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Highlights Fed Policy Loop: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation stays below target. High-Yield: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Spread Product: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product allocation in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Feature Chart 1The Fed Policy Loop In Action One of this publication's main themes during the past few years has been the Fed Policy Loop.1 In essence, the Loop describes the feedback mechanism between monetary policy and financial markets, a relationship that results from both investors' sensitivity to the Fed's policy stance and the Fed's reliance on financial conditions as a predictor of economic growth. In practice, the Loop works as follows: Easier Fed policy causes spread product to outperform Treasuries. Tighter credit spreads lead to easier financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will accelerate. An improved economic outlook causes the Fed to step up the pace of tightening. Tighter Fed policy causes spread product to underperform Treasuries. Wider credit spreads lead to tighter financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will moderate. A worse economic outlook causes the Fed to slow its expected pace of tightening. Rinse, repeat. Chart 2 provides a graphical description of the Loop, and its most recent iteration can be seen in Chart 1 above. Chart 1 shows that corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries leading up to the March rate hike, but then rate expectations rose too far. In mid-March the market was discounting a fed funds rate of 1.86% by the end of 2018. These overly stringent rate hike expectations caused corporate bonds to underperform, and this underperformance led rate hike expectations to be revised lower. The market now expects a fed funds rate of only 1.47% by the end of 2018, and these depressed rate expectations have fueled the rally in corporate bonds that started in mid-April. Normally at this stage of the Fed Policy Loop we would expect rate hike expectations to move higher until they eventually prompt a correction in corporate spreads. However, extremely disappointing core inflation prints during the past three months have caused the market to keep its rate hike expectations depressed. This has extended the most recent rally in spread product. This is why we have consistently pointed to core inflation and the cost of inflation protection embedded in long-maturity bond yields as the main factors to watch to determine how much life is left in the corporate bond trade. As long as inflation stays below target, the Fed absolutely needs it to rise. It will therefore be quick to respond to any tightening of financial conditions/widening of credit spreads. Table 1 shows average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds relative to duration-matched Treasuries. These returns are split into buckets based on the reading from the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure (PPM). The PPM is a composite of 104 economic indicators designed to measure the probability that inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next 12 months. As can be seen, average monthly excess returns are strongest when inflation pressures are low, but they gradually decline as inflation heats up and the Fed's reaction function becomes less supportive for markets. At present, the PPM gives a reading of only 4.8%. Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different ##br## Ranges Of Price Pressures Measure** (January 1990 To Present) Similarly, Table 2 shows that it is difficult to get a long-lasting correction in an environment with low inflation pressures and a responsive Fed. This table shows the results of a "buy the dips" trading strategy where if the average junk spread widens by 20 basis points we buy the junk index versus duration-matched Treasuries and hold it for a period of 1, 2 or 3 months. Just as in Table 1, this strategy works well when inflation pressures are muted, but starts to fail as inflation ramps up. Table 2High-Yield Corporate Bond Returns* Achieved By Holding The Junk Index ##br## Following A 20 BPs Widening In High-Yield Corporate OAS** Under Different Ranges Of ##br## The St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure*** (February 1994 To Present) Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves So when will the Fed staunch the current rally? That depends on how quickly inflation rebounds,2 and also on how much emphasis Fed policymakers place on financial conditions versus the actual inflation data. At the moment, most indexes are sending the message that financial conditions are easier than average and that the Fed should continue to tighten (Chart 3). However, as was noted above, inflation gauges are sending the opposite signal (Chart 3, panel 2). For now, the Fed is downplaying low inflation as transitory. It decided to leave its median projected rate hike path unchanged at the June FOMC meeting. But the Fed's refusal to capitulate in the face of weaker inflation has caused the yield curve to flatten, the cost of inflation protection to plummet (Chart 3, bottom panel) and investors to grow increasingly concerned about a policy mistake (Chart 4). Chart 3Financial Conditions Are Supportive Chart 4Should The Fed Keep Tightening? This brings up an interesting flaw in the financial conditions approach to policymaking. Most indexes of financial conditions are at least partially driven by long-maturity Treasury yields (lower yields = easier financial conditions, and vice-versa). This makes some sense. Lower yields do in fact indicate that the financing back-drop is more supportive and tend to translate into higher growth in the future (Chart 5). Chart 5Financial Conditions Lead Economic Growth However, what if lower long-maturity Treasury yields are the result of excessively tight Fed policy? This would appear to be the case at the moment. Investors are revising their long-run inflation forecasts lower on the view that the Fed is not doing enough to allow prices to rise. In such a situation it would be incorrect to interpret lower Treasury yields as a signal that policy needs to tighten further. On the contrary, tighter policy would only exacerbate the downtrend in yields. For this reason we do not include the level of yields in the financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor (Chart 3, top panel). As a result, this financial conditions indicator is not as deep in "easing territory" as most other indicators. However, it is still above the zero line, suggesting that policy should be biased tighter at the margin. Bottom Line: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. The key risk is that inflation stays low but the Fed continues to focus exclusively on "easy" readings from financial conditions indexes, and proceeds on its current tightening path. In that scenario cries of "policy mistake" will grow louder and spread product will sell off, converging with lower rate hike expectations. We view this scenario as a low-probability tail risk. Junk Valuation Update At 378 bps, the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is only 55 bps above its post-crisis low, but still more than 100 bps above the level where it tends to settle in the late stages of the economic cycle when the Fed is tightening policy (Chart 6, top panel). Higher debt levels than are typical for this stage of the cycle suggest that somewhat wider spreads are justified,3 but the idea that junk spreads are extremely tight compared to history does not hold up to scrutiny. Chart 6High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread Our preferred measure of junk valuation, the default-adjusted high-yield spread, paints an even rosier picture. The second panel of Chart 6 shows an ex-post measure of the default-adjusted spread (the option-adjusted spread of the high-yield index less actual default losses over the subsequent 12 months). The most recent reading from this indicator is based on our forecast of default losses for the next 12 months, and is shown as a dashed line. The message from the default-adjusted spread is that, assuming our default loss forecast is correct, junk bonds currently offer compensation for default risk that is in line with the historical average. That level of compensation would be consistent with an excess return of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months (Chart 6, panel 3), and is contingent on the speculative grade default rate falling to 2.68%, in line with Moody's baseline forecast (Chart 6, bottom panel). We expect a decline in the default rate to materialize in the coming months as commodity sector defaults continue to work their way out of the data. Moody's did not record any commodity-related defaults in May, the first month this has occurred since January 2015. The risk going forward is that defaults start to emerge in the increasingly stressed retail sector. So far, Moody's has recorded two retail defaults this year. However, more are probably on the way. This will be especially true if inflationary pressures start to mount and the Fed tightens policy, giving banks less incentive to extend credit. We will be monitoring the situation in retail closely going forward. Bottom Line: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Roundup As can be inferred from the previous two sections, we are still reasonably comfortable taking credit risk in U.S. bond portfolios. However, this week we also look at the compensation offered by Aaa-rated spread product. For investors who desire some Aaa-rated allocation outside of the Treasury market, Chart 7 provides a snapshot of where the most additional spread is available. The first thing that jumps out is that Agency bonds offer very little spread compared to other Aaa-rated instruments. Agency residential mortgage-backed securities also offer relatively little compensation, unless one is willing to extend into premium coupons (4% and above). Agency CMBS, auto ABS and credit card ABS all offer more spread than Aaa-rated corporate bonds. Non-agency CMBS offer much more attractive spreads than the other Aaa sectors, but we see potential for capital losses in that segment, as is discussed below. Agency MBS Only agency MBS carrying coupons of 4% or above offer interesting compensation relative to other Aaa-rated sectors, and even there we see potential for spread widening in the coming months. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared to history (Chart 8) and appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance (Chart 8, panel 2). While refinancing activity will likely stay depressed (Chart 8, panel 3), we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. A similar scenario played out in 2007 (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Chart 8MBS Spreads Biased Wider Chart 9Avoid Non-Agency CMBS CMBS As noted above, non-agency CMBS look very attractive compared to other Aaa-rated spread products. But we see potential for spread widening in this sector. Commercial real estate lending standards are tightening and property prices are decelerating, both should pressure non-agency CMBS spreads wider (Chart 9). Agency CMBS offer somewhat lower spreads than their non-agency counterparts. But this sector should be more insulated from spread widening. For one thing, Agency CMBS are mostly backed by multi-family loans. Multi-family property prices have been stronger than those in the retail or office segments (Chart 9, panel 3), and multi-family properties have also experienced much lower delinquencies (Chart 9, bottom panel). Consumer ABS Chart 10Credit Cards Greater Than Autos While Chart 7 shows that Aaa-rated auto ABS offer a slight spread advantage over Aaa-rated credit card ABS, we are inclined to view credit card ABS more favorably. Rising auto loan net loss rates pose a risk for auto ABS spreads, while credit card charge-offs remain historically low (Chart 10). Auto lending standards have also moved deep into "net tightening" territory, while credit card lending standards have dipped back into "net easing" territory. The small extra compensation available in auto ABS relative to credit card ABS does not seem to be worth the extra risk. Bottom Line: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we view the risk of a further widening in non-agency CMBS spreads as substantial. We prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product exposure in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Both sectors offer reasonably attractive spreads, and should remain insulated from capital losses going forward. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Our view is that core inflation will rebound fairly quickly. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The rollover in the economic surprise index is not sending a near-term recession signal and should trough in the next month or so, as decent economic data begins to surpass now lowered expectations. Investors should be prepared for a mild recession in 2019, but odds of a recession are low in the next 12-18 months. Oil prices will move higher from the mid $40s per barrel as investors start to see the inventory drawdowns we expect in the coming months. We expect that the Fed will stick to its plan to begin shrinking its balance sheet in September and hike rates again in December. Still, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the next few months would likely see the Fed postpone any further tightening until early 2018. Small cap stocks have underperformed large caps this year, but investors should not interpret this as a sign of that start of sell-off in risk assets. Feature The Citi Economic Surprise Index (CESI) is not sending a near-term recession signal and should trough in the next month as decent economic data begin to surpass lowered economic expectations. The index is nearly two standard deviations below its mean after peaking in early March in the wake of the election and has been falling for 71 days. It typically takes 90 days for the surprise index to find a footing after readings above 40. Moreover, the mean reverting nature of the index suggests a rebound at two standard deviations, absent a recession that we do not foresee (Chart 1). Chart 1Economic Surprise Index Approaching A Turning Point CESI is composed of two components, whose composition and recent behavior are crucial to interpreting the weakness in the overall surprise metric. A positive reading on the "consensus change" index, which tracks economists' forecasts, means that expectations have improved relative to their one-year average. A positive reading on the "data change" component suggests that economic releases have been stronger than their one-year average. The overall surprise index combines these two elements/factors (Chart 2). Chart 2Post Election, Economic Expectations For Soft Data Hit An Eight Year High Lofty expectations, rather than poor data, account for much of CESI's weakness in the past three months. This is most pronounced in the soft economic surprise index, where outlooks moved sharply in the wake of the U.S. election when forecasters were swept up in Trump euphoria. By early March 2017, the economic consensus index for soft data was at its highest in seven years, topping out just shy of the all-time record set in late 2009. Prognosticators also ratcheted up their forecasts for the hard data, but not by nearly as much. The inevitable result of elevated expectations, combined with economic reports that signaled that overall growth remained close to 2%, was a prolonged spell of economic disappointment. This type of divergence between heightened expectations and weakness in the overall surprise index has occurred several times in the past 13 years (2004, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2017). Each episode took place before a bottom in the economic surprise index and our view is that this time is no different (Chart 2). Despite the dismal surprise index, forecasts for U.S. and global GDP in 2017 and 2018 have held up, which is a positive sign for profits (Chart 3). The stability of these forecasts is in sharp contrast to 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 when global growth estimates sunk at the same time as the economic surprise index. As we stated in our recent report,1 GDP growth in 1H 2017 in the U.S. is on track to match the Fed's modest 2.1% target for the year. Moreover, in years when Q1 GDP is weak, 2H growth is faster than 1H growth 70% of the time. Chart 3U.S. & Global GDP Estimates For 2017 & 2018 Have Held Up Well Falling oil prices are another worry for investors concerned that global growth is on the wane. We take a different view and expect oil prices to increase in the coming months. In a recent report,2 our Energy Sector Strategy team noted that investors are confused about conflicting supply signals in oil markets. Traders do not see the physical shortage that the IEA/EIA/OPEC and BCA's top-down supply & demand analyses argue should prevail (Chart 4). Investors are cautious amid the uncertainty. We view the investment environment as overly pessimistic and anticipate that oil prices (and oil-focused upstream equities) will improve as inventory withdrawals escalate in the coming months. The latest 3.5% year-over-year reading on LEI for May points to low odds of a near-term recession (Chart 2, panel 3). However, BCA's Global Investment Strategy service has raised the possibility of a U.S. recession commencing in 2019. Financial markets would move ahead of a recession, thus investors should begin to adjust their portfolios3 for a recession scenario in the latter half of 2018, as economic and profit growth begins to weaken. Until then, we favor stocks over bonds, but we remain vigilant for any signs of imbalances that typically precipitate a recession. Our Global Investment Strategy service points out that in the post-war era the unemployment rate's three-month moving average has never risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession. A good leading indicator of the unemployment rate is the weekly unemployment claims data, and they suggest continued tightening in the labor market (Chart 5). Chart 4We Expect The Oil Balance To Tighten Later This Year Chart 5Claims Not Even Close To Sending A Recession Signal A tighter labor market will lead to the familiar vicious cycle of a more aggressive Fed, a margin squeeze, slower and eventually falling profits, rising corporate defaults and layoffs. The resulting economic downturn would be mild compared with the 2007-2009 recession because the current imbalances are not as severe as those in 2007. Even so, with valuations stretched, the pain of the recession may be most felt in the financial markets, with a likelihood of a 20-30% equity bear market. Bottom Line: Despite signs to the contrary, the sweet spot that has buoyed risk assets remains in place: a beneficial combination of moderate economic growth, healthy corporate profit growth, stable margins, low inflation and a Fed prepared to only gradually hike rates. We remain overweight stocks versus bonds in the next 6-12 months. Threats to this risk-asset friendly environment include a further drop in core inflation, an over-aggressive central bank, and signs that negative economic shocks are leading to a significant markdown of global growth prospects. Is The Fed's Inflation Target Credible? The recent drop in oil prices has undermined our short-duration recommendation. But more than that, investors are questioning whether the Fed even has the ability to reach its inflation goals, following the surprising May CPI report and the softening in some of the wage data. Is it possible that the U.S. is following Japan's roadmap where even an over-heated labor market is insufficient to generate any meaningful inflation? The sharp flattening of the Treasury curve indicates that the bond market has already rendered its judgement. As we noted last week, the energy component pulled down the headline CPI rate again in May, but the softening of inflation this year is widespread in the index. This is contrary to Fed Chair Yellen's assertion that recent weak readings are due largely to special factors, such as wireless telecommunications prices. The deceleration in inflation began around the start of the year. The 3-month rate of change of the headline index fell by more than five percentage points between January and May, of which energy accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The deceleration in the core rate was a less severe, but still substantial, 2.8 percentage points. Table 1 presents the components of the CPI that made the largest contribution to the deceleration in core inflation. Motor vehicles, owners' equivalent rent, apparel, recreation, wireless telecom and medical care services accounted for 1.2 percentage points as a group. However, many other sectors contributed in a small way to the overall deceleration of core inflation in the first five months of the year. Table 1Key Drivers Of Core Inflation Deceleration In 2017 Some special factors were at play. The moderation in rent inflation likely reflects the bottoming of the vacancy rate. Discounting in the auto sector is not a surprise given weak sales. Wireless prices can be viewed as a special case as well. Nonetheless, the breadth and suddenness of the deceleration in core inflation across such diverse sectors, some unrelated to labor markets, commodity prices, the weak dollar or on-line shopping, is startling. The disinflation this year in the Fed's preferred measure, the PCE price index, is not as extended but the data lag the CPI by roughly a month. A diffusion index made up of the components of the PCE index is still in positive territory, unlike the CPI's diffusion index (Chart 6). Nonetheless, the CPI data suggest that core PCE inflation will edge lower when the May data are released at the end of June. There has also been a moderation in some of the wage inflation data, such as average hourly earnings (Chart 7). The slowdown has been fairly widespread across manufacturing and services. The good news is that the soft patch appears to be over; 3-month rates of change have firmed almost across the board (retail is a major exception). Chart 6CPI, PCE Diffusion##BR##Indices Are Mixed Chart 7Wages Have Accelerated##BR##Over Past Three Months There is no slowdown evident at all in the better-constructed Employment Cost Index (ECI) as of the first quarter (Chart 8). The related diffusion indexes also remain constructive. The ECI is adjusted to avoid compositional effects that can distort the aggregate index. We conclude from these and other wage measures that the Phillips curve is still operating. Admittedly, the curve appears to be quite flat, which means it is difficult to generate inflation even when the labor market overheats. Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECI and measures of labor market tightness, such as the quit rate, the "jobs plentiful" index and NFIB compensation plans, does not appear to have broken down (Chart 9). The percentage of U.S. states with unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment is above 70%. Anything over 60% in the past has been associated with wage pressure (Chart 10). The percentage jumped from 58% in March to 71% in April, blasting through the 60% threshold. Chart 8No Slowdown##BR##In ECI Data Chart 9Labor Market Tight Enough##BR##To Push Up Inflation The bottom line is that, while we are concerned about the breadth of the soft patch in the consumer price data, we are in agreement with the Fed that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. We are willing at this point to chalk up the recent drop in core inflation partly to randomness in the data, and partly to lagged effects of the slowdown in real GDP growth in the first half of 2016 (Chart 11). The PPI for services and for core goods are not suggesting there is deflationary pressure in the pipeline (Chart 8). Chart 10Rise In State Level Diffusion Indices Consistent With Higher Compensation Costs Chart 11Inflation Lags Economic Growth By 18 Months What Will The Fed Do? The CPI data have rattled some on the FOMC. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Kaplan, for example, believes that the Fed needs to be patient to ensure that the inflation pullback is temporary. However, the June FOMC Statement and Yellen's press conference suggested that the consensus is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment. FOMC Vice Chairman Dudley echoed this view in comments he made last week to the press. The Fed has been quick to ease or back away from planned rate hikes at the first hint of trouble since the Lehman shock. However, it appears that the reaction function has changed, now that the labor market is at full employment. This is especially the case because financial conditions have eased further since the June rate hike. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the economy. Policymakers know that the Fed has had little success in the past when it tried to nudge unemployment higher in order to relieve inflation pressure and achieve a soft landing; these attempts almost always ended in recession. Dudley added that "...pausing policy now could raise the risk of inflation surging and hurting the economy." Other FOMC members are worried that financial stability risk will rise if the low-rate environment extends much further. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed will stick with the game-plan for now. The FOMC will begin shrinking the balance sheet in September, but will wait until December for the next rate hike. That said, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the coming months would likely see the FOMC postpone the next rate increase into next year. Where Next For Bonds? Our fixed-income strategists see three possible scenarios for the bond market:4 Base Case: Weak recent inflation readings are nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. U.S. growth accelerates in the second half, unemployment falls further and both wage growth and inflation pick up. Oil inventories begin to contract and prices head higher. The FOMC is vindicated in its inflation view and proceeds with the current rate hike and balance sheet adjustment agenda. Investors receive a "wake up call" from the Fed, bond prices get hit and recent curve-flattening trend reverses. Fed Capitulates: The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, but core PCE inflation is still close to 1½% by the September FOMC meeting. We would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. Long-maturity real yields would fall in this scenario, although long-term inflation expectations could rise to the extent that the Fed's more dovish tilt will weaken the dollar and generate more inflation in the medium term. Nominal yields may not end up moving much in this scenario. A Policy Mistake: If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would price-in a policy mistake scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. In terms of likelihoods, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case scenario, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a tail risk. The bottom line is that short-duration positions have been a "pain trade" in recent weeks, but it appears to us that the rally is overdone. We remain short-duration. No Signal From Small Caps Chart 12Small Caps Are No Longer Expensive The underperformance of small cap stocks since December is not sending a signal about the broader equity market. In fact, small cap relative performance has a mixed track record calling the peak in large cap equities. We maintain our view from a 2014 report:5 There is no basis for concluding that small cap underperformance heralds a fragile economy, stock market weakness or heightened risk aversion. Investors should note the sector/compositional, domestic/international, cyclical/defensive, and valuation discrepancies between small and large cap stocks before drawing any conclusions about the signals from small caps. The S&P 500 small cap index has more exposure to financials, industrials and materials than its large cap cousins, and has lower weights in energy, staples and healthcare. This mix makes small caps more cyclically oriented. Moreover, small caps have less exposure to overseas economies and, therefore, less sensitivity to fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. Plus, our small cap valuation indicator has moved even further into undervalued territory since our discussion of small cap equities in this publication on April 246 (Chart 12). Chart 13Small Caps Are Not Great##BR##Market Prognosticators Small-cap stocks outperformed large cap by 12% from November 8 through December 8, 2016, but have lagged since, as investors unwound the Trump trade. The implication is that the recent sell-off in small caps is not a signal that the broader market is poised for a downturn. Instead, it reflects the market's view that Trump's pro-small business agenda has stalled. Moreover, history shows that the relative performance of small caps versus large caps is not a good predictor of the future performance of risk assets versus bonds. The small-to-large ratio sent plenty of mixed signals in the '80s and '90s when the economy was in a long expansion, fostered by low inflation and a gradualist Fed (Chart 13, panels 1 and 2). On the other hand, local peaks and troughs in small cap performance provided solid signals for turns in stock versus bond performance from the early '70s through the mid-80s, a period characterized by soaring inflation that is not present today (Chart 13, panel 1). Small-cap outperformance starting in late 2008 did presage an upturn in the stock-to-bond total return ratio in 2009, and captured a few of the risk on/risk off periods from 2010 through 2012, while the Fed engineered QE2, Operation Twist and QE3. More recently, the relative performance of small versus large has been range-bound and has not provided a consistent signal for turns in the overall market (Chart 13, panel 3). Bottom Line: The underperformance of small caps to large is a reaction to the market's perception that Trump's pro-small business agenda will disappoint, not a sign that U.S. growth is waning. While several planned policies of the Trump administration have been delayed, a legislative agenda that appears to be pro-business is in place. As such, our view is that it is too early to abandon a bullish bias towards small cap stocks, especially given the major improvement in relative valuation noted above. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?", June 5, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Views From The Road", June 21, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Timing Of The Next Recession", June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "On The Road Again", June 2, 2014, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Spring Snapback", April 24, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The divergence between global bond yields and equity prices is not as puzzling as it may first appear. Thus far, lower inflation has dampened the need for central banks to tighten monetary policy. This has caused bond yields to fall, lifting stocks in the process. Looking out, the combination of faster growth and dwindling spare capacity will cause inflation to rise. This is particularly the case for the U.S., where the economy has already reached full employment. The "blow-off" phase for the U.S. economy is likely to last until mid-2018. The dollar and Treasury yields will move higher over this period. The euro and the yen will suffer the most against a resurgent greenback, the pound less so. China's economy will remain resilient, helping to boost commodity prices. This will support the Canadian and Aussie dollars. Stronger global growth will provide a tailwind to emerging markets. However, at this point, most of the good news is already reflected in EM asset valuations. Feature Stocks And Bonds: A Curious Divergence Chart 1Global Growth: Increasing Optimism One could be forgiven for thinking that equity and bond investors are living on different planets. Global bond yields have been trending lower thus far this year, while stocks have been setting new highs. Are bonds signaling an imminent slowdown which equity investors are willfully ignoring? Not necessarily. Almost all of the decline in bond yields has been due to falling inflation expectations. Real yields have remained reasonably steady, suggesting that growth worries are not foremost on investors' minds. The fact that consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have continued to grind higher is consistent with this observation (Chart 1). A quiescent inflation picture has given investors more confidence that the Fed will not need to raise rates aggressively. This has pushed down bond yields, weakened the dollar, and fueled the rally in stock prices. The decline in headline inflation, in turn, has been largely driven by lower commodity prices. In the U.S., several one-off factors - including Verizon's decision to move to unlimited data plans, a temporary lull in health care inflation, and a drop in airline fares - have helped keep core inflation in check. The U.S. Economy: It Gets Better Before It Gets Worse Looking out, global growth is likely to remain firm. This should ultimately translate into higher inflation, particularly in the U.S., where the economy has already achieved full employment. Granted, as we discussed last week,1 the U.S. business cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. However, history suggests that the transition between boom and bust is often accompanied by a revelry of sorts where things get better before they get worse. Call it a "blow-off" phase for the business cycle. The example of the late 1990s - the last time the U.S. unemployment rate fell below NAIRU for an extended period of time - comes to mind. Chart 2 shows that final domestic demand accelerated to 8.3% in nominal terms in Q1 of 2000. Personal consumption growth surged, reaching 8.4% in nominal terms and 5.7% in real terms. Obviously, there are many differences between now and then. However, there is at least one critical similarity: The unemployment rate stood at 4.3% in January 1999. This is exactly where it stands today. And if it keeps falling at its current pace, the unemployment rate will dip below its 2000 low of 3.8% by next summer. As was the case in the past, an overheated labor market will lead to faster wage growth. In the U.S., underlying wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% at present (Chart 3). Chart 2The Late 1990s: An End-Of-Cycle Blow-Off Chart 3Stronger Labor Market Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Granted, this is still well below the levels seen in 2000 and 2007. However, productivity growth has crumbled over the past decade while long-term inflation expectations have dipped. Real unit labor costs - a measure of compensation which adjusts for shifts in productivity growth and inflation - are rising at a faster rate than in 2007 and close to the pace recorded in 2000 (Chart 4). In fact, real wage growth in the U.S. has eclipsed business productivity growth for three straight years (Chart 5). As a result, labor's share of national income is now increasing. Chart 4Real Unit Labor Cost Growth: Back To Its 2000 Peak Chart 5Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity What happens to aggregate demand when the share of income going to workers rises? The answer is that at least initially, demand goes up. Companies typically spend less of every marginal dollar of income than workers. This is especially the case in today's environment where the distribution of corporate profits has become increasingly tilted towards a few winner-take-all firms which, for the most part, are already flush with cash (Chart 6). Thus, a shift of income towards workers tends to boost overall spending. In addition, an overheated labor market typically generates the biggest gains for workers at the bottom of the income distribution. Wages for U.S. workers without a college degree have been rising more quickly than those with a university education for the past few years (Chart 7). Such workers often live paycheck-to-paycheck and, hence, have a high marginal propensity to consume. Chart 6A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart 7Tighter Labor Market Boosting Wages Of Less Educated Workers Let's Get This Party Started The discussion above suggests that U.S. aggregate demand could accelerate over the next few quarters. There is some evidence that this is already happening (Chart 8). Despite a moderation in auto purchases, real PCE growth is still tracking at 3.2% in the second quarter according to the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model. And with the personal saving rate still stuck at an elevated 5.3%, there is scope for consumer spending to grow at a faster rate than disposable income. Chart 9 shows that the current saving rate is well above the level one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income. Chart 8Solid Near-Term Outlook For U.S. Consumers Financial conditions have eased over the past six months thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart 10). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart 11). This could make the coming blow-off phase even more explosive than in past business cycles. Some commentators have noted that while financial conditions have eased, bank lending has slowed significantly. If true, this would imply that easier financial conditions are not boosting credit growth in the way one might expect. The problem with this argument is that it takes a far too limited view of the U.S. financial system. Although bank lending to companies has indeed slowed, bond issuance has soared. In fact, total nonfinancial corporate debt rose by $212 billion in the first quarter according to the Fed's Financial Accounts database, the largest increase in history (Chart 12). Chart 10Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 11...Which Will Support Growth Chart 12Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Surged In Q1 All Good Things Must Come To An End Unfortunately, the burst of demand that often occurs in the late stages of business cycle expansions contains the seeds of its own demise. Initially, when consumer spending accelerates, firms tend to react by expanding capacity. This translates into higher investment spending. However, as labor's share of income keeps rising, an increasing number of firms start incurring outright losses. This causes them to dismiss workers and cut back on investment spending. Such a souring in corporate animal spirits is not an immediate risk for the U.S. economy. Hiring intentions remain solid and businesses are still signaling that they expect to increase capital spending over the coming months (Chart 13). Profit margins are also quite high by historic standards, which gives firms greater room for maneuver. This will change over time, however. Margins are already falling in the national accounts data (Chart 14). History suggests that S&P 500 margins will follow suit. This raises the risk that capex and hiring will start to slow late next year, potentially sowing the seeds for a recession in 2019. We remain overweight global equities on a cyclical 12-month horizon, but will be looking to significantly pare back exposure next summer. Chart 13Corporate America Feeling Great Again Chart 14Economy-Wide Margins Have Slipped The Dollar Bull Market Is Not Over Yet Chart 15Historically, A Rising Labor Share Has Pushed Up The Dollar Until U.S. growth does decelerate, the path of least resistance for bond yields and the dollar will be to the upside. Chart 15 shows the strikingly close correlation between labor's share of income and the value of the trade-weighted dollar. As noted above, the initial effect of accelerating wage growth is to put more money into workers' pockets. This results in higher aggregate demand and, against a backdrop of low spare capacity, rising inflation. Historically, such an outcome has prompted the Fed to expedite the pace of rate hikes, leading to a stronger dollar. This time is unlikely to be any different. The market is currently pricing in only 21 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. This seems far too low to us. Other things equal, a stronger dollar implies a weaker euro and yen. Improved export competitiveness will lead to better growth prospects and higher inflation expectations in the euro area and Japan. Unless the ECB and the BoJ respond by tightening monetary policy, short-term real rates will fall. This, in turn, could put further downward pressure on the euro and the yen. The ECB And The BoJ Will Not Follow The Fed's Lead Many commentators have argued that better growth prospects will cause the ECB and the BoJ to follow in the Fed's footsteps and take away the punch bowl. We doubt it. Labor market slack is still considerably higher in the euro area than was the case in 2008. Outside of Germany, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the euro area is about seven points higher than it was before the Great Recession (Chart 16). If anything, the market has priced in too much tightening from the ECB. Our months-to-hike measure has plummeted from a high of 65 months in July 2016 to 28 months at present (Chart 17). Investors now expect real rates in the U.S. to be only 23 basis points higher than in the euro area in five years' time. This is well below the 76 basis-point gap in the equilibrium rate between the two regions that Holston, Laubach, and Williams estimate (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Is Still High Outside Of Germany Chart 17ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tightening Chart 18The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area As for Japan, while it is true that the unemployment rate has fallen to 2.8% - a 22-year low - this understates the true amount of slack in the economy. Output-per-hour in Japan remains 35% below U.S. levels. A key reason for this is that many Japanese companies continue to pad their payrolls with excess labor. This is particularly true in the service sector, which remains largely insulated from foreign competition. In any case, with both actual inflation and inflation expectations in Japan nowhere close to the BoJ's target, this is hardly the time to be worried about an overheated economy. And even if the Japanese authorities were inclined to slow growth, it would be fiscal policy rather than monetary policy that they would tighten first. After all, they have been keen to raise the sales tax for several years now. The Pound Will Rebound Against The Euro, But Weaken Further Against The Dollar Chart 19Pound: Unloved And Underappreciated While we continue to maintain a strong conviction view that the euro and yen will weaken against the dollar, we are more circumspect about other currencies. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney played down speculation this week that the BoE would raise rates later this year, noting in his annual speech at London's Mansion House that "now is not yet the time to begin that adjustment." U.K. growth has been the weakest in the G7 so far in 2017, partly because of growing angst over the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. Nevertheless, U.K. inflation remains elevated and fiscal policy is likely to be eased in the November budget, as Chancellor Hammond confirmed in a BBC interview on Sunday. Sterling is already quite cheap based on our metrics (Chart 19). Our best bet is that the pound will weaken against the dollar over the next 12 months but strengthen against the euro and the yen. We are currently long GBP/JPY. The trade has gained 7.2% since we initiated it in August 2016. CAD Has Upside We went long CAD/EUR in May. Despite the downdraft in oil prices, the trade has managed to gain 2.6% thus far. We are optimistic on the Canadian dollar over the coming months. Our energy strategists remain convinced that crude prices are heading higher. They expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. Consequently, oil inventories should fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 20). The Bank of Canada has also turned more hawkish. Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins suggested last week that interest rates are likely to rise later this year. The market is now pricing in a 84% chance of a rate hike in 2017, up from only 18% earlier this month. The Canadian economy continues to perform well (Chart 21). Retail sales are growing briskly, the unemployment rate is close to its lowest level in 40 years, and goods exports are recovering thanks to a weak loonie and stronger growth south of the border. While the bubbly housing market remains a source of concern, this is as much a reason to raise interest rates - to prevent further overheating - as to cut them. Chart 20Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices Chart 21Canadian Economy: Chugging Along China Will Drive The Aussie Dollar And EM Assets After a very strong start to the year, Chinese growth has slipped a notch. Housing starts slowed in May, as did gains in property prices. M2 growth decelerated to 9.6% from a year earlier, the first time broad money growth has fallen into the single-digit range since the government began publishing such statistics in 1986. Still, the economy is far from falling off a cliff, as evidenced by the fact that the IMF upgraded its full-year 2017 GDP growth forecast from 6.6% to 6.7% last week. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global growth. The PBoC's trade-weighted RMB basket has fallen by over 8% since it was introduced in December 2015. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. The percentage of households that intend to buy a new home has also surged to record-high levels. This should limit the fallout from the government's efforts to cool the housing market. The rebound in exports and industrial output is helping to lift producer prices. Higher selling prices, in turn, are fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 22). A better profit picture should support business capital spending in the coming months. The government also remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system last Friday. This was the single biggest one-day intervention since January, when demand for cash was running high in the lead up to the Chinese New Year celebrations. Fiscal policy has also been eased (Chart 23). So far, the "regulatory windstorm" of measures designed to clamp down on financial speculation has largely bypassed the real economy. Medium and long-term lending to nonfinancial corporations - a key driver of private-sector capital spending - has actually accelerated over the past eight months (Chart 24). Chart 22China: Higher Selling Prices Fuelling A Rebound In Profits Chart 23Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend Chart 24China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating The key takeaway for investors is that Chinese growth is likely to slow over the next few quarters, but not by much. Considering that fund managers surveyed by BofA Merrill Lynch in June cited fears of a hard landing in China as the biggest tail risk facing financial markets for the second month in a row, the bar for positive surprises out of China is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the Aussie dollar and other commodity plays. Strong Chinese growth should provide a tailwind for EM assets. However, EM stocks and currencies have already had a major run, which limits further upside. The fact that serial-defaulter Argentina could issue a 100-year bond this week in an offering that was three times oversubscribed is a testament to that. The fundamental problems plaguing many emerging markets - high debt levels, poor governance, and lackluster productivity growth - remain largely unaddressed. Until they are, the long-term outlook for EM assets will continue to be challenging. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," dated June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights While the yield curve is a critical indicator for developed economies, its significance in China should be put in proper perspective, as the country's market-based financial intermediation is much less important compared with the West. The inverted Chinese yield curve indicates tighter interbank liquidity in recent months, but the impact on the economy should be limited. The PBoC will at minimum pause its liquidity tightening campaign, which will provide a window for bonds to rally. Go long Chinese onshore corporate bonds. The near term impact of MSCI's A Share inclusion should be negligible for the broader market. Valuation indicators of the select 222 large-cap names are much more attractive compared with their domestic peers, which may well provide a catalyst for some catch-up rally. Feature Chart 1China's Inverted Yield Curve The Chinese authorities' tightening measures on the financial sector have significantly pushed up interest rates across the curve, particularly in the short end, leading to rapid yield-curve flattening. By some measures, long-dated interest rates are currently lower than short rates, generating an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Some have viewed an inverted Chinese yield curve as a harbinger of an impending material growth slowdown. While the yield curve is undoubtedly a critical indicator for developed economies, its significance in China should be put in proper perspective. In short, bank loans still play a dominant role in financial intermediation, the interest rates on which are still largely determined by the policy lending rate. Therefore, a simple comparison of the Chinese yield curve to its counterparts in the West misreads the situation and is overly alarmist. Moreover, we suspect that the phase of maximum strength of policy tightening is over, at least in the near term. Therefore, Chinese interest rates are likely to fall in the coming three to six months. This week we recommend a long position in Chinese onshore corporate bonds. Why The Yield Curve Matters Less For China To be sure, the yield curve is among the most relevant and watched indicators in some developed economies. In the U.S., for example, an inverted yield curve, defined as U.S. 10-year Treasury yields resting below three-month Treasury yields, has historically been a reliable indicator in predicting economic recessions (Chart 2). Evidence from other developed economies such as Japan and Europe is less compelling, but a flat/inverted yield curve is still generally regarded as a market signal for growth problems. Chart 2U.S. Yield Curve Inversion Predicts Economic Recession The reasons for the linkage between yield curve inversion and economic recessions have been the subject of lengthy debates among academia, policymakers and investors. From a financial market perspective, it is generally accepted that an inverted yield curve occurs when the bond market anticipates a significant slowdown in growth and/or decline in inflation, which bids down long-term yields, while policymakers fail to respond in a timely manner, which holds short-term rates at elevated levels. Yield curve inversion is typically followed by aggressive monetary easing as central banks wake up to the economic reality predicted by the bond market. Economically, the costs of funding in most developed countries are tightly linked with interest rates in the bond markets. One of banks' key functions as financial intermediaries is to transform maturity - i.e. to "borrow short and lend long," and therefore interest rates of bank loans are tied to government bond yields at the longer end, while their costs of funding are linked to the shorter end. Therefore, an inverted yield curve typically compresses banks' interest margins, which tends to hinder credit origination and slow down business activity. For example, Chart 3 shows that U.S. mortgage interest rates historically have been tightly linked with 10-year Treasury yields, while interest rates of banks' deposit base and interbank rates for "wholesale" funding are both determined by short-term Treasury yields, which is in turn determined by the fed funds rate. In China, the yield curve plays a much smaller role than in the developed world, simply because the country's market-based financial intermediation is much less important. Traditionally both lending rates and deposit rates of commercial banks were rigidly set by the People's Bank of China, and there was little lending/borrowing activity outside the formal commercial banking system. The situation has been gradually changing in recent years as a result of financial reforms. Banks are given flexibility to set their own interest rates, and non-bank lending, or shadow banking activity that is more driven by market interest rates, has expanded. However, commercial banks still play a dominant role. Chart 3U.S. Bank Loan Rates Follow Treasury Yields Closely Chart 4China: Bank Loans Still Dominate Bank loans currently account for over 70% of China's total non-equity social financing, both in terms of flow and total outstanding stock (Chart 4). Commercial banks' average lending rate still closely tracks the PBoC policy benchmark. Banks' prime lending rate moves in lock step with PBoC interest rate adjustments, and average interest rates on new mortgages are also primarily determined by the policy rate (Chart 5). Banks' cost of funding is also primarily determined by retail deposit interest rates, which are in turn set by the PBoC. Retail deposits account for about 80% of total loanable funds for large banks, or 70% for smaller banks (Chart 6). Repo and interbank transactions, which are subject to the central bank's liquidity tightening, only account for 14% of smaller lenders' source of funds, or a mere 2% for large lenders. Chart 5Chinese Bank Loan Rates ##br##Still Track PBoC Benchmarks Chart 6Retail Deposits Are Still The Dominant Funding Source ##br##For Commercial Banks The important point is that market signals from China's juvenile and volatile financial markets should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism, and a simple comparison with the West is often misleading. For example, a significant decline in stock prices in developed economies may well herald a growth recession in their respective economies. In China, however, domestic stock prices have routinely gone through massive boom and bust cycles without any tangible impact on the broader economy, as the equity markets play a marginal role for both the corporate sector in terms of raising capital and for households in managing their wealth. In recent years, China's financial sector reforms have been gradually introducing market forces in setting interest rates, but the process is far from advanced enough to have a meaningful and direct impact on the cost of funding for both the corporate sector and banks. Overall, the inverted Chinese yield curve indicates tighter interbank liquidity in recent months, but the impact on the economy should be limited. PBoC Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength Moreover, it is noteworthy that yield-curve flattening has been a global phenomenon rather than a China-specific development (Chart 7). What's different is that in other countries the flatter yield curve has been mostly due to falling yields of longer-dated bonds, while in China it has been entirely driven by a sharp increase in short-term yields due to the PBoC's liquidity tightening.1 Looking forward, the PBoC will maintain close scrutiny on the financial sector to keep financial excesses in check. However, we believe the phase of maximum strength of liquidity tightening is likely over, at least in the near term. There is no case for genuine monetary tightening, as inflation is extremely low and growth momentum is already softening. It is very unlikely that the PBoC will tighten monetary conditions further, amplifying deflationary pressures in the process.2 The PBoC's tightening measures have already significantly reduced the pace of leverage buildup and excesses in the financial system. Banks' exposure to non-bank financial institutions has tumbled, net issuance of commercial banks' negotiable certificates of deposits has turned negative of late, and overall off-balance-sheet lending by financial institutions, or shadow banking activity, has slowed sharply in recent months (Chart 8). In other words, the tightening campaign has achieved the intended consequences, diminishing the odds of further escalation. Chart 7Synchronized Yield Curve Flattening Chart 8Financial Excesses Are Being Reined In Global developments are also conducive for some loosening by the PBoC. Last week's rate hike by the Federal Reserve has further pushed down both U.S. interest rates and the dollar. The spread between Chinese 10-year government bond yields and U.S. Treasurys has widened sharply of late, which is helping stabilize the RMB (Chart 9). All of this has reduced pressure on the PBoC to follow the Fed with additional domestic tightening. Already, the PBoC has stepped in to ease liquidity pressure in the interbank system in recent weeks. After massive liquidity withdrawals early this year, the PBoC has been injecting liquidity into the interbank market through various open market operations in the past two months, according to our calculations - likely a key reason why interbank rates have stopped rising of late (Chart 10). Chart 9China - U.S. Interest Rate Spread Versus##br## Exchange Rate Chart 10The PBoC Is Stepping In ##br##To Ease Interbank Liquidity Pressure Chart 11Onshore Corporate Bonds ##br##Are Attractive Chinese corporate bonds will benefit the most, should the authorities stop further tightening (Chart 11). Onshore corporate spreads have widened sharply since late last year amid the PBoC crackdown, and are now substantially higher than in other countries. Chinese corporate spreads should recover without further escalation in liquidity tightening, and will also benefit from the ongoing profit recovery in the corporate sector. We expect both quality spreads and government bond yields to drop in the next three to six months, lifting corporate bond prices. Bottom Line: The PBoC will at minimum pause its liquidity tightening campaign, which will provide a window for bonds to rally. Go long Chinese onshore corporate bonds. A Word On The MSCI A-Share Inclusion MSCI Inc. announced this week its decision to include Chinese A shares in its widely followed emerging market and world equities indexes. The company will add 222 China A large-cap stocks to its EM benchmark at a 5% partial inclusion factor, which will account for about 0.73% of EM market cap. This marks a major milestone in China's capital market development and financial sector liberalization. Increasing participation of foreign institutional investors will also over the long run help improve China's corporate governance and regulatory practices - all of which are instrumental for improving the efficiency of domestic capital market as well as the efficiency of capital allocation. Table 1Valuation Of China A-Share Universe The near-term market impact, however, should be negligible. After all, the inclusion will take effect June next year. In addition, foreign investors already have access to these A share companies through the existing Stock Connect channels between Chinese domestic exchanges and Hong Kong. Moreover, potential capital inflows from global managed assets benchmarked to MSCI indexes in the initial step will be marginal. It is estimated that a total of US$18 billion, or RMB 125 billion, foreign capital may follow the MSCI decision into the A share market, a tiny fraction of A-shares' almost RMB 40 trillion market cap. That said, the valuation indicators of the select 222 large-cap names look attractive compared with their domestic peers, with median trailing P/E and P/B ratios at 23 and 2 times, substantially lower than other major domestic indexes (Table 1). MSCI inclusion may well provide a catalyst for some catch-up rally. We will follow up on this issue in the following weeks. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside?," dated June 8, 2017, and "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights For the time being, our cyclical stance is to underweight the globally-sensitive Energy, Materials and Banks sectors versus Healthcare - in both the equity and credit asset-class. Combined with our expectation of a weakening pound/euro, this necessarily means the following European equity market allocation: Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Underweight: Italy, Spain, and Norway. We anticipate shifting to a more cyclical sector (and country) allocation by the late summer, especially on dips. Feature It is worth reminding readers that picking mainstream equity markets1 is overwhelmingly about the industry sectors and dominant stocks that you are buying, wittingly or unwittingly. Picking equity markets is seldom about the prospects of the underlying domestic economies or head-to-head valuations.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal Energy Has Just Tracked The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse (Down) The usual top-down approach to picking stock markets ignores two dominant features of these markets. First, they have huge variations in their sector exposures. Second, large industry sector groups like Energy, Banks, Healthcare and Technology tend to move en masse under the influence of global or regional rather than domestic drivers. The combination of these two features means that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) impact swamps the effect that comes from the domestic economy. Right now, by far the most important consideration for country pickers is the relative outlook for the globally-sensitive Energy and Banks sectors versus the more defensive Healthcare. As an example, consider the choice between Spain and Switzerland. Spain's IBEX is at the mercy of its huge weighting to Banks, dominated by Santander and BBVA; while Switzerland's SMI is at the mercy of its similarly dominant weighting in the Healthcare sector, via Novartis and Roche. Box I-1 - Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks (Chart 2). France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials (Chart 3). Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks (Chart 4). Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks (Chart 5). Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks (Chart 6). Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy (Chart 7). And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound (Chart 8). Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy (Chart 9). Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials (Chart 10). Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials (Chart 11). Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy (Chart 12). The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks (Chart 13). It follows that if Banks underperform Healthcare, it is highly likely that Spain's IBEX will underperform Switzerland's SMI, irrespective of the performances of the Spanish and Swiss domestic economies. For long-term investors, the large skews in sector exposure also mean that a head-to-head comparison of country valuations can be very misleading. At first glance, Spain, trading on a forward price to earnings (PE) multiple of 15.5, appears 15% cheaper than Switzerland, trading on a multiple of over 18. But this head-to-head difference just reflects the impact of forward PEs of Banks at 11 and Healthcare at 18. The Bank sector's lower multiple does not necessarily make it better value than Healthcare. Unlike two developed economies - whose long-term growth prospects tend to be broadly similar - two industry sectors could end up experiencing very different structural growth outcomes. Which would justify very different multiples. Despite its low multiple, a structural underweight to Banks might nonetheless be a good strategy if the sector's structural growth outlook is poor. In such a case, the low multiple is potentially a value trap. Picking Stock Markets The Right Way To reiterate, the decision to overweight or underweight a mainstream equity index should not be based on your view of the country's underlying economy - unless, of course, the country is the potential source of a major tail-risk event. Instead, the decision should be based on your over-arching sector view, combined with the country's skews to specific dominant stocks and sectors (Box I-1). Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5, Chart I-6, Chart I-7, Chart I-8, Chart I-9, Chart I-10, Chart I-11, Chart I-12 and Chart I-13 should leave readers in absolutely no doubt. A market's dominant sector skew is by far the most important determinant of its relative performance. Chart I-2Germany (DAX) Is Overweight Chemicals,##br## Underweight Banks Chart I-3France (CAC) Is Underweight Banks##br## And Basic Materials Chart I-4Italy (MIB) Is Overweight Banks Chart I-5Spain (IBEX) Is Overweight Banks Chart I-6Netherlands (AEX) Is Overweight Technology,##br## Underweight Banks Chart I-7Ireland (ISEQ) Is Overweight Airlines (Ryanair) ##br##Which Is, In Effect, Underweight Energy Chart I-8The U.K. (FTSE100) Is Effectively ##br##Underweight The Pound Chart I-9Switzerland (SMI) Is Overweight Healthcare, ##br##Underweight Energy Chart I-10Sweden (OMX) Is ##br##Overweight Industrials Chart I-11Denmark (OMX20) Is Overweight ##br##Healthcare And Industrials Chart I-12Norway (OBX) Is ##br##Overweight Energy Chart I-13The U.S. (S&P500) Is Overweight Technology, ##br##Underweight Banks Which brings us to the key consideration for country allocation right now: how to allocate to the sectors that feature most often in the skews: Energy and Banks versus Healthcare. For Energy relative performance, note the very strong recent connection with the global 6-month credit impulse. The downswing in the impulse - heralding a very clear growth pause - lines up with the setback in energy and resource prices and the underperformance of these globally-sensitive equity sectors (Chart of the Week and Chart I-14). Meanwhile, in the most recent mini-cycle, Banks' relative performance is tracking the bond yield almost tick for tick (Chart I-15). There are two reasons. For banks, lower bond yields presage both slimmer net interest margins and weaker economic growth. Chart I-14Commodity Price Inflation Is Just Tracking ##br##The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Chart I-15Financials Are Just Tracking ##br##The Bond Yield So for both Energy and Banks relative performance the overriding question is: when will this mini-downswing end? To answer this question, we note that we are 4-5 months into the global mini-downswing, whose average duration tends to be around 8-9 months. On this basis, now is a little too early to switch to an aggressively pro-cyclical sector allocation. But we would look for potential opportunities by the late summer, especially on sharp dips. Hence, for the time being our cyclical stance is to underweight the globally-sensitive Energy (and Materials) and Banks versus Healthcare. Combined with our expectation of a weakening pound/euro, this necessarily means the following European country allocation: Overweight: France,3 Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. Underweight: Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Norway. Clearly, if you have a different cyclical and over-arching sector view, you will arrive at a different country allocation. That's fine. The important point is that the stock and sector skew approach is the right way to pick between mainstream equity indexes. Financials Drive The European Credit Market Finally, an over-arching sector view is also highly relevant for the European corporate credit market. In the euro area, the credit market is heavily skewed towards bank and other financial sector bonds, which account for almost half of euro area corporate bonds by value. By comparison, the U.S. credit market is not so skewed to one dominant sector. Hence, the outlook for the European credit asset-class hinges on the prospects for one sector: Financials (Chart 16). With the European high yield credit spread already close to a 20-year low, we would again wait for a better opportunity before adding aggressively to the European credit asset-class. Chart I-16Mirror Image: European High Yield Credit Spread And Bank Equity Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In the developed world. 2 Please also see the three European Investment Strategy Special Reports 'Picking 5 European Countries The Right Way' November 13, 2014, 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 2' March 26, 2015 and 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 3' November 12, 2015. 3 But expect a small near-term countertrend underperformance in the CAC40. See page 11. Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. Last week's trade, long nickel / short palladium has made an encouraging countertrend move at the classic limit of a trend. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-17 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights The European Central Bank's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and, by extension, boosted German manufacturing. Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. As a result of this and labor shortages, wages in central Europe are rising rapidly, and inflation is accelerating. The Polish and Czech central banks will be forced to hike rates sooner than later. Hungary's central bank will lag behind. Go long the PLN versus the IDR. Stay long the CZK versus the euro and the PLN against the HUF. Feature Inflation in central Europe is picking up and will continue to rise (Chart I-1). The main driver is surging wage growth in central Europe. Considerable acceleration in wage growth, in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signifies genuine inflationary pressures that could very well spread. Based on this, our primary investment recommendation is to be long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. Labor Shortages There is a shortage of labor in the central European manufacturing economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This partially reflects similar trends in Germany and its increased use of outsourcing to central European countries. Escalating wage growth (Chart I-2) in central European economies denotes widening labor shortages. Chart I-1Inflation Is Rising In CE3 Chart I-2Labor Shortages = Higher Wages Indeed, our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - has surged of late across all central European countries (Chart I-3). The same measure for Germany is at a 27-year high (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate both components of the ratio: the number of job vacancies has skyrocketed to all-time highs and the number of unemployed people has dropped to multi-decade lows as well. Chart I-3Labor Is Scarce In CE3 And Germany Chart I-4AA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Chart I-4BA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Importantly, it is not the case that labor shortages are occurring because people are discouraged and giving up on their search for work. The participation rate for all these countries has risen to its highest level since data have been available. In brief, a rising share of the population in these countries is either working or actively looking for a job. (Chart I-5). Finally, their working age population is shrinking (Chart I-6), with Germany being the exception because of immigration inflows (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Labor Participation Rate Is ##br##High In CE3 And Germany... Chart I-6...While Working Age ##br##Population Is Declining In CE3 Robust labor demand has been occurring in central Europe because of the ongoing manufacturing boom in the region. Given central Europe's extensive supply chain linkages to German manufacturing, the artificial cheapness of the euro that the ECB engineered has boosted the German economy and by extension central Europe's manufacturing boom. Germany: A Cheap Currency And Export Boom The ECB's ultra-accommodative policy has suppressed the value of the euro, and caused German exports to mushroom (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-7ECB Policies Have Been ##br##A Boon For German Exports A cheap common European currency has boosted Germany's manufacturing competitiveness and has led to rising demand for German exports. An overflow of manufacturing orders in Germany in turn has led to labor shortages in central Europe via increased German outsourcing. Currency appreciation is the conventional economic adjustment in a country with a flexible exchange rate and an export boom coupled with a large current account surplus. However, this has not occurred in Germany in recent years. This is because of the ECB's ultra-easy policies. The euro has depreciated even as the German and euro area overall current account has mushroomed (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Since the currency has not been allowed to appreciate in nominal terms, the real effective exchange rate will inevitably appreciate via inflation - rising wages initially and broader inflation increases later. In our opinion, the best currency valuation measure is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Our basis is that this measure reflects both changes in productivity and wages - i.e. it reflects genuine competitiveness. Chart I-8 demonstrates Germany's real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs in absolute terms compared to other advanced manufacturing competitors like the U.S., Japan, Switzerland and Sweden. Based on this measure, it is clear that Germany continues to enjoy a significant comparative advantage on the manufacturing world stage among advanced manufacturing economies. It is only less competitive versus Japan. Chart I-8Germany Is Very Competitive Based On Real Effective Exchange Rates Bottom Line: The ECB's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and boosted German manufacturing. This has boosted central European manufacturing and demand for labor. Germany Is Passing The Inflation Baton To Central Europe Despite a historic low in the unemployment rate and ongoing labor shortages, German wages have not risen by much (Chart I-9). Our hunch is that German companies faced with some labor shortages have been increasing their use of outsourcing. Central European economy's export to Germany have boomed, especially after the euro started depreciating circa 2010 (Chart I-10). Chart I-9German Wage Inflation Is Muted Chart I-10Growing Dependence On ##br##Germany For CE3 Growth Being the lower marginal cost producer in the region, central European economies have benefited from German competitiveness and the cheap euro. Outsourcing is economically justified because German wages are still four times higher than in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. (Chart I-11). Even though Germany's productivity is higher than in central Europe, manufacturing wages adjusted for productivity are still higher than in central European economies (Chart I-12). Therefore, it still makes sense for German businesses to outsource more to lower-cost producers in central Europe. Chart I-11CE3 Wage Bill Is Cheaper ##br##Than That Of Germany... Chart I-12...Even After Adjusting ##br##For Productivity Faced with strong orders as well as a lack of available labor, businesses in central European countries have been competing for labor by raising wages. Unlike in Germany, manufacturing and overall wages in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have recently surged (Chart I-2 on page 3). Wages are rising more so in Hungary and the Czech Republic since they have smaller labor pools compared to Poland. Notably, wage growth has exceeded productivity growth, and unit labor costs have been rising rather rapidly (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Unit Labor Costs Are Rising Rapidly In CE3 Higher unit labor costs amid rising output denote genuine inflationary pressures. Producers faced with rising unit labor costs and shrinking profit margins will attempt to raise prices. Given that income and demand are strong, they will partially succeed - meaning genuine inflationary pressures in central Europe are likely to intensify. Since the beginning of the ECB's accommodative monetary policy, Germany has been able to avoid the fallout of higher wages because it has been able to outsource a portion of its production to other countries, namely central Europe. The problem is that the supply of labor in central Europe is now drying out, so its price will naturally rise. If Germany did not have the labor pool of CE3 available as a resource, German wage inflation would be significantly higher by now because companies would have been forced to employ Germans more rapidly, paying more in labor costs. Bottom Line: Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. Overheating In Central Europe Various inflation measures are showing signs that inflation is escalating in CE3. With rising wages and unit labor costs, these trends will continue. Consequently, output gaps in central European economies are closing or have closed, warranting further increases in inflation (Chart I-14). Money and credit growth are booming, which is further facilitating the rise in inflation (Chart I-15). Finally, employment growth is very robust and retail sales are strong (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Inflation Will Remain On An Up Trend In CE3 Chart I-15Money & Credit Will Facilitate Path To Inflation Chart I-16Employment & Retail Sales Growth Is Robust Bottom Line: A cheap euro has supercharged German demand for central European labor at the time when the pool of available labor in CE3 is shrinking. This has generated genuine inflationary pressures in the region. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations 1. The Polish and Czech central banks will hike rates sooner than later. This will boost their currencies. The Hungarian central bank will lag and the HUF will underperform its regional peers. CE3 currencies are set to appreciate, especially the CZK and the PLN: stay long the PLN versus the HUF, and the CZK versus the euro. We recommended going long PLN/HUF and long CZK/EUR on September 28 2016 due to stronger growth and rising inflationary pressures. This week's analysis reinforces our conviction on these trades. In the face of rising inflationary pressures, the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) will be less reluctant to tighten policy than the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and the ECB. This will drive the PLN and CZK higher relative to the EUR and HUF. The NBH is unlikely to tighten policy while credit growth is still weak. Given strong political pressure for faster economic growth, our bias is that the NBH is more interested in ending six years of non-existent credit growth rather than containing inflation. The ECB is unlikely to tighten policy either, given the still-poor structural growth outlook among the peripheral European economies. A new currency trade: go long the PLN versus the IDR, while closing our short IDR/long HUF trade with a 9% loss. This is based on our expectations that central European currencies will appreciate versus their EM peers, and the PLN will do better than the HUF. 2. Relative growth trajectory favors Central European economies relative to other EM countries. Such economic outperformance and resulting currency appreciation will be a tailwind to CE3 equity performance versus EM in common currency terms. Continue overweighting CE3 equity markets within the EM benchmark. We recommended equity traders go long CE3 banks / short euro area banks on April 6, 2016. This position has not worked out due to a significant rally in euro area banks since Brexit. However, euro area banks remain less profitable and overleveraged compared to their central European counterparts. As such they will likely underperform in the coming months. 3. In fixed income, we have the following positions: Overweight Hungarian sovereign credit within an EM sovereign credit portfolio. Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. A new trade: Receive 1-year Hungarian swap rates / Pay 10-year swap rates. As structural inflationary pressures become rampant in the Hungarian economy, the market will start pricing in rate hikes further down the curve, and the yield curve will consequently steepen (Chart I-17). Polish and Czech bonds offer better value relative to bunds as investors stand to gain from currency appreciation as well as an attractive spread. (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Bet On Yield Curve ##br##Steepening In Hungary Chart I-18Polish & Czech Bond Offer Value ##br##Relative To German Bunds Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The Fed Is Right: Wage growth and inflation increase as growth rebounds in the second half of the year. Treasury yields move higher, the yield curve steepens and TIPS breakevens widen. This is the most likely scenario. The Fed Capitulates: Inflation fails to rebound but the Fed responds by signaling a shallower rate hike path. Increased inflation compensation offsets lower real yields, leaving long-maturity nominal yields unchanged. Meanwhile, wider TIPS breakevens cause the yield curve to steepen. This is the second most likely scenario. Policy Mistake: Inflation fails to rebound and the Fed continues to tighten. Nominal yields move lower and tighter TIPS breakevens cause the yield curve to flatten. This is the least likely scenario. Feature Chart 1Pricing A Policy Mistake Rather than go out of her way to assure markets that the Fed will respond to recent weakness in core inflation, Janet Yellen insisted at last week's post-FOMC press conference that low inflation will prove transitory. The Fed decided to plough ahead with its second rate hike of 2017, while maintaining its median projection for one more before the year is out. The Treasury market remains skeptical. Long-maturity nominal yields continued to decline following the FOMC meeting while short-maturity yields increased (Chart 1). The resultant curve flattening - the 2/10 Treasury slope is back down to 84 basis points - signals that the market is pricing-in an overly aggressive pace of Fed tightening. Consistent with this message, the drop in long-dated yields continues to be concentrated in the inflation component while real yields - which are linked to the expected pace of Fed rate hikes - remain firm (Chart 1, bottom panel). We were surprised by Yellen's reluctance to throw the market a bone, but we actually agree with her assessment of the fundamentals underpinning inflation. Our base case scenario is that inflation will soon resume its gradual uptrend, causing the Treasury curve to bear-steepen and TIPS breakevens to widen. Whether or not this base case scenario plays out, it is clear that the next few inflation prints and how the Fed responds to them will dictate the path for Treasury yields between now and the end of the year. We see three possible scenarios, and this week we examine each in turn, in order of most likely to least likely. Specifically, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case scenario, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a remote tail risk. Scenario 1: The Fed is Right The Fed is taking a gamble betting against the markets, but as we have argued in the past several reports,1 we think this gamble will soon pay off. In fact, it is quite likely that weak core inflation during the past three months is nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. A deceleration that has already reversed. The year-over-year change in core CPI tends to lag year-over-year GDP growth by about 18 months. Meanwhile, GDP growth has already rebounded and leading indicators such as financial conditions, the BCA Beige Book Monitor and the BCA Composite New Orders Indicator, all point to a further acceleration (Chart 2). More importantly, it would be very unusual for core inflation to trend lower while the unemployment rate is falling and wage growth is increasing (Chart 3). This Phillips Curve relationship between the labor market and prices is the basis for the Fed's belief that inflation will resume its uptrend, and it has worked quite well since 1995.2 Chart 2Inflation Set To Rebound Chart 3Fundamentals Suggest Inflation Will Rise Further, our U.S. Investment Strategy3 service has calculated that it does not take much growth for the unemployment rate to continue its descent (Chart 4). Even a monthly increase of 130k in nonfarm payrolls is sufficient to bring the unemployment rate down, assuming the labor force participation rate stays flat. Monthly payroll gains are already averaging 162k so far this year, and our model suggests that number is poised to accelerate (Chart 5). Chart 4The Unemployment Rate Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios ##br##The Unemployment Rate Will Keep Falling Chart 5BCA Employment##br## Model What Could Cause Inflation To Fall? A Rising Participation Rate. While labor market fundamentals support gradually rising inflation, it follows that inflation would likely fall if the unemployment rate were to increase. This is not a likely scenario, but it could occur if there is either a severe slowdown in payroll growth, or a surge of re-entrants into the labor market, leading to an increase in the labor force participation rate. The labor force participation rate fell from 65.9% at the end of 2007 to 62.8% in June 2014. As of today it stands at 62.7%, not far off its mid-2014 level (Chart 6). A paper published by the White House's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) in July 20144 attributed 1.6% of the decline since 2007 to the ageing of the population, another 0.5% of the decline to normal cyclical factors and left the remaining 1% of the drop unexplained. The demographic effect is not about to reverse. Also, normal cyclical variation in the participation rate is linked to changes in the unemployment rate itself (Chart 6, panel 2). With the unemployment rate already low, it is likely that any normal cyclical decline in the participation rate has already been unwound. It is the remaining 1% residual decline in the participation rate that is tougher to pin down. The CEA offers two possible explanations for that residual 1% drop. The first is that it is the result of the downtrend in the prime age (25-54) participation rate that pre-dated the Great Recession (Chart 7). Prior to the recession, this downtrend had been partially offset by increasing participation among those aged 55+, but that latter trend has leveled off since 2010. If the 1% residual is the result of this longer-run trend in prime age participation, a trend possibly driven by technological advancement and the outsourcing of jobs overseas, then it is unlikely to reverse. Chart 6Can The Part Rate ##br##Bounce Back? Chart 7Secular Downtrend In Prime-Age ##br##Participation The second possible explanation is that the extra 1% is accounted for by the large increase in long-term unemployment that followed the Great Recession (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels). There is an observable correlation between the participation rate and the average duration of unemployment. If this correlation holds, and the duration of unemployment falls back to pre-crisis levels, then the participation rate could increase in the near term. However, there is also a school of thought that says the longer a person is out of the labor force the less likely it is they will ever return.5 If this turns out to be an accurate description of the dynamic between long-term unemployment and the participation rate, then it suggests that the permanent damage from the Great Recession has already been done. Even if the average duration of unemployment falls from current levels, its correlation with the participation rate would likely break down. If we assume that the participation rate rises 0.5% during the next year, then it would take payroll gains of more than 200k per month to keep the unemployment rate flat. That is too high a hurdle. While a much higher participation rate is not our base case, mathematically it is possible to envision a scenario where increasing participation causes the unemployment rate to rise, keeping a lid on wage growth and inflation in the process. Bottom Line: Overall, we agree with the Fed that wage growth and inflation will increase as growth rebounds in the second half of the year. This will very likely cause Treasury yields to move higher, the yield curve to steepen and TIPS breakevens to widen. Indications that the average duration of unemployment is rapidly falling and/or that the labor force participation rate is rising could lead us to change our view. Scenario 2: The Fed Capitulates Chart 8A Dovish Fed Can Boost Breakevens Now let's imagine that U.S. growth remains steady, the labor market continues to tighten, yet core PCE inflation is still close to 1.5% by the time the Fed meets in September. In this scenario we would expect the Fed to send a much more dovish message to markets than it did last week. Specifically, we would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. What sort of impact would this have on the yield curve? Long-maturity real yields, which are highly correlated with rate hike expectations, would almost certainly fall. However, if the Fed sends a sufficiently aggressive signal that it is willing to take action to support inflation, then it is conceivable that the long-maturity compensation for inflation protection could rise, offsetting some of the decline in real yields. In last week's report we noted how this exact scenario played out in 2011/12.6 Regression analysis shows that the 10-year real yield has historically moved about half as much as our 24-month Fed Funds Discounter (Chart 8), with the exception of the period surrounding the 2013 taper tantrum. If we assume the historical beta of 0.5 holds, then even if the market starts to discount no Fed rate hikes during the next two years and our discounter falls from its current level of 42 bps to zero, the 10-year real yield would have only 21 bps of downside. The current 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 1.67%, and would only need to return to 1.88% to completely offset the decline in real yields from the Fed being completely priced out. This does not seem like a high bar (Chart 8, top panel). Bottom Line: If core PCE inflation remains close to 1.5% by the time the Fed meets in September, then we would expect the Fed to respond more aggressively by signaling a shallower path of rate hikes. In this scenario it is likely that wider TIPS breakevens would offset the impact from lower real yields, leaving nominal Treasury yields close to unchanged. Scenario 3: A Policy Mistake A monetary policy mistake in its strongest form would be tightening so aggressively that the slope of the yield curve flattens all the way to zero before inflation has reached the Fed's target. In prior cycles we are used to seeing much higher inflation when the slope of the 2/10 curve is as flat as it is today (Chart 9), which suggests that the market is already starting to discount a premature Fed tightening. If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting, and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would go further to price-in a policy mistake scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. We still view this as the least likely scenario. The Fed should be concerned about inflation expectations becoming un-anchored to the downside. As we showed in last week's report,7 it is well documented that when inflation expectations become unmoored, the relationship between prices and the labor market is significantly weakened. Further, the longer that actual inflation deviates from target the more likely it becomes that inflation expectations will become un-anchored to the downside. In last week's press conference Janet Yellen said: It is true that some household surveys of inflation expectations have moved down, but overall I wouldn't say that we've seen a broad undermining of inflation expectations.8 That claim is undoubtedly open for interpretation (Chart 10), but the important point is that the longer inflation stays below target, the more likely a "broad undermining of inflation expectations" becomes. We expect the Fed will heed this message from the markets, but after last week's meeting we cannot completely rule out a policy mistake. Chart 9Curve Is Too Flat Versus Inflation Chart 10Still Well Anchored? Bottom Line: If inflation stays low between now and September, but the Fed sticks to its current forward rate guidance, then the market will price-in more of a policy mistake scenario. Nominal yields will fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens, and the yield curve will flatten. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Reports, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 207, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017 and "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, all available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The post-1995 environment has been characterized by stable inflation expectations. It is well documented that the relationship between labor markets and inflation is much weaker when inflation expectations become un-anchored. We discuss this risk in Scenario #3. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Balancing Act", dated June 12, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stock/files/labor_force_participation.pdf 5 http://www.nber.org/reporter/2015number3/2015number3.pdf 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20170614.pdf Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Special Report Highlights Risk Budgeting: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". Tracking Error Of Our Portfolio: We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Our current tracking error is just under ½ of that limit. We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Feature Last September, we introduced a model portfolio framework to Global Fixed Income Strategy.1 This was done to better communicate our investment research into actionable ideas more in line with the day-to-day decisions and trade-offs made by professional bond managers. We followed that up with the addition of performance measurement tools to more accurately track the returns of our model bond portfolio versus a stated benchmark.2 We are now initiating the final piece of our model bond portfolio framework in this Special Report - introducing a risk management component to identify cumulative exposures and guide the relative sizes of our suggested tilts. Our goal is to translate our individual investment recommendations into the language of a "risk budget", i.e. how much of the desired volatility of the portfolio would we suggest placing into any single trade idea. This will allow our readers to apply our proposed tilts - based on how much conviction (i.e. "risk") we allocate to each position - to their own portfolios which may have different risk limits and return expectations. For example, our current recommendation to overweight U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) represents nearly 1/3 of our estimated total portfolio risk, by far our largest source of potential volatility both in absolute terms and versus our benchmark index (Table 1). Overweighting U.S. corporates, both versus U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area equivalents, is one of our highest conviction trades at the moment. A client who may choose to run a lower risk portfolio can still follow our recommendation by placing enough into U.S. corporates so that 33% of the desired portfolio volatility will come from those positions. Table 1Risk Allocation In Our Model Bond Portfolio In the rest of this Special Report, we will discuss some of the various ways to measure fixed income portfolio risk, apply them to our model portfolio, and introduce some measures to monitor our aggregate portfolio volatility. Going forward, we will closely watch our established metrics and position sizes to ensure that the combination of our individual investment recommendations that we discuss on a week-to-week basis does not create a portfolio that is potentially more volatile than desired. Risk Measurement In Fixed Income Portfolios While investors are typically focused on meeting return targets for their portfolios, the other side of the equation - managing portfolio volatility - is often less stressed. This is especially true during bull markets for any asset class. Investors may become complacent if returns meet or exceed their targets when, in fact, excess returns may have actually been earned through overly risky positions that could have easily not worked in the investors' favor. In the current macro environment, where many financial asset prices are at new highs with stretched valuations and with most of the major global central banks incrementally moving towards less accommodative monetary policy stances, risk management should be even more important for investors. Overly concentrated positioning could now lead to considerable portfolio losses, especially if measuring risk with a metric that is flawed or incomplete, which can lead to a false sense of security. With that in mind, we consider some typical risk measurement metrics used by fixed income investors: Duration: Duration is usually the most popular risk metric for fixed income portfolios as it measures interest rate sensitivity. Duration is defined as the percentage change in a portfolio or asset resulting from a one percentage point change in interest rates. While it provides a solid base understanding of interest rate risk, it does make a simplifying assumption that there is a linear relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Value-At-Risk: Value-At-Risk (VaR) is a statistical technique that measures the loss of an investment, or of an entire portfolio, over a certain period with a given level of confidence. However, there are two considerable flaws with this approach. First, the VaR output suggests a portfolio can lose at least X%, it does not actually indicate how big the potential loss could be. Instead, using a measure such as Historical VaR, if a portfolio has a long enough track record, can better quantify potential losses. Second, VaR is highly susceptible to estimation errors. Certain assumptions on correlations and the normality of return distributions can have a substantial impact on VaR readings. Table 2Value At Risk Of Our Benchmark In Table 2, we show the Historical VaR (HVAR) of our benchmark index, calculating the potential monthly loss using data going back to 2005. On that basis, the worst expected monthly loss for our benchmark is -1.6% (using a 95% confidence interval) and -2.1% (using a 99% confidence interval). Tracking Error: Tracking error measures the volatility of excess returns relative to a certain benchmark. It is a standard risk measure used by a typical "real money" bond manager with a benchmark performance index, like a mutual fund. Tracking error does not offer information on alpha generation (i.e. how much you can expect to beat your benchmark based on your current investments), it simply indicates how much more volatile a portfolio is expected to be versus its benchmark. As our model portfolio returns are measured on a relative basis to our stated bond benchmark index, tracking error is quite appropriate as our main risk metric. A Historical Examination Of Our Portfolio When we first created our model portfolio, we also introduced a benchmark index against which we could measure our performance. Our customized benchmark differs from typical multi-sector measures like the Barclays Global Aggregate Index in that it has a broader scope, including sectors that can have credit ratings below investment grade such as High Yield corporates. The benchmark does, however, exclude smaller regions that we only occasionally discuss such as Sweden, Portugal, Norway and New Zealand. These smaller markets offer comparatively poor liquidity and we want our benchmark to be as investible as possible. Nevertheless, our customized benchmark has been highly correlated to the Barclays Global Aggregate Index over the past decade. As our portfolio has not had a full year of return data, its history is quite limited. Still, in our first performance review conducted two months ago, we indicated that our portfolio had been very closely tracking our customized benchmark. We have since increased our positions in our highest conviction views and our tracking error has risen noticeably and now sits at just over 40bps (Chart 1). Within our model portfolio, we are setting an expected excess return target of 100bps per year. That means that we are setting a goal of beating our benchmark index returns by one full percentage point per year. Given that we are measuring our performance versus currency-hedged benchmarks that are primarily rated investment grade or better, 100bps of annual excess return is a reasonable target. We are also setting a limit where the excess return/tracking error ratio should aim to be equal to 1 each year. This is under the simple assumption that we want an equal amount of return over our benchmark for our expected excess volatility versus our benchmark. On that basis, we are setting our tracking error "limit" at 100bps per year. That suggests that our current tracking error is relatively low. However, correlations between the individual components of our benchmark index have been rising over the past couple of years (Chart 2). Therefore, running a relatively low overall level of risk at a time where diversification among the positions within our portfolio is now harder to achieve, and when the valuations on most government bond and credit markets look rich, is prudent. Chart 1Higher Tracking Error, But Still Well Below Our Target Chart 2Correlations Across Fixed Income Sectors Have Been Rising This is another way that we can control the overall riskiness of our model portfolio. Not only by how much of our risk budget (tracking error) that we want to allocate to each of our recommended positions, but also how big of a risk budget do we want to run at any given point in time. If we see more assets trading at cheap valuations, then we could choose to run a higher tracking error than when most assets look expensive. Bottom Line: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Measuring The Contribution To Risk From Our Market Tilts In our model portfolio, we include a wide range of geographies and sectors from the global fixed income universe. Understanding the risk contribution of each position to the overall portfolio provides a clearer picture as to where our potential risks lie, and by how much. To measure the risk contribution of each of our individual recommendations to our overall portfolio volatility, we used the following formula: wA * E CovAB * wB Where W = the weight of any single asset in our portfolio and COV is the covariance between the asset and other assets in the portfolio. As such, an asset's contribution to risk is a function of its weight in the portfolio and its covariance with the other assets. Importantly, since we are measuring our model portfolio performance in terms of excess returns, we examined each position's contribution to risk relative to the benchmark. All calculations begin in late 2005, when return data is available for all of the assets in our portfolio. The results are summarized in Table 1 on Page 1. Our portfolio tilts are based off of our four highest conviction themes. They include: Stronger global growth led by the U.S. The U.S. economy should expand at a faster pace in the latter half of the year on the back of a rebound in consumption and strong capital spending, all supported by solid income growth and easy financial conditions. We have expressed this theme through our overweight allocation to U.S. corporate debt. While our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that balance sheets are becoming increasingly strained, easy monetary conditions and an expansionary economic backdrop should continue to support excess returns for U.S. corporates. More Fed rate hikes than expected. We expect U.S. economic and corporate profit growth to remain robust due to accommodative monetary conditions, diminishing slack and resilient consumption. As such, the Fed will continue tightening policy by more than what markets are currently pricing in. This theme is expressed through an underweight position in U.S. Treasuries, which accounts for 17% of our volatility versus 24% for that of the benchmark. This wide spread relative to the benchmark is a substantial source of our tracking error, but one that we are comfortable running given our view that U.S. Treasury yields are too low. Chart 3Realized Bond Volatility Has Been Declining Rising tapering risks in Europe. Our expectation is that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be forced to announce a slower pace (tapering) of bond buying starting next year, given the current robust economic expansion in Europe that is rapidly absorbing spare capacity. An ECB taper announcement is expected to lead to rising longer-term global bond yields, mostly via rising term premia. We are expressing that view in our portfolio through our overall underweight interest rate duration stance. Our current portfolio duration is 5.6 years versus our benchmark duration of 7.0 years. That is a large tilt that represents a significant portion of our tracking error, but given our view that U.S. Treasuries also look overvalued, running a large overall duration underweight does correlate to our conviction level. Rising geopolitical risks and banking sector issues in Italy. Geopolitical risks remain elevated leading up to parliamentary elections in 2018, and Italian banks remain undercapitalized with non-performing loans still in an uptrend. Therefore, we are underweight Italian debt, though this is a smaller deviation of portfolio risk versus our benchmark (around 2%), given the smaller size of Italy in our benchmark. Purely looking at geography and sector selection, our four highest conviction views make up almost 80% of the active portfolio risk that we are "running" in our model portfolio. That number may seem high but, as described earlier, our realized portfolio volatility has been quite low (Chart 3). That suggests that there could be some degree of underlying diversification within our recommended portfolio given lower correlations of certain assets to the rest of the portfolio. This is a topic that we will investigate more deeply in future Weekly Reports. Bottom Line: We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Table 4
Highlights Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC is looking through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. Lower oil prices are the key driver of plunging market-based inflation expectations. We expect the Fed to begin to trim its balance sheet later this year, and be a modest negative for Treasury prices. The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017; the student loan debt situation is not a source of financial systemic risk. Feature We first outlined our view that U.S. assets were in a policy sweet spot back in September 2016, noting that the monetary policy sweet spot won't end for risk assets until interest rates climb above the equilibrium rate. Nine months later, policy remains in the sweet spot, thanks to a beneficial combination of moderate economic growth, healthy corporate profit growth, stable margins and low inflation. Last week's CPI report was disconcerting, but did reinforce the notion that the Fed can take its time. Thus, when investors ask: "How can equity prices and bond prices both be moving higher?" Our answer is: "Because we are still in the sweet spot." Low And Slow Wins The Day Investors are wondering how the equity market can hold up given that the bond market and the dollar appear to be signaling sluggish economic growth. We look at it another way. Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC reaffirmed its intended path for rates at last week's meeting (see below). If the Fed's modest forecasts for growth and inflation are met, the central bank will raise rates gradually and begin to shrink its balance sheet. The implication for investors is that the recent outperformance of stocks over bonds accompanied by positive correlations between the two can persist for some time. Lessons from the 1950s and 1990s are helpful in illustrating this point. During the 1950s (Chart 1A, the Fed was gradually raising rates, but inflation and long rates remained low. Even as rates edged higher, stocks outperformed bonds, despite a booming economy that was near full employment. In the 1990s, long bond yields fell even as equity prices surged. Inflation was well contained for most of that decade (Chart 1B). Chart 1ABond Yields, Stocks, Inflation And The Fed In The 1950s... Chart 1B...And In The 1990s At what point will bond market become a problem for stocks? Charts 2 and 3 show that low inflation and low rates are both critical to keeping stock and bond yields positively correlated. The 4.25% level on the 10-year Treasury is a critical level to watch based on the historical relationship between Treasury yields and stock-bond correlations. However, the reason for rising bond yields is as important as the level of yields. An increase in long-dated Treasury yields associated with a pickup in real growth is less of a threat to equities than a rise in yields due to an uptick in inflation, because the latter invites a more aggressive Fed tightening cycle. Chart 3 shows that core inflation around or below 2% supports a positive correlation between stock and bond yields. As inflation begins to move from 2 to 3%, the relationship fluctuates, and above 3% there are very few periods of positive correlation. All signs point to a depressed inflation environment over the next year, which is one of the keys to keeping bond yields and stock prices positively correlated. We expect core CPI to move back up to 2% in the medium term, and the Fed agrees. The central bank's latest forecast puts inflation at just 2% for the next two years and in the long run. Bottom Line: Stocks can handle rising bond yields as long as higher yields are driven by better growth and not inflation. With inflation low and bonds yields at 2.15%, we are a long way from where bond yields become a problem for the stock market. FOMC: Sticking With The Roadmap For Now It was a wild ride in the Treasury market last week as bonds first rallied hard on the heels of some data releases, before selling off after the FOMC failed to deliver a fully "dovish hike". May retail sales were decent below the surface. The "control group" measure that feeds into the GDP figures was flat in May, but was revised up to a 0.6% gain in April (Chart 4). The result was a solid 4.3% annualized gain over the past three months. This suggests that, although not booming, consumer spending growth is solid in the second quarter. U.S. household balance sheets are in solid shape, as we highlight below. The FOMC was probably not swayed by this report. The CPI report was another story (Chart 5). The energy component pulled down the headline rate as expected, but the softening of inflation is widespread in the index. The annualized 3-month rate of change in the core rate fell virtually to zero in May. Disinflation can be seen in areas that have little to do with the output gap, such as shelter and medical care. But it is also showing up in other services, a segment of the CPI that is most highly correlated with wage growth and labor market pressure. The sudden broad-based change in direction is difficult to explain and, at a minimum, presents a challenge to the view that the U.S. economy is approaching its non-inflationary limits. Chart 4Consumer Spending##BR##Remains Solid Chart 5Disinflation In Core Services##BR##Is A Challenge To Fed's View Bonds rallied heading into the FOMC meeting on the view that the Fed would deliver a rate hike as promised, but would revise down the "dot plot" or, at a minimum, would play up concerns about the inflation undershoot. In the event, the Fed did neither. Chart 6Labor Market Continues To Tighten The statement acknowledged the disappointing inflation readings, but also revealed a determination to normalize interest rates in the face of a tight labor market. In the press conference, Chair Yellen downplayed the inflation shortfall, pointing to some one-off factors. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Given the tight labor market, the Fed Chair argued that the conditions are in place for inflation to move higher. Indeed, the median FOMC forecast for headline and core inflation was revised down for this year only; the outlook for 2018 and 2019 was left unchanged at 2%. Growth was revised up a little for 2017. We agree with the FOMC that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. The underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% today according to our wage tracker, in line with the narrowing of the unemployment gap over the period (Chart 6). The FOMC trimmed its estimate of the full-employment level of unemployment by 0.1 percentage points to 4.6%, but it revised down its forecast for the actual unemployment rate by a larger 0.3 percentage points over the next two years. This means that the projected amount of excess labor demand is now greater than in the March projection. By itself, this should make the FOMC more predisposed to tightening, especially since financial conditions have been easing. That said, the May CPI report was admittedly disconcerting due to the broad-based nature of the disinflationary pulse. This is contrary to Chair Yellen's assertion that the inflation disappointment reflects one-off factors. The May CPI report could be a head-fake, related to normal randomness in the data. But it is not clear why there would be a sudden and widespread moderation of inflation. Inflation Expectations Plunge A large portion of the decline in long-term Treasury yields since March reflected a decline in inflation expectations. The 10-year CPI swap rate has dropped by 35 basis points over the period. BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the decline in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether or not actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the oil price decline as the main driver. Weaker energy prices have been part of a broader move lower in commodity prices that is likely related to less reflationary monetary and fiscal policies out of the world's biggest commodity consumer, China. However, our commodity strategists have noted that export and import volumes in the emerging economies accelerated sharply in the first quarter of 2017. Given that there is a strong correlation between trade volumes and oil demand in the emerging markets, this bodes well for a rebound in global oil demand. Combined with the "OPEC 2.0" production cuts, the demand-supply balance in world oil markets is likely to turn positive in the months ahead, which will allow oil prices to return to a range close to $60/bbl by year-end. A move in oil prices back to that level would help arrest the downturn in overall commodity price indices, and stabilize goods CPI inflation in the developed economies in the latter half of 2017. This should also boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although one cannot blame the deceleration in inflation entirely on energy in this case. We expect inflation to move higher in line with the tight labor market, but we may have to change our view if service sector inflation continues to move lower in the next few of months. Balance Sheet News Chart 7Main Risk To Bond Yields Is To The Upside The Fed also provided some details on plans to shrink the balance sheet in terms of the size of the monthly "run off". If the economy evolves as the Fed expects, the balance sheet will start to shrink later this year. Reducing the Fed's balance sheet will be negative for Treasury prices as we argued in the May 22, 2017 Weekly Report, but the impact of this adjustment on its own will be modest. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. The bottom line is that the FOMC is looking-through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. The evolution of inflation in the coming months will obviously be key. Nonetheless, given that only one more rate hike is expected over the next year, inflation expectations are back to U.S. pre-election levels, and that the 10-year U.S. term premium is well below zero again, it appears that the main risk for bond yields is to the upside (Chart 7). The equity market should benefit in the short-term to the extent that market expectations for a flatter rate hike cycle are driven by lower inflation expectations, rather than a slower growth outlook. If we are correct that inflation expectations will bounce later this year, the associated bond sell-off may present a small headwind for stocks. Nonetheless, we do not believe this will derail the rally in risk assets until inflation has reached the Fed's 2% target, and bond yields and the dollar are significantly higher. The Consumer Comeback Continues The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017 and beyond. Household net worth continues to rise and is well above average at this point in a long expansion (Chart 8). While the total wealth effect for consumer spending is lagging behind prior cycles, it remains supportive. Debt to income ratios are at multi-decade lows. The result of the ongoing balance sheet repair is that FICO scores have hit an all time high (Chart 8, panel 4). The most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer's Survey also suggests that the banking sector is willing to lend to households and that consumers themselves are open to borrowing, although household demand for loans has weakened in recent quarters (Chart 9). Chart 8Support For Consumer Remains In Place Chart 9Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive Consumer spending intentions also remain in an uptrend, and while consumers do not always do what they say, the 10-year high readings on "plans to buy" a house and a car are telling. (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). Overall measures of consumer confidence also remain at 16 year highs (Chart 10, panel 3). Chart 10Consumers Are In A Good Mood The sturdy labor market, modest wage growth, and low inflation are all factors that support a solid pace of real income growth, adding another support to the spending backdrop (Chart 10, panel 4). Rising rates do not pose a threat to spending for two main reasons, at least in the early stages of the Fed tightening cycle. First, we expect Fed rate hikes to be gradual this year and next, putting only modest upward pressure on longer-dated Treasury yields that anchor consumer loan rates for mortgages, autos, and personal loans. Our colleagues in The Bank Credit Analyst concluded that household interest payment burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, in the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100bps for today's levels. According to their analysis, it would require a much more significant shock, i.e. 300bps or greater, to move interest payments as a share of GDP back toward historical averages.2 We continue to receive many questions from clients on the risks posed by the rise in student debt levels. The Bank Credit Analyst publication covered the topic in a comprehensive report back in November 2016.3 The key takeaway from that report for investors was that student debt is a modest drag for economic growth, but is not a source of risk for U.S. government finances and does not represent the next subprime crisis. More than half a year later, our conclusions remain the same, though the concern among investors has not abated. A recent report4 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides some data on student loans through Q1 2017. More specifically, the report noted that student debt levels continued to rise in Q4 2016 and Q1 2017, and that student loan delinquencies remain high by historical standards but moved sideways in recent years. We will continue to monitor the student loan and all other forms of consumer indebtedness as we assess the risks in the U.S. economy. However, the elevated level of student loan delinquencies does not change our overall assessment of the impact of student loans on the economy and the financial system. Student loans are only a mild economic headwind, and do not represent a source of financial systemic risk. Bottom Line: The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This climate will allow the Fed to raise rates one more time this year and begin to pare its balance sheet. The solid underpinnings for the consumer will sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report "Alternative Facts In The Bond Market," dated June 13, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg?," dated February 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Student Loan Blues: Can't Replay What I Borrowed," dated October 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Quarterly Report On Household Debt And Credit", dated May 2017, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2017Q1.pdf
Highlights Global Growth: Global bond yields have fallen in a coordinated fashion among the major economies, even with only a modest cooling of growth momentum and realized inflation outcomes. With little sign of an imminent downturn in growth on the horizon, government bonds now look a bit expensive. Global Inflation: Inflation expectations in the major economies have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. With oil prices likely to begin rising again as the demand-supply balance in global energy markets tightens up, both realized inflation and expectations should move higher in the latter half of the year, especially in the U.S. Bond Market Strategy: Markets are pricing in too few rate hikes in the U.S., leaving U.S. Treasuries exposed to higher yields in the next 3-6 months. Yields should also rise in core Europe, although not by as much as in the U.S. with the ECB not yet ready to turn less dovish. Stay underweight U.S., neutral core Europe and overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios. Feature Have bond investors now become too pessimistic on global growth and inflation prospects? This is a question worth asking after the sharp decline in longer-dated government bond yields witnessed since the peak in mid-March. The benchmark 10-year yield has fallen during that period by -43bps in the U.S., -21bps in Germany, -24bps in the U.K., -45bps in Canada and -54bps in Australia. Granted, there has been a bit of softer news on both growth and, more importantly, inflation readings in several economies in the past couple of months. Those pullbacks, however, have been relatively modest compared to the severe bull-flattening bond rally seen in most developed economies (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekAn Overreaction From Bond Investors Global leading economic indicators are still pointing to faster growth over the latter half of the year, led by easing financial conditions given booming equity and credit markets. With most major economies either at full employment (U.S., U.K., Japan, Australia) or approaching full employment (Euro Area, Canada), accelerating growth will ensure that the recent downtick in global inflation will not persist for long - especially if oil prices begin to move higher again as our commodity strategists expect. This week brings several major central bank meetings with an opportunity to change the bullish tone in the bond markets. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) all meet, although only the Fed is expected to deliver another rate hike that is now heavily discounted in the markets. The BoE's hands are now effectively tied, even with high U.K. inflation, after last week's election outcome where the ruling Conservatives lost their majority government, thus ensuring even more uncertainty over the contours of the Brexit process. The BoJ is also stuck in a bind, with surprisingly strong Japanese economic growth but shockingly weak inflation. This is also the situation that the European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of Australia are facing, to a lesser extent: solid domestic growth but without enough inflation to force any immediate tightening of monetary policy. These sorts of mixed messages and conflicting signals also exist in the bond markets in the developed world, as we discuss in this Weekly Report. Our conclusion is that yields have now priced in too much pessimism and the balance of risks points to yields rising again in the months ahead, led by U.S. Treasuries. A Big Move In Yields For Such A Small Change In Growth... Looking at the change in government bond yields within the major developed markets since the peak on March 13th (Table 1) shows a few important facts: Table 1A Bull Flattening Of Global Yield Curves Since March The largest yield declines were in the U.S., Canada & Australia; The smallest declines were in the U.K., the Euro Area and Japan - unsurprisingly, the countries where central banks are engaged in large bond purchase programs; Lower market-based inflation expectations have played a role in the bond rally, coinciding with softer energy prices and declines in realized inflation outcomes; Real yields (i.e. nominal yields minus inflation expectations) have fallen sharply in the U.S., Canada & Australia; Yield curves have bull-flattened everywhere; Breaking the curve moves into real yield and inflation expectations components shows that both contributed to the flatter yield curves. The U.S. Treasury action stands out compared to the others. There has also been a 103bp flattening in the 2-year/10-year TIPS real yield curve, while the TIPS breakeven curve has steepened by 64bps. This is the result of the -89bp drop in 2yr breakevens, which now sit at 1.38% - well below the current U.S. headline CPI inflation rate of 2.2%. Even allowing for any potential liquidity issues that can distort the precise interpretation of shorter-dated TIPS breakevens, the market appears to be expecting a bigger drop in inflation in the next couple of years than both the Fed and the Bloomberg consensus of economic forecasters (Table 2).1 This U.S. move stands out relative to the other countries, where there has been very little change in 2-year inflation expectations (using CPI swaps instead of breakeven rates from inflation-linked bonds). With the headline U.S. unemployment rate now at a cyclical low of 4.3%, and with the broader U-6 measure, now down to a decade low of 8.4%, we anticipate a recovery in realized inflation, and TIPS breakevens, in the next few months. The source for the broader downturn in global inflation expectations is a bit of a mystery. While some cyclical global growth indicators like manufacturing PMIs have fallen a bit in some countries, most notably the U.S. and China, they are still at strong levels above 50 that point to faster economic growth (Chart 2). Leading economic indicators (LEIs) are also still pointing to some acceleration in the latter half of 2017 although, admittedly, the list of countries with rising LEIs has been diminishing in recent months. We see that as a potential sign of slower growth next year, but not for the rest of 2017. Table 2Consensus Growth & Inflation Forecasts Chart 2Global Economic Upturn Still Intact Bottom Line: Global bond yields have fallen in a coordinated fashion among the major economies, even with only a modest cooling of growth momentum and realized inflation outcomes. With little sign of an imminent downturn in growth on the horizon, government bonds now look a bit expensive. ...And Inflation Of course, some of the decline in inflation expectations can be attributed to softer readings on realized inflation over the past few months. Yet the markets seem to have overreacted a bit to that move, as well. The run of stronger-than-expected inflation outcomes has taken a breather in both the developed and emerging world, as evidenced by the rolling over of the Citigroup inflation surprise indices (Chart 3). Yet those indices remain at high levels and are not pointing to a meaningful, extended pullback in realized inflation. Chart 3Global Inflation Data Has Cooled A Bit The pullback in global energy prices since March has played a role in softer headline inflation in most countries. That decline has been part of a broader move lower in commodity prices that is likely related to less reflationary monetary and fiscal policies out of the world's biggest commodity consumer, China. However, our colleagues at BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy have noted that export and import volumes in the emerging economies accelerated sharply in the first quarter of 2017. Given that there is a strong correlation between trade volumes and oil demand in the emerging markets, this bodes well for a rebound in global oil demand. Combined with the "OPEC 2.0" production cuts, the demand-supply balance in world oil markets is likely to turn positive in the months ahead, which will allow oil prices to return to a range close to $60/bbl by year-end.2 A move in oil prices back to that level would help arrest the downturn in overall commodity price indices, and help stabilize goods CPI inflation in the developed economies in the latter half of 2017 (Chart 4). This should help boost global inflation expectations, and eventually bond yields, as the downturn in energy prices has shown very little pass-through into non-energy inflation in the developed world (Chart 5). Chart 4Disinflationary Impulse##BR##From Energy Will Soon Fade... Chart 5...Although The Impact On##BR##Inflation Has Been Modest Yet that stability of non-energy inflation visible in the charts masks many of the cross-currents seen across countries and within countries. Services CPI inflation remains strong in the U.S. at 3%, and has accelerated to 2% in both the U.K. and the Euro Area (Chart 6). Yet at the same time, both services and core inflation are falling rapidly towards 0% in Japan, despite a solid economic upturn and tight labor market. The situation is even more confusing in Canada, where wage inflation has fallen to below 1% but services inflation has picked up to 3%. Australia is in a similar boat, with services inflation above 3% but wages growing at only 2%. The divergence between the inflation outcomes across the countries can also be seen in our headline CPI diffusion indices, which measure the number of CPI sectors that are witnessing accelerating rates of inflation. The diffusion indices in the U.S., Japan and Canada are all at low levels, with the majority of CPI components seeing slowing rates of inflation, yet overall inflation seems to be holding up well despite the breadth of the "downturn", at least based on past correlations (Chart 7). The opposite is true in the Euro Area and Australia, where a majority of inflation components are growing faster, yet overall inflation is only moving slowly higher. Only in the U.K. is there a clear robust rise in the breadth of inflation (90% of CPI components accelerating) and overall inflation (headline CPI expanding at around 3%). Chart 6Underlying Inflation Has Not##BR##Slowed Much (Except In Japan) Chart 7Mixed Signals From The##BR##Global CPI Diffusion Indices Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, we are surprised that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the oil price decline as the main cause of the lower expectations, rather than a more pernicious drop caused by expectations of slowing economic growth and cooling domestic inflation pressures. Given the BCA view that oil prices have likely reached bottom and will begin to move higher, the decline in global inflation expectations is likely to also end soon. Bottom Line: Inflation expectations in the major economies have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. With oil prices likely to begin rising again as the demand-supply balance in global energy markets tightens up, both realized inflation and expectations should move higher in the latter half of the year, especially in the U.S. Bond Market Strategy For The Second Half Of 2017 The outlook for government bond yields in the remaining months of the year will be driven by decent global growth and rising inflation expectations. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to point to the need for tighter monetary policy in every major developed market excluding Japan (Chart 8), leaving bond yield exposed to any unexpected moves from central bankers. This is especially problematic in the U.S., where fed funds futures now discount only a 25-30% probability of a Fed rate hike in September and December after the expected hike at this week's FOMC meeting (Chart 9). With the U.S. OIS curve pricing in only 48bps of hikes over the next 12 months, the Treasury market is exposed to a Fed moving more aggressively in meetings later in 2017. Chart 8Our Central Bank Monitors Still##BR##Calling For Tighter Policy (Ex Japan) Chart 9Markets Will Be Surprised##BR##By The Fed Later This Year In Europe, the ECB talked up a more positive economic growth story at last week's policy meeting, eliminating the language suggesting that rate cuts would be necessary because the growth recovery was still fragile. No signal was given about slowing the pace of ECB asset purchases, which was not a surprise given the still-low readings on core inflation in the Euro Area. The ECB did slightly downgrade its inflation projections for the next two years, with core inflation now expected to rise to 1.8% by 2019. Our Months-to-Hike measure for the Euro Area now out to 29 months, indicating that the first ECB rate hike is now expected in November of 2019 (Chart 10). Our view remains that the ECB will look to taper asset purchases before contemplating any rate hikes, and will likely signal a move to slow the pace of bond buying at the September policy meeting. While we agree that a rate hike is unlikely until 2019, the current market pricing does leave European bond markets exposed to any upside surprises in inflation over the next year. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to core European government bonds, with a curve steepening bias, while focusing Peripheral exposure on Spain relative to Italy. We envision moving to underweight Europe over the summer if the growth and inflation data continue to point to an eventual ECB taper, especially given the strong comparisons between Europe now and the pre-Taper Tantrum period in the U.S. in 2012-13 (Chart 11). Chart 10No ECB Hikes##BR##Expected Until 2019 Chart 11Bunds Still Following The U.S.##BR##Post-QE Experience In Japan, we expect the BoJ to continue to target a 0% 10yr JGB yield for some time, in order to ensure that there is enough currency weakness to keep headline inflation from decelerating (Chart 12). This will especially be true if our call for higher U.S. interest rates comes to fruition and USD/JPY begins moving higher again. We continue to recommend an overweight position on Japan with government bond portfolios, given the low yield beta of JGBs to the other bond markets (Chart 13). Chart 12The BoJ Will Do "Whatever It Takes"##BR##To Keep The Yen Soft Chart 13Stay Overweight##BR##Low-Beta JGBs Finally, we continue to recommend long CPI swaps positions in both the Euro Zone and Japan, and an overweight in U.S. TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, as a way to play for the rebound in global inflation expectations that we are expecting over the balance of 2017. However, given the disturbing downturn in core inflation readings in Japan, we are implementing a tight stop-loss level at 0.4% on our long 10yr Japan CPI swaps position (Chart 14). Chart 14Stay Long CPI Swaps##BR##In Europe & Japan (With A Stop) Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in too few rate hikes in the U.S., leaving U.S. Treasuries exposed to higher yields in the next 3-6 months. Yields should also rise in core Europe, although not by as much as in the U.S. with the ECB not yet ready to turn less dovish. Stay underweight U.S., neutral core Europe and overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The FOMC projections for growth in the headline Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator from the latest set of forecasts released in March called for inflation of 1.9% in 2017 and 2.0% in 2018. The gap between the headline measures of CPI inflation and PCE deflator inflation has averaged about 50bps in recent years, so that implies that the Fed is expecting CPI inflation to be much higher than the 1.38% 2-year TIPS breakeven. 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil", dated June 8 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns