities will escalate. Outside commodities, there are early signposts that another Chinese slowdown is beginning to unfold - slowing exports in May from Korea and Taiwan to China, being one glaring example (Chart I-6). This chart corroborates our argument that the surge in Chinese imports in late 2016 and the first quarter 2017 was a one-off growth boost, and appeared very strong because of the low base from a year ago. Consistently, Taiwan's manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratio has rolled over, which correlates well with the tech-heavy Taiwanese stock index (Chart I-6, bottom panel). With respect to the broader EM universe, EM equities and currencies have decoupled from U.S. inflation expectations (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Shipments To China Have Rolled Over Chart I-7EM And U.S. Inflation Expectations: ##br##Unsustainable Decoupling? Historically, falling U.S. inflation expectations have reflected dropping oil prices and caused real rates (TIPS yields) to rise. In turn, lower oil prices and/or rising TIPS yields weighed on EM risk assets. The decline in U.S. Treasurys yields since last December has been largely due to inflation expectations rather than real rates. Such a mixture has historically been ominous for EM risk assets. Notwithstanding, EM risk assets have rallied a lot, despite such a hostile backdrop year-to-date. Finally, the Brazilian and South African exchange rates and their bonds have been among the more stellar performers in the past 12 months. Nevertheless, first quarter GDP releases in Brazil and South Africa have confirmed that there has been little domestic demand recovery in either country. Remarkably, in both countries, agriculture and mining volumes boomed in the first quarter, boosting GDP growth, yet final domestic demand remained shockingly depressed, as illustrated in Chart I-8. This discards the popular EM rally narrative that improving global growth will lift EM economies. Neither a poor domestic growth backdrop and political volatility nor falling commodities prices have prompted a meaningful plunge in either the Brazilian or South African exchange rate. Chart I-9 portends that the BRL and ZAR have historically been correlated with commodities prices but have recently shown tentative signs of decoupling. Chart I-8Not Much Recovery In Brazil ##br##And South Africa's Domestic Demand Chart I-9BRL And ZAR And Commodities Bottom Line: EM financial markets have veered away from many traditional indicators. These constitute important contradictions and raise the question of whether this time is different. We do not think so. What Has Driven This EM Rally: U.S. Rates And The U.S. Dollar The variables that have explained the EM rally in the past six months have been falling U.S. interest rate expectations and a weaker U.S. dollar, as well as the global technology mania. We elaborated on the tech rally in recent weeks,2 and this week re-visit EM's link with U.S. interest rates and the greenback. The main driving force behind EM risk assets, year -to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-10). In short, it has been the carry trade that has transpired since the Fed's meeting on December 15, 2016 - regardless of EM growth dynamics and fundamentals. Going forward, barring a major growth relapse in China/EM growth and an associated U.S. dollar rally, the odds favor a rise in U.S. interest rates in general and U.S. TIPS yields in particular: The U.S. composite capacity utilization gauge (Chart I-11, top panel) - constructed by our Foreign Exchange Strategy team based on the unemployment gap and industrial capacity utilization - is moving above the zero line, denoting that there is little slack in the U.S. economy. Chart I-10U.S. TIPS Yields, Dollar And EM Chart I-11The U.S. Economy: Is It The Time To Bet On Higher Bond Yields? Any time the indicator has moved above the zero line in the past 55 years - the shaded periods on Chart I-11 - inflationary pressures, wages and bond yields have typically risen, and vice versa. The message from this indicator is unambiguous: U.S. inflationary pressures will become evident soon, and interest rates will rise. In this context, U.S. interest rate expectations are too low. Re-pricing of U.S. interest rates will shake off lingering complacency across many financial markets worldwide. Notably, the U.S. mortgage purchase index is surging, job openings are very elevated (Chart I-12), financial and property markets are buoyant and the dollar has been weak. If the Fed does not normalize interest rates now, when will it? Finally, both nominal and inflated-adjusted U.S. bond yields are at their technical support, and will likely bounce from these levels (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Are U.S. Rate Expectations Too Low? Chart I-13U.S. Bond Yields Are At A Critical Juncture Chart I-14U.S. Growth Underperformance Is Late Rising U.S. interest rates will trigger another up leg in the U.S. dollar. Notably, the relative economic surprise index between the U.S. and the G10 is close to its post-crisis lows (Chart I-14). The relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon. While it does not always define the fluctuations in the U.S. dollar, we would still expect it to lend some support to the greenback. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service believes the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is still in a bull market, especially versus EM, DM commodities currencies and Asian currencies. We have less conviction on the magnitude of the downside in the euro, but the latter at minimum will not rally above 1.14 -1.15 for now. Finally, various EM currencies are facing an important technical resistance (Chart I-15A and Chart I-15B). We expect these technical levels to mark their top. Chart I-15AEM Currencies Are Facing Technical Resistance (II) Chart I-15BEM Currencies Are Facing Technical Resistance (I) At the same time, the precious metals index seems to be rolling over at its 200-day resistance level (Chart I-16). A top in the precious metals index would be consistent with a bottom in U.S. TIPS yields and the U.S. dollar. Chart I-16Precious Metals Are Facing ##br##A Major Resistance Bottom Line: U.S. interest rate expectations are too low and are set to rise. Rising interest rates will remove a major support underpinning the EM rally. A Resolution There are three potential scenarios as far as the ongoing EM rally is concerned: The goldilocks scenario of low interest rates in the U.S., a weaker dollar and steady-to-improving growth in EM/China. The markets have already priced in a lot of good news, but the rally could feasibly continue for some time if this scenario transpires. Re-pricing of the Fed. U.S. interest rates will rise and the dollar will get bid up. The rationale is the modest U.S. inflationary pressures will become evident amid solid U.S. growth. This will weigh on EM risk assets, even if EM/China growth does not falter. The basis for this is the EM rally year-to-date has been driven by diminishing U.S. interest rates expectations. Deflation trade redux. China/EM growth will deteriorate meaningfully (for reasons discussed above), causing a considerable downshift in commodities prices and EM risk assets. This could well occur even if U.S. rates stay low. In fact, this is the main plausible reason to bet against a rise in U.S. interest rate expectations from current levels. Investing is about assigning probabilities. We assign much lower probability to the first scenario (no more than 20%), while we see the odds of either the second or third scenarios playing out in the short term at closer to 40%. In the medium term (nine-to 12 months), scenario 3 will be the most prevalent one. If conditions in scenario 2 (rising U.S. bond yields) coincide with a deflationary shock emanating from China, EM financial markets will face a perfect storm. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend a defensive investment strategy for absolute-return investors, and recommend an underweight allocation towards EM within global portfolios across stocks, credit and currencies. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM: Is This Time Different?", dated June 7, 2017, link available on page 19. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?", dated May 17, 2017, and Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM: Is This Time Different?", dated June 7, links available on page 19. Argentina: Favor Local Bonds And Sovereign Spreads EM fixed-income portfolio should continue to overweight Argentine local currency bonds and sovereign credit based on the following reasons: Policymakers continue pursuing credible orthodox policies. The central bank has been accumulating foreign exchange as a part of its explicit program to increase international reserves from 10% to 15% of GDP and keep the peso competitive. At the same time, the monetary authorities have partially siphoned off liquidity via reverse repos (Chart II-1). On a net-net basis, monetary stance is rather tight as evidenced by money and credit contraction in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Argentina: Rising Reserves ##br##And Reverse Sterilization Chart II-2Argentina: Inflation-Adjusted Money ##br##And Credit Are Contracting Rapid disinflation is proving difficult to achieve due to inflation inertia and high inflation expectations. However, the authorities are holding their position steady in wage negotiations. Wages in both the public and private sectors are contracting in real terms (Chart II-3). Provided wages are a major driver of inflation, employee compensation growing at a slower pace than inflation signals lower inflation ahead. The economy is not yet recovering as evidenced by Chart II-4 and lingering economic stagnation will foster disinflation. Chart II-3Argentina: Lower Wage Growth ##br##Is Critical To Anchor Inflation Chart II-4Argentina: The Economy ##br##Is Still In Doldrums A change in our fundamental view on inflation would require an irresponsible central bank tolerating run away money and credit growth. We find this scenario unlikely and hold the view that the inflation outlook will improve (Chart II-5). Chart II-5Argentina: Inflation Is On The Right Track In regard to the currency, the Argentine central bank will allow the peso to depreciate as maintaining a competitive exchange rate is a major policy priority for them. This is especially true if commodities prices fall and the regional currencies (BRL and CLP) depreciate versus the greenback. The current account and fiscal deficits are large but Argentina is seeing significant FDI and foreign portfolio capital inflows. Hence, funding will not be a problem for some time. The eventual economic recovery and the cheap currency, as well as slow but progressing reforms, will make Argentina a more attractive destination for foreign investors and ensure foreign capital inflows. Overall, there are many challenges, but the outlook for Argentina is much better compared with EM economies in general, and Brazil in particular. Hence, we recommend staying long Argentinian assets on a relative basis versus EM counterparts, particularly Brazil. Specifically, we maintain the following positions: Long ARS versus BRL. We do not expect the currency to depreciate more than what the NDF market is pricing in the next 12 months, and believe it will outperform the BRL on a total return basis (including carry). Stay long Argentine 7-year local currency government bonds. Stay long Argentine / short Brazilian and Venezuelan sovereign credit. Overweight Argentine stocks within the emerging and frontier market universes. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Duration & TIPS: The recent downtrend in nominal Treasury yields has been driven entirely by inflation that has come in weaker than expected. We are inclined to view inflation's weakness as transitory and suggest investors maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, as well as an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. Corporate Debt & The Economy: High corporate debt levels are not indicative of over-investment on the part of the corporate sector. As such, they do not suggest an elevated risk of recession. Corporate Debt & Credit Spreads: While a supportive Fed will keep corporate spreads low for the time being, rising leverage is starting to send a worrying message. Feature It's All About Inflation Chart 1End Of The Trump Trade? Treasury securities have reversed a lot of their post-election sell off during the past few weeks, and the 10-year yield is now only 38 basis points above where it was last November (Chart 1). A quick glance at the 10-year's real and inflation components reveals that weaker inflation is the culprit. The real 10-year Treasury yield remains 31 bps above its pre-election level, but the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now only 7 bps higher (Chart 1, bottom panel). This explains a lot about the broader financial environment. Stable growth and low inflation create a fertile breeding ground for risk assets, and corporate bond spreads are indeed considerably tighter than prior to the election. The average spread on the investment grade corporate bond index is currently 113 bps, down from 135 bps in November. The average junk spread is currently 365 bps, down from 489 bps. What explains the large drop in inflation breakevens? One reason is that they had simply overshot the fair value implied by other financial instruments (Chart 2). Our financial model- based on the oil price, the exchange rate and the stock-to-bond total return ratio - shows that the 10-year breakeven rate was around 20 bps too high earlier this year. It is now almost exactly in line with our model's fair value. The most likely explanation for the overshoot is that markets started to discount a much more stimulative fiscal policy in the immediate aftermath of the election. The potential for large tax cuts at a time of already tight labor markets caused investors' inflation expectations to ramp up. While tax cuts are still likely, it now appears as though they will occur much later and be smaller in scale than was originally thought. Falling oil prices have also exacerbated the drop in breakevens by causing the fair value reading from our model to roll over (Chart 2, bottom panel). Our commodity strategists do not think oil prices will stay this low for much longer.1 OPEC 2.0 production cuts and sustained growth in emerging market trade volumes will cause oil inventories to fall this year, leading to a rebound in prices. The second explanation for this year's drop in the inflation component of yields is that the core inflation data have disappointed during the past couple of months. After reaching 1.8% in February of this year, 12-month trailing core PCE inflation has deviated sharply from the uptrend that had been in place since mid-2015. As of April, it had fallen back to 1.5%, well below the level implied by our Phillips Curve inflation model (Chart 3). Chart 2TIPS Financial Model Chart 3A Phillips Curve Inflation Model With the labor market continuing to tighten and the dollar having depreciated in recent months, we are inclined to view the recent drop in core inflation as transitory. In fact, even after making some adjustments to the estimation interval (see Box), our Phillips Curve inflation model still projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2% by the end of this year in a base case scenario where the unemployment rate, the exchange rate and survey inflation expectations are all unchanged. Box: Incorporating Different Regimes Into Our Inflation Model As has been explored in depth in prior reports,2 we have been modeling core PCE inflation using a Phillips Curve model that is inspired by one that Janet Yellen mentioned in a 2015 speech.3 Essentially, we model core inflation using lagged inflation, the gap between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of the natural unemployment rate, relative non-oil import prices and a survey measure of inflation expectations. Previously we estimated the coefficients for this model using the longest time interval we could obtain - starting in October 1979. However, a recent Fed paper by Jeremy Nalewaik4 motivated us to refine this approach. Nalewaik shows that core PCE inflation has been driven by different factors in different regimes, and that those regimes can be defined by whether inflation expectations were well-anchored or highly volatile. Specifically, in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, inflation expectations were highly volatile and explained much more of the variation in actual core inflation than they did in the 1960s or from the mid-1990s until the present day. We confirmed this result by splitting our sample into two periods - 1979 to 1995, and 1995 to present. Our results show that inflation expectations were a much more significant driver of core inflation in the 1979-1995 regime than they are in the current regime (Table 1). As such, we have decided that the coefficients calculated using the 1995-present interval are probably more representative of the current environment. Applying these coefficients to the four scenarios we examined in our May 2 report, our model now projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.03% by year end in our "base case" scenario, 1.93% in our "strong dollar" scenario, 1.97% in our "bad NAIRU" scenario and 1.87% in our "deflation case" scenario. Table 1BCA Phillips Curve Model* Of Core** PCE Inflation Under Different Regression Intervals Where Are Yields Headed From Here? We see two potential scenarios that could play out between now and the end of the year. The first is that core inflation rebounds during the next few months and ends the year closer to our model's fair value estimate. The inflation component of yields would move higher in this scenario and real yields would probably also increase. The 10-year real yield closely tracks our 12-month fed funds discounter, which measures the number of rate hikes the market expects during the next year (Chart 4). The discounter currently sits at 49 bps, meaning that the market expects fewer than 2 rate hikes during the next 12 months. This would certainly be revised higher if inflation were to rebound. Chart 4Fed Wants Wider Breakevens The second possible scenario is that while U.S. growth stays close to its current 2% pace, inflation simply does not bounce back. In other words, core PCE ends the year closer to 1.5% than to 2% and a large residual opens up between inflation and our Phillips Curve model. While TIPS breakevens would be unlikely to rise in this scenario, the downside is also probably limited unless inflation were to fall below its current 1.5%. If this second scenario plays out the Fed would also probably react by adopting a more dovish policy stance. This would cause the market's rate hike expectations, and 10-year real yields, to fall. But even here the downside would appear to be limited. With the market currently priced for a mere 39 bps of hikes between now and the end of 2017 and only another 24 bps for all of 2018, there simply isn't much scope for a large dovish re-rating of the Fed. Additionally, if the Fed were to adopt a sufficiently dovish reaction function in the face of persistently low inflation, it is possible that lower rate hike expectations could spur a recovery in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates. If the market believes that the Fed will stay dovish enough for inflation to recover to target, then the positive correlation between real yields and inflation breakevens could reverse. There are recent precedents for this (Chart 4, bottom panel). In 2011 and 2012, the Fed's Operation Twist caused rate hike expectations and real yields to fall, but also led to wider TIPS breakevens. The reverse scenario played out in 2015 when the market decided that the Fed was adopting an overly hawkish policy stance. This caused TIPS breakevens to fall as real yields rose. The conclusion here is that even if inflation stays stubbornly low for the remainder of the year, and the Fed responds by guiding the market toward a shallower rate hike path, then it is possible that some of the downside in real yields will be mitigated by rising TIPS breakevens. In our view, the risk/reward trade-off between the two scenarios outlined above suggests that investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Bottom Line: The recent downtrend in nominal Treasury yields has been driven entirely by inflation that has come in weaker than expected. We are inclined to view inflation's weakness as transitory and suggest investors maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, as well as an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. Even in a scenario where inflation stays low despite continued above-trend economic growth, we view the downside in yields from current levels as limited. It's Late In The Game For Corporate Credit With last week's release of the U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) we are able to update some of our preferred credit cycle indicators. One concerning development is that net corporate leverage - defined as total debt less cash as a percent of EBITD - ticked higher for the second consecutive quarter in Q1 (Chart 5). Chart 5Corporate Balance Sheets Continue To Add Leverage As we have observed in previous reports,5 there is a strong correlation between net leverage and spreads. In fact, we are only able to identify one other period in which spreads were able to tighten as leverage rose. That period was in the late 1980s, immediately following the crash and subsequent rebound in oil prices. As is shown in Chart 5, net leverage correlates strongly with both corporate spreads and the default rate. However, in the late 1980s the collapse of the energy sector caused spreads to widen too far. Spreads then benefited from a "payback period" as energy prices recovered and defaults ebbed during the following two years. But in the background, net leverage only managed to level-off for a brief period before continuing to trend higher. The uptrend in leverage culminated in the 1990 default cycle and recession. We see a similar dynamic playing out at the moment. Spreads (and the default rate) are currently benefiting from the payback period following the 2014 collapse and subsequent recovery in commodity prices. But so far leverage has not managed to cease its upward march. What Is Leverage Telling Us Right Now? As was mentioned above, net leverage has now increased for two consecutive quarters. To see what this has meant historically, we looked at excess investment grade corporate bond returns over 6-month periods following different changes in net leverage. For example, we found that after leverage has increased for two consecutive quarters, the average (annualized) 6-month excess return to investment grade corporate bonds has been -190 bps, and also that corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries in 45% of those 6-month periods (Table 2). Table 26-Month Investment Grade Corporate Excess Returns* ##br##Following A Rise In Net Corporate Leverage** (1973 To Present) Conversely, in 6-month periods after leverage has declined for two consecutive quarters, average (annualized) excess returns came in at +120 bps, and corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries in 61% of those episodes (Table 3). Table 36-Month Investment Grade Corporate Excess Returns* ##br##Following A Decline In Net Corporate Leverage** (1973 To Present) Not surprisingly, the late 1980s episode was one that defied the above statistics. In fact, investment grade corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries by an annualized 5% in the 6-month span between September 1986 and March 1987, even though leverage had previously increased for 4 consecutive quarters. For this reason we remain comfortable with our overweight in corporate bonds for now, especially since the Fed is likely to remain sufficiently accommodative to support higher inflation and hence continued economic growth. However, it is obvious that trends in leverage will be critical to monitor going forward. Where Is Leverage Heading? A rebound in corporate profits would help stem the uptrend in leverage, and the outlook for that is good. Not only did our measure of EBITD diverge negatively from S&P 500 operating profits in the first quarter, but other leading profit indicators such as the growth in business sales less inventories suggest that EBITD should catch up to S&P 500 profits, and not the reverse (Chart 6). What remains unclear is whether the looming rebound in profit growth will be enough to cause leverage to fall. While debt growth has been rolling over (Chart 5, bottom panel), we think it will remain at a reasonably high level going forward. Meanwhile, the historical evidence suggests that net leverage does not usually reverse its uptrend unless first prompted by a recession. Turning to debt, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP is definitely eyebrow raising (Chart 7), as it is now very close to levels observed at the peak of the past two cycles. However, one important caveat is in order. While corporate debt levels have grown quickly, corporate investment has not. Chart 6Profit Growth Will Improve Chart 7Investment Is Coming Back The corporate financing gap - capital expenditures less internally generated revenue - is a good proxy for the amount of debt issued to fund investment. In the second panel of Chart 7 we see that it has only just moved into positive territory and is well below the levels observed at the end of the last two recoveries. The obvious conclusion is that most corporate debt issuance has not been used to finance investment, but rather has been used to buy back equities. This is bad news from the perspective of corporate bondholders who would certainly prefer more people below them in the capital structure, but it also means that high corporate debt levels are not indicative of over-investment on the part of the corporate sector. As such, high corporate debt levels do not suggest that the risk of recession is elevated. They merely suggest that corporations' capital structures have shifted in favor of shareholders over bondholders. Going forward, we see potential for a moderation in the amount of corporate debt issuance used to fund buybacks. This has already started to occur as evidenced by our buyback proxy (Chart 7, panel 3) - simply the difference between net issuance and the financing gap shown in panel 2. Not surprisingly, this buyback proxy is highly correlated with the difference between the equity risk premium and corporate bond spreads. However, any moderation in share buybacks will be at least partially offset by an increase in debt issuance to fund investment. Corporate investment has seen a revival during the past few quarters, and leading indicators such as ISM New Orders surveys suggest it will continue trending up (Chart 7, bottom panel). Bottom Line: While a supportive Fed will keep corporate spreads low for the time being, rising leverage is starting to send a worrying message. Unless strong profit growth causes leverage to reverse course, it will likely be appropriate to scale back on credit risk either later this year or early next year, once the monetary back-drop becomes less supportive. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil", dated June 8, 207, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 3, 2017, and "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016078pap.pdf 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The current economic and profit environment supports our stance of favoring stocks over bonds. The Fed will need to see more evidence to alter its gradual path for rates. Although valuations remain elevated, they are not a great market timing tool. Margins are expanding according to the S&P 500 data, and we expect this to continue in the second half of the year. But a peak in margins next year could be the justification to scale back on overweight positions in stocks, in anticipation of slower EPS growth. Corporate balance sheets continued to deteriorate in the first quarter, but that is not enough to warrant cutting back on corporate bond positions within fixed-income portfolios. Watch real short-term rates and bank C&I lending standards, as an exit warning. Feature Environment Remains Supportive For Stocks Over Bonds Investors are wondering whether the equity and currency/bond markets are living on different planets. The dollar and Treasurys seem to be priced for sluggish economic growth, less inflation and no fiscal stimulus. Yet, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. Many believe that the only reason that stocks got to this level in the first place is the prospect of tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending. If true, then it is only a matter of time before equity investors capitulate. We look at it another way. Yes, equities initially received a boost following the U.S. election on hopes for tax reform. But indicators such as the ratio of small-to-large-cap stocks, or high-tax companies relative to the S&P 500, suggest that the stock market has priced out all chances of any tax reform. The overall stock market has performed well despite this because of the favorable profit backdrop. The fact that Corporate America can generate such profits despite a lackluster economy is impressive. Moreover, the recent softening in inflation has led many to believe that the Fed can proceed even more slowly than the market previously believed, leading to a bond rally. This is quite a bullish backdrop for equities. One does not have to conclude that the bond and stock markets are living on different planets. The backdrop is also positive for corporate bonds versus Treasurys, despite the fact that corporate health continues to deteriorate (see below). Turning to politics, the political consequences of the extraordinary U.K. general election are still not clear. The outcome of the election does not change our core views on the U.S. dollar, equity or bond markets. The dollar has rallied, Treasury yields are higher and U.S. equity prices moved up as this report was being prepared on Friday, June 9. Looking ahead, the coalition-building process in the U.K. will take time as the horse-trading between parties proceeds. Nonetheless, our high conviction view is that the investment implications are in fact already self-evident and do not require foresight into the eventual make-up of the U.K. government. A key takeaway for investors is that, aside from Brexit, domestic fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Austerity is dead in Britain and investors should expect its economic policy - under whatever leadership ultimately gains power - to swing firmly to the left on fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy. Moreover, the Brexit process will continue, albeit of a potentially more "softer" variety and with a somewhat higher probability of eventual reversal.1 Will They Or Won't They? A 25-basis point rate hike is likely this week, but the FOMC will need more evidence on the direction of inflation and the economy before significantly changing the timing and pace of rate hikes or economic forecasts. The market is fully pricing in the anticipated 25-basis point rate bump, but beyond that, there is not much agreement between the Fed and the market on interest rates or economic projections. Nonetheless, as the Fed prepares its June forecast and dot plots, policymakers and the market are on the same page in terms of the labor market, inflation, and the economy in the next few years. The unemployment rate (4.3% in May 2017) is below the Fed's forecasts for 2017 (4.5%) and longer run (4.7%). The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate keeps it below the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 1, panel 3). Even assuming that the 120,000 pace of job growth in the past three months persists, the unemployment rate would remain below the Fed's view of NAIRU (Chart 2). Our unemployment rate projections are based on a stable labor force participation rate and a 1% gain in the working age population. Chart 1Fed, Market And Reality##BR##Not Too Far Apart Chart 2The Unemployment Rate##BR##Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios However, a closer look at what policymakers have said about prices and the trajectory of inflation in recent years suggests that the market and the Fed are not that far apart. At +1.7% in April, the PCE deflator remains near the FOMC's projection of 1.9% for this year and 2.0% in the long run. Bloomberg consensus estimates for inflation for this year and next are above the top end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 1, panel 2). The FOMC's May minutes state that "participants generally continued to expect that inflation would stabilize around the Committee's two percent objective over the medium run as the effects of transitory factors waned." The market is still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with the economy below the Fed's estimate of full employment. We will discuss the Phillips curve in a post-GFC world in an upcoming edition of The Bank Credit Analyst. As we discussed in last week's report,2 GDP growth in 2017 is on track to exceed the Fed's 2017 target (2.1%) and is already running ahead of the Fed's GDP projection (1.8%) for the long term. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is at the upper end of the Fed's range set in March (Chart 1, panel 1). Despite the general agreement between the Fed and the market on certain aspects, they diverge on the outlook for the fed funds rate in the next 18 months (Chart 3). As of June 9, the Fed sees a total of six quarter-point rate hikes by the end of 2018. The market sees just two in the same period. The Fed and market are still far apart on rates in 2019. However, the disconnect between the Fed and the market is not as large as it was in early 2015. This disagreement was a major factor in the equity market pullback in the first few months of 2016 (Chart 3). Neither the recent weakness in the economic data nor softer-than-expected inflation readings will be enough to prompt a significant shift from the Fed in terms of the 'dot plot'. The economic surprise index has been declining for 63 days since peaking in early- to mid-March, but remains consistent with slow growth, not a recession. Economic data tends to disappoint for an average of 90 days after the economic surprise index is above 40, as it was in late 2016/early 2017 in the wake of the U.S. election (Chart 4). Chart 3Disconnect Between Fed##BR##And Market On Rates Chart 4Economic Surprise Index Has Rolled Over##BR##Since Early To Mid March Bottom Line: It would take a significant deterioration in the economy and labor market and in the benign inflation environment to alter the Fed's gradual rate hike plan. A backdrop of gradual hikes and eventually, a smaller balance sheet, will continue to foster the conditions under which stocks have outperformed bonds since 2009. We believe that the recent Treasury rally is overdone because the market has gone too far in revising down the path of Fed rate hikes. A re-evaluation of the outlook could see bond yields jump, sparking a small equity correction. This is not enough of a risk to scale back on equities versus bonds. Valuations, Earnings And Margins: An Update U.S. equities remain overvalued and would be even more extended if not for low rates. However, they are attractively priced relative to competing assets, such as corporate bonds and Treasurys. Valuation is not a great tool to time market turning points and, absent a significant deterioration in the economic, profit and margin environment, we don't foresee a sustained pullback in stocks. Looking beyond our tactical 6-12 month window, above-average market multiples alone imply below-average returns for stocks across a strategic time horizon. Our BCA valuation indicator has deteriorated since we last published it in March 2017 and shows that U.S. equities remain expensive.3 Individually, two of the three components of the Valuation index remain in overvalued territory. The Earnings Group remains at a record high (aside from the tech bubble). The Balance Sheet group shows the same profile. Only the Yield Group, which compares stock prices with various nominal and real interest rates, suggests that equities are undervalued. Thus, U.S. stock prices are vulnerable to a sharp jump in rates, which supports our view that U.S. equity markets will perform well in an economic and inflation backdrop that allows the Fed to raise interest rates and unwind its balance sheet gradually (Chart 5). While tax cuts and infrastructure spending might provide the equity market with a "sugar high", it probably would not last long because fiscal stimulus would bring forward Fed rate hikes. Moreover, Chart 6 shows that U.S. stocks remain favorably priced relative to competing assets such as corporate bonds, Treasurys and residential housing. That said, equity valuation measures such as price-to-book or price-to-sales make the market vulnerable to shocks. Chart 5U.S. Stocks##BR##Are Overvalued... Chart 6Stocks Look Less Expensive##BR##Relative To Competing Assets Inflated valuations alone are not enough to trigger a bear market or even a significant correction in U.S. equities. Outside of aggressive Fed tightening, we will become more defensive when profits come under pressure. On this score, the decline in Q4 profits according to the NIPA data is concerning. We are in a period where margins based on the NIPA data are diverging from the S&P's measure. Like corporate earnings, there is more than one data source for profit margin data, and the data itself is a mix of art and science. In the long run, the S&P-based margin data and the data derived from the NIPA accounts tend to move together. Over shorter time horizons, however, these two metrics may diverge. The NIPA margins peaked in 2014 and have moved steadily lower since then, but the BEA-derived profit data are not closely watched by investors and are subject to significant revision. On the other hand, margins based on S&P data are followed closely by the markets, are not subject to revision and have been moving higher since end of 2015. In the past 55 years, the peak in NIPA margins has often led the S&P data at peaks; the caveat is that it is unclear whether the NIPA data led in real time because of the endless revision process for GDP and profit data.4 The margin series based on S&P data tends to lead heading into margin troughs, but it is not a reliable signal. During the long economic expansion in the 1960s, both indicators topped out around the same time (1966-67). The NIPA derived margins peaked in 1975 as the S&P margins troughed, and later in the decade, the zenith in NIPA margins peaked three years before the S&P version. Similar to the current decade the long expansion in the 1980s saw a mid-decade collapse in oil prices and margins. In the late 80s, NIPA and S&P measures peaked almost simultaneously, which was three years before the crest in equity prices. The 1990s saw unabated margin expansion through 1997 for NIPA margins; the expansion in S&P-based margins lasted until 1999 (Chart 7). Chart 7Margins, Like Profits Are Mix Of Art & Science History also shows that falling margins do not always mean declining EPS growth. In the past 40 years, when the U.S. economy was not in recession, corporate EPS growth was very high on average when margins rose. It was mostly a wash when margins dropped, with slightly negative EPS growth on average. There were two episodes (late-1990s and mid-2000s) when margins fell, but EPS growth was strongly positive (Chart 8). The stock market can also rise significantly even after margins peak for the cycle. Chart 8EPS Can Grow Even As Margins Contract According to S&P data we are in a phase of climbing margins and we expect EPS growth to further accelerate into year end, peaking at just under 20%, before moderating in 2018. If profit growth decelerates in 2018 and the S&P measure of margins begins to narrow again, it would send a strong signal to trim exposure, especially given lofty equity valuations (Chart 9). Chart 9Profit Growth And Margins Both Rising Bottom Line: Rich valuations in U.S. equities will be overlooked as most investors are focused on the S&P and not the NIPA margins. EPS growth will decelerate sharply when margins resume their mean reversion, which could be the catalyst for a major correction or bear market in stock prices. We do not expect this scenario to play out until 2018 at the earliest. Meanwhile, rising margins and profits trump expensive multiples for U.S. equities. Stay long. Corporate Bonds: Kindling And Sparks Last week's U.S. Flow of Funds release allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) for the first quarter (Chart 10). The level of the CHM moved slightly deeper into "deteriorating health territory." The deterioration in the Monitor over the past few years is largely reflected in the profit-related components of the CHM, including the return on capital, cash flow coverage and free cash flow-to-total debt. Chart 10Deteriorating Since 2015, But... The Monitor has been a reliable indicator for the trend in corporate bond spreads over the years. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and most reliable indicators in BCA's stable of indicators. However, spreads have trended tighter over the past year even as the CHM began to signal deteriorating health in early 2015. Why the divergence? The CHM is only one of three key items on our checklist to underweight corporate bonds versus Treasurys. The other two are tight Fed policy (i.e. real interest rates that are above the neutral level) and the direction of bank lending standards for C&I loans. On its own, balance sheet deterioration only provides the kindling for a spread blowout. A blowout requires a spark. Investors do not worry about high leverage or a profit margin squeeze, for example, until the outlook for defaults sours. The latter occurs once inflation starts to rise and the Fed actively targets slower growth via higher interest rates. Banks see trouble on the horizon and respond by tightening lending standards, thereby restricting the flow of credit to the business sector. Defaults start to rise, buttressing banks' bias to curtail lending in a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. The three items on the checklist usually occurred at roughly the same time in previous cycles because a deteriorating CHM is typically a late-cycle phenomenon. But this has been a very different cycle. High stock prices and rock-bottom bond yields have encouraged the corporate sector to leverage up and repurchase stock. At the same time, the subpar, stretched-out recovery has meant that it has taken longer than usual for the economy to reach full employment. Even now, inflationary pressures are so muted that the Fed can proceed quite slowly. It will be some time before real short-term interest rates are in restrictive territory. As for banks, they tightened lending standards a little in 2015/16 due to the collapse of energy prices, but this has since reversed. As an aside, recent weakness in the growth rate of C&I loans has contributed to concerns over the health of the U.S. recovery. However, the easing in lending standards this year points to an imminent rebound in C&I loan growth (Chart 11). Our model for C&I loans, based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate, supports this view. Chart 11C&I Loan Growth Set To Rebound The implication is that, while corporate health has deteriorated, we do not have the spark for a sustained corporate bond spread widening. Indeed, Moody's expects that the 12-month default rate will trend lower over the next year, which is consistent with constructive trends in corporate lending standards, industrial production and job cut announcements (all good indicators for defaults). Chart 12 presents a valuation metric that adjusts the HY OAS for 12-month trailing default losses (i.e. it is an ex-post measure). In the forecast period, we hold today's OAS constant, but the 12-month default losses are a shifting blend of historical losses and Moody's forecast. The endpoint suggests that the market is offering about 200 basis points of default-adjusted excess yield over the Treasury curve for the next 12 months. This is roughly in line with the mid-point of the historical data. In the past, a default-adjusted spread of around 200 basis points provided positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average return of 82 basis points. It is also a positive sign for corporate bonds that the net transfer to shareholders, in the form of buybacks, dividends and M&A activity, has eased on a 4-quarter moving average basis (although it ticked up in Q1 on a 2-quarter basis; Chart 13). As a result, ratings migration has improved (i.e. easing net downgrades), especially for shareholder-friendly rating action, which is a better indicator for corporate spreads. The moderating appetite to "return cash to shareholders" may not last long, but for now it supports our overweight in both investment- and speculative-grade bonds versus Treasurys. That said, excess returns are likely to be limited to the carry given little room for spread compression. Chart 12Still Some Value In##BR##High-Yield Corporates Chart 13Net Transfers To Shareholders##BR##Eased In Past Two Quarters Within balanced portfolios, we recommend favoring equities to high-yield at this stage of the cycle, for reasons we outlined in the April 17, 2017 Weekly Report. In a nutshell, value is not good enough in HY relative to stocks to expect any sustained period of outperformance in the former, assuming that the bull market in risk assets continues. Bottom Line: Corporate balance sheets are still deteriorating but risk assets, including corporate bonds, should continue to outperform Treasurys and cash in the near term. We will look to downgrade risk assets when core inflation moves closer to the Fed's 2% target, which would trigger a more aggressive FOMC tightening campaign and tighter bank lending standards. Favor equities to high yield, but within fixed-income portfolios, overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporates versus Treasurys. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the Geopolitical Strategy Client Note "U.K. Election: The Median Voter Has Spoken, published on June 9, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?" June 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "How Expensive Are U.S. Stocks", dated March 13, 2017 available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth, Inflation and the Fed", May 8, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Chart 1Something's Got To Give Last Friday's disappointing employment report reinforced the bond market's recent strength. The 10-year Treasury yield reached a new 2017 low of 2.15%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate broke below 1.8% and the overnight index swap curve is now priced for only 47 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months. Increasingly, the bond market is discounting two different future states of the world that cannot possibly coexist. Decelerating wage growth has caused the market to expect fewer Fed rate hikes, while concurrently, the cost of long-maturity inflation protection has fallen and the yield curve has flattened (Chart 1). This means the market expects that poor wage growth and inflation will cause the Fed to back away from its expected pace of two more rate hikes this year, but also that this relent will not be sufficient to prompt a recovery in economic growth or inflation. This dichotomy cannot exist for long. Either wage growth and inflation will bounce back in the second half of the year allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017 (our base case expectation), or inflation will continue to disappoint in which case the Fed will slow its pace of hikes. In both cases long-maturity Treasury yields should head higher, led by an increasing cost of inflation compensation. Stay at below benchmark duration. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month and, at 113 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). Limited inflationary pressure will keep monetary policy accommodative enough to ensure excess returns consistent with carry. However, corporate spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2) and we do not see much potential for spread tightening from current levels. BEA data show that EBITD contracted in Q1, causing the annual growth rate to tick back below zero (panel 4). Meanwhile, gross issuance has been strong so far this year, suggesting that leverage will show an uptick in Q1 when the Flow of Funds data are released later this week. This aligns with our observation that, historically, net leverage - defined as total debt less cash as a percent of trailing EBITD - has never declined unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. For now, rising leverage will limit the amount of spread tightening, but shouldn't lead to negative excess returns. That will only occur when inflationary pressures are more pronounced and the Fed steps up the pace of tightening - probably sometime next year. Energy related sectors still appear cheap on our model (Table 3), and have outperformed the overall corporate index this year even though the oil price has fallen. Remain overweight. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and, at 362 bps, it is currently 18 bps above its 2017 low. While the average spread on the junk index is a mere 38 bps above its post-crisis low, our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread is 204 bps, only slightly below its historical average (Chart 3). Assuming our forecast for default losses is correct, a default-adjusted spread in this range has historically coincided with positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average excess return of 82 bps. Our estimate of 12-month forward default losses is calculated using Moody's baseline assumption for the speculative grade default rate, which stands at 2.96%. We also incorporate an expected recovery rate of 47%. This expectation for a continued decline in the default rate squares with trends in corporate lending standards (which are once again easing), industrial production (which is accelerating) and job cut announcements (which are trending lower). Weak first quarter profit growth will be a headwind if it persists, but we expect it will recover alongside the broader economy in Q2. Overall, with muted inflationary pressures, an improving default back-drop and still moderate valuations, we think junk bonds will deliver small positive excess returns during the next 12 months. Stay overweight. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in May. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) rose 2 bps on the month, but this was entirely offset by a 2 bps tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The most important issue for mortgage investors at the moment is when and how the Fed will cease the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio. We have written extensively on this topic in recent weeks,1 and through Fed communications have learned the following: The unwinding of the balance sheet will start before the end of this year (assuming the economic outlook does not deteriorate substantially) Both MBS and Treasury securities will be impacted The process will be "tapered" with monthly caps set on the amount of securities that will be allowed to run off. The caps will gradually increase according to a pre-set schedule. MBS OAS are already starting to look attractive, especially relative to Aaa-rated credit (Chart 4). But we are hesitant to move back into MBS at current levels. OAS have further upside relative to trends in net issuance (panel 4), and the increased supply from the end of Fed reinvestment will only add to the widening pressure. Remain underweight. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 86 bps. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors outperformed by 18 bps and 38 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 7 bps and 9 bps, respectively. The Sovereign sector underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 12 bps on the month. Sovereigns underperformed in May even though the broad trade-weighted dollar depreciated by 1.4%. Similarly, Mexican debt - which carries the largest weighting in the Sovereign index - underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 22 bps, even though the peso continued to appreciate versus the dollar (Chart 5). With U.S. growth likely to rebound following a weak Q1, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar should appreciate in the second half of this year. Meanwhile, our Emerging Markets Strategy thinks that Mexico's central bank could deliver another 25 bps rate hike, but it won't be long before tighter policy becomes a drag on consumer spending.2 The peso could stay well-bid for now, but the longer run trend is for a weaker peso versus the U.S. dollar. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer attractive spreads, after adjusting for credit rating and duration, compared to most U.S. corporate sectors. We continue to recommend overweight positions in Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities within an overall underweight allocation to the Government-Related Index. Municipal Bonds: Cut To Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in May (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio declined 8% on the month, and is now more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. In a recent report,3 we noted that the current weakness in state & local government revenue growth mostly reflected the fall-out from the mid-2014 commodity price slump. As such, we expect that revenue growth will rebound in the months ahead and that state & local government net borrowing will decline. However, this eventuality is now fully discounted in M/T yield ratios (Chart 6, panel 3). Further, M/T yield ratios benefited from a steep decline in issuance during the past few months (bottom panel), and the recent uptick in visible supply suggests that the tailwind from declining issuance is about to shift. Factor in the uncertainty surrounding tax reform and a potential infrastructure program, and it is difficult to make the case for much tighter yield ratios. We recommend investors reduce municipal bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5). Investors should continue to capture the premium in long-maturity munis relative to short maturities (panel 2), and also favor the debt of commodity-dependent states where tax revenues should grow more quickly. In particular, Aaa-rated Texas General Obligation bonds offer a premium of 14 bps versus the overall Aaa muni curve at the 10-year maturity point. The average premium offered by other Aaa-rated states is -0.6 bps. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted lower and flattened in May. The 2/10 slope flattened 8 basis points and the 5/30 slope flattened 3 bps. For the second consecutive month yields remained stable out to the 2-year maturity point, but declined further out the curve. As stated on the first page of this report, the recent flattening of the Treasury curve indicates that the market expects the Fed will maintain a policy that is too restrictive for inflation to return to target. We think this is flat out wrong. Either core inflation will turn higher in the second half of this year, allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017. Or, core inflation will remain depressed. In the latter scenario, the Fed would adopt a more dovish policy stance until inflation starts to rise. In either case, the cost of inflation compensation at the long-end of the curve is not high enough, and it will cause the curve to steepen as it rises (Chart 7). We previously documented that the positive correlation between TIPS breakeven rates and the slope of the yield curve still holds during Fed rate hike cycles.4 We continue to recommend positioning for a steeper 2/10 curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade returned 0 bps in May, but is still 26 bps in the money since inception on December 20, 2016. While this trade no longer benefits from the extreme cheapness of the 5-year bullet relative to the rest of the curve (panel 3), it will continue to outperform as TIPS breakevens widen and the curve steepens in the second half of the year. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 107 basis points in May. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate fell 11 bps on the month and, at 1.79%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. A series of disappointing inflation reports have led to weakness in TIPS breakevens so far this year. Year-over-year trimmed mean PCE inflation fell to 1.75% in April, all the way from a peak of 1.91% as recently as January (Chart 8). As we discussed in two recent reports,5 a Phillips Curve model- based on lagged inflation, the employment gap, non-oil import prices and inflation expectations - forcefully predicts that core inflation will trend higher for the remainder of the year (panel 4). In a base case scenario in which both the unemployment rate and the trade-weighted dollar remain flat at current levels, the model projects that core PCE inflation will exceed 2% by the end of this year. In fact, we find it difficult to create a set of reasonable economic assumptions that don't result in core PCE inflation at (or above) the Fed's 1.9% forecast by year end. While we anticipate a rebound in core inflation between now and the end of the year, if that rebound does not seem to be materializing by the end of the summer, the Fed is likely to adopt a more dovish policy stance. Such a policy shift would lend support to TIPS breakeven wideners. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 7 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. In a recent report, we highlighted that consumer balance sheets are in their best shape since prior to the start of the housing bubble.6 As such, consumer ABS should remain a relatively low risk investment. However, some signs of stress are beginning to emerge, particularly in the sub-prime auto space. According to the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey, credit card lending standards tightened in Q4 of last year, but have since reverted into net easing territory (Chart 9). In contrast, auto loan lending standards continue to tighten and net losses on auto loans appear to have bottomed for the cycle. At least so far, auto ABS are not discounting much deterioration in credit quality. After adjusting for volatility, Aaa-rated auto ABS do not offer much of a spread pick-up relative to Aaa-rated credit card ABS (panel 3) and the spread differential between non-Aaa auto ABS and Aaa auto ABS has fallen to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. We continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within an overall overweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 33 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 4 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Apartment and office building prices are growing strongly, but retail sector property prices have been close to flat during the past year (bottom panel). Tighter lending standards and falling demand also suggest that credit stress is starting to mount in the commercial real estate sector. So far, this stress has manifested itself in rising retail and office delinquency rates, while multi-family delinquencies remain low (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +50 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 5 bps on the month, and currently sits at 49 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS still looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 36 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 39 bps, Agency bonds = 17 bps and Supranationals = 19 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.49% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.41%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound. The U.S. PMI has dipped lower in recent months, but remains firmly entrenched above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, the Eurozone PMI continues to surge ahead. China's PMI is the real source of concern. It has recently dipped below 50, and there is a risk that tighter monetary policy could lead to further contraction in the near term (bottom panel).7 For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.15%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017. All available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Time To Be Contrarian", dated April 5, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017. Both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Past Peak Pessimism", dated May 9, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon) Current Recommendation
Feature Table 1 Growth And Its Implications We still see little on the horizon to undermine a continued rally in risk assets over the next 12 months. U.S. economic growth will be propelled by an acceleration in both consumption and capex - leading indicators for both point to further upside (Chart 1). The weak U.S. GDP growth in Q1, just 1.2% annualized, was dragged down by two, less meaningful elements: inventories (which fell, deducting 1 ppt from growth) and imports (which rose, deducting 0.6 ppt). Regional Fed GDP "nowcasts" are pointing to 2.2-3.8% growth in Q2. Corporate earnings had their best quarter in five years in Q1, with S&P500 sales up 8% and EPS up 14% - but, despite this, analysts have barely revised up their calendar year EPS growth forecast, which stands at 10%. In Europe, loan growth has picked up to 2.5% YoY, with the credit impulse indicating that GDP growth is likely to remain above trend at around the 2% it achieved in Q1 (Chart 2). But the stronger growth has implications. It suggests the market is too complacent about the probability of Fed tightening. Futures are pricing a hike on June 14 as a near certainty but, after that, imply little more than one further 25bp rise by end-2019 (Chart 3). We expect two hikes before the end of 2017. Not least, the Fed will be cognizant of how financial conditions have recently eased, not tightened, despite its raising rates in December and March (Chart 4) and will want to put in place insurance against inflation rising sharply in 12 months' time, especially given that it may wish to hold back from hikes early next year as it begins to reduce its balance-sheet. Chart 1Consumption And Capex On Track to Rebound Chart 2Euro Credit Growth Looks Good For GDP Chart 3 Will The Fed Really Be This Slow? As a result, 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields are likely to move back up. The 40bp fall from the peak of 2.6% in March was caused partly by softer growth and inflation data, but also reflected a correction after the excessive pace at which rates had run up - the fastest in 30 years (Chart 5). The combination of stronger growth, a 50bp higher Fed Funds Rate, and a moderate acceleration of inflation as wages begin to pick up again, should push the 10-year yield to above 3% by year-end. Chart 4Fed Must Worry About Easing Conditions Chart 5Rates Couldn't Keep Rising This Fast Momentum for risk assets over the coming months is likely to slow a little. Global PMIs have probably peaked for now (Chart 6) and investors should not expect to repeat the 19% total return from global equities they have enjoyed over the past 12 months. And there are potential pitfalls: China could continue to slow, and European politics could come into focus again (with early Austrian and Italian parliamentary elections looking increasingly possible for the fall). Investors may also worry about the chaotic state of the Trump White House. However, we never believed the U.S. presidential election had much impact on markets (the S&P500 has risen by 2% a month since then, whereas it had risen by 4% a month over the previous nine months). If anything, there could still be a positive catalyst if Congress is able to pass a tax cut before year-end - which we see as likely - since this is no longer priced in (Chart 7). Chart 6Momentum For Equities Will Slow A Little Chart 7No One Expects A Corporate Tax Cut On balance, then, we continue to see equities outperforming bonds comfortably over the next 12 months, and so keep an overweight on equities within our asset class recommendations. We also maintain the generally pro-cyclical, pro-risk and higher-beta tilts within our multi-asset global portfolio. Equities: The combination of cyclical economic growth, accelerating earnings, and easy monetary conditions represents a positive environment for global equities. Valuations are not particularly stretched: forward PE for the MSCI All Country World Index is 15.9x, almost in line with the 30-year average of 15.7x (Chart 8). The Vix (30-day implied volatility on S&P500 options) may look low - famously it dipped below 10 last month, raising fears of complacency - but the Vix term structure is fairly steep, implying that investors are hedging exposure three and six months out (Chart 9). Within equities, our preference remains for DM over EM. The latter will be hurt by the slowdown in China (Chart 10), a rising dollar, the ongoing slowdown in credit growth in most EM economies, and continual political disappointments (most recent example: Brazil). We like euro zone equities, on the grounds of their high beta and greater cyclicality of earnings. We are overweight Japan (with a currency hedge), since rising global rates will weaken the yen and boost earnings. Chart 8Global Equity Valuations Are Not So High Chart 10China's Slowdown Should Hurt EM Fixed Income: As described above, we expect the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield to reach 3% by year-end. This should mean a negative return from global sovereign bonds for the year as a whole, for the first time since 1994. Accordingly, we remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds in most markets. In this positive cyclical environment, we continue to overweight credit, with a preference for U.S investment grade (which trades at a 100 bp spread over Treasuries) over high-yield bonds (where valuations are not as attractive) and euro area credit (which will be hurt when the ECB starts to taper its bond purchases). Currencies: The temporary softness in the dollar has probably run its course. Interest rate differentials between the U.S. and other G7 countries point to further dollar appreciation (Chart 11). At the same time as we expect the Fed to tighten more quickly than the market is pricing in, we see the ECB setting monetary policy for the euro periphery (especially Italy) which, given weak fundamentals (Chart 12), cannot bear much tightening. The Bank of Japan, too, will stick to its yield curve control policy which, as global rates rise, ought to significantly weaken the yen. Chart 11Interest Differentials Point To Stronger USD Chart 12Italy Can Not Bear A Rate Hike Chart 13OPEC Cut Agreement Showing Through Commodities: The recently agreed extension of the OPEC agreement should push crude oil prices up to around $60 a barrel in the second half. OPEC production has already fallen noticeably since the start of the year, but the response from non-OPEC producers - including North American shale - to boost output has so far been subdued (Chart 13). Metals prices have fallen sharply over the past two months (iron ore, for example, by 36% since March) as Chinese growth slowed as a result of moderate fiscal and monetary tightening. They could have further to fall. But China, with its key five-year Party Congress scheduled for the fall, is likely to take measures to boost activity if economic growth slows much further, which would help commodities prices stabilize. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation
Highlights Through the 18 years of the euro, growth in 'core' Germany and France and 'periphery' Spain has equalled that in the U.S., U.K. and Canada. But Italy has severely underperformed since 2008. Italy's economic underperformance is due to the uncured malaise in its banks. Fixing Italian banks will fix Italy and reduce euro breakup risk. Euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. But for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election. Feature The euro recently had its 18th birthday.1 Through the formative, testing and often tempestuous first 18 years of its life, how have the euro area's main economies performed - and how do these performances compare with the developed world's other major economies? The answers might come as a surprise (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekItaly Has Severely Underperformed Since 2008. Why? To allow for the different demographics, we must look at growth in real GDP per head.2 On this metric, the gold medal goes to Japan, with 34% growth. During the euro's lifetime, Japan's real GDP has grown by 18%, but its working age population has shrunk by 12%, resulting in the developed world's best real growth per head.3 The silver medal winner is probably not surprising: Germany, with 28% growth. But the bronze medal winner might surprise you. It is a euro 'periphery' country: Spain, with 26% growth - a medal shared with the U.K. Then come Canada, 24%; the U.S., 22%; and France, 19%. So through the 18 years of the euro, Germany, France and Spain have performed more or less in line with the U.S., U.K. and Canada. Making it very difficult to argue that being in the single currency has penalized the growth of either 'core' Germany and France or 'periphery' Spain. Italy Isn't Partying... But Don't Blame The Euro Unfortunately, there's a problem - Italy. Through the 18 years of the euro, Italy's real GDP per head has grown by just 5%, substantially below any other G10 or G20 economy. If the euro is to blame for the significant underperformance of its third largest economy with 60 million people, then the single currency's long-term viability has to be in serious doubt. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that the euro per se is not to blame for Italy's painful underperformance. First, observe that through 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head kept up with many of its G10 peers. Even without a substantial tailwind from a credit-fuelled housing boom - which other economies had - Italian real growth per head performed in line with France, the U.S. and Canada (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line With France, The U.S. And Canada Second, in the post-crisis years, there was little to distinguish the economic performance of Italy from Spain until 2013 (Chart I-3). Only after 2013 has a huge gap opened up. While Italy has struggled to grow, Spain has taken off, expanding by more than 12%. This recent strong recovery in Spain makes it hard to attribute Italy's underperformance to membership of the single currency (per se). Chart I-3Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish Italy and Spain Until 2013 Fix Italian Banks To Fix Italy We believe that Italy's economic underperformance is down to the as yet uncured malaise in its banks. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Crucially, the acute financial crises in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland forced their policymakers to recapitalize the banks, and thereby allowed the bank credit flow channel to function again. For example, Spain's turning point came in 2013, when bank equity capital as a multiple of non-performing loans (NPLs) started to recover (Chart I-4), allowing Spanish banks to operate more normally. Chart I-4Spanish Banks' Solvency Recovered In 2013 But Spanish banks' health did not recover because NPLs declined; indeed, if anything, NPLs continued to increase (Chart I-5). Spanish banks' health improved because of a large injection of bailout equity capital (Chart I-6). By contrast, Italian banks have not yet received the injection of equity capital that is desperately needed to fix Italy's bank credit flow channel. Chart I-5NPLs Continued To Rise Everywhere Chart I-6French And Spanish Banks Have Raised Equity. Italian Banks Have Not. To lift Italian banks' equity capital to NPL multiple to the lowest level that Spanish banks reached before recovery would require €80-100 billion of fresh bank equity capital. Which equates to 5-6% of Italian GDP. The good news is that this is an affordable price if it kick starts long-term growth. The bad news is that Italy's avoidance of outright financial crisis (thus far) has now tied its hands. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the state bailout escape route that Spain and Ireland used. Granted, in a crisis, the BRRD would allow Italian government state intervention to aid a troubled bank. But the overarching aim would be to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. "Other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." Without a crisis, the process to recapitalise Italian banks and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Our concern is that such a protracted nursing to health will keep Italy's bank credit channel dysfunctional, thereby leaving economic growth in a 60 million people economy sub-par for an extended period. Only when the Italian banks are adequately recapitalized, will the danger of a financial or political tail-event - and a euro breakup - be fully exorcised. Unfortunately, the danger may first have to rise before policymakers allow the necessary action. But ultimately they will. Some Investment Thoughts If euro breakup risk does ultimately fade, then euro area equities will receive a tailwind relative to other markets. This is because relative to these other markets, euro area equity prices are discounted to generate a 1.5% excess annual return through the next 10 years - as a risk premium for euro breakup.4 So if this risk premium suddenly and fully vanished, relative prices would have to rise by 15%. Likewise, euro area periphery bond yields can compress further - as the yield premium effectively equals the perceived annual probability of euro breakup multiplied by the expected currency redenomination loss after the breakup. So euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that the policy steps needed to boost Italian growth are affordable and relatively minor - and that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. However, for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election due to take place within the next year. Breakup risk may flare up again before it does ultimately fade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The euro was born on January 1st 1999. 2 Zeal GDP divided by working age (15-64) population 3 1.18/(1-0.12)=1.34 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Markets Suspended In Disbelief" published on April 13 2007 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Markets have gone too far in pricing out the Republican's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections. A bill that at least cuts taxes should be forming by year end. The risk is that continued political turbulence, now including the possibility of impeachment, distracts Congress and delays or completely derails tax reform plans. Fortunately for the major global equity markets, corporate profits are providing solid support. We expect U.S. EPS growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%. The projected profit acceleration is even more impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. Corporations are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end that will favor the latter two bourses in local currency terms. EPS growth will fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017, but what is more important for equity indexes is the direction of 12-month forward EPS expectations, which remain in an uptrend. The positive earnings backdrop means that stocks will outperform bonds for the remainder of the year even if Congress fails to pass any market-friendly legislation. The FOMC is "looking through" the recent soft economic data and slower inflation, and remains on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year. The impact of the Fed's balance sheet runoff on the Treasury market will be limited by several factors, but a shrinking balance sheet and Fed rate hikes will force bond yields to rise faster than is currently discounted. Policy divergence will push the dollar higher. The traditional relationship between the euro/USD and short-term yield differentials should re-establish following the French election. The euro could reach parity before the next move is done. "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chinese growth has slowed but the authorities are easing policy, which will stabilize growth and support base metals. That said, we remain more upbeat on oil prices than base metals. Feature Investors have soured on the prospects for U.S. tax reform in recent weeks, but the latest travails in Washington inflicted only fleeting damage on U.S. and global bourses. The S&P 500 appears to have broken above the 2400 technical barrier as we go to press. Market expectations for a more tepid Fed rate hike cycle, lower Treasury yields and related dollar softness undoubtedly provided some support. But, more importantly, corporate profits are positively surprising in the major economies and this is not just an energy story. The good news on company earnings should continue to drive stock prices higher this year in absolute terms and relative to bond prices. It is a tougher call on the dollar and the direction of bond yields. We remain short duration and long the dollar, but much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and fiscal policy. A Death Knell For U.S. Tax Reform? Chart I-1 highlights that the market now sees almost a zero chance that the Republicans will ever be able to deliver any meaningful tax cuts or infrastructure spending. Many believe that mushrooming political scandals encumbering President Trump will distract the GOP and delay or derail tax reform. Indeed, impeachment proceedings would be a major distraction, although this outcome would not necessarily lead to an equity bear market. The historical record shows that the economy is much more important than politics for financial markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists looked at three presidential impeachments, covering the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974) and the President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999).1 Watergate was the only episode that coincided with a bear market, but it is difficult to pin the market downturn on Nixon's impeachment since the U.S. economy entered one of the worst post-war recessions in 1973 that was driven by tight Fed policy and an oil shock. Impeachment would require that Trump loses support among the Republican base, which so far has not happened. The President still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart I-2). Investors should monitor this support level as an indicator of the President's political capital and the risk of impeachment. Chart I-1Fading Hopes For Tax Reform We believe that markets have gone too far in pricing out Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. The odds are good that an agreement to cut taxes will be formed by year end. Congressional leaders want tax reform to be revenue neutral, but finding sufficient areas to cut spending will be extremely difficult. They may simply require that tax cuts are paid for in a 10-year window. This makes it possible to lower taxes upfront and promise non-specific spending cuts and revenue raising measures down the road. Or, Congress may pass tax reform that is not revenue neutral through the reconciliation process, which would require that tax cuts sunset at some point in the future. Tax cuts would give stocks a temporary boost either way but, as we discuss below, it may be better for corporate profits in the medium term if Congress fails to deliver any fiscal stimulus. Profits, Beats And Misses While economists fret over the soft U.S. economic data so far this year, profit growth is quietly accelerating in the background (Chart I-3). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at about 18%, before moderating in 2018. Profit growth is accelerating outside of the energy sector. The projected acceleration in EPS growth is equally impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. The favorable profit picture in the major economies reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2015/16, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart I-4). Our short-term forecasting models for real GDP, based on a mixture of hard data and surveys, continue to flag a pickup in economic growth in the major economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Top-Down Profit Projection Chart I-4EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production Chart I-5GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate The U.S. model's forecast paints an overly rosy picture, but it does support our view that Q1 softness in the hard data reflected temporary factors that will give way to a robust rebound in the second and third quarters. The Eurozone economy is really humming at the moment, as highlighted by our model and recent readings from the IFO and purchasing managers' surveys. Indeed, these indicators are consistent with real GDP growth of nearly 3%! Our GDP models are also constructive for Japan and the U.K., although not nearly as robust as in the U.S. and Eurozone. Chart I-6Profit Margins On The Rise Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row (Chart I-6). Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.2 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, and we expect the "mean reversion" in profit margins to resume next year. But for now, our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). Profit margins are also on the rise in Japan and the Eurozone. Margins in the latter appear to have the most upside potential of the three major markets, given the fact that current levels are still depressed by historical standards, and that there remains plenty of slack in the European labor market. We are not incorporating any margin expansion in Japan because they are already very high. Nonetheless, we do not expect any "mean reversion" in margins over the next year either, because the business sector is going to great lengths to avoid any increase in the wage bill despite an extremely tight labor market. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end: The U.S. is further ahead in the global profit mini recovery and year-ago EPS comparisons will become more difficult by the end of the year. The drag on corporate profits in 2017 from previous dollar strength will be larger than the currency drag in the Eurozone according to our models, assuming no change in trade-weighted exchange rates in the forecast period (Chart I-7). The pass-through of past yen movements will be a net boost to EPS growth for Japanese companies this year.3 Currency shifts would favor the Japanese and the Eurozone markets versus the U.S. even more if the dollar experiences another upleg. We expect the dollar to appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% broad-based dollar appreciation would trim EPS growth by 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lags (Chart I-8). Eurozone and Japanese EPS growth would receive a lift of 2 and ½ percentage points, respectively, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Chart I-7Currency Impact On EPS Growth Chart I-8A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits Finally, the fact that profits in Japan and the Eurozone are more leveraged to overall economic growth than in the U.S. gives the former two markets the edge as global industrial production continues to recover this year and into 2018. Japanese and Eurozone equity market indexes also have a higher beta with respect to the global equity index. The implication is that we remain overweight these two markets relative to the U.S. on a currency hedged basis. Lofty Expectations Even though the message from our EPS models is upbeat, our forecasts still fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially in the U.S. where valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table I-1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in the recession. But even outside of 2008, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart I-9 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years since the Great Recession. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the trend in 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Chart I-9S&P 500 Follows ##br##12-month Forward EPS The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth U.S. expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time The minutes from the May FOMC meeting reiterated that policymakers plan to begin scaling back on reinvesting the proceeds of its maturing securities of Treasurys and MBS by the end of the year. The Fed is leaning toward a gradual tapering of reinvestment in order to avoid shocking the bond market. Still, investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the balance sheet runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. Chart I-10 presents a forecast for the flow of Treasurys available to the private sector, taking into consideration the supply that is absorbed by foreign official institutions and by the Fed. The bottom panel shows a similar calculation for the aggregate supply of government bonds from the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone and the U.K. While the supply of Treasurys has been positive since 2012, the net flow has been negative for these four economies as a whole because of aggressive quantitative easing programs. This year will see the largest contraction in the supply of government bonds available to the private sector, at US$800 billion. The flow will become less negative in 2018 even if the Fed were to keep its balance sheet unchanged (mostly due to assumed ECB tapering). If the Fed goes ahead with its balance sheet reduction plan, the net supply of government bonds from the major economies will move slightly into positive territory for the first time since 2014. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" for the path of future short rates. Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables and the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. Just for exposition purposes, let us take an extreme example and assume that the Fed simply terminates all re-investment as of January 2018 (i.e. the runoff is not tapered). In this case, the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a contraction of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart I-11). Applying the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.09, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. Chart I-11Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: The balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).4 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Fed Outlook: Mostly About Inflation The May FOMC minutes confirmed that the FOMC is "looking through" the soft economic data in the first quarter, chalking it up to temporary factors such as shifts in inventories. They are also inclined to believe that the moderation in core CPI inflation in recent months is temporary. The message is that policymakers remain on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year, in line with the 'dot plot' forecast. The market is pricing almost a 100% chance of a June rate hike. However, less than two full rate hikes are expected over the next year, which is far too benign in our view. Investors have been quick to conclude that recent economic data have convinced Fed officials to shift from a "gradual" pace of rate hikes to a "glacial" pace. Treasurys rallied on this shift in Fed expectations and a decline in long-term inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has dropped to about 1.8%, the lowest level since before the U.S. election. This appears to us that the bond market over-reacted to the drop in core CPI inflation from 2.2% in February to 1.9% in April. The evolution of actual inflation will be critical to the outlook for the Fed and Treasury yields in the coming months. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists have simulated a traditional Phillips Curve model of inflation (Chart I-12).5 The model projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.1% by December, even assuming no change in the unemployment rate or the trade-weighted dollar. Inflation ends the year not far below the 2% target even in an alternative scenario in which we assume that the dollar appreciates and that the full-employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed currently assumes. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% Thus, the trend in inflation should reinforce the FOMC's bias to keep tightening policy, forcing the bond market to reassess the pace of rate hikes discounted in the curve. That said, if we are wrong and inflation does not trend higher in the next 3-4 months, then it is the FOMC that will be forced to reassess and our short duration recommendation will probably not pan out on a six month horizon. Longer-term, last month's Special Report highlighted that we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, builds on that theme with a look at the impact of technological progress on equilibrium bond yields. With respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. Stay overweight corporate bonds within fixed income portfolios for now. While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten policy for an extended period, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. The euro has appreciated versus the dollar even as two-year real interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar since the end of March. This divergence probably reflects euro short-covering following the market-friendly French election outcome. Next up are the two rounds of French legislative elections in June. Polls support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus. In the meantime, we do not see any risk factors emanating from the Eurozone that could upset the global equity applecart in the near term. Moreover, the traditional relationship between the euro/USD exchange rate and 2-year real yield differentials should now re-establish. The implication is that the euro could reach parity before the next move is done. Dr. Copper? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 25% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 5% since February (Chart I-13). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 7-10%, nickel has dropped by 18% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Chart I-13What Are Commodities Telling Us? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in previous reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart I-14). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over. Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: The authorities wish to slow credit growth, but there is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably this year (Chart I-15). Finally, the PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility and recently made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months. Chart I-14China Is The Main Story ##br##For Base Metals Demand Chart I-15Direct Fiscal Spending And ##br##Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. Fading fears about a China meltdown may give commodities a lift later this year. Our commodity strategists are particularly positive on crude oil, as extended production cuts from OPEC and Russia outweigh the impact of surging shale production, allowing bloated inventories to moderate. In contrast, the backdrop is fairly benign for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Investment Conclusions: Accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a healthy tailwind and suggests that stocks could perform well under a couple of different scenarios in the second half of 2017. If the rebound in U.S. economic growth from the poor first quarter is unimpressive and it appears that Congress will be sidetracked by political turmoil in the White House, then the S&P 500 should benefit from the 'goldilocks' combination of healthy profit growth, low bond yields, an accommodative Fed and a soft dollar. If, instead, U.S. growth rebounds strongly and Congress makes progress on the broad outline of a tax reform bill over the summer months, then stocks should benefit from the prospect of stronger growth in 2018. Rising bond yields and a firmer dollar would provide some offset for stocks, but would not derail the equity bull market as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. Our model suggests that U.S. inflation will remain below-target for the next several months, but could be near 2% by year end. This scenario would set the stage for a more aggressive Fed in 2018, a surge in the dollar and possibly a bear market in risk assets next year. We are therefore comfortable in predicting that the stock-to-bond total return ratio will continue to rise for at least the remainder of this year. The tough part relates to bond yields and the dollar, since the above two scenarios have very different implications for these two asset classes. Our base case is closer to the second scenario, such that we remain below benchmark in duration and long the dollar. That said, much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and U.S. politics. Both are particularly difficult to forecast. A failure for core PCE inflation to pick up in the next 3-4 months and/or continuing political scandals in Washington would force us to reconsider our asset allocation. Of course, there are other risks to consider, including growing mercantilism in the U.S., Sino-American tensions and North Korea. At the top of the list are China and Italy. (1) China China remains our geopolitical strategists' top pick as the catalyst most likely to scuttle our upbeat view on global risk assets in 2017.6 Our base case assumption is that policymakers will not enact wide-scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans and bankruptcies and defaults, ahead of the Fall Party Congress. The regulatory crackdown so far seems merely to keep the financial sector in check for a while. The government has already stepped back somewhat in the face of the liquidity squeeze, and fiscal policy has been loosened (as mentioned above). All of the key Communist Party statements have emphasized that stability remains a priority. Nonetheless, it may be difficult for the authorities to manage the deleveraging process given nose-bleed levels of private-sector leverage. Politicians could misjudge the fragility of the financial system and investors might front-run the reform process, sending asset prices down well in advance of policy implementation. (2) Italy We have flagged the next Italian election as a key risk for markets because of polls showing that voters have become disillusioned with the euro. It appeared that an election would not take place until 2018, and we have downplayed European elections as a risk factor for 2017. However, the 5-Star Movement has now backed a proportional electoral system, which raises the chances of an autumn election in Italy. This would obviously spark turbulence in financial markets in the months leading up to the event. Turning to emerging markets, the pickup in global growth and a modest bounce in commodity prices would support this asset class. However, our view that the dollar is headed higher on the back of Fed rate hikes keeps us from getting too excited about EM stocks, bonds or currencies. Our other recommendations include the following: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Overweight small caps stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2017 Next Report: June 29, 2017 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Overview," April 017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Currency shifts affect earnings with a lag, which in captured by our models. 4 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets ," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com II. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? This month's Special Report was written by Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist for BCA's Global Investment Strategy Service. The report is a companion piece to last month's Special Report, which argued that some of the structural factors that have depressed global interest rates are at an inflection point. These factors include demographic trends and the integration of China's massive labor supply into the global economy. Peter's report focuses on technology's impact on bond yields. He presents the non-consensus view that slow productivity growth likely depresses interest rates at the outset, but will lead to higher rates later on. Not only could sluggish productivity growth lead to higher inflation, it could also deplete national savings. Both factors would be bond bearish, reinforcing the other factors discussed in last month's Special Report. I trust that you will find the report as insightful and educational as I did. Mark McClellan Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software ##br##Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The ##br##1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of the Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce ##br##Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed ##br##Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 above 2400 in May has further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are elevated relative to past equity cycles. The price/sales ratio is in a steep rise too. However, our U.S. Composite valuation metric, which takes into consideration 11 different measures of value, is still a little below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, these measures will not look as favorable when rates finally rise. Technically, the U.S. equity market has upward momentum. Our Equity Monetary Indicator has remained around the zero line, meaning that it is not particularly bullish or bearish at the moment. Our Speculation Index is high, pointing to froth in the market. The high level of our Composite Sentiment Index and low level of the VIX speaks to the level of investor complacency. The U.S. net revisions ratio jumped higher this month, and it is bullish that the earnings surprise index advanced again. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little "dry powder" left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The widening gap between the U.S. WTP and that of Japan and Europe highlights that recent flows have favored the U.S. market relative to the other two. Looking forward, this means that there is more "dry powder" available to buy the Japanese and European markets. A rise in the WTPs for these two markets in the coming months would signal that a rotation into Europe and Japan is taking place. It is disconcerting that our Europe WTP suffered a pull-back over the past month. Nonetheless, we believe that accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a strong tailwind and suggests that stocks remain in a window in which they will outperform bonds. U.S. bond valuation is hovering close to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. We also believe that the combination of Fed balance sheet shrinkage and rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Technically, our composite indicator has touched the zero line, clearing the way for the next leg of the bond bear market. The dollar is very expensive on a PPP basis, although it is less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year, crossing the 200-day moving average. That said, according to our dollar technical indicator, overbought conditions have been totally worked off, suggesting that the currency is clear to move higher if Fed rate expectations shift up as we expect. Moreover, we believe that policy divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and BoJ on the other will push the dollar higher. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY: